VMware BC-FJA
(Bouncy Castle FIPS Java
API)
Software Version: 1.0.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.2
VMware, Inc.
3401 Hillview Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
Tel: 877-486-9273
Email: info@vmware.com
http://www.vmware.com
Security Policy, Version 0.2 VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Reference .....................................................................................................................................................4
2 VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module.................................................................................5
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................5
2.1.1 VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) ........................................................................................5
2.2 Module Specification....................................................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................6
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary..............................................................................................................6
2.2.3 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................7
2.2.4 Module Configuration..............................................................................................................................7
2.3 Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Roles, Authentication and Services ............................................................................................................10
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles ..............................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 Services..................................................................................................................................................10
2.5 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................13
2.6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................13
2.6.1 Use of External RNG...............................................................................................................................16
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................16
2.7.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................................20
2.7.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................22
2.8 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................23
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy .............................................................................................................24
3 Secure Operation ........................................................................................................................................26
3.1 Basic Enforcement......................................................................................................................................26
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager ..............................................................................26
3.3 Basic Guidance ...........................................................................................................................................26
3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs....................................................................................................27
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF......................................................................27
4 References and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................28
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram.............................................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary ..................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................5
Table 2 – Available Java Permissions ..........................................................................................................8
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping .........................................................................................9
Table 4 – Roles Description........................................................................................................................10
Table 5 – Services ......................................................................................................................................10
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Services............................................................................................12
Table 7 – Tested Configuration...................................................................................................................14
Table 8 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ..........................................................16
Table 9 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation ..........................................19
Table 10 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions...............................................................19
Table 11 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only.................................19
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).........................................................................................20
Table 13 – Public Keys ...............................................................................................................................22
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests ..................................................................................................................23
Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................24
Table 16 – References................................................................................................................................28
Table 17 – Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................29
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle
FIPS Java API) Module from VMware, Inc. This Security Policy describes how the VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy
Castle FIPS Java API) Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is
available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module is also referred to in this document as “BC-FJA
Module”, or “the module”.
1.2 Reference
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the composite module in the technical terms
of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The VMware website (http://www.vmware.com) contains information on the full line of products
from VMware.
• The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/Validated-Modules/Search) contains options to get contact information for individuals to
answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
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2 VMWARE BC-FJA (BOUNCY CASTLE FIPS JAVA API) MODULE
2.1 Introduction
VMware, Inc., a global leader in virtualization, cloud infrastructure, and business mobility, delivers
customer-proven solutions that accelerate Information Technology (IT) by reducing complexity and
enabling more flexible, agile service delivery. With VMware solutions, organizations are creating
exceptional experiences by mobilizing everything, responding faster to opportunities with modern data and
apps hosted across hybrid clouds, and safeguarding customer trust with a defense-in-depth approach to
cybersecurity. VMware enables enterprises to adopt an IT model that addresses their unique business
challenges. VMware’s approach accelerates the transition to solutional-computing while preserving existing
investments and improving security and control.
2.1.1 VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
The VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software cryptographic module based on the
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. FIPS Java API (BC-FJA) Module (SW Version 1.0.0). The module is a
software library that provides cryptographic functions to various VMware applications via a well-defined
Java-language application program interface (API). The module only performs communications with the
calling application (the process that invokes the module services).
The VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels shown
in Table 1:
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC2
1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
2.2 Module Specification
The VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software cryptographic module with a multiple-
chip standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 1. The software version of the
module is 1.0.0, using the 1.0.0 SW version of the Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle
FIPS Java API) Module.
1
N/A – Not Applicable
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
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2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, there are no physical protection mechanisms implemented. Therefore, the module
must rely on the physical characteristics of the host system. The BC-FJA Module runs on a General-
Purpose Computer (GPC) and the physical boundary of the cryptographic module is defined by the hard
enclosure around the host system on which it runs. The module supports the physical interfaces of the
GPC. See Figure 1 below for a block diagram of the typical GPC and the ports or interfaces across the
physical cryptographic boundary marked with red dotted line.
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The executable for VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module is a Java Archive (JAR) file which
is: bc-fips-1.0.0.jar. This module is the only software component within the Logical Cryptographic
Boundary and the only software component that carries out cryptographic functions covered by FIPS 140-
2. Figure 2 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware
components of the computer. The BC classes are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) using the
classes of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE). The JVM is the interface to the computer’s Operating
System (OS) that is the interface to the various physical components of the computer.
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Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary
2.2.3 Modes of Operation
There will be two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-approved
mode when the appropriate factory is called. To verify that a module is in the Approved Mode of operation,
the user can call a FIPS-approved mode status method (CryptoServicesRegisrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()).
If the module is configured to allow approved and non-approved mode operation, a call to
CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the current thread of user control into
approved mode.
In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will
be called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved Mode.
2.2.4 Module Configuration
In default operation the module will start with both approved and non-approved mode enabled.
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If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed the module will be running in
approved mode with secret and private key export disabled.
Use of the module with a Java Security manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow
the module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to
examine secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly with
a Java Security manager are indicated by a Y in the Req column of Table 2.
Table 2 – Available Java Permissions
Permission Settings Req Usage
RuntimePermission “getProtectionDomain” Y Allows checksum to be carried out
on jar.
RuntimePermission “accessDeclaredMembers” Y Allows use of reflection API within
the provider.
PropertyPermission “java.runtime.name”, “read” N Only if configuration properties are
used.
SecurityPermission "putProviderProperty.BCFIPS" N Only if provider installed during
execution.
CryptoServicesPermission “unapprovedModeEnabled” N Only if unapproved mode
algorithms required.
CryptoServicesPermission “changeToApprovedModeEnabled” N Only if threads allowed to change
modes.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportSecretKey” N To allow export of secret keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportPrivateKey” N To allow export of private keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportKeys” Y Required to be applied for the
module itself. Optional for any other
codebase.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsNullDigestEnabled” N Only required for TLS digest
calculations.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled” N Only required if TLS is used with RSA
encryption.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsAlgorithmsEnabled” N Enables both NullDigest and
PKCS15KeyWrap.
CryptoServicesPermission “defaultRandomConfig” N Allows setting of default
SecureRandom.
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CryptoServicesPermission “threadLocalConfig” N Required to set a thread local
property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
CryptoServicesPermission “globalConfig” N Required to set a global property in
the CryptoServicesRegistrar.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s logical interfaces exist at a low level in the software as an API. Both the API and physical
interfaces can be categorized into the following interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
• Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
• Power input
As a software module, the module’s manual controls, physical indicators, and physical and electrical
characteristics are those of the host platform. A mapping of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces, the physical
interfaces, and the module interfaces can be found in Table 3 below.
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping
FIPS Interface Physical Interface Module Interface (API)
Data Input Network port, Serial port, USB
port, SCSI/SATA Controller
The function calls that accept input data
for processing through their arguments.
Data Output Network port, Serial port, USB
port, SCSI/SATA Controller
The function calls that return by means of
their return codes or argument generated
or processed data back to the caller.
Control Input Network port, Serial port, USB
port, Power button
The function calls that are used to initialize
and control the operation of the module.
Status Output Network port, Serial port, USB
port, Graphics controller
Return values for function calls; Module
generated error messages.
Power Input AC Power socket Not applicable.
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module
is performing self-tests, or is in error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The
module is single-threaded and in error states returns only an error value, and no data output is returned.
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2.4 Roles, Authentication and Services
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The cryptographic
module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that
instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
Table 4 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The module does not support a maintenance role
and/or bypass capability. The module does not support authentication.
Table 4 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type
CO Cryptographic Officer – Powers on and off
the module.
N/A – Authentication not required
for Level 1
User User – The user of the complete API. N/A – Authentication not required
for Level 1
2.4.2 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 5 below, and Table 6 describes all usage of CSPs
by the service.
Table 5 lists the services. The second column provides a description of each service and availability to the
Cryptographic Officer and User, in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Table 5 – Services
Service Description CO U
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module
initialization.
X
Show Status A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if the
module is ready.
CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode() can be called to
determine the FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread termination. X
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Authentication Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures. X
DRBG (SP800-90A) output Used for random number, IV and key generation. X
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Service Description CO U
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest, SHAKE
output.
X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-master secret and
additional input.
X
SP 800-108 KDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SSH Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
X9.63 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input. X
IKEv2 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SRTP Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
PBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an
encoding of a password and an additional function such as a
message hash.
X
Key Agreement Schemes Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56A, Diffie-
Hellman).
X
Key Wrapping Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided function X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs X
Note: The module services are the same in the approved and non-approved modes of operation. The only
difference is the function(s) used (approved/allowed or non-approved/non-allowed).
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke non-
approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as approved mode only. In
approved only mode no non-approved services are accessible. In the presence of a Java SecurityManager
approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific
permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Cryptographic Officer or User.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
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Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of
access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an
existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
AES
Keys
DH
Keys
DRBG
Keys
DSA
Keys
EC
Agreement
Key
ECDSA
Key
HMAC
Keys
KDF
Secret
Values
RSA
Keys
Triple-DES
Keys
Initialize Module and Run Self-
Tests on Demand
Show Status
Zeroize / Power-off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption R R
Data Decryption R R
MAC Calculation R R R
Signature Authentication R R R
Signature Verification R R R
DRBG (SP800-90A) output G G G,R G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message Hashing R
TLS Key Derivation Function R
SP 800-108 KDF R
SSH Derivation Function R
X9.63 Derivation Function R
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Service CSPs
AES
Keys
DH
Keys
DRBG
Keys
DSA
Keys
EC
Agreement
Key
ECDSA
Key
HMAC
Keys
KDF
Secret
Values
RSA
Keys
Triple-DES
Keys
SP 800-56A-rev2 Concatenation
Derivation Function
R
IKEv2 Derivation Function R
SRTP Derivation Function R
PBKDF G,R
Key Agreement Schemes G R R R R G
Key Wrapping/Transport (RSA,
AES, Triple-DES)
R R R R
Key Unwrapping (RSA, AES,
Triple-DES)
R R R R
NDRNG Callback G
Utility
2.5 Physical Security
The VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software module, which FIPS defines as a multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module. As such, it does not include physical security mechanisms. Thus, the
FIPS 140-2 requirements for physical security are not applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational
environment list. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated
manner. The Module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that instantiates the Module
within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.
The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager, and starts in FIPS-approved mode by default when
used with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java Security
Manager, it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environment on the general-purpose
computer (GPC) platforms detailed in Table 7 below:
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Table 7 – Tested Configuration
# GPC Platforms
Operational Environment
(on ESXi 6.5)
Java SE Runtime
Environment
Processor
Family
1 Dell PowerEdge T620 with
Intel Xeon Processor
PhotonOS 1.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
2 PhotonOS 2.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
3 Microsoft Windows Server 2008 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
4 Microsoft Windows Server 2012 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
5 Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
6 Ubuntu 16.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
7 BLUX 4.9 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
8 SLES 12 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
9 Microsoft Windows 7 (32-bit) Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Core i
10 Microsoft Windows 10 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Core i
# GPC Platforms
Operational Environment
(on ESXi 6.7)
Java SE Runtime
Environment
Processor
Family
11 Dell PowerEdge T620 with
Intel Xeon Processor
PhotonOS 1.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
12 PhotonOS 2.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
13 Ubuntu 16.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
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14 Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
Intel Xeon
E5
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, the cryptographic module will remain compliant with the
FIPS 140-2 validation when operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that:
1) No source code has been modified.
2) The GPC uses the specified single-user platform, or another compatible single-user platform
such as one of the Java SE Runtime Environments listed on any of the following:
HP-UX
Linux Centos
Linux Debian
Linux Oracle RHC
Linux Oracle UEK
Linux SUSE
Linux Ubuntu
Mac OS X
Microsoft Windows
Microsoft Windows Server
Microsoft Windows XP
RedHat Enterprise Linux
VMware ESXi
VMware PhotonOS
BLUX
Further, VMware, Inc. affirms that the VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module runs in its
configured, Approved mode of operation on the following binary compatible platforms executing VMware
ESXi 6.0, ESXi 6.5, or ESXi 6.7 and Java SE Runtime Environment 7 or 8 with any of the above listed OS:
• Dell PowerEdge T320 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R530 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R730 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R830 with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen9 with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL38P Gen8 with AMD Opteron Processor
• Cisco UCS – B22 M Series Blade Servers with Intel Processor
• Cisco UCS – C24 M3 Series Rackmount with Intel Xeon Processor
• A general-purpose computer platform with an Intel Core i/Intel Xeon/AMD Opteron
Processor executing VMware ESXi and any OS (including Apple OS (OS X, macOS, iOS),
Android OS, and others) with single user mode.
• A cloud computing environment composed of a general-purpose computing platform
executing VMware ESXi or a VMware cloud solution that is executing VMware ESXi.
For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct
operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific
operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
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The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require a FIPS 140-2
validated Cryptographic Library. The Module is a software-only embodiment; the cryptographic boundary
is the Java Archive (JAR) file, bc-fips-1.0.0.jar.
2.6.1 Use of External RNG
The module makes use of the JVM's configured SecureRandom entropy source to provide entropy when
required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding
configuration for the DRBG that is using it. In approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that would
be requested is 112 bits with a larger minimum being set if the security strength of the operation requires
it. The module will wait until the SecureRandom.generateSeed() returns the requested amount of entropy,
blocking if necessary.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Table 8 to Table 10, below.
Table 8 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5365
AES-CBC
Ciphertext
Stealing (CS)
[Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct 2010]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
Based on 5365
CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5365
CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits and Triple-DES with 2-key3,4
,
3-key
5365 (AES),
2709 (Triple-
DES)
3
2^20 block limit is enforced by module
4
In approved mode of operation, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than
verification purposes is non-compliant.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
GCM/GMAC5
[SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5365
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits
2076
DSA6
[FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only for SigVer)
1386
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Signature Generation Component, Public Key
Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification, Public Key
Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-192*, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163*, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163*, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
* Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
1415,
1833 (CVL)
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
3553
KAS7
[SP 800-56A-rev2]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: FB, FC, EB, EC, ED, EE
177
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific8
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH KDF, X9.63 KDF, IKEv2
KDF, SRTP KDF.
1831 (CVL)
5
GCM with an internally generated IV, see section 8.3 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant
with IG A.5.
6
DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols.
7
Keys are not established directly into the module using the key agreement algorithms.
8
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions9
[SP 800-108]
Modes: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double-Pipeline Iteration
Mode
Functions: CMAC-based KBKDF with AES, 2-key Triple-DES, 3-key
Triple-DES or HMAC-based KBKDF with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
194
Key Wrapping
Using Block
Ciphers10
[SP 800-38F]
Modes: AES KW, KWP
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (provides between 128 and 256 bits of
strength)
5365 (AES)
[SP 800-38F]
Mode: Triple-DES TKW
Key size: 3-key (provides 112 bits of strength)
2709 (Triple-
DES)
RSA [FIPS 186-4, FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998 and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS and
PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification, Component Test
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only for SigVer)
2870, 1832
(CVL)
SHA [FIPS 180-4],
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
4307
SHA-3, SHAKE [FIPS 202]
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256
42
Triple-DES (Triple-
DES)
[SP 800-67]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB, TCBC, TCFB64, TCFB8, TOFB, CTR
Key sizes: 2-key (Decryption only)11
, 3-key
2709
9
Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not
be used in approved mode.
10
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
11
2^20 block limit is enforced by the module, 2-key encryption is disabled.
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Table 9 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
KAS12
using SHA-
512/224 or SHA-
512/256
[SP 800-56A-rev2]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: FB, FC, EB, EC, ED, EE13
Vendor
Affirmed IG A.3
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.6
Key Wrapping10
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B]
RSA-KEMS-KWS with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
Key Transport10
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B]
RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
Table 10 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Non-SP 800-56A-
rev2 Compliant DH
[IG D.8]
Diffie-Hellman 2048-bit key agreement primitive for use with system-level key
establishment; not used by the module to establish keys within the module.
(CVL Cert #1831, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength)
Non-SP 800-56B
compliant RSA Key
Transport
[IG D.9] RSA 2048 or 3072-bit may be used by a calling application as part of a
key encapsulation scheme (key wrapping; key establishment methodology
provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength).
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2]
Table 11 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only
AES (non-compliant14
)
ARC4 (RC4)
Blowfish
Camellia
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256
(non-compliant)
MD5
OpenSSL PBKDF (non-compliant)
12
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
13
Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with EE.
14
Support for additional modes of operation.
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CAST5
DES
Diffie-Hellman KAS (non-compliant15
)
DSA (non-compliant16
)
DSTU4145
ECDSA (non-compliant17
)
ElGamal
GOST28147
GOST3410-1994
GOST3410-2001
GOST3411
HMAC-GOST3411
HMAC-MD5
HMAC-RIPEMD128
HMAC-RIPEMD160
HMAC-RIPEMD256
HMAC-RIPEMD320
HMAC-TIGER
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL
IDEA
PKCS#12 PBKDF (non-compliant)
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF (non-compliant)
PRNG X9.31
RC2
RIPEMD128
RIPEMD160
RIPEMD256
RIPEMD320
RSA (non-compliant18
)
RSA KTS (non-compliant19
)
SCrypt
SEED
Serpent
SipHash
SHACAL-2
TIGER
Triple-DES (non-compliant20
)
Twofish
WHIRLPOOL
2.7.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section in Table 12. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in section 2.4.2.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
15
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
16
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
17
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
18
Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional
key sizes.
19
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
20
Support for additional modes of operation.
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CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, SP800-38C, Addendum to SP 800-38A] AES
(128/192/256) encrypt key21
AES Decryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, SP800-38C, Addendum to SP 800-38A] AES
(128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DH Agreement key [SP 800-56A-rev2] Diffie-Hellman (>= 2048) private key agreement key
DRBG (CTR AES)
V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG (CTR Triple-DES)
V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(Hash)
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(HMAC)
V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy
input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >= 224 bits) private
key agreement key
EC Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >= 224 bits) signature
generation key.
HMAC Authentication
Key
[FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size determined by security
strength required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2
PRF.
PBKDF Secret Value
[SP 800-132] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified PRF.
RSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (>= 2048) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (>=2048) key transport (decryption) key
21
The AES-GCM key and IV is generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum
of 96 bits. In the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that
any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
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CSP Description / Usage
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
[SP 800-56A-rev2] Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF.
SP 800-108 KDF Secret
Value
[SP 800-108] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF.
SRTP Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP
PRF.
SSH Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH PRF.
TLS KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified TLS PRF.
Triple-DES
Authentication Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) CMAC key
Triple-DES Encryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) decryption key
Triple-DES Wrapping Key
[SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping key, (128
unwrapping only).
X9.63 KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified X9.63 PRF.
2.7.2 Public Keys
Table 13 – Public Keys
CSP Description / Usage
DH Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev2] Diffie-Hellman (>= 2048) public key agreement key
DSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) public key
agreement key
EC Verification Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature
verification key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (>=2048) key transport (encryption) key.
RSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (>= 1024) signature verification key
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2.8 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 14 below. All KATs
must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs
fails, the module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed error message
when FipsStatus.isReady() is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and calling
FipsStatus.isReady() again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Software Integrity HMAC-SHA256
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
FFC KAS KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
ECC KAS KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Mode: TECB
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
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Test Target Description
Extendable-Output
functions (XOF)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs: SHAKE128, SHAKE256
Key Agreement
Using RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Key Transport
Using RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DH DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key pair generation.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
SP 800-56A
Assurances
Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3. Required per
IG 9.6.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing based attacks against its internal
implementations. There are two counter-measures used.
The first is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by strictly
avoiding “fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a MAC,
signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.
The second is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both protect the
RSA algorithm.
Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input
into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input makes
it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the
operation as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the
operation tells them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification
operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or
signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying
the correctness the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected
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errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the private
value of the RSA key.
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3 SECURE OPERATION
The VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The
sections below describe how to install, use, and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The module shall provide two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-tests by
cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager
In the presence of a Java SecurityManager approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA and
ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the
Cryptographic Officer or User. The SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the ability of particular
code bases to examine CSPs. See section 2.2.4 Module Configuration for further advice on this.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
3.3 Basic Guidance
The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate to
its use in applications running on the JVM.
Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that
provide access to the FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module. A more
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abstract level of access can also be gained through the use of strings providing operation names passed
into the module's Java cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography
Architecture (JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).
When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of
algorithms which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.
3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly, where an IV is not generated randomly the module supports the
importing of GCM IVs.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved
DRGB in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In approved mode, importing a GCM IV is non-conformant.
Per IG A.5, section 2.1 of this security policy also states that in the event module power is lost and restored
the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption
are re-distributed.
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be used
for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.
In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112
bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF
should be as large as practical.
As the module is a general-purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use
for the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain
enough entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength
required for the key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII a 14-byte
password is unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A,
“Security Considerations” of SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count
selection.
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4 REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS
The standards in Table 16 are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 17 provides definitions for the
acronyms used in this document.
Table 16 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31
X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12
Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-38A
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext
Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
SP 800-56A
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
SP 800-56B
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
SP 800-90A
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions
Table 17 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BC Bouncy Castle
BC-FJA Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Authority
DSTU4145 Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
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Acronym Definition
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG See References
JAR Java Archive
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
JVM Java Virtual Machine
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Not Applicable
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Security Policy, Version 0.2 VMware BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
August 20, 2018 Page 31 of 32
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Acronym Definition
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XOF Extendable-Output Function
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