

# Level 3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for ProtectServer Internal Express 2 (PSI-E2)

## LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY



## Document Information

<b>Document Part Number</b>	002-010933-003
<b>Release Date</b>	February 23, 2022

## Revision History

Revision	Date	Reason
A	September 9, 2021	Initial release
B	February 23, 2022	Removed duplicate algorithm entry

## Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software

© 2022 . All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are trademarks and service marks of Thales and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All other trademarks and service marks, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the property of their respective owners.

## Disclaimer

All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Thales. and/or its subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual property protection in connection with such information.

Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise, under any intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Thales's information.

This document can be used for informational, non-commercial, internal and personal use only provided that:

- > The copyright notice below, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice appear in all copies.
- > This document shall not be posted on any network computer or broadcast in any media and no modification of any part of this document shall be made.

Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.

The information contained in this document is provided "AS IS" without any warranty of any kind. Unless otherwise expressly agreed in writing, Thales makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of information contained herein.

Thales hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein, including all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Thales be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect, special or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages resulting from loss of use, data, profits, revenues, or customers, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information contained in this document.

Thales does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall not incur, and disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security

standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves according to the state of the art in security and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no circumstances, shall Thales be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case of any successful attack against systems or equipment incorporating Thales products. Thales disclaims any liability with respect to security for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result from any use of its products. It is further stressed that independent testing and verification by the person using the product is particularly encouraged, especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or insecure functioning could result in damage to persons or property, denial of service or loss of privacy.

# CONTENTS

ACRONYMS .....	5
Acronyms and abbreviations.....	5
<b>1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1 Purpose .....	7
1.2 References .....	7
1.3 Terminology.....	7
1.4 Document Organization.....	7
<b>2 Module Overview .....</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1 Module Specification .....	8
2.2 Ports and Interfaces .....	9
2.3 Roles and Services.....	10
2.3.1 Roles .....	10
2.3.2 Services.....	10
2.3.3 Administrator Security Officer.....	11
2.3.4 Administrator .....	11
2.3.5 Token SO .....	12
2.3.6 Token User.....	12
2.3.7 Unauthenticated Operators .....	13
2.3.8 Audit User.....	13
2.4 Physical Security .....	13
2.5 Operational Environment.....	13
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management .....	14
2.6.1 Key Generation.....	14
2.6.2 Key Access / Storage .....	14
2.6.3 Security Functions.....	19
2.7 Self Tests .....	22
2.7.1 Power-On Self Tests .....	22
2.7.2 Conditional Self Tests.....	23
2.7.3 Mitigation of Other Attacks .....	24
<b>3 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation .....</b>	<b>25</b>
3.1 Description .....	25
3.2 Invoking Approved Mode of Operation .....	25
3.3 Mode of Operation Indicator .....	26
3.4 Invoking Mode of Operation Indicator.....	26
<b>4 Design Assurance.....</b>	<b>27</b>
4.1 Distribution and Delivery of Module .....	27

# ACRONYMS

## Acronyms and abbreviations

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AK	Application Key
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
ARIA	Korean Government Standard Encryption Algorithm
ATSO	Administrator Token Security Operator
ATU	Administrator Token User
CA	Certificate Authority
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DHEK	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHEK	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HRNG	Hardware Random Number Generator
IDEA	International Data Encryption Algorithm
KAT	Known Answer Test
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MAK	Message Authentication Key
MD2	Message Digest Algorithm 2
MD5	Message Digest Algorithm 5
MD5 HMAC	MD5 Hashed Message Authentication Code

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
MMK	Module Master Key
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NO	Normal Operator
PSI-E2	ProtectServer Internal-Express 2
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RAM	Random Access Memory
RC2	Rivest's Code 2
RC4	Rivest's Code 4
RNG	Random Number Generator
RoHS	Restriction on Hazardous Substances
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RWXZ	Read, Write, Execute, Zeroize
SDRAM	Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SO	Security Operator
SRAM	Static Random Access Memory
Triple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
USB	Universal Serial Bus
USO	User Security Operator
VGA	Video Graphics Array

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the ProtectServer Internal Express 2 (PSI-E2). This security policy describes how the PSI-E2 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to operate the PSI-E2 in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as a part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of the PSI-E2.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST web site at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

## 1.2 References

This document applies to hardware version 808-000064-005 with firmware version 5.06.01 with bootloader version 1.1.2

The security policies described in this document apply to the module only and do not include any security policy that may be enforced by the host appliance, server, or smart card.

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the PSI-E2 in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy.

## 1.3 Terminology

In this document the Thales ProtectServer Internal Express 2 card is referred to as the PSI-E2, the adapter, or the module.


## 1.4 Document Organization

This document provides an overview of the PSI-E2 and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the PSI-E2. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

## 2 Module Overview

### 2.1 Module Specification

The Thales PSI-E2 is a cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that provides a wide range of cryptographic functions using firmware and dedicated hardware processors. This document refers specifically to PSI-E2 hardware version 808-000064-005 with firmware version 5.06.01 and bootloader version 1.1.2



**Figure 2-1 ProtectServer Internal Express 2 Card**

The module, running Thales's Cprov firmware, implements the Cryptoki cryptographic API as defined by RSA Data Security. While certain Cryptoki features are not supported, the module does provide a comprehensive compliance to the PKCS#11 standard as well as vendor-specific extensions.

The cryptographic boundary for this module includes the metal cover enclosure that is outlined in red above, under which a hard epoxy coating is protecting the PCB. This boundary encapsulates the Data Ciphering Processor (DCP), embedded processor, SDRAM memory chips, and the Real Time Clock (RTC). The battery, battery isolation link, and external alarm input link are excluded from the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

The module provides key management (e.g., generation, storage, deletion, and backup), an extensive suite of cryptographic mechanisms, and process management including separation between operators. The PSI-E2 also features non-volatile tamper protected memory for key storage, a hardware random number generator, and an RTC.



The FIPS 140-2 cryptographic boundary is defined by the perimeter of the protection covers. The PSI-E2 meets all level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-2 as summarized in Table 2-1.

Section	Section title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	3
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	3
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Machine	3
5	Physical Security	3
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	3
8	EMI/EMC	3
9	Self Tests	3
10	Design Assurance	3
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

**Table 2-1 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels**

## 2.2 Ports and Interfaces

The PSI-E2 has the following physical interfaces:

- > A standard PCI Express bus interfacing to the motherboard of the host machine;
- > One USB serial connector;
- > One Luna Remote PED connector (not used);
- > One external battery isolation connector; and
- > One External tamper input.

The PSI-E2 provides a tightly secured cryptographic element. All requests for services sent to the adapter over the PCI bus or the serial ports are captured by the adapter's processor, which controls the level of access to the on-board cryptographic services and the keys. The adapter's processor also responds to PKCS #11 commands, ensuring that during FIPS operation only authenticated users receive cryptographic services.

The module's physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces, defined by FIPS 140-2, and described in Table 2-2:

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces	Adapter Physical Interfaces
Data Input Interface	PCI Bus, USB Serial port
Data Output Interface	PCI Bus, USB Serial port
Control Input Interface	PCI Bus, External tamper input
Status Output Interface	PCI Bus

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces	Adapter Physical Interfaces
Power Interface	PCI Bus, External battery isolation connector

Table 2-2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces

## 2.3 Roles and Services

### 2.3.1 Roles

The PSI-E2 supports identity-based authentication of its operator. Operators are identified by a token name and PIN. The different roles and required authentication are shown in Table 2-3.

Operator	Role	Type of authentication	Authentication Data
Administrator SO	Crypto Officer	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Administrator	User	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Token SO	Crypto Officer	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Token User	User	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Audit User	User	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN

Table 2-3 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

The PSI-E2 supports three types of Tokens: one Administration Token, multiple Cprov Tokens and one or more Smart Card Tokens. All Tokens have two operators: a Security Officer (SO) and a User. For the Administration Token, the Administrator SO is the FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer and the Administrator is the User. For all other Tokens, the Token SO is the FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer and the Token User is the User.

The operator explicitly selects a role when logging in by selecting a PKCS#11 Token and nominating either User or SO Role. The adapter provides restricted services to an operator based on the role to which the operator authenticated. There is only one operator assigned to each role. The Administrator SO and Token SO perform FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer roles while the Administrator and Token User performs a FIPS 140-2 User role.

The PSI-E2 enforces a minimum PIN length of 4 characters and a maximum PIN length of 32 characters. The module allows the PIN character to be any value but the software typically used with the module restricts the dictionary to the ANSI C character set. This character set provides for 92 visible characters which, with a 4 character PIN, provides a probability of less than one in 1,000,000 that a random PIN attempt (e.g., guess) will succeed (actual probability is approximately 1/71,600,000). The module is protected from brute force PIN attacks by imposing an increasing delay for every failed PIN attempt after the first three failed attempts. The initial delay is 5 seconds and increases by an additional 5 seconds for each subsequent failed attempt, e.g., 3 fails causes a 5 second delay; 4 fails causes a 10 second delay; 5 fails causes a 15 second delay; etc.

### 2.3.2 Services

Table 2-4 lists the services related to each authorized role within the adapter:

Role	Services
Administrator SO	Initialize Administrator Token User PIN
Administrator	Manage Adapter and Administrator Token
Token SO	Manage Token
Token User	Use Token and manage token keys
Unauthenticated operator	Unauthenticated services
Audit User	Manage Audit Key and logs

**Table 2-4 Types of Available Services**

All services listed in can be accessed in FIPS and non-FIPS mode. When the module is operating in FIPS-approved mode as described in Section 3, the Non-FIPS Approved key derivation mechanisms in Table 2-10 are disabled and cannot be used for these services. The non-Approved functions in Table 2-10 can only be accessed through the services when the module is in non-FIPS Approved mode.

### 2.3.3 Administrator Security Officer

The primary role of the Administrator Security Officer (ASO) is to introduce the Administrator to the system. The ASO is able to set the initial Administrator PIN value but is not able to change the administration PIN after it is initialized. The ASO can perform the following services:

- > Set the initial Administrator PIN value (may not change it later);
- > Set the CKA\_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in the Administrator Token;
- > Set the CKA\_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in the Administrator Token;
- > Manage Host Interface Master Keys;
- > Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects;
- > May change his/her own PIN;
- > Read the Hardware Event Log;
- > May modify Monotonic Counter object and
- > Power-up self-test on demand.

### 2.3.4 Administrator

The Administrator is responsible for the overall security management of the adapter. Token Security Officers and Slots are controlled by the Administrator. The following services are available to the Administrator:

- > Set or Change RTC value;
- > Read the Hardware Event Log;
- > Purge a full Hardware Event Log;

- > Configure the Transport Mode feature;
- > Specify the Security Policy of the adapter;
- > Create new Cprov Slots/Tokens and specify their Labels, SO PINs, and minimum PIN Length;
- > Initialize smart cards and specify their Labels and SO PINs;
- > Destroy individual Cprov Slots/Tokens;
- > Zeroize all adapter Secure Memory including all PINs and User Keys;
- > Perform Firmware Upgrade Operation;
- > Manage Host Interface Master Keys;
- > Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects on Administrator Token;
- > Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects on Administrator Token;
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects on Administrator Token;
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects on Administrator Token;
- > May change his/her own PIN; and
- > Power-up self-test on demand.

### 2.3.5 Token SO

The Token SO is responsible for granting and revoking ownership of the token. If the Token does not have a User PIN, the Token SO should initialize it by assigning the Label and User PIN. The token SO may also revoke the Token User's privileges (and possibly reassign the token to another operator) but only by destroying all the key material of the original operator first. The following services are available to the Token SO:

- > Set the initial User PIN value (may not change it later)
- > Reset (re-initialize) the Token (destroys all keys and User PIN on the Token) and set a new Label
- > Set the CKA\_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
- > Set the CKA\_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
- > Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token;
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects in his or her Token
- > May change his/her own PIN;
- > May modify Monotonic Counter object; and
- > Power-up self-test on demand.

### 2.3.6 Token User

Token users may manage and use private and public keys on their own tokens. The following services are available to the Token User:

- > Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token;
- > Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects in his or her Token;
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, derive Public objects in his or her Token;
- > Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects in his or her Token;
- > May change his/her own PIN; and
- > Power-up self-test on demand.

### 2.3.7 Unauthenticated Operators

Certain services are available to operators who have not (yet) authenticated to the adapter:

- > Exercise status querying services;
- > Authenticate to a Token; and
- > Force session terminate, restart adapter by setting a register which is memory mapped to the PCI bus. The host application can force a restart by writing a certain value to the register through the PSI-E2 device driver. The transparent PCI chip will then generate a bus cycle restart which in turn will restart the adapter.

All of the services available to the Unauthenticated Operators are also available to all authenticated operators.

### 2.3.8 Audit User

The AuditUser role is present on the Admin Token and can be initialized by the AdminSO role. The responsibility of this role is limited to:

- > Create/Destroy AUDIT\_KEY; and
- > Verify the generated audit logs.

## 2.4 Physical Security

The adapter provides tamper evidence and tamper response mechanisms. A metal casing covers the epoxy-covered PCB board. The epoxy provides a strong tamper evident enclosure. The Administrator should perform routine visual inspection of the module for evidence of tamper such as scratches.

The module is actively protected through a combination of an external tamper jumper switch and a voltage monitor. The PSI-E2 protection can also be activated by removal of the adapter from the host machine or via an external alarm input capability. In the event of a tamper the PSI-E2 enters a Tamper state in which all processing is halted and the Non-Volatile secure memory is zeroized.

Hardness testing of the epoxy was performed from a low of -50° to +60° Celsius. No assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.

## 2.5 Operational Environment

This section does not apply. The PSI-E2 does not provide a modifiable operational environment.

---

## 2.6 Cryptographic Key Management

---

The PSI-E2 is a general-purpose cryptographic management device and thus securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters (CSPs) such as passwords.

### 2.6.1 Key Generation

The PSI-E2 Module supports the generation of DSA, RSA, ECDSA (also known as ECC), and DH public and private keys. The module also supports the generation of three-key Triple-DES keys as well as AES 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys. The module implements a FIPS approved AES-CTR DRBG specified in NIST SP 800-90A. ECDH is supported for key derivation functions.

### 2.6.2 Key Access / Storage

All keys except module specific keys are stored in one of three media.

Flash memory is used to store encrypted keys, plaintext keys are stored either in Volatile RAM or in tamper responding secure memory (battery-backed RAM). The module prevents physical access all these media through the physical security mechanisms discussed in section 2.4. Logical access to keys and other CSPs is restricted to authenticated operators with valid permissions. The communication to the module including key generation and key creation is performed over a Three Key Triple DES encrypted trusted channel and the module only allows keys to be output if they are wrapped <sup>1</sup>using a FIPS Approved algorithm.

Table 2-5 outlines all the keys stored by the module.

---

<sup>1</sup> In accordance to SP 800-67Rev2, the firmware implements a counter to ensure the same Triple-DES keys used for encryption are not utilized more than 228 operations.

CSP	CSP Type	Generation	Input/Output	Storage	Destruction Mechanism	Use
Firmware upgrade Public Key	2048 bit RSA	N/A	Input with Firmware Update Image which is considered plaintext	Plaintext in Flash	None	To verify the signature attached to a new firmware image. Generation done at manufacture.
Default Administrator Token SO PIN	PIN	N/A	Not input/output	Plaintext in Flash	Replaced as part of the initialization process	For initial authentication to the module. Replaced after the module is initialized.
DH Key Agreement Keys	2048, 3072 and 4096 - bit Modulus Size	Private Component Generated Via FIPS approved DRBG; Public Value Computed via Diffie-Hellman	Public key exported as part of key agreement	Working memory	Power cycle, tamper, or C_DestroyObject() API	To establish an encrypted channel between an operator and the module.
Message Encryption Shared Secret Key	3-key Triple-DES	Established via DH	Not input/output	Working memory	Power cycle, tamper, or C_DestroyObject() API	Protects data between an operator and the module. Triple-DES is used to protect the secure channel established using DH.
Message Authentication Key	HMAC-SHA-1	Established via DH	Not Input/Output	Working memory	Power cycle, tamper, or C_DestroyObject() API	Provide data authentication of encrypted data between an operator and the module.
Operating PINs	PIN	N/A	Input encrypted <sup>2</sup>	Obfuscated with MMK	Tamper or Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	All users' PINs – Administrator Token SO, Administrator Token User, Token SOs, and Token users used to authenticate to the module.

<sup>2</sup> PINs encrypted using Triple-DES

CSP	CSP Type	Generation	Input/Output	Storage	Destruction Mechanism	Use
Module Master Key	3-key Triple-DES	FIPS Approved DRBG	Not input/output	Tamper responsive memory in NVRAM of RTC	Tamper or Zeroize command (ctconf -x)	Obfuscates other keys and zeroizes contents of secure memory on object deletion.
ECDH Key Agreement Keys	ECDH (P224-P521)	Private Component Generated Via FIPS approved DRBG; Public Value Computed via Diffie-Hellman	Public key exported as part of key agreement	Working memory	Power cycle, tamper, or C_DestroyObject() API	User-created keys for use by user applications
Secret Key	3-Key Triple-DES, AES 128, 192 and 256 bit	Established via ECDH, DH, transported using RSA or Secret Key or generated by FIPS approved DRBG	Encrypted (with another Secret Key) or split knowledge	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	User-created keys for use by user applications for Encryption, Decryption, or Signature Verification/Generation and key wrapping/unwrapping
RSA Public/Private Keys	2048, 3072 bit RSA	FIPS 186-4	Public key exported	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	User-created keys for use by user applications for Signature Generation/Verification
DSA Public/Private Keys	2048 – 4096 bit DSA	FIPS 186-4	Public key exported	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	User-created keys for use by user applications for Signature Generation/Verification



CSP	CSP Type	Generation	Input/Output	Storage	Destruction Mechanism	Use
ECDSA Public/Private Keys	224 – 512 bit ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	Public key exported	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	User-created keys for use by user applications for Key wrapping/Unwrapping and Signature Generation/Verification
DRBG Seed	384 bits	H/W RNG	Not input/output	Not permanently stored	Power cycle or tamper	Used as part of the RNG process.
DRBG V	128 bits	Hardware Random Source	Not input or output	Not permanently stored	Power cycle or tamper	Part of the secret state of the approved DRBG. The value is generated using the methods described in NIST SP 800-90A.
DRBG Key	AES-256	Hardware Random Source	Not Input or Output	Not permanently stored	Power cycle or tamper	32 bytes AES key stored in the RAM. Used in an implementation of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR (AES) DRBG.
DRBG Entropy Input	384 bits	Hardware Random Source	Not Input or Output	Not permanently stored	Power cycle or tamper	The 384-bit entropy value used to initialize the approved DRBG.
Secure Audit Logging Key (SALK)	HMAC-SHA-256	FIPS approved DRBG	Encrypted	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	A key used to verify integrity and authentication of log messages and saved in Flash memory
Secure Audit AppID-HMAC Key	HMAC-SHA-256	FIPS approved DRBG	Not Input or Output	Working memory or Secure Memory obfuscated with MMK	Power cycle, Tamper, Zeroize command (ctconf -x) or C_DestroyObject() API	A key used to create an HMAC of the AppID to be used in the Secure Audit logs.

**Table 2-5 List of Keys Stored in Module**

Table 2-6 outlines the access that “Authorized Services” (see Table 2-4) have to the keys listed in Table 2-5. Here ‘R’ stands for “Read”, ‘W’ stands for “Write”, X stands for “Execute” and “Z” stands for “Zeroize”.

	FW Upgrade Cert	Default Administrator Token SO PIN	DH / ECDH Ephemeral Keys	Key Agreement Keys	Message Authentication Key	Operating PINs	Token Keys (Public)	Token Keys (Private)	DRBG	Module Master Key	Audit Keys
Initialization	-	-	-	X	-	WX	-	-	-	W	-
Administrator SO	WX	WX	-	WXZ	-	WXZ	RWXZ	RWXZ	-	RWXZ	-
Administrator	-	-	WZ	X	WZ	WXZ	-	-	-	RWXZ	-
Token SO	-	-	RXZ	X	RXZ	X	-	-	-	-	-
Token User	-	-	RXZ	X	RXZ	X	XZ	XZ	XW	-	-
Audit User	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	RWXZ
Unauthenticated Operators	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-

**Table 2-6 Access to Keys for Authorized Services**

Please note that the FW Upgrade Cert is never zeroized because it is a public key. The Default Administrator Token SO PIN is never zeroized because it's a pre-initialization value. The DRBG Seed is zeroized when a tamper event is detected or overwritten when the module is restarted. All other CSPs/Keys identified in Table 2-5 are zeroized by a call to C\_DestroyObject() API by the respective role or through a tamper event.

## 2.6.3 Security Functions

The PSI-E2 supports a wide variety of security functions. FIPS 140-2 requires that only FIPS Approved algorithms be used whenever there is an applicable FIPS standard.

Table 2-7 lists the PSI-E2 FIPS Approved security functions. In the FIPS mode of operation these Approved security functions are available.

FIPS Approved Security Function	Firmware	SafeXcel-3120	SafeXcel-1746
AES ECB, CBC, OFB, KW, KWP, CMAC, GCM <sup>3</sup> (The module generates IVs internally using the Approved DRBG which are at least 96-bits in length) (Key Size = 128, 192, 256)	5571	n/a	n/a
AES ECB, CBC (Key Size = 128, 192, 256)	n/a	4849	4960
AES CCM (Key Size = 128, 192, 256)	C1898	n/a	n/a
DSA Parameter Generation [2048,3072], Key Generation [2048,3072], Signature Generation [2048,3072], Signature Verification [1024,2048,3072]	1434	n/a	n/a
ECDSA– Only NIST Recommended Curves Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	1503	n/a	n/a
RSA	2998	n/a	n/a

<sup>3</sup> The module generates IVs internally using the Approved DRBG which all IV used are 128-bits in length.

Key Generation [2048], Signature Generation [2048,3072],Signature Verification [1024,2048,3072]			
KAS (FFC) dhEphem, dhOneFlow FB: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FC: SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	192	n/a	n/a
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	4476	n/a	n/a
SHA3: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	57	n/a	n/a
HMAC: SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	3713	n/a	n/a
Triple-DES ECB, CBC, KW, OFB	2807	n/a	n/a
Triple-DES ECB, CBC	n/a	n/a	2573
KTS (AES Cert. #5571; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)	5571	n/a	n/a
KTS (Triple-DES Cert. #2807; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)	2807	n/a	n/a
DRBG NIST SP 800-90A DRBG (CTR) AES-256	n/a	1704	n/a
CKG	Vendor Affirmed (Resulting Symmetric keys and seeds used for asymmetric key generation are an unmodified output from the Approved DRBG.)		

**Table 2-7 FIPS Approved Security Functions**

Table 2-8 lists the PSI-E2 Non-Approved but FIPS allowed security functions. In the FIPS mode of operation

<b>Non-Approved FIPS but Allowed Security Functions</b>
AES (Cert. #5571, key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)

<b>Non-Approved FIPS but Allowed Security Functions</b>
EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
<i>NDRNG<sup>4</sup></i>
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
Triple-DES (Cert. #2807, key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)

**Table 2-8 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Security Functions**

Table 2-9 lists the PSI-E2 key derivation mechanisms that are non-Approved but Allowed in FIPS mode.

<b>MECHANISMS FOR SPLIT KNOWLEDGE ENTRY/OUTPUT OF KEY (Allowed in FIPS Mode)</b>
CKM_SECRET_SHARE_WITH_ATTRIBUTES

**Table 2-9 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Key Derivation Mechanisms**

Table 2-10 lists the PSI-E2 key derivation mechanisms that are non-Approved and not Allowed in FIPS mode. These key derivation mechanisms are actively disabled by the module when operating in FIPS mode.

<b>NON-ALLOWED DERIVATION METHODS (Disabled in FIPS Mode)</b>
CKM_DES3_DERIVE_CBC
CKM_DES3_DERIVE_ECB
CKM_SHAxxx_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY
CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY
CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA

<sup>4</sup> This is being built-in 3120 SafeExcel module. The estimated amount of entropy provided by the NDRNG is 4 bits per each byte of data

CKM\_XOR\_BASE\_AND\_KEY

Table 2-10 Non-Approved Key Derivation Mechanisms

## 2.7 Self Tests

The PSI-E2 Module performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation.

### 2.7.1 Power-On Self Tests

When the module is initially powered-on, each cryptographic library in the module executes its own battery of power-up self-tests. If any of the power-up self-tests fail in any of the cryptographic library implementations, the module will enter an error state and prohibit an operator from exercising the module's cryptographic functionality. Table 2-11 lists the power-up self-tests:

Test	Function	Where Performed	FIPS 140-2 Required
Secure Memory File System Integrity	Initializes and checks the module's secure memory file system	Firmware	No
DRBG KAT	Performs a known answer test and health checks for the AES CTR DRBG.	SafeXcel-3120	Yes
Symmetric Cipher KATs	Performs known answer tests for AES (various modes including GCM), Triple-DES, Triple-DES KW, CAST, IDEA, RC2, DES, and RC4 operations (encrypt/decrypt)	Firmware, SafeXcel-3120, SafeXcel-1746 (AES) Firmware, SafeXcel-1746 (Triple-DES)	AES and Triple-DES
MAC and HMAC KATs	Performs known answer tests for CAST MAC, IDEA MAC, RC2 MAC, DES MAC and Triple-DES MAC. Performs known answer tests for MD5 HMAC, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, RMD128 HMAC and RMD160 HMAC.	Firmware	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
Asymmetric Cipher KATs	Performs known answer tests for RSA operations (sign and verify, encrypt/decrypt).	Firmware	Yes
Asymmetric Key Derive KATs	Performs known answer tests for ECDH Derive	Firmware	No

Test	Function	Where Performed	FIPS 140-2 Required
Asymmetric Pairwise Consistency Test	Performs a pairwise consistency test on a DH key pair	Firmware	No
DH X9.42 Parameter Verification KAT	Performs a known answer test on DH X9.42 Parameter Verification algorithm	Firmware	Yes
DH X9.42 Pairwise Consistency Test	Performs a pairwise consistency test on a random DH X9.42 key pair	Firmware	Yes
DH X9.42 ASN1 KDF KAT: CS_DA_SHA1	Known answer Test of ASN1 KDF	Firmware	Yes
DH X9.42 Concatenate KDF KAT: CS_DA_SHA1	Known answer Test of Concatenate KDF	Firmware	Yes
Sign/Verify	Known Answer signature/verification tests for RSA, DSA and ECDSA.	Firmware	Yes
Message Digest KATs	Verifies known message/hash pairs for MD2, MD5, RMD128, RMD 160, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and SHA-3	Firmware	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3
Software/Firmware Integrity	Ensures that the software/firmware on the module has not been modified / damaged by calculating a SHA-1 hash over all software/firmware components and comparing the result to a known good result.	Firmware	Yes

Table 2-11 Power-up Self-Tests

## 2.7.2 Conditional Self Tests

The module performs conditional self-tests as outlined in Table 2-12.

Test	Function	Where Performed	FIPS 140-2 Required
Pairwise Consistency	Runs a pairwise consistency check each time the module generates a DSA, RSA, ECDSA, or DH public/private key pair.	Firmware	DSA, RSA, ECDSA

Continuous HW RNG	Performs the FIPS 140-2 required continuous RNG check each time the module's Hardware RNG is used to produce random data.	SafeXcel-3120	Yes
Continuous RNG	Performs the FIPS 140-2 required continuous RNG check each time the module's RNG is used to produce random data.	Firmware	Yes
Firmware Load	<p>Checks that the firmware to be loaded is verified with a digital signature. If the signature cannot be verified, the module will report an error and the firmware will not be loaded. The verification algorithm used is RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA512 and 2048 bit key.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> Following a successful verification, all keys and CSPs will first be zeroized and then the firmware will be updated</p> <p>A firmware upgrade in FIPS mode will reset the HSM to factory default state, forcing the user to re-initialize the module, enable the FIPS mode and re-load the cryptographic keys.</p>	Firmware	Yes

Table 2-12 Conditional Self-Tests

### 2.7.3 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The PSI-E2 does not employ any technology specifically intended to mitigate against other attacks.



## 3 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation

### 3.1 Description

The PSI-E2 allows its administrators the choice of employing a wide range of security technologies. To comply with FIPS mode of operation the PSI-E2 must be configured in a secure manner. Once configured, the module enforces the following, which includes:

- > Operation with FIPS Approved algorithms as listed in Table 2-7, Non-Approved but FIPS allowed algorithms as listed in Table 2-8 and Table 2-9;
- > Not permitting the export of clear keys;
- > In conformance with limitations on the maximum number of blocks encrypted for a given 168-bit Triple-DES key outlined in SP 800-67r2 and further tightened in FIPS IG A.13 – the module enforces that any given Triple-DES key stored in the module cannot be used for more than  $2^{16}$  64-bit data block encryption operations. Triple-DES keys created on the HSM (imported or generated) include a ‘remaining blocks’ attribute that is managed by the HSM and decremented following each encrypt operation requested. Once the ‘remaining blocks’ count reaches zero, the key is permitted for use with decrypt and MAC verify operations exclusively. The key is prohibited from being copied and exported. The counter is managed by the module and cannot be reset to a non-zero value;
- > Not permitting PINs to be used in clear;
- > Not permitting changes to the PSI-E2 firmware without first clearing all protected keys and CSPs; and
- > Providing authentication and session management security.

This Security Policy describes a particular PSI-E2 firmware and hardware. The PSI-E2 firmware can be replaced (with a firmware upgrade operation) or extended (by loading Functionality Modules [FMs]). Operators can load their own trusted code into the module. However, by doing so, the module is no longer FIPS validated unless the FM has been separately FIPS validated.

The PSI-E2 checks that new firmware is digitally signed before it can be loaded. Following a successful verification all keys and CSPs will be zeroized. After the zeroization, the PSI-E2 will automatically transition to a non-FIPS mode and will require reconfiguration to return to FIPS mode.

### 3.2 Invoking Approved Mode of Operation

An operator may easily place the PSI-E2 in “FIPS mode” by simply running the administrative `CTCONF -fF` command from the remote management facility. Once this command is executed the PSI-E2 will reject all requests for non-FIPS algorithms or configurations. Please note that the operator has to be logged in as an Administrator to invoke the FIPS mode of operation.

### 3.3 Mode of Operation Indicator

---

Running the display status command from a remote management facility will return a status displaying the current PSI-E2 operating mode.

Security Mode: FIPS 140-2 Mode: <list of flags indicating attributes set for FIPS>

When the module is not running in FIPS mode, this status displays as:

Security Mode:

### 3.4 Invoking Mode of Operation Indicator

---

An operator may easily view the current PSI-E2 mode of operation by simply running the administrative CTCONF -v command from the remote management facility. Once this command is executed the PSI-E2 will respond with full details of the adapter configuration. The configuration details include details of the firmware loaded and a listing of the adapter security mode flags one of which indicates that the module is in the FIPS mode of operation.

## 4 Design Assurance

### 4.1 Distribution and Delivery of Module

The module is shipped in an anti-static shipping envelope that is sealed with a Thales security sticker and placed inside a Thales shipping box. The user should inspect the product shipping boxes to make sure they have not been tampered with or damaged upon receiving the modules, which could indicate a security compromise.