FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 1 of 37
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Poly Crypto Module for Java
Software Version 3.0.2.1
Document Version 1.4
August 9, 2022
Prepared For: Prepared By:
Plantronics, Inc.
345 Encinal Street
Santa Cruz, CA 95060
www.poly.com
SafeLogic Inc.
530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94301
www.safelogic.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 2 of 37
Overview
This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Poly Crypto Module for Java.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 3 of 37
Table of Contents
Overview..............................................................................................................................................................2
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 About FIPS 140 .............................................................................................................................................5
1.2 About this Document....................................................................................................................................5
1.3 External Resources .......................................................................................................................................5
1.4 Notices..........................................................................................................................................................5
2 Poly Crypto Module for Java..........................................................................................................................6
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................6
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail .............................................................................................................................6
2.1.2 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................7
2.1.3 Module Configuration..............................................................................................................................7
2.1.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .......................................................................................................9
2.1.5 Non-Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms.........................................................................14
2.1.6 Non-Approved Mode of Operation .......................................................................................................14
2.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys .............................................................................................16
2.2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................................16
2.2.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................18
2.3 Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................................................19
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...........................................................................................................20
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles ..............................................................................................................................20
2.4.2 Services ..................................................................................................................................................21
2.5 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................26
2.6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................26
2.6.1 Use of External RNG...............................................................................................................................26
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................27
2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................27
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................28
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................29
3 Security Rules and Guidance .......................................................................................................................30
3.1 Basic Enforcement......................................................................................................................................30
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager ..............................................................................30
3.3 Basic Guidance ...........................................................................................................................................30
3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for AES GCM IVs.............................................................................................31
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for Use of the Approved PBKDF .....................................................................31
3.6 Rules for Setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE ....................................................................................32
3.7 Guidance for the Use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source..............................................32
3.8 Software Installation..................................................................................................................................33
4 References and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................34
4.1 References..................................................................................................................................................34
4.2 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................36
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 4 of 37
List of Tables
Table 1 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section ...........................................................................................................6
Table 2 - Available Java Permissions..............................................................................................................................7
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithm Certificates.............................................................................................................9
Table 4 - Approved Cryptographic Functions Implemented with Vendor Affirmation ...............................................13
Table 5 - Non-Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms................................................................................14
Table 6 - Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for Use in non-Approved mode Only ...........................................14
Table 7 - Critical Security Parameters..........................................................................................................................16
Table 8 - Public Keys ....................................................................................................................................................18
Table 9 - Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping.............................................................................................20
Table 10 - Description of Roles....................................................................................................................................21
Table 11 - Module Services, Descriptions, and Roles ..................................................................................................21
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services...............................................................................................................24
Table 13 - Tested Environments ..................................................................................................................................26
Table 14 - Power-Up Self-Tests....................................................................................................................................27
Table 15 - Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................28
Table 16 – References .................................................................................................................................................34
Table 17 - Acronyms and Terms ..................................................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram.................................................................................................19
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 5 of 37
1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140
program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates
modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and
tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-
module-validation-program.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Poly Crypto Module for Java from
Plantronics, Inc. (“Poly”) provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it
meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
Poly Crypto Module for Java may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
1.3 External Resources
The Poly website (www.poly.com) contains information on Poly services and products. The
Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and Poly
contact information.
1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 6 of 37
2 Poly Crypto Module for Java
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
Poly Crypto Module for Java is a standards-based "Drop-in Compliance" cryptographic engine for servers
and appliances. The module delivers core cryptographic functions to mobile platforms and features
robust algorithm support, including Suite B algorithms. Poly Crypto Module for Java offloads functions
for secure key management, data integrity, data at rest encryption, and secure communications to a
trusted implementation.
The module’s software version is 3.0.2.1. The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the Java
Archive (JAR) file (ccj-3.0.2.1.jar).
The module is a software module that relies on the physical characteristics of the host platform. The
module’s physical cryptographic boundary is defined by the enclosure of the host platform, which is the
General Purpose Device that the module is installed on. For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 validation, the
module’s embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.
All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal
daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail
The following table lists the module’s level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
Table 1 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 7 of 37
2.1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode. The
module will be in FIPS Approved mode when the appropriate transition method is called. To verify that a
module is in the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the user can call a FIPS Approved mode status
method (CryptoServicesRegistrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()). If the module is configured to allow FIPS
Approved mode and non-Approved mode operations, a call to
CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the current thread of user control into FIPS
Approved mode.
In FIPS Approved mode, the module will not provide non-Approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions
will be called if the user tries to access non-Approved algorithms in the FIPS Approved mode.
2.1.3 Module Configuration
In default operation, the module will start with both FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode
enabled.
If the module detects that the system property com.safelogic.cryptocomply.fips.approved_only is set to
true the module will start in FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode functionality will not be
available.
If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed, the module will be running in
FIPS Approved mode with secret and private key export disabled.
Use of the module with a Java Security Manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow
the module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to
examine secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly
with a Java Security Manager are indicated by a Y in the Req column of Table 2 - Available Java
Permissions.
Table 2 - Available Java Permissions
Permission Settings Req Usage
RuntimePermission “getProtectionDomain” Y Allows checksum to be
carried out on jar
RuntimePermission “accessDeclaredMembers” Y Allows use of reflection API
within the provider
PropertyPermission “java.runtime.name”, “read” N Only if configuration
properties are used
SecurityPermission "putProviderProperty.BCFIPS" N Only if provider installed
during execution
CryptoServicesPermission “unapprovedModeEnabled” N Only if non-Approved mode
algorithms required
CryptoServicesPermission “changeToApprovedModeEnabled” N Only if threads allowed to
change modes
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 8 of 37
Permission Settings Req Usage
CryptoServicesPermission “exportSecretKey” N To allow export of secret
keys only
CryptoServicesPermission “exportPrivateKey” N To allow export of private
keys only
CryptoServicesPermission “exportKeys” Y Required to be applied for
the module itself. Optional
for any other codebase.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsNullDigestEnabled” N Only required for TLS digest
calculations
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled” N Only required if TLS is used
with RSA encryption
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsAlgorithmsEnabled” N Enables both NullDigest and
PKCS15KeyWrap
CryptoServicesPermission “defaultRandomConfig” N Allows setting of default
SecureRandom
CryptoServicesPermission “threadLocalConfig” N Required to set a thread local
property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
CryptoServicesPermission “globalConfig” N Required to set a global
property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 9 of 37
2.1.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
2.1.4.1 CAVP Tested Approved Algorithms
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP).
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithm Certificates
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
A2720 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
CBC, ECB, CFB8, CFB128,
CTR, OFB
128, 192, 256 Encryption, Decryption
A2720 AES CCM SP 800-38C CCM 128, 192, 256 Generation, Authentication
A2720 AES CMAC SP 800-38B CMAC 128, 192, 256 Generation, Authentication
A2720 AES GCM/GMAC1
SP 800-38D GCM/GMAC 128, 192, 256 Generation, Authentication
A2720 CVL: KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific2
SP 800-135 TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF,
TLS 1.2 KDF,
SSH KDF,
X9.63 KDF,
IKEv2 KDF,
SRTP KDF
Various (See #A2720 for details) KDF Services
A2720 DRBG SP 800-90A Hash DRBG
HMAC DRBG
CTR DRBG
112, 128, 192, 256
(SHA-1, SHA-2,
3-Key Triple DES, AES)
Random Bit Generation
1
GCM encryption with an internally generated IV, see Security Policy section 3.4 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5.
2
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 10 of 37
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
A2720 DSA3
FIPS 186-4 Key Pair Generation,
PQG Generation,
PQG Verification,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
(1024, 160)4
(2048, 224)
(2048, 256)
(3072, 256)
Digital Signature Services
A2720 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification,
Public Key Validation,
Signature Generation
Component (CVL)
P-1925
, P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521,
K-1636
, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-1637
, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Digital Signature Services
A2720 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512,
HMAC-SHA-512/224,
HMAC-SHA-512/256,
HMAC-SHA3-224,
HMAC-SHA3-256,
HMAC-SHA3-384,
HMAC-SHA3-512
Various (KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS) HMAC Generation,
HMAC Authentication
3
DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols
4
Key size only used for Signature Verification
5
Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
6
Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
7
Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 11 of 37
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
A2720 KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions
SP 800-108 Counter Mode,
Feedback Mode,
Double-Pipeline
Iteration Mode
CMAC-based KDF: AES (128, 192,
256), 3-key Triple-DES
HMAC-based KDF: SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-5128
KDF Services
A2720
(AES)
KTS: Key
Wrapping Using
AES9
SP 800-38F AES KW, AES KWP 128, 192, 256 Key Transport
For AES, the key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
A2720
(TDES)
KTS: Key
Wrapping Using
TDES10
SP 800-38F TKW 3-key Triple-DES Key Transport
For Triple-DES, key
establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
A2720 RSA FIPS 186-4
SP 800-56B
Section
7.1.2
Key Pair Generation:
2048, 3072
Signature Generation (ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS):
2048, 3072
Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS):
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
RSA Signature Primitive Component (CVL):
2048
RSA Decryption Primitive Component (CVL) per SP 800-56B:
2048
Digital Signature Services, Key
Transport (per SP 800-56B)
FIPS 186-2 Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS):
1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits
8
Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not be used in FIPS Approved mode.
9
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
10
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 12 of 37
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
A2720 SHA-3, SHAKE FIPS 202 SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512,
SHAKE128,
SHAKE256,
N/A Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature
Applications
A2720 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512,
SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
N/A Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature
Applications
A2720 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC, TCFB8, TCFB64,
TECB, TOFB, CTR
2-key11
, 3-key12
Encryption, Decryption
A2720 Triple-DES CMAC SP 800-38B Triple-DES Triple-DES with
2-key13
, 3-key
Generation, Authentication
11
220
block limit is enforced by the module, 2-key encryption is disabled.
12
3-key Triple-DES encryption must not be used for more than 220
blocks for any given key.
13
220
block limit is enforced by the module. In FIPS Approved mode, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than verification
purposes is non-compliant.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 13 of 37
2.1.4.2 Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms
The following Approved cryptographic algorithms were implemented with vendor affirmation.
Table 4 - Approved Cryptographic Functions Implemented with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm IG Reference Use
AES-CBC
Ciphertext Stealing
(CS)
Vendor Affirmed
per IG A.12
[Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct 2010]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
CKG using output
from DRBG14
Vendor Affirmed
per IG D.12
[SP 800-133]
Section 6.1 (Asymmetric from DRBG)
Section 7.1 (Symmetric from DRBG)
Using DRBG #A2720
cSHAKE128,
cSHAKE256
Vendor Affirmed
per IG A.15
[SP 800-185]
Section 3, cSHAKE
Using SHA3 #A2720, SHAKE #A2720
KAS-SSC15
Vendor Affirmed
per IG D.1-rev3
[SP 800-56Ar3]
• Section 5.6.2.3.1 (Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) Full
Public Key Validation Routine)
• Section 5.6.2.3.2 (Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Full Public Key Validation Routine)
• Section 5.7 (DLC Primitive)
• Section 5.8 (Key Derivation Functions for Key
Agreement Schemes)
• Section 5.9 (Key Confirmation)
• Section 6 (Key Agreement)
• Parameter sets/Key sizes
o ECC: Approved P, B, K Curves per Appendix D
o FFC: Safe primes per Appendix D (safe primes
key generation tested under #A2720)
KTS: Key Transport16
Using RSA
Vendor Affirmed
per IG D.4
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.3]
RSA-KEM-KWS with, and without, key confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
KTS: Key Transport17
Using RSA
Vendor Affirmed
per IG D.4
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.2]
RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
14
The resulting key or a generated seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG
15
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
16
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
17
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 14 of 37
Algorithm IG Reference Use
PBKDF, password-
based key derivation
Vendor Affirmed
per IG D.6
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Using HMAC #A2720
Refer also to Security Policy section 3.5 - Enforcement
and Guidance for Use of the Approved PBKDF
RSA Vendor Affirmed
per IG A.14
[SP 800-131Ar2] Section 3
Key sizes: 4096 - 16384 bits
Using mechanism tested in #A2720
2.1.5 Non-Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 non-Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used
in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
Table 5 - Non-Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
Algorithm Use
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2, IG 1.23 example 2a]
NDRNG [IG 7.15, IG 7.14 example 1b]
Non-deterministic random number generator.
The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are
modified by available entropy
RSA Key Wrapping, Non-SP 800-
56B compliant
[IG D.9]
RSA may be used by a calling application as part of a key
encapsulation scheme.
Key sizes: 4096 - 16384 bits (key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides between 150 and 256 bits of encryption
strength)
2.1.6 Non-Approved Mode of Operation
The module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to
be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
Table 6 - Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for Use in non-Approved mode Only
Algorithm Use
AES (non-compliant18
) Encryption, Decryption
ARC4 (RC4) Encryption, Decryption
Blowfish Encryption, Decryption
18
Support for additional modes of operation.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 15 of 37
Algorithm Use
Camellia Encryption, Decryption
CAST5 Encryption, Decryption
DES Encryption, Decryption
DSA (non-compliant19
) Public Key Cryptography
DSTU4145 Public Key Cryptography
ECDSA (non-compliant20
) Public Key Cryptography
EdDSA Public Key Cryptography
ElGamal Public Key Cryptography
GOST28147 Encryption, Decryption
GOST3410-1994 Hashing
GOST3410-2001 Hashing
GOST3411 Hashing
HMAC-GOST3411 Hashing
HMAC-MD5 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD128 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD160 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD256 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD320 Hashing
HMAC-TIGER Hashing
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL Hashing
IDEA Encryption, Decryption
KAS21
, Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant22
) Key Agreement
KAS23
using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256 Key Agreement
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256 (non-compliant) KDF
MD5 Hashing
OpenSSL PBKDF (non-compliant) KDF
PKCS#12 PBKDF (non-compliant) KDF
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF (non-compliant) KDF
PRNG X9.31 Random Number Generation
RC2 Encryption, Decryption
RIPEMD128 Hashing
RIPEMD160 Hashing
RIPEMD256 Hashing
RIPEMD320 Hashing
RSA (non-compliant24
) Public Key Cryptography
RSA KTS (non-compliant25
) Public Key Cryptography
SCrypt KDF
19
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
20
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
21
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
22
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
23
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
24
Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional key sizes.
25
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 16 of 37
Algorithm Use
SEED Encryption, Decryption
Serpent Encryption, Decryption
SipHash Hashing
SHACAL-2 Encryption, Decryption
TIGER Hashing
Triple DES (non-compliant26
) Encryption, Decryption
Twofish Encryption, Decryption
WHIRLPOOL Hashing
XDH Key Agreement
2.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
2.2.1 Critical Security Parameters
The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:
Table 7 - Critical Security Parameters
CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]
AES (128/192/256) encrypt key27
AES Decryption Key [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]
AES (128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication
Key
[FIPS 197]
AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F]
AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DH Agreement Key
[SP 800-56Ar3]
Diffie-Hellman (160 - 512 bits) private key agreement key
DRBG (CTR AES)
V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG (CTR Triple-
DES)
V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG (Hash)
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG (HMAC)
V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy
input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4]
DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
26
Support for additional modes of operation
27
The AES GCM key and IV are generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum of
96 bits. In the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES
GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Refer also to Security Policy section 3.4.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 17 of 37
CSP Description / Usage
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56Ar3]
EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-
409 and B-571) private key agreement key
EC Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) signature generation key
HMAC
Authentication Key
[FIPS 198-1]
Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3). Key size determined by security
strength required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation
Function Secret
Value
[SP 800-135]
Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2 PRF
PBKDF Secret Value
[SP 800-132]
Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified PRF
RSA Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4]
RSA (2048 - 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport
Key
[SP 800-56B]
RSA (2048 - 16384 bits) key transport (decryption) key
SP 800-56C
Concatenation
Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-56C]
Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF
SP 800-108 KDF
Secret Value
[SP 800-108]
Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF
SRTP Derivation
Function Secret
Value
[SP 800-135]
Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP PRF
SSH Derivation
Function Secret
Value
[SP 800-135]
Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH PRF
TLS KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135]
Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified TLS PRF
Triple-DES
Encryption Key
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES (192 bits) encryption key
Triple-DES
Decryption Key
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES (128/192 bits) decryption key
Triple-DES
Authentication Key
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES (128/192 bits) CMAC key
Triple-DES Wrapping
Key
[SP 800-38F]
Triple-DES key wrapping (192 bits)/unwrapping key (128/192 bits)
X9.63 KDF Secret
Value
[SP 800-135]
Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified X9.63
PRF
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 18 of 37
2.2.2 Public Keys
The table below provides a complete list of the public keys used within the module:
Table 8 - Public Keys
Public Key Description / Usage
DH Agreement Key
[SP 800-56Ar3]
Diffie-Hellman (2048 and 3072) public key agreement key
DSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4]
DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key [SP 800-56Ar3]
EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) public key agreement key
EC Verification Key [FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA (P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) signature verification key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B]
RSA (2048 - 16384) key transport (encryption) key
RSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4]
RSA (1024 - 16384) signature verification key
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 19 of 37
2.3 Module Interfaces
The figure below shows the module’s physical and logical block diagram:
Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram
The module’s physical boundary is the boundary of the General Purpose Computer (GPC) that the
module is installed on, which includes a processor and memory. The interfaces (ports) for the physical
boundary include the computer’s network port, keyboard port, mouse port, power plug, and display.
When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it
is a software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module’s interfaces are purely logical.
Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware
components of the GPC. The module classes are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) using the
classes of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE). The JVM is the interface to the computer’s Operating
System (OS), which is the interface to the various physical components of the computer. The logical
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 20 of 37
interface is provided through an Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can
operate. The API itself defines the module’s logical boundary, i.e. all access to the module is through this
API. The API provides functions that may be called by an application (see Section 2.4 – Roles, Services,
and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between logical
interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.
The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces, which relate to the
module’s callable interface as follows:
Table 9 - Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Interface Logical Interface Module Physical Interface
Data Input API input parameters – plaintext and/or
ciphertext data
Network Interface
Data Output API output parameters and return values –
plaintext and/or ciphertext data
Network Interface
Control Input API method calls – method calls, or input
parameters, that specify commands and/or
control data used to control the operation of
the module
Network Interface, Keyboard
Interface, Mouse Interface
Status Output API output parameters and return/error
codes that provide status information used to
indicate the state of the module
Display Controller, Network
Interface
Power None Power Supply
When the module performs self-tests, is in an error state, is generating keys, or performing zeroization,
the module prevents all output on the logical data output interface as only the thread performing the
operation has access to the data. The module is single-threaded, and in an error state, the module does
not return any output data, only an error value.
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, which are the User and Crypto Officer (CO), as
indicated in Table 10 - Description of Roles. The cryptographic module implicitly maps the two roles to
the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module and, therefore,
only one concurrent user is allowed.
The module does not support a Maintenance role or bypass capability. The module does not support
authentication.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 21 of 37
Table 10 - Description of Roles
Role Role Description Authentication Type
CO Crypto Officer – Powers the module on and off N/A – Authentication is not a
requirement for FIPS 140 Level 1
User User – The user of the complete API N/A – Authentication is not a
requirement for FIPS 140 Level 1
2.4.2 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 - Module Services, Descriptions. The
second column provides a description of each service, and availability to the Crypto Officer and User is
indicated in columns three and four, respectively. Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services describes
all CSP usage by services.
Table 11 - Module Services, Descriptions, and Roles
Service Description CO User
Initialize Module and
Run Self-Tests on
Demand
The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module
initialization.
X
Show Status A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if
the module is ready.
CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode() can be called
to determine the FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread
termination.
X
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Generation Used to generate digital signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
DRBG (SP 800-90A)
output
Used for random number, IV and key generation. X
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest,
SHAKE output.
X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-
master secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-108 KBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
SSH Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 22 of 37
Service Description CO User
X9.63 Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
SP 800-56C
Concatenation
Derivation Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
IKEv2 Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
SRTP Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value
suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and
additional input.
X
PBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an
encoding of a password and an additional function such as a
message hash.
X
Key Agreement
Schemes
Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56Ar3, key
agreement in non-Approved mode)
X
Key
Wrapping/Transport
Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided
function.
X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs. X
Note: The module services are the same in the FIPS Approved and non-Approved modes of operation.
The only difference is the function(s) used (Approved/allowed or non-Approved/non-allowed).
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke
non-Approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as FIPS Approved
mode only. In FIPS Approved only mode, no non-Approved services are accessible. In the presence of a
Java SecurityManager FIPS Approved mode services specific to a context (such as DSA and ECDSA for use
in TLS) require specific permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Crypto Officer or
User.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the
different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 23 of 37
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an
existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 24 of 37
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Services
CSPs
AES
Encryption
Key
AES
Decryption
Key
AES
Authentication
Key
AES
Wrapping
Key
DH
Agreement
Key
DRBG
(CTR
AES)
DRBG
(CTR
Triple-DES)
DRBG
(Hash)
DRBG
(HMAC)
DSA
Signing
Key
EC
Agreement
Key
EC
Signing
Key
HMAC
Authentication
Key
IKEv2
DF
Secret
PBKDF
Secret
RSA
Signing
Key
RSA
Key
Transport
Key
SP
800-56C
Concat.
DF
Secret
SP
800-108
KDF
Secret
SRTP
DF
Secret
SSH
DF
Secret
Value
TLS
KDF
Secret
Triple-DES
Encryption
Key
Triple-DES
Decryption
Key
Triple-DES
Authentication
Key
Triple-DES
Wrapping
Key
X9.63
KDF
Secret
Value
Initialize Module
and Run Self-Tests
on Demand
Show Status
Zeroize / Power-off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption R R
Data Decryption R R
MAC Calculation R R
Signature
Generation
R R R
Signature
Verification
R R R
DRBG (SP 800-90A)
output
G G G G G
G
R
G
R
G
R
G
R
G G G G G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message
Hashing
R
TLS Key Derivation
Function
R
SP 800-108 KBKDF R
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 25 of 37
Services
CSPs
AES
Encryption
Key
AES
Decryption
Key
AES
Authentication
Key
AES
Wrapping
Key
DH
Agreement
Key
DRBG
(CTR
AES)
DRBG
(CTR
Triple-DES)
DRBG
(Hash)
DRBG
(HMAC)
DSA
Signing
Key
EC
Agreement
Key
EC
Signing
Key
HMAC
Authentication
Key
IKEv2
DF
Secret
PBKDF
Secret
RSA
Signing
Key
RSA
Key
Transport
Key
SP
800-56C
Concat.
DF
Secret
SP
800-108
KDF
Secret
SRTP
DF
Secret
SSH
DF
Secret
Value
TLS
KDF
Secret
Triple-DES
Encryption
Key
Triple-DES
Decryption
Key
Triple-DES
Authentication
Key
Triple-DES
Wrapping
Key
X9.63
KDF
Secret
Value
SSH Derivation
Function
R
X9.63 Derivation
Function
G G G R
SP 800-56C
Concatenation
Derivation Function
G G G R
IKEv2 Derivation
Function
R
SRTP Derivation
Function
R
PBKDF
G
R
R
Key Agreement
Schemes
G G G G R R G R G G G G
Key Wrapping/
Transport
R R R R
Key Unwrapping R R R R
NDRNG Callback G G G G
Utility
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 26 of 37
2.5 Physical Security
The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational
environment list in this section. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a
logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that
instantiates the module within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.
The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager and starts in FIPS Approved mode by default
when used with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java
Security Manager, it will start by default in the non-Approved mode.
The module was tested on the following platforms:
Table 13 - Tested Environments
Operating System Hardware Platform Processor (CPU)
VMware Photon OS 2.0 with JDK 11 on VMware ESXi 6.7 Dell PowerEdge R830 Intel Xeon E5
FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained for other compatible operating systems (in single user
mode) where the module source code is unmodified, and the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are
met. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation
certificate.
The module, when compiled from the same unmodified source code, is vendor-affirmed to be FIPS 140-
2 compliant when running one of the Java SE Runtime environments on any of the following on the
following supported single-user operating systems for which operational testing and algorithm testing
were not performed:
• Microsoft Windows 2008, 2008 R2, 7, 2012 R2, 8, 2016, 10 (and newer)
• OpenJDK 1.8 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
2.6.1 Use of External RNG
The module makes use of the JVM's configured SecureRandom entropy source to provide entropy when
required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding
configuration for the DRBG that is using it and for the default DRBG will request a minimum of 256 bits
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 27 of 37
of entropy. In approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that can be requested by a DRBG is 112
bits. The module will wait until the SecureRandom.generateSeed() returns the requested amount of
entropy, blocking if necessary.
2.7 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly
and that sensitive data has not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 14 - Power-Up
Self-Tests. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the
module. If one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will
output a detailed error message when FipsStatus.isReady() is called. The error state can only be cleared
by reloading the module and calling FipsStatus.isReady() again to confirm successful completion of the
KATs.
2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
Table 14 - Power-Up Self-Tests
Test Target Description
Software Integrity Check HMAC-SHA-256 (HMAC Cert. #A2720)
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256
KAS: FFC28
KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
28
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 28 of 37
KAS: ECC29
KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EC
KBKDF (SP 800-108) KATs: Per IG 9.4 – Output Verification
Modes: Counter, Feedback, Double Pipeline
PRFs: AES-CMAC, Triple-DES-CMAC, SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA, Key Transport KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA, Key Wrapping KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
XOF (Extendable-Output
functions)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs: SHAKE256
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number
generation (respectively):
Table 15 - Conditional Self-Tests
Test Target Description
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the DRBG.
DRBG Health Checks Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section
11.3.
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key
pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key
pair generation.
KAS: DH DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key
pair generation.
KAS: ECDH/ECCDH EC DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every
ECDH/ECCDH key pair generation.
29
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 29 of 37
Test Target Description
KAS: SP 800-56A
Assurances30
Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2,
and/or 5.6.3
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the NDRNG.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key
pair generation.
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against its internal
implementations. There are two countermeasures used.
The first countermeasure is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity
algorithms by strictly avoiding “fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken
to compare a MAC, signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.
The second countermeasure is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which
both protect the RSA algorithm.
Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random
input into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random
input makes it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing
attack on the operation as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time
taken for the operation tells them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature
verification operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the
decryption or signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack
by verifying the correctness of the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes
advantage of undetected errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be
used to discover the private value of the RSA key.
30
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 30 of 37
3 Security Rules and Guidance
3.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Crypto Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator may command the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or
resetting the module.
4. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Output related to keys
and their use is inhibited until the key concerned has been fully generated.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager
In the presence of a Java SecurityManager FIPS Approved mode services specific to a context (such as
DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS) require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM
configuration by the Crypto Officer or User. The Java SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the
ability of particular code bases to examine CSPs. See Section 2.1.3 –Module Configuration for further
advice on this.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
3.3 Basic Guidance
The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate
to its use in applications running on the JVM.
Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that
provide access to the FIPS Approved and non-Approved services provided by the module. A more
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 31 of 37
abstract level of access can also be gained using strings providing operation names passed into the
module's Java cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography Architecture
(JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).
When the module is being used in FIPS Approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of
algorithms which are not FIPS Approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.
3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for AES GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly or via a FipsNonceGenerator. Where an IV is not generated
within the module, the module supports the importing of GCM IVs.
In FIPS Approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an
approved DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In FIPS approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated using the FipsNonceGenerator, a counter is used as
the basis for the nonce. Rollover of the counter in the FipsNonceGenerator will result in an
IllegalStateException indicating the FipsNonceGenerator is exhausted. Per IG A.5, where the AES GCM IV
is used for TLS, rollover will terminate any TLS session in process using the current key. The exception
can only be recovered from by using a new handshake and creating a new FipsNonceGenerator.
In FIPS Approved mode, importing a GCM IV for encryption that originates from outside the module is
non-conformant unless the source of the IV is also FIPS approved for GCM IV generation.
Per IG A.5, Section 2.2.1 of this Security Policy also states that in the event module power is lost and
restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES GCM keys used for encryption or
decryption are re-distributed.
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for Use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be
used for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.
In FIPS Approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes
(112 bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the
PBKDF should be as large as practical.
As the module is a general purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use
for the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain
enough entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength
required for the key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII, a 14-
byte password is unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 32 of 37
Appendix A, “Security Considerations” in SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and
iteration count selection.
For users interested in introducing memory hardness as a layer on top of the PBKDF, the scrypt
augmentation to PBDKF based on HMAC-SHA-256 (as described in RFC 7914) is also available.
3.6 Rules for Setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE
To customize the output of the cSHAKE function, the cSHAKE algorithm permits the operator to input
strings for the Function-Name input (N) and the Customization String (S).
The Function-Name input (N) is reserved for values specified by NIST and should only be set to the
appropriate NIST specified value. Any other use of N is non-conformant.
The Customization String (S) is available to allow users to customize the cSHAKE function as they wish.
The length of S is limited to the available size of a byte array in the JVM running the module.
3.7 Guidance for the Use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy
Source
A user can instantiate the default Approved DRBG for the module explicitly by using
SecureRandom.getInstance ("DEFAULT", "CCJ"), or by using a CryptoComplyFipsProvider object instead
of the provider name as appropriate. This will seed the Approved DRBG from the live entropy source of
the JVM, for example /dev/random on the tested Linux operational environments, with an appropriate
number of bits of entropy for the security level of the default Approved DRBG configured for the
module.
An additional option is available using the Approved Hash_DRBG and the process outlined in SP 800-
90A, Section 8.6.5. The provider can be configured to use an DRBG chain based on a SHA-512 SP 800-
90A DRBG as the internal (source) DRBG providing a seed generation for the external (target) DRBG. To
configure this use: “C:HYBRID;ENABLE{All};”
The two DRBGs are instantiated in a chain as a "Source DRBG" to seed the "Target DRBG" in accordance
with Section 7 of Draft NIST SP 800-90C, where the Target DRBG is the default Approved DRBG used by
the module.
The initial seed and the subsequent reseeds for the DRBG chain come from the live entropy source
configured for the JVM. The DRBG chain will reseed automatically by pausing for 20 requests (which will
usually equate to 5120 bits). An entropy gathering thread reseeds the DRBG chain when it has gathered
sufficient entropy (currently 256 bits) from the live entropy source. Once reseeded, the request counter
is reset and the reseed process begins again.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 33 of 37
The “Source DRBG” in the chain is internal to the module and inaccessible to the user to ensure it is only
used for generating seeds for the default Approved DRBG of the module.
The user shall ensure that the Approved entropy source is configured per Section 6.1 of this Security
Policy and will block, or fail, if it is unable to provide the amount of entropy requested.
3.8 Software Installation
The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the
general public. Only the compiled module is provided to solution developers. The module and its host
application are to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.6 or on an operating system
where portability is maintained.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 34 of 37
4 References and Acronyms
4.1 References
Table 16 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31 X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-2 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext
Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
SP 800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
SP 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then- Expansion
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 35 of 37
SP 800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application–Specific Key Derivation Functions
SP 800-185 SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 36 of 37
4.2 Acronyms
The following table defines acronyms found in this document:
Table 17 - Acronyms and Terms
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSTU4145 Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EdDSA Edwards Curve DSA using Ed25519, Ed448
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
JAR Java ARchive
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Poly Crypto Module for Java
Document Version 1.4 © Plantronics, Inc. Page 37 of 37
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
JVM Java Virtual Machine
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Not Applicable
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XDH Edwards Curve Diffie-Hellman using X25519, X448
XOF Extendable-Output Function