Nokia 1830 PSS FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2020-2023 © Nokia 2.21
June 21, 2023 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 1 of 62
Nokia
Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 2.21
Nokia 1830 PSS FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2020-2023 © Nokia 2.21
June 21, 2023 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 62
Table of Contents
1....... INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................6
1.1 Purpose ............................................................................................................................................ 6
1.2 Versions tested................................................................................................................................. 6
1.2.1 1830 PSS-32 Version tested ........................................................................................... 8
1.2.2 1830 PSS-16II Version tested........................................................................................ 9
1.2.3 1830 PSS-8 Version tested ............................................................................................. 9
2....... 1830 PSS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE OVERVIEW .........................................10
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................... 10
2.2 1830 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interface ...................................................................... 11
2.2.1 PSS-32 Interfaces ......................................................................................................... 11
2.2.2 PSS-16II Interfaces ...................................................................................................... 12
2.2.3 PSS-8 Interfaces ........................................................................................................... 14
2.2.4 Equipment Controller PSS-16II and PSS-32............................................................. 14
2.2.5 Equipment Controller PSS-8 ...................................................................................... 15
2.2.6 11QPEN4 ....................................................................................................................... 16
2.2.7 S13X100E....................................................................................................................... 17
2.2.8 Filler Card .................................................................................................................... 18
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ............................................................................................ 19
2.3.1 Cryptographic Officer Role (Admin)......................................................................... 19
2.3.2 User Role (Crypto)....................................................................................................... 20
2.3.3 Authentication.............................................................................................................. 21
2.4 Physical security ............................................................................................................................ 23
2.5 Operational Environment ............................................................................................................ 27
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management................................................................................................ 28
2.7 Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................ 31
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.............................................................................................. 31
3....... CONFIGURING THE 1830 PSS FOR SECURE OPERATION .............................32
3.1 Bringing the module into the FIPS mode of operation.............................................................. 32
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3.1.1 Provision 1830 PSS for CC EAL3+ secured operation............................................. 32
3.1.2 Connect to the NE using CRAFT port ....................................................................... 33
3.1.3 Provision IP addresses and date/time......................................................................... 34
3.1.4 Provision user roles...................................................................................................... 35
3.1.5 Install 11QPEN4, S13X100E, or 11DPM12 cards..................................................... 37
3.2 Checking FIPS mode of operation............................................................................................... 38
3.2.1 Displaying FIPS mode and UI mode .......................................................................... 39
3.2.2 Error States .................................................................................................................. 39
3.3 Zeroization..................................................................................................................................... 40
3.4 Crypto Officer and User Guidance ............................................................................................. 40
3.4.1 Interworking with other Modules............................................................................... 40
3.4.2 Authentication modes .................................................................................................. 40
3.4.3 Disabled Protocols........................................................................................................ 40
3.4.4 Non-Approved and Non-Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms (IG page 47, footnote 1) 40
3.4.5 Backups and restores................................................................................................... 40
4....... ABBREVIATIONS, TERMINOLOGY AND REFERENCES ................................41
4.1 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 41
4.2 Terminology .................................................................................................................................. 41
4.3 References...................................................................................................................................... 42
5....... APPENDIX A- PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLATION OF THE FIPS TAMPER SEALS 43
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - 1830 PSS-32 Module Version Tested........................................................................8
Figure 2 - 1830 PSS-16II Module Version Tested.....................................................................9
Figure 3 - 1830 PSS-8 Module Version Tested..........................................................................9
Figure 4 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSS-32/16-II/8 .....................................................10
Figure 5 - PSS-32 User Panel - front view...............................................................................12
Figure 6 - PSS-16II User Panel - front view ............................................................................13
Figure 7 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel - front view ................................................................................14
Figure 8 - PSS-32 and PSS-16II equipment controller 32EC2E Faceplate..............................15
Figure 9 - PSS-8 equipment controller 8EC2E Faceplate ........................................................16
Figure 10 - 11QPEN4 Encryption card ....................................................................................17
Figure 11 - S13X100E Encryption card ...................................................................................17
Figure 12 - Filler Card..............................................................................................................18
Figure 13 - Tamper-evident label: intact ..................................................................................25
Figure 14 - Tamper-evident label: broken ................................................................................26
Figure 15 - Rear of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf..................................................................................47
Figure 16 - Top of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf...................................................................................48
Figure 17 - Left/Right of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf........................................................................49
Figure 18 - Front of a 1830 PSS-8 shelf..................................................................................50
Figure 19 - Tamper labels front overall....................................................................................52
Figure 20 - Tamper labels rear overall .....................................................................................53
Figure 21 - Rear of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf .......................................................................54
Figure 22 - Left of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf ........................................................................55
Figure 23 - Right of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf......................................................................56
Figure 24 - Front of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf ......................................................................57
Figure 25 - Rear of Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf .........................................................................59
Figure 26 - Close-up of location 5...........................................................................................60
Figure 27 - Close-up of location 6............................................................................................61
Figure 28 - Front of Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf ........................................................................62
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section.....................................................................11
Table 2 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-32 .........................................11
Table 3- FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-16II........................................12
Table 4 - Legend PSS-16II User Panel.....................................................................................14
Table 5 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-8 ...........................................14
Table 6 - Legend PSS-8 Shelf Panel ........................................................................................14
Table 7 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for PSS-32/PSS-16II Equipment Controller Card 14
Table 8 - Legend 32EC2E ........................................................................................................15
Table 9 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for PSS-8 Equipment Controller Card .......15
Table 10 - Legend 8EC2E ........................................................................................................16
Table 11 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for 11QPEN4 Card...................................17
Table 12 - Legend S13X100E ..................................................................................................17
Table 13 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for S13X100E Card..................................18
Table 14 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for Filler Card ..........................................18
Table 15 - Crypto Officer (Admin) Service Table ...................................................................19
Table 16 - User (Crypto) Service Table ...................................................................................20
Table 17 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ...............................................................21
Table 18 - List of FIPS 140-2 Algorithms Certificates for 1830 PSS......................................28
Table 19 - List of Crypto Keys and CSPs ................................................................................30
Table 20 - Power-Up Known Answer Self-Tests PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8.............................31
Table 21 - Abbreviations ..........................................................................................................41
Table 22 - Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf label locations..................................................................46
Table 23 - Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf label locations..............................................................51
Table 24 - Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf label locations.................................................................58
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1. Introduction
This document describes the rules for use of the highly secure Nokia 1830 PSS configurations using
11QPEN4 card and S13X100E card for high speed encryption transport when used in accordance with
FIPS 140-2 level 2 requirements. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of
the module.
The 1830 PSS is a scalable, next-generation Dense Wave Division Multiplexer (DWDM) platform that
supports data center aggregation for Ethernet, Fiber Channel (FC) and other protocols. Multiprotocol
services can then be dynamically and flexibly transported over metro and long-haul spans, using Tunable
and Reconfigurable Optical Add-Drop Multiplexers (T-ROADMs) for optical wavelengths. The 1830 PSS
enables transparent L2 Ethernet or FC and L3 IP services over the optical link.
The 11QPEN4 is a full height, single-slot standalone card providing transport level encryption for
interconnecting datacenters via optical fiber. The card supports OTU-2 line encryption with AES-256 that
can be used to provide encryption of one or more pluggable client ports including 10 GE, OTU-2, 8G and
10G Fiber Channel client signals.
The S13X100E is a full height, single-slot standalone card providing transport level encryption for
interconnecting datacenters via optical fiber. The card supports OTU-4 (100G) line encryption with AES-
256 and HMAC-SHA-256 that can be used to provide encryption of one or more pluggable client ports
including 10GE, 40GE and 100GE client signals.
1.1 Purpose
This document covers the secure operation of the 1830 PSS-32 and 1830 PSS-16II and 1830 PSS-8 Series
including initialization, roles, and responsibilities of operating the product in a secure, FIPS 140-2
compliant manner.
1.2 Versions tested
The 1830 PSS products are very flexible and various circuit cards can be used in the slots provided by the
PSS-8, PSS-16II and PSS-32 chassis. The subset of circuit packs used in the test configuration is shown
below.
Use of circuit packs not tested under this validation will invalidate the FIPS certification.
HW Versions:
PSS-32
Chassis (WOM4V10GRA / 8DG59319AB)
32EC2E Card(8DG63583AA)
11QPEN4(8DG60996AA)
S13X100E (8DG63988AA)
Filler Card(8DG59418AA)
Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA)
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PSS-16II
Chassis (WOMR300BRA / 3KC48960AC)
32EC2E Card (8DG63583AA)
11QPEN4(8DG60996AA)
S13X100E (8DG63988AA)
Filler Card(8DG59418AA)
Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA)
PSS-8
Chassis (WOMPU00CRA / 3KC48901AA)
8EC2E Card(3KC48910AA)
11QPEN4(8DG60996AA)
S13X100E (8DG63988AA)
Filler Card(8DG59418AA)
Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA)
Firmware Version:
PSS-32, PSS-16II, PSS-8
1830PSSECE-10.1-2
Document Versions:
PSS-32, PSS-16II, PSS-8
1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 10.1.2 Common Criteria User Guide (3KC-69646-
KBCA-TSZZA)
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1.2.1 1830 PSS-32 Version tested
The module tested is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - 1830 PSS-32 Module Version Tested
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1.2.2 1830 PSS-16II Version tested
The module tested is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - 1830 PSS-16II Module Version Tested
1.2.3 1830 PSS-8 Version tested
The module tested is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 - 1830 PSS-8 Module Version Tested
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2. 1830 PSS Cryptographic Module Overview
FIPS Configurations of 1830 PSS must meet stringent Physical, Logical and Operational requirements that
are more restrictive than typical telecom or data center deployments. While the generalized use of 1830
PSS may normally include many different multi-shelf configurations with many different circuit pack
types, the FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSS consist of physically secured single shelf entities
equipped with equipment controller cards and 11QPEN4 and/or S13X100E cards.
The cryptographic module is based on the encryption card 11QPEN4 and/or S13X100E installed on a
single shelf version of an 1830 PSS with an Equipment Controller (32EC2E or 8EC2E).
Note, that an encrypted ODU4 path must have an S13X100E on both ends and an encrypted ODU2 path
must have an 11QPEN4 on both ends. The S13X100Es and 11QPEN4s must use the same Firmware
version (i.e. R10.1.2 in this case) and the same configuration (as described in chapter 3. ) thus making the
module bound to other modules within the same validation.
Other combinations do not work (this restriction includes equipment of other vendors).
The cryptographic modules are intended to be deployed at both ends of a transmit/receive pair of external
optical fibers between two data centers to provide encryption of (10GE, 8G/10GFC and OTU2 client traffic
for 11QPEN4) and (10x 10GE/OTU2,2x 40GE or 100GE/OTU4 for S13X100E) while in flight between
data centers.
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2.
KM-NE
interfaces
Encrypted OTU-2 link (x4 per 11QPEN4)
And/Or
Encrypted OTU-4 link (x1 per S13X100E)
EC-uBCM
S13X100E/
11QPEN4
AES-256
FPGA
Key Repository
S13X100E/
11QPEN4
AES-256
FPGA
Key Repository
1830 PSS
32EC2E
8EC2E
1830 PSS
32EC2E
8EC2E
Optical Fibre
EC-uBCM
External KM
External NM
KM-NE
interface
NM-NE
interfaces
NM-NE
interface
cryptographic boundary cryptographic boundary
Data Service interface
(10GE/10GFC/OTU2)
(100GE, 40GE, 10GE)
Data Service interface
(10GE/10GFC/OTU2)
(100GE, 40GE,10GE)
Figure 4 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSS-32/16-II/8
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Table 1 - Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
All three of the PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 platforms are hardware modules with multi-chip standalone embodiments.
2.2 1830 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interface
FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces:
• Data Input
• Data Output
• Control Input
• Status Output
2.2.1 PSS-32 Interfaces
Table 2 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-32
Panel Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
User Panel (1) – See Figure 5 below
OAMP 1 Control Input – Status Output
Craft(USB) 1 Control Input – Status Output
Craft(DB-9) 1 Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 32EC2E (2) – See Figure 8 below
CIT 2 Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 16) – See Figure 10 below
LEDs 9 Status Output
L 4 Data Input and Data Output
VA 4 Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 15) – See Figure 11 below
LEDs 2 Status Output
L 1 Data Input and Data Output
Filler Card (up to 16) – No Figure provided
n.a. n.a. No interfaces
Section Section Title Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and
Interfaces
2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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Figure 5 - PSS-32 User Panel - front view
2.2.2 PSS-16II Interfaces
Table 3- FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-16II
Panel Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
User Panel (1) – See Figure 6 below
OAMP 1 Control Input – Status Output
Craft 1 Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 32EC2E (2) – See Figure 8 below
CIT 2 Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 8) – See Figure 10 below
LEDs 9 Status Output
L 4 Data Input and Data Output
VA 4 Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 8) – See Figure 11 below
LEDs 2 Status Output
L 1 Data Input and Data Output
Filler Card (up to 8) – No Figure provided
n.a. n.a. No interfaces
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Figure 6 - PSS-16II User Panel - front view
1 LEDs “Alarms status”
2 LEDs “ATTENDED”
3 LEDs “STATUS”
4 2*Shelf-ID Rotary
Shelf-ID Rotary "H"
5 Shelf-ID Rotary "L"
6 1* Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
7 “HOUSEKEEPING1” interface
“HOUSEKEEPING2” interface
8 ALARM: RACK ALARM
RACK LAMP
9 OAMP: OAMP (GbE) and its LED
VOIP: VOIP and its LED
10 2*RJ-45 interface
External LAN port and its LED E1
External LAN port and its LED E2
11 2*RJ-45 interface
BITSin1 TODin1: BITS and 1pps and ToD IN1
BITSout1 TODout1: BITS and 1pps and ToD OUT1
12 2*RJ-45 interface
BITSin2 TODin2: BITS and 1pps and ToD IN2
BITSout2 TODout2: BITS and 1pps and ToD OUT2
13 RJ-11 interface (INV): 1-wire connection to SFD44
14 Alarm cut-off button (ACO)
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15 “LAMP TEST” button
Table 4 - Legend PSS-16II User Panel
2.2.3 PSS-8 Interfaces
Table 5 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface mapping for 1830 PSS-8
Panel Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Shelf Panel (1) – See Figure 7
OAMP 1 Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 8EC2E (2) – See Figure 9
Craft 1 Control Input – Status Output
CIT 1 Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 4) – See Figure 10
LEDs 9 Status Output
L 4 Data Input and Data Output
VA 4 Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 4) – See Figure 11 below
LEDs 2 Status Output
L 1 Data Input and Data Output
Filler Card (up to 4) – No Figure provided
n.a. n.a. No interfaces
Figure 7 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel - front view
1 “BITS out and TOD out” RJ-45 interface
2 “BITS in and TOD in” RJ-45 interface
3 “OAMP” RJ-45 interface
Table 6 - Legend PSS-8 Shelf Panel
2.2.4 Equipment Controller PSS-16II and PSS-32
Table 7 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for PSS-32/PSS-16II Equipment Controller Card
Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
LED 2 Status Output
CIT 1 Control Input – Status Output
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AUX 1 Port disabled and cannot be used in FIPS configuration
ES1 1 Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS configuration
ES2 1 Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS configuration
The physical access to the AUX, ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper labels (see Figure
28 for PSS-32 and Figure 19 for PSS-16II) if the module is in FIPS mode of operation. The AUX channel is disabled
in the FIPS mode of operation and cannot be used. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are
unused in FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations. They are,
however, only used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires provisioning actions that
are prohibited by policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code cannot be loaded using ES1/2.
Figure 8 - PSS-32 and PSS-16II equipment controller 32EC2E Faceplate
1 LED “STATUS”
2 LED “EPS”
3 Interface that is not supported on 32EC2E (disabled by SW and
covered by a seal)
4 “CIT” interface
5 “AUX” interface
6 “ES 1” interface
7 “ES 2” interface
Table 8 - Legend 32EC2E
2.2.5 Equipment Controller PSS-8
Table 9 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for PSS-8 Equipment Controller Card
Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
LED 2 Status Output
CIT 1 Control Input – Status Output
CRAFT 1 Control Input – Status Output
ES1 1 Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS configuration
ES2 1 Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS configuration
RST 1 Control Input (EC reset)
The physical access to the ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper labels (see Figure 18) if
the module is in FIPS mode of operation. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are unused in
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FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations. They are, however, only
used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires provisioning actions that are prohibited by
policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code cannot be loaded using ES1/2.
Figure 9 - PSS-8 equipment controller 8EC2E Faceplate
1 LED “STATUS”
2 “CRAFT” interface
3 “ES 1” interface
4 “ES 2” interface
5 “CIT” interface
6 Interface that is not supported on 8EC2E (disabled by SW and
covered by a seal)
7 “RST” button
8 LED “EPS”
Table 10 - Legend 8EC2E
2.2.6 11QPEN4
The 11QPEN4 has four pluggable client interfaces (C1, C2, C3, and C4), four pluggable
line interfaces (L1, L2, L3 and L4) and four VOA sockets (VA1, VA2, VA3 and VA4) and a status LED as shown in
Figure 10. The client and line interfaces are equipped with XFP transceivers. Each transceiver provides an optical
fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. Each line-client pair (L1-C1, L2-C2, L3-C3, L4-
C4) provides an encrypted line port and the associated unencrypted client port. In the transmit direction, unencypted
data in the form of Fibre Channel, Ethernet or OTU2 signals enter a client port and are encrypted and then transmitted
out the assoicated line port. In the receive direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted
and sent out the associated client port. The VOA sockets provide a means to optically attenuate the Line port signals-
(They do not access or modify the content of the line port signals).
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Figure 10 - 11QPEN4 Encryption card
Legend:
1 LEDs “STATUS”
2 “VA1”-“VA4” interfaces
3 “L1”-“L4” interfaces
4 “C1”-“C4” interfaces
Table 11 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for 11QPEN4 Card
Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
L1,L2,L3,L4 4 Data Input – Data Output
VA1,VA2,VA3,VA4 4 Data Output
C1,C2,C3,C4 8 Data Input – Data Output
LEDs 13 Status Output
2.2.7 S13X100E
The S13X100E has
• thirteen pluggable client interfaces
o C1 … C10: SFP+ transceivers
o C21: CFP4 tranceiver
o C31, C32: QSFP tranceivers
• one fixed line interface
• a status LEDs for the card
• fourteen status LEDs (one for each interface)
as shown in Figure 11. Each pluggable client interface transceiver and the fixed line side tranceiver provides an optical
fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. In the transmit direction, unencypted data in the
form of Ethernet, OTU2 or OTU4 signals enters the client ports, are multiplexed into one ODU4 signal and then
encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the receive direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and
then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports.
Figure 11 - S13X100E Encryption card
STAT Card Status LED
C1…C10 Client XFP interfaces
C31, C32 Client QSFP interfaces
C21 Client CFP4 interface
L1 Line interface
Table 12 - Legend S13X100E
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Table 13 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for S13X100E Card
Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
L1 2 Data Input – Data Output
C1…C10,C21,C31,C32 26 Data Input – Data Output
LEDs 15 Status Output
2.2.8 Filler Card
The Filler Card has no transmission functionality. Its main purpose is to guarantee the proper airflow for
the cooling of the NE.
Figure 12 - Filler Card
Physical Ports Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
none Not applicable Not applicable
Table 14 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for Filler Card
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2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports identity based authentication and the module supports two roles:
1) Crypto Officer Role which is referred to as ‘Admin’
2) User Role which is referred to as ‘Crypto’
2.3.1 Cryptographic Officer Role (Admin)
The Admin accesses the module via the SNMP and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI). This role provides all
services that are necessary for initial installation of the module and management of the module. These services are all
Approved services.
Table 15 - Crypto Officer (Admin) Service Table
Service Operator Description Input Output
Key\CSP Access (W\X)
(no keys have read access)
User
Account
Management
Admin Manage user accounts, password
complexity and user privileges via CLI
interface
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password – W, X
Change User
Password
Admin Change the User password for same
account via CLI interface
Command Command
Response
User Password - W
SNMP
Configuratio
n and
Management
Admin Facilitates the user to manage SNMPv3
configurations via CLI interface
Command
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password – X
SNMPv3 Proxy Authentication Key –
W
SNMPv3 Proxy Privacy Key - W
Commission
the Module
Admin Commission the module by following the
Security Policy guidelines via CLI
interface
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
None
Perform Self-
tests
Admin Perform on-demand Power-up Self Tests
by power cycling the cryptographic
module
Commands Command
Response
None
Show Status Admin Allows operator to view status of the
parameters associated with FIPS-
Approved mode or not via SNMPv3 and
CLI interfaces
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
Alarms
Monitoring
Admin Allows operator to view active alarms via
SNMPv3 interfaces
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
Events
Monitoring
Admin Allows the user to view all logged events
associated with their permissions via
SNMPv3 interfaces
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
11QPEN4
Provision
Equipment
Admin Allows the user to provision and
configure the 11QPEN4 cards via
SNMPv3 interface
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
11QPEN4
Provision
Facility
Admin Allows the user to provision and
configure the facility information
associated with 11QPEN4 cards via
SNMPv3 interface
Command
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
S13X100E
Provision
Equipment
Admin Allows the user to provision and
configure the S13X100E cards via
SNMPv3 interface
Commands
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
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Service Operator Description Input Output
Key\CSP Access (W\X)
(no keys have read access)
S13X100E
Provision
Facility
Admin Allows the user to provision and
configure the facility information
associated with S13X100E cards via
SNMPv3 interface
Command
and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - X
Zeroize Keys Admin Zeroize keys and CSPs over SNMPv3
and CLI interfaces
Command
and
Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto or User Password - W
SNMPv3 Crypto (KM) or Admin
(NMS) password - W
SNMPv3 Proxy Authentication Key - W
SNMPv3 Proxy Privacy Key – W
11QPEN4 Session Encryption Key - W
11QPEN4 Session KAT Key – W
S13X100E Session Encryption Key - W
S13X100E Session KAT Key - W
Session
initiation
Admin Initiate session with another module
using AES keys.
Command
and
Parameters
Command
Response
AES key - W
2.3.2 User Role (Crypto)
The User accesses the module via the SNMP and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI). This role provides all services
that are necessary for the provisioning and supervision of the transmission encryption function of the module for
S13X100E and 11QPEN4. Those transmission encryption functions cannot be provisioned by other roles. These
services are all Approved services.
Table 16 - User (Crypto) Service Table
Service Operator Description Input Output Key\CSP Access (R\W\X)
Change Crypto
Password
Crypto Change the Crypto password for same
account
Command Command
Response
Crypto Password - W
Perform Self-
tests
Crypto Perform on-demand Power-up Self Tests
by power cycling the cryptographic
module
Remove and
reestablish
power to
module
Status Response
in logs
None
Alarms
Monitoring
Crypto Allows users to view active alarms via
SNMPv3 interfaces
Commands
and Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
Events
Monitoring
Crypto Allows the user to view all logged events
associated with their permissions via
SNMPv3 interfaces
Commands
and Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
11QPEN4 Line
Port WKAT
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the crypto user to provision and
configure the WKAT via SNMPv3
interface
Commands
and Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
11QPEN4 Line
Port Encryption
Key
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the crypto user to provision and
switch the Encryption Key via SNMPv3
interface
Command and
Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
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Service Operator Description Input Output Key\CSP Access (R\W\X)
11QPEN4 Line
Port Encryption
State
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the user to provision and configure
the facility information associated with
11QPEN4 cards via SNMPv3
Command and
Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
S13X100E Line
Port WKAT
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the crypto user to provision and
configure the WKAT via SNMPv3
interface
Commands
and Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
S13X100E Line
Port Encryption
Key
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the crypto user to provision and
switch the Encryption Key via SNMPv3
interface
Command and
Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
S13X100E Line
Port Encryption
State
Provisioning
Crypto Allows the user to provision and configure
the facility information associated with
S13X100E cards via SNMPv3
Command and
Parameters
Command
Response
Crypto Password - X
Zeroize Keys Crypto Zeroize keys and CSPs over SNMPv3
interfaces
Command and
Parameters
Command
Response
User Password - W
11QPEN4 Session Encryption Key - W
11QPEN4 Session KAT Key – W
S13X100E Session Encryption Key -
W
S13X100E Session KAT Key - W
R - indicates Read access W – indicates Write access
X – indicates the CSP is used within a security function or authentication mechanism
2.3.3 Authentication
The cryptographic module only provides access to a user that assumes a role (Administrator or Crypto) and has a
specific identity (user name and a password). Users are required to follow password restrictions listed in the following
table.
Table 17 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
PassKey / Password Rules Strength of Mechanism
SNMPv3 user name and
PassKey for 1830 SMS
and NMS
The user name should not
be longer than 21
characters. The user name
is a human readable
string and no more that
21 characters in length,
there are no additional
SNMPv3 standards for
user restrictions.
The PassKey can be from 27 to
32 characters, using upper and
lower case letters and numeric
digits 0–9.
The PassKey must be generated
by a key generator (to guarantee
the required randomness).
The SNMP v3 Crypto user is created by the user
manually at system turn-up. The PassKey can be
entered from 27 to 32 characters, upper and lower
letter case and numeric. There are 26 lower case
plus 26 upper case plus 10 digits for a total of 62
characters: with a minimum PassKey length of
27, the minimum combinations that are possible
are 2,481E+48 or 62^27.
The fastest network connection supported by the
module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100×10^6 ×
60 = 6 × 10^9) = 6,000,000,000 bits of data can
be transmitted in one minute.
Therefore, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in
one minute is
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1 : 62^27 possible PassKeys / ((6 ×10^9 bits per
minute) / 64 bits per PassKey)), which is
1: 2,481E+48 possible PassKeys / 93,750,000
PassKeys per minute), which is
1: 2,646E+40, which is a smaller probability than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
This provides a security strength of 160 bits (27
characters) to 190 bits (32 characters).
CLI user name and
password
User names are strings of
5 to 12 case-sensitive
alphanumeric characters
where the first character is
an alphabetic character.
The following special
characters are also valid:
• % (percent
• + (plus sign)
• # (pound sign)
• _ (underscore)
Minimum password length is 12
characters.
There are 26 lower case plus 26
upper case plus 10 digits plus 14
special characters for a total of
76 characters. A password is a
case- sensitive string of 12 to 32
alphanumeric characters having
at least one of the following:
• at least one lowercase
alphabetic character
• at least one uppercase
alphabetic character
• at least one numeric
character
• at least one special character
The following special
characters are valid:
o % (percent)
o + (plus sign)
o # (pound sign)
o _ (underscore)
o ! (exclaimation mark)
o @ (at sign)
o $ (dollar sign)
o ” (double quotation mark)
o & (ampersand)
o ' (apostrophe)
o ( (left parenthesis)
o ) (right parenthesis)
o (asterisk)
o . (period)
The first character of the
password can be any alphabetic,
numeric, or a valid special
character.
The new Password cannot be the
same as or the reverse of the
associated user name and the
password must not have three
consecutive identical characters.
(26 lower case + 26 upper case + 10 digits + 14
special characters) = 76 characters X a minimum
password length of 12.
7612
= 37,133,262,473,195,501,387,776
After a failed login attempt, the system delays the
next login prompt. With this delay, a maximum
of 31 attempts can occur in one minute.
Therefore, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in
one minute is 1: 37,133,262,473,195,501,387,776
possible passwords / 31 passwords per minute) =
1:1,197,847,176,554,693,593,154 which is a
smaller probability than 1 in 100,000 as required
by FIPS 140-2.
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2.4 Physical security
Overview
TooperateinFIPSApprovedmodethetamper-evidentlabelsshallbeinstalledasshowninAppendixA.
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Physical boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the 1830 PSS shelves is
• PSS-8: Shelf and Shelf Cover and Shelf Panel
• PSS-16II, PSS-32: Shelf and Shelf Cover and User Panel
Physical security mechanisms
After the tamper seals have been applied to the module, the shelf cannot be accessed
without indicating signs of tampering.
The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms:
Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with
tamper-evident labels.
Tamper-evident labels. Refer Procedure 1: “Install the tamper evident labels” for detailed
instructions on tamper-evident label placement.
Provision the cryptographic module to operate in a FIPS compliant mode. Refer to
Procedure 1: “Provision 1830 PSS for FIPS 140-2 secured operation” for detailed
instructions.
all unpopulated slots are equipped with filler cards
Tamper-evident labels
Tamper-evident labels shall be installed (by the Crypto Officer (CO)) for the module to
operate in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The following graphics illustrate a tamper-evident label.
Figure 13, “Tamper-evident label: intact” illustrates a tamper-evident label with no
evidence of tampering.
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Figure 13 - Tamper-evident label: intact
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Figure 14, “Tamper-evident label: broken” illustrates a
tamper-evident label that shows signs of tampering. Note the VOID markings on the
solid red label. If any portion of the VOID marking is visible, the equipment is showing
signs of potential tampering.
Figure 14 - Tamper-evident label: broken
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Scan labels
The tamper-evident labels each have a unique serial number and a linear barcode. The
linear barcodes can be scanned while still on the sheet.
Inspect labels
The Crypto Officer is also responsible for inspecting the tamper-evident labels on the
shelves at least every 3 months.
Detailed procedures on affixing labels for PSS-32, PSS-16II and PSS-8 are given in
Appendix A.
Broken tamper-evident labels
If a tamper-evident label is broken, then the respective module must be considered
compromised and must not be used anymore.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module employs a non-modifiable operating environment. The firmware is executed by the module’s
Marvel Armada processor.
This operational environment of the module does not provide a general-purpose OS to the operator. The
operational environment is not modifiable by the operator, and only the module’s signed image can be
executed. All firmware upgrades are digitally-signed, and a conditional self-test (RSA signature
verification) is performed during each upgrade. If the signature test fails, the new firmware is ignored and
the current firmware remains loaded.
Note: Only FIPS-validated firmware may be loaded to maintain the module’s validation.
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2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The following table specifies the algorithms that were CAVP tested for the modules:
Table 18 - List of FIPS 140-2 Algorithms Certificates for 1830 PSS
Algorithm Nokia PSS-8
and PSS-
32/16II
Crypto-SNMP
Engine (EC)
Rijndael AES256
(Nokia Crypto-
OTU2
Engine
11QPEN4)
CRYPOT
N
(Nokia
100G
using
Microsem
i,
S13X100
E)
Nokia_
File_
Integrity
_
Check
AES-256 in CFB128
Mode: CFB128 (e/d; 256) C882
SHA-1 C882
CVL (SNMP) C882
KTS (AES Cert. #C882 and HMAC Cert.
#C882) C882
HMAC-SHA-1 C882
HMAC-SHA256 C1545
AES-256 in CTR
Mode: CTR (e; 256) C1144
AES
3844
AES-256 GMAC
Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
• Key Length: 256
• Tag Length: 128
• IV Length: 96
• AAD Length: 128
AES
3844
SHA256 C1545 C1143
There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but not used by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by the module.
The module also uses HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1 (MAC:96)) Certificates C882 to perform key wrapping
authentication in compliance to SP800-38F Revision 1 Transition (AES/TDES key wrapping). The module
also uses AES (AES-256-CFB128) Certificates C882 to perform key wrapping encryption in compliance to
SP800-38F Revision 1 Transition (AES/TDES key wrapping).
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KTS (AES Cert. C882 and HMAC Cert. C882 establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption
strength).
No parts of the SNMP protocol (under SNMP Cert. C882) other than the KDF has been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses HMAC-SHA256 (and the underlying SHA-256) for the
authentication of the pack serial number, which is used to distinguish the two ends of the encryption
section (certificate C1545).
CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses AES-256-CTR combined with AES-GMAC to form a
proprietary authenticated encryption function (GMAC+CTR). The authentication key is derived from the
encryption key in exactly the same way that AES-GCM does and also all calculations are done in a GCM
like manner. The only difference is that the length of the authentication and cipher text fields are
transposed.
For CRYPOTN, the IV generation follows the rules of [FIPS 140-2 IG] section A.5 (case 4):
The probability that the proprietary GMAC+CTR authenticated encryption function ever will be invoked
with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct sets of input data shall be no greater than 2-32
for 1830 PSS S13X100E.
The following rules ensure that the construction of the IV, the keys and the Fixed Field used satisfy the
above requirement.
i.) By implementation, the Fixed Field for AtoZ direction is always different than the ZtoA direction.
ii.) By implementation, the IV is composed of a Fixed Field and a running counter (Invocation Field) that
starts at zero
iii.) By implementation, authentication stops and new keys are required from the key management system if:
a. The modules power is lost and then restored (which would cause the IV to be reset)
b. Running counter reaches its maximum
iv.) Therefore, since IV are only reused with different keys, as long as the probability of new keys being
different than any previous used keys exceeds 2-32
, then the concatenation of the keys with the IV will
also exceed 2-32
.
v.) By Policy, the key management system (external to the module) always generates random 256-bit keys
and the probability of the key manager ever generating the same key again shall be no greater than 2-32
during the system lifetime across all keys generated.
vi.) By Policy, the key management system uses one newly generated key on one circuit per one key session
time period. The key is used for both the AtoZ and the ZtoA directions of that circuit for that key session
time period.
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The following table lists the keys and CSPs of the module:
Table 19 - List of Crypto Keys and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Generation
/Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
SNMPv3
Crypto officer(Admin) or
User (Crypto)
PassKey
Alpha-
Numeric string
Entered into
module at local
console at initial
provisioning
Never exits
the module
Not stored -
converted to
authentication
and privacy
keys
Zeroized when
PassKey is
updated with a
new one
Used to
generate
authentication
and encryption
keys
SNMPv3
Crypto officer(Admin) or
User (Crypto)
Proxy Authentication
Key
HMAC
SHA-1-96
key
generated from
SNMP
authentication
password and
localized variables
Never exits
the module
Stored within
module in
clear text in
EC flash
memory
Zeroized when
PassKey is
updated with a
new one
Used to
authenticate
during
communication
via SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Crypto officer(Admin) or
User (Crypto)
Proxy Privacy Key
AES-256 key generated from
SNMP privacy
password and
localized variables
Never exits
the module
Stored within
module in
cleartext in
EC flash
memory
Zeroized when
PassKey is
updated with a
new one
Used to
encrypt during
communication
via SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Crypto (KM) or
Admin (NMS)
PassKey
Alpha-
Numeric string
Entered into
module at local
console at initial
provisioning
Never exits
the module
Not stored -
converted to
authentication
and privacy
keys
Zeroized when
PassKey is
updated with a
new one
Used to
generate
authentication
and encryption
keys
11QPEN4
Session Encryption Key
AES-256 key Imported across
encrypted
SNMPv3 link
from KM
Never exits
the module
Stored in
write only
device
registers in
FPGA
Zeroized on
module reset and
key switches to
new keys
Used to
encrypt traffic
data
S13X100E
Session Encryption Key
AES-256 key Imported across
encrypted
SNMPv3 link
from KM
Never exits
the module
Stored in
write only
device
registers in
FPGA
Zeroized on
module reset and
key switches to
new keys
Used to
encrypt traffic
data
11QPEN4 Session KAT
key
(WKAT Authentication
String)
Hexadecimal
Alpha-
Numeric string
Imported across
encrypted
SNMPv3 link
from KM
Exits the
module in
plaintext
over secured
SNMPv3
link
Stored within
module in
plain text in
EC flash
memory and
in ASIC
Zeroized when
new string is
entered or when
service is deleted
Used to
authenticate
traffic data
connection
S13X100E Session KAT
key
(WKAT Authentication
String)
Hexadecimal
Alpha-
Numeric string
Imported across
encrypted
SNMPv3 link
from KM
Exits the
module in
plaintext
over secured
SNMPv3
link
Stored within
module in
plain text in
EC flash
memory and
in ASIC
Zeroized when
new string is
entered or when
service is deleted
Used to
authenticate
traffic data
connection
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CSP CSP Type Generation
/Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
S13X100E Session
Authentication Key
AES-256 key S13X100E Session
Encryption Key is
used
Never exits
the module
Stored AES-
256 encrypted
in module
RAM
Zeroized on
module reset and
key switches to
new keys
Used to
authenticate
(with HMAC-
SHA256)
information
exchanged
between
modules
2.7 Self-Tests
The 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 perform known answer tests and critical functions tests at power up.
Table 20 - Power-Up Known Answer Self-Tests PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8
Test Description
AES Encrypt KAT Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CFB-128.
AES Decrypt KAT Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CFB-128.
AES Encrypt FPGA KAT (11QPEN4 cards) Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CTR.
AES Decrypt FPGA KAT (11QPEN4 cards) Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CTR.
AES Encrypt ASIC KAT (S13X100E cards) Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 GMAC.
AES Decrypt ASIC KAT (S13X100E cards) Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 GMAC.
SHA KAT Known answer test for SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT Known answer test for HMAC-SHA-1
Firmware Integrity Test All the cryptographic firmware modules are contained
in rpm files in the Main storage flash on the EC card
and are verified by SHA256 checksum during the
firmware startup.
HMAC-SHA256 KAT Known answer test for HMAC-SHA256
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2
requirements.
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3. Configuring the 1830 PSS for Secure Operation
This chapter describes how to configure the 1830 PSS for FIPS mode of operation.
3.1 Bringing the module into the FIPS mode of operation
In the following some actions must be executed
• Provision the module in general – chapter 3.1.1 to chapter 3.1.4
• Install the HW to be used – chapter 3.1.5
• Install tamper-evident labels – see APPENDIX A- Procedures for Installation of the FIPS Tamper Seals
3.1.1 Provision 1830 PSS for CC EAL3+ secured operation
3.1.1.1 Purpose
Perform these procedures to provision the shelf for CC EAL3+ secured operation.
3.1.1.2 Before you begin
1830 PSS can only be a CC EAL3+ certified configuration if the installed firmware is Release 10.1.2.
All subcomponents (11QPEN4, S13X100E, 11DPM12, and filler plates) must be installed in the 1830 PSS
shelf before 1830 PSS is a CC EAL3+ certified configuration.
Refer to the following documents before performing this procedure
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 10.1 Command Line Interface Guide
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 8 (PSS-8) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-up Guide
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 16II (PSS-16II) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-up Guide
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 16/32 (PSS-16/PSS-32) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-
up Guide
3.1.1.3 Overview
1
Install the shelf with the required equipment.
Reference:
Refer to the appropriate document for your shelf type.
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 8 (PSS-8) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-up Guide
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 16II (PSS-16II) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-up Guide
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 16/32 (PSS-16/PSS-32) Release 10.1 Installation and System Turn-
up Guide
Important! The equipment packaging is sealed with a “Void unless removed by end Customer” label. If
the packaging label shows any evidence of tampering, DO NOT use the equipment.
Important! The USB port on each controller is covered by a blue tamper-evident label to prevent access to
the port. If the label shows any evidence of tampering DO NOT use the card.
Note: The 8EC2E and 32EC2E equipment controller operate in fixed CC EAL3+ compliant mode (ANSSI
mode). The operation mode cannot be changed. The ANSSI mode is compliant with the FIPS mode of
operation.
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2
Establish an initial connection to your NE.
Reference: 3.1.2 Connect to the NE using CRAFT port (p. 33)
3
Provision IP addresses, date/time, and commission the node.
Reference: 3.1.3 Provision IP addresses and date/time (p. 34)
4
Provision the user roles.
Reference: 3.1.4 Provision user roles (p. 35)
5
Install the cards.
Reference: 3.1.5 Install 11QPEN4, S13X100E, or 11DPM12 cards (p. 37)
6
Verify the Product Version.
An operator can verify that the validated firmware version is in operation by checking the
Release Number displayed in response to the following CLI command: show version.
END OF STEPS
3.1.2 Connect to the NE using CRAFT port
3.1.2.1 Purpose
Locally connect to the NE, using a co-located PC with terminal SW (TERATERM or PUTTY), at the
CRAFT port on the 8EC2E or 32EC2E cards with Baud Rate 38400, no parity, 8 data and 1 stop bits, no
flow control.
Note: the use of SSH (and thus the use of a CIT LAN port) is avoided in 1830PSSECE-10.1-2 as the SSH
is not part of this certification.
Note: as this is a direct local connection from PC to the NE no additional securing of this connection is
needed.
3.1.2.2 Steps
1
If not already connected, connect one end of the CRAFT cable to the CRAFT port on the active 8EC2E or
32EC2E card (indicated by a green Active LED) on the shelf. Connect the other end of the cable to the
serial port on your PC.
2
On your PC, open a terminal application with user name CLI (no password necessary) and initiate a CLI
command session.
Result: The CLI interface opens, and the Username: prompt appears.
3
At the Username: prompt, type admin and Enter.
Result: The Password: prompt appears.
4
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At the Password: prompt, type admin and Enter.
Result: The warning notice appears.
Note: After an invalid login, (for example, due to wrong password), the NE does not allow the next login
immediately. The default waiting time is 4 seconds. After 3 consecutive failed attempts, the connection is
terminated and will need to be re-established.
Reference: To provision the intrusion attempt handling parameters (minimum wait time between failed
login attempts and the maximum number of invalid logins) refer to Step 7 in chapter 3.1.4.
5
Type Y and Enter.
END OF STEPS
3.1.3 Provision IP addresses and date/time
3.1.3.1 Purpose
Provision the IP addresses and the date/time of the NE.
3.1.3.2 User role
You must login to the NE using CLI with the user role of Administrator.
3.1.3.3 Steps
1
Provision Loopback IP address.
In CLI, enter config interface loopback ip <ip>/<mask> to set the IP address.
Confirm execution by typing yes after the command.
Result: The shelf will reboot.
2
When the controller LED is solid green, the shelf has completed rebooting. Reconnect to the NE.
3
Provision Control Network default route.
In CLI, enter config cn routes default add <ip> <distance> <distribution mode> to set the CN default
route.
4
Provision OAMP IP address.
• For 1830 PSS-16II/1830 PSS-32: In CLI, enter the following commands:
o config interface usrpnl oamp ip <ip>/<mask>
Confirm execution by typing yes after the command.
o config interface usrpnl oamp st up
• For 1830 PSS-8: In CLI, enter the following commands:
o config interface shfpnl oamp ip <ip>/<mask>
Confirm execution by typing yes after the command.
o config interface shfpnl oamp st up
5
Provision current date and time on the shelf.
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In CLI, enter:
1. config gen timezone name <timezone>.
2. config general time <hour> <min> <sec>.
3. config general date <yyyy> <m> <d>.
4. show gen date to verify your provisioning.
6
Do not enter crypto key generate to generate SSH keys.
As a side effect SSH cannot be used (especially not on CIT and OAMP LAN ports).
7
For 1830 PSS-8 only, enter the following CLI command config general etr disable.
END OF STEPS
3.1.4 Provision user roles
3.1.4.1 Purpose
Use this procedure to provision the following:
• User role (Administrator and Crypto) for CLI
• User role (Administrator and Crypto) for SNMPv3
• User role for Linux OS
3.1.4.2 Steps
1
In CLI, enter config admin users add username crypto.
2
Change the password for the admin account.
In CLI, enter:
• config admin users edit service status disabled
• config admin users edit admin passwd
3
Log out of the system and log in with the new password.
4
Provision the default timeout for the CLI user session as 15 minutes and the admin session as
0 minutes.
In CLI, enter:
• config admin session timeout 15
• config admin users edit admin timeout 0
5
Perform a warm reset on the shelf to execute the session timeout provisioning change in Step
4.
In CLI, enter config admin resetne warm
Result: WARNING! You are about to perform a warm system restart. Enter 'yes' to confirm,
'no' to cancel:
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Enter yes to confirm that you want to restart the network element firmware.
6
Log in to system again.
7
Provision the number of invalid login attempts a CLI user is allowed before the CLI user is
locked out and an Intrusion Attempt alarm raised.
Provision intrusion attempt handling parameters using the following CLI commands:
• config admin session maxfailedlogins 5
• config admin session minwaitlogin 60
Note: Users are locked out based on their originating address. Security logs record the
originating address and connection type of invalid login attempts. Results of previous
authentications are stored in volatile memory and cleared when the 1830 PSS shelf is
powered off.
8
Create one SNMPv3 user as Administrator and one SNMPv3 user as Crypto.
In CLI, enter:
• config admin snmpusers add omsuser administrator aes128md5
• config admin snmpusers add smsuser crypto aes256sha1
Result: The newly created SNMP v3 user applies the same password for authentication and
privacy. After new SNMP v3 user is added, you must edit the new user to change the Privacy
Password.
9
Change the privacy password for the omsuser and the smsuser.
In CLI, enter:
• config admin snmpusers edit omsuser privpasswd
• config admin snmpusers edit smsuser privpasswd
Note: In this step the PassKey for SNMPv3 is set for the NM (omsuser) and KM (smsuser). Refer to
chapter 2.3.3 for details.
10
Disable the default SNMP v3 user accounts.
In CLI, enter:
• config admin snmpusers edit v3DefaultUser status disabled
• config admin snmpusers edit v3DftAdvUser status disabled
11
Enable fips-squelching mode.
In CLI, enter config general fips-squelching enable
12
Change the maintenance (Linux OS) user passwords.
Note: The Linux OS users are for service and maintenance access only. Remember the
passwords and share with service technicians if Linux OS access is necessary.
In CLI, enter:
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• config admin system maint1 credential
• config admin system maint2 credential
Important! Wait 5 seconds before entering the next CLI command.
13
Verify that the maintenance (Linux OS) user passwords are correct.
In CLI, enter config admin system status
Result:
ANSSI-#2 config admin system status
User Password status
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
maint1 Password OK
maint2 Password OK
14
Verify the current NE database synchronization status and control card activity states (active or
inactive).
In CLI, enter config redundancy detail
Verify that the Inactive 8ECE2/32EC2E is ReadyTo Protect = Yes.
Result: Example:
Slot Type Activity ReadyTo
State Protect
---------------------------------------------
1/6 8EC2E Active -
1/12 8EC2E Inactive Yes
1/1 PF(cru) Active -
1/7 PF(cru) Inactive Yes
---------------------------------------------
15
Perform an EC side-switch.
In CLI, enter config redundancy switch ec 1
Result: WARNING: You are about to perform an activity switch. It is recommended that the
databases be synchronized before performing an activity switch Enter 'yes' to confirm, 'no' to
cancel.
Refer to Step 14.
16
Enter yes to confirm the activity switch.
Result: The system performs a warm reset.
END OF STEPS
3.1.5 Install 11QPEN4, S13X100E, or 11DPM12 cards
3.1.5.1 Steps
1
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Install 11QPEN4, S13X100E, and 11DPM12 cards and verify that all unpopulated slots are equipped with
filler plates.
Result: Allow the cards to boot.
Reference:
For related CLI commands, refer to 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 10.1 Command Line
Interface Guide:
• Part III: Card (core, OT, OTH) management, Chapter 6, “OT management commands”.
o 11QPEN4 interface commands
o S13X100E interface commands
o 11DPM12 interface commands
• Part V: Connection and protection management, Chapter 10, “Connection and protection
management commands”.
o config interface topology
o config odukxc
• 1830 Photonic Service Switch 8/16II/16/32 (PSS-8/PSS-16II/PSS-16/PSS-32) Release 10.1 User
Provisioning Guide
2
Set the Administrator passwords on 1830 SMS and NMS to be CC EAL3+ compliant.
Important! Never save passwords in your browser or 1830 SMS.
3
To add the NE to NMS, you must use an Administrator SNMPv3 user created in chapter 3.1.4.
Select snmpv3 option, AES256 encryption, and HMAC-SHA authentication.
4
To add the NE to 1830 SMS, you must use a Crypto SNMPv3 user created in chapter 3.1.4.
Select snmpv3 option, AES256 encryption, and SHA authentication.
5
Setup the service using CLI or 1830 SMS and NMS according to referenced documentation.
Result: The NE should be added to the NMS and discovered.
6
Verify that the service is up.
END OF STEPS
Note: Till this point CLI over serial interface is used. Now the NE is in the FIPS mode of operation. From
then on CLI is not used anymore, but SNMPv3 is the means to access the NE.
3.2 Checking FIPS mode of operation
By default and by the steps shown in 3.1 the module is now in FIPS mode of operation. In addition the following
checks should be done to make sure that UI mode and FIPS-squelching is correctly set.
Note: in FIPS compliant mode, the UI mode is displayed as “ANSSI”.
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3.2.1 Displaying FIPS mode and UI mode
The following commands will display FIPS mode and UI mode; If the 1830 PSS-32/16-II/8 is in FIPS approved mode
when executed from the local CIT port as user (admin) after the steps to bring the module into the FIPS mode of
operation.
The command and output will be as shown here:
ANSSI-3# show general detail
Name : ANSSI-3
System Description : Nokia 1830 PSS v10.1 SONET ADM
Description :
Location :
Contact :
S/W Version : 1830PSSECE-10.1-2
Current Date : 2019/11/12 18:46:46 (UTC)
System Up Time : 5 hours, 0 minutes, 35 seconds
Loopback IP Address : 10.20.219.52/32
# show admin ui
UI: ANSSI
# config general fips-squelching
Fips Squelch Mode is Enable.
3.2.2 Error States
Non-Recoverable Error State
An 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 transitions to the Non-Recoverable Error state when one of the following conditions
are met:
• Failure of any of the following tests:
– 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 power-on and boot time self-tests
While an 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 is in an Non-Recoverable Error state:
• All data output via the data output interfaces on the 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 is squelched (signal is
replaced by a fixed traffic pattern).
• A log is generated to notify the user about the reason which caused the node to transition to the error state.
.
CR SA 13/05/24 00:13:27 ODU2 FIPSFAILURE 1/7/L1 In
FIPS Selftest Squelch 11QPEN4
CR SA 13/05/24 00:13:27 ODU2 FIPSFAILURE 1/5/L1 In
FIPS Selftest Squelch S13X100E
CR SA 13/05/28 21:07:40 EQPT FIPSSWMISMATCH
1/2
FIPS Software version mismatch Equipment Controller
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CR SA 13/05/29 17:45:57 EQPT AESFIPSFAILURE 1/2
AES FIPS Failure Equipment Controller
Note: the “FIPSSWMISMATCH” alarm log entry refers to a software version mismatch, where the
terminology “software” is being used in the more generalized sense, but refers specifically to the module’s
firmware. For clarity, please note that the alarm indicates a mismatch in the module’s firmware, version
1830PSSECE-10.1-2.
3.3 Zeroization
1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-256 keys to encrypt client traffic over the
WAN. Encryption keys are zeroized by any of the following actions, resulting in a loss of traffic:
• Zeroization of passwords and encryption keys are detailed in Table 15.
• Disabling encryption for a line port. This action zeroizes the encryption key for the port.
• Decommissioning the system. This action zeroizes all encryption keys on the system.
• Restoring provisioning data. This action zeroizes all encryption keys on the system.
• Deprovisioning (deleting) the 11QPEN4. This action zeroizes all encryption keys on the 11QPEN4.
• Deprovisioning (deleting) the S13X100E. This action zeroizes all encryption keys on the S13X100E.
• Restarting the system or the 11QPEN4 (or the S13X100E) when there are expired encryption keys. This
action zeroizes all expired keys on the system or 11QPEN4 (or the S13X100E).
3.4 Crypto Officer and User Guidance
3.4.1 Interworking with other Modules
The Crypto Officer shall make sure that this module only interacts (for transmission encryption) with another module
that is validated with the same certificate number.
3.4.2 Authentication modes
Local account authentication mode shall be provisioned for access to the 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8 when in FIPS
mode. RADIUS authentication is not used in FIPS mode.
3.4.3 Disabled Protocols
SSH and SFTP cannot be used in the approved mode of operation. These protocols did not undergo the full certification
and are therefore disabled.
3.4.4 Non-Approved and Non-Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms (IG page 47, footnote 1)
The use of the SNMPv3 security option AES128/HMAC-MD5 provides a too weak security level and shall therefore
not be used. Please refer to chapter 2.6 for the allowed SNMPv3 security options.
3.4.5 Backups and restores
Backups and restores shall not be performed in FIPS mode.
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4. Abbreviations, Terminology and References
4.1 Abbreviations
Table 21 - Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD Assurance Guidance Documents
ALC Assurance Life Cycle
ANSSI Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
CC Common Criteria
CIT Craft Interface Terminal
CLI Command Line Interface
COE Central Office Equipment
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CT Commercial Temperature
DWDM Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing
EC Equipment Controller
FC Fibre Channel
GE Gigabit Ethernet
KAT Known Answer Test
KM Key Manager
NE Network Element
NM Network Manager
NOC Network Operations Center
OAMP Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisoning
OTU Optical Transport Unit
PP Protection Profile
PSS Photonic Service Switch
QPEN Quad Pluggable ENcryption
RBAC Role Based Access Control
RFS Remote File Server
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SNMP Simple Network Manager Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
T-ROADM Tunable-Reconfigurable Optical Add/Drop Mulitplexer
TSF TOE Security Functions
UID User Identifier
VOA Variable Optical Attenuator
VOIP Voice over Internet Protocol
WKAT Well Known Answer Test
XFP eXtended Form-factor Pluggable
4.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document.
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4.3 References
FIPS
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May
25, 2001, CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002).
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 DTR] Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, January 4, 2011 Draft.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
2/fips1402DTR.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program, October 23, 2019.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
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5. APPENDIX A- Procedures for Installation of the FIPS Tamper Seals
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Procedure 1: Install the tamper-evident labels
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830
PSS-8/16-II/32. The tamper seals are provided in the Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA).
Steps
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
1 When applying tamper-evident labels, ensure that the surface temperature to be sealed is
be a minimum of +10°F and a maximum of +167°F.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
2 Ensure that the surface to be sealed is dry. Moisture of any kind can cause a problem.
Wipe the area with a clean paper towel.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Ensure that the surface to be sealed is clean. Wipe the area with a clean cloth or paper
towel to remove any dust or other loose particles.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
4 If there are possible chemical contaminants (oil, lubricants, release agents, etc), clean the
surface with 100% iso-propyl alcohol. Wipe the alcohol dry with clean dry cloth or paper
towel.
Note: Avoid using rubbing alcohol; it can leave an oily coating that will interfere with
adhesion of the label.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
5 Installed tamper-evident labels shall be cured for 24 hours.
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
6 Proceed to the appropriate procedure to install the tamper-evident labels:
Procedure 1.1: “Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-8”
Procedure 1.2: “Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-16II”
Procedure 1.3: “Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-32”
E
...N
...D
.....O
...F
......
S
..T
...
E
..P
...S
.....................................................................................................................................................................
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Procedure 1.1: Install the tamper-evident labels on
Nokia 1830 PSS-8
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-8.
Steps
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
1 Install the 10 tamper-evident labels to seal the Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf.
Table 22 - Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf label locations
Location Action Reference
1 Place labels 1–4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix
the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 15, “Rear of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf”
2
3
4
5 Place labels 5 and 6 over the top cover to wrap the faceplate latches
on the controller.
Figure 16, “Top of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf ”
6
7 When the 1830 PSS-8 is installed in a 23” bay:
Place label 7 and 8 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix
the front cover adaptor to the shelf
Figure 17, “Left/Right of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf
in a 23” bay”
8
9 Place labels 9 and 10 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front
cover to the shelf.
Figure 18, “Front of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf”
10
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
2 Place labels 1–4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 15 - Rear of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Place labels 5 and 6 over the over the top cover to wrap the faceplate latches.
Figure 16 - Top of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
4 Place label 7 and 8 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover adaptor to the shelf.
Figure 17 - Left/Right of an 1830 PSS-8 shelf
7 8
Left Right
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
5 Place labels 9 and 10 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf.
Figure 18 - Front of a 1830 PSS-8 shelf
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
6 The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf is now sealed
E
...N
...D
.....O
...F
......
S
..T
...
E
..P
...S
.....................................................................................................................................................................
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Procedure 1.2: Install the tamper-evident labels on
Nokia 1830 PSS-16II
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia
1830 PSS-16II.
Steps
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
1 Install the 13 tamper-evident labels to seal the Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf.
Table 23 - Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf label locations
Location Action Reference
1
Place labels 1-5 horizontally over the 5
mounting screws that affix the rear cover to
the shelf.
Figure 21, Rear of
Nokia 1830 PSS-16II
shelf
2
3
4
5
6 Place labels 6-7 vertically over the 2
mounting screws that affix the left bracket to
the shelf.
Figure 22, Left of
Nokia 1830 PSS-16II
shelf
7
8 Place labels 8 and 9 horizontally over the 2
mounting screws that affix the right bracket to
the shelf.
Figure 23, Right of
Nokia 1830 PSS-16II
shelf
9
10 Place labels 10 and 11 vertically over the 2
mounting screws that affix the front cover to
the shelf.
Place labels 12 and 13 vertically over the 2
mounting screws that affix the front cover to
the fan tray.
Figure 24, Front of
Nokia 1830 pss-16II
shelf
11
12
13
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Figure 19 - Tamper labels front overall
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Figure 20 - Tamper labels rear overall
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
2 Place labels 1–5 vertically over the 5 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the
shelf.
Figure 21 - Rear of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Place labels 6 to 7 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the left bracket
to the shelf.
Figure 22 - Left of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf
7
6
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
4 Place labels 8 and 9 horizontally over the 2 mounting screws that affix the right bracket to
the shelf.
Figure 23 - Right of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf
9
8
9
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
5 Place labels 10 and 11 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to
the shelf. Place labels 12 and 13 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front
cover to the fan tray.
Figure 24 - Front of Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf
10 11
12 13
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
6 The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf is now sealed
E
...N
...D
.....O
...F
......
S
..T
...
E
..P
...S
.....................................................................................................................................................................
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Procedure 1.3: Install the tamper-evident labels on
Nokia 1830 PSS-32
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels.
Steps
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
1 Install the 9 tamper-evident labels to seal the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf.
Table 24 - Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf label locations
Location Action Reference
1 Place labels 1–4 horizontally
over the 4 mounting screws that
affix the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 25, “Rear of Nokia
1830 PSS-32 shelf”
2
3
4
5 Wrap labels 5 and 6 around each
of the 2 mounting screws that
affix the bottom shelf cover
mounting bracket to the shelf.
Figure 26, “Close-up of
location 5”
Figure 27, “Close-up of
location 6”
6
7 Place label 7 over one of the two
screws that affix the top air
exhaust to the shelf.
Figure 28, “Front of Nokia
1830 PSS-32 shelf”
8 Place labels 8 and 9 over the 2
mounting screws that affix the
front cover to the shelf.
9
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
2 Place labels 1–4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the
shelf.
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Figure 25 - Rear of Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf
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...................................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Wrap labels 5 and 6 around each of the 2 mounting screws that affix the bottom shelf
cover mounting bracket to the shelf.
Figure 26, “Close-up of location 5” illustrates a close-up view of locations 5.
Figure 26 - Close-up of location 5
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Figure 27, “Close-up of location 6” illustrates a close-up view of locations 6.
Figure 27 - Close-up of location 6
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
4 Place label 7 over one of the two screws that affix the top air exhaust to the shelf. Place
labels 8 and 9 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf.
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Figure 28 - Front of Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf
...................................................................................................................................................................................................
5 The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf is now sealed.
E
...N
...D
.....O
...F
......
S
..T
...
E
..P
...S
............................
7
8
9