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Revision History

Version	Change						
1.0	Initial Version						

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1. General

1.1. Scope

This document specifies the security policy for Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. ("Samsung") **NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs BM1733a Series**, herein after referred to as a "cryptographic module" or "module", SSD (Solid State Drive), satisfies all applicable FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2 requirements of a hardware module, supporting TCG Opal SSC based SED (Self-Encrypting Drive) features, designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND Flash memories. The built-in AES HW engines in the cryptographic module's controller provide on-the-fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED's nature also provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase.

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic module specification	2
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	2
4	Roles, services, and authentication	2
5	Software/Firmware security	2
6	Operational environment	N/A
7	Physical security	2
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	2
10	Self-tests	2
11	Life-cycle assurance	2
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A

Table 1. Security Levels

1.2. Acronyms

Acronym	Description			
CTRL	Controller			
CPU	Central Processing Unit (ARM-based)			
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory			
DRAM I/F	Dynamic Random Access Memory Interface			
ECC	Error Correcting Code			
KAT	Known Answer Test			
LBA	Logical Block Address			
LDPC	Low Density Parity Check			
MEK	Media Encryption Key			
MSID	Manufactured SID(Security Identifier)			
NAND	NAND Flash Memory			
NAND I/F	NAND Flash Interface			
NVMe	Non-Volatile Memory Host Controller Interface Specification			
ROM	Read-only Memory			
SFR	Special Function Register			

Table 2. Acronyms

2. Cryptographic module specification

2.1. Cryptographic Boundary

The following photographs show the cryptographic module's top and bottom views. The multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consists of hardware and firmware components that are all enclosed in two aluminum alloy cases, which serve as the cryptographic boundary of the module.




Figure 1. Specification of the Samsung SSD NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs BM1733a Series Cryptographic Boundary

The firmware utilizes a single chip controller with an NVMe interface on the system side as well as Samsung NAND flash. The following figure depicts the module operational environment. The firmware within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.




Figure 2. Block Diagram for Samsung SSD NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs BM1733a Series

2.2. Version information

Model	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Drive Capacity
BM1733a	MZWM515THALC-00AC9	MPO92E5Q	15.36TB

Table 3. Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

2.3. Cryptographic Functionality

2.3.1. Approved Algorithm

The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage:

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
C1271 ¹	AES / FIPS 197, SP 800-38E	XTS	256 bits	Data Encryption / Decryption (only used for storage)
A1720	DRBG / SP 800-90A Rev. 1	Hash_DRBG (SHA-256)	N/A	Deterministic Random Bit Generation
A940	RSA / FIPS 186-4	PSS SigVer (SHA- 256)	3072 bits	Digital Signature Verification
C1272	SHS / FIPS 180-4	SHA-256	N/A	Message Digest
Vendor Affirmed	CKG / SP 800-133 rev2	Section 4 and Section 6.1	N/A	Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
N/A	ENT (P) / SP800-90B	N/A	N/A	Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (only used for generating seed materials for the Approved DRBG) ENT (P) provides a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for DRBG seed

Table 4. Approved Algorithms

2.3.2. Non-Approved Algorithm

Following algorithms are not intended to be used as a security function, and not used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements. These algorithms are not provided through a non-approved service to an operator.

Algorithm	Caveat	Use / Function
AES-XTS / FIPS 197, SP 800-38E	No Security Claimed; AES-XTS is only used for firmware removal of obfuscation during ROM initialized. (IG 2.4.A Scenario #2)	Firmware Removal of obfuscation
AES-CCM / FIPS 197, SP 800-38C	No Security Claimed; Non-approved	Key obfuscation and Removal of obfuscation
PBKDF2	algorithms here are only used for obfuscation and removal of	Non-SSP Derivation
HMAC / SHA-256 (SHS Cert.# C1272)	obfuscation the CSP. (IG 2.4.A Scenario #1)	Non-SSP Derivation

Table 5. Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed

2.4. Approved Mode of Operation

The module only has a single approved mode of operation and does not have a non-approved mode of operation. The cryptographic module shows the approved mode through validated version status by Show Status Service in Table 9 via NVM express Identify Controller command.

The non-approved algorithms are allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed in the module.

¹ AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-XTS; AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

3. Cryptographic module interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface Type	Data that Passes Over Port/Interface
	Data Input	plaintext data; signed data; authentication data
	Data Output	plaintext data;
NVMe Connector	Control Input	commands input logically via an API (e.g. for the software and firmware components of the cryptographic module); signals input logically or physically via one or more physical ports (e.g. for the hardware components of the cryptographic module);
	Status Output	status information output logically via an API; signal outputs logically or physically via one or more physical ports;
	Power	Power input

Table 6. Ports and Interfaces

4. Roles, services, and authentication

4.1. Role

The following table defines the roles, and associated services supported by the each role:

Role	Service	Input	Output
Cryptographic Officer(CO)	Lock/Unlock an LBA Range	LBA Range	Status
and User	Erase an LBA Range's Data	LBA Range	Status
СО	Change the Password.	CO Password	Status
User	Set User Password	User Password	Status

Table 7. Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

4.2. Approved service

E: Execute; W: Write; G: Generate; Z: Zeroise

Service	Description	Approved Security	SSPs	Role		Type(s) of Access ²			Indicator ³
	Functions		Ε	W	G	Ζ			
			CO Password		0	0		0	UID: AdminSP_SID_C_PIN /
Change the Password.	Change CO password	SHA-256	Hashed CO Authentication Data	со	о	0	0		AdminSP_Admin1_C_PIN TCG Method: Set Result: TCG status code
			User Password		0	0		0	UID:
Set User Password	Set User Password	SHA-256	Hashed User Authentication Data	User	0	0	0		LockingSP_Admin1~4_C_PIN / LockingSP_User1~9_C_PIN TCG Method: Set Result: TCG status code
Lock/Unlock an LBA Range⁴	Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data	N/A	МЕК			0		0	UID: Locking_GlobalRange / Locking_RangeNNNN TCG Method: Set Result: TCG status code
Erase an LBA	Erase user data by	Hash_ DRBG	DRBG Internal State	CO, User	0	0	0	0	UID: K_AES_256_GlobalRange_Key /
Range's Data	changing the data	(SHA-256) MEK				0	0	0	K_AES_256_RangeNNNN_Key TCG Method: GenKey Result: TCG status code

Table 8. Authenticated Services

² It means that "Write" and "Zeroise" perform in each storage of SSPs that is described in Table 13. The (R)ead column, which is specified in NIST SP 800-140B, is not applicable to the module.

³ The result of NVMe or TCG command is used as an indicator.

⁴ The CO can grant Users the authority to utilize this service via updating the "Locking SP ACE Table", in accordance with the TCG specification (included in the Lock/Unlock an LBA Range service). Initially, only the CO can perform this service. This module provides an indicator which shows when Self-Initiated Cryptographic Output Capability is activated or inactivated. The operator can check whether the target range is locked or unlocked through the 'getLockingTable' query per the TCG specification.

- Following table shows unauthenticated services. It is initially possible to use the services in following table without authentication.

Service	Description	Approved Security	SSPs	Role	Т	ype Acc		of	Indicator ⁵													
Service	Description	Functions	551 5	Noie	Е	W	G	Z	indicator													
Show Status ⁶	Show approved version status of the module / FIPS fail mode	N/A	N/A						NVM Command: Identify Controller command Result : Status Code													
Authentication	Authenticate to the	SHA-256	CO Password		0			0	UID: AdminSP_SID / AdminSP_Admin1 / LockingSP_Admin1~4 /													
hathendedion	module	51#1250	User Password		0			0	LockingSP_User1~9 TCG Method: Authenticate Result: TCG status code													
Get Random Number	Provide a random number generated by the CM	Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)	DRBG Internal State		0		0		UID: ThisSP TCG Method: Random Result: TCG status code													
IO Command ⁷	Read/Write user data.	AES-XTS	MEK		0				NVM Command: Write / Read Result : Status Code													
	Erase user data in all Range by changing the data encryption key and clearing the authentication data	Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)	DRBG Internal State		0		0															
Devent			Hash DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	Hash_ DRBG	MEK	N/A		0	0	0	UID: SPObj(AdminSP)
Revert			Hashed CO Authentication Data					0	TCG Method: Revert Result: TCG status code													
			Hashed User Authentication Data					0														
FormatNVM /	Erase user data by	Hash_ DRBG	DRBG Internal State		0	0	0	0	Admin Command: Format NVM / Sanitize /													
Sanitize / DeleteNS	changing the data encryption key	(SHA-256)	МЕК			0	0	0	Namespace Management Result : Status Code													
Update the firmware ⁸	Update the firmware	RSA	Firmware Verification Key		0			0	Admin Command: Firmware Commit Result : Status Code													
Perform Self-tests	Power cycling the module to perform self-tests	N/A	N/A						N/A													

Table 9. Unauthenticated Services

⁵ The module only supports approved services in an approved manner. The module uses implicit indicators through the result of the NVMe or TCG commands.

 ⁶ The cryptographic module shows the hardware version and firmware version through the 'Model Number (MN)' and 'Firmware Revision (FR)' of Identify Controller Data Structure. If the module enters the FIPS Fail Mode, this service indicates "ERRORMOD" in Firmware Revision (FR).
 ⁷ The I/O command itself is the approved service where Self-Initiated Cryptographic Output Capability occurs, while the unlock request (via

Lock/Unlock an LBA range" service) is the authorized enablement of this capability.

⁸ This service is exempted from being authenticated by exception clause (c) of IG 4.1.A.



4.3. Authentication

This module provides the role-based authentication. The authentication mechanism allows a minimum 8-byte length or longer (up to 32-byte) password, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF, for every Cryptographic Officer and User role supported by the module, which means a single random attempt can succeed with the probability of $1/2^{64}$ or lower. Each Password authentication attempt takes at least 750ms. It means, the number of attempts possible in a minute period is maximum 80 attempts (60000ms/750ms).

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength			
CO	Password	Probability of 1/2 ⁶⁴ in a single random attempt			
User	(Min: 8 bytes, Max: 32 bytes)	Probability of 80/2 ⁶⁴ in multiple random attempts in a minute			
Table 10 Polos and Authentication					

Table 10. Roles and Authentication

5. Software/Firmware security

- The cryptographic module employs the 428 byte parity for firmware integrity test
- The firmware integrity test is performed when power on reset.

6. Operational environment

- The cryptographic module operates in a limited operational environment that is consist of the module's firmware. This operational environment does not require any specific security rules, settings, configurations or restrictions to be set.
- The cryptographic module does not provide any general-purpose operating system to the operator.
- Unauthorized modification of the firmware is prevented by the pre-operational firmware integrity test and conditional firmware load test.

7. Physical security

The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module:

- The module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws. However, the module is sealed with tamper-evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Physical Security requirements so that tampering is easily detected when the top and bottom cases are detached.
- 2 tamper-evident labels are applied over both top and bottom cases of the module at the factory. The tamper-evident labels are not removed and reapplied without tamper evidence.
- The tamper-evident labels are applied by Samsung at Manufacturing.

The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained:

Physical Security Mechanisms	Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test	Inspection/Test Guidance Details	
Production grade cases	As often as feasible	Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found.	
Tamper-evident Sealing Labels	As often as leasible	Inspect the sealing labels for scratches, gouges, cuts and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found.	

Table 11. Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms




Figure 3. Tamper Evident Label Placement



Figure 4. Example of Signs of Tamper

8. Non-invasive security

- Non-invasive security has not applicable for this cryptographic module

9. Sensitive security parameter management

- Temporary SSPs are zeroised when power on reset.
- Firmware integrity temporary values are zeroised after the firmware integrity test is complete.
- The zeroisation is performed before overwriting to the target SSP with random value which is generated from the DRBG.
- SSP's are not exported outside the module.

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import /Export	Estab lishm ent	Storage	Zeroisation	Use & Related Keys
DRBG Internal State ⁹	256-bit	A1720 Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)	SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG (SHA-256)	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in RAM	Power on Reset	MEK
DRBG Seed	256-bit	A1720 Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)	ENT (P)	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in RAM	Power on Reset	MEK
DRBG Entropy Input String	256-bit	A1720 Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)	ENT (P)	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in RAM	Power on Reset	MEK
CO Password	Min. 64- bit	N/A	N/A	Manual Distribution/Ele ctronic Entry	N/A	Plaintext in RAM	Via "Authentication" service	N/A
User Password	Min. 64- bit	N/A	N/A	Manual Distribution/Ele ctronic Entry	N/A	Plaintext in RAM	Via "Authentication" service	N/A
Hashed CO Authenticatio n Data	128-bit	C1272 SHA-256	Hashed from Password as per SHA-256	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in Flash	Via "Change the Password" and Revert" service	N/A
Hashed User Authenticatio n Data	128-bit	C1272 SHA-256	Hashed from Password as per SHA-256	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in Flash	Via "Set User Password" and Revert" service	N/A
MEK	256-bit	C1271 AES-XTS	SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG (SHA-256)	N/A	N/A	Plaintext in RAM and Flash	Via "Unlock an LBA Range", "Erase an LBA Range's Data", "Revert" and "FormatNVM / Sanitize / DeleteNS" service	N/A
Firmware Verification Key	128-bit	A940 RSA	N/A	Entered during manufacturing	N/A	Plaintext in Hardware SFR Plaintext in Flash	Right after FW load test N/A	Firmwar e load test

Table 12. SSPs

The module contains an entropy source, compliant with SP 800-90B, within the module's cryptographic boundary.

Entropy Sources	Minimum Number of Bits of Entropy	Details
ENT (P)	- 0.5 entropy per bit	Entropy source for
	- Minimum of 256 bits of entropy for DRBG seed	Hash_DRBG
	(total seed size of 512 bits).	

Table 13. Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

⁹ The values of V and C are the "secret values" of the internal state

10. Self-tests

While executing the following self-tests, all data output is inhibited until self-test completion. To execute the preoperational tests on-demand, the operator may power-cycle the module. If a cryptographic module fails a self-test, the module will enter an error state. While in this state, all data output is inhibited.

- 10.1. Pre-operational Test
- Firmware integrity check
 - Firmware integrity check is performed by using 428-byte parity at power-on.

10.2. Conditional Test

Algorithm	Туре	Description		
DRBG	Cryptographic algorithm self-test	KATs for Hash_DRBG (SHA-256) described in SP 800-90A Section 11.3.1, 11 11.3.3, 11.3.4 KAT performed with 512-bit entropy input		
AES-XTS	Cryptographic algorithm self-test	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed with 512-bit key size		
SHA	Cryptographic algorithm self-test	Hash Digest KAT performed with 256-bit message size		
RSA	Cryptographic algorithm self-test	Verify KAT performed with 3072 Modulus (3072-bit key size) and SHA-256.		
RSA	Firmware load test	Perform using RSA-3072 with SHA-256 when new firmware is downloaded.		
ENT (P)	Cryptographic algorithm self-test	 Perform the below 2 types of tests and each test includes the Rep Count test and Adaptive Proportion test described in SP800-90B. Start-up test is performed for Entropy Source after power on res Continuous test is performed for Entropy Source while the more operating 		

Table 14. Self-tests

10.3. Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error state in Boot	The module does not provide any crypto operation.	• •	Power cycle	Hang state. No action
Error State		Any other self-test failure		If the module enters the FIPS Fail Mode, Show Status service indicates "ERRORMOD" in Firmware Revision (FR).

Table 15. Error States

11. Life-cycle assurance

The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate in accordance with FIPS 140-3:

- The cryptographic module operates always in Approved Mode once shipped from the vendor's manufacturing site.
- The steps necessary for the secure installation, initialization and start-up of the cryptographic module as per FIPS 140-3 VE11.33.01 are as follows:

11.1. Secure Installation

- [Step1] User should examine the tamper evidence.
 - Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering including the tamper evident sealing label.
 - If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung.
- [Step2] Identify the firmware version in the device.
 - Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via NVM express Identify Controller command.
- [Step3] Take the drive's ownership.
 - Change SID's PIN by setting a new PIN.
 - Activate the Locking SP by using the Activate method.

Note: If required to enable the additional Admin authorities in Locking SP, new PINs must be set by the Cryptographic Officer.

- [Step4] Periodically examine the tamper evidence
 - If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid potential security hazards or information leakage.

11.2. Operational Description of Module

- The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control input, control output, and power.
- The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form.
- The cryptographic module shall use the Approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys.
- The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using RSA PSS-3072 with SHA-256.
- The cryptographic module shall provide a production-grade cryptographic boundary.
- The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of self-tests. most commands except for supported command from the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected in the error state and the IO command returns Namespace Not Ready (SC=0x82, SCT=0x0), the other commands return Internal Error (SC=0x6, SCT=0x0) defined in NVMe specification via the status output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state. When module fails firmware integrity checks performed by Mask ROM, the module will fail to boot; module will not service any requests or provide any status output (module hangs).
- The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-3 IG C.I (i.e. $key_1 \neq key_2$).
- The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.
- Bypass capability is not applicable to the cryptographic module.
- Critical functions are not applicable to the cryptographic module.
- The module generates symmetric keys which are unmodified outputs from the DRBG.
- If you require the "Samsung SED Product Manual", kindly reach out to the vendor contact information that is posted in certification.

12. Mitigation of other attacks

The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3

Other Attacks	Mitigation Mechanism	Specific Limitations		
N/A	N/A	N/A		

Table 16. Mitigation of Other Attacks