Version 2.1
3e Technologies International, Inc.
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
3e-525A-3[2],
3e-525A-3 BASIC[2], 3e-525A-3 BASIC with TEC[2],
3e-525A-3MP[2], 3e-525A-3MP with TEC[2],
3e-525V-3[2], 3e-525Ve-3[2] and 3e-525Ve-4[1]
AirGuard™ Wireless Access Points
(Hardware Versions: 2.0(A) (3e-525A-3, 3e-525A-3 BASIC, 3e-525A-3
BASIC with TEC, 3e-525A-3MP, 3e-525A-3MP with TEC, 3e-525V-3, 3e-
525Ve-3, 3e-525Ve-4), 2.1 (3e-525A-3, 3e-525A-3MP, 3e-525V-3, 3e-
525Ve-4); Firmware Versions: 4.3.2[1] and 4.3.3[2])
Security Policy Version 2.2
January 25, 2010
Copyright ©2008 by 3e Technologies International.
This document may freely be reproduced and distributed in its entirety.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 ii
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1
2. REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 1
3. AIRGUARD WIRELESS ACCESS POINT .......................................................... 2
3.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE .................................................................................. 2
3.2. MODULE INTERFACES .......................................................................................... 5
3.3. ROLES AND SERVICES .......................................................................................... 6
3.3.1. Crypto Officer and Administrator Role Services........................................ 7
3.3.2. User Role Services.................................................................................... 11
3.3.3. Security Server Role Services ................................................................... 12
3.3.4. Unauthenticated Services.......................................................................... 12
3.4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ......................................................................... 13
3.5. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND SRDIS................................................................... 14
3.6. SELF-TESTS ....................................................................................................... 21
3.7. SECURE OPERATION OF THE AIRGUARD WIRELESS ACCESS POINT ................... 21
3.7.1. Applying Tamper-Evident Seals (All Models)........................................... 22
3.7.2. Checking for Tamper Evidence................................................................. 30
GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................... 31
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 1
1. Introduction
This document describes the non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for
3e Technologies International‘s wireless gateway product variations, the 3e-525A-3[2],
3e-525A-3 BASIC[2], 3e-525A-3 BASIC with TEC[2], 3e-525A-3MP[2], 3e-525A-3MP
with TEC[2], 3e-525V-3[2], 3e-525Ve-3[2] and 3e-525Ve-4[1] AirGuard™ Wireless
Access Points
(Hardware Versions: 2.0(A) (3e-525A-3, 3e-525A-3 BASIC, 3e-525A-3 BASIC with TEC,
3e-525A-3MP, 3e-525A-3MP with TEC, 3e-525V-3, 3e-525Ve-3, 3e-525Ve-4), 2.1 (3e-
525A-3, 3e-525A-3MP, 3e-525V-3, 3e-525Ve-4); Firmware Versions: 4.3.2[1] and
4.3.3[2]). Please note other HW and FW versions may be vendor-affirmed. This policy
was created to satisfy the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. This document defines
3eTI’s security policy and explains how the gateway product variations meet the FIPS
140-2 security requirements.
The cryptographic module security policy consists of a specification of the security rules,
under which the cryptographic module shall operate, including the security rules derived
from the requirements of the standard. Please refer to FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
2. References
• AirGuard™ Wireless Access Point User’s Guide, Model 3e-525A-3, Model 3e-
525A-3 Basic, Model 3e-525A-3MP, 6/3/08.
• Installation Guide for the 3e525A-3MP Wireless Access Point with Mobile
Power, document Revision A.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 2
3. AirGuard Wireless Access Point
3.1. Cryptographic Module
The eight variants of the 525A-3 AirGuard Wireless Access Point module (the module)
are devices, which consist of electronic hardware, embedded software and strong metal
case. There are two different types of metal cases, one for non-MP models, and one for
MP models, as depicted in the figures below. For purposes of FIPS 140-2, the module is
considered to be a multi-chip standalone product. The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants operate as either a gateway connecting a local area network to wide area
network (WAN) or as an access point within a local area network (LAN).
The 525V-3/Ve-3/Ve-4 products are simply 525A-3 units that contain separate video-
processing printed circuit boards (entirely isolated from all cryptographic functionality).
The 525V-3 contains an older Axis video board, with separate video and camera PTZ
interface ports. The 525Ve-3 contains a newer Mango video board, with a video port
only (no camera PTZ port). The 525Ve-4 contains a different Mango video board with
dual video ports, as well as a separate camera PTZ port.
In summary, the eight variants of the module under Hardware Version 2.0(A) differ from
each other as follows:
1. 525A-3 has mil-spec-461 compliant filters. Uses Power Over Ethernet (POE).
Executes firmware 4.3.3.
2. 525A-3 BASIC does not have the mil-spec-461-compliant filtering. Uses POE.
Executes firmware 4.3.3.
3. 525A-3 BASIC w/TEC is a variant of #2 above with a thermo-electric cooler
installed. Executes firmware 4.3.3.
4. 525A-3MP has power (24V nominal) entering through the antenna panel.
Executes firmware 4.3.3.
5. 525A-3MP w/TEC is a variant of #4 above with a thermo-electric cooler installed.
Executes firmware 4.3.3.
6. 525V-3 is a variant of #1 above with older Axis video processing board. Executes
firmware 4.3.3.
7. 525Ve-3 is a variant of #1 above with newer Mango video board and video port
only. Executes firmware 4.3.3.
8. 525Ve-4 is a variant of #1 above with newer Mango video board and dual video
ports as well as camera PTZ port. Executes firmware 4.3.2.
The four variants under Hardware Version 2.1 differ from each other as follows:
1. 525A-3 does not have the mil-spec-461-compliant filtering. Uses POE. Executes
firmware 4.3.3.
2. 525A-3MP has power (24V nominal) entering through the antenna panel.
Executes firmware 4.3.3.
3. 525V-3 is a variant of #1 above with older Axis video processing board. Executes
firmware 4.3.3.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 3
4. 525Ve-4 is a variant of #1 above with newer Mango video board and dual video
ports as well as camera PTZ port. Executes firmware 4.3.2.
The term TEC in two of the variants stands for Thermo-Electric Cooler. It is circuitry
included within the unit to extend the temperature range of the unit. It is used to pump
heat energy away from the WLAN circuit boards to the enclosure case in warm
environment.
The cryptographic boundary of the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants is
defined to be the entire enclosure of the Gateway. The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants are physically bound by the mechanical enclosure, which is protected by
tamper evident tape.
525A-3 metal case, Hardware Version 2.0(A)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 4
525A-3MP models’ power port on AP Antennae panel
3e-525V-3
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 5
3.2. Module Interfaces
There are three modes of operation that determine how antennae and ports are used by
the module:
• Mode #1. Access point mode
o local antennae configured to encrypt/decrypt
o LAN port used for administration
o WAN port used to connect protected wired network
o Bridging antenna – configurable
• Mode #2. Gateway mode
o local antennae configured to encrypt/decrypt
o LAN port used to connect protected wired network
o WAN port used to connect unprotected external network
o either LAN or WAN port used for administration.
o Bridging antenna – configurable
• Mode #3. Bridging mode:
o bridge antenna configured to encrypt/decrypt
o local antennae may be configured for either access point mode or bridging
mode.
Additionally, there is no separate power port for the "-3" models (they use Power over
Ethernet a.k.a. PoE), while there is a separate DC power port for the "MP" models.
The following table summarizes module interfaces when the module is operating in
access point mode:
FIPS interface Module interface
Data input Local antennae (2)
Bridging antenna (if enabled)
WAN port
Video (525-“V” models only)
Data output Local antennae (2)
Bridging antenna (if enabled)
WAN port
Camera PTZ (525-“V” models only)
Control input LAN port
Status output LEDs:
• Power
• WAN
• WLAN 1
• WLAN 2
• WLAN SS
• FIPS/MODE
LAN port
Power port WAN port (PoE)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 6
FIPS interface Module interface
MP port (DC) (Mobile Power models only)
The following table summarizes module interfaces when the module is operating in
gateway mode:
FIPS interface Module interface
Data input Local antennae
Bridging antenna (if enabled)
LAN port
WAN port
Video (525-“V” models only)
Data output Local antennae
Bridging antenna (if enabled)
LAN port
WAN port
Camera PTZ (525-“V” models only)
Control input LAN port
WAN port
Status output LEDs:
• Power
• WAN
• WLAN 1
• WLAN 2
• WLAN SS
• FIPS/MODE
LAN port
WAN port
Power port WAN port (PoE)
MP port (DC) (Mobile Power models only)
3.3. Roles and Services
The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants support four separate roles. The
set of services available to each role is defined in this section. The 525A-3/525V-
3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants authenticate an operator’s role by verifying his PIN
or access to a shared secret.
The following table identifies the strength of authentication for each authentication
mechanism supported:
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 7
Authentication Mechanism1
Strength of Mechanism
Userid and password Minimum 8 characters => 94^8 = 1.641E-16
Static Key (TDES or AES) TDES (192-bits) or AES (128, 192, or 256-bits)
AES CCM pre-shared key Minimum 8 characters => 94^8 = 6.095E15
The module halts (introduces a delay) for a second after each unsuccessful authentication
attempt by CO or Admin. The highest rate of authentication attempts to the module is one
attempt per second. This translates to 60 attempts per minute. Therefore the probability
for multiple attempts to use the module's authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period is 60/(94^8), or less than (9.84E-15).
3.3.1. Crypto Officer and Administrator Role Services
Crypto Officer Role: The Crypto officer role performs all security functions provided by
the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. This role performs cryptographic
initialization and management functions (e.g., module initialization, input/output of
cryptographic keys and SRDIs, audit functions and user management). The Crypto
officer is also responsible for managing the Administrator users. The Crypto officer must
operate within the Security Rules and Physical Security Rules specified in Sections 3.1
and 3.2. The Crypto officer uses a secure web-based HTTPS connection to configure the
525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. Up to ten Crypto Officers may be
defined in the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. The Crypto Officer
authenticates to the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants using a username
and password.
Administrator Role: This role performs general 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants configuration such as defining the WLAN, LAN and DHCP settings,
performing self-tests and viewing system log messages for auditing purposes. No CO
security functions are available to the Administrator. The Administrator can also reboot
the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants, if deemed necessary.
The Administrator must operate within the Security Rules a specified in Section 3.1 and
always uses a secure web-based HTTPS connection to configure the 525A-3/525V-
3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. The Administrator authenticates to the 525A-
3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants using a username and password. Up to 5
operators who can assume the Administrator role can be defined. All Administrators are
1
The module implements one authentication mechanism that authenticates individual
operators into Crypto Officer and Administrator roles: the web GUI username/password
mechanism. The module implements three authentication mechanisms that implicitly
authenticate operators into a single User operator role: 3eTI static pre-shared key
mechanism, 802.11i pre-shared key mechanism, 3eTI bridging pre-shared key
mechanism. The module relies on an authentication server in the environment to
authenticate User operators for 3eTI DKE and 802.11i EAP-TLS Approved encrypting
modes.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 8
identical; i.e., they have the same set of services available. The Crypto Officer is
responsible for managing (creating, deleting) Administrator users.
Crypto Officer and Administrator services, and the keys/CSPs that each role has access to
using web GUI page to provide correspondence to the key/CSP are summarized in the
table below. If there is no web GUI interface to input/output a key/CSP, neither the
Crypto Officer nor the Administrator have access to it. Please see the table titled “RFC
2818 HTTPS Keys/CSPs” under section 3.5 of this document for a list of keys/CSPs
used/generated as a result of executing the Web GUI service
Operator Roles
CryptoOfficer Administrator
Categories Features
Show
2
Set
3
Add
4
Delete
5
Default
Reset
6
Show
7
Set
8
Add
9
Delete
10
Default
Reset
11
System Configuration
• General Hostname
Domain name
Date/Time
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• WAN DHCP client
Static IP address
10/100 MBps half/full
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2
The operator can view this setting
3
The operator can change this setting
4
The operator can add a required input. For example: Adding an entry to the MAC address filtering table
5
The operator can delete a particular entry. For example: Deleting an entry from the MAC address
filtering table
6
The operator can reset this setting to its factory default value.
7
The operator can view this setting
8
The operator can change this setting
9
The operator can add a required input. For example: Adding an entry to the MAC address filtering table
10
The operator can delete a particular entry. For example: Deleting an entry from the MAC address
filtering table
11
The operator can reset this setting to its factory default value.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 9
Operator Roles
CryptoOfficer Administrator
Categories Features
Show
2
Set
3
Add
4
Delete
5
Default
Reset
6
Show
7
Set
8
Add
9
Delete
10
Default
Reset
11
duplex/auto
• LAN IP address
Subnet mask
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Operating Mode Gateway – FIPS
Gateway – Non-FIPS
AP / Bridging Mode – FIPS
AP / Bridging Mode – Non-
FIPS
AP / Bridging Mode – FIPS /
IPv6
AP / Bridging Mode – Non-
FIPS / IPv6
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Wireless Access Point
• General SSID
Wireless Mode
Channel Number
• Enable / Disable Auto
Selection
• Auto selection button
Transmit Power Mode
Fixed Power Level
Beacon Interval
RTS Threshold
DTIM
Basic Rates
Preamble
Enable / Disable Broadcast
SSID
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Security No Encryption
Dynamic Key Management
Triple-DES
AES (128-/192-256-bit)
FIPS 802.11i
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Wireless VLAN Enable/Disable
VLAN
X
X
X
X X X
X
X
X
X
• MAC Address Filtering Enable/Disable
Add/Delete entry
Allow/Disallow Filter
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Rogue AP Detection Enable/Disable
Known AP MAC address
Email / Display rogue AP
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Advanced Load Balancing
Layer 2 Isolation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Wireless Bridge
• General Manual/Auto Bridge
SSID
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 10
Operator Roles
CryptoOfficer Administrator
Categories Features
Show
2
Set
3
Add
4
Delete
5
Default
Reset
6
Show
7
Set
8
Add
9
Delete
10
Default
Reset
11
Max Auto Bridge
Bridge Priority
Signal Strength Threshold
Broadcast SSID
enable/disable
Signal Strength LED MAC
STP enable/disable
Remote BSSID
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Radio Wireless Mode
Tx Rate
Channel No
Tx Pwr Mode
Propagation Distance
RTS Threshold
Remote BSSID
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Encryption No Encryption
Triple-DES
AES (128-/192-256-bit)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Service Settings
• DHCP Server Enable / Disable
Starting / Ending IP address
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Subnet Roaming Enable / Disable
Coordinator Address
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
• SNMP agent Enable/ Disable
Community settings
Secure User Configuration
System Information
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Misc Service Print Server: Enable/ Disable X X X X X X
User Management
• List All Users X X X X X X
• Add New User X
• User Password Policy Enable/Disable
Policy setting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Monitoring/Reports
• System Status Security Mode
Current Encryption Mode
Bridging encryption mode
System Uptime
Total Usable memory
Free Memory
Current Processes
Other Information
Network interface status
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Bridging Status Status of Layer 2 bridge
devices
X X
• Wireless Clients MAC Address (manfr’s X X
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 11
Operator Roles
CryptoOfficer Administrator
Categories Features
Show
2
Set
3
Add
4
Delete
5
Default
Reset
6
Show
7
Set
8
Add
9
Delete
10
Default
Reset
11
name)
Received Signal Strength
TX rate
X
X
X
X
• Adjacent AP List AP MAC address
SSID
Channel
Signal
Noise
Type
Age
WEP
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• DHCP Client List Client Hostname
IP Address
MAC Address (manfr’s
name)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• System Log Date/Time/Message X X X X
• Web Access Log X X X X
• Network Activities X X X X
Auditing
• Log X X X X
• Report Query X X
• Configuration Enable/Disable
Selectable items
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
System Administration
• System Upgrade Firmware Upgrade
Local Configuration Upgrade
Remote Configuration
Upgrade
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Factory Defaults X
• Remote Logging Enable/Disable
Settings
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
• Reboot X X
• Utilities Ping
Traceroute
X
X
X
X
3.3.2. User Role Services
User Role: This role is assumed by the wireless client workstation that uses static or
dynamic key AES or Triple-DES encryption to communicate wirelessly with the 525A-
3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. Authentication is either performed
through entry of a static key by the user or an EAP-TLS authentication is performed, with
the user providing a public key certificate. The static key (Triple-DES or AES key) is
configured on the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants by the Crypto
officer. The static key must be pre-shared between the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 12
product variants and the User. The Gateway supports 128 Users (client workstations) if
MAC address filtering is disabled. If MAC address filtering is enabled, only 60 Users are
allowed.
The User role has the ability to send data to and through the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-
3/525Ve-4 product variants. All data is sent in the form of 802.11i wireless packets. All
wireless communication is encrypted using either Triple-DES or AES encryption (based
upon the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants configuration). In bypass
mode, plaintext packets can also be sent to the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants. The User role also employs 802.11i authentication schemes including
802.1X, EAP-TLS, and preshared key modes. Also, a Wireless Access Point (WAP) may
act in the User role by communicating with the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants in bridging mode.
3.3.3. Security Server Role Services
Security Server Role: This role is assumed by the authentication server, which is a self-
contained workstation connected to the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product
variants over the Ethernet Uplink WAN port. The security server is employed for
authentication of wireless clients and key management activities. The Security Server is
used only during dynamic key exchange. The Security Server authenticates using a
shared secret which is used as an HMAC-SHA1 key to sign messages sent to the 525A-
3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants during dynamic key exchange. The
Security Server IP address and password are configured on the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-
3/525Ve-4 product variants by the Crypto Officer. Only one Security Server is
supported.
The Security Server performs following services:
• The EAP-TLS authentication from 3e-SS through the 3e-WAP to the 3e-010F Crypto
Client
• Process dynamic key exchange after a successful authentication
• Perform a DH key exchange with the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product
variants to negotiate an AES key
• Send Unicast key to the Gateway encrypted with the AES key negotiated using a DH
key exchange
3.3.4. Unauthenticated Services
Unauthenticated services include the following:
Service Description Input Output Key/CSP
802.11a/b/g
(and variants,
as well as
WLAN
management
802.11 wireless
traffic (used in
both Approved
encrypting
modes and in
802.11a/b/g
inputs and data
802.11a/b/g
outputs and
data
None
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 13
functions such
as VLAN and
MAC filtering
are supported
as described in
the User’s
Guide section
“Introduction”)
bypass modes)
NAT Wired network
service
available only
in gateway
mode (used in
both Approved
encrypting
modes and in
bypass modes)
NAT inputs and
data
NAT outputs
and data
None
DHCP Wired network
service
available only
in gateway
mode (used in
both Approved
encrypting
modes and in
bypass modes)
DHCP inputs
and data
DHCP outputs
and data
None
3.4. Cryptographic Algorithms
The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants supports the following FIPS-
approved cryptographic algorithms:
• TDES (ECB, CBC modes; 192-bit keysize), cert #292
• AES (ECB mode; 128, 192, 256-bit keysizes), cert #238
• AES CCM (128-bit keysize), cert #1
• SHA-1, cert #278
• HMAC-SHA1, cert #13
• FIPS 186-2 (Appendix 3.1 and 3.1) PRNG, cert#22
The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants also supports the following non-
FIPS cryptographic algorithms:
• Diffie Hellman (1024-bit modulus) allowed in FIPS mode for key agreement.
This key establishment method provides 80-bits of security.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 14
• RSA decrypt (PKCS#1 using a 1024-bit modulus) allowed in FIPS mode for key
un-wrapping. This key establishment method provides 80-bits of security.
• RC4 (used in WEP/WPA)
• MD5 hashing (used in MS-CHAP for PPPoE and SNMP agent)
• DES CBC (non-compliant) (used in SNMP v3)
• AES CFB (non-compliant) (used in SNMP v3)
3.5. Cryptographic Keys and SRDIs
The 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants contains the following security
relevant data items:12
Non-Protocol Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Operator
passwords
ASCII string Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Ciphertext in
flash (SHA-1
hash)
Not zeroized Used to
authenticate
CO and
Admin role
operators
Configuration
file
passphrase
HMAC key
(ASCII string)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM. It is put
into
temporary
memory/auto
variable/stack.
Zeroized
when a
configuration
file is
uploaded after
it is used.
Used for
downloaded
configuration
file message
authentication
Firmware
integrity
check key
HMAC key
(ASCII string)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Not zeroized. Used for
firmware load
message
authentication
SNMP packet
authentication
keys,
username
HMAC key
(ASCII string)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Use for
SNMP
message
authentication
RNG Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
FIPS 186-2
seed
ASCII string
(includes the
value of a call
to the
standard C
library time()
function)
Not input Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
every time a
new random
number is
generated
using the
FIPS PRNG
after it is
used.
Used to
initialize FIPS
PRNG
FIPS 186-2
seed key
Symmetric RNG Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
every time a
new random
Used to
initialize FIPS
PRNG
12
There is in addition to the keys/CSPs listed below a “configuration file key”. However, it is not
considered either a key or a CSP. Keys/CSPs encrypted using the configuration file key stored in flash are
considered stored as plaintext.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 15
number is
generated
using the
FIPS PRNG
after it is
used.
3eTI Static Protocol Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Static key 1. AES ECB
(e/d;
128,192,256)
2. TDES
(Triple-DES
192)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from 3eTI
Static mode to
any other local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode, to
bypass mode.
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Used to
encrypt
unicast, and
broadcast/
multitcast
traffic in
support of
static mode
3eTI DKE Protocol Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
See EAP-TLS
keys/CSPs
- - - - - There are
DKE-specific
EAP-TLS
keys/CSPs
used to
authenticate
User operator
to module
Dynamic
unicast key
1. AES ECB
(e/d;
128,192,256)
2. TDES
(Triple-DES
192)
Not input
(TLS master
secret
resulting from
successful
User EAP-
TLS
authentication
in DKE mode)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when 3eTI
DKE session
times out
Note that it
takes
approximately
five minutes
for a DKE
session to time
out given the
DKE protocol
specification.
When a
timeout occurs
after a session
Used to
encrypt
unicast traffic
in support of
DKE
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 16
times out,
zeroization is
immediate.
Dynamic
broadcast key
1. AES ECB
(e/d;
128,192,256)
2. TDES
(Triple-DES
192)
RNG (it is
only generated
once, the first
time a DKE
client needs it,
since all
clients use
same
broadcast key)
Encrypted
(using
Dynamic
unicast key)
Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from 3eTI
DKE mode to
any other local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode, to
bypass mode.
Used to
encrypt
broadcast and
multicast
traffic in
support of
DKE.
The same key
is used for all
DKE clients.
IEEE 802.11i Protocol PSK Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
PSK mode
passphrase
ASCII string Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from IEEE
802.11i mode
to any other
local antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including
802.11i EAP-
TLS), to
bypass mode.
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Used to derive
802.11i PMK
IEEE 802.11i Protocol EAP-TLS Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
See EAP-
TLS
keys/CSPs
- - - - - There are
802.11i EAP-
TLS-specific
EAP-TLS
keys/CSPs used
to authenticate
User operator to
module
IEEE 802.11i Protocol Keys/CSPs (Common to PSK and EAP-TLS)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 17
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
PMK If 802.11i
PSK, then
derived from
PSK mode
passphrase:
HMAC-SHA1
where
passphrase is
HMAC key
and SSID is
hashed.
If 802.11i
EAP-TLS,
then secret
key (TLS
master secret)
If 802.11i
PSK, then
ASCII string
is input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
If 802.11i
EAP-TLS,
then not input,
instead
derived (TLS
master secret
resulting from
successful
User EAP-
TLS
authentication
in DKE mode)
Not output If 802.11i
PSK, then
plaintext in
flash
For both
802.11i PSK
and EAP-TLS,
plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from IEEE
802.11i mode
to any other
local antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including
from 802.11i
PSK to
802.11i EAP-
TLS, and
802.11i EAP-
TLS to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
mode.
If 802.11i
PSK, zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
802.11i PMK
PTK AES (key
derivation;
256)
Not input
(derived from
PMK)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
When 802.11i
session ends.
802.11i PTK
KCK HMAC key
(128 bits from
PTK)
Not input
(derived from
PTK)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
When 802.11i
session ends.
802.11i KCK
KEK AES ECB(e/d;
128)
Not input
(derived from
PTK)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
When 802.11i
session ends.
802.11i KEK
TK AES CCM
(e/d; 128)
Not input
(derived from
PTK)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
When 802.11i
session ends.
802.11i TK
TK (copy in
driver)
AES CCM
(e/d; 128)
Not input
(derived from
PTK)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
When 802.11i
session ends.
802.11i TK
GMK AES (key
derivation;
256)
Not input
(RNG)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from IEEE
802.11i mode
to any other
802.11i GMK
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 18
local antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including
from 802.11i
PSK to
802.11i EAP-
TLS, and
802.11i EAP-
TLS to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
mode.
When re-key
period expires
GTK AES CCM
(e/d; 128)
Not input
(derived from
GMK)
Output
encrypted
(using KEK)
Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from IEEE
802.11i mode
to any other
local antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including
from 802.11i
PSK to
802.11i EAP-
TLS, and
802.11i EAP-
TLS to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
mode.
When re-key
period expires
802.11i GTK
3eTI Security Server Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Security
Server
password
HMAC key
(ASCII string)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from 3eTI
DKE or IEEE
802.11i EAP-
TLS mode to
Authenticate
module to
Security
Server in
support of
DKE and
802.11i EAP-
TLS
authentication
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 19
any other local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
mode
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Backend
password
HMAC key
(ASCII string)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from 3eTI
DKE or IEEE
802.11i EAP-
TLS mode to
any other local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
mode
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Authenticate
messages
between
module and
security server
in support of
802.11i EAP-
TLS
Backend key AES ECB key
(d;128)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or changed
from 3eTI
DKE or IEEE
802.11i EAP-
TLS mode to
any other local
antennae
Approved
encrypting
mode
(including to
802.11i PSK),
to bypass
Decrypt TLS
master secret
returned to
module by
Security
Server after
successful
User
authentication
in support of
802.11i EAP-
TLS
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 20
mode
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
DH private
exponent
Private DH
key
RNG Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized after
decrypt TLS
master secret
returned from
Security
Server
Zeroized if the
DKE session
times out.
Used in DH
exchange
performed
after
successful
User EAP-
TLS
authentication
in DKE mode
DH session
key (a.k.a.
AES post
authentication
key)
AES ECB key
(d;128)
Not input
(derived from
DH exchange)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when
successfully
authenticate
3eTI DKE
client after
decrypt TLS
master secret
returned from
Security
Server.
Decrypt TLS
master secret
returned to
module by
Security
Server after
successful
User
authentication
in support of
DKE EAP-
TLS
3eTI Bridging Protocol Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Bridging static
key
AES ECB
(e/d;
128,192,256)
TDES (Triple-
DES 192)
Input
encrypted
(using TLS
session key)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when bridge
antenna
Approved
encrypting
mode either
reconfigured
or when
changed from
3eTI bridging
mode to any
other bridging
antenna mode.
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Used to
encrypt
bridged traffic
between two
modules
RFC 2818 HTTPS Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA private
key
RSA (1024)
(key
wrapping; key
establishment
Not input
(installed at
factory)
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Not zeroized. Used to
support CO
and Admin
HTTPS
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 21
methodology
provides 80-
bits of
encryption
strength)
interfaces.
TLS session
key for
encryption
Triple-DES
(192)
Not input
(derived)
Not output Plaintext in
RAM
Zeroized
when a page
of the web
GUI is served
after it is used.
TLS server
write key
3.6. Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests:
Power-up self-tests:
• AES ECB - encrypt/decrypt KAT
• Triple-DES CBC – encrypt/decrypt KAT
• AES CCM KAT
• SHA-1 KAT
• HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
• FIPS 186-2 (Appendix 3.1, 3.3) RNG KAT
• DH pairwise consistency test (critical function)
• SHA-1 Integrity Test for firmware
Conditional self-tests:
• CRNGT for Approved PRNG
• CRNGT for non-Approved PRNG (Open SSL based RNG)
• Bypass Tests
• Firmware Load Test using HMAC-SHA-1
3.7. Secure Operation of the AirGuard Wireless Access Point
The following 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants security rules must be
followed by the operator in order to ensure secure operation:
1. Every operator (Crypto Officer or Administrator) has a user-id on the 525A-
3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants. No operator will violate trust by
sharing his/her password associated with the user-id with any other operator or
entity.
2. The Crypto Officer will not share any key, or SRDI used by the 525A-3/525V-
3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants with any other operator or entity.
3. The Crypto Officer will not share any MAC address filtering information used by
the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants with any other operator or
entity.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 22
4. The operators will explicitly logoff by closing all secure browser sessions
established with the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants.
5. The operator will disable browser cookies and password storing mechanisms on
the browser used for web configuration of the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4
product variants.
6. The Crypto officer is responsible for inspecting the tamper evident seals on a
daily basis. A compromised tape reveals message “OPENED” with visible red
dots. Other signs of tamper include wrinkles, tears and marks on or around the
label.
7. The Crypto Officer should change the default password when configuring the
525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants for the first time. The default
password should not be used.
Secure installation, configuration, and operation procedures are below.
3.7.1. Applying Tamper-Evident Seals (All Models)
The following section contains detailed instructions to the Crypto Officer concerning
where and how to apply the tamper evident seals to the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-
4 product variants enclosure, in order to provide physical security for FIPS 140-2 level 2
requirements. Note the physical security rules are the same between the 525A-3 and the
525A-3MP.
A security seal is added from the back plate to the antenna plate. A second security seal is
added from the front of the unit to the antenna plate, taking care not to cover the L.E.D.
labeling. ½” length 440 Pan Head screws are used on each circular connector to secure
them to the panel. Two 440 KEPS nuts and a nylon washer are added to the inside shaft
and tightened together with washers facing each other approximately 1/32” from the
connector panel. This prevents the screws from being removed and thus entry cannot be
accomplished without removing the security labels.
Materials:
525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants – Quantity: 1
Seal, Tape, Tamper-evident – Quantity: 4
Isopropyl Alcohol Swab
3M Adhesive Remover (citrus or petroleum based solvent)
Installation – Tamper-evident tape
1. Locate on 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants the placement
locations of tamper-evident tape seals. (4 locations as shown in the figures above
for the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants).
2. Thoroughly clean area where tamper-evident tape seal is to be applied with
isopropyl alcohol swab. Area must be clean of all oils and foreign matter (dirt,
grime, etc.)
3. Record tracking number from tamper-evident tape seal.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 23
4. Apply seal to locations on the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants
as shown in the figure above. It is important to ensure that the seal has equal
contact area with both top and bottom housings.
5. After application of seals to the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product
variants, apply pressure to verify that adequate adhesion has taken place.
Removal – Tamper-evident tape
1. Locate on 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants locations of
tamper-evident tape seals. (4 locations (two on each panel) as shown in the figure
above for the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants)
2. Record tracking numbers from existing tamper-evident tape seal and verify
physical condition as not tampered or destroyed after installation.
3. Cut tape along seam of 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-3/525Ve-4 product variants to
allow opening of enclosure.
4. Using 3M adhesive remover or equivalent, remove residual tamper-evident seal
tape. (two locations as shown in the figure above for the 525A-3/525V-3/525Ve-
3/525Ve-4 product variants)
The photos below show the physical interface of the 3e-525A-3 enclosure with tamper
evident seals.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 24
HARDWARE VERSION 2.0(A)
3e-525A-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One – Upper Left
3e-525A-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One – Lower Right
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 25
3e-525A-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side Two
The photos below show the physical interface of the 3e-525A-3 BASIC enclosure with
tamper evident seals.
3e-525A-3 BASIC, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 26
3e-525A-3 BASIC, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side Two
The photos below show the physical interface of the 3e-525A-3MP enclosure with
tamper evident seals.
3e-525A-3MP, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 27
3e-525A-3MP, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side Two
The figures below show the physical interface of the 3e-525V-3 enclosure with tamper
evident seals.
3e-525V-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 28
3e-525V-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side Two
The figures below show the physical interface of the 3e-525Ve-3 enclosure with tamper
evident seals.
3e-525Ve-3, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Sides One and Two
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 29
The figures below show the physical interface of the 3e-525Ve-4 enclosure with tamper
evident seals.
VIDEO
CAMERA
UPLINK LOCAL
BRIDGING
ANTENNA
VIDEO
PTZ
0
1
3e-525Ve-4, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side One
3e-525Ve-4, Hardware Version 2.0(A), Side Two
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 30
HARDWARE VERSION 2.1
Common to all Hardware Version 2.1 models, Side One
Common to all Hardware Version 2.1 models, Side Two
3.7.2. Checking for Tamper Evidence
Tamper-evident seals should be checked for letters from the word “OPENED” left behind
by seal residue when the seal is removed.
Tamper-evident seals should also be checked for nicks and scratches that make the metal
case visible through the nicked or scratched seal.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.1 31
Glossary
AP Access Point
CO Cryptographic Officer
DH Diffie Hellman
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMZ De-Militarized Zone
IP Internet Protocol
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HTTPS Secure Hyper Text Transport Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Medium Access Control
NAT Network Address Translation
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SRDI Security Relevant Data Item
SSID Service Set Identifier
TLS Transport Layer Security
WAN Wide Area Network
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network