© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright
Notice.
Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches
Cisco Systems, Inc.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 1.1
March 27, 2023
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 MODULES VALIDATION LEVEL.................................................................................................... 3
1.3 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION...................................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO SYSTEMS CATALYST 9200L SERIES SWITCHES ......................................................... 6
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES INTERFACES AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ......................................... 7
2.2 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION ..................................................................................... 9
2.2.1 User Role..................................................................................................................... 9
2.2.2 Crypto-Officer Role ................................................................................................... 10
2.2.3 Unauthorized Role .................................................................................................... 12
2.2.4 Services Available in Non-FIPS Mode of Operation.................................................. 13
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ................................................................................................ 14
2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 16
2.5 SELF-TESTS.......................................................................................................................... 22
2.5.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs) .................................................................................... 22
2.5.2 Conditional Tests....................................................................................................... 22
2.6 PHYSICAL SECURITY ............................................................................................................... 23
3 SECURE OPERATION...................................................................................................... 23
3.1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION ............................................................................ 23
3.2 VERIFY FIPS MODE OF OPERATION.......................................................................................... 24
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series
Switches running Cisco IOS-XE Firmware Version 16.12 or 17.3. This security policy describes how the modules
listed below meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 1, and how to operate the switches with on-board
crypto enabled in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. The Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series has the following primary SKUs
that are covered in this validation effort:
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24P-4G
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24P-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24T-4G
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24T-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48P-4G
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48P-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48T-4G
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48T-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24P8X-2Y
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-24P8X-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48P12X-4X
Cisco Catalyst 9200L-48P8X-2Y
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program.
1.2 Modules Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
Table 1: Modules Validation Level
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
1.3 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the modules in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the switches from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco products. Please refer to the following
websites for:
Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches -
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/switches/catalyst-9200-series-switches/index.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions, please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems
website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact
information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the modules.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches is referred to as C9200L switches, the switches, the
devices, the cryptographic modules, or the modules.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the
Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches and explains the secure
configuration and operation of the modules. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the
general features and functionality of the switches. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for
the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation
is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these
documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
2 Cisco Systems Catalyst 9200L Series Switches
Catalyst 9200L Series switches provide security features that protect the integrity of the hardware as well as the
software and all data that flows through the switch. It provides resiliency that keeps your business up and running
seamlessly. Combine that with open APIs of Cisco IOS-XE and programmability of the UADP ASIC technology,
Catalyst 9200L Series switches give you what you need now with investment protection on future innovations.
With full PoE+ capability, power and fan redundancy, stacking bandwidth up to 160 Gbps, modular uplinks, Layer
3 feature support, and cold patching, Catalyst 9200L Series switches are the industry’s unparalleled solution with
differentiated resiliency and progressive architecture for cost-effective branch-office access.
The illustration below shows a representation of Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series switch models. All the switch models
have similar appearance. The internal capabilities and port numbers distinguish the models.
Figure 1: Cisco Catalyst 9200L 24/48 Port Series Switches
Cisco Catalyst 9200L series has multigigabit switches with Ethernet, SFP+ and PoE+ ports and the switches also
support Cisco StackWise feature. The switches include cryptographic algorithms implemented in IOS-XE firmware
as well as hardware ASICs. The modules support IKE/IPSec, SESA (Symmetric Early Stacking Authentication),
SNMPv3, SSHv2, and MACsec.
The cryptographic modules have two mode of operations: FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode. The non-FIPS mode
is default for the switches. It is the Crypto-Officer’s responsibility to install and configure the modules in FIPS
mode of operation. Detailed instructions to setup FIPS mode of operation can be found in Secure Operation
section of this document.
2.1 Cryptographic Modules Interfaces and Physical Characteristics
The modules are multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules. The cryptographic boundary is defined as
encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” “rear,” and “bottom” surfaces of the chassis for the switches and
the casing for the switches. Included in the physical boundary is the ACT2Lite Cryptographic Module (CMVP
Certificate #3637). Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches provide support for the following features:
Table 2 - Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Switches Models and Descriptions
Switch Model Description
C9200L-24P-4G Stackable 24x1G PoE+ ports; 4x10G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed
fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-24P-4X Stackable 24x1G ports; 4x1G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans;
supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-24T-4G Stackable 24x1G ports; 4x10G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans;
supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-24T-4X Stackable 48x1G PoE+ ports; 4x1G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed
fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-48P-4G Stackable 48x1G PoE+ ports; 4x10G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed
fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-48P-4X Stackable 48x1G ports; 4x1G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans;
supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-48T-4G Stackable 48x1G ports; 4x10G fixed uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans;
supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-48T-4X Stackable 8xMultigigabit Ethernet PoE+ ports and 16x1G PoE+ ports; 2x25G fixed
uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-24P8X-2Y Stackable 12xMultigigabit Ethernet PoE+ ports and 36x1G PoE+ ports; 4x10G fixed
uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-24P8X-4X Stackable 12xMultigigabit Ethernet PoE+ ports and 36x1G PoE+ ports; 4x10G fixed
uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans; supports StackWise-80.
C9200L-48P12X-4X Stackable 8xMultigigabit Ethernet PoE+ ports and 40x1G PoE+ ports; 2x25G fixed
uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans; supports StackWise-80.
Switch Model Description
C9200L-48P8X-2Y Stackable 8xMultigigabit Ethernet PoE+ ports and 40x1G PoE+ ports; 2x25G fixed
uplink ports; 2 power supply slots; 2 fixed fans; supports StackWise-80.
All the switch models have similar components but might have slight cosmetic differences on the bezels.
The modules provide a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided
by the modules are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control
input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables.
Table 3: Catalyst 9200L Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Physical Interfaces and Cabling
Data Input Interface, Data Output Interface 24 or 48 downlink ports of one of the following types:
• 10/100/1000
• 10/100/1000 PoE+
Uplink ports either 1G SFP or 10G SFP+
Control Input Interface 10/100/1000 Ethernet out-of-band management port
RJ-45 console port
Universal Serial Connector (USB) type A
Mini-USB type B
StackWise-80 port connectors
Mode button
Status Output Interface 10/100/1000 Ethernet out-of-band management port
RJ-45 console port
Universal Serial Connector (USB) type A
Mini-USB type B
StackWise-80 port connectors
Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs)
• Console LED
• System LED
• Master LED
• Stack LED
• PoE LED
• Port LEDs
• Beacon LED
• RJ-45 Console ort LED
• Fan LED
• Uplink LEDs
Power Interface AC power connector
The following physical interfaces are prohibited from usage in FIPS mode of operation:
• Universal Serial Bus (USB)
• Wireless Console Access with Bluetooth
2.2 Roles, Services and Authentication
The modules support identity-based authentication. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the modules.
There are two roles in the switches that may be assumed: the Crypto-Officer (CO) role and the User role. The
administrator of the switches assumes the CO role in order to configure and maintain the switches, while the
Users are processes that exercise security services over the network.
2.2.1 User Role
The role is assumed by users obtaining secured data services. From a logical view, user activity exists in the data-
plane via defined Data Input/Output Interfaces. Users are authenticated using EAP methods and 802.1X-REV,
and their data is protected with 802.1AE protocols. EAP and 802.1X-REV can use password-based credentials for
User role authentication – in such a case the user passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long. The
password must contain at least one special character and at least one number character along with six additional
characters taken from the 26-upper case, 26-lower case, 10-numbers and 32-special characters (procedurally
enforced). This requirement gives (26 + 26 + 10 + 32 =) 94 options of character to choose from. Without repetition
of characters, the number of probable combinations is the combined probability from 6 characters
(94x93x92x91x90x89) times one special character (32) times 1 number (10), which turns out to be
(94x93x92x91x90x89x32x10 =) 187,595,543,116,800. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random
attempt is approximately 1 in 187,595,543,116,800, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In
order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280
guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the switches.
EAP and 802.1X-REV can also authenticate the User role via certificate credentials by using 2048-bit RSA keys –
in such a case the security strength is 112 bits, so the associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1
in 2112
, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a
successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules.
The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w), execute (e)
and zeroized/delete (d) are listed below:
Table 4 - User Services
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Secured Dataplane MACsec Network Functions: authentication,
access control, confidentiality and data
integrity services provided by the MACsec
protocol
Diffie- Hellman (DH) private key, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) public key, Diffie- Hellman (DH)
Shared Secret, MACsec Security Association
Key (SAK), MACsec Connectivity Association
Key (CAK), MACsec Key Encryption Key
(KEK), MACsec Integrity Check Key (ICK) (w,
e, d)
Bypass Services Traffic without cryptographic processing
except authentication. The rule must have
been previously configured by the Crypto
Officer.
Diffie- Hellman (DH) private key, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) public key, Diffie- Hellman (DH)
Shared Secret (w, e, d)
2.2.2 Crypto-Officer Role
This role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the switches via CLI through the console port and
performing management functions and modules configuration. Additionally, the stack master is considered CO for
stack members. From a logical view, CO activity exists only in the control plane. IOS-XE prompts the CO for their
username and password, and, if the password is validated against the CO’s password in IOS-XE memory, the CO
is allowed entry to the IOS-XE executive program. A CO can assign permission to access the CO role to additional
accounts, thereby creating additional COs.
CO passwords must be at a minimum eight (8) characters long. The Secure Operation sections procedurally
enforces the password must contain at least one special character and at least one number character along with
six additional characters taken from the 26-upper case, 26-lower case, 10-numbers and 32-special characters
(procedurally enforced). This requirement gives (26 + 26 + 10 + 32 =) 94 options of character to choose from.
Without repetition of characters, the number of probable combinations is the combined probability from 6
characters (94x93x92x91x90x89) times one special character (32) times 1 number (10), which turns out to be
(94x93x92x91x90x89x32x10 =) 187,595,543,116,800. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random
attempt is approximately 1 in 187,595,543,116,800, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In
order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280
guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules.
Additionally, on a stack, the CO is authenticated via possession of a SESA Authorization key that is 128 bits long.
So, an attacker would have a 1 in 2128
chance of a successful authentication which is much stronger than the one
in a million-chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key
guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 5.67x1036
attempts per second, which
is less than 1 in 100,000 and far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules.
The Crypto-Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the switches. The services available to the Crypto
Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w), execute (e) and zeroized/delete (d) are
listed below:
Table 5 - Crypto-Officer Services
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Define Rules and Filters Define network interfaces and settings, create
command aliases, set the protocols the switch will
support, enable interfaces and network services, set
system date and time, and load authentication
information.
Log off users, shutdown or reload the switch, manually
back up switch configurations, view complete
configurations, manage user rights, and restore switch
configurations.
Create packet Filters that are applied to User data
streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set
of Rules, which define a set of packets to permit or
deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Enable password (r, w, e, d)
View Status Functions View the switch configuration, routing tables, active
sessions, health, temperature, memory status, voltage,
packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view
physical interface status.
Enable password (r, w, e, d)
Configure Encryption/Bypass Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set
pre-shared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP
range or allow plaintext packets to be set from
specified IP address.
[IKE session encrypt key, IKE
session authentication key,
ISAKMP pre-shared, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, skeyid,
skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IPsec
session encryption key, IPsec
session authentication key] (w,
d) and Enable password (r)
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
SESA Configure Secure Stacking (SESA) manually on each
of the member switches.
SESA Authorization Key, SESA
Master Session Key, SESA
Derived Session Keys (w, e, d)
SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output
of CSPs.
DH private DH public key, DH
Shared Secret, SSH RSA private
key, SSH RSA public key, SSH
integrity key, SSH session key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG V,
DRBG Key (w, e, d)
SNMPv3 Configure SNMPv3 MIB and monitor status [SNMPv3 Password,
snmpEngineID] (r, w, d), SNMP
session key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG V, DRBG Key (w, e, d)
IPsec VPN Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED,IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key, ISAKMP pre-
shared, IKE authentication
private Key, IKE authentication
public key, IPsec session
encryption key, IPsec session
authentication key, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (w, e, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. User Password (r, w, e, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the
zeroization methods classified in table 7, Zeroization
column.
All CSPs (d)
2.2.3 Unauthorized Role
The services for someone without an authorized role are: passing traffic through the devices, view the status
output from the modules’ LED pins, and cycle power.
2.2.4 Services Available in Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
The cryptographic modules in addition to FIPS mode of operation can operate in a non-FIPS mode of operation.
This is not a recommended operational mode but because the associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow
for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. The modules
are considered to be in a non-FIPS mode of operation when it is not configured per section 3 (Secure Operation
of the Switches). The FIPS approved services listed in table 8 become non-approved services when using any
non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve sizes.
Table 6 - Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Services 1 Non-Approved Algorithms
IPsec
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4, Triple--DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Hashing: HMAC
MACing: HMAC SHA
Symmetric: AES, DES, RC4, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: ECDSA (key transport), RSA (key transport), DH, ECDH
SNMP v1/v2 Hashing: MD5
Symmetric: DES
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any of non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve
sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms
The modules implement a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The switches support the following FIPS-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 7 – Algorithm Certificates
Algorithms CAVP #A1462: IOS
Common Cryptographic
Module (IC2M)
Rel5a
CAVP #4769: UADP
MSC 1.0
CAVP #C1301:
Firmware Image
Signing
AES CBC (128, 192, 256),
CFB128 (128, 192, 256),
CMAC (128, 256),
CTR (128, 192, 256),
ECB (128, 192, 256),
GCM (128, 192, 256)
ECB (128, 256)
GCM (128, 256)
N/A
KAS-ECC-SSC (NIST
SP 800-56Arev3)
KAS-ECC-SSC:
Curves:
P-256
P-384
N/A N/A
KAS-FFC-SSC (SP
800-56Arev3)
KAS-FFC-SSC:
modp-2048
modp-3072
modp-4096
N/A N/A
DRBG CTR-AES (256) N/A N/A
HMAC HMAC SHA-1, HMAC
SHA2-256, HMAC SHA2-
384, HMAC SHA2-512
N/A N/A
ECDSA KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen,
SigVer (Curve: P-256, P-
384)
N/A N/A
CVL (SP800-135) IKEv2
SNMP
SSH
N/A N/A
KBKDF (SP800-108) Counter: HMAC-SHA-1 N/A N/A
RSA KeyGen (186-4) 2048-,
3072-bits modulus
SigGen (186-4 PKCS 1.5)
2048-, 3072-bits modulus,
SigVer (186-2 PKCS 1.5)
1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-,
4096-bits modulus
N/A RSA 2048 with
SHA-512 SIgVer
SigVer (186-4 PKCS 1.5)
1024-, 2048-, 3072-bits
modulus
SHS SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
N/A SHA-512
CKG Vendor affirmed N/A N/A
KTS (AES Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength)
KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1462, CVL Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 192
bits of encryption strength)
The KAS FFC and KAS ECC strengths are as follows:
KAS-ECC-SSC: 128 and 192 bits of encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC: 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength
Notes:
There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the modules. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the modules are shown in this table.
The modules’ AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 7296 for
IPSec/IKEv2 and IEEE 802.1AE and its amendments for MACsec.
The modules use RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the
AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key. In case the modules’ power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
The AES GCM IV is generated internally in the cryptographic module in accordance with IEEE 802.1AE
and its amendments. The IV length used is 96 bits (per SP 800-38D and FIPS 140-2 IG A.5). If the
module loses power, then new AES GCM keys should be established. The module should only be
used with CMVP FIPS 140-2 validation modules when supporting the MACsec protocol for
providing Peer, Authenticator functionality. The link between the Peer and the Authenticator
should be secured to prevent the possibility for an attacker to introduce foreign equipment into the
local area network.
No parts of the SSH and IPSec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic modules perform Cryptographic Key Generation
as per scenario 1 of section 4 in SP800-133rev1. The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed
used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
NDRNG2
to seed FIPS approved DRBG (256 bits)
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic modules implement the following non-Approved algorithms that are not used in FIPS mode of
operation:
MD5 (MD5 does not provide security strength to TLS protocol)
HMAC-MD5
RC4
DES
Triple-DES
2.4 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The modules securely administer both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on the CO role login and can be zeroized by
the CO. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically. Persistent keys are entered by the CO via the console
port CLI, transient keys are generated or established and stored in DRAM.
Note that the command ‘fips zeroize’ will zeroize a large majority of the listed CSPs. This command essentially
results in a device reboot and therefore forces a power cycle, zeroizing all the keys listed below with “Power cycle”
in the Zeroization Method column.
Table 8 lists the secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the modules.
Table 8 – Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
ID Algorithm Size Description Storage Zeroization Method
General Keys/CSPs
2
ACT2Lite Cryptographic Module (CMVP Certificate #3637)
DRBG V SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits Generated by entropy source via the
CTR_DRBG derivation function. It is
stored in DRAM with plaintext form
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG key SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits This is the 256-bit DRBG key used
for SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG
entropy
input
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits HW based entropy source output
used to construct seed
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG seed SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG derivation
function that includes the entropy
input from the entropy source
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
User
password
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
Enable
secret
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users at
a higher privilege level
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
DH 2048-4096
bits
The public exponent used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
DH 224-379 bits The private exponent used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically after
shared secret
generated.
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
DH 2048-4096
bits
This is the shared secret agreed
upon as part of DH exchange
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
ECDH P-256, P-384 Public key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange. This key is
derived per the EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
ECDH P-256, P-384 Private key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange. Generated by
calling the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
ECDH P-256, P-384 Shared secret used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SSH
SSHv2 RSA
public key
RSA 2048-3072
bits modulus
SSH public key used in SSH session
establishment
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
SSHv2 RSA
private key
RSA 2048-3072
bits modulus
SSH private key used in SSH
session establishment
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
SSHv2
integrity key
HMAC 160-512 bits Used for SSH integrity protection. DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
SSH session
terminated
SSHv2
session key
AES 256-bits This is the SSH session symmetric
key.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
SSH session
terminated
SESA
SESA
authorizatio
n key
pre-shared
key
128 bits Used to authorize members of
stacked units. Entered by CO.
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘no fips authorization-
key’
SESA
master
session Key
AES 128 bits Used to derive SESA session key DRAM (plaintext) Upon completion of
key exchange
SESA
derived
session key
AES 128 bits and
192 bits
Used to protect traffic over stacking
ports
DRAM (plaintext) Upon bringing down
the stack
SNMPv3
snmpEngine
ID
Shared
secret
32-bits Unique string to identify the SNMP
engine
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no snmp-server
engineID local
engineid-string’,
overwritten with new
engine ID
SNMPv3
password
shared
secret
256 bits This secret is used to derive HMAC-
SHA1 key for SNMPv3
Authentication
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SNMPv3
session key
AES 128-bit Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IPSec
skeyid Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE. This
key was derived in the module
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
skeyid_d Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SKEYSEED Keying
material
160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will
be used for deriving IKE session
authentication key.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
IPSec/IKE session is
terminated
IKE session
encryption
key
AES 256-bit AES Derived in the module used for
IKEv2 payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IKE session
authenticati
on key
HMAC-
SHA1
160 bits HMAC-SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IKE
authenticati
on private
Key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA (2048
bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in
IKEv2 authentication. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA keypair
deletion command
IKE
authenticati
on public
key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA (2048
bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA public key used in
IKEv2 authentication. The key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA/ECDSA key pair
generation method in the module.
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA keypair
deletion command
ISAKMP
preshared
pre-shared
key
Variable (8+
characters)
This key was configured by CO and
used for User role authentication
using IKE Pre-shared key based
authentication mechanism
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no crypto isakmp
key..’
IPSec
session
encryption
key
AES 256-bit AES Derived in the module used for
IKEv2 payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IPSec
session
authenticati
on key
HMAC-
SHA1
160 bits HMAC-SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
MACsec
MACsec
Security
Association
Key (SAK)
AES-GCM 128-, 256-bits Used for creating Security
Associations (SA) for
encrypting/decrypting the MACsec
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
data plane traffic. Derived from the
CAK using the SP800-108 KDF.
MACsec
Connectivity
Association
Key (CAK)
AES-GCM 128-, 256-bits A CO configured pre-shared secret
key possessed by members of a
MACsec connectivity association
(via MKA) to secure control plane
traffic
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no key-string..’
MACsec Key
Encryption
Key (KEK)
AES-CMAC 128/256 bits Used to transmit SAKs to other
members of a MACsec connectivity
association. Derived from the CAK
using the SP800-108 KDF.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
MACsec
Integrity
Check Key
(ICK)
AES-GCM 128/256 bits Used to prove an authorized peer
sent the message. Derived from the
CAK using the SP800-108 KDF.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
2.5 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent
any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly.
2.5.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)
• Firmware Integrity Test (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-512)
• IC2M Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES-CBC (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES GCM KAT
o AES-CMAC KAT
o SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
o SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify (Curve: P-256)
o HMAC-SHA-1, -256, -384, 512 KATs
o ECC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
o FFC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
o IKEv2 KDF KAT
o SNMP KDF KAT
o SRTP KDF KAT
o SSH KDF KAT
o FIPS 186-4 RSA (sign/verify) KATs (Size. 2048)
o SHA-1, -256, -384, -512 KATs
o KBKDF (Counter) KAT
• UADP ASIC Hardware Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES-ECB (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
2.5.2 Conditional Tests
• Conditional Bypass test
• IC2M Algorithm Implementation Conditional Tests:
o Pairwise consistency test for RSA
o Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA
o Continuous Random Number Generation test for approved DRBG
• NDRNG Continuous Health Tests:
o Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
o Repetition Count Test (RCT)
The devices perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must be passed before
each role starts to perform services.
2.6 Physical Security
The cryptographic modules entirely contained within production-grade enclosure. The chassis of the modules
have removable covers.
3 Secure Operation
The switches meet all the overall Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setup instructions provided
below to place the modules in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this Switches without maintaining the following
settings will remove the modules from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 System Initialization and Configuration
1. The CO must create the “enable” password for the CO role. Procedurally, the password must be at least 8
characters, including at least one letter and at least one number, and is entered when the CO first engages
the “enable” command. The CO enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
Switch(config)# enable secret [PASSWORD]
2. The CO must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one
number) to users. Identification and authentication on the console/auxiliary port is required for users. From
the “configure terminal” command line, the CO enters the following syntax:
Switch(config)# username name [privilege level] {password encryption-type password}
Switch(config)# line con 0
Switch(config-line)# login local
3. Disable manual boot:
Switch(config)#no boot manual
4. Disable Telnet and configure Secure Shell for remote command line:
Switch(config)# line vty line_number [ending_line_number]
or
Switch(config)# transport input ssh
5. Disable the following interfaces by configuration:
a. USB 3.0
Switch(config)# hw-module switch 1 usbflash1 unmount
b. Wireless Console Access with Bluetooth
Switch(config)# hw-module beacon rp active off
6. To ensure all FIPS 140-2 logging is received, set the log level:
Switch(config)# logging console error
7. The CO enables FIPS mode by configuring the Authorization key:
Switch(config)# fips authorization-key <128 bit, i.e, 16 hex byte key>
8. The CO shall only assign users to a privilege level 1 (the default).
9. The CO shall not assign a command to any privilege level other than its default.
Note: The keys and CSPs generated in the cryptographic module during FIPS mode of operation cannot be used
when the module transitions to non-FIPS mode and vice versa. While the module transitions from FIPS to non-
FIPS mode or from non-FIPS to FIPS mode, all the keys and CSPs are to be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. For
transition from FIPS to non-FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer has to zeroize the module to delete all plaintext, secret
keys and CSPs as defined in the Table 8 of the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy document and the
Crypto Officer has to issue “no fips authorization key <128-bits (16 octet) key to be used>” command in addition
to those defined in Table 8 of the security policy document.
3.2 Verify FIPS Mode of Operation
Use the command lines to display the FIPS configuration information. The switch CLI output shows running status
for FIPS mode of operation.
1. To ensure FIPS mode of operation is enabled.
Switch#show fips status
Switch and Stacking are running in fips mode
or
Switch#show fips status
Switch and Stacking are not running in fips mode