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Motorola Solutions, Inc.
RFS7000 SERIES Wireless Controller
FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version: R1.2
Date: November 3, 2014
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CHANGE RECORD
Revision Date Author Description of Change
R1.0 April 16, 2014 Motorola Solutions Initial release
R1.1 May 16, 2014 Motorola Solutions Updates from lab review
R1.2 November 3, 2014 Motorola Solutions Updates from lab review
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................5
1.1 RFS7K Controller Physical, Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Functionality.............................................................................................9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 11
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................ 13
3.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 15
4 Self‐test ......................................................................................................................... 18
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 18
4.2 Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 19
4.3 Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 19
5 Physical Security Policy.................................................................................................. 20
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 21
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................. 21
8 Security Rules and Guidance.......................................................................................... 21
9 References..................................................................................................................... 22
10 Acronyms and Definitions.............................................................................................. 22
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table ......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements....................................................................................... 5
Table 3 – RFS7K Controller Ports and Interfaces .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4 –Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................................ 9
Table 5 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................10
Table 6 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality .............................................10
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 11
Table 8 – Public Keys...................................................................................................................................12
Table 9 – Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 – Authentication Methods and Strengths....................................................................................14
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 15
Table 12 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services......................................................................15
Table 13 – Admin Role Services .................................................................................................................. 16
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services ............................................................................................. 17
Table 15 – Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 18
Table 16 – Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 19
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 19
Table 18 – References.................................................................................................................................22
Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 22
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Operational Context..................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – RFS7K Controller .......................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3 – RFS7K Controller Port Descriptions.............................................................................................. 8
Figure 4 – RFS7K Controller Power Port ....................................................................................................... 8
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola Solutions RFS7000 Series Controller
Cryptographic modules, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module, validated to FIPS 140‐2 overall
Level 2. The Module incorporates an integrated router, gateway, firewall, DHCP and AAA RADIUS server,
VPN, and hot‐spot gateway.
HW Model FW Version
RFS‐7010 4.1.4.0‐0030GR
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table
Once the firmware is installed, the resulting Module supports only the FIPS‐Approved mode of
operation. The FIPS‐Approved mode of operation is explicitly indicated in the banner message.
RFS7000 login: cli
This device is running in Common Criteria mode.
Attention:
This is a protected and private wireless system. No unauthorized access allowed.
You must have proper rights to access and manage this system from the authorized personnel.
Do you want to proceed? (y/n):
The cryptographic boundary is the enclosure that encloses all hardware and firmware components not
including external antennas. The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self‐Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
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Figure 1 – Operational Context
1.1 RFS7K Controller Physical, Ports and Interfaces
The RFS‐7010 GR is shipped with tamper evident seals over seams and covering the Out‐of‐Band
Management port, USB ports, and the Compact Flash slot.
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Figure 2 – RFS7K Controller
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Figure 3 – RFS7K Controller Port Descriptions
Figure 4 – RFS7K Controller Power Port
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Power 120V AC Power
Manageme
nt
Out‐of‐Band Management (Ethernet) port This port is covered by a tamper seal.
Fiber Four Gigabit Fiber SFP ports Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
GE Four Gigabit Ethernet ports Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
Console RJ45 Console Port (serial) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
Status LEDs Cluster of 4 green/amber LEDs for System,
Fan and Temperature status
Status out
Comm
LEDs
LEDs integral to RJ45 connectors to indicate
port speed and status
Status out
Flash Compact Flash memory slot This port is covered by a tamper seal.
USB Two USB Ports This port is covered by a tamper seal.
Table 3 – RFS7K Controller Ports and Interfaces
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Table 4 and Table 5 below. The notation #n indicates multiple implementations of an algorithm
or protocol; for example, “AES #1” is one implementation of the AES algorithm; “AES #2” is a second
implementation of AES.
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES #1 [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: ECB, CBC; Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits and
CFB 128 mode Key size 128 bits
Encryption and decryption used for RADIUS, SSHv2, SNMP and TLS.
2752
AES #2 [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: CBC; Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits.
Encryption and decryption used for IPsec/IKE functionality.
2765
HMAC #1 [FIPS 198‐1] HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA‐256 Generation and Verification used
for RADIUS, SSHv2, SNMP and TLS
1726
HMAC #2 [FIPS 198‐1] HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA‐256 Generation and Verification
used for IPsec functionality.
1731
TLS KDF [SP 800‐135] TLS key derivation function. 191
SSH KDF [SP 800‐135] SSHv2 key derivation function. 192
IKE KDF [SP 800‐135] IKEv1 key derivation function. 193
SNMP KDF [SP 800‐135] SNMP key derivation function. 190
RNG #1 [ANSI X9.31‐1998] Random number generation for use with RADIUS, SSHv2,
SNMP and TLS.
1268
RNG #2 [ANSI X9.31‐1998] Random number generation for use with IPSec. 1270
RSA [FIPS 186‐4, ANSI X9.31‐1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, and Signature Verification
used for IKE, TLS, SSHv2.
1443
SHA #1 [FIPS 180‐3] SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
Secure hashing used for firmware integrity checking, RADIUS, SSHv2 and
TLS.
2321
SHA #2 [FIPS 180‐3] SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
Secure hashing used for IKE.
2326
Triple‐DES #1 [SP 800‐20] Modes: TECB, TCBC; Key sizes: 3‐Key
Encryption and decryption used for PEAP‐TLS.
1656
Triple‐DES #2 [SP 800‐20] Modes: TECB; Key sizes: 3‐Key
This implementation provides encryption and decryption for use with IPSec.
1658
Table 4 –Approved Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Non‐Compliant SP
800‐56A
[IG D.2] Diffie‐Hellman (group 14). Key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
Non‐ Compliant
SP 800‐56B
[IG D.2] 2048‐bit RSA Key Transport. Key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
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Algorithm Description
NDRNG
[Annex C] Hardware Non‐Deterministic RNG; 4096 bits per access, used only to
seed the FIPS Approved RNG.
MD5 [IG D.8] Used during TLS handshake.
Table 5 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
IKEv1 [IG D.2] IKEv1 and IPsec supported cryptography:
AES‐CBC‐128, AES‐ CBC‐192, AES‐ CBC‐256, SHA1, DH (2048)
SSHv2 [IG D.2] The SSHv2 Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
Cipher: aes128‐cbc, aes192‐cbc and aes256‐cbc
MAC: hmac‐sha1, hmac‐sha1‐96
KEX: diffie‐hellman‐group14‐sha1
Hostkey‐algorithms: ssh‐rsa
TLS [IG D.2] The TLS Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
RADIUS EAP‐TLS, EAP‐TTLS, PEAP‐TLS
Table 6 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module is
described in the services detailed in Section 4.
CSP Description / Usage
RNG‐SM
RNG Seed Material: 64‐bit seed; Two 64 bit 2‐key Triple‐DES seed key for the Approved
RNG. The Module ensures that the seed and seed key are not equal.
RNG‐STATE The current values of the Approved X9.31 (2‐key Triple‐DES) RNG instance.
RNG‐QS‐SM
RNG Seed Material: 64‐bit seed; Three 64 bit 3‐key Triple‐DES seed key for the Approved
RNG. The Module ensures that the seed and seed key are not equal.
RNG‐QS‐STATE The current values of the Approved X9.31 (3‐key Triple‐DES) RNG instance.
DH‐KEK
Diffie‐Hellman Key Establishment Key: DH Group 14 (2048 bit) private key for TLS, IKE and
SSH key establishment.
DEV‐PRI
Device Private key: RSA 2048 private keys used for TLS, SSH, and EAP authentication
methods.
IKE‐PSS IKE Pre‐Shared Secret: 64 byte secret value used for IKEv1 authentication.
IPS‐SDEK
IPsec Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/192/256 key used to encrypt and decrypt IPsec
messages.
IPS‐SAK
IPsec Session Authentication Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) key used for IPsec message
authentication.
RAD‐SEC
Radius Secret: 8 byte minimum, 32 byte maximum secret value used for RADIUS server
authentication.
SNMP‐SEC SNMP Secret: 8 byte minimum (no maximum) secret value used for SNMP authentication.
SNMP‐DEK SNMP Data Encryption Key: AES‐128 bit key used to encrypt and decrypt SNMP messages.
SSH‐DEK SSH Encryption Key: AES‐128/192/256 key used to encrypt and decrypt SSH messages.
SSH‐HMAC SSH HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA1, HMAC‐SHA1‐96 key used to protect TLS message integrity.
TLS‐SDEK TLS Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/256 used to encrypt and decrypt TLS messages.
TLS‐HKEK
TLS Handshake Key Encryption Key: RSA‐2048 private key establishment key, used in the TLS
and EAP handshakes.
TLS‐HMAC TLS HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) key used for TLS message authentication.
WL‐PSK
64 byte pre‐shared key for use in 802.11i (SP 800‐108) Key Derivation. WL‐PSK is not used
directly on device; only stored on device, and sent to adopted access points during
configuration.
PW 8 byte minimum (no maximum) value used for local user authentication.
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters
2.2 Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
CA‐PUB Certificate authority RSA‐1024 or RSA‐2048 public key, used for path validation.
DEV‐PUB Device RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
PC‐PUB Peer or client RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
FW‐PUB Device RSA‐1024 public key, used for firmware load.
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Table 8 – Public Keys
The Module zeroizes all plaintext CSPs by overwriting the storage area three (3) times with three (3)
different patterns. After zeroization, the Module assumes factory default settings on reboot.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles
Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Admin and User roles are human operator
roles; the remaining roles are for machine to machine interaction. The Module does not support a
maintenance role, state or interface.
ID Role Description Authentication
Method
Admin
An administrative user, inclusive of the following defined groups with
varying levels of access to Module functionality:
Web Admin: Create guest Hot Spot users and printout a voucher with
their credentials.
Monitor: Read only access to statistics and configuration information.
Security Admin: Modify access to WLAN keys. Allows troubleshooting
tasks such as clear statistics, reboot.
Crypto Officer: Manage Layer 2, Layer 3, Wireless, RADIUS Server, DHCP
Server, SMART‐RF; and all SEC role services.
System Administrator: Upgrade image, change boot partition, set time,
manage admin access; and all CO role services.
Super User: Full access including halt and delete startup configuration;
and all SYS role services.
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Officer role requirement.
Passphrase
verification
User
Wireless User (FIPS 140‐2 “User” role): Engage the wireless cryptographic
services provided by the module.
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 User role requirement.
Passphrase
verification
NMSU
An SNMP Network Management System User, inclusive of the following:
SNMP Manager: Non‐security related configuration, status monitoring.
SNMP Operator: Read only access and status monitoring
SNMP Trap: Read only access and status monitoring through SNMP trap
messages
Passphrase
verification
TLSC
TLS Client entity, inclusive of the following:
https client for Web GUI administration; Air Defense Services Platform
(ADSP) communications. (Uses RSA authentication exclusively)
RSA
IPSP
IPsec Peer (uses IKEv1 and the shared secret authentication method
exclusively)
Passphrase
verification
SSHC SSHv2 Client (Uses RSA authentication exclusively) RSA
Table 9 – Roles Description
The Module enforces the separation of roles using an internal access control and groups for associating
specific operator credentials with operator roles.
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3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements the following authentication methods. Probability of false authentication and
probability of false authentication in a one minute period are shown along with derivation information.
Authentication
Method
Probability of false authentication
(1.0E‐06 required)
Probability of false authentication
in a one‐minute period
(1.0E‐05 required)
Passphrase
verification
Minimum length: 8 characters
Character set: ASCII printable (95)
1/(95^8) = 1.5E‐16
Failed authentication imposes 1
second delay (60
attempts/minute).
60/(95^8)=9.0E‐15
RSA Client certificates using RSA‐1024 provide 80
bit equivalent strength.
1/(2^80) = 8.3E‐25
Failed authentication imposes 1
second delay (60
attempts/minute).
60/(2^80) = 5.0E‐23
Table 10 – Authentication Methods and Strengths
The Passphrase verification method is a generalization of passwords, SNMP community strings and IKE
shared secrets. This calculation uses the worst case scenario to describe minimum strength: 8 bytes
minimum and a restricted character set.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below.
Service Description
Local Reset Power cycle the Module.
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
IPSP
SSHC
TLSC
User
NMSU
Connect (IPsec)
Establish and use IPsec connection, used for VPN
connection between Motorola devices, RADIUS,
syslog, NTP server, etc.
X
Connect (SSH)
Establish and use connection with SSH client, used
to connect Motorola device for management and
monitoring purpose.
X
Connect (TLS)
Establish and use TLS connection, used for Web
GUI, establishment of captive portal connection.
X
Wireless Traffic 802.11 network communications by end User. X
SNMP Traffic SNMP MIB communications. X
Table 12 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services
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Service Description
Admin
Login Authentication via CLI or web GUI for administrative use. X
Configure
Configure device parameters, non‐security relevant: routing, quality of
service, radio function, etc.
X
Configure security
Configure IPsec, TLS, SSH, 802.11, operator accounts, SNMP access, and
RADIUS.
X
Monitor View intrusion detection and prevention logs. X
Show status Show status and configuration information. X
Remote reset Trigger a module reset and reboot, inclusive of Power‐On Self‐Test. X
Update firmware Load and manage a new firmware image. X
Zeroize
Destroys the Module’s CSPs and restore the module to factory settings (the
Restore Factory Setting operation).
X
Table 13 – Admin Role Services
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Table 14 defines access to CSPs by Module services.
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services
 ‐ = No access to the CSP by the service.
 G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The Module exports the CSP.
 E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The Module writes the CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP.
CSPs
Service
RNG‐SM
RNG‐STATE
RNG‐QS‐SM
RNG‐QS‐STATE
DH‐KEK
DEV‐PRI
IKE‐PSS
IPS‐SDEK
IPS‐SAK
RAD‐SEC
SNMP‐SEC
SNMP‐DEK
SSH‐DEK
SSH‐HMAC
TLS‐SDEK
TLS‐HKEK
TLS‐HMAC
WL‐PSK
PW
Configure ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ R ‐
Configure
Security
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
E
W
‐ ‐
E
W
E
W
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
R
W
W
Connect
(IPsec)
‐ W ‐ W G ‐ E
G
E
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(SSH)
‐ W ‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(TLS)
‐ W ‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G
E
G
E
G
E
G
E
G
E
‐ ‐
SNMP
Traffic
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Login ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
Monitor ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Show
status
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Remote
reset
G
Z
Z
G
Z
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ ‐
Update
firmware
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Zeroize ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z Z
Local
Reset
G
Z
Z
G
Z
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ ‐
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4 Self‐test
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power‐up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self‐tests described in Table 15 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails,
the Module enters an error state. The module will output a status message to the external console
stating the module is in error state. Additionally, when an error state is entered the System LED 1 will
blink red. The System LED 2 will be off.
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity SHA‐256 performed over all code stored in the Module, when the module is
initialized after power‐up or a soft‐reset.
AES #1 ECB Encrypt AES‐128 ECB Encryption KAT
AES #1 ECB Decrypt AES‐128 ECB Decryption KAT
AES #1 CBC Encrypt AES‐128 CBC Encryption KAT
AES #1 CBC Decrypt AES‐128 CBC Decryption KAT
AES #2 CBC Encrypt AES‐128 CBC Encryption KAT
AES #2 CBC Decrypt AES‐128 CBC Decryption KAT
HMAC #1 HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT
HMAC #2 HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT
RNG#1 ANSI X9.31‐1998 RNG (2‐key Triple‐DES) KAT with fixed seed, seed key and
date/time input.
RNG#2 ANSI X9.31‐1998 RNG (3‐key Triple‐DES) KAT with fixed seed, seed key and
date/time input.
RSA SigGen RSA 2048‐bit Signature Generation KAT
RSA SigVer RSA 2048‐bit Signature Verification KAT
SHA‐1 #1 SHA‐1 KAT
SHA‐256 #1 SHA‐256 KAT
SHA‐1 #2 SHA‐1 KAT
SHA‐256 #2 SHA‐256 KAT
Triple‐DES#1 Encrypt 3‐Key TECB Encryption KAT
Triple‐DES#1 Decrypt 3‐Key TECB Decryption KAT
Triple‐DES#2 Encrypt 3‐Key TECB Encryption KAT
Triple‐DES#2 Decrypt 3‐Key TECB Decryption KAT
SP 800‐135 KDF (TLS) Power‐on KDF self‐test for TLS keys.
SP 800‐135 (SSH) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SSH keys.
SP 800‐135 (IKE) Power‐on KDF self‐test for IKE v1 keys.
SP 800‐135 (SNMP) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SNMP keys.
Table 15 – Power Up Self‐tests
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4.2 Conditional Self‐tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random
value is requested from the NDRNG.
RNG#1 RNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value
is requested from the Approved RNG.
RNG#2 RNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value
is requested from the Approved RNG.
RSA PCT RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
Image integrity The Module performs a SHA‐256 test over all data storage.
Firmware Load RSA 2048 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded.
Table 16 – Conditional Self‐tests
4.3 Critical Function Tests
Test Target Description
Kernel space
self‐test
This test includes memory test, DRAM test, data and address bus walk and PCI test.
CCM Generate AES‐CCM Generation KAT using AES‐128
CCM Verify AES‐CCM Verification KAT using AES‐128
SP 800‐108 KDF Power‐on KDF self‐tests for 802.11i keys.
AES#3 Encrypt AES‐128 Encryption KAT
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests
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5 Physical Security Policy
The Module is housed in an industrial quality enclosure.
Motorola Solutions uses production grade components and materials in the manufacture of this
product. In addition to the requirements for Level 1, the module provides evidence of tampering when
physical access to the module is attempted.
The product contains eight (8) tamper‐evident seals as depicted in Figure 5. The tamper evident
seals are applied by Motorola Solutions during the manufacturing process. The tamper‐evident seals
shall be inspected every six months. Tamper seals should be inspected along the entire seal’s perimeter,
its surface (see Figure 6), and the area immediately surrounding the seal for scratches, scrapes, gouges,
cuts and any other signs of tampering. The unit should be removed from service when any such
markings are found.
Figure 5 - Tamper Seal Locations
Figure 6 – Example of Tampered Seal
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
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6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within
the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module does not implement mitigation for any other attacks.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The following security rules are enforced by the Module:
1. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. The Module does not perform any cryptographic functions until an operator (human or proxy)
authenticates to the module, with the exception of cryptographic functions used in the
authentication process.
3. Operators can perform the power up self‐tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. The module ensures that the seed and seed key inputs to the Approved RNGs are not equal.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not support manual key entry.
11. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
12. The module does not output intermediate key values.
Guidance for first time usage or post factory default reset usage of the Module is provided in the
Module’s Secure Installation Guide, and summarized below:
1. On first use after delivery from the factory, or after zeroization, an authorized administrator shall
access the Module with the default password and create a new password.
2. The Firmware version listed in Table 1 shall be loaded onto the module.
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2014 Version R1.2 Page 22 of 22
Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
9 References
The following documents are referenced in this Security Policy.
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS140‐2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[RFC3268] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt
[RFC2571] SNMPv3
[RFC2574] User‐based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)
Table 18 – References
10 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
ADSP Air Defense Services Platform
Captive portal
A web page hosted by the module to authenticate wireless users. An attempt to
access the device for network access redirects the user to the login web page.
CLI Command Line Interface
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL EAP over LAN
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
IDS Intrusion Detection System
MIB Management Information Base
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
POE Power Over Ethernet
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTLS Tunneled TLS
Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions