© 2026 Senetas Corporation Ltd. All rights reserved. CE Crypto Module Security Policy v1.00 Once released this document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 1 of 35 Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.00 17 July 2026 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 2 of 35 Table of Contents 1 General....................................................................................................................................................................................................7 1.1 Overview..........................................................................................................................................................................................7 1.2 Security Levels.................................................................................................................................................................................8 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................................................................................9 2.1 Description.......................................................................................................................................................................................9 Purpose and Use:..............................................................................................................................................................................9 Module Type:.....................................................................................................................................................................................9 Module Embodiment:.........................................................................................................................................................................9 Cryptographic Boundary and Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):.......................................................9 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ....................................................................................................10 Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):.....................................................................10 Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:....................................................................................................10 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:.....................................................................................10 2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................................................................................10 2.4 Modes of Operation........................................................................................................................................................................10 Modes List and Description: ............................................................................................................................................................10 2.5 Algorithms......................................................................................................................................................................................10 Approved Algorithms: ......................................................................................................................................................................10 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:............................................................................................................................................................13 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: ................................................................................................................................................13 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: .......................................................................................................13 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:..........................................................................................................................................13 2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................................................................13 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .......................................................................................................................................................15 AES-GCM Key and IV generation for TLS.......................................................................................................................................15 2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................................................................................15 2.9 Key Generation ..............................................................................................................................................................................16 2.10 Key Establishment .......................................................................................................................................................................16 2.11 Industry Protocols ........................................................................................................................................................................16 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...........................................................................................................................................................17 3.1 Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................................................17 3.2 Data Privacy...................................................................................................................................................................................17 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication......................................................................................................................................................18 4.1 Authentication Methods..................................................................................................................................................................18 4.2 Roles..............................................................................................................................................................................................18 4.3 Approved Services.........................................................................................................................................................................18 4.4 Non-Approved Services .................................................................................................................................................................21 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded..............................................................................................................................................21 5 Software/Firmware Security ..................................................................................................................................................................22 5.1 Integrity Techniques.......................................................................................................................................................................22 5.2 Initiate on Demand.........................................................................................................................................................................22 6 Operational Environment.......................................................................................................................................................................23 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 3 of 35 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ........................................................................................................................23 Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable ..........................................................................................................................23 How Requirements are Satisfied: ....................................................................................................................................................23 7 Physical Security ...................................................................................................................................................................................24 8 Non-Invasive Security............................................................................................................................................................................25 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management.........................................................................................................................................26 9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................................................................................26 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................................................................................26 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ..............................................................................................................................................................26 9.4 SSPs..............................................................................................................................................................................................26 9.5 Transitions .....................................................................................................................................................................................29 10 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................................................................30 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................................................30 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................................................30 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information......................................................................................................................................................31 10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................................................................................33 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests....................................................................................................................................................33 11 Life-Cycle Assurance...........................................................................................................................................................................34 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures .......................................................................................................................34 11.2 Administrator Guidance................................................................................................................................................................34 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................................................................................34 11.4 End of Life....................................................................................................................................................................................34 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..................................................................................................................................................................35 12.1 Attack List ....................................................................................................................................................................................35 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 4 of 35 List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels .............................................................................................................................................................................8 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).................................................................10 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid................................................................................................10 Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid.................................................................................10 Table 5: Modes List and Description ........................................................................................................................................................10 Table 6: Approved Algorithms ..................................................................................................................................................................13 Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .......................................................................................................................................................13 Table 8: Security Function Implementations.............................................................................................................................................15 Table 9: Entropy Certificates ....................................................................................................................................................................15 Table 10: Entropy Sources.......................................................................................................................................................................15 Table 11: Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................................................................17 Table 12: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................................................18 Table 13: Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................................................20 Table 14: Storage Areas...........................................................................................................................................................................26 Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods.......................................................................................................................................................26 Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods.........................................................................................................................................................26 Table 17: SSP Table 1 .............................................................................................................................................................................27 Table 18: SSP Table 2 .............................................................................................................................................................................29 Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................................................30 Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ..............................................................................................................................................................31 Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .......................................................................................................................................31 Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information...............................................................................................................................................33 Table 23: Error States ..............................................................................................................................................................................33 List of Figures Figure 1 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram ...................................................................................................................................9 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 5 of 35 References For more information on the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program please refer to the National Institute of Standards and Technology website at www.nist.gov/cmvp. The following standards from NIST are all available via the URL: www.nist.gov/cmvp. [1] FIPS PUB 140-3: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. [2] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR). [3] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements. [4] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Brev1 CMVP Security Policy Requirements. [5] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Crev2 CMVP Approved Security Functions. [6] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Drev2 CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods. [7] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms. [8] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics. [9] ISO/IEC 19790:2012(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for cryptographic modules. [10] ISO/IEC 24759:2017(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules. [11] NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program. [12] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197. [13] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4. [14] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4. [15] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-131Arev2, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. [16] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-90Arev1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. [17] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Arev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. [18] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4. [19] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Brev2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. [20] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-108rev1 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions. [21] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Crev2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key Establishment Schemes. [22] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation. [23] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-133rev2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation. [24] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-67rev2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher. [25] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-135rev1, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 6 of 35 Acronyms and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions API Application Programming Interface CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security CFB Cipher Feedback CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CNF Cloud Network Function CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DH Diffie-Hellman DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ESV(NP) Non-Physical Entropy Source ESV Entropy Source Validation FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code IV Initialisation Vector KAS-ECC Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Scheme (ECDH) KAS-FCC Finite Field Key Agreement Scheme (DH) KAT Known Answer Test KDF Key Derivation Function NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding PAA Processor Algorithm Accelerator PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards PSP Public Security Parameter PUB Publication RAM Random Access Memory RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman Public Key Algorithm SP Special Publication SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SSP Sensitive Security Parameter TOEPP Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter VNF Virtual Network Function CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 7 of 35 1 General 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Senetas Corporation Ltd. CE Crypto Module v5.5.0. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the module operates to meet the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements. The CE Crypto Module is used in a range of Senetas encryption appliances. The vendor distributes under their own Senetas brand, and jointly with their master worldwide distributor, Thales SA. FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. Based on four security levels for cryptographic modules, this standard identifies requirements in twelve sections. For more information about the NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) and the FIPS 140-3 standard, visit www.nist.gov/cmvp. This Security Policy, using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification, describes how the CE Crypto Module complies with the twelve sections of the standard. In this document, the CE Crypto Module is more generally referred to as “the module”. This Security Policy contains only non-proprietary information. Any other documentation associated with FIPS 140-3 conformance testing and validation is proprietary and confidential to Senetas Corporation Ltd. and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For more information describing the module and associated platforms, visit https://www.senetas.com. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 8 of 35 1.2 Security Levels The module meets the overall Security Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The table below reflects the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas. Section Title Security Level 1 General 1 2 Cryptographic module specification 1 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1 4 Roles, services, and authentication 1 5 Software/Firmware security 1 6 Operational environment 1 7 Physical security 1 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 1 10 Self-tests 1 11 Life-cycle assurance 1 12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A Overall Level 1 Table 1: Security Levels CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 9 of 35 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description Purpose and Use: The CE Crypto Module version 5.5.0 is a firmware cryptographic module running on a multi-chip standalone general- purpose compute platform. The module provides low-level cryptographic primitives to the overall platform and its functions. The Module exists as a number of shared libraries and is linked against various encryption applications to supply all cryptographic operations as required by those applications. Module Type: Firmware Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Boundary and Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The CE Crypto Module cryptographic boundary and TOEPP are depicted in the diagram below. The cryptographic boundary encompasses the libcypernet, libcrypto, entropy and selftest libraries and is defined by the innermost cyan block in the diagram. The TOEPP encompasses the host general-purpose computing platform that the module is installed on and is defined by the outermost cyan block in the diagram. Figure 1 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 10 of 35 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): Package or File Name Software/ Firmware Version Features Integrity Test libcyphernet.so, libcrypto.so, selftest, libjitterentropy.so 5.5.0 SHA2-256 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Operating System Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host OS Version(s) Debian Linux v11 Dell VEP4600 Intel Xeon D-2145NT (Skylake) Yes 5.5.0 Debian Linux v11 Dell VEP4600 Intel Xeon D-2145NT (Skylake) No 5.5.0 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Operating System Hardware Platform Debian Linux v11 Dell VEL1485 with Intel Atom C3000 (Goldmont) CPU Debian Linux v11 CONTEC CPS-BXC-200 with Intel Atom x7-E3950 CPU Debian Linux v11 (VNF/CNF) Dell VEP4600 with Intel Xeon D-2145NT (Skylake) CPU Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. 2.3 Excluded Components None 2.4 Modes of Operation Modes List and Description: The module only supports an approved mode of operation. Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator FIPS mode The module only supports an approved mode of operation. Approved Pre-Operational flag reset (Global) Table 5: Modes List and Description 2.5 Algorithms Approved Algorithms: The module implements the approved algorithms in the table below. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 11 of 35 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC A4648 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CFB128 A4648 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CTR A4648 Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 128 Counter Tests Performed - Yes SP 800-38A AES-GCM A4648 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 256 Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96 IV Length - IV Length: 96 Payload Length - Payload Length: 120, 128, 248, 256, 0 AAD Length - AAD Length: 0, 120, 128, 248, 256 SP 800-38D ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4648 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates FIPS 186-4 ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4) A4648 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4648 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4648 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-4 Hash DRBG A4648 Prediction Resistance - No Supports Reseed - No Mode - SHA2-256 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 512 Nonce - Nonce: 128 Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 0-1024 Increment 8 Additional Input - Additional Input: 0-1024 Increment 8 Returned Bits - 1024 SP 800-90A Rev. 1 HMAC-SHA-1 A4648 MAC - MAC: 160 Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 A4648 MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-384 A4648 MAC - MAC: 384 Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-512 A4648 MAC - MAC: 512 Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 A4648 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation iutId - 123456ABCD Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - Initiator, Responder KDF Methods - oneStepKdf - Auxiliary Function Methods - Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-256 Fixed Info Pattern - literal[abcd1234]||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo SP 800-56A Rev. 3 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 12 of 35 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation Key Length - 256 KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3 A4648 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - MODP-2048 Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation iutId - 123456ABCD Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - Initiator, Responder KDF Methods - oneStepKdf - Auxiliary Function Methods - Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-256 Fixed Info Pattern - literal[abcd1234]||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation Key Length - 256 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KDF SP800-108 A4648 KDF Mode - Counter MAC Mode - HMAC-SHA2-256 Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 256 Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data Counter Length - 32 Supports Empty IV - No Requires Empty IV - No Custom Key In Length - 0 SP 800-108 Rev. 1 KTS-IFC A4648 Function - keyPairGen, partialVal IUT ID - CAFECAFE Modulo - 2048 Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Scheme - KTS-OAEP-basic - KAS Role - initiator, responder Key Transport Method - Hash Algorithms - SHA2-256 Supports Null Associated Data - Yes Associated Data Encoding - concatenation Key Length - 256 SP 800-56B Rev. 2 RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) A4648 Key Generation Mode - B.3.6 Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - Table C.3 Info Generated By Server - No Public Exponent Mode - Fixed Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Private Key Format - Standard FIPS 186-4 RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4) A4648 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048 Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 FIPS 186-4 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4648 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 4096 Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Public Exponent Mode - Fixed Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 FIPS 186-4 Safe Primes Key Generation A4648 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 13 of 35 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference Safe Primes Key Verification A4648 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 SHA-1 A4648 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 A4648 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A4648 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A4648 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA3-256 A3449 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202 Table 6: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The module implements the vendor-affirmed algorithms in the table below. Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG 1 Key Type:Asymmetric N/A SP 800-133rev2 Section 4/Example 1 Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. 2.6 Security Function Implementations The module implements the security functions listed in the table below. Name Type Description Properties Algorithms Symmetric Encryption/Decryption BC-Auth BC-UnAuth AES-CBC: (A4648) AES-CFB128: (A4648) AES-CTR: (A4648) AES-GCM: (A4648) KAS ECC KAS-SSC/KDF Key agreement primitives IG D.F:Scenario 2 path (2) Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4648) KAS FFC KAS-SSC/KDF Key agreement primitives IG D.F:Scenario 2 path (2) Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of security strength KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4648) CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 14 of 35 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms KTS RSA AsymKeyPair-Decap AsymKeyPair-Encap Key encapsulation and un-encapsulation IG D.G:Approved bullet 1 Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of security strength KTS-IFC: (A4648) KTS AES BC-AuthDecrypt BC-AuthEncrypt Authenticated encryption and decryption IG D.G:Approved bullet 2 Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of security strength AES-CFB128: (A4648) Key Length: 256 HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) Message Authentication HMAC MAC Generation and verification of data integrity HMAC-SHA-1: (A4648) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4648) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4648) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4648) SHA-1: (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-384: (A4648) SHA2-512: (A4648) KBKDF KBKDF Generate AES Key- wrapping Key and HMAC keys KDF SP800-108: (A4648) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) DRBG Request DRBG Request random data from DRBG Hash DRBG: (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) Entropy Source ENT-Cond ENT-ESV Request Entropy SHA3-256: (A3449) Signature Generation RSA DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4): (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) Signature Verification RSA DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-384: (A4648) SHA2-512: (A4648) Signature Generation ECDSA DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-384: (A4648) SHA2-512: (A4648) Signature Verification ECDSA DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-384: (A4648) SHA2-512: (A4648) Generate Secure Hash SHA SHA-1: (A4648) SHA2-256: (A4648) SHA2-384: (A4648) SHA2-512: (A4648) CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 15 of 35 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms Generate Asymmetric Keys 1 (RSA) AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generate an asymmetric key pair SP 800-133rev2 Sections 5.1:Asymmetric key generation using unmodified DRBG output RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4): (A4648) Hash DRBG: (A4648) Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generate an asymmetric key pair SP 800-133rev2 Sections 5.1 and 5.2:Asymmetric key generation using unmodified DRBG output ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4648) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A4648) Hash DRBG: (A4648) Generate Asymmetric Keys 3 (DH) AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generate an asymmetric key pair SP 800-133rev2 Sections 5.2:Asymmetric key generation using unmodified DRBG output Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4648) Safe Primes Key Verification: (A4648) Hash DRBG: (A4648) Table 8: Security Function Implementations 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information AES-GCM Key and IV generation for TLS Whilst the module does not provide the TLS protocol (this protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP) itself, it does supply the underlying cryptographic functionality required by TLS including AES-GCM. IG C.H Scenario 1a applies: • The module conforms to TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in SP 800-52rev2, Section 3.3.1. • When the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key according to RFC 5246. • In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. 2.8 RBG and Entropy An approved NIST [SP800-90A] deterministic random bit generator using a hash based DRBG (SHA-256) is used. The DRBG is seeded via a Linux Inter Process Communication (IPC) pipe, which in turn is filled via a user space daemon that utilises the software-based CPU jitter library (https://www.chronox.de/jent.html). The user space daemon ensures a watermark entropy pool is maintained for seeding the DRBG. Based on testing and analysis, the estimated minimum amount of entropy per output bit is 1.0 bits. The overall amount of generated entropy meets the required security strength of 256 bits based on the entropy per bit and the amount of entropy requested by the module. Cert Number Vendor Name E49 Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet) Table 9: Entropy Certificates Name Type Operational Environment Sample Size Entropy per Sample Conditioning Component Senetas CPU Jitter Entropy Source Non-Physical Intel® Xeon® D-2145NT (Skylake) 256 bits Full Entropy SHA3-256 (A3449) Table 10: Entropy Sources CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 16 of 35 2.9 Key Generation Asymmetric RSA and ECDSA keys are generated in accordance with FIPS186-4. Symmetric keys are generated using the SP 800-108rev1 compliant KDF function. 2.10 Key Establishment The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS. The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KTS. 2.11 Industry Protocols CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 17 of 35 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces As a firmware only module, the module does not have any physical ports. Any reference to physical ports refers to that hardware on which the module is operating and outside of the cryptographic boundary. With regard to logical interfaces, the cryptographic API (C programming language) delineates the module interfaces. Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes N/A Data Input API call variables. Data read from variables passed in the API. N/A Data Output API return variables. Data written to user supplied variables or pointers in the API. N/A Control Input API function calls. The API function called and the parameters by which it is invoked. N/A Status Output API return values. The return value of the invoked API call. N/A Power Table 11: Ports and Interfaces Note 1: The Control Output interface was intentionally omitted from this table, as the module does not implement it. 3.2 Data Privacy During the pre-operational self-test phase the API is unavailable to the user and data cannot be input to or output from the module prior to successful completion of the self-tests. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 18 of 35 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods N/A for this module. 4.2 Roles The cryptographic module supports a single role of Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer has access to all approved services. Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Role CO Table 12: Roles 4.3 Approved Services The module supports the approved services listed in the table below. Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access AES Encryption/ Decryption Status API call parameters, AES Keys and cipher/plain text Status, cipher/plain text Symmetric Encryption/Decryption Crypto Officer - AES Keys: W,E RSA Key Generation Status API call parameters Status, RSA Private and RSA Public Keys Generate Asymmetric Keys 1 (RSA) Crypto Officer - RSA Private Keys: G,R - RSA Public Keys: G,R RSA Signature Generation and Verification Status API call parameters, RSA Private and RSA Public Keys, message Status, Signature Signature Generation RSA Signature Verification RSA Crypto Officer - RSA Private Keys: W,E - RSA Public Keys: W,E ECDSA Key Generation Status API call parameters Status, ECDSA Private and ECDSA Public Keys Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) Crypto Officer - ECDSA Private Keys: G,R - ECDSA Public Keys: G,R ECDSA Signature Generation and Verification Status API call parameters, ECDSA Private and ECDSA Public Keys, message Status, Signature Signature Generation ECDSA Signature Verification ECDSA Crypto Officer - ECDSA Private Keys: W,E - ECDSA Public Keys: W,E ECDH Key Agreement Status API call parameters Status, Agreed Key KAS ECC Crypto Officer - ECDHE Private Keys: R,W,E - ECDHE Public Keys: R,W,E - ECDHE Shared Secret: G CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 19 of 35 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access DH Key Generation Status API call parameters Status, DH Key Pair Generate Asymmetric Keys 3 (DH) Crypto Officer - Diffie Hellman Private Keys: G,R - Diffie Hellman Public Keys: G,R DH Key Agreement Status API call parameters Status, Agreed Key KAS FFC Crypto Officer - Diffie Hellman Private Keys: R,W,E - Diffie Hellman Public Keys: R,W,E - Diffie Hellman Shared Secret: G Secure Hash Generation Status API call parameters, message Status, Hash Generate Secure Hash Crypto Officer HMAC Generation and Verification Status API call parameters, HMAC key, message Status, HMAC Message Authentication HMAC Crypto Officer - HMAC Key: W,E Random Number Generation Status API call parameters Status, Random numbers DRBG Request Entropy Source Crypto Officer - DRBG Entropy Input and Nonce: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG V and C internal state parameters: G,E Key Based Key Derivation Function Status API call parameters, KBKDF Key Derivation Key Status, Derived Key KBKDF Crypto Officer - KBKDF Key Derivation Key: W,E - AES Key- wrapping Key: G,R - HMAC Key: G,R RSA Key Encapsulation/ Un-encapsulation Status API call parameters, RSA Public and RSA Private Keys, AES key to be en/un-capsulated Status, en/un- encapsulated AES key KTS RSA Crypto Officer - RSA Private Keys: W,E - RSA Public Keys: W,E AES Key Wrapping/ Unwrapping Status API call parameters, AES Key-wrapping Key, AES Key to be un/wrapped Status, un/wrapped AES key KTS AES Crypto Officer - AES Key- wrapping Key: W,E Self-test Run self-tests N/A API call parameters Status (Test results: Pass/Fail) None Crypto Officer Show Status API call return code N/A API call parameters Status None Crypto Officer CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 20 of 35 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Show Module Info (Show Version) API call (inventory), module version number and description N/A API call parameters Status (Module version number and description) None Crypto Officer Zeroisation Zeroise all unprotected SSPs and key components within the module N/A API call parameters N/A None Crypto Officer - AES Keys: Z - RSA Private Keys: Z - RSA Public Keys: Z - ECDSA Private Keys: Z - ECDSA Public Keys: Z - ECDHE Private Keys: Z - ECDHE Public Keys: Z - ECDHE Shared Secret: Z - Diffie Hellman Private Keys: Z - Diffie Hellman Public Keys: Z - Diffie Hellman Shared Secret: Z - DRBG Entropy Input and Nonce: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG V and C internal state parameters: Z - KBKDF Key Derivation Key: Z - AES Key- wrapping Key: Z - HMAC Key: Z Table 13: Approved Services The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 21 of 35 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module does not support loading of external firmware. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 22 of 35 5 Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques The approved SHA-256 algorithm implemented in the module is used to verify the integrity of all components within the cryptographic boundary of the module. If this integrity test fails, the module stays in the pre-operational state, preventing access to the API and all cryptographic services. 5.2 Initiate on Demand The user can execute the Software/Firmware Integrity Test on demand by rebooting the module’s host platform. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 23 of 35 6 Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements The module is designed to operate as a component of a larger general-purpose operating system. The operational environment is non-modifiable. Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable How Requirements are Satisfied: As per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 7.6.3: • The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. • The host operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that prevent uncontrolled access to the CSPs and uncontrolled modification of the SSPs. This ensures that direct access to SSPs is restricted to the cryptographic module and the trusted parts of the operational environment. • Processes that are spawned by the cryptographic module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 24 of 35 7 Physical Security The module is a firmware module with a multi-chip standalone cryptographic embodiment. The module's host platform provides production-grade components and chassis, using standard passivation. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 25 of 35 8 Non-Invasive Security Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 26 of 35 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas The module’s SSP storage areas are detailed in the table below. Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type RAM Temporary storage of SSPs in main dynamic memory. Dynamic Table 14: Storage Areas 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The module’s SSP input-output methods are detailed in the table below. Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type SFI or Algorithm API Call Input Calling Application RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic API Call Output RAM Calling Application Plaintext Manual Electronic Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods The module’s SSP zeroisation methods are detailed in the table below. Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Power Cycle Zeroization will be initiated immediately upon a module power cycle. All SSPs are stored in volatile memory (RAM) and will be destroyed by power cycling the module. Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs The module’s SSPs are detailed in the two tables below. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By AES Keys 128 bits, 256 bits - 128 bits, 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP Symmetric Encryption/Decryption RSA Private Keys 2048 bits - 112 bits Asymmetric Key - CSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 1 (RSA) KTS RSA Signature Generation RSA RSA Public Keys 2048 bits - 112 bits Asymmetric Key - PSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 1 (RSA) KTS RSA Signature Verification RSA ECDSA Private Keys P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Asymmetric Key - CSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) Signature Generation ECDSA CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 27 of 35 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By ECDSA Public Keys P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Asymmetric Key - PSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) Signature Verification ECDSA ECDHE Private Keys P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Asymmetric Key - CSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) KAS ECC ECDHE Public Keys P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Asymmetric Key - PSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 2 (EC) KAS ECC ECDHE Shared Secret P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS ECC Diffie Hellman Private Keys 2048 bits - 112 bits Asymmetric Key - CSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 3 (DH) KAS FFC Diffie Hellman Public Keys 2048 bits - 112 bits Asymmetric Key - PSP Generate Asymmetric Keys 3 (DH) KAS FFC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret 2048 bits - 112 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS FFC DRBG Entropy Input and Nonce Used as input for SP 800- 90Ar1 Hash_DRBG 384 bits - Input to DRBG - CSP Entropy Source DRBG Request DRBG Seed Used as input for SP 800- 90Ar1 Hash_DRBG 440 bits - Input to DRBG - CSP DRBG Request DRBG Request DRBG V and C internal state parameters The V and C parameters store the internal state of the SP 800-90rev1 DRBG. 440 bits - DRBG State Variables - CSP DRBG Request DRBG Request KBKDF Key Derivation Key The KBKDF Key Derivation Key is used to separately derive the AES Key-wrapping Key and the HMAC key using an SP 800-108 compliant KDF. 256 bits - Key Derivation Key - CSP KBKDF AES Key- wrapping Key 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP KBKDF KTS AES HMAC Key The HMAC keys are used to protect the integrity of messages. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP KBKDF Message Authentication HMAC Table 17: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs AES Keys API Call Input RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 28 of 35 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs RSA Private Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle RSA Public Keys:Paired With RSA Public Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle RSA Private Keys:Paired With ECDSA Private Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle ECDSA Public Keys:Paired With ECDSA Public Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle ECDSA Private Keys:Paired With ECDHE Private Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle ECDHE Public Keys:Paired With ECDHE Public Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle ECDHE Private Keys:Paired With ECDHE Shared Secret RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle ECDHE Private Keys:Agreed Using ECDHE Public Keys:Agreed Using Diffie Hellman Private Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle Diffie Hellman Public Keys:Paired With Diffie Hellman Public Keys API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle Diffie Hellman Private Keys:Paired With Diffie Hellman Shared Secret RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle Diffie Hellman Private Keys:Agreed Using Diffie Hellman Public Keys:Agreed Using DRBG Entropy Input and Nonce RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle DRBG Entropy Input and Nonce:Created From DRBG V and C internal state parameters RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle DRBG Seed:Associated With KBKDF Key Derivation Key API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle AES Key-wrapping Key API Call Input RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle KBKDF Key Derivation Key:Derived From CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 29 of 35 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs API Call Output HMAC Key API Call Input API Call Output RAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle KBKDF Key Derivation Key:Derived From Table 18: SSP Table 2 9.5 Transitions Please see the latest revision of SP 800-131 and CMVP Programmatic Transitions page for transitions that may affect this module. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 30 of 35 10 Self-Tests 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module’s pre-operational self-tests are detailed in the table below. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details SHA2-256 (A4648) Approved Integrity Technique SW/FW Integrity Module becomes operational A 32-byte SHA2-256 hash is used to verify the integrity of all components within the cryptographic software when the module is powered up and on demand by issuing the reboot command. The SHA256 algorithm is tested using a KAT prior to the Software/ Firmware integrity test running. Upon any file error the system will not transition from the pre-operational state to the operational state Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The module performs a set of conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests. These conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests run in the pre-operational state. The cryptographic algorithm used to perform the approved integrity technique for the Pre-Operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test (listed in the table above), is tested using a Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test (CAST) prior to the Pre- Operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test. The module’s conditional self-tests are detailed in the table below. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-CBC (A4648) 128-bit, 256- bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up AES-CFB128 (A4648) 128-bit, 256- bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up AES-GCM (A4648) 128-bit, 256- bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) P-256, P-384, P-521 KAT CAST Module becomes operational SigGen Power Up ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4648) P-256, P-384, P-521 KAT CAST Module becomes operational SigVer Power Up Hash DRBG (A4648) 256-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational SP 800-90 A Section 11.3 (Instantiate, Reseed, Generate and Un-instantiate) Power Up HMAC-SHA-1 (A4648) 160-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational MAC Power Up HMAC-SHA2-256 (A4648) 256-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational MAC Power Up HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4648) 384-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational MAC Power Up HMAC-SHA2-512 (A4648) 512-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational MAC Power Up KAS-ECC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4648) P-256, P-384, P-521 KAT CAST Module becomes operational SP 800-56Arev3 Key Agreement Power Up CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. 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Page 31 of 35 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions KAS-FFC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4648) 2048-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational SP 800-56Arev3 Key Agreement Power Up KDF SP800-108 (A4648) 256-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Key Derivation Power Up KTS-IFC (A4648) 2048-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) 2048-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Sign/ Verify Power Up RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4648) 2048-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Sign/ Verify Power Up SHA-1 (A4648) 160-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Secure Hash Power Up SHA2-256 (A4648) 256-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Secure Hash Power Up SHA2-384 (A4648) 384-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Secure Hash Power Up SHA2-512 (A4648) 512-bit KAT CAST Module becomes operational Secure Hash Power Up ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) P-256, P-384, P-521 PCT PCT API Return Code Key Pair Generation Key Pair Generation RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) 2048-bit PCT PCT API Return Code Key Pair Generation Key Pair Generation Safe Primes Key Generation (A4648) 2048-bit PCT PCT API Return Code Key Pair Generation Key Pair Generation Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) FD CAST Module becomes operational SP 800-90B Section 4 Power Up, Continuous, On Demand Repeat Count Test (RCT) FD CAST Module becomes operational SP 800-90B Section 4 Power Up, Continuous, On Demand Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information The Crypto Officer can initiate the Pre-Operational Self-Test and Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests on- demand and for periodic testing of the module by issuing a reboot of the module’s host operating system The module’s periodic self-tests are detailed in the table below. Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method SHA2-256 (A4648) Approved Integrity Technique SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually by power cycling module Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 32 of 35 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-CBC (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module AES-CFB128 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module AES-GCM (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module Hash DRBG (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module HMAC-SHA-1 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module HMAC-SHA2-256 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module HMAC-SHA2-512 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module KDF SP800-108 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module KTS-IFC (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module SHA-1 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module SHA2-256 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module SHA2-384 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module SHA2-512 (A4648) KAT CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A4648) PCT PCT On Demand After key pair generation RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4648) PCT PCT On Demand After key pair generation CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 33 of 35 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Safe Primes Key Generation (A4648) PCT PCT On Demand After key pair generation Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) FD CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module Repeat Count Test (RCT) FD CAST On Demand Manually by power cycling module Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States The module’s self-test error states are described in the table below. Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator Pre- operational The module will remain in the pre-operational state until the pre-operational self-tests have successfully run. Cryptographic functions are inhibited while the module is in this state. * Pre-Operational Software/ Firmware Integrity test failure * Cryptographic KAT failure * RCT/APT failure Attempt to recover by rebooting the module. pre- operational flag Soft Error Service operation aborted and error code returned. System state unchanged. * PCT failure Re-run service and observe return code API return code Table 23: Error States 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests The Crypto Officer can run the pre-operational self-tests on demand by power cycling the host platform. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 34 of 35 11 Life-Cycle Assurance 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The module is part of a larger Senetas encryption platform distributed on a range of comparable compute devices as a complete Linux distribution and set of services, and as such is installed as part of the encompassing Senetas encryption application. The development and operational processes around which the module is supported are strictly controlled across the complete development life cycle and supply chain and externally audited for correctness. 11.2 Administrator Guidance Once powered on the module will run the pre-operational self-tests. On successful completion of the tests the module will automatically transition to the operational state (Approved mode) and the API will be available. 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance There is no non-Administrator guidance for the module. 11.4 End of Life The module does not store SSPs persistently and can be sanitised by zeroisation. CE Crypto Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Senetas Corp. Ltd. Page 35 of 35 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks 12.1 Attack List The requirements in this section are Not Applicable.