© Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Cisco IOS 15.5M Router Security Policy
Integrated Services Router (ISR) 891W, 1941W, 829W
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 1.0
June 2016
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 3
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 3
2 CISCO ISR WIRELESS ROUTERS ................................................................................... 5
2.1 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
DATA INPUT INTERFACE ....................................................................................................... 6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 7
2.3 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .......................................................................... 7
2.3.1 User Services .............................................................................................................. 7
2.3.2 Crypto Officer Services............................................................................................... 8
2.4 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ........................................................................................... 9
2.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT................................................................................ 9
2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 12
2.6.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms........................................................................ 12
2.6.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ......................................... 14
2.6.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms............................................................................... 14
2.7 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 14
2.7.1 Router Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)....................................................................... 14
2.7.2 AP Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)............................................................................. 15
2.7.3 Router Conditional tests ........................................................................................... 15
2.7.4 AP Conditional tests ................................................................................................. 15
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 17
3.1 INITIAL SETUP .................................................................................................................. 17
3.2 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION................................................................ 17
3.3 IPSEC REQUIREMENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ............................................ 17
3.4 SSLV3.1/TLS REQUIREMENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS............................... 18
3.5 ACCESS............................................................................................................................. 18
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco IOS 15.5M Router running on Cisco
891W, 1941W and IR829W (Router Firmware Version: IOS 15.5M and AP Firmware Version: 15.3.3-JB). This
security policy describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run the
modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals only with the capabilities and operations of the Cisco 891W, 1941W and IR829W in the
technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the routers
from the following sources:
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains
contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, these Cisco Integrated Services Router models identified above are referred to as Integrated
Services Router, ISR or the systems.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the
Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
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Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the routers and explains their secure configuration and operation. This
introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the router.
Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation
is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these
documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
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2 Cisco ISR Wireless Routers
Cisco 891W, 1941W, IR829W are multifunctional networking devices delivering fast, reliable, data transfers with a
high standard in security. These routers offer full network security, and other capabilities to fill networking needs for
a small to medium size network.
The following subsections describe the physical characteristics of the Cisco 891W, 1941W and IR829W which are a
multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module.
Cisco 891 Gigabit Ethernet security router with SFP and Dual Radio 802.11n Wifi for FCC -A domain or ETSI -E
domain. Cisco 891 Series Integrated Services Routers are designed to deliver highly secure broadband, Metro
Ethernet, wireless LAN connectivity, and business continuity for enterprise small branch offices. Secure
802.11a/g/n access point (optional), which offers dual-band radios for mobility, and supports Cisco Unified WLAN
architectures.
The Cisco 1941 are future-enabled with multi-core CPUs, Gigabit Ethernet switching with enhanced POE, and new
energy monitoring and control capabilities while enhancing overall system performance. Additionally, a new Cisco
IOS® Software Universal image and Services Ready Engine module enable you to decouple the deployment of
hardware and software, providing a stable technology foundation which can quickly adapt to evolving network
requirements. The units offer differentials based on carrier and country compliance of use.
The IR829 are the first generation Internet of Things Group (IOTG) Routing Platform intended for
hardened/extended-temperature M2M, mobile/fleet, Smart-Connected Vehicle (SCV), and road-side infrastructure
applications. C829 Hardened WAN GE 4G LTE secure platform multi-mode carrier specific with 802.11n, FCC
compliant.
The tested platforms consist of the following components:
Router Hardware Model Protocols Firmware version
C891
C891FW-A
802.1X Authentication, SSH,
TLS (VPN/Mgt/SIP), IPSec, and
SNMPv3
Router IOS 15.5M
AP IOS 15.3.3-JB
C891FW-E
1941W 1941W
IR829
IR829GW-LTE-NA-A
IR829GW-LTE-VZ-A
Table 2 Module Hardware Configurations
The following pictures are representative each of the modules hardware model:
Figure 1 - Cisco 891W ISR
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Figure 2 - Cisco 1941 ISR
Figure 3 - IR829
2.1 Module Interfaces
The physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces from FIPS 140-2 as described in the following table:
Logical Interface 891w 1941w IR829w
Data Input Interface
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Fast Ethernet (FE) ports
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
WAN interface slots
EHWIC
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
USB Console Port
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Antenna Ports
USB Console Port
Data Output Interface
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Fast Ethernet (FE) ports
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
WAN interface slots
EHWIC
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
USB Console Port
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Antenna Ports
USB Console Port
Control Input Interface
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Fast Ethernet (FE) ports
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Reset Button
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
WAN interface slots
EHWIC
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
USB Console Port
Reset Button
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Antenna Ports
USB Console Port
Reset Button
Status Output Interface
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Fast Ethernet (FE) ports
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
LED
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
WAN interface slots
EHWIC
Antenna Ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
USB Console Port
Top Panel Ethernet LED
Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports
Console Port
Auxiliary Port
Antenna Ports
USB Console Port
Top Panel LED
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Logical Interface 891w 1941w IR829w
Ethernet Jack LEDs
Top Panel Status LED
Power Interface
5v DC power supply
POE
110v ~240v AC power supply 12VDC, 30W or 60W AC
POE
Table 3 Module Interfaces
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the module is the physical enclosure of the system on which the module is executed.
All of the functionality discussed in this document is provided by components within this cryptographic boundary.
2.3 Roles, Services and Authentication
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the module. The module also
supports RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication. There are two roles in the router that operators can assume: the
Crypto Officer role and the User role. The administrator of the router assumes the Crypto Officer role and associated
services in order to configure the router, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. A complete
description of all the management and configuration capabilities of the router can be found in the Performing Basic
System Management manual or Configuration Guide Manual and in the online help for the routers.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at least eight (8) characters long,
including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). See the Secure
Operation section for more information. If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used
without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in
4,488,223,369,069,440 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY
computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters
to choose from in total. Since it is claimed to be for 8 digits with no repetition, then the calculation should be 94 x
93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 88 x 87). In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the
ability to make over 74,803,722,817,824 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the
module.
Additionally, when using RSA-based authentication, RSA key pair has a modulus size of 2048-3072 bits, thus
providing 112 or 128 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a 1 in 2112
chance
of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To
exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be
capable of approximately 5.19x1028
attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the
modules to support.
2.3.1 User Services
Users enter the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or via IPSec protected telnet or SSH
session to a LAN port. The IOS prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User
is allowed entry to the IOS executive program. The services available to the User role and the type of access – read
(r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) –are listed below.
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of IOS currently running. User password (r)
Network Functions Connect to other network devices through outgoing telnet, PPP, etc. and
initiate diagnostic network services (i.e., ping, mtrace).
User password (r)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust flow control). User password (r)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. User password (r)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Operator password (r, w,
d) and [TLS pre-master
secret, TLS Traffic Keys]
(r, w, d)
IPsec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec VPN Operator password (r, w,
d) and [skeyid, skeyid_d,
SKEYSEED, IKE session
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Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, IKE
authentication private
Key, IKE authentication
public key, IPsec
encryption key, IPsec
authentication key] (r, w,
d)
SSH Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH Operator password (r. w.
d), SSH Traffic Keys (r,
w, d)
HTTPS Functions (TLS) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS Operator password (r, w,
d) and [TLS pre-master
secret, TLS Traffic Keys]
(r, w, d)
SNMPv3 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SNMPv3 SNMP v3 password,
SNMP session key (r, w,
d)
Wireless functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via 802.11i User password (r, w, d)
Table 4 - User Services
2.3.2 Crypto Officer Services
During initial configuration of the router, the Crypto Officer password (the “enable” password) is defined. A Crypto
Officer can assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional
Crypto Officers. The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the router. The services available to
the Crypto Officer role and the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) –are listed below.
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Configure the router Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable
interfaces and network services, set system date and time,
and load authentication information.
[ISAKMP preshared, Operator password,
Enable password] - (r, w, d), [IKE session
encrypt key, IKE session authentication key,
IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key] – (w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on
each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which
define a set of packets to permit or deny based on
characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP
connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password - (r, w,
d)
View Status Functions View the router configuration, routing tables, active
sessions, use gets to view SNMP MIB statistics, health,
temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics,
review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password - (r, w,
d)
Manage the router Log off users, shutdown or reload the router, erase the flash
memory, manually back up router configurations, view
complete configurations, manager user rights, and restore
router configurations.
Operator password, Enable password - (r, w,
d)
SNMPv3 Non security-related monitoring by the CO
using SNMPv3.
SnmpEngineID, SNMP v3 password,
SNMP session key (w, d)
Configure Encryption/Bypass Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set
preshared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP range
or allow plaintext packets to be set from specified IP
address.
[ISAKMP preshared, Operator password,
Enable password] - (r, w, d); [IKE session
encrypt key, IKE session authentication key,
IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key] – (w, d)
SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output
of CSPs.
TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys –
(r, w, d)
SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key and
SSHv2 session key (r, w, d)
IPsec VPN Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and output
of CSPs.
skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption
ISAKMP preshared (r, w, d), [skeyid,
skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt
key, IKE session authentication key, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE
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authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key] – (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys All CSPs (d)
Wireless Functions Configure wireless parameters, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
802.11i Pre-shared Key (PSK), 802.11i
Pairwise Master Key (PMK), 802.11i
Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), 802.11i
Temporal Key (TK), 802.11i Group Master
Key (GMK), 802.11i Group Temporal Key
(GTK) (r, w, d)
Table 5 - Crypto Officer Services
2.4 Unauthenticated Services
The services available to unauthenticated users are:
 Viewing the status output from the module’s LEDs
 Powering the module on and off using the power switch
 Sending packets in bypass
2.5 Cryptographic Key Management
The router securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as passwords.
All keys are protected by the Crypto Officer role login password-protection, and these keys can be zeroized by the
Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key.
The router is in the approved mode of operation only when FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms are used (except DH
and RSA key transport which are allowed in the approved mode for key establishment despite being non-approved).
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is protected by a
password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys. The Crypto Officer needs to be
authenticated to store keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly associated
with that specific tunnel only via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)/Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI). RSA
Public keys are entered into the modules using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of
the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with the
user/role that entered them.
The module supports the following keys and critical security parameters (CSPs).
Name CSP Type Size Description Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
DRBG_CTR
(using AES-256)
256-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
HW (onboard Cavium cryptographic processor)
based entropy source used to construct seed.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
DRBG_CTR
384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines the internal
state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG
derivation function that includes the entropy
input from hardware-based entropy source.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
DRBG_CTR
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical values of the
internal state upon which the security of this
DRBG mechanism depends. Generated first
during DRBG instantiation and then
subsequently updated using the DRBG update
function.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP800-90A 256-bits Internal Key value used as part of SP 800-90A SDRAM Power cycle the
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DRBG_CTR CTR_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
(plaintext) device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The shared secret used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange. Established per the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224-379 bits The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange. This key is generated by calling
SP800-90A DRBG.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange. This key is derived per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key
ECDH Curves: P-
256/P-384
Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec
session. The private key used in Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
ECDH Curves: P-
256/P-384
Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec
session. The public key used in Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This key is
established per the EC Diffie-Hellman key
agreement.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman shared
secret
ECDH Curves: P-
256/P-384
The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) exchange. Established per the
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was
established via key derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1) and it will be used
for deriving other keys in IKE protocol
implementation.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was
derived via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1) and it will be used for
deriving IKE session authentication key.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
SKEYSEED Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was
derived via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for
deriving IKE session authentication key.
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bit Triple-
DES or
128/192/256
bits AES
The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This
key is derived via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC SHA-1 160 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication
key. This key is derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared key Variable 8 plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE skeyid when using
preshared secret authentication. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘# no
crypto isakmp
key’ command
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA/ ECDSA RSA (2048 –
3072 bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves: P-
256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE
authentication. This key is generated by calling
SP800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running
‘#crypto key
zeroize’ command
IKE RSA/ ECDSA RSA (2048 – RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE SDRAM By running
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authentication
public key
3072 bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves: P-
256/P-384)
authentication. Internally generated by the
module
(plaintext) ‘#crypto key
zeroize’ command
IPsec encryption
key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256
bits AES
The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This
key is derived via a key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC-
SHA1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key.
This key is derived via a key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 - 25
characters
The password of the User role. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable password Password 8 - 25
characters
The password of the CO role. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
RADIUS secret Shared Secret 8 - 25
characters
The RADIUS shared secret. Used for RADIUS
Client/Server authentication. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext),
By running ‘# no
radius-server key’
command
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 8 - 25
characters
The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for
TACACS+ Client/Server authentication. This
CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext),
By running ‘# no
tacacs-server key’
command
SSHv2 Private
Key
RSA 2048 – 3072
bits modulus
The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is generated by calling
SP800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
crypto key zeroize
rsa’ command
SSHv2 Public
Key
RSA 2048 – 3072
bits modulus
The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is internally generated by
the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
crypto key zeroize
rsa’ command
SSHv2 Session
Key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256
bits AES
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used to
encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics traversing
between the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
This key is derived via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
snmpEngineID Shared Secret 32 bits A unique string used to identify the SNMP
engine. This key is entered by Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new engine ID
SNMPv3
password
Shared Secret 256 bits The password use to setup SNMP v3
connection. This key is entered by Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
SNMPv3 session
key
AES 128 bits Encryption key used to protect SNMP traffic.
This key is derived via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (SNMPv3).
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
TLS server
private key
RSA 2048-3072
modulus
Private key used for SSLv3.1/TLS. NVRAM
(plaintext)
“# crypto key
zeroize rsa"
TLS server
public key
RSA 2048-3072
modulus
Private key used for SSLv3.1/TLS. NVRAM
(plaintext)
“# crypto key
zeroize rsa"
TLS pre-master
secret
Shared Secret 384-bits Shared Secret created using asymmetric
cryptography from which new TLS session keys
can be created
SDRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
TLS session
encryption key
Triple-DES/AES 192- bits Triple-
DES or/
128/192/256-
Key used to encrypt TLS session data SDRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
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12
bits AES
TLS session
integrity key
HMAC-
SHA1/256/384/512
160-512 bits Used for TLS data integrity protection SDRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
802.11i Pre-
shared
Key (PSK)
Shared Secret 8 – 25
characters
The PSK is used to derive the PMK for 802.11i
communications.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Using either the
“no
wpa-psk” or
“no dot11 ssid”
command
802.11i Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK)
HMAC-SHA-1 160-bits The PMK is Used to derive the Pairwise
Transient Key (PTK) for 802.11i
communications.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when
the router is
powercycled.
802.11i Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
AES-CCM 128-bits The PTK, also known as the CCMP key, is the
802.11i session key for unicast communications.
This key also used to encrypt and sign
management frames between AP and the
wireless client.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
terminated.
802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK)
AES-CCM 128-bits The TK, also known as the CCMP key, is the
802.11i session key for unicast communications.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
terminated.
802.11i Group
Master Key
(GMK)
HMAC-SHA-1 160-bits The GMK is Used to derive the Group Temporal
Key (GTK) for 802.11i communications.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
terminated.
802.11i Group
Temporal Key
(GTK)
AES-CCM 128-bits The GTK is the 802.11i session key for
broadcast communications.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
terminated.
Table 6 – Keys/CSPs Table
2.6 Cryptographic Algorithms
The router is in the approved mode of operation only when FIPS 140-2 approved/allowed algorithms are used. The
module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
2.6.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The routers support the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Router IOS Router HW Accelerator AP IOS Wireless Radio Mac
AES #2817
(128,192,256)(ECB
, CBC,
CFB,CTR,CMAC,
GCM), #3625
(128,192,256)(CBC
, CFB,CTR,CMAC,
GCM)
#2343 (128,192,256)(ECB,
CBC, GCM)
#2817
(128,192,256)(E
CB, CBC,
CFB,CTR,CMAC,
GCM), #3625
(128,192,256)(C
BC,
CFB,CTR,CMAC,
GCM)
#1791 (128)(CCM)
Triple-DES #1688 (192) (CBC) #1466 (192) (ECB, CBC) N/A N/A
SHS #2361
(SHA1,256,384,51
2), #3043
(SHA1,256,384,51
#2020
(SHA1,256,384,512)
#2361
(SHA1,256,384,
512), #3043
(SHA1,256,384,
N/A
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13
Router IOS Router HW Accelerator AP IOS Wireless Radio Mac
2), 512),
HMAC #1764 (HMAC
SHA1,256,384,512
), #2377 (HMAC
SHA1,256,384,512
),
#1452 (HMAC
SHA1,256,384,512)
#1764 (HMAC
SHA1,256,384,5
12), #2377
(HMAC
SHA1,256,384,5
12),
N/A
RSA #1471 (Gen,
PKCS1_V1_5, Sig-
GEN, SIG-VER)
(2048, 3072),
#1868 (Gen,
PKCS1_V1_5, Sig-
GEN, SIG-VER)
(2048, 3072)
Note 1: The
module supports
1024-bit RSA
Signature
Generation. This
may not be used
in FIPS mode
Note 2: The
module supports
RSA Signature
Generation with
SHA-1. This may
only be used in
protocols as
defined in SP 800-
52 and SP 800-57.
N/A N/A N/A
ECDSA #493 (P-256, P-
384), #752 (P-256,
P-384)
N/A N/A N/A
DRBG #481 (CTR-AES-
256), #953 (CTR-
AES-256),
N/A #481 (CTR-AES-
256), #953
(CTR-AES-256),
N/A
CVL #253 (IKE, TLS,
IPsec, SSH, SNMP,
SRTP), #645 (IKE,
TLS, IPsec, SSH,
SNMP, SRTP)
N/A N/A N/A
SP800-108 KBKDF N/A N/A #49 (HMAC-
SHA1, CTR), #86
(HMAC-SHA1,
CTR)
N/A
Table 7 – Algorithm Certificates
Note:
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 The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 6071 for IPsec.
The module uses basically a 96-bit IV, which is comprised of a 4 byte salt unique to the crypto session and
8 byte monotonically increasing counter. The module generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses
power.
 The TLS, IKEv1/IKEv2, SSH, and SNMP protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
2.6.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
 Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength; non-
compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength;
non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
2.6.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms
Integrated Services Routers (ISRs) cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms:
Service Non-Approved Algorithm
SSH* Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5,
Symmetric: DES,
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS* Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPsec* Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SNMP* Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 8 Non-Approved Services
Note: Services marked with a single asterisk (*) have the listed non-approved cryptographic algorithms available to
be used. Use of these algorithms are prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. The services may be used
with FIPS-approved algorithms.
2.7 Self-Tests
In order to prevent any secure data from being released, it is important to test the cryptographic components of a
security module to insure all components are functioning correctly. The router includes an array of self-tests that are
run during startup and periodically during operations. In the error state, all secure data transmission is halted and the
router outputs status information indicating the failure.
2.7.1 Router Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)
 IOS Algorithm Self-Test
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests
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15
o AES GCM Known Answer Test
o DRBG Known Answer Test
o ECDSA Sign/Verify
o HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
o HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
o HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
o RSA Known Answer Test
o SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o SHA-256 Known Answer Test
o SHA–384 Known Answer Test
o SHA-512 Known Answer Test
o Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Test
o ECC Primitive “Z” KAT
o FFC Primitive “Z” KAT
 Hardware Accelerator Self-Tests
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests
o Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests
o HMAC (SHA-1) Known Answer Test
o SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o SHA-256 Known Answer Test
o SHA–384 Known Answer Test
o SHA-512 Known Answer Test
 Firmware integrity test
o RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-512
2.7.2 AP Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)
 IOS Algorithm Known Answer Testes:
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests
o DRBG Known Answer Test
o HMAC (SHA-1) Known Answer Test
o KBKDF Known Answer Test
 AP Radio MAC Known Answer Tests:
o AES-CCM Known Answer Test
 Firmware integrity test
o RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-512
2.7.3 Router Conditional tests
 Conditional Bypass test
 Continuous random number generation test for approved and non-approved RNGs
 Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA
 Pairwise consistency test for RSA
 Firmware load test
2.7.4 AP Conditional tests
 Continuous random number generation test for approved and non-approved RNGs
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3 Secure Operation
The Cisco 891W, 1941W and IR829W Routers meet all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the
setting instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this router without
maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The Crypto Officer must disable IOS Password Recovery by executing the following commands:
configure terminal
no service password-recovery
end
show version
NOTE: Once Password Recovery is disabled, administrative access to the module without the password will not be
possible.
3.2 System Initialization and Configuration
1 The value of the boot field must be 0x0102. This setting disables break from the console to the ROM
monitor and automatically boots the IOS image. From the “configure terminal” command line, the Crypto
Officer enters the following syntax:
config-register 0x0102
2 The Crypto Officer must create the “enable” password for the Crypto Officer role. The password must be at
least 8 characters (all digits; all lower and upper case letters; and all special characters except ‘?’ are
accepted) and is entered when the Crypto Officer first engages the “enable” command. The Crypto Officer
enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
enable secret [PASSWORD]
3 The Crypto Officer must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters) to users. Identification and
authentication on the console port is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command line, the
Crypto Officer enters the following syntax:
line con 0
password [PASSWORD]
login local
4 If using a Radius/TACACS+ server for authentication, it is recommended that an IPsec tunnel or some
other secure tunnel between the Router and the RADIUS/TACACS+ be set up.
The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long.
3.3 IPSec Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms
1 Although the IOS implementation of IKE allows a number of algorithms, only the following algorithms are
allowed in a FIPS 140-2 configuration:
 ah-sha-hmac
 esp-sha-hmac
 esp-Triple-DES
 esp-aes
2 The following algorithms are not FIPS approved and should not be used during FIPS-approved mode:
 DES
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 MD-5 for signing
 MD-5 HMAC
3.4 SSLV3.1/TLS Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms
When negotiating TLS cipher suites, only FIPS approved algorithms must be specified. All other versions
of SSL except version 3.1 must not be used in FIPS mode of operation. The following algorithms are not
FIPS approved and should not be used in the FIPS-approved mode:
 MD5
 RC4
 DES
3.5 Access
1 Telnet access to the module is only allowed via a secure IPSec tunnel between the remote system and the
module. The Crypto officer must configure the module so that any remote connections via telnet are
secured through IPSec, using FIPS-approved algorithms. Note that all users must still authenticate after
remote access is granted.
2 SSH access to the module is only allowed if SSH is configured to use a FIPS-approved algorithm. The
Crypto officer must configure the module so that SSH uses only FIPS-approved algorithms. Note that all
users must still authenticate after remote access is granted.
3 SNMP access is only allowed via when SNMPv3 is configured with AES encryption.