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Geotab Inc.
Geotab Extended Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Page 2 of 31
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
Module description ........................................................................................................... 5
System description........................................................................................................... 6
Module Boundary.............................................................................................................. 6
Cryptographic Boundary.................................................................................................. 7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 8
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 9
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 9
Non-Approved security functions...................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................12
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................12
RBG entropy sources ......................................................................................................13
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................13
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................13
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................13
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................13
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................13
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................14
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................14
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................14
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................14
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................18
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................18
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................19
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................19
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5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................19
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................19
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................19
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................19
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................20
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................20
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................20
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................20
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................20
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................21
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................25
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................25
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................25
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................27
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................29
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................29
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................29
Installation........................................................................................................................29
Initialization......................................................................................................................29
Startup Procedure............................................................................................................29
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................29
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................29
11.4 End of Life .....................................................................................................................29
11.5 Additional Information....................................................................................................30
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................31
Page 4 of 31
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 8
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 9
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................10
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................12
Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................13
Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................13
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................14
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................14
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................18
Table 13: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................20
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................20
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................21
Table 16: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................23
Table 17: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................25
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................25
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................27
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................27
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................28
Table 22: Error States...............................................................................................................29
Table 23: Compilers..................................................................................................................30
Table 24: Linkers ......................................................................................................................31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Cryptographic Boundary.............................................................................................. 7
Page 5 of 31
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Geotab Extended Cryptographic
Module from Geotab Inc. This Security Policy describes how the Geotab Extended
Cryptographic Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3 for security level 1.
1.2 Security Levels
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS-140-3
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
Reference Description
[140-3 IG] FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance
[RFC 8446] RFC 8446
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Module description
The Geotab Cryptographic module is classified as Level 1 Firmware Module as per FIPS-140-3
guidelines executing within a limited operational environment. The module operates within a
Page 6 of 31
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single-chip module embodiment. The Tested Operational Environment’s physical perimeter is a
single-chip microcontroller. The module is bundled with the firmware image used by the physical
microcontrollers. The module performs no communication other than with the calling application
via well-defined APIs that invoke the module.
System description
The system described by this security policy is a single-chip firmware module, running in a limited
operational environment. The operating environment has an operating system and contains a
single CPU with one core. The environment is multithreaded. Program instructions of the module
and volatile SSPs are stored within the cryptographic boundary. The module does not provide
non-volatile key storage. Keys are provided externally by the application layer and are not stored
by the module in non-volatile memory. Raw entropy is provided externally from an accelerometer
and is conditioned within the module, or uses a pre-conditioned entropy source. The Conditioners
used being SHA2-256/AES-CMAC.
Module Type: Firmware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics:
Module Boundary
The following block diagram details modules' Tested Operational Environment’s Physical
Perimeter and Cryptographic boundaries.
Page 7 of 31
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Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 1. Cryptographic Boundary
Page 8 of 31
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Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
Per figure 1 for Configuration 1, the Tested Operational Environment’s physical perimeter is the
S32K Core Telematics Board and STM32H7 Core Telematics Board that the module operates
on.
Per figure 1 for Configuration 2, the Tested Operational Environment's physical perimeter is the
STM32U5 Core Telematics Board that the module operates on.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
The Tested Module is a Geotab Cryptographic module ( Firmware Module Level 1) and its
identification is stated below.
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
fipslib.bin 1.0 Compiled for ARM
Cortex M33 on
STM32U5 (ARMv8-
M) - No PAA
Yes
fipslib.bin 1.0 Compiled for ARM
Cortex M33 on
STM32U5 (ARMv8-
M) - PAA
Yes
fipslib.bin 1.0 Compiled for ARM
Cortex M4F on NXP
S32K14X (Armv7E-
M)
Yes
fipslib.bin 1.0 Compiled for ARM
Cortex M7 on
STM32H7 (Armv7E-
M)
Yes
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
The product has been tested and is intended to operate on the following Geotab Operating
Environments. There are no Vendor affirmed operational environments.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Page 9 of 31
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N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Apache
Nuttx
S32K Core
Telematics Board
NXP S32K14X
(Armv7E-M)
No 1.0
Apache
Nuttx
STM32H7 Core
Telematics Board
STM32H7
(Armv7E-M)
No 1.0
Apache
Nuttx
STM32U5 Core
Telematics Board
STM32U5
(Armv8-M)
No 1.0
Apache
Nuttx
STM32U5 Core
Telematics Board
STM32U5
(Armv8-M)
Yes 1.0
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no excluded components
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
The following are the modes of operation and their description mentioned in the Table below.
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Mode of
Operation
The mode of operation in which the
module is operating correctly
Approved Successful
completion of service
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The module does not support any operation in a degraded mode.
In the approved mode of operation, the “Get Version” service will return an integer value
corresponding to the module revision which is 1.0.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Page 10 of 31
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5265 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A5265 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
SP 800-38D
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5265 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5265 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5265 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-
384
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5265 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-
384
FIPS 186-5
HMAC DRBG A5265 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5265 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5265 Modulo - 2048, 3072
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A5265 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A5265 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) A5265 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256
KDF Running Modes - PSK-DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Note: Only the algorithms specified in the table above are supported by the module in approved
mode of operation
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Asymmetric N/A Section 4 Example 1
Page 11 of 31
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Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved security functions
The module does not support any of the following:
“Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms”,
"Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed".
“Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms”
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-CBC BC-UnAuth Used for
Authentication &
encryption
AES-CBC:
(A5265)
AES-GCM BC-Auth Used for
Authentication &
encryption
AES-GCM:
(A5265)
DRBG DRBG Deriving Entropy HMAC DRBG:
(A5265)
HMAC MAC Integrity Check HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5265)
KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5265)
KeyVer AsymKeyPair-
PubKeyVal
Public Key
Verification
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5265)
SHA SHA Hash Function SHA2-256:
(A5265)
SHA2-384:
(A5265)
Page 12 of 31
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SigGen DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5265)
SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5265)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5265)
TLSv1.3 KAS-135KDF Key Agreement TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A5265)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
The Security Function implementations are mentioned in the table above.
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
IG C.H Conformance
1) The module itself does not implement the TLS protocol. The module’s implementation of
AES-GCM is used by an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic
boundary. Per the design of the TLS protocol, the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the
IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In
case the counter exhausts, the module returns an error indication to the calling
application, which will then need to either abort the connection, or trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key.
This implementation falls under Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that
provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the
cipher-suites that explicitly select AES GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher
(Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites
from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52r2. TLS 1.3 employs separate 64-bit sequence numbers,
one for protocol records that are received, and one for protocol records that are sent to a
peer. These sequence numbers are set at zero at the beginning of a TLS 1.3 connection
and each time when the AES-GCM key is changed. After reading or writing a record, the
respective sequence number is incremented by one. The protocol specification
determines that the sequence number should not wrap, and if this condition is observed,
then the protocol implementation must either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new
key for AES-GCM), or terminate the connection. Utilizing AES-GCM outside of this
intended use (TLS v1.3) is use of the service and Module outside of an approved
manner.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Page 13 of 31
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RBG entropy sources
The entropy source resides outside the module's cryptographic boundary but within the
module’s physical perimeter.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E86 Geotab Inc.
E11 STMicroelectronics
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Accelerometer
noise source
Physical Apache Nuttx on an NXP
S32K14X running on an
Armv7E-M and Apache
Nuttx on an
STMicroelectronics
STM32H7 running on an
Armv7E-M
256 bits 256 bits SHA256
conditioning
component
(A5265)
STM32U5x
TRNG
Physical STM32U5x advanced
Arm®-based 32-bit MCU
128 bits 128 bits AES-CMAC
conditioning
component
(A1729)
Table 9: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
The module generates asymmetric keys per section 5.1 of SP 800-133r2 as part of the
‘Asymmetric Generate Keypair’ service.
The asymmetric ECDSA keys are generated per the requirements of FIPS 186-5.
2.10 Key Establishment
This module does not support any Key Agreement Schemes.
2.11 Industry Protocols
None
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Page 14 of 31
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The physical ports of the module are the same as the special purpose single chip
microcontroller system on which it is executing. The logical interface is an application
programming interface (API), the mapping of logical interface type is explained below.
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API entry point data input parameters
N/A Data Output API entry point data output parameters
N/A Control Input API entry point and corresponding parameters
N/A Status Output API entry point return values
N/A Power N/A
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
Since the module boundary is firmware, control of the physical ports is outside the module
scope. When the module is in self-test state, error state or zeroization state, all output on the
logical data output interface is prohibited. In error state module will only return error value (no
data output is returned).
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
The module does not support operator authentication.
4.2 Roles
The module supports following role:
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer (CO) Role Crypto Officer None
Table 11: Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer (CO) role and does not support multiple concurrent
roles or any maintenance or bypass capability. The CO role is implicitly assumed by the
application accessing services implemented by the module.
4.3 Approved Services
Page 15 of 31
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Initialize
Module
Initializes the
module and runs
the designated
self tests.
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Module
Integrity
Value
Status None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Module
Integrity
Value:
W,E
Asymmetri
c Generate
Keypair
Generates Key
pairs.
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Flags Status,
Generate
d Key
Pair -
Private,
Generate
d Key
Pair -
Public
KeyGen Crypto
Officer
(CO)
-
Generate
d Key Pair
- Private:
G,R
-
Generate
d Key Pair
- Public:
G,R
Asymmetri
c Keypair
Verification
Verify the
Keypair
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Verify the
Keypair
Verify:
Status
KeyVer Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Digital
Signature
-
Verificatio
n Key:
W,E
- AES-
GCM IV:
W
Digital
Signature
Generate or
verify digital
signatures
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Sign:
Digital
Signature
-
Generatio
n Key
Verify:
Digital
Signature
-
Verificatio
n Key,
Sign:
Status,
signature
value.
Verify:
status
SigGen
SigVer
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Digital
Signature
-
Generatio
n Key:
W,E
- Digital
Signature
-
Page 16 of 31
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Verificatio
n Key:
W,E
Get State Provide Module
state
Module
state is
provided.
Module
State
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Get
Version
Provides Module
Version
Module
Version is
provided.
Module
Version
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Key
Derivation
Derive key
material from a
shared secret to
be exported from
the module.
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Shared
Secret
Status,
Derived
Key
Material
TLSv1.3 Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Derived
Key
Material:
G,R
- Shared
Secret:
W,E
Keyed
Hash
Generate or
verify message
integrity
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Message,
Keyed
Hash Key
Status,
Hash
Value
HMAC Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Keyed
Hash Key:
W,E
Message
Digest
Generate a
message digest
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Message Status,
Hash
Value
SHA Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Random Generate
random bits
using a DRBG
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Number of
bits to
generate,
Entropy
Seed
Status,
randomly
generate
d bits.
DRBG Crypto
Officer
(CO)
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key -
CBC: G,R
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Key -
GCM: G,R
Symmetric
Ciphers
Encrypt or
Decrypt data
with AES
including CBC,
and GCM
modes.
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key
Status,
Plaintext
or
Ciphertex
t data
AES-CBC
AES-
GCM
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key -
CBC: W,E
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key -
GCM:
W,E
Zeroize Unitialize any
context and
zeroise any
SSPs. These
calls are in the
format
"fips140_xxxFre
e"
Successf
ul
completio
n of
service
(Status =
0)
Context to
zeroise
Status None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Derived
Key
Material:
Z
- Digital
Signature
-
Generatio
n Key: Z
- Digital
Signature
-
Verificatio
n Key: Z
- Entropy
Input
String: Z
- Entropy
Seed: Z
-
Generate
d Key Pair
- Private:
Z
-
Page 18 of 31
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Generate
d Key Pair
- Public: Z
- Keyed
Hash Key:
Z
- Module
Integrity
Value: Z
- Secret
C: Z
- Secret
V: Z
- Shared
Secret: Z
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key -
CBC: Z
-
Symmetri
c Cipher
Key -
GCM: Z
Table 12: Approved Services
The indicator field of the above table specifies the “successful completion of service” means
Services return success status; non-zero value or the approved security function finishes
successfully.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
N/A for this module.
Page 19 of 31
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The firmware module is in the form of a compiled binary called fipslib.bin which is a subset of the
overall firmware binary. (geotab.bin = businesslogic.bin + fipslib.bin)
After a module is powered on, the module’s integrity check using HMAC-SHA2-256 (#A5265) is
performed during module instantiation. If the Integrity check fails, it will cause the module to enter
an error state. All the temporary values generated during the integrity check are zeroized upon
completion of the operation.
Additionally, the module performs listed self-tests and if successful the module is deemed to be
usable by the user. If the self-tests or HMAC based integrity test fails for any reason the module
will only provide the ‘Initialize Module’, ‘Get State’, and ‘Get Version’ services.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator is able to initiate the integrity test on demand by re-initializing the module or by
power-cycling the host platform. Upon initialization the module performs an integrity test of the
module on itself using HMAC-SHA2-256 (#A5265). If the Integrity check fails, it will cause the
module to enter an error state.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The Module tested operating environments are listed below. The module functions entirely
within the Operating environment provided space for the calling application.
• S32K Core Telematics Board with the NXP S32K14X (Armv7E-M) processor
• STM32H7 Core Telematics Board with the STM32H7 (Armv7E-M) processor
• STM32U5 Core Telematics Board with the STM32U5 (Armv8-M) processor
7 Physical Security
The module implements standard passivation for its components.
The module employs production-grade components.
Page 20 of 31
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8 Non-Invasive Security
This cryptographic module does not claim any non-Invasive security features.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Volatile Memory area where all SSPs are stored Dynamic
Table 13: Storage Areas
All Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) are stored in volatile memory in plaintext format.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
API
Interface -
Input
Volatile
Memory
outside the
module
boundary
RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
API
Interface -
Output
RAM Volatile
Memory
outside the
module
boundary
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods
All SSPs Input Output methods are specified in the table above.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Power Cycle Sets the SSPs to 0
when the module is
powered off.
Power loss to clear SSP
values stored in volatile
memory
Unplug the device
Page 21 of 31
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroize
service
Sets SSP's used by
the module to 0 on
request.
Need to clear temporary
SSP values stored in
volatile memory during
runtime.
Call the Zeroize service
on SFI context that is
no longer needed.
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods
All temporary SSP values in volatile memory used are zeroized. The zeroization consists of
writing zeros to the memory location used by the SSP. The zeroization service for the SSP in
volatile memory consists of powering off the module, which sets all instances of SSPs to 0 value
and making it non-retrievable.
9.4 SSPs
The module receives all SSPs through API calls to the module. All sensitive parameters are
provided externally to the module and handled by the application using the module.
To protect the SSPs from unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, and substitution, the
microcontroller's hardware Readout Protection (RDP) is set. When RDP is enabled, the
module's firmware and the confidentiality and integrity of all stored SSPs are protected.
The module supports the following SSP’s listed below
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
AES-GCM
IV
Initialization
Vector for
AES-GCM
operation
96 bits -
96 bits
Initialization
Vector - PSP
AES-
GCM
Derived
Key
Material
Key
Derivation
derived key
material.
TLS KDF
v1.3:
256, 384
bits -
128, 192
bits
Derived Key
Material -
CSP
TLSv1.3 TLSv1.3
Digital
Signature -
Generation
Key
Private key
for signature
generation.
Supported
Algorithm:
ECDSA
P-224, P-
256, P-
384 bits -
112, 128,
192 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen SigGen
Digital
Signature -
Public key
for signature
verification.
P-224, P-
256, P-
384,
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen SigVer
Page 22 of 31
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
Verification
Key
Supported
Algorithms:
RSA,
ECDSA
2048,
and 3072
bits -
112, 128,
192 bits
and 112,
128 bits
Entropy
Input
String
Entropy
input string
from
external
entropy
source.
1024 bits
- 1024
bits
Entropy -
CSP
DRBG
Entropy
Seed
Seed
entropy
taken from
Entropy
Input String
128-bits -
128-bits
Entropy -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
Generated
Key Pair -
Private
Generated
private key
component
Algorithm:
ECDSA
P-224, P-
256, P-
384 bits -
112, 128,
192 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen KeyGen
Generated
Key Pair -
Public
Generated
Public key
component.
Supported
Algorithm:
ECDSA
P-224, P-
256, P-
384 bits -
112, 128,
192 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen KeyGen
Keyed
Hash Key
Key for
keyed hash
service.
112-512
bits - 112
bits (for
112 bit
keys),
128 bits
(for >112
bit keys)
Symmetric
Key - CSP
DRBG HMAC
Module
Integrity
Value
Pre-
calculated
value for
module
integrity.
256 bits -
256 bits
Message
Authentication
- Neither
Pre-loaded HMAC
Secret C Hash DRBG
Internal
256 bits -
256 bits
Entropy -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
Page 23 of 31
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
state secret
C
Secret V Hash DRBG
Internal
state secret
V
256 bits -
256 bits
Entropy -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
Shared
Secret
Shared
secret for
deriving
Derived Key
Material.
Algorithm:
ECDSA
P-224, P-
256, P-
384 bits -
112, 128,
192 bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
TLSv1.3
Symmetric
Cipher Key
- CBC
AES Key
used for
encryption
and
decryption
operations
for AES
CBC mode
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
DRBG AES-
CBC
Symmetric
Cipher Key
- GCM
AES Key
used for
encryption
and
decryption
operations.
For AES
GCM mode
128 and
256 bits -
128 and
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
DRBG AES-
GCM
Table 16: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES-GCM IV API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Derived Key
Material
API
Interface -
Output
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
Digital
Signature -
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Generated Key Pair
- Private:Paired
With
Page 24 of 31
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Generation
Key
Zeroize
service
Digital
Signature -
Verification
Key
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Generated Key Pair
- Public:Paired With
Entropy Input
String
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Entropy Seed API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Entropy Input
String:Derived
From
Generated
Key Pair -
Private
API
Interface -
Output
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Digital Signature -
Generation
Key:Paired With
Generated
Key Pair -
Public
API
Interface -
Output
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Digital Signature -
Verification
Key:Paired With
Keyed Hash
Key
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Module
Integrity Value
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Secret C RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Entropy
Seed:Derived From
Secret V RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Entropy
Seed:Derived From
Shared Secret API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Symmetric
Cipher Key -
CBC
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Page 25 of 31
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Symmetric
Cipher Key -
GCM
API
Interface -
Input
RAM:Plaintext Duration
of use
Power
Cycle
Zeroize
service
Table 17: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
If any self-test fails, the module enters an error state. To attempt to clear the error, re-initialize
the module. A power cycle is required in order to run power on self-tests on demand.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Pre-operational self-test is listed in the table below. The algorithm used in the integrity test
i.e. HMAC SHA2-256 is tested before it is used in the integrity test.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5265)
256-bits key
length
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Return
success
Integrity test performed on
the module image.
Integrity verified using
HMAC SHA-256.
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module does not support bypass.
The module does not implement any pre-operational critical function tests.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
All the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Tests (CAST) are listed here in the table below. All
CASTs must pass before the module can operate.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
N/A Fault
Detection
CAST Returns
success
Checks the
proportion of
ones and zeros
in consecutive
DRBG output
blocks.
Entropy
Collection
Page 26 of 31
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
Decrypt
(A5265)
Key length -
256 bits
KAT CAST Returns
success
Decryption Power-on
AES-CBC
Encrypt
(A5265)
Key length -
256 bits
KAT CAST Returns
success
Encryption Power-on
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(A5265)
Key length -
256 bits
KAT CAST Returns
success
Decrypt &
ciphertext
Authentication
Power-on
AES-GCM
Encrypt
(A5265)
Key length -
256 bits
KAT CAST Returns
success
Encryption and
provide TAG
value
Power-on
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A5265)
Key length -
224 bits
(Based on
P-224
curve)
PCT CAST Returns
success
Key Generation Power-on,
Service
Invocation
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A5265)
Key length -
192 bits
(based on
P192 curve)
KAT CAST Returns
success
Key Verification Power-on
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A5265)
Key length -
384 bits (
based on P-
384 curve)
KAT CAST Returns
success
Signature
Generation
Power-on
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A5265)
Key length -
384 bits (
based on P-
384 curve)
KAT CAST Returns
success
Signature
Verification
Power-on
HMAC
DRBG
(A5265)
N/A KAT CAST Returns
success
Random
Number
Generator
Context
Initialization
HMAC
DRBG
Continuous
Test
N/A Continuous
test
CAST Returns
success
Confirms that
the DRBG
output is not
stuck when new
seed is
requested
Service
Invocation
HMAC
DRBG Test
Generate
N/A KAT CAST Returns
success
Confirms DRBG
generation
Power-on
HMAC
DRBG Test
Instantiate
N/A KAT CAST Returns
success
confirm the
DRBG
instantiation
Power-on
Page 27 of 31
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC
DRBG Test
Ressed
N/A KAT CAST Returns
success
Confirms DRBG
reseed
Power-on
HMAC
DRBG Test
Un-
instantiate
N/A KAT CAST Returns
success
error handling
and the internal
state has been
zeroized
Power-on
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5265)
256 bits KAT CAST Returns
success
HMAC Power-on
Repetition
Count Test
N/A Fault
Detection
CAST Returns
success
Checks for
repeated output
blocks from the
DRBG.
Entropy
Collection
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A5265)
Key length-
2048 bits
KAT CAST Returns
success
Signature
Verification
Power-on
SP 800-90B
Health
Tests
N/A Continuous
test
CAST Returns
success
Confirms
working of
conditioned
entropy source
Power-on
TLS v1.3
KDF
(A5265)
336 bit
input
values, 256
bit secrets
KAT CAST Returns
success
Key Derivation Power-on
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5265)
KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Power cycle
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Adaptive
Proportion Test
Fault Detection CAST On Demand Power cycle
AES-CBC
Decrypt (A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
Page 28 of 31
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
Encrypt (A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
AES-GCM
Decrypt (A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
AES-GCM
Encrypt (A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5265)
PCT CAST On Demand Power cycle
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
Continuous Test
Continuous test CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
Test Generate
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
Test Instantiate
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
Test Ressed
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC DRBG
Test Un-
instantiate
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
Repetition Count
Test
Fault Detection CAST On Demand Power cycle
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
SP 800-90B
Health Tests
Continuous test CAST On Demand Power cycle
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A5265)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information
Page 29 of 31
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The module does not support periodic self-testing.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Module in
Error State
If Integrity test or KAT
fails, enter error state
N/A Retry Initialize Module service
returns a non-zero value.
Table 22: Error States
Integrity tests and self-tests can fail and result in error status as mentioned in the table above.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Installation
The Module is already installed as part of the main firmware for the device. The device is
already installed with the main firmware which includes the cryptographic module.
Initialization
The Module is initialized by calling the Initialize Module service. The initialization procedure shall
be invoked by the CO Role. The CO role has responsibility to ensure that the ‘Initialize Module’
service returns a successful indicator before the usage of the module begins.
Startup Procedure
The device is powered on. After entering into the initialization state an integrity check is
performed. Then the Module performs self-tests. Upon successful completion of the self-tests,
the module enters in Operational state.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Please contact embeddedsecurity@geotab.com for Administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module supports the CO role and does not support non-administrators or non-
administrative roles.
11.4 End of Life
The module’s life is defined by the application invoking the APIs associated with the module.
The module end of life is reached once the application relieves the module. The module does
not store any SSPs persistently, but does store SSPs in reconfigurable memory. The module
Page 30 of 31
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does not store any information on non-reconfigurable memory. The procedure for secure
sanitization of the module is to power it off, which is the action of zeroization of the SSPs. The
sanitization via power-off, results in removal of SSP from the module.
11.5 Additional Information
Configuration Management
The code repositories are managed through Git-based configuration management and version
control systems. Production grade C/C++ (gcc) compilers and assemblers are used for the
development.
Platform Hardware Compiler Configuration
NuttX NXP S32K148 gcc-arm-none-eabi -fno-builtin -Wall -
Werror -Wstrict-
prototypes -Wshadow
-Wundef -g -
mcpu=cortex-m4 -
mthumb -mfloat-
abi=hard -mfpu=fpv4-
sp-d16 -O1
-Wl,--fatal-warnings
NuttX ST STM32H7 arm-none-eabi-gcc -fno-builtin -Wall -
Werror -Wstrict-
prototypes -Wshadow
-Wundef -g -
mcpu=cortex-m7 -
mthumb -mfloat-
abi=hard -O1
-Wl,--fatal-warnings
NuttX ST STM32U5 arm-none-eabi-gcc -fno-builtin -Wall -
Werror -Wstrict-
prototypes -Wshadow
-Wundef -g -
mcpu=cortex-m33 -
mthumb -mfloat-
abi=hard
Table 23: Compilers
Platform Hardware Linker Configuration
NuttX NXP S32K148 gcc-arm-none-eabi n/a
Page 31 of 31
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NuttX ST STM32H7 arm-none-eabi-gcc n/a
NuttX ST STM32U5 arm-none-eabi-gcc n/a
Table 24: Linkers
The module does not claim any authentication functionality.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks.