Utimaco IS GmbH
u.trust Anchor
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 2 of 102
Imprint
Copyright 2026 Utimaco IS GmbH
Germanusstrße. 4
D-52080 Aachen, Germany
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Utimaco IS GmbH accepts no liability for misprints and damage resulting from them.
Phone AMERICAS: +1-844-UTIMACO (+1 844-884-6226)
EMEA: +49 800-627-3081
APAC: +81 800-919-1301
Internet https://support.hsm.utimaco.com
Email support@utimaco.com
Document version 2.3.6
Date 2025-12-19
Status Released
Document No. 2020-0031
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 3 of 102
Table of Contents
1 General ..................................................................................................................7
1.1 Overview...........................................................................................................................7
1.2 Security Levels..................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Module Specification............................................................................8
2.1 Description .......................................................................................................................8
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ........................................10
2.3 Excluded Components.....................................................................................................11
2.4 Modes of Operation.........................................................................................................11
2.5 Algorithms......................................................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................22
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ........................................................................................31
2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................32
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................33
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................33
2.11 Industry Protocols...........................................................................................................33
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.............................................................................. 34
3.1 Ports and Interfaces........................................................................................................34
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................... 35
4.1 Authentication Methods ..................................................................................................35
4.2 Roles ..............................................................................................................................36
4.3 Approved Services...........................................................................................................36
4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................61
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded.................................................................................67
5 Software/Firmware Security..................................................................................... 68
5.1 Integrity Techniques........................................................................................................68
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................68
6 Operational Environment......................................................................................... 69
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .............................................................69
7 Physical Security ................................................................................................... 70
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ..................................................................................70
7.2 EFP/EFT Information .......................................................................................................71
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges............................................................................71
8 Non-Invasive Security............................................................................................. 73
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ............................................................... 74
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................74
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods...............................................................................................74
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................74
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 4 of 102
9.4 SSPs...............................................................................................................................75
10 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................ 91
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests...............................................................................................91
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................91
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information .........................................................................................95
10.4 Error States.....................................................................................................................97
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .......................................................................................98
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................. 99
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ............................................................99
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................99
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance............................................................................................99
11.4 Design and Rules.............................................................................................................99
11.5 Maintenance Requirements ...........................................................................................100
11.6 End of Life .................................................................................................................... 100
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.................................................................................... 102
12.1 Attack List .................................................................................................................... 102
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 5 of 102
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ............................................................................................. 10
Table 3: Modes List and Description ...................................................................................................................... 11
Table 4: Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................................. 18
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms..................................................................................................................... 19
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms ........................................................................................................ 20
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.......................................................... 20
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms................................................................................................. 22
Table 9: Security Function Implementations ........................................................................................................ 31
Table 10: Entropy Certificates.................................................................................................................................. 32
Table 11: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................................................ 33
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................. 34
Table 13: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................................... 36
Table 14: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................... 36
Table 15: Approved Services.................................................................................................................................... 60
Table 16: Non-Approved Services........................................................................................................................... 66
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...................................................................................................... 71
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information............................................................................................................................... 71
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures........................................................................................................... 72
Table 20: Storage Areas............................................................................................................................................ 74
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods..................................................................................................................... 74
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods ....................................................................................................................... 75
Table 23: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................................................ 85
Table 24: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................................................ 90
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...................................................................................................................... 91
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Table 26: Conditional Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................. 95
Table 27: Pre-Operational Periodic Information................................................................................................... 95
Table 28: Conditional Periodic Information........................................................................................................... 97
Table 29: Error States................................................................................................................................................ 98
List of Figures
Figure 1: u.trust Anchor as a PCIe plug-in card.......................................................................................................8
Figure 2: u.trust Anchor - side view............................................................................................................................9
Figure 3: u.trust Anchor - top view .............................................................................................................................9
Figure 4: u.trust Anchor - bottom view................................................................................................................... 10
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 7 of 102
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document defines the security policy for u.trust Anchor Cryptographic Module, hereafter
referred to as “the module” or “u.trust Anchor”. u.trust Anchor is a hardware security module
made by Utimaco IS GmbH, hereafter referred to as Utimaco.
u.trust Anchor is suitable for use in a multi-tenant environment where multiple users run their
own applications on different containers deployed on the same hardware.
The module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-3.
1.2 Security Levels
The module meets the overall requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 8 of 102
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
The module is an encapsulated, protected hardware security module (HSM) realized as a
multi-chip embedded cryptographic module. Figure 1 shows the physical module.
Purpose and Use:
The u.trust Anchor is the next generation of HSMs. It incorporates all the traditional hardware
security features as well as the concept of containerized HSMs (cHSMs) and multi-tenancy.
The u.trust Anchor platform consists of the following subsystems:
• The u.trust Anchor hardware
• The u.trust Anchor platform firmware called COSMOS including Bootloader, Linux
kernel, container management firmware, and Global Administration (glad) service
firmware
• cHSM (containerized HSM) firmware which can be loaded into containers as provided
by COSMOS
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed
Figure 1: u.trust Anchor as a PCIe plug-in card
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Module Characteristics:
The critical components within the module are encapsulated on a PCIe plug-in card with the
boundaries described below.
Cryptographic Boundary:
The module's cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer perimeter of the heat sink on the
top side and the epoxy surface on the bottom side of the module.
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the side, top, and bottom views of the module. The red
dashed line indicates the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 2: u.trust Anchor - side view
Figure 3: u.trust Anchor - top view
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 10 of 102
Figure 4: u.trust Anchor - bottom view
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
The module is designed to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3 (refer to
Table 1). The module is available in the following configurations listed in Table 2.
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
u.trust
Anchor
u.trust Anchor
7.03.00.03
Device System v6.0.1.0-c
Sensory Controller v3.02.0.7,
v3.02.0.8
Quad ARM
Cortex-A53
Tamper
Protected PCIe
Card
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
The hardware version covers variants with and without the Exar accelerator chip.
The u.trust Anchor with hardware version 7.03.00.03 is called Se1
.
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths
of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on
the validation certificate.
1
The module could be marketed as various variants, e.g., u.trust Anchor Se100, Se2k, Se5K8,
Se5K16, Se5K31, Se15K, Se40K8, Se40K16, Se40K31, and CSAR (Standard, Plus, Premium).
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 11 of 102
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components excluded from the cryptographic boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
The module supports an Approved and a Non-Approved mode of operation. Global
Administrator Application (glad) always runs in the Approved mode. Each cHSM container can
run either the Approved mode or the Non-Approved mode. The module does not support a
maintenance interface.
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Services associated with the Global
Administrator Application or a
containerized HSM created with the
template 'SecurityServer-FIPS'
Approved glad_Status shows versions as
listed in table 2 "Tested Module
Identification" or cHSM_Status
shows 'FIPS mode = ON'
Non-
Approved
Services associated with a
containerized HSM created with the
template 'SecurityServer'
Non-
Approved
cHSM_Status does not show
'FIPS mode = ON'
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
All services associated with the Global Administrator Application always execute in the
Approved mode. All services associated with a cHSM that has been created using the template
‘SecurityServer-FIPS’ always execute in the Approved mode. All services associated with a
cHSM that has been created using the template ‘SecurityServer’ always execute in the Non-
Approved mode. The mode of operation of services associated with the Global Administrator
Application or a cHSM never changes. Once a cHSM has been created using either the
‘SecurityServer-FIPS’ or ‘SecurityServer’ template, it is not possible for the cHSM to transition
between the two templates. See Section 11.1 for initialization instructions.
Degraded Mode Description:
The module does not support a degraded mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
The module supports the approved cryptographic algorithms shown in Table 4.
Approved Algorithms:
The module supports the following approved cryptographic algorithms.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 12 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A6714 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A6713 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CMAC A6713 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CMAC A6714 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A6714 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A6713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
DSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6713 L - 1024, 2048, 3072
N - 160, 224, 256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Curve - P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 13 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6713 Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6716 Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6717 Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Curve - P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Curve - P-256, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6713 Component - No
Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
FIPS 186-4
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 14 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6716 Component - No
Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6717 Component - No
Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Curve - P-256, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen A6713 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen A6716 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyVer A6713 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyVer A6716 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen A6713 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen A6716 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer A6713 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer A6716 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A6714 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Hash DRBG A6715 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6714 Key Length - Key Length: 256-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
224
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
256
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
384
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
512
A6713 Key Length - Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6713 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6714 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6716 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6717 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 16 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
A6713 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192
Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
A6714 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192
Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF ANS 9.63
(CVL)
A6713 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Key Data Length - Key Data Length: 128, 4096
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-
108
A6713 KDF Mode - Feedback
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-512
Increment 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-
108
A6714 KDF Mode - Feedback
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-512
Increment 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF TLS (CVL) A6713 TLS Version - v1.2
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A6713 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A6714 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 256
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A6716 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A6717 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 17 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-2)
A6713 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-2)
A6716 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-2)
A6717 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6713 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6716 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6717 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6713 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6714 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6716 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 18 of 102
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6717 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A1563 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6714 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6714 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6715 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6713 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-256 A6713 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP 800-133r2 and IG D.G
per Section 4 example 1,
Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 19 of 102
Name Properties Implementation Reference
DSA sigVer FIPS
186-4 with SHA-
3
Mode:SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Key Length:1024/160,
2048/224, 2048/256 or
3072/256
N/A FIPS 186-4
RSA sigVer
FIPS186-4 with
SHA-3
Mode:SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Key Length:1024
N/A FIPS 186-4
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
ECDSA (Key Generation and Signature Generation and Verification) with secp256k1 curve
listed in Table 6 may only be used in blockchain-related applications.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
EC Diffie-Hellman
(Shared Secret
Computation)
Curves:brainpoolP224r1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP320r1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1,
brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256t1,
brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384t1,
brainpoolP512t1
u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG D.F
Scenario 3
EC Diffie-Hellman
(Key Agreement)
Curves:brainpoolP224r1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP320r1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1,
brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256t1,
brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384t1,
brainpoolP512t1
u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG D.F
Scenario 3
ECDSA (Signature
Verification)
Curve:brainpoolP320t1 u.trust Anchor - 64
bit yay crypto
library
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG C.A
Resolution 1a
and NIST SP
800-186
ECDSA (Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation and
Verification)
Curve:secp256k1 u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG C.A
Resolution 1b
ECDSA (Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation and
Verification)
yay32++ secp256k1
Curve:secp256k1 u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library with Silex
(yay32++)
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG C.A
Resolution 1a
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 20 of 102
Name Properties Implementation Reference
ECDSA (Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation and
Verification)
yay32++ Brainpool
Curves:brainpoolP224r1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP320r1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1,
brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256t1,
brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384t1,
brainpoolP512t1
u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library with Silex
(yay32++)
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG C.A
Resolution 1a
and NIST SP
800-186
ECDSA (Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation and
Verification) yay32+
Curves:brainpoolP224r1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP320r1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1,
brainpoolP224t1, brainpoolP256t1,
brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384t1,
brainpoolP512t1
u.trust Anchor - 32
bit yay crypto
library with EXAR
(yay32+)
NIST FIPS
140-3 IG C.A
Resolution 1a
and NIST SP
800-186
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The module also implements algorithms (listed in Table 7) that may be used in Approved
mode of operation but is not a security function per IG 2.4.A. In accordance with IG 2.4.A
example 1, these algorithms are used to obfuscate stored CSPs. These algorithms are not
used for security-relevant purposes, and no security is claimed.
Name Caveat Use and Function
AES_CBC-CS3-256
(SP 800-38A)
Obfuscation Obfuscation of encrypted data stored in cHSM file system. This
is allowed per IG 2.4.A example 1.
AES_CTR-256 (SP
800-38A)
Obfuscation Obfuscation of public keys and data stored in glad user backups
(yay64 implementation). This is allowed per IG 2.4.A example 1.
AES_XTS-256 (SP
800-38E)
Obfuscation Obfuscation of encrypted data stored in cHSM file system. This
is allowed per IG 2.4.A example 1.
PBKDF (SP 800-
132)
Derivation Derivation of operator's password. This is allowed per IG 2.4.A
example 2.
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
If a container runs the non-approved cHSM firmware ‘Security Server’, the container provides
the non-approved, not allowed algorithms listed in Table 8 in addition to the Approved
cryptographic algorithms listed in Table 4.
Name Use and Function
RSA Signature (non-
compliant)
Key Generation, Signature Generation/Verification, Key Wrapping (key sizes
512 - 1024); Key Generation: mechanisms other than
CXI_MECH_KEYGEN_FIPS_PRIME; Sign/Verify: no padding; Sign: SHA-1,
ANSI X9.31; Key Wrapping: PKCS#1 v1.5
RSA Encryption (non-
compliant)
Encryption/Decryption (key sizes 512-16384)
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 21 of 102
Name Use and Function
DSA Signature (non-
compliant)
Key Generation, Signature Generation, DH and Domain Parameter
Generation (NIST FIPS 186-4); SHA-224 (Domain Parameter Generation
with SHA-224 is only possible for key length 2048/224), SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
EC Cryptography (non-
compliant)
Key Generation, Signature Generation/Verification, Encryption/Decryption,
ECDH, Message Authentication (key sizes shorter than 224 bits, curves
secp224k1, sect239k1, P-192, K-163, B-163, Sign: SHA-1, signing with
deterministic k according to DCC - compliant to GBCS, not NIST FIPS 186-
5)
EC Encryption with
ECIES
Encryption/Decryption (all available curves)
ECDSA with K-/B-
curves: K-233, K-283, K-
409, K-571, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571
Message Authentication, ECDSA Key Generation, Signature Generation,
Derive Key (Shared Secret Computation)
FRP256v1 Curve ECDSA Key Generation, Signature Generation/Verification, Key Derivation
Montgomery Curves:
Curve448, Curve25519
Key Generation, ECDH
secp256k1 Curve Message Authentication, Key Derivation
MD5, MDC-2, RIPEMD-
160 (non-compliant)
Hashing
FFC Key Agreement Diffie-Hellman key agreement based on FFC
KDF (non-compliant) Key Derivation
DES Encryption/Decryption, (Un-)Wrapping, Key Derivation, Split Key, Message
Authentication
TDES in CBC and ECB
modes
Encryption/Decryption, (Un-)Wrapping, Key Derivation, Split Key, Message
Authentication via 3-key (24 bytes) and 2-key (16 bytes) constructions
TDES MAC (Un-)Wrapping, Key Derivation, Split Key, Message Authentication via 3-key
(24 bytes) and 2-key (16 bytes) constructions
TDES ANSI retail MAC Message Authentication
AES CTR mode (non-
compliant)
Encryption/Decryption, (Un-)Wrapping in yay32 implementation
AES GCM mode (non-
compliant)
Encryption/Decryption, Wrapping. Non-compliant to requirements of IG C.H
scenario 4.
AES GMAC with
external initial IV (non-
compliant)
Message Authentication
AES CBC MAC (non-
compliant)
Message Authentication
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 22 of 102
Name Use and Function
AES CBC with 0 IV (non-
compliant)
Import DB Entry, Restore User, Encryption/Decryption, Wrapping
ECC point
multiplication
according to TR-03111
Shared Secret Computation on curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/
256r1/ 256t1/ 320r1/ 320t1/ 384r1/ 384t1/ 512r1/ 512t1, secp256k1,
FRP256v1
Chinese Algorithms
SM2, SM3, SM4
according to IETF
drafts
Cryptographic functions with algorithm specifier CXI_KEY_ALGO_CUSTOM
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The module implements the Security Functions listed in Table 9 using the Approved and Non-
Approved, Allowed cryptographic algorithms.
• Cert. #A6714 is used by the glad services,
• Cert. #A6713, Cert. #A6716 and Cert. #A6717 are used by the cHSMs,
• Cert. #A6715 is used for the cHSM start-up integrity test and DRBG implementation,
• Cert. #A1563 is used for the module’s start-up integrity tests.
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Auth_Block_Ci
pher
BC-Auth Authenticat
ed block
cipher
modes
Standards:
NIST SP
800-38C,
SP 800-
38D
AES-CCM: (A6713)
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-GCM: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
IV Generation: Internal
IV Generation Mode: 8.2.2
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
DRBG DRBG Random
Bit
generation
and
Message
Digest for
glad and
cHSM
SMOS
Standard:
NIST SP
800-90A
Hash DRBG: (A6714, A6715)
Prediction Resistance: No
Mode: SHA2-512
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 23 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS KAS-Full Key
Agreement
Schemes
and Key
Derivation
Functions
Standard:
NIST SP
800-56A,
SP 800-
56C, SP
800-135
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2
path (2),
split
Key
Confirmati
on:No
Key
Derivation:
KDA
(separatel
y tested)
and IG
2.4.B SP
800-
135rev1
CVL
Caveat:Ke
y
establish
ment
methodolo
gy
provides
between
112 and
256 bits of
security
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6713)
Domain Parameter Generation Methods: P-
224, P-256, P-384, P-521
KAS Role: responder
Curves: brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/ 256r1/
256t1/ 320r1/ 320t1/ 384r1/ 384t1/ 512r1/
512t1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6714)
Domain Parameter Generation Methods: P-
521
KAS Role: responder
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6717, A6716)
Domain Parameter Generation Methods: P-
224, P-256, P-384, P-521
KAS Role: responder
Curves: brainpoolP224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/
384t1/ 512t1
KDA OneStep SP800-56Cr2: (A6713, A6714)
Derived Key Length: 2048
Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8
KDF ANS 9.63: (A6713)
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Key Data Lengths: 128, 4096
KDF TLS: (A6713)
TLS Version: v1.2
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KBKDF KBKDF Key-Based
Key
Derivation
Standards:
NIST FIPS
198-1, SP
800-108
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6713, A6714)
Key Length: 256-8192 Increment 8
KDF SP800-108: (A6713, A6714)
KDF Mode: Feedback
Lengths: 256
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 24 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KeyGen AsymKe
yPair-
KeyGen
KAS-
KeyGen
CKG
Asymmetri
c Key
Generation
for cHSM
and glad
Standards:
NIST FIPS
186-5, SP
800-133
CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6717)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
brainpoolP224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/ 384t1/
512t1
Secret Generation Mode: extra bits
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/ 256r1/ 256t1/
320r1/ 320t1/ 384r1/ 384t1/ 512r1/ 512t1,
secp256k1
Secret Generation Mode: extra bits
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Curve: P-521
Secret Generation Mode: extra bits
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6716)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
brainpoolP224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/ 384t1/
512t1, secp256k1
Secret Generation Mode: extra bits
EDDSA KeyGen: (A6713, A6716)
Curves: ED-25519, ED-448
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6717, A6716)
Key Generation Mode:
probableWithProbableAux
Primality Tests: 2pow100
Private Key Format: crt
Key Length: 2048-8192 (even key length)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Key Generation Mode:
probableWithProbableAux
Private Key Format: crt
Key Length: 2048-16384 (even key length)
Primality Tests: 2pow100
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Key Generation Mode:
probableWithProbableAux
Primality Tests: 2pow100
Private Key Format: crt
Key Length: 2048-16384 (even key length)
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 25 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KTS_CBC_CM
AC
KTS-
Wrap
KTS-
Unwrap
Key
Transport
Scheme
based on
AES-CBC
and AES-
CMAC
Standards:
NIST SP
800-38A,
SP 800-
38B
IG
D.G:Appro
ved
method
from IG
D.G
Caveat:Ke
y
establish
ment
methodolo
gy
provides
between
112 and
256 bits of
security
strength
AES-CBC: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-CBC: (A6714)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Length: 256
AES-CMAC: (A6713)
Directions: Generation, Verification
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-CMAC: (A6714)
Directions: Generation, Verification
Key Length: 256
KTS_Enc KTS-
Wrap
KTS-
Unwrap
Key
Transport
scheme
(with
encryption,
decryption,
encapsulati
on,
unencapsul
ation)
Standards:
NIST SP
800-38D,
SP 800-
38F
IG
D.G:Appro
ved
method
from IG
D.G
Caveat:Ke
y
establish
ment
methodolo
gy
provides
between
112 and
256 bits of
security
strength
AES-KW: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-KWP: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-GCM: (A6713, A6714)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
IV Generation: Internal
IV Generation Mode: 8.2.2
Key Length: 256
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 26 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KTS_Encap_R
SA
KTS-
Decap
KTS-
Encap
Key
Transport
Scheme
(encapsula
tion,
unencapsul
ation)
Standard:
NIST SP
800-
56Brev2
IG
D.G:Appro
ved
method
from IG
D.G
Caveat:Ke
y
establish
ment
methodolo
gy
provides
between
112 and
256 bits of
security
strength
KTS-IFC: (A6714)
Moduli: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods: rsakpg2-crt
KAS Role: responder
Key Transport Method: Hash Algorithms:
SHA2-256; Supports Null Associated Data
Key Length: 256
Function: keyPairGen, partialVal
KTS-IFC: (A6713)
Moduli: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods: rsakpg2-crt
KAS Roles: initiator, responder
Key Transport Method: Hash Algorithms:
SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512; Supports Null Associated Data
Key Length: 1024
Function: keyPairGen, partialVal
KTS-IFC: (A6717, A6716)
Moduli: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Key Generation Methods: rsakpg2-crt
KAS Roles: initiator, responder
Key Transport Method: Hash Algorithms:
SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512; Supports Null Associated Data
Key Length: 1024
Function: keyPairGen, partialVal
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 27 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
MAC MAC Message
authenticat
ion
generation
and
verification
Standards:
NIST SP
800-38B,
SP 800-
38D, FIPS
198-1
AES-CMAC: (A6713)
Directions: Generation, Verification
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-CMAC: (A6714)
Directions: Generation, Verification
Key Length: 256
AES-GMAC: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
IV Generation: Internal
IV Generation Mode: 8.2.2
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
HMAC-SHA-1: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6714)
Key Length: 256-8192 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A6713)
Key Length: 112-8192 Increment 8
Additional Key Length for verification only:
80-104 Increment 8
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 28 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
PubKeyVal AsymKe
yPair-
PubKeyV
al
Public Key
Validation
Standard:
NIST FIPS
186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, brainpool
P224r1/224t1/256r1/256t1/320r1/320t1/38
4r1/384t1/512r1/512t1
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Curve: P-521
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A6716, A6717)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, brainpool
P224t1/256t1/320t1/384t1/512t1
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A6713)
Curves: P-192, B-163, K-163
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A6716, A6717)
Curve: P-192
EDDSA KeyVer: (A6713, A6716)
Curves: ED-25519, ED-448
SHS SHA Message
Digest
Standards:
NIST FIPS
202, FIPS
180-4
SHA-1: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA2-224: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA2-256: (A6714, A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA2-384: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA2-512: (A6714, A6715, A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA3-224: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA3-256: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA3-384: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA3-512: (A6713)
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SHA2-256: (A1563)
Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 29 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SigGen DigSig-
SigGen
Digital
Signature
Generation
Standard:
NIST FIPS
186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/ 256r1/ 256t1/
320r1/ 320t1/ 384r1/ 384t1/ 512r1/ 512t1,
secp256k1
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Curve: P-521
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6716)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
brainpoolP224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/ 384t1/
512t1, secp256k1
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6717)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
brainpoolP224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/ 384t1/
512t1
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
EDDSA SigGen: (A6713, A6716)
Curves: ED-25519, ED-448
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-512, SHAKE256
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Key Length: 2048-16384, even key length
only
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6716, A6717)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Key Length: 2048-8192, even key length only
SHAKE-256: (A6713)
Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 30 of 102
SigVer DigSig-
SigVer
Digital
Signature
Verification
Standards:
NIST FIPS
186-2,
FIPS 186-
4, FIPS
186-5
DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A6713)
(L, N): (1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256),
(3072, 256)
Hash Algorithms: SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-2): (A6713, A6716,
A6717)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS, ANSI
X9.31
Key Length: 1024-4096 (even key length only)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A6713)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS, ANSI
X9.31
Key Lengths: 1024-2048 for PKCS 1.5 and
PKCSCSS (even key length only), 1024-16384
for ANSI X9.31 (even key length only)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A6716, A6717)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS, ANSI
X9.31
Key Lengths: 1024-2048 for PKCS 1.5 and
PKCSCSS (even key lengths only), 1024-8192
for ANSI X9.31 (even key lengths only)
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A6713)
Curves: B-163, K-163, P-192
Hash Algorithm: SHA-1
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A6716, A6717)
Curve: P-192
Hash Algorithm: SHA-1
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/ 256r1/ 256t1/
320r1/ 320t1/ 384r1/ 384t1/ 512r1/ 512t1,
secp256k1
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Curves: P-256, P-521, brainpoolP320t1
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6716)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512, brainpoolP224r1/
224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/ 384t1/ 512t1,
secp256k1
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6717)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
brainpoolP224r1/ 224t1/ 256t1/ 320t1/
384t1/ 512t1
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
EDDSA SigVer: (A6713, A6716)
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 31 of 102
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Curves: ED-25519, ED-448
Hash Algorithms: SHA2-512, SHAKE256
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6713)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Key Length: 2048-16384 (even key length
only)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6714)
Signature Types: PKCSPSS
Key Length: 2048-16384 (even key length
only)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6716, A6717)
Signature Types: PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Key Length: 2048-8192 (even key length only)
SHAKE-256: (A6713)
Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8
SKG CKG Symmetric
Key
Generation
Standard:
NIST SP
800-133
CKG: ()
Key Type: Symmetric
Hash DRBG: (A6714, A6715)
Unauth_Block
_Cipher
BC-
UnAuth
Unauthenti
cated block
cipher
modes
Standard:
NIST SP
800-38A
AES-CBC: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-ECB: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-OFB: (A6713)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Lengths: 128, 192, 256
AES-CBC: (A6714)
Directions: Encrypt, Decrypt
Key Length: 256
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario 2. The module uses the
approved DRBG (Cert. #A6714 and Cert. #A6715) to generate the IV with a length of 96-bits.
The entropy source producing the DRBG seed is located inside the module’s cryptographic
boundary.
The module complies with IG D.M. All of the keys generated through KDF SP 800-108 (Cert.
#A6713 and Cert. #A6714) are derived from keys that have been generated using an approved
method or CKG per NIST SP 800-133r2 in the approved mode. The encoding of the data fields
(i.e., Label, Context, and Length L) is compliant to Section 6.4 of NIST SP 800-133r2. No
asymmetric keys are generated through KBKDF.
The module’s use of elliptic curves conforms to IG C.A. Table 9 lists the approved curves while
Tables 6 and 8 list the non-approved curves. The curve secp256k1 listed in Table 9 is only used
for blockchain-related applications. EDDSA-related algorithms (Cert. #A6713, Cert. #A6717 and
Cert. #A6716) are used only with Edwards25519 and Edwards448 curves.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 32 of 102
The module’s TLS 1.2 KDF can only be performed in the context of the TLS protocol.
Algorithms designated as "Legacy" can only be used on data that was generated prior to the
Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M. These legacy algorithms are SHA-1 for DSA and
ECDSA Signature Verification, HMAC Verification, and RSA Signature Verification.
Compliance to NIST SP 800-56Ar3 Assurances
For KAS ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). The key derivation functions
comply with NIST SP 800-56Cr2 (i.e., KDA OneStep KDF Cert. #A6713 and Cert. #A6714), NIST
SP 800-108 (i.e., Feedback mode KDF Cert. #A6713 and Cert. #A6714), and KDF ANS 9.63
(Cert. #A6713). Furthermore, the module obtains the appropriate assurances as required in
Section 5.6.2 of NIST SP 800-56Ar3. For KAS-ECC, the module uses C(2e,0s), thus no static key
pairs are used as a part of the KAS schemes per NIST SP 800-56Ar3. Full public key validations
are implemented (NIST SP 800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.3). No key confirmation is implemented.
Compliance to NIST SP 800-56Br2 Assurances
For KTS RSA, the module satisfies IG D.G. The RSA keys for KTS-IFC (Cert. #A6713, Cert.
#A6714, Cert. #A6716 and Cert. #A6717) all have lengths of at least 2048 bits, which are
acceptable per NIST SP 800-131Ar2. The modulus sizes, the method for key generation, and
the roles (initiator, i.e., the module performs encapsulation, or responder, i.e., the module
performs unencapsulation) are specified in Table 9. The RSA key generation algorithms are
CAVP validated (Cert. #A6713, Cert. #A6714, Cert. #A6716 and Cert. #A6717). No key
confirmation is implemented.
The module implements the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and obtains the appropriate
assurances as required in Sections 5 and 6 of NIST SP 800-56Br2.The module performs partial
public-key validation. No key confirmation is implemented.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module incorporates a NIST SP 800-90A Hash DRBG (Cert. #A6714 and Cert. #A6715)
that is seeded from the module’s NIST SP 800-90B validated entropy source. The unmodified
output of the DRBG is used for generating cryptographic key material. The DRBG is
instantiated anew every power-on. The threshold for reseeding is monitored to not exceed 248
per SP 800-90A.
A public user document for the entropy source is available at
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-
validations/certificate/108. This physical entropy source is used to seed and reseed the
approved deterministic bit generators (DRBGs) for glad as well as for cHSMs.
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E108 Utimaco
Table 10: Entropy Certificates
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 33 of 102
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Utimaco Entropy Source Physical u.trust Anchor 512 417.28 LFSR
Table 11: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
The module supports the generation of cryptographic keys and components with a security
strength of at least 256 bits.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module supports key establishment using KAS with a supported security strength of 112-
256 bits depending on the selection of key sizes and hash sizes utilized. The module supports
AES-based key transport with a supported security strength 128-256 bits depending on the
selection of key sizes and hash sizes utilized. The module supports RSA-based key transport
with a supported security strength of 112-256 bits depending on the selection of key sizes and
hash sizes utilized.
2.11 Industry Protocols
No industry protocols are used in this module.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 34 of 102
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
For the communication with a host, the PCIe board offers a PCIe interface and a serial log
interface. Figure 1 shows the module on its carrier board with PCIe interface.
Together with Utimaco’s appropriate host application software, the cHSMs also provide
cryptographic standard interfaces such as PKCS#11, JCE, OpenSSL, CSP/CNG and EKM.
A Secure Messaging concept uses key agreement followed by encryption and MAC to protect
communication to and from the cryptographic module. The communication that is protected
covers the Global Administrator command interface and the cHSM command interface in both
the Approved mode and in the Non-Approved modes of operation.
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The module incorporates physical ports and logical interfaces defined in Table 12.
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Battery Measuring Inputs Data Input Measurement Data
External communication
port (PCIe)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
SSPs, Operator data, Command, Return codes, Status,
Diagnostic information.
External Erase button Control
Input
Control signal to zeroize all security relevant information
inside the module
LED Status
Output
Indicator that the External Erase button is pressed
Power Power N/A
Serial output Status
Output
Status output like boot sequence output during startup.
USB interfaces Status
Output
Status output like boot sequence output during startup.
SMBUS interface Control
Input
Status
Output
Status requests and output for device manager such as
temperature, versioning, and PCIe state
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 35 of 102
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module supports authentication methods for the Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User
roles. These roles have separate identity-based authentication methods as indicated in Table
13. The module supports three authentication methods: Password, RSA Signature, and ECDSA
Signature. For each authentication attempt, the operator must present their unique identifier.
The methods are in conformance with NIST SP800-140E and SP 800-63B (refer to Sections
5.1.1 and 5.1.6). The operators must update the relevant default authentication SSPs upon
authentication to the module for the first time.
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Password The operator
password is a
minimum of 8
characters chosen
from 94 printable
ASCII characters.
N/A The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed, or a false
acceptance will
occur, is 1/(94^8),
which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Due to a correctional delay
of 120 milliseconds for every
non-successful
authentication on a cHSM,
there is a maximum limit of
60 * 1000 / 120 = 500 non-
successful authentications
per minute. This can be
stated as allowing only 500
non-successful
authentication attempts per
minute based on a rate of
120 ms per attempt.
Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating
to the module within one
minute is (less than) 500 *
1/(94^8), which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA
Signature
The operator
sends an ECDSA
signed command
containing its
username to
authenticate to
the cryptographic
module. (key size
>= 224)
SigVer The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed, or a false
acceptance will
occur, is less than or
equal to
approximately
1/(2^112) (according
to NIST SP 800-57-
Part1 Table 2) which
is less than
1/1,000,000.
Assuming a duration of at
least 1 microsecond for each
signature verification, there
is a maximum limit of 60 *
1,000,000 authentication
attempts per minute.
Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating
to the module within one
minute is less than 60 *
1,000,000 * [1/(2^112)] which
is less than 1/100,000.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 36 of 102
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
RSA
Signature
The operator
sends an RSA
signed command
containing its
username to
authenticate to
the cryptographic
module. (key size
>= 2048)
SigVer The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed, or a false
acceptance will
occur, is less than or
equal to
approximately
1/(2^112) (according
to NIST SP 800-57-
Part1 Table 2), which
is less than
1/1,000,000.
Assuming a duration of at
least 1 microsecond for each
signature verification, there
is a maximum limit of 60 *
1,000,000 authentication
attempts per minute.
Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating
to the module within one
minute is less than 60 *
1,000,000 * [1/(2^112)] which
is less than 1/100,000.
Table 13: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The module supports a Cryptographic Officer (CO) role, a User role, and an Unauthenticated
role. The Unauthenticated role has access to non-security-relevant services only.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
cHSM User Identity User Password
RSA Signature
ECDSA Signature
Global Administrator (glad) Identity Crypto Officer
(CO)
RSA Signature
ECDSA Signature
Unauthenticated Role N/A None
Table 14: Roles
Global Administrator operators use the gladm tool to access the Global Administrator
Application glad. cHSM administrators use the csadm tool to access their cHSM. The
operators must update the default authentication keys when they authenticate to the module
for the first time. See Section 11.1 for details.
The module supports multiple concurrent operators separated by unique sessions. Operator
authentication does not persist beyond power-cycling the module. The selection of roles is
implicit.
4.3 Approved Services
The module supports the following approved services listed in Table 15. Note that all services
invoked by an authenticated operator (i.e., one that takes on the CO role or the User role) are
protected by the Secure Messaging concept described in Section 3.
In the description, inputs, and outputs columns in Table 15, the term “object” may be a
cryptographic key, a storage object, or a configuration object within a cHSM. The term “backup
blob” contains one or more objects.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 37 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Access_Secrets Internal service for accessing
cHSM keys and User's
secrets and keys, i.e., ALK,
CAK, MBK, PSW_AUTH, U_S,
U_KM, U_Legacy, and
U_PRIV.
cHSM_Stat
us output
None None KBKDF
KTS_Enc
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- CMK: G,E
- MBK: E
- MBKDK: G,E
- ALK: E
- CAK: E
- PSW_AUTH: E
- U_S: E
- U_KM: E
- U_Legacy: E
- U_PRIV: E
cHSM_Allocate_Key Cuts keying material, deleting
original key from the
database. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key handle,
key
templates
Key handles
or backup
blobs
KTS_CBC_CMAC cHSM User
- MBKDK: E
- U_KM: E,G,R
- U_S: G,R
cHSM_Compute_Hash Compute SHA-1/2/3 or
HMAC of a given value. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Data or
secret blob,
mechanism
parameters,
(optional key)
Hash or
HMAC
MAC
SHS
cHSM User
- U_KM: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 38 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Config 1. Delete parts of audit log 2.
Return all search keys of
given database 3. Outputs
information about all master
backup keys stored in the
cHSM 4. Import a customer
certificate for the CAK 5.
Toggle Administration-Only
mode (blocks all
cryptographic services) 6. Set
configuration parameters 7.
Set maximum number of
allowed consecutive failed
authentication attempts 8.
Set startup mode
cHSM_Stat
us output
1. parameter
2. database
name 3. N/A
4. certificate
over CAK+ 5.
new mode 6.
module ID
and config
data 7.
maximum
number of
consecutive
failed
authenticatio
n attempts 8.
new startup
mode
1. N/A 2.
search keys
of given
database 3.
information
(key type,
key size, key
check value,
etc.) about
all Master
Backup
Keys that
are stored
inside the
cHSM 5.
N/A 6. N/A
7. N/A 8.
N/A
None cHSM User
- CAK+: W
cHSM_Crypt_Data Encrypts or Decrypts data
with AES key. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key handle or
backup blob,
data,
mechanism
parameter
Encrypted
or
decrypted
data
Auth_Block_Ciphe
r
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
DRBG
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- U_S: W,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- MBKDK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 39 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Delete_Key Deletes an assigned object
from the module
cHSM_Stat
us output
Object handle
or property
list
N/A None cHSM User
- U_S: Z
- U_KM: Z
- U_Legacy: Z
- U_PRIV: Z
- U_PUB: Z
- U_DSA_PUB: Z
cHSM_Derive_Key Derive cHSM user's secrets
and keys and store in cHSM
or a Backup Blob. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Base key, key
template and
mechanism
parameter
Key handle
or Backup
Blob
PubKeyVal
KAS
KBKDF
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- Shared Secret:
G,E,Z
- U_S: E,R,W,G
- U_KM: E,R,W,G
- U_PRIV: E
- U_PUB: E
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_End_Session End secure messaging
session by zeroizing session
key
cHSM_Stat
us output
Session ID N/A None cHSM User
- SMEK: Z
- SMMK: Z
Unauthenticated
- SMEK: Z
- SMMK: Z
cHSM_Generate_Audit_Log_Key Generate and store audit log
key. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key type ALK+ KeyGen
SigGen
cHSM User
- ALK+: G,R
- ALK: G,E
cHSM_Generate_Master_Backu
p_Key
Generates and outputs
master backup key. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key attributes Encrypted
Master
Backup Key
DRBG
SKG
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- MBK: G,R
- SMEK: E
- SMMK: E
- S_DRBG: G,E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 40 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Generate_Random_Num
ber
Generates a random number
using DRBG
cHSM_Stat
us output
Flags,
Mechanism
parameters
Random
bytes
DRBG cHSM User
- S_DRBG: G,E
cHSM_Generate_User_Keys Generate a key or key pair.
Store key(s) in object(s) or
backup blob. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key template,
Mechanism
parameters
Key handle
or Backup
Blob
DRBG
KeyGen
SKG
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- S_DRBG: G,E
- U_S: G,R
- U_PRIV: G,R
- U_PUB: G,R
- U_KM: G,R
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_Get_Audit_Log_Key Retrieve the public audit log
signature key.
cHSM_Stat
us output
N/A ALK+ SigGen
KTS_Enc
cHSM User
- CMK: E
- ALK+: R
- ALK: E
Unauthenticated
- CMK: E
- ALK+: R
- ALK: E
cHSM_Get_Key_Property Get properties of an object.
Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Object handle
or property
list
Property list,
user public
keys
None cHSM User
- U_PUB: R
- U_DSA_PUB: R
cHSM_Get_Signed_Audit_Log Return audit file signed by
audit log signature key. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Index Signed
Audit Log
file
SigGen cHSM User
- ALK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 41 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Import_Master_Backup_
Key
Import master backup key.
Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Encrypted
MBK, Slot
Number
N/A KTS_CBC_CMAC cHSM User
- MBK: W
- SMEK: E
- SMMK: E
cHSM_Init_Key_Group Delete all local objects
belonging to a key group
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key Group Number of
deleted
objects
None cHSM User
- U_S: Z
- U_KM: Z
- U_Legacy: Z
- U_PRIV: Z
- U_PUB: Z
- U_DSA_PUB: Z
cHSM_Manage_Files Load or remove files cHSM_Stat
us output
New file, new
location or
file
description
pattern
N/A SigVer cHSM User
- AMSK+: W,E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 42 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Login Set up secure messaging and
authenticate cHSM operator.
Generate new secure
messaging session keys. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Authenticatio
n data,
SMRK+
Session ID,
SMLK+,
certificate
chain
DRBG
SigGen
SigVer
KAS
PubKeyVal
KeyGen
KBKDF
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
MAC
KTS_CBC_CMAC
Unauthenticated
- S_DRBG: G,E
- SMRK+: W,E
- SMLK: G,E
- SMLK+: G,R
- DAK+: R
- CAK+: R
- CAAK+: E
- PSW_AUTH: E
- CAK: E
- SMKDK: G,E
- Shared Secret:
G,E,Z
- SMEK: G,E
- SMMK: G,E
cHSM_Manage_Database_Back
ups
Manage import/export of
Backup Blobs which contain
an Object for backup
purposes. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Backup Blob
and key
template/Obj
ect handle or
database
name
Object
handle or
backup
blob/Backu
p blob
KTS_CBC_CMAC
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
MAC
cHSM User
- MBKDK: E
- U_S: R,W
- U_KM: R,W
- U_Legacy: R,W
- U_PRIV: R,W
- U_PUB: R,W
- U_DSA_PUB:
R,W
- ALK: R,W
- ALK+: R,W
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 43 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Manage_Object Import or copy an assigned
key or storage object. The
object is stored either in the
cHSM or an exported Backup
Blob. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
key handle or
backup blob,
key template
key handle
or backup
blob
KTS_CBC_CMAC
PubKeyVal
cHSM User
- U_S: R,W
- U_KM: R,W
- U_PRIV: R,W
- U_PUB: R,W
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_Manage_User_Backups 1. Import or 2. export all user
account data for a given
cHSM operator for backup
purposes. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
1. Backup
data
containing
CAAK+ or
PSW_AUTH
2. Username
1. None 2.
Backup data
containing
CAAK+ or
PSW_AUTH
KTS_CBC_CMAC
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
MAC
cHSM User
- CAAK+: W,R
- PSW_AUTH: W,R
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_Manage_Users Add or delete a cHSM user or
change operator's key or
password (resets failed
authentication attempts
counter). Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
username,
user
attributes,
CAAK+,
PSW_AUTH,
permissions
short
username
None cHSM User
- CAAK+: W
- PSW_AUTH: W
cHSM_Migrate_Key Migrate keys from one
release to another, i.e.,
change an internal property
of Edwards keys. Call internal
service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key handle or
backup blob
Key handle
or backup
blob
KTS_CBC_CMAC cHSM User
- MBKDK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 44 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Open_Key Opens an assigned object
and returns a reference or
backup blob containing the
object. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Object
Attributes
Reference
or Backup
Blob
KTS_CBC_CMAC cHSM User
- MBKDK: E
- U_S: R
- U_KM: R
- U_Legacy: R
- U_PRIV: R
- U_PUB: R
- U_DSA_PUB: R
cHSM_Set_Key_Property Set one or more properties
for a key or storage object or
local or global configuration
object. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Object
handle,
Property list
Object
handle or
backup blob
KTS_CBC_CMAC cHSM User
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_Sign_Data Generates signature or
calculates MAC for given
data with an assigned signing
key. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key handle or
backup blob,
data,
mechanism
parameter
Signature or
MAC or
HMAC
MAC
SigGen
DRBG
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- U_S: E
- U_KM: E
- U_PRIV: E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- MBKDK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 45 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Status 1. Echo 2. Get any of the
following: audit log,
authentication state, boot log,
CXI Information,
Configuration Parameters,
Maximum Consecutive
Failure Counter, RAM usage
information, startup mode,
current status of the cHSM
including approved mode
indicator, current internal
time of cHSM clock, and user
information 3. Lists any of
the following: active modules,
files stored in cHSM, all
current users, and
information about users for a
given key group, properties of
user keys accessible by the
user
cHSM_Stat
us output
1. data to be
echoed 2.
Any of the
following: log
file number,
module ID, or
username. 3.
Any of the
following
lists: type of
files, key
group or
property list
for filtering
1. data 2.
Any of the
information
requested 3.
Any of the
lists
requested
including
user and
permission
list, list of
logged in
users
None cHSM User
- CTIME: R
Unauthenticated
- CTIME: R
cHSM_Time Set internal time of cHSM
clock
cHSM_Stat
us output
CTIME or
relative time
N/A None cHSM User
- CTIME: W,G
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 46 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_Verify_Signature Verify signature or MAC or
HMAC. Call internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
Key handle or
backup blob,
mechanism
parameter,
signature or
MAC or
HMAC, data
or reference
hash value
Verification
result, error
in case of a
wrong
signature
MAC
SigVer
KTS_CBC_CMAC
cHSM User
- U_PUB: E
- U_DSA_PUB: E
- U_S: E
- U_KM: E
- U_Legacy: E
- MBKDK: E
cHSM_Wrap_Unwrap_User_Key
s
Export/wrap key.
Import/unwrap key. Call
internal service
cHSM_Access_Secrets.
cHSM_Stat
us output
key (optional
wrapping key
and
mechanism
parameter),
key blob or
key template
key blob,
key handle
or blob
Auth_Block_Ciphe
r
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
DRBG
KTS_Enc
KTS_Encap_RSA
KTS_CBC_CMAC
PubKeyVal
cHSM User
- U_S: R,W,E
- U_KM: R,W
- U_Legacy: R,W
- U_PRIV: R,W,E
- U_PUB: R,W,E
- U_DSA_PUB:
R,W
- MBKDK: E
- S_DRBG: G,E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 47 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
cHSM_restart_and_self_tests Restart cHSM and initiate all
cHSM self-tests
cHSM_Stat
us output
N/A N/A DRBG
KBKDF
KTS_Enc
SigGen
cHSM User
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
put: G,E
- DRBG_Seed: G,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- CBK: E,Z
- CMK: Z,G
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: G,E
- DAK: E
- CAK: E
- CTIME: G
Unauthenticated
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
put: G,E
- DRBG_Seed: G,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- CBK: E,Z
- CMK: Z,G
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: G,E
- DAK: E
- CAK: E
- CTIME: G
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 48 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_Access_Secrets Internal service for accessing
glad-accessible secrets and
keys, i.e., CBK, VBS, OBS,
OBSEK, GAK, and DAK.
glad_Statu
s output
None None KBKDF
KTS_Enc
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: E
- CBK: E
- OBS: E
- OBSEK: E
- GAK: E
- VBS: E
- DAK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 49 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_Config 1. Get system audit log 2.
Truncate audit log 3. Fetch
boot log of a cHSM 4. List
operator secrets 5.
Get/configure cHSM
resource quota 6. Fetch and
delete system log 7. Get
license information 8. Get
system metrics 9.
Get/configure system quota
10. list cHSM templates 11.
set quorum requirements 12.
update system status
glad_Statu
s output
1. - 2. hash of
most recent
audit log
entry to be
deleted 3.
cHSM slot 4.
- 5. cHSM
slot/ cHSM
slot and
quota 6. - 7. -
8. - 9. -/new
system quota
10. - 11.
quorum
requirements
12. -
1. Glad
system
audit log 2. -
3. cHSM
boot log 4.
fingerprints
of all
operator
secrets on
device 5.
cHSM
resource
quota/- 6.
system log
7. license
file 8.
system
metrics 9.
system
quota/- 10.
list of
available
cHSM
templates
11. - 12.
update
status
None Global
Administrator
(glad)
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 50 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_End_Session Terminate current secure
messaging session
glad_Statu
s output
Session ID N/A None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- SMEK: Z
- SMMK: Z
Unauthenticated
- SMEK: Z
- SMMK: Z
glad_Login_Session Set up secure messaging and
authenticate multiple glad
users. Call internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
Names of
users,
SMRK+,
Signatures
Authenticati
on
mechanism
s, SMLK+,
Session ID,
certificates
DRBG
KAS
PubKeyVal
KeyGen
KBKDF
SigGen
SigVer
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
MAC
KTS_CBC_CMAC
Unauthenticated
- S_DRBG: G,E
- GAAK+: E
- GAK: E,G
- GAK+: G,R
- DAK: E
- DAK+: R
- SMRK+: W,E
- SMLK: G,E
- SMLK+: G,R
- SMKDK: G,E
- Shared Secret:
G,E,Z
- SMEK: G,E
- SMMK: G,E
glad_Manage_User_Backup Create or restore an
encrypted backup of a glad
user. Call internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
If restoring:
backup blob
of a glad user
If creating:
backup blob
of a glad
user
KBKDF
Unauth_Block_Cip
her
MAC
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- OBS: E
- USMK: G,E
- GAAK+: R,W
- SMEK: E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 51 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_Manage_Users Add, delete, change
credentials of global admin
glad_Statu
s output
username
and
credentials
(GAAK+) for
adding or
changing a
user;
username for
deleting a
user
N/A SHS Global
Administrator
(glad)
- GAAK+: W
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 52 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_Manage_cHSM_snapshots 1. Restore a cHSM from a
snapshot and clone to
specified cHSM slot(s). 2.
Create an encrypted cHSM
snapshot. Call internal
services
glad_Access_Secrets in both
cases.
glad_Statu
s output
1. cHSM
snapshot and
cHSM slot(s)
2. N/A
1. N/A 2.
cHSM
snapshot
KBKDF
KTS_Enc
KTS_CBC_CMAC
SigGen
MAC
DRBG
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- PSW_AUTH: W,R
- DEK: E
- CBK: W,R,E,Z
- CMK: G,E
- MBK: W,R
- CAAK+: W,R
- CAK: W,R,E
- CAK+: W,R
- ALK: W,R
- ALK+: W,R
- VBS: E
- OBS: E
- CBKEK: G,E
- SEK: G,E
- SMK: G,E
- DAK: E
- U_S: W,R
- U_KM: W,R
- U_Legacy: W,R
- U_PRIV: W,R
- U_PUB: W,R
- U_DSA_PUB:
W,R
- S_DRBG: G,E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 53 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_Status 1. List cHSM slots or glad
users 2. Get any of the
following: session
information, system quorum
requirements, system time,
system information and
approved mode indicator, or
system metrics.
glad_Statu
s output
1. N/A 2. N/A 1.
Information
about cHSM
slots or list
of all glad
users 2. Any
of the
following:
session
users and
permissions
, required
quorum for
each
command,
DTIME,
status and
version
information
and
approved
mode
indicator, or
system
metrics.
None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DTIME: R
Unauthenticated
- DTIME: R
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 54 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_System_Reset_Alarm Reset system alarm state glad_Statu
s output
N/A N/A KBKDF
DRBG
SKG
KeyGen
KTS_Enc
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DMK: G
- DAK: G
- DAK+: G
- SDMK: G,E
- SDEK: G,E
glad_Time 1. Toggle ntp time
adjustment 2. Set ntp
configuration 3. Set device
system time 4. Get ntp
configuration
glad_Statu
s output
1. flag for
activation 2.
flag for
activation
and
maximum
values for
time
adjustment 3.
DTIME 4. N/A
1. N/A 2.
N/A 3. N/A
4. ntp
configuratio
n file
None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DTIME: W,G
- CTIME: G
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 55 of 102
glad_Zeroize Clear all system data. For
more details about the
zeroization methods, see "9.3
SSP Zeroization Methods."
glad_Statu
s output
N/A N/A None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- SDMK: Z
- SDEK: Z
- DMK: Z
- DEK: Z
- VBS: Z
- DAK: Z
- OBS: Z
- OBSEK: Z
- CBK: Z
- CMK: Z
- CAK: Z
- CBKEK: Z
- SEK: Z
- SMK: Z
- USMK: Z
- MBK: Z
- MBKDK: Z
- GAK: Z
- PSW_AUTH: Z
- ALK: Z
- U_S: Z
- U_KM: Z
- U_Legacy: Z
- U_PRIV: Z
- SMLK: Z
- SMKDK: Z
- SMEK: Z
- SMMK: Z
- S_DRBG: Z
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 56 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
put: Z
- DRBG_Seed: Z
glad_chsm_create Create new cHSM from a
template. Call internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
cHSM slot,
CIAK+,
template
Certificates
over CIAK+,
DAK+, GAK+
DRBG
KeyGen
SKG
KBKDF
KTS_Enc
SigGen
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- CBK: G,E,Z
- CAK: G,E
- MBK: G
- CMK: G,E
- GAK: E
- DAK: E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- GAK+: R
- DAK+: R
- CAK+: R
- CIAK+: W,R
- S_DRBG: G,E
glad_chsm_delete Remove a cHSM from the
module and remove its
associated data. The cHSM
must be halted before it can
be removed.
glad_Statu
s output
cHSM slot N/A None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- PSW_AUTH: Z
- U_S: Z
- U_KM: Z
- U_Legacy: Z
- U_PRIV: Z
- CAK: Z
- CMK: Z
- ALK: Z
- MBK: Z
- MBKDK: Z
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 57 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_device_restart_and_self_te
sts
Restart the device and initiate
the glad self-tests. If
glad_system_update was
performed beforehand,
glad_device_restart_and_self_
tests activates the new
image.
glad_Statu
s output
N/A N/A DRBG
KBKDF
KTS_Enc
MAC
SHS
SigGen
SigVer
Global
Administrator
(glad)
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
put: G,E
- DRBG_Seed: G,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- CBK: E
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: G,E
- DAK: E
- GAK+: E
- CAK+: E
- ISK+: G,E
Unauthenticated
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
put: G,E
- DRBG_Seed: G,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- CBK: E
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: G,E
- DAK: E
- GAK+: E
- CAK+: E
- ISK+: G,E
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 58 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_key_get_csr Get certificate signing
request for the device
authentication key. Call
internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
N/A CSR for the
DAK
SigGen Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DAK: E
- DAK+: R
glad_key_get_wrapping_key Generate and store the RSA
OAEP wrapping key. Call
internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
Key size Certificate
over
OBSEK+
KeyGen
SigGen
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- OBSEK: G
- OBSEK+: G,R
- DAK: E
glad_key_import_cert Import an operator DAK
certificate
glad_Statu
s output
Operator DAK
certificate
N/A None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DAK+: W
glad_manage_operator_secret Delete operator secret or
import a new wrapped
operator secret and mark it
as active. Call internal service
glad_Access_Secrets.
glad_Statu
s output
Fingerprint of
OBS, OBS
wrapped with
OBSEK
Fingerprint
of OBS
KTS_Encap_RSA Global
Administrator
(glad)
- OBS: W
- OBSEK: E,Z
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 59 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_system_restart_and_self_t
ests
Restart the device and initiate
the glad self-tests. If
glad_system_update was
performed beforehand,
glad_system_restart
activates the new image.
glad_Statu
s output
N/A N/A DRBG
KBKDF
KTS_Enc
MAC
SHS
SigGen
SigVer
Global
Administrator
(glad)
-
DRBG_Entropy_In
put: G,E
- DRBG_Seed: G,E
- S_DRBG: G,E
- DMK: E
- DEK: G,E
- CBK: E
- SDMK: E
- SDEK: G,E
- DAK: E
- GAK+: E
- CAK+: E
- ISK+: G,E
glad_system_set_time_delay Set delta time delay glad_Statu
s output
Flag for
setting time
(backwards
or forwards),
time delta
N/A None Global
Administrator
(glad)
- DTIME: G
- CTIME: G
Unauthenticated
- DTIME: G
- CTIME: G
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 60 of 102
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
glad_system_update Update the device firmware
including operational
bootloader, glad firmware,
and cHSM templates.
Existing cHSMs will be
deleted.
glad_Statu
s output
System
image binary
N/A SigVer
KTS_CBC_CMAC
Global
Administrator
(glad)
- GIAK+: W
- ISK+: W,E
- SMEK: E
- SMMK: E
- PSW_AUTH: Z
- U_S: Z
- U_KM: Z
- U_Legacy: Z
- U_PRIV: Z
- CAK: Z
- CMK: Z
- ALK: Z
- MBK: Z
- MBKDK: Z
Table 15: Approved Services
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 61 of 102
4.4 Non-Approved Services
In the Non-Approved mode, the module supports all services from the Approved mode
with the additional services and modifications listed in Table 16.
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Agree Secret Calculate a shared secret from two
ECDH or ECDSA keys as described
in TR-03111.
ECC point
multiplicatio
n according
to TR-03111
cHSM User
cHSM: Allocate Key
using non-approved,
not allowed key types
or mechanisms
cHSM_Allocate_Key service with the
following key types or sizes is
allowed only in non-approved mode:
symmetric key of size < 112.
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
cHSM User
cHSM: any
authenticated services
without Secure
Messaging
In non-approved mode, it is possible
to execute an authenticated
command without Secure
Messaging.
cHSM User
cHSM: any services
involving
authentication using
non-approved curves
for ECDSA
In non-approved mode, all available
curves can be used during cHSM
User authentication.
EC
Cryptograph
y (non-
compliant)
ECDSA with
K-/B-curves:
K-233, K-
283, K-409,
K-571, B-
233, B-283,
B-409, B-
571
FRP256v1
Curve
secp256k1
Curve
cHSM User
cHSM: Compute Hash
using non-approved,
not allowed key types
or mechanisms
cHSM_Compute_Hash service with
the following key types or sizes is
allowed only in non-approved mode:
DES, RAW with size < 112
MD5, MDC-
2, RIPEMD-
160 (non-
compliant)
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
TDES MAC
cHSM User
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 62 of 102
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Crypt Data
using non-approved,
not allowed key types
or mechanisms
cHSM_Crypt_Data service with the
following key types or sizes is
allowed only in non-approved mode:
DES, TDES in CBC and ECB modes,
AES CTR, AES CBC with 0 IV, GCM
with initial IV generated externally,
RSA with key length < 2048, ECDSA
with key length < 224, ECIES
encryption
RSA
Encryption
(non-
compliant)
EC
Cryptograph
y (non-
compliant)
EC
Encryption
with ECIES
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
AES CTR
mode (non-
compliant)
AES GCM
mode (non-
compliant)
AES CBC
with 0 IV
(non-
compliant)
cHSM User
cHSM: Cryptographic
functions with flag
CXI_MECH_VDM_FLAG
or algorithm specifier
CXI_KEY_ALGO_CUSTO
M
When a cryptographic function is
called with the flag
CXI_MECH_VDM_FLAG or the
algorithm specifier
CXI_KEY_ALGO_CUSTOM then the
respective functions for the Chinese
algorithms are used.
Chinese
Algorithms
SM2, SM3,
SM4
according
to IETF
drafts
cHSM User
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 63 of 102
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Derive Key
using non-approved,
not allowed key types
or mechanisms
cHSM_Derive_Key service with the
following key types or mechanisms
is allowed only in non-approved
mode: symmetric key of size < 112,
ECDSA with non-approved, not
allowed curves, DSA/DH/DH_PKCS,
several non-approved key derivation
mechanisms, which are blocked in
approved mode
DSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
EC
Cryptograph
y (non-
compliant)
ECDSA with
K-/B-curves:
K-233, K-
283, K-409,
K-571, B-
233, B-283,
B-409, B-
571
FRP256v1
Curve
Montgomer
y Curves:
Curve448,
Curve25519
secp256k1
Curve
FFC Key
Agreement
KDF (non-
compliant)
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
cHSM User
cHSM: Generate DSA
domain parameters
Generate DSA Param, DSA Param
PQ, DSA Param G needed to create
a DSA key.
DSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
cHSM User
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 64 of 102
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Generate Key or
Key Pair using non-
approved, not allowed
key types or
mechanisms
cHSM_Generate_User_keys service
with the following types: symmetric
keys of size < 112, RSA with key
length < 2048, key generation
mechanism other than
CXI_MECH_KEYGEN_FIPS_PRIME,
ECDSA with non-approved, not
allowed curves, DSA/DH/DH_PKCS.
RSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
DSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
EC
Cryptograph
y (non-
compliant)
ECDSA with
K-/B-curves:
K-233, K-
283, K-409,
K-571, B-
233, B-283,
B-409, B-
571
FRP256v1
Curve
Montgomer
y Curves:
Curve448,
Curve25519
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
cHSM User
cHSM: Import DB Entry Import an encrypted database entry
created by the function Export DB
Entry, which is now deprecated.
AES CBC
with 0 IV
(non-
compliant)
cHSM User
cHSM: List Registered
Functions
Return a list with the module IDs of
the firmware modules with external
interfaces.
cHSM User,
Unauthenticat
ed
cHSM: Restore User
with a backup blob with
0 IV
In non-approved mode, it is possible
to restore user data taken from a
backup data blob that was output
by the Backup User function in
previous versions. These backup
data were encrypted using AES CBC
encryption with 0 IV.
AES CBC
with 0 IV
(non-
compliant)
cHSM User
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 65 of 102
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Sign using non-
approved, not allowed
key types or
mechanisms
cHSM_Sign_Data service with the
following key types or sizes is
allowed only in non-approved mode:
DES, AES CBC MAC, GMAC initial IV
generated externally, RAW with size
< 112, RSA with key size < 2048;
hash-algos: SHA-1, MD5, RIPEMD-
160; ANSI X9.31, no padding,
ECDSA with non-allowed curves
(see column algorithms),
DSA/DH/DH_PKCS
RSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
DSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
EC
Cryptograph
y (non-
compliant)
ECDSA with
K-/B-curves:
K-233, K-
283, K-409,
K-571, B-
233, B-283,
B-409, B-
571
FRP256v1
Curve
MD5, MDC-
2, RIPEMD-
160 (non-
compliant)
DES
TDES MAC
TDES ANSI
retail MAC
AES GMAC
with
external
initial IV
(non-
compliant)
AES CBC
MAC (non-
compliant)
cHSM User
cHSM: unauthenticated
Get Session Key
In non-approved mode, a session
key can be obtained (via a function
called Get_Session_Key) without
authentication.cHSM_Get_Session_
Key and cHSM_End_Session
services can be performed without
authentication.
Unauthenticat
ed
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 66 of 102
Name Description Algorithms Role
cHSM: Unwrap, Import
Key using non-
approved, not allowed
key types or
mechanisms for the
unwrapping
The functions Unwrap, Import Key
with the following key types or sizes
are allowed only in non-approved
mode: DES, AES CTR, RSA with key
size < 2048
RSA
Encryption
(non-
compliant)
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
AES CTR
mode (non-
compliant)
cHSM User
cHSM: Verify using
non-approved, not
allowed key types or
mechanisms
cHSM_Verify_Signature service with
the following key types or sizes is
allowed only in non-approved mode:
DES, AES CBC MAC, RSA with key
size < 1024; hash-algos: MD5,
RIPEMD-160; no padding, ECDSA
with non-approved, not allowed
curves (see column algorithms),
DSA/DH/DH_PKCS
RSA
Signature
(non-
compliant)
FRP256v1
Curve
MD5, MDC-
2, RIPEMD-
160 (non-
compliant)
DES
TDES ANSI
retail MAC
AES CBC
MAC (non-
compliant)
cHSM User
cHSM: Wrap, Export
Key using non-
approved, not allowed
key types or
mechanisms for the
wrapping
The functions Wrap, Export Key
with the following key types or sizes
are allowed only in non-approved
mode: DES, AES CTR, CBC 0 IV,
GCM initial IV generated externally,
RSA with key size < 2048, PKCS1
v1.5
RSA
Encryption
(non-
compliant)
DES
TDES in
CBC and
ECB modes
AES CTR
mode (non-
compliant)
AES GCM
mode (non-
compliant)
AES CBC
with 0 IV
(non-
compliant)
cHSM User
Table 16: Non-Approved Services
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 67 of 102
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
Firmware can only be loaded to the module using the service glad_system_update, which
allows loading of an operational image if and only if
• the operator successfully authenticates as a Global Administrator (i.e., Crypto
Officer),
• and the image being loaded is accompanied by a valid ECDSA signature (i.e.,
passes ECDSA signature verification algorithm Cert. #A6714) corresponding to
the Image Signing Key ISK+.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 68 of 102
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module checks the integrity of the firmware components during pre-operational
tests (during power-on) as well as automatically each 24 hours as conditional (periodic)
tests. Descriptions of these tests are given in Sections 10.1 and 10.2. The algorithms for
integrity testing are CRC32, SHA3-384 (used as an EDC), SHA2-256, SHA2-512, and
HMAC-SHA2-256. The HMAC key for HMAC-SHA2-256 computation is a 256-bit fixed
value stored in the flash memory.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
All self-tests may be invoked on demand by power-cycling the module.
Additionally, the glad services “glad_system_restart_and_self_tests" and
“glad_device_restart_and_self_tests” restart the module and therewith trigger all self-
tests including firmware integrity tests. “glad_system_restart_and_self_tests" requires
authentication. “glad_device_restart_and_self_tests” does not require authentication.
The cHSM service “cHSM_restart_and_self_tests” triggers cHSM self-tests including
firmware integrity tests. It does not require authentication.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 69 of 102
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module is defined as a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module whose
operational environment is classified as limited. The FIPS 140-3 Area 6 Operational
Environment requirements are not applicable because the cryptographic module does
not contain a modifiable operational environment. The module has the ability to load its
firmware from Flash memory. Only the firmware versions identified on the module’s
validation certificate are included in the scope of this validation. Any other firmware
loaded onto the module is not validated and would require a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 70 of 102
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module encapsulated in a hard,
opaque, tamper-evident coating. It entails a list of physical security mechanisms, which
perform their functions autonomously and under all circumstances.
On the top side of the module a (hollow) metal heat sink is directly mounted on the
printed circuit board on three edges, and the space between the PCB and the heat sink is
completely filled with potting material (epoxy resin). On the bottom side of the PCB, a
metal frame is stuck directly onto the printed circuit board, and the space inside the
metal frame is completely filled with potting material. Epoxy hardness testing was
performed over the module’s storage, distribution and operating temperature range from
-10˚C to +60˚C.
The heat sink and potting material together define the top and bottom sides of the
module and deliver a hard, opaque coating. All the cryptographic module’s hardware
components (which are all mounted on the PCB) are entirely covered by this coating.
The module with its tamper-evident enclosure (the heat sink and the potting material and
the sensor patch wires) implements the following physical security mechanisms:
• The cryptographic module’s hardware components are covered by hard, opaque
potting material or the heat sink which show evidence of tampering on the
enclosure when a physical attack is attempted.
The potting material is hard and opaque enough to prevent direct observation
and easy penetration to the depth of the underlying hardware components. It is
highly probable that anyone attempting to penetrate to the depth of the circuitry
will break off large pieces of potting material, disrupt one of the tamper wires and
activate the tamper response, or at least tear off important hardware
components of the module, causing serious damage to the module.
• Active tamper response and zeroization circuitry.
Two sensor patch wires (covered by potting material) are observed by the
sensory controller. If any of these are disrupted (i.e. in the case of physical
attack), the sensory controller activates the tamper response.
Temperature sensors activate a tamper response if the module is outside of the
defined temperature range of –18°C to 81°C (-0.4°F to 177.8°F).
Voltage sensors monitor the power supply of the module and activate a tamper
response if the power input is outside of the defined range (including low or
removed battery).
Tamper response and zeroization circuitry is active while module is in standby
mode (powered down).
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 71 of 102
Zeroization is performed within less than 7 milliseconds after tamper detection
(temperature or voltage outside of defined range or disrupted sensor patch
wires).
• The module regularly inverts all bits of the plaintext master keys (DMK and
SDMK) in the persistent storage referred to as Key RAM to avoid “burn in” of
information into SRAM cells.
To ensure security of the cryptographic module, the module must be periodically
inspected for evidence of tampering. The recommended inspection schedule depends
on the customer’s application area. This may vary between inspecting the module once
a week and once a year.
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Tamper-evident
enclosure
Inspection for evidence of tampering on
receipt and periodically depending on the
application area and operational
environment. This may vary between
inspecting the module once a week and
once a year
Optical inspection
Tamper
response and
zeroization
circuitry
N/A No inspection needed: In
case of detected tamper,
u.trust Anchor erases all
cHSMs which immediately
stops all cHSM services.
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
As part of the module's general alarm mechanism, measures are taken to protect
against environmental failures. Alarm triggering temperature and voltage ranges and
protection capabilities are described in Table 18.
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature < -18C EFP Zeroisation
HighTemperature > 81C EFP Zeroisation
LowVoltage < 2.1V EFP Zeroisation
HighVoltage > 13.9V EFP Zeroisation
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
The module has been tested at the operational, storage, and distribution temperatures
listed in Table 19. The module’s hardness is assured within these ranges.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 72 of 102
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -10C
HighTemperature 60C
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 73 of 102
8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not provide protection against non-invasive security methods.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 74 of 102
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
SSPs are stored in areas defined in Table 20.
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Cache Part of the DDR4 RAM used as cache for encrypted or non-
confidential data and instruction code during runtime.
Dynamic
Flash Provided by the eMMC. Persistently stores firmware and encrypted
or non-confidential data.
Static
Key RAM Internal RAM located in the sensory controller. Persistently stores
unencrypted system keys. Zeroised in case of an alarm.
Static
Secure
RAM
Sensory protected part of the DDR4 RAM. Stores unencrypted keys
during runtime. Zeroised in case of an alarm.
Dynamic
Table 20: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Specific SSPs may be entered and output from the module via various methods, which
include plaintext or protected by either a secure channel established through Secure
Messaging or an Approved KTS. Table 21 lists all SSP input-output methods.
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
CE External Cache Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS
CO Cache External Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS
FO Flash External Plaintext Automated Electronic
FSME External Flash Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS_CBC_CMAC
FSMO Flash External Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS_CBC_CMAC
KTSE External Flash Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS_Encap_RSA
SSME External Secure RAM
or cache
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS_CBC_CMAC
SSMO Secure RAM
or cache
External Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS_CBC_CMAC
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Table 22 lists all of the SSP zeroization methods.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 75 of 102
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Alarm Physical Zeroizes SDMK and
DMK in Key RAM.
Zeroizes Secure RAM
and associated
caches.
Through tamper detection or by means
of environmental failure protection.
Erase Physical,
Service
Zeroizes DMK in Key
RAM. Zeroizes Secure
RAM and associated
caches.
1) By pushing the external erase button
when the operator has physical access to
the device or 2) by the global admin
(Crypto Officer) via glad interface or 3) by
pushing the external erase followed by an
erasure via glad interface.
Auto Automatic After the CSP in
Secure RAM is used
and no longer needed,
it is automatically
zeroized.
N/A
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
The SSPs used in the module are listed in Table 23 and Table 24.
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
ALK cHSM
Audit Log
Signature
Key: Signs
audit log
EC P-256,
RSA 3072 -
128
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
SigGen
ALK+ Public
cHSM
Audit Log
Signature
Key: Audit
Log
Signature
Verificatio
n,
exportable
EC P-256,
RSA 3072 -
128
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
SigVer
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
AMSK+ Public
Alternativ
e Module
Signature
Key:
Verifies
integrity
and
authenticit
y of a
loaded
configurat
ion file.
RSA 2048 -
112
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
CAAK+ cHSM
Operator
Public
Authentic
ation Key:
cHSM
operator
authentica
tion
RSA at least
2048, EC
224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521 -
112-256
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
CAK Container
Authentic
ation Key:
Container
Authentic
ation for
Secure
Messagin
g
EC P-521 -
256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
SigGen
CAK+ Public
Container
Authentic
ation Key:
Container
Authentic
ation for
Secure
Messagin
g,
exportable
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
SigVer
CBK Container
Base Key:
Derives
Container
Master
Key
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
SKG KBKDF
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
CBKEK Container
Base Key
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
CBK in
snapshot
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_Enc
CIAK+ cHSM
operator
Initial
Admin
Key: initial
cHSM
operator
authentica
tion
RSA at least
2048, EC P-
256, P-521 -
112-256
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
CMK Container
Master
Key:
Encrypts
secrets
within
cHSM
container
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_Enc
CTIME Container
time:
Internal
time of
the cHSM
144 - N/A Public -
PSP
N/A
DAK Device
Authentic
ation Key:
Generates
device
individual
certificate
s
EC P-521 -
256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
SigGen
DAK+ Public
Device
Authentic
ation Key:
Certificate
verificatio
n,
exportable
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
SigVer
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
DEK DMK-
Derived
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
all glad
secrets
apart from
vendor
secret and
DAK
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_Enc
DMK Device
Master
Key: Key
derivation
key for
DEK
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
SKG KBKDF
DRBG_Entropy
_Input
DRBG
Entropy
Input to
the DRBG
512 - 256 ENT - CSP Interna
lly by
ESV
E108
DRBG
DRBG_Seed Seed for
the DRBG,
used to
initialize
the DRBG
state
888 - 256 ENT - CSP Interna
lly by
ESV
E108
DRBG
DTIME System
time of
the
device:
Internal
time of
the device
(glad)
64 - N/A Public -
PSP
N/A
GAAK+ Glad
Admin
Authentic
ation Key:
glad
operator
authentica
tion
RSA at least
2048, EC P-
256, P-521,
brainpoolP3
20t - 112-
256
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 79 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
GAK Glad
Authentic
ation Key:
Device
Authentic
ation for
Secure
Messagin
g
EC P-521 -
256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
SigGen
GAK+ Public
glad
Authentic
ation Key:
Device
Authentic
ation for
Secure
Messagin
g,
exportable
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
SigVer
GIAK+ Glad Initial
Admin
Authentic
ation Key:
initial glad
operator
authentica
tion
EC P-256 -
128
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
ISK+ Image
Signing
Key:
Authentic
ates new
boot
images on
download
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
MBK Master
Backup
Key:
Derives
keys for
handling
cHSM
data
backups
128, 192,
256 - 128,
192, 256
Symmetri
c - CSP
SKG KBKDF
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
MBKDK MBK-
Derived
Keys:
Keys for
handling
cHSM
data
backups
256 - 128,
192, 256
Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_CBC_CMA
C
Unauth_Block_
Cipher
MAC
OBS Operator
Base
Secret:
Derives
backup
and
snapshot
keys
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
Extern
al
KBKDF
OBSEK Operator
Base
Secret
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
Operator
Base
Secret on
import
RSA 2048-
16384 -
112-256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
KTS_Encap_RS
A
OBSEK+ Public
Operator
Base
Secret
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
Operator
Base
Secret on
import
RSA 2048-
16384 -
112-256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
KTS_Encap_RS
A
PSW_AUTH cHSM
User
Password
for cHSM
User
authentica
tion
minimum 8
characters -
N/A
Authentic
ation -
CSP
Extern
al
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 81 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
SDEK SDMK-
Derived
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
vendor
secret and
DAK
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_Enc
SDMK Sticky
Device
Master
Key: Key
derivation
key for
SDEK
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
SKG KBKDF
SEK Snapshot
Encryptio
n Key:
Encrypts
cHSM
container
in
snapshot
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_Enc
SMEK Session
Keys:
derived
from
SMKDK
per NIST
SP 800-
108 and
used for
Secure
Messagin
g
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_CBC_CMA
C
Unauth_Block_
Cipher
SMK Snapshot
MAC Key:
Protects
Integrity
of cHSM
snapshot
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF MAC
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
SMKDK Secure
Messagin
g Session
Key
Derivation
Key:
derived
from
Shared
Secret via
KDA
OneStep
NIST SP
800-56C
and used
to derive
session
keys for
Secure
Messagin
g
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KAS KBKDF
SMLK Secure
Messagin
g Local
Diffie-
Hellman
Key:
generated
by the
glad as
well as
each
cHSM for
Secure
Messagin
g with
ECDH
EC P-521 -
256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
KAS
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
SMLK+ Secure
Messagin
g Local
Public
ECDH
Key:
generated
by the
module
(glad or
cHSM)
and used
for ECDH
for Secure
Messagin
g
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
KAS
SMMK Session
Keys:
derived
from
SMKDK
per NIST
SP 800-
108 and
used for
Secure
Messagin
g
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF KTS_CBC_CMA
C
MAC
SMRK+ Secure
Messagin
g Remote
Public
ECDH
Key:
generated
by the
host and
used for
ECDH for
Secure
Messagin
g (glad or
cHSM)
EC P-521 -
256
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
PubKeyVal
KAS
S_DRBG DRBG
Secrets V
and C
888 - 256 ENT - CSP DRBG DRBG
KeyGen
SKG
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Shared Secret ECDH key
establish
ment
Shared
Secret per
NIST SP
800-56Ar3
EC 224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521 -
112-256
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS KAS
USMK User
Snapshot
MAC key:
Protects
integrity
of user
backup
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
KBKDF MAC
U_DSA_PUB Public
DSA User
Key for
signature
verificatio
n
1024/160,
2048/224,
2048/256 or
3072/256 -
80, 112, 128
Public -
PSP
Extern
al
SigVer
U_KM User Key
Material
>=112 -
>=112
Symmetri
c - CSP
KAS
SKG
KAS SKG
MAC
KAS
U_Legacy HMAC key
for legacy
used
(HMAC
verificatio
n only)
80-111 - 80-
111
Symmetri
c - CSP
Extern
al
MAC
U_PRIV User
Asymmetr
ic Private
Key for
signature
generatio
n, key
wrapping,
and key
agreemen
t
RSA at least
2048 for
SigGen and
KTS_Encap_
RSA, EC
224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521 for
SigGen and
KAS,
ed25519
and ed448
for SigGen -
112-256
Private -
CSP
KeyGe
n
SigGen
KTS_Encap_RS
A
KAS
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 85 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
U_PUB User
Asymmetr
ic Public
Key for
signature
verificatio
n, key
wrapping,
and key
agreemen
t
RSA at least
1024 for
SigVer, RSA
at least
2048 for
KTS_Encap_
RSA, EC
163-571 for
SigVer, KAS
and
PubKeyVal,
ed25519
and ed448
for SigVer -
80-256
Public -
PSP
KeyGe
n
SigVer
KTS_Encap_RS
A
KAS
PubKeyVal
U_S AES User
Key: Key
Encryptio
n, Data
Encryptio
n or MAC
128, 192,
256 - 128,
192, 256
Symmetri
c - CSP
KAS
SKG
Auth_Block_Cip
her
Unauth_Block_
Cipher
MAC
KTS_Enc
KAS
VBS Vendor
Base
Secret:
Derives
snapshot
keys
256 - 256 Symmetri
c - CSP
Extern
al
KBKDF
Table 23: SSP Table 1
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
ALK FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
ALK+:Paired With
CMK:Encrypted By
ALK+ FO
FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A ALK:Paired With
AMSK+ FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 86 of 102
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
CAAK+ FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
CAK FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CAK+:Paired With
CMK:Encrypted By
CAK+ FSME
FSM
O
FO
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A CAK:Paired With
DAK:Signed By
CBK FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DEK:Encrypted By
CMK:Derives
CBKEK:Encrypted By
CBKEK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CBK:Encrypts
VBS:Derived From
OBS:Derived From
CIAK+ FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
CMK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CBK:Derived From
CTIME FO
FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
N/A
DAK Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SDEK:Encrypted By
DAK+:Paired With
GAK+:Signs
CAK+:Signs
DAK+ FSM
O
FO
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A DAK:Paired With
GAK+:Verifies
CAK+:Verifies
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 87 of 102
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
DEK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DMK:Derived From
DMK Key
RAM:Plaintext
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DEK:Derives
DRBG_Entropy_In
put
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DRBG_Seed:Derives
DRBG_Seed Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DRBG_Entropy_Input:Deri
ved From
S_DRBG:Derives
DTIME FO
FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
N/A
GAAK+ FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
GAK Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DEK:Encrypted By
GAK+:Paired With
GAK+ FSM
O
FO
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A GAK:Paired With
DAK:Signed By
GIAK+ FSME Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
ISK+ FSME Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 88 of 102
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
MBK FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CMK:Encrypted By
MBKDK:Derives
MBKDK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
MBK:Derived From
OBS FSME
KTSE
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DEK:Encrypted By
OBSEK+:Encrypted By
CBKEK:Derives
SEK:Derives
SMK:Derives
USMK:Derives
OBSEK Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DEK:Encrypted By
OBSEK+:Paired With
OBSEK+ Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A OBSEK:Paired With
OBS:Encrypts
PSW_AUTH FSME
FSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CMK:Encrypted By
SDEK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SDMK:Derived From
SDMK Key
RAM:Plaintext
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SDEK:Derives
SEK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
VBS:Derived From
OBS:Derived From
SMEK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SMKDK:Derived From
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 89 of 102
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SMK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CBK:Used With
VBS:Derived From
OBS:Derived From
SMKDK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SMEK:Derives
SMMK:Derives
SMLK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SMLK+:Paired With
SMLK+ CO Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A SMLK:Paired With
SMMK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SMKDK:Derived From
SMRK+ CE Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
S_DRBG Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
DRBG_Seed:Derived From
Shared Secret Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SMKDK:Derives
USMK Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
OBS:Derived From
U_DSA_PUB FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 90 of 102
Name Input
-
Outpu
t
Storage Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
U_KM FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CMK:Encrypted By
U_Legacy FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CMK:Encrypted By
U_PRIV FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
U_PUB:Paired With
CMK:Encrypted By
U_PUB FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Plaintex
t
Cache:Plainte
xt
N/A U_PRIV:Paired With
U_S FSME
FSM
O
SSME
SSM
O
Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
CMK:Encrypted By
VBS Flash:Encrypt
ed
Secure
RAM:Plaintext
Until
no
longer
needed
Alarm
Erase
Auto
SDEK:Encrypted By
CBKEK:Derives
SEK:Derives
SMK:Derives
Table 24: SSP Table 2
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 91 of 102
10 Self-Tests
The following pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. All
self-tests are performed regardless of whether the module is in the Approved or Non-
Approved mode. The data output interface is inhibited whenever the cryptographic
module is in a self-test condition.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The pre-operational tests listed in Table 25 are performed upon power-up and on
demand, the latter by power-cycling the module. The module logs an appropriate error
message and transitions to its error state if the test fails. Each approved algorithm in the
pre-operational tests is conditionally self-tested prior to its invocation. SHA3-384 is also
used as an EDC for the integrity test of the bootRom and BOOT.bin as a part of the pre-
operational tests.
Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
cHSM
firmware
integrity
test
SHA2-512
(A6715) or
CRC32
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
cHSM_Status will show
operational mode in
case of success.
Otherwise, the module
will be in Critical Error
state.
Verification of
cHSM
firmware
modules
glad
firmware
integrity
test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6714)
Key length 160
bits or SHA2-
256 (A6714)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
glad_Status will show
approved mode in case
of success. Otherwise,
an error will be logged or
the module will be in
Critical Error state.
Verification of
glad services
and SMOS
SHA2-256
(A1563)
N/A KAT SW/FW
Integrity
glad_Status will show
approved mode in case
of success. Otherwise,
an error will be logged or
the module will be in
Critical Error State.
Verification of
boot image
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the conditional self-tests listed in Table 26. Cryptographic
algorithm self-tests (CAST) are performed on power-up and on-demand. All other
conditional tests are triggered when the conditions specified for the tests occur.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 92 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A6713,
A6714)
Encrypt
Key length
256 bits, IV
96 bits, Tag
128 bits
KAT CAST Implicit Encrypt Prior to
first use
AES-GCM
(A6713,
A6714)
Decrypt
Key length
256 bits, IV
96 bits, Tag
128 bits
KAT CAST Implicit Decrypt Prior to
first use
DSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A6713)
Key Length
2048 bits
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
ECDSA
SigGen (FIPS
186-5)
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
P-256, B-
283, SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Generation
KAT
Prior to
first use
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
(A6713,
A6716,
A6717)
P-256, B-
283, SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
fist use
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
P-256, B-
283, SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6714)
P-521 Signature
Verificatio
n
SW/FW
Load
Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
When
loading
new
firmware
EDDSA
SigGen
(A6713,
A6716)
Ed25519,
Ed448,
Ed25519ctx
, Ed448ctx,
SHA2-512,
SHAKE256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Generation
KAT
Prior to
first use
EDDSA SigVer
(A6713,
A6716)
Ed25519,
Ed448,
Ed25519ctx
, Ed448ctx,
SHA2-512,
SHAKE256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 93 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditions
Hash DRBG
(A6714,
A6715)
Hash DRBG,
SHA2-512
based
KAT CAST Implicit NIST SP 800-
90A Health
Tests for
Instantiate,
Generate,
Reseed
Prior to
first use
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6713,
A6714)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Implicit MAC Prior to
first use
KAS-ECC-SSC
SP800-56Ar3
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
P-256, B-
283
KAT CAST Implicit Shared Secret
Computation
KAT
Prior to
first use
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
(A6713,
A6714)
SHA2-256,
SHA3-256
KAT CAST Implicit Key
Derivation
Prior to
first use
KDF ANS 9.63
(A6713)
X9.63 KAT CAST Implicit Key
Derivation
Prior to
first use
KDF TLS
(A6713)
TLS 1.2
KDF
KAT CAST Implicit Key
Derivation
Prior to
first use
KDF SP800-
108 (A6713,
A6714)
HMAC-
SHA256
feedback
mode
KAT CAST Implicit Key
Derivation
Prior to
first use
KTS-IFC
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
Encapsulation
Key Length
2048 bits
KAT CAST Implicit Encapsulation
KAT
Prior to
first use
KTS-IFC
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
Decapsulatio
n
Key Length
2048 bits
KAT CAST Implicit Decapsulatio
n KAT
Prior to
first use
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 94 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditions
Public Key
Validation
P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521, ED-
25519, ED-
448
N/A Critical
Functio
n
Implicit KAS-ECC
Peer Public
Key, ECDSA
Public Key,
EDDSA Public
Key
Prior to
first use
PWCT
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
Sign/Verify Sign/Verify PCT Implicit ECDSA (FIPS
186-5), RSA
(FIPS 186-5)
Upon key
generatio
n
PWCT
(A6713,
A6716)
Sign/Verify Sign/Verify PCT Implicit EDDSA Upon key
generatio
n
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713,
A6716,
A6717)
2048-bit
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Generation
KAT
Prior to
first use
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-2)
(A6713,
A6716,
A6717)
2048-bit
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
(A6713,
A6716,
A6717)
2048-bit
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713,
A6714,
A6716,
A6717)
2048-bit
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital
Signature
Verification
KAT
Prior to
first use
SHA2-256
(A1563)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Implicit Hash KAT Prior to
first use
SHA2-512
(A6715)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Implicit Hash KAT Prior to
first use
SHA3-224
(A6713)
SHA3-224 KAT CAST Implicit Hash KAT Prior to
first use
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 95 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditions
SHS (A6713,
A6714)
SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Implicit Hash KAT Prior to
first use
SP800-90B APT, RCT NIST SP
800-90B
Health
Tests
CAST Implicit APT, RCT Upon use
Table 26: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
The module performs the glad firmware integrity test and the cHSM firmware integrity
test automatically without external input or control every 24 hours. SHA2-256 (Cert.
#A1563) pre-operational test is exempt from the periodic test requirements per IG 10.3.E
Resolution 3.c.
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
cHSM firmware
integrity test
KAT SW/FW Integrity Every 24 hours Automatic
glad firmware
integrity test
KAT SW/FW Integrity Every 24 hours Automatic
SHA2-256
(A1563)
KAT SW/FW Integrity N/A N/A
Table 27: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM
(A6713, A6714)
Encrypt
KAT CAST N/A N/A
AES-GCM
(A6713, A6714)
Decrypt
KAT CAST N/A N/A
DSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A6713)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713, A6714,
A6716, A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 96 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
(A6713, A6716,
A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713, A6714,
A6716, A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6714)
Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load N/A N/A
EDDSA SigGen
(A6713, A6716)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
EDDSA SigVer
(A6713, A6716)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
Hash DRBG
(A6714, A6715)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6713,
A6714)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KAS-ECC-SSC
SP800-56Ar3
(A6713, A6714,
A6716, A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
(A6713, A6714)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KDF ANS 9.63
(A6713)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KDF TLS
(A6713)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KDF SP800-108
(A6713, A6714)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KTS-IFC (A6713,
A6714, A6716,
A6717)
Encapsulation
KAT CAST N/A N/A
KTS-IFC (A6713,
A6714, A6716,
A6717)
Decapsulation
KAT CAST N/A N/A
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 97 of 102
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Public Key
Validation
N/A Critical Function N/A N/A
PWCT (A6713,
A6714, A6716,
A6717)
Sign/Verify PCT N/A N/A
PWCT (A6713,
A6716)
Sign/Verify PCT N/A N/A
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713, A6716,
A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-2)
(A6713, A6716,
A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
(A6713, A6716,
A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-5)
(A6713, A6714,
A6716, A6717)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
SHA2-256
(A1563)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
SHA2-512
(A6715)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
SHA3-224
(A6713)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
SHS (A6713,
A6714)
KAT CAST N/A N/A
SP800-90B NIST SP 800-
90B Health
Tests
CAST N/A N/A
Table 28: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The module transitions into the error states when an error condition is encountered and
provides an error status indicator as specified in Table 29. All data output and
cryptographic functions are inhibited while the module is in an error state.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 98 of 102
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Critical
Error
The
module is
unable to
perform
any action
or services
or cHSM
does not
accept
security-
relevant
commands
or any
command.
Critical
error during
pre-
operational
self-tests or
error during
cHSM
initialization
or self-test
phase or
integrity FW
test failure.
Reset or power-cycle or restart the
cHSM
Implicit. No
communication
possible with
the device or
cHSMs or
cHSM_Status
service
answers with
"error state =
ON" and mode
= 'Operational'
Hard
Error
Alarm
event or
external
erase or
boot image
update
failure.
Physical
alarm or
external
erase event
triggered or
failure in
the
secondary
boot image
Invoke glad_System_Reset_Alarm
or glad_system_update with
succeeding
glad_system_restart_and_self_tests
Implicit.
glad_Status
returns "Alarm"
or contains
"recovery"
Transient
Error
Entropy
source or
DRBG pre-
operational
or
conditional
tests
failure.
Entropy
source, glad
DRBG, or
cHSM
DRBG pre-
operational
or
conditional
tests
failure.
Automatically Implicit. TRNG
returns an error
or any glad or
cHSM service
requesting new
random bits
return an error.
Table 29: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
At any time, the Global Administrator operator can force the module to perform all
power-up self-tests via the following services: glad_device_restart_and_self_tests and
glad_system_restart_and_self_tests. Each cHSM operator can force their cHSM to
perform all cHSM power-up self-tests via the cHSM_restart_and_self_tests service.
Document No.: 2020-0031 Document version: 2.3.6 Page 99 of 102
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The administration manual delivered with the product bundle describes in details
procedures for installing, initializing, and starting the module.
Configuration of Approved Mode:
Global Administrator operators use the gladm tool to access the Global Administrator
Application glad. cHSM administrators use the csadm tool to access their cHSM.
The operators must update the default authentication keys when they authenticate to
the module for the first time. The Global Initial Admin Key is delivered as part of the
u.trust Anchor product bundle that can be downloaded from the Utimaco download
portal.
The device is in FIPS 140-3 validated state if a valid FIPS certificate exists for the device
identifier versions output by the glad_Status service:
$ gladm Dev=<device_address> system-info
A Global Administrator operator can perform glad_chsm_create to create a cHSM. To
create a cHSM in the Approved mode, the operator uses the FIPS template
‘SecurityServer-FIPS’. To create a cHSM in the Non-Approved mode, the operator uses
the non-FIPS template ‘SecurityServer’.
The cHSM mode cannot be changed after creation.
Each cHSM’s mode of operation is indicated by the cHSM_Status service:
$ csadm Dev=<device address, cHSM slot number> GetState
A cHSM operates in the Approved mode if the device is in FIPS 140-3 validated state and
if the cHSM_Status service outputs ‘FIPS mode = ON’.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The administrator Guidance delivered with the product bundle provides information and
guidance for Crypto Officers administrating the u.trust Anchor device and the cHSMs.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
cHSM User guidance delivered with the product bundle describes the usage of
cryptographic services within the cHSMs.
11.4 Design and Rules
The following security rules are enforced by the cryptographic module to ensure the FIPS
140-3 security requirements are met.
1. The module supports an Approved and a Non-Approved mode of operation.
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2. The module does not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the
module’s cryptographic services.
3. Concurrent operators are separated by the unique sessions. No services from a
given session can modify the services/data of another separate session.
4. The module inhibits data output during self-tests, firmware load, zeroization, and
error states.
5. The module logically disconnects data output from the processes performing
zeroization and key generation.
6. The module enforces identity-based authentication.
7. The module does not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off
or reboot.
8. The module supports the following roles: Cryptographic Officer and User.
9. The module does not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode.
10. The module supports the following logically distinct interfaces:
a) Data input interface
b) Data output interface
c) Control input interface
d) Status output interface
e) Power interface
11. The module protects critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure,
modification, and substitution.
12. The zeroization excludes the overwriting of an unprotected SSP with another
unprotected SSP.
13. The module performs power-on, on-demand, and periodic self-testing.
14. The module logs errors whenever an error state is entered.
15. The module does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The battery status shall be checked regularly using the service glad_Config and be
replaced if the status is critical. Detailed instructions can be found in operation manuals
delivered with the product bundle: in the PCIe manual under section “Replacing the
Battery” and in the LAN manual under section “Maintenance.”
11.6 End of Life
Before disposing of the module, the Crypto Officer shall perform an external erase by
pushing the erase button. An alarm will be triggered that is shown by the LED flashing up
to red, causing the zeroization of sensitive data. The battery shall, in addition, be
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removed and disposed of according to the recycling rules and laws of the country where
the module is deployed. Apart from pushing the external erase, the removal of the
battery also causes the automatic deletion of sensitive data after a maximum of 30
minutes.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The cryptographic module has been designed to mitigate several physical attacks,
Simple and Differential Power Analysis (SPA/DPA) and timing analysis listed in Section
12.1.
12.1 Attack List
Mitigation of other attacks is described below.
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism
Timing Analysis Triple-DES and AES operations are executed in constant time so that it is not
feasible to determine the value of an algorithm’s keys by measuring the
execution time of a cryptographic operation.
If blinding is switched on for RSA and ECDSA on a cHSM, the input data for a
single RSA and ECDSA signature generation is randomized through the use of
a blinding technique so that the input parameters of the algorithm are not
known by the operator. In this case, it is hard to gain knowledge about the
private key based on the amount of time required by the signature generation
operation. Blinding is not possible for bulk signing.
Mechanical attack Each u.trust Anchor with hardware version 7.03.00.03 has two sensor patch
wires installed in the epoxy. If one of these is disturbed (i.e., in the case of
physical attack), the tamper response is activated resulting in zeroization.
Temperature and
voltage
The module provides physical EFP temperature and voltage protections that
are outside the scope of FIPS 140-3 physical security Level 3. A tamper
response (that is, zeroization) is activated if the module is outside the defined
temperature range (–18°C to 81°C) or voltage range (2.1V to 13.9V).
Table 30: Mitigation of Other Attacks