Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Version 0.5
August 27, 2018
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 4
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 5
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 5
2 CISCO ADAPTIVE SECURITY APPLIANCE CM.......................................................... 6
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ................................................................................................. 6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS .................................................. 6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 7
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 13
2.5 USER SERVICES ................................................................................................................ 14
2.6 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................. 14
2.7 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES .............................................................................................. 15
2.8 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 16
2.9 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 16
2.10 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 20
2.10.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 21
2.10.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode .................................................................................... 22
2.10.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................... 22
2.10.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module............................................................................ 22
2.10.5 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded Module............................................. 23
2.10.6 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module.................................................................... 23
2.11 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 24
2.12 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 25
2.12.1 Opacity Shield Security ........................................................................................................................................ 25
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield................................................................................................. 25
ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield ............................................................................................................ 26
2.12.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) ............................................................................................................................ 26
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels ................................................................................................................................. 37
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 37
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION .................................................. 37
3.2 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM CONFIGURATION................................................. 39
3.3 IDENTIFYING MODULE OPERATION IN AN APPROVED MODE............................................ 39
TABLES
TABLE 1 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL............................................................................................................................................................ 4
TABLE 2 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................................................................................... 7
TABLE 3 USER SERVICES..................................................................................................................................................................................14
TABLE 4 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 5 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS IN THE NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES..........................................................................................16
TABLE 6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CSPS..................................................................................................................................................20
TABLE 7 APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS AND ASSOCIATED CERTIFICATE NUMBER.........................................................21
TABLE 8 APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS AND ASSOCIATED CERTIFICATE NUMBER FOR EMBEDDED MODULE..........22
DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM 1 BLOCK DIAGRAM............................................................................................................................................................................ 7
FIGURES
FIGURE 1 CISCO ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X APPLIANCE FONT PANEL..................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 2 CISCO ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X APPLIANCE REAR PANEL...................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 3 ASA 5506H-X APPLIANCE FRONT PANEL .................................................................................................................................. 9
FIGURE 4 ASA 5506H-X APPLIANCE REAR PANEL..................................................................................................................................... 9
FIGURE 5 ASA 5508-X AND ASA 5516-X APPLIANCES FRONT PANEL................................................................................................10
FIGURE 6 ASA 5508-X AND ASA 5516-X APPLIANCES REAR PANEL..................................................................................................10
FIGURE 7 ASA 5525-X APPLIANCES FRONT PANEL..................................................................................................................................11
FIGURE 8 ASA 5525-X APPLIANCES REAR PANEL ....................................................................................................................................11
FIGURE 9 ASA 5545-X AND ASA 5555-X APPLIANCES FRONT PANEL................................................................................................12
FIGURE 10 ASA 5545-X AND ASA 5555-X APPLIANCES REAR PANEL ...............................................................................................13
FIGURE 11 ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X AND ASA 5506W-X OPACITY SHIELD PLACEMENT ......................................................26
FIGURE 12 ASA 5508-X AND ASA 5516-X OPACITY SHIELD PLACEMENT.........................................................................................26
FIGURE 13 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X FRONT VIEW..................................................................................................................27
FIGURE 14 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X RIGHT SIDE VIEW .........................................................................................................27
FIGURE 15 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X LEFT SIDE VIEW............................................................................................................27
FIGURE 16 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT...............................................................................................27
FIGURE 17 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X TOP VIEW.......................................................................................................................28
FIGURE 18 ASA 5506-X AND ASA 5506W-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT .........................................................................................28
FIGURE 19 ASA 5506H-X FRONT VIEW .....................................................................................................................................................28
FIGURE 20 ASA 5506H-X RIGHT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT .......................................................................................................................29
FIGURE 21 ASA 5506H-X LEFT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT..........................................................................................................................29
FIGURE 22 ASA 5506H-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT ..................................................................................................................................29
FIGURE 23 ASA 5506H-X TOP VIEW..........................................................................................................................................................29
FIGURE 24 ASA 5506H-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT ............................................................................................................................30
FIGURE 25 ASA 5508-X FRONT VIEW.........................................................................................................................................................30
FIGURE 26 ASA 5508-X RIGHT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT...........................................................................................................................30
FIGURE 27 ASA 5508-X LEFT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT.............................................................................................................................30
FIGURE 28 ASA 5508-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT......................................................................................................................................30
FIGURE 29 ASA 5508-X TOP TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................................................31
FIGURE 30 ASA 5508-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT................................................................................................................................31
FIGURE 31 ASA 5516-X FRONT VIEW.........................................................................................................................................................31
FIGURE 32 ASA 5516-X RIGHT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT...........................................................................................................................31
FIGURE 33 ASA 5516-X LEFT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT.............................................................................................................................32
FIGURE 34 ASA 5516-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT......................................................................................................................................32
FIGURE 35 ASA 5516-X TOP TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................................................32
FIGURE 36 ASA 5516-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT................................................................................................................................33
FIGURE 37 ASA 5525-X FRONT TEL PLACEMENT ..................................................................................................................................33
FIGURE 38 ASA 5525-X RIGHT SIDE VIEW................................................................................................................................................33
FIGURE 39 ASA 5525-X LEFT SIDE VIEW ..................................................................................................................................................33
FIGURE 40 ASA 5525-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT......................................................................................................................................33
FIGURE 41 ASA 5525-X TOP TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................................................34
FIGURE 42 ASA 5525-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT................................................................................................................................34
FIGURE 43 ASA 5545-X FRONT TEL PLACEMENT ...................................................................................................................................34
FIGURE 44 ASA 5545-X RIGHT SIDE VIEW................................................................................................................................................34
FIGURE 45 ASA 5545-X LEFT SIDE VIEW ..................................................................................................................................................35
FIGURE 46 ASA 5545-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT......................................................................................................................................35
FIGURE 47 ASA 5545-X TOP TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................................................35
FIGURE 48 ASA 5545-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT................................................................................................................................35
FIGURE 49 ASA 5555-X FRONT TEL PLACEMENT ...................................................................................................................................36
FIGURE 50 ASA 5555-X RIGHT SIDE VIEW................................................................................................................................................36
FIGURE 51 ASA 5555-X LEFT SIDE VIEW ..................................................................................................................................................36
FIGURE 52 ASA 5555-X REAR TEL PLACEMENT......................................................................................................................................36
FIGURE 53 ASA 5555-X TOP TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................................................36
FIGURE 54 ASA 5555-X BOTTOM TEL PLACEMENT................................................................................................................................37
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Adaptive Security
Appliances Cryptographic Module running Firmware 9.8 referred to in this document as
appliances. This security policy describes how the module meets the security requirements of
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be
freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module will operate, including the
rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2IG and additional rules imposed
by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available on the modules from the following
sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following websites:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5
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1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module is referred to
as Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module, ASA, Module, Appliance or the
Systems.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic
Module on the 5500 Security Appliances models and explains the secure configuration and
operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the
general features and functionality of the appliances. Section 3 specifically addresses the required
configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6
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2 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance CM
Cisco® Adaptive Security Appliances, ASA 5500-X Series Next-Generation Firewalls provide
balanced security effectiveness with productivity. This solution offers the combination of the
industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation
network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security, secure unified
communications, TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IKEv2 and Suite B.
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software is the core operating system for the Cisco
ASA Family. It delivers enterprise-class firewall capabilities for the ASA devices in an array of
form factors - standalone appliances tailor-made for small and midsize businesses, midsize
appliances for businesses improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and
throughput appliances for demanding enterprise data centers, high-performance blades that
integrate with the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches, virtual instances to provide enterprise-
class security for private and public clouds and Firepower services.
2.1 Cryptographic Module
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module is defined as a multiple-chip
standalone cryptographic module running on the following Adaptive Security Appliances:
Small Scale Models:
 ASA 5506-X
 ASA 5506H-X
 ASA 5506W-X
 ASA 5508-X
 ASA 5516-X
Medium Scale Models:
 ASA 5525-X
 ASA 5545-X
 ASA 5555-X
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance, when deployed as next-generation firewall (NGFW)
appliances, use Adaptive Security Appliance CM and the embedded Cisco®
Firepower CM,
Certificate# 3261 with these appliances. The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance CM is the core
operating system for the Cisco ASA Family. It delivers enterprise-class firewall capabilities for
the ASA series appliances. Please refer to FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3261 for more information about
the FIPS relevant security services provided by Cisco Firepower CM. The sections below detail
the Adaptive Security Appliance CM FIPS compliance.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics
The Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Security Appliances deliver enterprise-class security for business-
to-enterprise networks in a modular, purpose-built appliance. It includes ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X,
5506W-X, 5508-X, 5516-X, 5525-X, 5545-X, and 5555-X models.
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Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provides
no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables:
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interface
ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506W-X, ASA 5506H-X, ASA 5508-X, ASA 5516-X, ASA 5525-X,
ASA 5545-X, ASA 5555-X Physical Interface
Data Input
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
SFP Ports (on 5545-X and 5555-X)
Data Output
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
SFP Ports (on 5545-X and 5555-X)
Control Input
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
SFP Ports (on 5545-X and 5555-X)
Console Port
Reset Pin/Switch/Button (only on 5506-X, 5506H-X, 5506W-X, 5508-X, 5516-X, 5525-X)
Status Output
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
SFP Ports (on 5545-X and 5555-X)
LED
Power Interface Power Plug
Unused Interface USB Port (USB Type A port and mini-USB Type B Console port)
Table 2 Module Interfaces
Processor
ASA-CM
Mgmt Port Console Port
Ethernet Ports
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Figure 1 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Font Panel
1 Power LED:
Green -> power applied OK
6 Console Ports: RJ-45 Console port and mini-
USB Type B Console port. The mini USB Type
B Console port is disallowed in FIPS mode.
2 Status LED:
Green blinking -> system is booting up
Green solid -> successful boot
Orange -> error during boot-up
7 GE Management Port
3 Active LED:
Green -> unit is Active in failover pair
Orange -> unit is Standby in failover pair
Off -> not part of a failover pair
8 USB port is disallowed in FIPS mode
4 WLAN Module
Only lit for 5506W-X Controlled by AP
module, same color/blink behavior as
existing AP702i Access Point
9 Reset Pin
5 GE ports:
Left-side LED Green -> link
Right-side LED blinking -> network activity
10 Power Supply
5 9
6
8
10
Figure 2 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Rear Panel
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Figure 3 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Front Panel
Figure 4 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Rear Panel
1 Power cord socket The chassis power-supply socket. See Power Supply for more information
about the chassis power supply.
Note The ASA is powered on when you plug in the AC power supply.
2 Status LEDs The locations and meanings of the status LEDs are described in Status Lights
section.
3 Network data ports Four Gigabit Ethernet RJ-45 (8P8C) network I/O interfaces. The ports are
numbered (from top to bottom) 1, 2, 3, 4. Each port includes a pair of LEDs,
one each for connection status and link status. The ports are named and
numbered Gigabit Ethernet 1/1 through Gigabit Ethernet 1/4.
4 Management port A Gigabit Ethernet interface restricted to network management access only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
5 Console ports Two serial ports, a mini USB Type B and a standard RJ-45 (8P8C), are
provided for management access via an external system. The mini USB Type B
Console port is disallowed in FIPS mode.
6 USB port A standard USB Type A port is disallowed in FIPS mode
7 Reset button A small recessed button that if pressed for longer than three seconds resets the
ASA to its default “as-shipped” state following the next reboot. Configuration
variables are reset to factory default. However, the flash is not erased and no
files are removed.
Note
You can use the service sw-reset-button to disable the reset button.
The default is enabled.
Note: Please refer to Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Hardware Installation Guide for more information.
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Figure 5 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Front Panel
Figure 6 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Rear Panel
1 Power switch Standard rocker-type power on/off switch.
2 Power cord socket The chassis power-supply socket.
3 Status LEDs The locations and meanings of the status LEDs are described in Status Lights.
4 Network data ports Eight Gigabit Ethernet RJ-45 (8P8C) network I/O interfaces. The ports are
numbered (from left to right) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Each port includes a pair of
LEDs, one each for connection status and link status. The ports are named and
numbered Gigabit Ethernet 1/1 through Gigabit Ethernet 1/8. See Network Ports
referred to Note 2 below for additional information.
5 Management port A Gigabit Ethernet interface restricted to network management access only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
6 Console ports Two serial ports, a mini USB Type B and a standard RJ-45 (8P8C) are provided
for management access via an external system. See Console Ports referred to
Note 2 below for additional information.
7 USB port A standard USB Type A port is provided, allowing attachment of an external
device such as mass storage. See Internal and External Flash Storage referred
to Note 2 below for additional information.
8 Reset button A small recessed button that if pressed for longer than three seconds resets the
ASA to its default “as-shipped” state following the next reboot. Configuration
variables are reset to factory default. However, the flash is not erased and no
files are removed.
Note You can use the service sw-reset-button to disable the reset button.
The default is enabled.
9 SSD LED Status light for installed solid-state drive (SSD). See Status Lights referred to
Note 2 below for additional information.
10 SSD bay Covered slot in which the SSD is installed. You can replace this drive if it fails.
See Replace the SST in the ASA referred to Note 2 below for additional
information.
Notes:
1. Both USB port and the mini USB Type B Console port are disallowed in FIPS mode. Please refer to section
“Physical Security” for more details.
2. Please refer to Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Hardware Installation Guide for more information.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11
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Figure 7 ASA 5525-X Appliances Front Panel
LED Description
1 Power Button A hard switch that turns the system on and off. Once depressed, the button stays in
the "on" position:
 On–The power symbol on the button illuminates.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
2 Hard disk release button Releases the hard disk from the device.
3 Alarm Indicates system operating status:
 Off–Normal operating system function.
 Flashing amber–Critical Alarm indicting one or more of the following:
- a major failure of a hardware or software component.
- an over-temperature condition.
- power voltage is outside of the tolerance range.
4 VPN Indicates VPN tunnel status:
 Solid green–VPN tunnel is established.
 Off–No VPN tunnel is established.
5 HD Indicates Hard Disk Drive status:
 Flashing green–Proportioned to read/write activity.
 Solid amber–Hard disk drive failure.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
6 PS Indicates the power supply status.
7 Active Indicates the status of the failover pair:
 Solid green–Failover pair is operating normally.
 Off– Failover is not operational.
8 Boot Indicates power-up diagnostics:
 Flashing green–Power-up diagnostics are running, or system is booting.
 Solid amber–System has passed power-up diagnostics.
 Off– Power-up diagnostics are not operational.
Figure 8 ASA 5525-X Appliances Rear Panel
Description
1 Management 0/0 interface Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet Interface that is restricted to management use only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
(See the “Management 0/0 Interface on the ASA 5500-S Series” section.)
2 Power supply Indicates the chassis power supply.
3 RJ-45 Ethernet ports Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet customer data interfaces.
The top row port numbers are (from left to right) 5, 3, 1.
The bottom row port numbers are (from left to right) 4, 2, 0.
4 USB ports Disallowed in FIPS mode
5 Console port Indicates the console port that directly connects a computer to the ASA.
Note: Please refer to Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Hardware Installation Guide for more information.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12
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Figure 9 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Front Panel
4
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13
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Figure 10 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Rear Panel
Notes:
1. The USB ports are disallowed in FIPS mode.
2. Please refer to Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Hardware Installation Guide for more information.
2.4 Roles and Services
The security appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
• Console Port
• Telnet over IPSec
• SSH v2
• ASDM via HTTPS/TLSv1.2
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to
the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the security appliances that
operators may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the security
appliances assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using
Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. The module also
supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another means of authentication, allowing the storage of
usernames and passwords on an external server as opposed to using the module’s internal
database for storage.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number
character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14
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case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by
performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in
one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048
bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Thus, an attacker would have a 1 in 2112
chance of
randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by
FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one
minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.6 x 1031
(5.2 x 1033
/60 = 8.6 x
1031
) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to
support.
2.5 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or via IPsec
protected telnet or SSH session to an Ethernet port or ASDM via HTTPS/TLS. The module
prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed
entry to the module management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via
an IPsec session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital
signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs,
the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the
CSPs are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of the
firmware currently running.
Operator password (r)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal,
adjust flow control).
Operator password (r)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
IPsec VPN Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec
VPN.
Operator password, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec
authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHv2. Operator password, SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public
Key and SSHv2 session key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions
(TLSv1.2)
Negotiation and encrypted data transport via
HTTPS/TLS (TLSv1.2).
Operator password, ECDSA private key, ECDSA public
key, TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS master key, TLS encryption key,
TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
2.6 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the security
appliances and authenticates from the enable command (for local authentication) or the login
command (for AAA authentication) from the user services. The services available to the Crypto
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Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) –
and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Configure the Security
Blade
Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the module will support, enable
interfaces and network services, set system date and time,
and load authentication information.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec
encryption key, IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r. w, d)
Firmware Installation Install the firmware during the System Initialization Integrity test key (r. w, d)
Configure External
Authentication Server
Configure Client/Server authentication RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret (r. w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams
on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules,
which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on
characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP
connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables, active
sessions health, temperature, memory status, voltage,
packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view
physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Manage the Security Blade Log off users, shutdown or reload the module, erase the
flash memory, manually back up module configurations,
view complete configurations, manager user rights, and
restore module configurations.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Configure
Encryption/Bypass
Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set
preshared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP
range or allow plaintext packets to be set from specified
IP address.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec
encryption key, IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
TLS VPN (TLSv1.2)
Functions
Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output
of CSPs.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private key,
TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS master key,
TLS encryption key, TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSH v2 Functions Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
SSHv2 private key, SSHv2 public key, SSHv2 encryption key,
SSHv2 integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG
V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
IPsec VPN Functions Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session
encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication
private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Local Certificate Authority Allows the ASA to be configured as a Root Certificate
Authority and issue user certificates for SSL VPN use
(AnyConnect and Clientless). The ASA can then be
configured to require client certificates for authentication.
N/A
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the
zeroization methods classified in table 6, Zeroization
column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.7 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.7, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
IPsec
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC-SHA-1, MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
All services available can be found at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/security/asa-5500-
series-next-generation-firewalls/products-installation-and-configuration-guides-list.html. This
site lists all configuration guides for the ASA systems.
2.8 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins and cycle power.
In addition, for details regarding the Roles, Services and Authentication provided by the
embedded cryptographic module, please refer to certificate number 3261’s Security Policy.
2.9 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer
role and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory
that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and electronically
distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are used for pre-
shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used for electronic distribution.
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer
can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly
associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are entered into
the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public
key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with
the user/role that entered them. The entropy comes from a process of extracting bits from the
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any of non-approved algorithms or non-approved key
or curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
entropy source and is fed into the DRBG. The module provides approximately 347 bits entropy
to instantiate the DRBG.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256) or
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
384-bits/512-
bits
This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG and HASH_DRBG. HW
based entropy source used to construct
seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256) or
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
384-bits/888-
bits
Input to the DRBG that determines the
internal state of the DRBG. Generated
using DRBG derivation function that
includes the entropy input from
hardware-based entropy source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A CTR
_DRBG (AES-256)
or HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
128-bits/888-
bits
The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon which
the security of this DRBG mechanism
depends. Generated first during DRBG
instantiation and then subsequently
updated using the DRBG update
function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(using AES-256)
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP
800-90A CTR_DRBG. Established per
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG C SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
888-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP
800-90A HASH_DRBG. Established
per SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. Established
per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224-384 bits The private key used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange. This key is generated
by calling SP800-90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The public key used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange. This key is derived per
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Keying material 160 bits Keying material known only to IKE
peers. It was established via key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF and it will be used for
deriving other keys in IKE protocol
implementation.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Keying material 160 bits Keying material known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
SKEYSEED Keying material 160 bits Keying material known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt
key. This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
authentication key. This key is derived
via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared secret Variable 8
plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE skeyid
when using preshared secret
authentication. This CSP is entered by
the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA/ECDSA RSA 2048
bits or
ECDSA
Curves:
P-256/P-
384/512
RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE
authentication. This key is generated by
calling SP800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IKE
authentication
public key
RSA/ECDSA RSA 2048
bits or
ECDSA
Curves:
P-256/P-
384/512
RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE
authentication. This key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4
RSA/ECDSA key pair generation
method in the module
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IPsec encryption
key
Triple-DES, AES
and AES-GCM
Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption
key. This key is derived via a key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication
key. This key is derived via a key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the User role. This
CSP is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable password Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the CO role. This CSP
is entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
RADIUS secret Shared Secret 16 characters The RADIUS shared secret. Used for
RADIUS Client/Server authentication.
This CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for
TACACS+ Client/Server
authentication. This CSP is entered by
the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
SSHv2 RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is generated by
calling SP 800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 RSA
public key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA key
pair generation method in the module
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2
encryption key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is
used to encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics
traversing between the SSHv2 Client
and SSHv2 Server. This key is derived
via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
SSHv2 integrity
key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits Used for SSH connections integrity to
assure the traffic integrity. This key
was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
ECDSA private
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
ECDSA public
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification (used in
IKE/IPSec and TLS). This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4
ECDSA key pair generation method in
the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
Enable secret Shared Secret At least eight
characters
The obfuscated password of the CO
role. However, the algorithm used to
obfuscate this password is not FIPS
approved. Therefore, this password is
considered plaintext for FIPS purposes.
This password is zeroized by
overwriting it with a new password.
The Crypto Officer configures the
module to obfuscate the Enable
password. This CSP is entered by the
Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS RSA private
keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in IPSec,
TLS, and SSH negotiations. This key
was generated by calling FIPS
approved DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS RSA public
keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in IPSec,
TLS, and SSH negotiations. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4
RSA key pair generation method in the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS pre-master
secret
keying material At least eight
characters
Keying material used to derive TLS
master key during the TLS session
establishment. This key entered into the
module in cipher text form, encrypted
by RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
secret is
generated
TLS master
secret
keying material 48 Bytes Keying material used to derive other
HTTPS/TLS keys. This key was
derived from TLS pre-master secret
during the TLS session establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS encryption
keys
Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM 128/192/256
Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
Used in HTTPS/TLS connections to
protect the session traffic. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS Integrity
Key
HMAC-
SHA256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS integrity to assure the
traffic integrity. This key was derived
in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Integrity test key RSA-2048 Public
key
2048 bits A hard coded key used for firmware
power-up integrity verification.
Hard coded
for firmware
integrity
testing
Zeroized by
“#erase flash:”
command, write
to startup config,
followed by a
module reboot
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
In addition, for details regarding the cryptographic keys and CSPs used in the embedded
cryptographic module, please refer to certificate number 3261’s Security Policy.
2.10 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
2.10.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The modules support the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
 The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS and RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2
and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1,
Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic
boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret
SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party,
client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use
with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
 Each of TLS, SSH and IPSec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-
DES keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPSec) for details
relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is
responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key
to 220
.
 No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by
the CAVP and CMVP.
Algorithm
Cisco Security
Crypto
(Firmware)
ASA On-board
(Cavium Octeon III)
(ASA 5506-X, 5506H-
X, 5506W-X, 5508-X,
5516-X)
ASA On-board
(Cavium Nitrox PX)
(ASA 5525-X)
ASA On-board
(Cavium Nitrox PX)
(ASA 5545-X, 5555-
X)
ASA CN7020 or
CN7130
ASA CN1610 ASA CN1620
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4905 3301 2472 2050 & 2444
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2559 1881 1513 1321
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 4012 2737 2091 1794
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3272 2095 1514 1247
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen,
SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits
PKCS1_V1_5; 2048 bits)
2678
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer;
P-256, P-384, P-521)
1254
CTR_DRBG (AES-256) 1735 819
SHA_DRBG (SHA-512) 336 332
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2
and SSHv2)
1521
CKG (vendor affirmed)
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting
generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the
unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
2.10.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1521, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
 NDRNG
2.10.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
 HMAC MD5
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
 strength; non-compliant)
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
In addition, the embedded cryptographic module (FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3261) also provides the
following FIPS approved algorithm certificates and non-approved algorithms:
2.10.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms Algorithm Implementations
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4266
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2307
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3512
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 2811
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2297
DRBG (AES-256 CTR) 1337
CVL Component (TLSv1.2 and SSHv2) 1008
CKG (vendor affirmed)
Table 8 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number for Embedded Module
Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the
acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion
of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts
the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or
server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES
GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
 No parts of SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
 Each of TLS and SSH protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES
keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS) and RFC 4253 (SSH) for details relevant to the
generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for
ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 220
.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting
generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the
unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
2.10.5 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded Module
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1008, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1008, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
2.10.6 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
 DES
 HMAC MD5
 MD5
 RC4
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
2.11 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
 ASA Self Tests
o POSTs – Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
 AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A
Section 11.3 are performed)
 ECDSA (sign and verify) Power On Self-Test
 Firmware Integrity Test (using SHA-512 and RSA 2048)
 HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 RSA (sign/verify) KATs
 SHA-1 KAT
 SHA-256 KAT
 SHA–384 KAT
 SHA-512 KAT
 Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o POSTs – ASA On-board (Hardware)
 AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A
Section 11.3 are performed)
 HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 SHA-1 KAT
 SHA-256 KAT
 SHA-384 KAT
 SHA-512 KAT
 Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o Conditional tests - Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
 RSA pairwise consistency test (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify)
 ECDSA pairwise consistency test
 Conditional IPSec Bypass test
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
o Conditional tests - ASA On-board (Hardware)
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 25
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Note: DRBGs will not be available should the NDRNG become unavailable. This will in turn
make the associated security service/CSP outlined above in Table 6 non-available.
The security appliances perform all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.
In addition, for details of the Self-Tests conducted by the embedded cryptographic module,
please refer to certificate number 3261’s Security Policy.
2.12 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use of
opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity and tamper
evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence.
2.12.1 Opacity Shield Security
The following table shows the tamper labels and opacity shields that shall be installed on the
modules to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for using,
securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. Actions to be taken
when any evidence of tampering should be addressed within site security program.
ASA Models Number
Tamper labels
Tamper Evident Labels Number
Opacity Shields
Opacity Shields
5506-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506H-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506W-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5508-X 5 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5508-FIPS-KIT=
5516-X 5 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5516-FIPS-KIT=
5525-X, 5545-X,
5555-X
3 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 0 None
Table 9 Tamper Labels and Opacity Shield Quantities
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X, follow these steps:
Step 1: Remove the three screws from the bottom of the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and
5506W-X.
Step 2: Slide the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X into the FIPS enclosure.
Step 3: Turn the FIPS enclosure with the chassis securely inside and use the three screws
removed in Step 1 to screw the FIPS enclosure to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-
X.
Step 4: Apply the tamper evident label over the screw on the bottom. Please see Figure 18 for
placement of the TEL.
Step 5: Apply another tamper evident label so that one half of the tamper evident label attaches
to the enclosure and the other half attaches to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X
chassis. Please see Figure 24 for placement of the TEL.
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Figure 11 ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X and ASA 5506W-X Opacity Shield Placement
ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5508-X or ASA 5516-X rear, follow these steps:
Step 1: Power off the ASA.
Step 2: Remove the two screws.
Step 3: Place the shield over the vent areas and insert the screws.
Figure 12 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield Placement
2.12.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs)
The tamper evident seals (hereinafter referred to as tamper evident labels (TEL)) shall be
installed on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in FIPS mode. TELs
shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored,
accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason,
the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove
the debris using a damp cloth.
Any deviation of the TELs placement such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change,
replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below
by unauthorized operators shall mean the module is no longer in FIPS mode of operation.
Returning the system back to FIPS mode of operation requires the replacement of the TEL as
depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope
of this Security Policy.
The Crypto Officer shall inspect the seals for evidence of tamper as determined by their
deployment policies (every 30 days is recommended). If the seals show evidence of tamper, the
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Crypto Officer shall assume that the module has been compromised and contact Cisco
accordingly.
To seal the system, apply tamper-evidence labels as depicted in the figures below.
Figure 13 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Front View
Figure 14 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Right Side View
Figure 15 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Left Side View
Figure 16 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Rear TEL Placement
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Figure 17 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Top View
Figure 18 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 19 ASA 5506H-X Front View
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Figure 20 ASA 5506H-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 21 ASA 5506H-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 22 ASA 5506H-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 23 ASA 5506H-X Top View
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Figure 24 ASA 5506H-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 25 ASA 5508-X Front View
Figure 26 ASA 5508-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 27 ASA 5508-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 28 ASA 5508-X Rear TEL Placement
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Figure 29 ASA 5508-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 30 ASA 5508-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 31 ASA 5516-X Front View
Figure 32 ASA 5516-X Right Side TEL Placement
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Figure 33 ASA 5516-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 34 ASA 5516-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 35 ASA 5516-X Top TEL Placement
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Figure 36 ASA 5516-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 37 ASA 5525-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 38 ASA 5525-X Right Side View
Figure 39 ASA 5525-X Left Side View
Figure 40 ASA 5525-X Rear TEL Placement
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Figure 41 ASA 5525-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 42 ASA 5525-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 43 ASA 5545-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 44 ASA 5545-X Right Side View
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Figure 45 ASA 5545-X Left Side View
Figure 46 ASA 5545-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 47 ASA 5545-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 48 ASA 5545-X Bottom TEL Placement
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Figure 49 ASA 5555-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 50 ASA 5555-X Right Side View
Figure 51 ASA 5555-X Left Side View
Figure 52 ASA 5555-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 53 ASA 5555-X Top TEL Placement
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Figure 54 ASA 5555-X Bottom TEL Placement
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the system before cleaning the chassis and applying labels.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels.
Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the security appliance as shown in figures above.
The tamper evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive
backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of
the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident seals have non-repeated serial numbers,
they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that
the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident seals can also be inspected
for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word
“OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and modules are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating the module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization
The Cisco ASA 5500-X series security appliances were validated with adaptive security
appliance firmware version 9.8 (file name: asa982-20-lfbff-k8.SPA and asa982-20-smp-k8.bin).
The ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X, ASA 5506W-X, ASA 5508-X, and ASA 5516-X run asa982-
20-lfbff-k8.SPA. The ASA 5525-X, ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X run asa982-20-smp-k8.bin.
These are the only allowable images for FIPS-approved mode of operation.
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The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
Step 1: Disable the console output of system crash information, using the following command:
(config)#crashinfo console disable
Step 2: Install Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the security appliances to use Triple-
DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 3: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the security appliances to internally enforce FIPS-
compliant behavior, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test, using the following
command:
(config)# fips enable
Note: If command fips disabled is entered, the module must be put back into factory setting
(factory reset).
o Reboot system and while the system is booting, go into ROMMON
o Under the configuration mode, type admin-password erase, this will erase
everything and bring the system back to factory defaults.
Step 4: Disable password recovery.
(config)#no service password-recovery
Step 5: Set the configuration register to bypass ROMMON prompt at boot.
(config)# config-register 0x10011
Step 6: If using a Radius/TACACS+ server for authentication, perform the following steps
(see Operator manual for specific TACACS+ commands). Otherwise, skip to step 7
(config)# aaa-server radius-server protocol radius
(config)# aaa-server radius-server host <IP-address>
Configure an IPsec tunnel to secure traffic between the ASA and the Radius server.
The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long.
Step 7: Enable AAA authentication for the console.
(config)#aaa authentication serial console LOCAL
(config)#username <name> password <password>
Step 8: Enable AAA authentication for SSH.
(config)#aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
Step 9: Enable AAA authentication for Enable mode.
(config)#aaa authentication enable console LOCAL
Step 10: Specify Privilege Level 15 for Crypto Officer and Privilege Level 1 for User and
set up username/password for each role.
(config)#username <name> password <password> privilege 15
(config)#username <name> password <password> privilege 1
Step 11: Ensure passwords are at least 8 characters long.
Step 12: All default passwords, such as enable and telnet, must be replaced with new
passwords.
Step 13: Apply tamper evident labels as described in the “Physical Security” section on
page 17.
Step 14: Reboot the security appliances.
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3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Configuration
To operate in FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer must perform the following steps:
Step 1: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.
Step 2: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters
long and secure traffic between the security appliances and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server
via IPSec tunnel.
Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise proceed to step 3.
Step 3: Configure the TLS protocol when using HTTPS to protect administrative functions.
Due to known issues relating to the use of TLS with certain versions of the Java plugin, we
require that you upgrade to JRE 1.5.0_05 or later. The following configuration settings are
known to work when launching ASDM in a TLS-only environment with JRE 1.5.0_05:
a. Configure the device to allow only TLS v1.2 packets using the following command:
(config)# ssl server-version tlsv1.2
(config)# ssl client-version tlsv1.2
b. Uncheck SSL Version 2.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.
c. Check TLS 1.2 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.
Step 4: Configure the security appliances to use SSHv2. Note that all operators must still
authenticate after remote access is granted.
(config)# ssh version 2
Step 5: Configure the security appliances such that any remote connections via Telnet are
secured through IPSec.
Step 6: Configure the security appliances such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are used
for IPSec tunnels.
Step 7: Configure the security appliances such that error messages can only be viewed by
Crypto Officer.
Step 8: Disable the TFTP server.
Step 9: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation.
HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.
Step 10: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved algorithms.
3.3 Identifying Module Operation in an Approved Mode
The following activities are required to verify that the module is operating in an Approved mode
of operation:
1. Verify that the tamper evidence labels and FIPS opacity shields have been properly placed on
the module based on the instructions specified in the “Physical Security” and “Secure
Operation” sections of this document.
2. Verify that the length of User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets are at least
eight (8) characters long, include at least one letter, and include at least one number
character, as specified in the “Secure Operation” section of this document.
3. Issue the following commands: 'show crypto IPSec sa' and 'show crypto isakmp policy' to
verify that only FIPS approved algorithms are used.
In addition, for the Secure Operations steps required for the embedded cryptographic module,
please refer to refer to certificate number 3261’s Security Policy.