Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
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Huawei AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
Non‐Proprietary FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.2
Date: May 4, 2017
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FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
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Contents
References and Definitions........................................................................................................................... 4
1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Module Hardware Models......................................................................................................... 10
1.1.1 AR1220E Model................................................................................................................... 10
1.1.2 AR1220EVW Model............................................................................................................. 10
1.1.3 AR2220E Model................................................................................................................... 11
1.2 Modes of Operation................................................................................................................... 12
2 Cryptographic Functionality ................................................................................................................. 13
2.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys............................................................................. 15
3 Roles, Authentication and Services...................................................................................................... 17
3.1 Assumption of Roles .................................................................................................................. 17
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................ 17
3.3 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 18
4 Self‐tests............................................................................................................................................... 20
5 Physical Security Policy......................................................................................................................... 22
5.1 Tamper Seal Placement ............................................................................................................. 22
5.1.1 AR1220E.............................................................................................................................. 22
5.1.2 AR1220EVW ........................................................................................................................ 23
5.1.3 AR2220E.............................................................................................................................. 24
6 Operational Environment..................................................................................................................... 25
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ....................................................................................................... 25
8 Security Rules and Guidance................................................................................................................ 26
Tables
Table 1: References.......................................................................................................................................4
Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions (for terms not defined in FIPS 140‐2 and associated documents) .......4
Table 3: Cryptographic Module Firmware.................................................................................................... 5
Table 4: Security Level of Security Requirements......................................................................................... 9
Table 5: AR1220E base model..................................................................................................................... 10
Table 6: AR1220E base model ports and interfaces ...................................................................................10
Table 7: AR1220EVW base model............................................................................................................... 10
Table 8: AR1220EVW base model ports and interfaces .............................................................................11
Table 9: AR2220E base model..................................................................................................................... 11
Table 10: AR2220E base model ports and interfaces .................................................................................11
Table 11: SSH Security Methods Available in Each Mode...........................................................................13
Table 12: IPsec ESP Cipher and Digest Methods Available.........................................................................13
Table 13: Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................. 14
Table 14: Allowed Algorithms..................................................................................................................... 15
Table 15: Non‐Approved Algorithms (Used only in the non‐Approved Mode)..........................................15
Table 16: Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)............................................................................................. 15
Table 17: Public Keys...................................................................................................................................16
Table 18: Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 17
Table 19: Authenticated Module Services.................................................................................................. 18
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Table 20: Unauthenticated Module Services.............................................................................................. 18
Table 21: Services only available in Non‐FIPS mode...................................................................................18
Table 22: CSP and Public Key Access Rights within Services.......................................................................19
Table 23: Power Up Self‐tests..................................................................................................................... 20
Table 24: Conditional Self‐tests .................................................................................................................. 21
Table 25: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines......................................................................................22
Figures
Figure 1: AR1220E (Top, Right, Front)........................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2: AR1220E (Bottom, Left, Back)........................................................................................................ 6
Figure 3: AR1220EVW (Top, Right, Front)..................................................................................................... 7
Figure 4: AR1220EVW (Bottom, Left, Back).................................................................................................. 7
Figure 5: AR2220E (Top, Right, Front)........................................................................................................... 8
Figure 6: AR2220E (Bottom, Left, Back)........................................................................................................ 8
Figure 7: Firmware Block Diagram................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 8: Front Plate Seals .......................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 9: Back Plate Seals............................................................................................................................ 23
Figure 10: Right Side Seals .......................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 11: Left Side Seals ............................................................................................................................ 23
Figure 12: Front Plate Seals ........................................................................................................................ 23
Figure 13: Back Plate Seals.......................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 14: Right Side Plate Seals ................................................................................................................. 24
Figure 15: Left Side Plate Seals ................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 16: Back Plate Seals.......................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 17: Front Plate Seals ........................................................................................................................ 25
Figure 18: Right Side Plate Seals ................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 19: Left Side Plate Seals ................................................................................................................... 25
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References and Definitions
Table 1: References
Ref Full Specification Name
ESP Kent, S., “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)”, RFC 4303, Internet Engineering Task Force,
December 2005.
ESP‐B Law, L. and J. Solinas, “Suite B Cryptography Suites for IPsec”, RFC 6379, Internet Engineering
Task Force, October 2011.
LDAP Semersheim, J., Ed., “Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol”, RFC 4511,
Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2006.
RADIUS Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W. and S. Willens, “Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS), RFC 2865, Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2000.
SSH Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, “The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol”, RFC 4254, Internet
Engineering Task Force, January 2006.
SSH‐B K. Igoe, “Suite B Cryptography in Suites for Secure Shell (SSH)”, Internet Engineering Task Force,
May 2011.
TLS Dierks, T., and E. Rescoria, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2”. RFC 5246,
Internet Engineering Task Force, August 2008.
TLS‐B Salter, M and R. Housely, “Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)”, Internet
Engineering Task Force, January 2012.
Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions (for terms not defined in FIPS 140‐2 and associated documents)
Term Definition
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting ‐ access control, policy enforcement and auditing
framework for computing systems, e.g. LDAP
ACL Access Control List
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
CAP Concurrence Accelerate Platform
CLI Command Line Interface
ESP Encapsulated Security Payload (a subset of IPsec, Internet Protocol Security)
GUI Graphical User Interface
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force, a standards body
IKE Internet Key Agreement, a key agreement scheme associated with IPsec (but not used by the
module)
IPC Inter‐process Communication
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NAT Network Address Translation
POST Power‐on Self‐tests
QoS Quality of Service
RFC Request For Comment; the prefix used by IETF for internet specifications.
SIC Service Interface Card
SSH Secure Shell
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Term Definition
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSM Terminal Security Management
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
VRP Versatile Routing Platform
VTY Virtual Terminal Line
WSIC Wide Service Interface Card
XSIC Extended Service Interface Card
1 Introduction
The Huawei AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers are multi‐chip standalone cryptographic modules
enclosed in hard, commercial grade metal cases. The cryptographic boundary for these modules is the
enclosure. The primary purpose of these modules is to integrate multiple services including; routing,
switching, 3G, voice, and security functions in one device. The modules provide network interfaces for
data input and output. The appliance encryption technology uses FIPS approved algorithms. FIPS
approved algorithms are approved by the U.S. government for protecting Unclassified data.
The module is designated as a non‐modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions.
Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate
FIPS 140‐2 validation.
Table 3: Cryptographic Module Firmware
Base Model FW Version
1 AR1220E V200R008C10SPC110
2 AR1220EVW V200R008C10SPC110
3 AR2220E V200R008C10SPC110
Figure 1 ‐ Figure 6 show the cryptographic boundary of the module.
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Figure 1: AR1220E (Top, Right, Front)
Figure 2: AR1220E (Bottom, Left, Back)
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Figure 3: AR1220EVW (Top, Right, Front)
Figure 4: AR1220EVW (Bottom, Left, Back)
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Figure 5: AR2220E (Top, Right, Front)
Figure 6: AR2220E (Bottom, Left, Back)
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Figure 7: Firmware Block Diagram
The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the module are as follows:
Table 4: Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self‐Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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1.1 Module Hardware Models
The physical forms of each configuration of the module are depicted in Figure 1 through Figure 6 above,
with corresponding ports and interfaces in Table 6, Table 8 and Table 10.
1.1.1 AR1220E Model
Table 5: AR1220E base model
Part number and Version Product Description
P/N: 02350DQJ
Version: E.5
Model: AR1220E
With Tamper Seals P/N:
4057‐113016
Huawei base model AR1220E with eight Ethernet ports, four GE WAN ports
(Note that the FIPS validated configuration is the base model with no
interface cards installed.)
Table 6: AR1220E base model ports and interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
USB USB interface (x2) N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
RST Reset button N/A ‐ Covered with a tamper evident seal
Console Serial console Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Mini USB Mini USB interface N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
WAN Network traffic connection (x4) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Ethernet Network traffic connections (x8) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
AC Power Power port Power
SIC Slots Service Interface Card slots and connector (x2) N/A – Populated with a faceplate and
secured in place with tamper evident seals
LEDs USB, SYS, WAN, Console, Mini USB, Ethernet
LEDs (x26)
Status out
1.1.2 AR1220EVW Model
Table 7: AR1220EVW base model
Part number and Version Description
P/N: 02350DQL
Version: F.5
Model: AR1220EVW
With Tamper Seals P/N:
4057‐113016
Huawei base model AR1220EVW with eight Ethernet ports, four GE WAN
ports
(Note that the FIPS validated configuration is the base model with no
interface cards installed)
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Table 8: AR1220EVW base model ports and interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
USB USB interface (x2) N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
RST Reset button N/A – Covered with a tamper evident seal
Wi‐Fi antenna
interfaces
Wi‐Fi interface to transmit and receive
data over Wi‐Fi (x2)
N/A ‐ Disabled in firmware
Console Serial console Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Mini USB Mini USB interface N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
WAN Network traffic connection (x4) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Ethernet Network traffic connections (x8) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
AC Power Power port Power
SIC Slots Service Interface Card slots and
connector (x2)
N/A – Populated with a faceplate and secured
in place with tamper evident seals
LEDs USB, SYS, WAN, Console, Mini USB,
Ethernet LEDs (x26)
Status out
1.1.3 AR2220E Model
Table 9: AR2220E base model
Part number and Version Description
P/N: 02350DQM
Version: E.6
Model: AR2220E
With Tamper Seals P/N:
4057‐113016
Huawei base model AR2220E with 3 GE WAN ports.
(Note that the FIPS validated configuration is the base model with no
interface cards installed)
Table 10: AR2220E base model ports and interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
AC power Power Power
WAN interface: GE
combo interface
Network traffic connection Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
WAN interfaces: GE
electrical interfaces
Network traffic connection (x2) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
USB USB interface (x2) N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
Mini USB Mini USB interface N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
Console Serial console Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
RST Reset button N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
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Port Description Logical Interface Type
MicroSD SD card support N/A – Covered with tamper evident seal
SIC Slots Service Interface Card slot and
connector (x4)
N/A – Populated with a faceplate and
secured in place with tamper evident seals
WSIC Slots Wide Service Interface Card slot
and connector (x2)
N/A – Populated with a faceplate and
secured in place with tamper evident seals
LEDs USB, SYS, WAN, Console, Mini
USB LEDs (x26)
Status out
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports both an Approved and non‐Approved mode of operation. By default, the module
comes configured in the non‐Approved mode.
See Section 8, Security Rules and Guidance, for instructions on how to configure the module to function
in the Approved mode operation.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The cryptographic protocols and primitives implemented and used by the modules are listed in this
section. Table 11 lists the SSH security methods; SSH methods are independently selectable and may be
used in any combination. Table 12 lists the IPsec security methods.
The module uses SSH‐2 to provide a shell interface over Ethernet for module configuration and
administration.
Table 11: SSH Security Methods Available in Each Mode
SSH Security Methods
Approved
Mode
Non‐Approved
Mode
Key Exchange
diffie‐hellman‐group14‐sha1 X X
Server Host Key (Authentication)
ssh‐ecdsa X X
Digest
hmac‐md5‐96 X
hmac‐sha1 X X
hmac‐sha1‐96 X X
Cipher
des‐cbc X
aes128‐cbc X X
blowfish‐cbc X
3des‐cbc X X
In the non‐Approved mode, the module supports SSH v1.5 with the same set of algorithms listed above.
The module uses IPsec ESP mode for data transport, using AES‐128, AES‐192 and AES‐256 in CBC mode
with IKE v2 key exchange. Only Oakley Group 14 is used by the IKE key exchange.
Table 12: IPsec ESP Cipher and Digest Methods Available
Cipher Suite String (IETF enumeration) Cipher Digest
AES128‐CBC‐SHA AES‐128 SHA‐1
AES128‐CBC‐SHA256 AES‐128 SHA‐256
AES128‐CBC‐SHA384 AES‐128 SHA‐384
AES128‐CBC‐SHA512 AES‐128 SHA‐512
AES192‐CBC‐SHA AES‐192 SHA‐1
AES192‐CBC‐SHA256 AES‐192 SHA‐256
AES192‐CBC‐SHA384 AES‐192 SHA‐384
AES192‐CBC‐SHA512 AES‐192 SHA‐512
AES256‐CBC‐SHA AES‐256 SHA‐1
AES256‐CBC‐SHA256 AES‐256 SHA‐256
AES256‐CBC‐SHA384 AES‐256 SHA‐384
AES256‐CBC‐SHA512 AES‐256 SHA‐512
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Cipher Suite String (IETF enumeration) Cipher Digest
3DES‐CBC‐SHA 3DES SHA‐1
3DES‐CBC‐SHA256 3DES SHA‐256
3DES‐CBC‐SHA384 3DES SHA‐384
3DES‐CBC‐SHA512 3DES SHA‐512
Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 list all Approved, Allowed and non‐Approved algorithms used by the
library, respectively.
Table 13: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Strength1
Use
Library: HFCL
4323 AES FIPS 197,
SP 800‐38A
CBC 128, 192, 256 Data Encryption/Decryption
4323
2861
AES
HMAC
SP 800‐38F Key Wrap 128 Key Establishment
2335
2861
Triple‐DES
HMAC
SP 800‐38F Key Wrap 112 Key Establishment
1379 DRBG2
SP 800‐90A Hash_DRBG 256 Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
1023 ECDSA FIPS186‐4 P‐224 and P‐256 (SHA‐256) ECC Key Generation; Digital
Signature
Generation/Verification
2861 HMAC FIPS 198‐1 HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA‐256,
HMAC‐SHA‐384, HMAC‐SHA‐512
Message Authentication
3565 SHS FIPS 180‐4 SHA‐1, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512 Message Digest Generation
2335 Triple‐DES SP 800‐67 TCBC 3‐Key Data Encryption/Decryption
1036
(CVL)
SSH3
KDF SP 800‐135 SHA‐1 KDF used to derive SSH v2
session keys
IKE3
KDFs SP 800‐135 2048: SHA‐1, SHA‐256, SHA‐384,
SHA‐512
KDF used to derive IKEv2 session
keys
Library: AR Router
4324
4325
AES FIPS 197 CBC 128, 192, 256 Data Encryption/Decryption
2862
2863
HMAC FIPS 198‐1 HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA‐256,
HMAC‐SHA‐384, HMAC‐SHA‐512
Message Authentication
3566
3567
SHA FIPS 180‐4 SHA‐1, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512 Message Digest Generation
1
Strength indicates DRBG Strength, Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli
2
Prediction resistance; hash_df used for instantiation
3
The SSH and IKE v2 protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP
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CAVP Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Strength1
Use
2336
2337
Triple‐DES SP 800‐67 TCBC 3‐Key Data Encryption/Decryption
Table 14: Allowed Algorithms
Algorithm (Establishment) Strength Use
Diffie‐Hellman DH Group 14 (2048‐bit modulus) (key agreement;
key establishment methodology provides 112 bits
of encryption strength)
Key establishment
NDRNG Internal entropy source with rationale to support
the claimed DRBG security strength.
DRBG (Cert. #1379) entropy
input
HMAC‐SHA‐1‐96 Based on HMAC Cert. #2861 Message authentication in SSH
Table 15: Non‐Approved Algorithms (Used only in the non‐Approved Mode)
Algorithm Use
Blowfish Message encryption in SSH
MD5 Message Digest Generation
HMAC‐MD5 Message Authentication
DES Data Encryption/Decryption
DH Group 1 (768‐bit modulus) For key exchange within SSH, IPsec
DH Group 2 (1024‐bit modulus) For key exchange within IPsec
DH Group 5 (1536‐bit modulus) For key exchange within IPsec
SM3 Message Digest Generation
SM1 Data Encryption/Decryption
SM4 Data Encryption/Decryption
SNMP KDF (non‐compliant) KDF used to derive SNMP session keys
IKEv1 KDF (non‐compliant) Key exchange within IPsec
2.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
All CSPs used by the module are described in this section.
Table 16: Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
AUTH‐PW Authentication Passwords, minimum of 8 characters
DRBG‐EI Entropy input (256 bytes) to the hash_df used to instantiate the Approved HASH_DRBG
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Name Description and usage
DRBG‐STATE SP 800‐90A Hash_DRBG V and C values (SHA‐256, 440‐bit V, per IG 14.5)
IKE‐DH‐PRIV IKE ephemeral Diffie‐Hellman private key for key exchange
IKE‐MS IKE master secret, used for SP 800‐135 key derivation.
IKE‐PSK The IKE Pre‐Shared Session: hmac‐sha1, hmac‐sha2‐256, hmac‐sha2‐384, hmac‐sha2‐512.
IKE‐SMAC The IKE / IPsec session authentication key (two instances, one per each direction of
communication): hmac‐sha1, hmac‐sha2‐256, hmac‐sha2‐384, hmac‐sha2‐512.
IKE‐SENC The IKE / IPsec session encryption key (two instances, one per each direction): 3 Key Triple‐
DES, AES‐128, AES‐192, AES‐256.
SSH‐DH SSH Diffie‐Hellman private component (2048‐bit). Ephemeral DH private key used in SSH.
SSH‐Priv SSH private key. ECDSA (P‐256) private key used to establish SSH sessions
SSH‐SENC SSH Session Encryption Key. AES‐128 or 3‐Key Triple‐DES key for SSH message
encrypt/decrypt
SSH‐SMAC SSH Session Authentication Key. HMAC‐SHA‐1 160‐bit session key for SSH message
authentication
Table 17: Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH‐Pub SSH public key. ECDSA (P‐256) public key used for SSH session establishment.
SSH‐DH‐Pub SSH Diffie‐Hellman public component. Ephemeral DH public key used in SSH. DH (L=2048
bit)
IKE‐PUB IKE Diffie‐Hellman public component. Ephemeral DH public key used in IKE. DH (L= 2048
bit)
IKE‐PEER IKE Diffie‐Hellman public key provided by the IKE peer. DH (L=2048 bit)
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module does not support a maintenance role or bypass capability. The module supports concurrent
use by End Users and Administrators. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles by the
partitioning of major subsystems (such as VPN traffic vs. shell or administrative functions), and by
partitioning of the administrative interfaces. Authentication status does not persist across module power
cycles. To change roles, an operator must first log out, then log in using another role.
Table 18 lists the available roles; the options for authentication type and data are common across roles.
Table 18: Roles Description
Role Authentication
ID Description Type Data
Root
Administrator
(CO)
Cryptographic Officer – Has full access to administer
and configure the module as well as delegate admin
access control rights to Administrators.
Identity‐based
(using Local
password
verification)
Username and
Password
Administrator
(AD)
Configures and administers the module per the
delegated access rights assigned by the Root
Administrator.
End User (EU) Typical end user accessing the virtual private
network resources via an encrypted connection.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The Local password verification method, which includes IKE peer authentication, requires an 8 character
minimum password using characters from at least two categories of printable character sets (upper case,
lower case, special character and numbers).
Since there are 28 possible special characters and 26 upper or lower case characters, the weakest
password that meets the policy but whose components are still chosen randomly would be 7 digits
and one upper or lower case character. This results in an upper bound probability of (10^7) x 26.
So, the probability of guessing the password with a single attempt is 1/(2.6x10^8), which is less than
one in 1,000,000.
For SSH connections, after n consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts, the module will lockout
additional authentication requests for a minimum of 5 minutes. The default value for n is 3, but per the
security rules must be less than 2600.
The probability of false authentication in a one minute period is 2599/(2.6x10^8) = 1/100038
For console access, after 1 unsuccessful attempt, the module requires a waiting period of 5 seconds before
accepting another authentication attempt. Thus, only 12 authentication attempts are possible over the
console in a one minute period.
The probability of a false authentication in a one minute period is 12/(2.6x10^8), which is less than
1 in 100,000.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are summarized next, with additional detail provided in Table 22
for traceability of cryptographic functionality and access to CSPs and public keys by services.
Table 19: Authenticated Module Services
Service Description
CO
AD
EU
Module Reset Reboot the module via reset CLI command. This service executes
the suite of self‐tests required by FIPS 140‐2.
X X
Configure System License management, file management, and logging configuration. X
Configure Network Network Interface configuration and management. X X
Configure Policy Configure VPN access policy. X X
Status Monitoring
and Reporting
Provides module status (CPU usage, etc.) and logs. X X
User Management
and Authentication
Creating users and setting access rights. X X4
VPN Provides VPN service through IPsec. X
Firewall Intrusion prevention and packet filtering. X
(Note: This is a condensed list of services for the purposes of this Security Policy. The full list of module
commands can be found in the module’s User manual. The link to the User Manual is provided below in
Section 8).
Table 20: Unauthenticated Module Services
Service Description
Reset to Factory This restores the module to factory defaults and is the means of providing
zeroization of all keys and CSPs
Network Traffic
Management
Provides network services through WAN, Uni/Multicast routing, QoS, Ethernet
switching, IP services(DHCP, DNS, NAT) and Voice
Show Status This service provides the current status of the cryptographic module, indicators
on the device show the module running properly or restarting
Table 21: Services only available in Non‐FIPS mode
Service Description
Remote AAA Connection to remote AAA server (RADIUS, TACACS)
SNMP Configuration, administration and monitoring
RIP and RIPng Routing protocol
OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 Routing protocol
ISIS and ISISv6 Routing protocol
BGP and BGP4+ Routing protocol
4
Only Administrators with a user level set between 3 and 15 can manage other administrator accounts
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Service Description
VRRP Redundancy backup mechanism for IP services, including IPv4/IPv6 VRRP
NTP Time synchronization for traditional IP networks
L2TP Functioning as the LAC or LNS and allowing concurrent user access on multiple
channels
Telnet Using telnet to remotely manage and maintain several devices without the need
to connect each device to a terminal, data is transmitted using TCP in plaintext
Table 22 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes
of access shown in the table are defined as:
 G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
 E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an
existing CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 22: CSP and Public Key Access Rights within Services
Services
AUTH‐PW
DRBG‐EI
DRBG‐STATE
IKE‐DH‐PRIV
IKE‐MS
IKE‐PSK
IKE‐SMAC
IKE‐SENC
SSH‐DH
SSH‐Priv
SSH‐SENC
SSH‐SMAC
SSH‐Pub
SSH‐DH‐Pub
IKE‐PUB
IKE‐PEER
Unauthenticated
Reset to Factory WZ Z Z Z Z WZ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Network Traffic
Management
‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Show Status ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Root Administrator (CO)
Module Reset ‐‐ GE G Z Z ‐‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐‐ Z Z
Configure System E ‐‐ EW ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
GRE GRE
WZ
GRE
WZ
GRE GRE
WZ
Configure Network ‐‐ ‐‐ EW ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
Configure Policy ‐‐ ‐‐ EW ‐‐ ‐‐ RWZ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
Status Monitoring and
Reporting
‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
User Management and
Authentication
RWZ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Administrator (AD)
Module Reset ‐‐ GE G Z Z ‐‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Configure Network E ‐‐ EW ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 20 of 26
Services
AUTH‐PW
DRBG‐EI
DRBG‐STATE
IKE‐DH‐PRIV
IKE‐MS
IKE‐PSK
IKE‐SMAC
IKE‐SENC
SSH‐DH
SSH‐Priv
SSH‐SENC
SSH‐SMAC
SSH‐Pub
SSH‐DH‐Pub
IKE‐PUB
IKE‐PEER
Configure Policy ‐‐ ‐‐ EW ‐‐ ‐‐ RWZ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
GRE
WZ
‐‐ GRE
WZ
Status Monitoring and
Reporting
‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
User Management and
Authentication
RWZ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
End User (EU)
VPN E ‐‐ EW GEZ GEZ E GEZ GEZ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ GRE
WZ
EWZ
Firewall ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
The Module Reset service instantiates the DRBG, with 256 bytes entropy input (DRBG‐EI) produced by the
Allowed NDRNG. The generation of DRBG‐STATE uses the [SP 800‐90A] Hash_df with 768 bits of entropy
input. The Zeroization of session keys by this service covers the case of module shutdown or power‐cycle
while a secure channels session (SSH) is active.
The Show Status service does not access CSPs or public keys.
4 Self‐tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self tests described in Table 23 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. Once called, the
initialization function does not allow any user intervention.
All data output via the data output interface is inhibited when an error state exists and during self‐tests.
Upon successful completion of the self‐tests the modules SYS LED will go from Red to Green. If a failure
of a self‐test occurs, the module enters an error state, outputs the following error message on the console
and forces the module to reboot: “Self‐Test Fail…”
Table 23: Power Up Self‐tests
Test Target (Cert. #) Description
Firmware Integrity 32 bit CRC performed over all code
AES HFCL (#4323) Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 128‐bit keys and CBC mode
Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 192‐bit keys and CBC mode
Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 256‐bit keys and CBC mode
AR Router AES
(#4324, #4325)
Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 192‐bit keys and CBC mode
Triple DES HFCL
(#2335)
Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 3 different keys and CBC mode
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 21 of 26
Test Target (Cert. #) Description
AR Router Triple‐DES
(#2336, #2337)
Separate encrypt, decrypt KATs using 3 different keys and CBC mode
DRBG HFCL (#1379) SHA‐256 DRBG test. Performed conditionally (where initial use at power‐up is the
condition) per SP 800‐90 Section 11
HMAC HFCL (#2861) Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐1
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐256
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐384
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐512
AR Router HMAC
(#2862, #2863)
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐1
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐256
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐384
Separate HMAC generation and verification KATs, using SHA‐512
ECDSA HFCL (#1023) Sign and verify Pairwise Consistency Test using P‐224 and SHA‐256
SHS HFCL (#3565) Separate KAT of SHA‐1 (SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512 tested in HMAC HFCL KATs)
AR Router SHS
(#3566, #3567)
KATs of SHA‐1, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512 tested in AR Router HMAC Kats)
Table 24: Conditional Self‐tests
Test Target Description
DRBG AS09.42 Continuous RNG Test performed on each DRBG access
NDRNG AS09.42 Continuous RNG Test performed on each NDRNG access
ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test Using private key for signature generation and public
key for signature verification
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 22 of 26
5 Physical Security Policy
The cryptographic modules each include the following physical security mechanisms:
 Production‐grade components and production‐grade opaque enclosure
 Tamper‐evident material and seals
 Protected vents
An operator in the CO role is responsible for the following:
 Applying the tamper seals per section 5.1 below. The tamper evident seals shall be installed for
the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for having
control at all times of any unused seals.
 Inspecting the tamper seals based on the schedule described in Table 25 below.
Table 25: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Mechanism Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test
Tamper‐evident Seals Inspect tamper‐evident seals monthly.
Note that seals can be reordered from Huawei Technologies using the following part number: 4057‐
113016
5.1 Tamper Seal Placement
5.1.1 AR1220E
The module includes fifteen (15) tamper‐evident seals, which are applied to the module as follows:
 Two (2) seals applied to the front, one on each side to prevent undetected removal of the top
and front cover (see #1 & #2 in Figure 8)
 One (1) seal applied to the front plate and top (see #3 in Figure 8)
 One (1) seal applied to the front plate and bottom (see #4 in Figure 8)
 Two (2) seals applied to the front plate, covering ports (see #5 & #6 in Figure 8)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back, one on each side to prevent undetected removal of the top
and back cover (see #7 & #8 in Figure 9)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back plate and top (see #9 & #10 in Figure 9)
 One (1) seal applied to the back panel (see #11 in Figure 9)
 One (1) seal applied to the back panel and bottom, preventing port access (see #12 in Figure 6)
 Two (2) seals, one on each side, applied to the side and bottom (see #13 & #15 in Figure 10 and
Figure 11)
 One (1) seal applied to the right side, covering vent holes (see #14 in Figure 10)
Figure 8: Front Plate Seals
#1
#2
#3
#5 #6
#4
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 23 of 26
Figure 9: Back Plate Seals
Figure 10: Right Side Seals
Figure 11: Left Side Seals
5.1.2 AR1220EVW
The module includes fifteen (15) tamper‐evident seals, which are applied to the module as follows:
 Two (2) seals applied to the front, one on each side to prevent undetected removal of the top
and front cover (see #1 & #2 in Figure 12)
 One (1) seal applied to the front plate and top (see #3 in Figure 12)
 One (1) seal applied to the front plate and bottom (see #4 in Figure 12)
 Two (2) seals applied to the front plate, covering ports (see #5 & #6 in Figure 12)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back, one on each side to prevent undetected removal of the top
and back cover (see #7 & #8 in Figure 13)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back plate and top (see #9 & #10 in Figure 13)
 One (1) seal applied to the back panel (see #11 in Figure 13)
 One (1) seal applied to the back panel and bottom, preventing port access (see #12 in Figure 10)
 Two (2) seals, one on each side, applied to the side and bottom (see #13 & #15 in Figure 14 and
Figure 15)
 One (1) seal applied to the right side, covering a hole (see #14 in Figure 14)
Figure 12: Front Plate Seals
#7
#8
#9 #10
#11
#13 #14
#2
#7
#15
#1
#8
#1 #2
#3
#4
#5 #6
#12
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 24 of 26
Figure 13: Back Plate Seals
Figure 14: Right Side Plate Seals
Figure 15: Left Side Plate Seals
5.1.3 AR2220E
The module includes twenty‐three (23) tamper‐evident seals, which are applied to the module as follows:
 One (1) seal applied to the front and left side, to prevent undetected removal of the top (see #1
in Figure 16)
 Six (6) seals applied to the front top card plates and top (see #2 to #7 in Figure 16)
 Four (4) seals applied to the front bottom card plates and bottom (see #8 & #11 in Figure 16)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back and each side, to prevent undetected removal of the top (see
#12 & #13 in Figure 17)
 Two (2) seals applied to the back redundant power supply port cover and the top (see #14 & #15
in Figure 17)
 One (1) seal applied to the back and the top, preventing undetected removal of the top (see #16
in Figure 17)
 One (1) seal applied to the back and bottom, preventing port access (see #17 in Figure 17)
 One (1) seal applied to the back and bottom (see #18 in Figure 17)
 Three (3) seals applied to the back, preventing port access (see #19, #20, & #21 in Figure 17)
 One (1) seal applied to the right side and bottom (see #22 in Figure 18)
 One (1) seal applied to the left side and bottom (see #23 in Figure 19)
Figure 16: Back Plate Seals
#7 #8
#9 #10
#11
#13 #14
#2 #7
#15
#1
#8
#12
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 25 of 26
Figure 17: Front Plate Seals
Figure 18: Right Side Plate Seals
Figure 19: Left Side Plate Seals
6 Operational Environment
The module is designated as a non‐modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions;
there is no mechanism for updating the module firmware.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The modules have not been designed to mitigate attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140‐2.
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
AR1200 and AR2200 Series Routers
FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Page 26 of 26
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the module security rules. The module implements and enforces the
following security rules:
1. An unauthenticated operator does not have access to any CSPs or cryptographic services.
2. The module inhibits data output during power up self‐tests and error states.
3. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
4. Zeroization overwrites all CSPs with the “Reset to Factory” service.
5. The module does not share CSPs between the Approved mode of operation and the non‐Approved
mode of operation. When switching between modes, the module zeroizes and forces a reboot before
operating in the new mode.
The following security rules must be adhered to for operation in the FIPS 140‐2 Approved mode:
6. Upon first time initialization, the Root Administrator (CO) shall authenticate to the module using the
default username and password:
Username: admin
Password: Admin@huawei
7. Place the module in the Approved mode of operation by issuing the following command: “set
workmode fips enable”.
8. When faced with the following prompt: “Successfully set fips mode will reboot the system. Continue”?
Enter ‘y’ to continue. The module will then save the workmode flag in flash, zeroize, and automatically
reboot in FIPS mode.
9. Upon the reboot the CO shall update from the default username and password. The minimum
password strength is enforced by the module per Section 3.2. The CO can then create Administrator
and End User accounts and proceed with module configuration per the vendor provided user manual
(available here: http://support.huawei.com/enterprise/en/router/ar3200‐pid‐6078845).
10. The CO must not configure the failed authentication limit setting for more than 2599.
Configure the retry‐interval parameter on the local‐aaa‐user wrong‐password CLI command setting
for no more than 2599.
An operator of the module can determine if the module is running the in Approved mode of operation by
adhering to the above rules.