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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Acme Packet VME
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validation
Software Versions: S-Cz8.2.0 and S-Cz8.2.0p5
Date: November 27th
, 2019
Oracle Acme Packet VME Security Policy
i
Title: Acme Packet VME Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Date: November 27th
, 2019
Author: Acumen Security, LLC.
Contributing Authors:
Oracle Communications Engineering
Oracle Security Evaluations – Global Product Security
Oracle Corporation
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Oracle Acme Packet VME Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Document Organization......................................................................................................................................1
2. Acme Packet VME..........................................................................................................................................2
2.1 Functional Overview ...........................................................................................................................................2
3. Cryptographic Module Specification ...............................................................................................................3
3.1 Definition of the Cryptographic Module.............................................................................................................3
3.2 Definition of the Physical Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................3
3.3 FIPS 140-2 Validation Scope................................................................................................................................3
3.4 Approved or Allowed Security Functions............................................................................................................4
3.5 Non-Approved But Allowed Security Functions..................................................................................................6
3.6 Non-Approved Security Functions and Services .................................................................................................6
3.7 Vendor Affirmed Security Functions...................................................................................................................7
4. Module Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................................8
5. Physical Security ............................................................................................................................................9
6. Roles and Services........................................................................................................................................10
6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions..................................................................................................................10
6.2 Unauthenticated Services and Descriptions .....................................................................................................13
6.3 Operator Authentication...................................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Crypto-Officer: Password-Based Authentication....................................................................................................... 13
6.3.2 User: Password-Based Authentication...................................................................................................................... 14
6.4 Key and CSP Management ................................................................................................................................14
7. Self-Tests.....................................................................................................................................................23
7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests..........................................................................................................................................23
7.1.1 Software integrity Test .............................................................................................................................................. 23
7.1.2 Mocana Cryptographic Library Machine Edition (VME) Self-tests ............................................................................ 23
7.1.3 Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Virtual Machine Edition (VME) Self-Tests............................................. 23
7.2 Critical Functions Self-Tests ..............................................................................................................................24
7.3 Conditional Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................24
8. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance ................................................................................................................25
8.1 Secure Setup and Initialization..........................................................................................................................25
8.2 AES-GCM IV Construction/Usage......................................................................................................................26
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks..........................................................................................................................27
10. Operational Environment.............................................................................................................................28
10.1 Tested Environments.....................................................................................................................................28
10.2 Vendor Affirmed Environment......................................................................................................................28
Acronyms, Terms and Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................29
References .........................................................................................................................................................30
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List of Tables
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements ................................................................................................................................. 4
Table 2: Approved and Allowed Security Functions Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Virtual Machine Edition (VME) ............... 5
Table 3: Approved and Allowed Security Functions Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic Library Virtual Machine Edition
(VME).................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Table 4: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions ............................................................................................................. 6
Table 5: Non-Approved Disallowed Functions............................................................................................................................. 7
Table 6: Vendor Affirmed Functions............................................................................................................................................ 7
Table 7: Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical interfaces to Logical Ports ................................................................................................. 8
Table 8: Service Summary......................................................................................................................................................... 10
Table 9: Operator Services and Descriptions............................................................................................................................. 13
Table 10: Operator Services and Descriptions........................................................................................................................... 13
Table 11: Crypto-Officer and User Authentication .................................................................................................................... 14
Table 12: User Authentication .................................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 13: CSP Table................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Table 14: Operating environment ............................................................................................................................................. 28
Table 15: Vendor Affirmed Operating Environment.................................................................................................................. 28
Table 16: Acronyms .................................................................................................................................................................. 29
Table 17: References................................................................................................................................................................. 30
List of Figures
Figure 1: VME Logical Cryptographic Boundary........................................................................................................................... 3
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document is the Security Policy for the Acme Packet VME developed by Oracle Communications. Acme
Packet VME is also referred to as “the module” or “module”. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under
which the module shall operate to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1. It also describes how the Acme
Packet VME functions to meet the FIPS requirements, and the actions that operators must take to maintain the
security of the module.
This Security Policy describes the features and design of the Acme Packet VME module using the terminology
contained in the FIPS 140-2 specification. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies
the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system
protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS 140-2. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of
both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information.
1.2 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. The Submission Package
contains:
• Oracle Non-Proprietary Security Policy
• Oracle Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Machine
• Entropy Assessment Document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is
proprietary to Oracle and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these
documents, please contact Oracle.
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2. Acme Packet VME
2.1 Functional Overview
The Acme Packet VME is specifically designed to meet the unique price performance and manageability
requirements of the small to medium sized enterprise and remote office/ branch office. Ideal for small site border
control and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunking service termination applications, the Acme Packet VME
deliver Oracle’s industry leading ESBC capabilities in binary packaged executable that can be run in a virtual
environment.
Acme Packet VME addresses the unique connectivity, security, and control challenges enterprises often
encounter when extending real-time voice, video, and UC sessions to smaller sites. The appliance also helps
enterprises contain voice transport costs and overcome the unique regulatory compliance challenges associated
with IP telephony. An embedded browser based graphical user interface (GUI) simplifies setup and
administration.
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3. Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Definition of the Cryptographic Module
The logical cryptographic boundary of the module consists of the Oracle VME ISO image called “nnSCZ820-img.iso
” for version S-Cz8.2.0 and “nnSCZ820p5-img.iso” for version S-Cz8.2.0p5.
Figure 1 shows the logical block diagram (red-dotted line) of the module executing in memory and its interactions
with the hypervisor through the module’s defined logical cryptographic boundary. The module interacts directly
with the hypervisor, which runs directly on the host system.
Figure 1: VME Logical Cryptographic Boundary
3.2 Definition of the Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The module consists of binary packaged into an executable that can be run in a virtual environment. The module
is classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The physical cryptographic boundary is defined as
the hard enclosure of the host system on which it runs and no components are excluded from the requirements
of FIPS PUB 140-2.
3.3 FIPS 140-2 Validation Scope
The Acme Packet VME appliances are being validated to overall FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. See Table 1
below.
Host Hardware
Hypervisor
Linux Operating System
Cryptographic Provider
Data Output
Data Input
Control Input
Status Output
Cryptographic Boundary
VME Application Software
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Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles and Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Machine Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements
3.4 Approved or Allowed Security Functions
The Acme Packet VME contains the following FIPS Approved Algorithms listed in Table 2 (Oracle Acme Packet
Cryptographic Library Acme Packet Virtual Machine Edition (VME)) and Table 3 (Oracle Acme Packet Mocana
Cryptographic Library Acme Packet Virtual Machine Edition (VME)):
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Certificate
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC, ECB, CTR, GCM; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 256 C 144
Triple DES1
CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192 C 144
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 C 144
Data Authentication Code
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 C 144
AsymmetricAlgorithms
1
Triple-DES was CAVP tested but is not utilized by the services associated with the Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library.
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RSA RSA: FIPS186-4:
186-4 KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Random_e
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(1, 256 , 384))
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256, 384))
RSA: FIPS186-2 :
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(gen) (4096 SHA (256,384))
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256, 384)), (4096 SHA (1, 256, 384))
RSA: FIPS186-4:
186-4 KEY(gen):
FIPS186-4_Random_e ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(1, 256 , 384), (4096
SHA (256,384))
SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256, 384))
RSA: FIPS186-2
Signature Verification 9.31:
Modulus lengths: 2048, 4096
SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
C 144
ECDSA Firmware: FIPS186-4
PKG: CURVES (P-256, P-384 Testing Candidates)
SigGen: CURVES (P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA-256, 384)
SigVer: CURVES (P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA-256, 384))
C 144
Random NumberGeneration
DRBG CTR_DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled; BlockCipher_Use_df:
(AES-256)]
Hash_Based DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled (SHA-1)
C 144
Key establishment
Key Derivation SNMP KDF, SRTP KDF, TLS KDF (TLS Version: v1.0/1.1, v1.2) C 144
Key Transport
KTS KTS (AES Cert. # C144 and HMAC Cert. # C144; key establishment methodology provides 128 or
256 bits of encryption strength);
Table 2: Approved and Allowed Security Functions Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Virtual Machine Edition (VME)
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Certificate
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 256 C 142
Triple DES2 CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192 C 142
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 C 142
Data Authentication Code
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 C 142
2 Per IG A.13 the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^20 64-bit blocks of data.
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AsymmetricAlgorithms
RSA RSA: 186-4:
186-4 KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Random_e PKCS1.5: SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA(1); (2048
SHA (1))
C 142
Key Establishment
Key Derivation SSH KDF, IKEv1/IKEv2 KDF C 142
Key Transport
KTS KTS (AES Cert. # C142 and HMAC Cert. # C142; key establishment methodology provides 128 or
256 bits of encryption strength);
Table 3: Approved and Allowed Security Functions Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic Library Virtual
Machine Edition (VME)
Note: P-384 for ECDSA was CAVP tested but is not utilized by the module’s services.
3.5 Non-Approved But Allowed Security Functions
The following are considered non-Approved but allowed security functions:
Algorithm Usage
EC-Diffie-Hellman CVL Certs. #C:144 and #C:142, key agreement, key establishment methodology provides
128 or 192-bits of encryption strength.
Diffie-Hellman CVL Certs. #C:144 and #C:142, key agreement, key establishment methodology provides
112-bits of encryption strength.
RSA Key Wrapping Key wrapping, key establishment methodology provides 112-bits of encryption strength.
NDRNG Used for seeding the NIST SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG and CTR_DRBG. Per FIPS 140-2 IG 7.14
scenario 1 (a).
The module provides a minimum of 440 bits of entropy input for the Hash_DRBG. The
input length for the CTR_DRBG depends on the size of the AES key used. If the AES key
length is 128 bits, the seed size is 256 bits. If the AES key length is 256 bits, then the seed
size is 384 bits.
MD5 (TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2) MACing: HMAC MD5, Hashing: MD5
Table 4: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
3.6 Non-Approved Security Functions and Services
The following services are considered non-Approved and may not be used in a FIPS-approved mode of operation:
Service Non-Approved Security Functions
SSH Asymmetric Algorithms: DSA, Symmetric Algorithms: Rijndael, AES GCM, 192-Bit AES CTR
SNMP Hashing: MD5, Symmetric Algorithms: DES
SRTP Hashing: MD5
IKEv1, IKEv2 Hashing: MD5, Symmetric Algorithms: 192-Bit AES CBC
TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 Symmetric Algorithms: DES
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Diffie-Hellman Key agreement, less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
RSA Key Wrapping Key wrapping, less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
Table 5: Non-Approved Disallowed Functions
Services listed in the previous table make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms. Use of these
algorithms is prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. Some of these services may be allowed in FIPS
mode when using allowed algorithms (as specified in section 8.1)
3.7 Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
The following services are considered non-Approved and may not be used in a FIPS-approved mode of operation:
Algorithm Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
CKG In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys
and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from an NIST
SP 800-90A DRBG.
Table 6: Vendor Affirmed Functions
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4. Module Ports and Interfaces
Oracle Virtual Machine edition is a virtualized cryptographic module that meets the overall Level 1 FIPS 140-2
requirements. The module interfaces can be categorized as follows:
• Data Input Interface
• Data Output Interface
• Control Input interface
• Status Output Interface
• Power Interface
The table below provides a mapping of ports for the Oracle VME:
FIPS 140 Interface Physical Port VM Port Logical
Interface
Information Input/Output
Data Input Host System
Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports,
Host System USB
Ports.
• Virtual Ethernet
Ports,
• Virtual USB Ports.
API Input Data
and Parameters.
Cipher text
Plain text
Data Output Host System
Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports,
Host System USB
Ports.
• Virtual Ethernet
Ports,
• Virtual USB Ports.
API Output Data
and Parameters.
Cipher text
Plain Text
Control Input Host System
Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports,
Host System Serial
Ports.
• Virtual Ethernet
Ports,
• Virtual Serial
Ports.
API Command
Input Parameters.
• Plaintext control input via
console port
(configuration commands,
operator passwords)
• Ciphertext control input
via network management
(EMS control, CDR
accounting, CLI
management)
Status Output Host System
Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports,
Host System Serial
Ports.
• Virtual Ethernet
Ports,
• Virtual Serial
Ports.
API Status Output
Parameters.
Plaintext Status Output via
Console Port.
Ciphertext Status Output via
network management.
Power Host Power Plug NA N/A N/A
Table 7: Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical interfaces to Logical Ports
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5. Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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6. Roles and Services
As required by FIPS 140-2 Level 1, there are three roles (a Crypto Officer Role, User Role, and Unauthenticated Role) in the module that operators
may assume. The module supports role-based authentication, and the respective services for each role are described in the following sections.
The below table gives a high-level description of all services provided by the module and lists the roles allowed to invoke each service.
Operator Role Summary of Services
User • View configuration versions and system performance data
• Test pattern rules, local policies, and session translations
• Display system alarms.
Crypto-Officer Allowed access to all system commands and configuration privileges
Unauthenticated • Request Authentication
• Show Status
• Initiate self-tests
Table 8: Service Summary
6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions
The below table provides a full description of all services provided by the module and lists the roles allowed to invoke each service.
U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X Configure Initializes the module for FIPS mode of
operation
HMAC-SHA-256 key R, W, X
X Zeroize CSP’s Clears keys/CSPs from memory and disk All CSP’s Z
X Software Update Updates software Software Integrity Key (RSA) R, X
X Bypass Configure bypass using TCP or UDP and
viewing bypass service status
HMAC-SHA-256 Bypass Key R, W, X
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X X Decrypt Decrypts a block of data Using AES or Triple-
DES in FIPS Mode
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-
256)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128 or
AES-256)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Encrypt Encrypts a block of data Using AES or Triple-
DES, in FIPS Mode
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-
256)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128 or
AES-256)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Generate Keys Generates AES or Triple-DES for
encrypt/decrypt operations.
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-
256)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES, AES-128 or
AES-256)
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
Generates Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman,
and RSA keys for key transport/key
establishment.
Diffie-Hellman Public Key (DH)
Diffie-Hellman Private Key (DH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key (ECDH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key (ECDH)
SSH authentication private Key (RSA)
SSH authentication public key (RSA)
TLS authentication private Key (ECDSA/RSA)
TLS authentication public key (ECDSA/RSA)
TLS premaster secret,
TLS Master secret,
SRTP Master key
IKE Private Key (RSA)
IKE Public Key (RSA)
SKEYSEED
SKEYID
SKEYID_d
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
X X Verify Used as part of the TLS, SSH protocol
negotiation
SSH authentication private Key (RSA)
SSH authentication public key (RSA)
TLS authentication private Key (ECDSA/RSA)
TLS authentication public key (ECDSA/RSA)
Diffie-Hellman Public Key (DH)
Diffie-Hellman Private Key (DH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key (ECDH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key (ECDH)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Generate Seed Generate an entropy_input for Hash_DRBG,
CTR DRBG
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
R, W, X
X X Generate Random
Number
Generate random number. DRBG C
DRBG V
DRBG Key
R, W, X
R, W, X
R, W, X
X X HMAC Generate HMAC SNMP Authentication Key
SRTP Authentication Key
SSH Integrity Keys
TLS Integrity Keys
IPsec Session Authentication Key
IKE Session Authentication Key
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Generate Certificate Generate certificate Web UI Certificate R, W, X
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X X Authenticate Authenticate Users Operator Password R, W, X
R – Read, W – Write, X – Execute, Z - Zeroize
Table 9: Operator Services and Descriptions
Note: TLS, SRTP and SNMP protocols use the Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic library.
Note: SSH, IKEv2 and IPSec use the Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic library.
6.2 Unauthenticated Services and Descriptions
The below table provides a full description of the unauthenticated services provided by the module:
Service Name Service Description
On-Demand Self-Test
Initialization
This service initiates the FIPS self-test when requested.
Show Status This service shows the operational status of the module
Factory Reset Service Factory Reset Service - This service restores the module to factory defaults
Table 10: Operator Services and Descriptions
6.3 Operator Authentication
6.3.1 Crypto-Officer: Password-Based Authentication
In FIPS-approved mode of operation, the module is accessed via Command Line Interface over the Console ports or via SSH, SNMPv3 or HTTPS
over the Network Management Ports. Other than status functions available by viewing the Status LEDs, the services described are available only
to authenticated operators.
Method Probability of a Single Successful Random Attempt Probability of a Successful Attempt within a Minute
Password-
Based
(CO and User
Authentication)
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The
password can consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9,
and special characters], yielding 94 choices per character.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/94^8,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The password can
consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character Assuming 10 attempts per second via
a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-minute period is 600/94^8, which is less
than 1/100,000.
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Method Probability of a Single Successful Random Attempt Probability of a Successful Attempt within a Minute
SNMPv3
Passwords
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The
password can consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9,
and special characters], yielding 94 choices per character.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/94^8,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The password can
consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10 attempts per second
via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-minute period is 600/94^8, which is less
than 1/100,000.
Password-
Based
(Challenge
Response)
Passwords must be a minimum of 12 numeric characters. 0-
9, yielding 10 choices per character. The probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/10^12, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 12 numeric characters. 0-9, yielding
10 choices per character. Assuming 10 attempts per second via a
scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with multiple
attempts in a one-minute period is 600/10^12, which is less than
1/100,000.
Table 11: Crypto-Officer and User Authentication
6.3.2 User: Password-Based Authentication
The module also supports authentication via digital certificates for the User Role as implemented by the TLS and SSH protocols. The module
supports a public key-based authentication with 2048-bit RSA and 2048-bit ECDSA keys.
Method Probability of a Single Successful Random Attempt Probability of a Successful Attempt within a Minute
Certificate-Based A 2048-bit RSA/ECDSA key has at least 112-bits of equivalent
strength. The probability of a successful random attempt is 1
/2^112, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Assuming the module can support 60 authentication attempts in one
minute, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts
in a one-minute period is 60/2^112, which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 12: User Authentication
6.4 Key and CSP Management
The following keys, cryptographic key components and other critical security parameters are contained in the module. No parts of the SSH, TLS,
IKEv1/IKEv2, SNMP or SRTP protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Operator Passwords Generated by the crypto
officer as per the module
Agreement: NA Virtual Hard Disk Authentication of the crypto officer and
user
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
policy Entry: Manual entry via console
or SSH management session
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Software Integrity Key
(RSA)
Generated externally Entry: RSA (2048 bits) entered
as part of software image
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Virtual Hard Disk Public key used to verify the integrity of
software and updates
DRBG Entropy Input
String
Generated internally
from hardware sources
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG Seed Generated internally
from hardware sources
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Entropy used in the random bit
generation process
DRBG C Internal value used as
part of SP 800-90a
HASH_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG V Internal value used as
part of SP 800-90a
HASH_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
DRBG V Internal value used as
part of SP 800-90a
CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG Key Internal value used as
part of SP 800-90a
CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
Diffie-Hellman Public
Key (DH) 2048-bit
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during DH key agreement protocol
Diffie-Hellman Private
Key (DH) 224-bit
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during DH key agreement protocol
ECDH Public Key (P-
256)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: EC Diffie-Hellman.
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during ECDH key agreement protocol
ECDH Private Key (P-
256)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: EC Diffie-Hellman.
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during ECDH key agreement protocol
SNMP Privacy Key
(AES-128)
NIST SP 800-135 KDF Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Volatile RAM For encryption / decryption of SNMP
session traffic
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
SNMP Authentication
Key (HMAC-SHA512)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-512 for message
authentication and verification in
SNMP
SRTP Master Key (AES-
128)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: encrypted or output as
part of HA direct physical
connection to another box
Volatile RAM Generation of SRTP session keys
SRTP Session Key (AES-
128)
NIST SP 800-135 KDF Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM For encryption / decryption of SRTP
session traffic
SRTP Authentication
Key (HMAC-SHA1)
Derived from the master
key
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 for message
authentication and verification in SRTP
SSH Authentication
Private Key (RSA)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048 bits) Virtual Hard Disk RSA private key for SSH authentication
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
SSH Authentication
Public Key (RSA)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048 bits)
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Virtual Hard Disk RSA public key for SSH authentication.
SSH Session Keys (AES-
128, AES-256)
Derived via SSH KDF.
Note: These keys are
generated via SSH (IETF
RFC 4251). This protocol
enforces limits on the
number of total possible
encryption/decryption
operations.
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman Volatile RAM Encryption and decryption of SSH
session
SSH Integrity Keys
(HMAC-SHA2-256)
Derived via SSH KDF. Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA2-256 for message
authentication and verification in SSH
TLS Authentication
Private Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048bits);
ECDSA (P- 256/P-384)
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Virtual Hard Disk ECDSA/RSA private key for TLS
authentication
TLS Authentication
Public Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048bits);
ECDSA (P- 256/P-384)
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM ECDSA/RSA public key for TLS
authentication.
TLS Premaster Secret
(48 Bytes)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA Volatile RAM Establishes TLS master secret
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Entry: Input during TLS
negotiation
Output: Output to peer
encrypted by Public Key
TLS Master Secret (48
Bytes)
Derived from the TLS Pre-
Master Secret
Agreement: NA Volatile RAM Used for computing the Session Key
TLS Session Keys (AES-
128, AES-256)
Derived from the TLS
Master Secret
Note: These keys are
generated via TLS (IETF
RFC 5246). This protocol
enforces limits on the
number of total possible
encryption/decryption
operations.
Agreement: RSA key transport Volatile RAM Used for encryption & decryption of
TLS session
TLS Integrity Keys
(HMAC-SHA256 or
HMAC-SHA384)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA256 or HMAC-
SHA384 for message authentication
and verification in TLS
SKEYSEED Derived by using key
derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160 bit shared secret known only to IKE
peers. Used to derive IKE session keys
SKEYID
(20 Bytes)
Derived by using key
derivation function
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135 Volatile RAM 160 bit secret value used to derive
other IKE secrets
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
SKEYID_d
(20 Bytes)
Derived using SKEYID,
Diffie Hellman shared
secret and other non-
secret values through key
derivation function
defined in SP800135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160 bit secret value used to derive IKE
session keys
IKE Pre-Shared Key Preloaded by the Crypto
Officer.
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Flash Memory Variable size secret used to derive IKE
skeyid when using pre-shared secret
authentication
IKE Session Encryption
Key
(Triple-DES, AES-128,
AES-256 bit)
Derived via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2)
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM Triple-DES, AES 128 or 256 key used to
encrypt data
IKE Session
Authentication Key
(HMAC-SHA-512)
Derived via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2)
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135 Volatile RAM 512 bit key HMAC-SHA-512 used for
data authentication
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
IKE Private Key
(RSA 2048-bit)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048 bits)
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM RSA 2048 bit key used to authenticate
the module to a peer during IKE
IKE Public Key
(RSA 2048-bit)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: RSA (2048 bits)
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM RSA 2048 bit public key for TLS
authentication.
IPsec Session
Encryption Key
(Triple-DES, AES-128 or
AES-256 bit)
Derived via a key
derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct connection to another
box
Volatile RAM Triple-DES, AES 128 or 256 key used to
encrypt data
IPsec Session
Authentication Key
(HMAC-SHA-512)
Derived via a key
derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct connection to another
Volatile RAM 512 bit HMAC-SHA-512 key used for
data authentication for IPsec traffic
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
box
Web UI Certificate Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: TLS session with
operator
Virtual Hard Disk Web server certificate
Bypass Key
(HMAC-SHA-256)
Internal generation by
FIPS-approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: NA
Virtual Hard Disk Bypass service. 256-bit HMAC-SHA-256
used to protect bypass table
Table 13: CSP Table
Note: When the module generates symmetric keys or seeds used for generating asymmetric keys, unmodified DRBG output is used as the
symmetric key or as the seed for generating the asymmetric keys.
Note: All keys generated by the module use the direct output of a FIPS approved DRBG. This meets the requirements of SP 800-133.
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7. Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and conditionally during operations to
prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly. Self-tests
may be run on-demand by power cycling the module.
7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
Acme Packet VME appliance performs the following power-up self-tests when the virtual machine is started.
These self-tests require no inputs or actions from the operator:
7.1.1 Software integrity Test
• RSA 2048 Software Integrity Test
7.1.2 Mocana Cryptographic Library Machine Edition (VME) Self-tests
• AES (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• Triple-DES (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test; and
• RSA verify Known Answer Test.
7.1.3 Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Virtual Machine Edition (VME) Self-Tests
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• AES (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• AES GCM (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• SP 800-90A HASH DRBG Known Answer Test;
• SP 800-90A CTR DRBG Known Answer Test;
• RSA sign/verify Known Answer Test; and
• ECDSA sign/verify Known Answer Test.
When the module is in a power-up self-test state or error state, the data output interface is inhibited and remains
inhibited until the module can transition into an operational state. While the user may attempt to restart the
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module to clear an error, the module will require re-installation in the event of a hard error such as a failed self-
test.
7.2 Critical Functions Self-Tests
Acme Packet VME performs the following critical self-tests. These critical function tests are performed for each SP
800-90A DRBG implemented within the module.
• SP 800-90A Instantiation Test
• SP 800-90A Generate Test
• SP 800-90A Reseed Test
• SP 800-90A Uninstantiate Test
7.3 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the following conditional self-tests when called by the module:
• Pair Wise consistency tests to verify that the asymmetric keys generated for RSA, and ECDSA work correctly by
performing a sign and verify operation;
• Continuous Random Number Generator test to verify that the output of approved-DRBG is not the same as the
previously generated value;
• Continuous Random Number Generator test to verify that the output of entropy is not the same as the
previously generated value;
• Bypass conditional test using HMAC-SHA-256 to ensure the mechanism governing media traffic is functioning
correctly, and;
• Software Load test using a 2048-bit/SHA-256 RSA-Based integrity test to verify software to be updated.
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8. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance
FIPS Mode is enabled by a license installed by Oracle, which will open/lock down features where appropriate.
This section describes the configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module.
8.1 Secure Setup and Initialization
The operator shall set up the device as defined in the Session Border Controller ACLI Configuration Guide. The
Crypto-Officer shall also:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is Version S-Cz8.2.0 or S-Cz8.2.0p5.
• A new account for the Crypto-Officer and User shall be created as part of Setup and Initialization process.
Upon creation of the new CO and User accounts the “default” accounts shipped with the module shall be
disabled.
• Ensure all traffic is encapsulated in a TLS, SSH, or SRTP tunnel as appropriate.
• Ensure that SNMP V3 is configured with AES-128/HMAC only.
• Ensure IKEv1 and IKEv2 is using AES CBC or CTR mode for encryption and HMAC-SHA-512 for authentication
• Ensure SSH is configured to use AES CTR mode for encryption.
• Ensure SSH and IKEv1/IKEv2 only use Diffie-Hellman group 14 in FIPS approved mode.
• Ensure all management traffic is encapsulated within a trusted session (i.e., Telnet should not be used in FIPS
mode of operation).
• Ensure RSA keys are at least 2048-bit keys for TLS, IKEv1/IKEv2. No 512-bit or 1024-bit keys can be used in FIPS
mode of operation.
• All operator passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters in length.
• Ensure use of FIPS-approved algorithms for TLS:
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• Be aware that HA configuration data that contains keys and CSP’s must never be transported over an
untrustednetwork. Ensure that the HA ports used for the transport of HA data (including keys and CSP’s)
are bound to a private IP address range during setup.
• RADIUS and TACACS+ shall not be used in FIPS approved mode.
• HTTPS shall be enabled and configure the web server certificate prior to connecting to the Web UI over TLS.
• Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of
this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
Services in Table 5 of Section 3.6 make use non-compliant cryptographic algorithms. Use of these algorithms will place
the module in a non-Approved mode of operation.
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8.2 AES-GCM IV Construction/Usage
The AES-GCM IV is used in the following protocols:
• TLS: The TLS AES-GCM IV is generated in compliance with TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in RFC 5288
and section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev1. Per RFC 5246, when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module will trigger a handshake to establish
a new encryption key.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall
be redistributed.
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9. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate attacks beyond those identified in FIPS 140-2.
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10. Operational Environment
10.1 Tested Environments
The module is installed using a common base image distributed in a compatible hypervisor format (i.e ova, ovm,
qcow2). The software image that is used to deploy the VME is common across all models. The tested
configuration includes:
Operating Environment Processor Hardware
Oracle Linux 7 running on VMware ESXi version 6.5 Intel Xeon Gold Processor Oracle Server X7-2
Table 14: Operating environment
This is considered a modifiable OE as defined by FIPS 140-2. The tested operating environments isolate virtual
systems into separate isolated process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes
by the operating environments software and hardware. The module functions entirely within the process space of
the isolated system as managed by the single operational environment. This implicitly meets the FIPS 140-2
requirement that only one entity at a time can use the cryptographic module.
10.2 Vendor Affirmed Environment
The following platforms have not been tested as part of the FIPS 140-2 level 1 certification however Oracle
“vendor affirms” that these platforms are equivalent to the tested and validated platform. Additionally, Oracle
affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same security services on the system listed
below.
Operating Environment Processor Hardware
Oracle Linux 7 running on VMware ESXi version 6.5 Intel Xeon Platinum Processors Oracle Server X7-2
Oracle Linux 7 running on VMware ESXi version 6.5 Intel Xeon Processor E5-2600 V3 Oracle Server X5-2
Oracle Linux 7 running on VMware ESXi version 6.5 Intel Xeon Platinum Processors Oracle Server X8-2
Table 15: Vendor Affirmed Operating Environment
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
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Acronyms, Terms and Abbreviations
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CDR Call Data Record
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DHE Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESBC Enterprise Session Border Controller
EDC Error Detection Code
EMS Enterprise Management Server
HMAC (Keyed) Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LED Light Emitting Diode
MGT Management
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
POST Power On Self Test
PUB Publication
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SRTP Secure Real Time Protocol
TDM Time Division Multiplexing
TLS Transport Layer Security
VME Virtual Machine Edition
Table 16: Acronyms
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References
The FIPS 140-2 standard, and information on the CMVP, can be found at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
More information describing the module can be found on the Oracle web site at
https://www.oracle.com/industries/communications/enterprise/products/session-border-controller/index.html.
This Security Policy contains non-proprietary information. All other documentation submitted for FIPS 140-2
conformance testing and validation is “Oracle - Proprietary” and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements.
Document Author Title
FIPS PUB 140-2 NIST FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
FIPS IG NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex A NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex B NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques
DTR for FIPS PUB 140-2 NIST Derived Test Requirements (DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
NIST SP 800-67 NIST Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm TDEA Block
Cypher
FIPS PUB 197 NIST Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS PUB 198-1 NIST The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS PUB 186-4 NIST Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS PUB 180-4 NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
NIST SP 800-131A NIST Recommendation for the Transitioning of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Sizes
PKCS#1 RSA
Laboratories
PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA Cryptographic Standard
Table 17: References