IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 2/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
Table of Contents
References................................................................................................................................................... 5
Acronyms and definitions ........................................................................................................................ 6
1 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 IDPrime Applet ............................................................................................. 8
1.2 FIDO Applet 8
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................... 10
2.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary................................................. 10
2.1.1 PIN Assignments and Contact Dimensions.............................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Specification....................................................................................... 12
3.1 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary .................................................. 12
3.2 Versions and mode of operation ..................................................................... 13
3.3 Cryptographic Functionality........................................................................... 18
4 Module Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................... 21
4.1 Platform Critical Security Parameters ............................................................... 21
4.2 IDPrime Applet Critical Security Parameters....................................................... 22
4.3 FIDO Applet Critical Security Parameters .......................................................... 23
4.4 IDPrime Applet Public Keys ........................................................................... 23
4.5 FIDO Applet Public Keys ............................................................................... 24
5 Roles, Authentication and Services........................................................................................ 25
5.1 Secure Channel Protocol (SCP) Authentication (CO) ............................................ 25
5.2 IDPrime User Authentication (IUSR) ................................................................. 26
5.3 IDPrime Card Application Administrator Authentication (ICAA) ............................... 26
5.4 IDPrime Init Key Authentication (Initialization Officer Role) .................................... 27
5.5 FIDO User Authentication (FUSR) .................................................................... 27
5.6 Platform Services........................................................................................ 27
5.7 IDPRIME Services ....................................................................................... 29
5.8 FIDO Services 35
6 Finite State Model ..................................................................................................................... 36
7 Physical Security Policy............................................................................................................ 36
8 Operational Environment.......................................................................................................... 37
9 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) .............................................. 37
10 Self-test....................................................................................................................................... 38
10.1 Power-on Self-test....................................................................................... 38
10.2 Conditional Self-tests................................................................................... 39
10.3 Reducing the number of Known Answer Tests.................................................... 39
11 Design Assurance ..................................................................................................................... 39
11.1 Configuration Management............................................................................ 39
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 3/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
11.2 Delivery and Operation ................................................................................. 39
11.3 Guidance Documents................................................................................... 39
11.4 Language Level .......................................................................................... 39
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ........................................................................................... 40
13 Security Rules and Guidance.................................................................................................. 40
Table of Tables
Table 1 – References ................................................................................................. 6
Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions................................................................................. 6
Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements ............................................................... 7
Table 4 – World Combi RLT Module - Physical Ports and Corresponding Logical Interfaces ..............11
Table 5 – DFN8 Contact Module - Physical Ports and Corresponding Logical Interfaces...................11
Table 6 - Voltage and Frequency Ranges .........................................................................11
Table 7 – Contactless voltage and Frequency Ranges ..........................................................11
Table 8 – Tags for tracking data (Approved Mode)...............................................................13
Table 9 – Card Production Life Cycle data ........................................................................14
Table 10 – Versions and Mode of Operations Indicators ........................................................16
Table 11 – IDPrime Applet Version and Software Version imput data .........................................17
Table 12 – IDPrime Applet Version returned value...............................................................17
Table 13 – IDPrime Software Version returned Values ..........................................................17
Table 14 – FIDO Applet Version ....................................................................................17
Table 15 – FIDO Applet Version returned value ..................................................................18
Table 16 – List of the algorithms/modes utilized by the module ................................................19
Table 17 – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions........................................20
Table 18 - Platform Critical Security Parameters .................................................................21
Table 19 – IDPrime Applet Critical Security Parameters.........................................................22
Table 20 – FIDO Applet Critical Security Parameters............................................................23
Table 21 – IDPrime Applet Public Keys............................................................................24
Table 22 – FIDO Applet Public Keys ...............................................................................24
Table 23 - Role Description..........................................................................................25
Table 24 - Unauthenticated Services ..............................................................................27
Table 25 – Authenticated Card Manager Services...............................................................28
Table 26 – Platform CSP Access by Service......................................................................29
Table 27 – IDPrime Applet Services and CSP Usage............................................................32
Table 28 – MSPNP applet Services ................................................................................32
Table 29 – IDPrime CSP Access by Service ......................................................................34
Table 30 – FIDO applet Services ..................................................................................35
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 4/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
Table 31 – FIDO CSP Access by Service .........................................................................36
Table 32 – Power-On Self-Test .....................................................................................38
Table of Figures
Figure 1– Physical form and Cryptographic Boundary ...........................................................10
Figure 2 - Module Block Diagram...................................................................................12
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
References
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[GlobalPlatform]
GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1, January 2011,
http://www.globalplatform.org
[ISO 7816]
ISO/IEC 7816-1:1998 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts -- Part 1:
Physical characteristics
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 2: Cards with
contacts -- Dimensions and location of the contacts
ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 3: Cards with
contacts -- Electrical interface and transmission protocols
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange
[ISO 14443]
Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards
ISO/IEC 14443-1:2008 Part 1: Physical characteristics
ISO/IEC 14443-2:2010 Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface
ISO/IEC 14443-3:2011 Part 3: Initialization and anticollision
ISO/IEC 14443-4:2008 Part 4: Transmission protocol
[JavaCard]
Java Card 3.0.5 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification
Java Card 3.0.5 Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification
Java Card 3.0.5 Application Programming Interface
Published by Sun Microsystems, October 2015.
[SP800-131A]
NIST Special Publication 800-131A revision 2, Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019
[SP 800-133]
NIST Special Publication 800-133, revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, June 2020
[SP 800-38B]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the
CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[SP 800-90A]
NIST Special Publication 800-90A revision 1, Recommendation for the Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised), June 2015
[SP 800-67]
NIST Special Publication 800-67 revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (Triple-DES) Block Cipher, November 2017
[FIPS113] NIST, Computer Data Authentication, FIPS Publication 113, 30 May 1985.
[FIPS 197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001.
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[FIPS 186-4] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July, 2013
[SP 800-56A]
NIST Special Publication 800-56A revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[SP 800-56B]
NIST Special Publication 800-56B revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, March 2019
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 6/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS 180-4] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015
[SP 800-38F]
NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012
[IG]
NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, last updated Nov 5, 2021
[MD] Microsoft, MD – Smart Card Mini Driver v7.07, April 20th , 2017
[CTAP] Fido Alliance, CTAP – Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP), January 30th , 2019
[U2F] Fido Alliance, U2F– Universal 2nd Factor, July 11th , 2017
Table 1 – References
Acronyms and definitions
Acronym Definition
GP Global Platform
CVC Card Verifiable Certificate
CTAP Client To Authenticator Protocol
U2F Universal 2nd Factor
Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 7/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Thales IDCore3130 platform and the IDPrime3930 (v4.5)
with FIDO2 (v2.0) applets, IDPrime 3930 FIDO (contact and contactless) and herein denoted as
Cryptographic Module, Module, or CM. The Cryptographic Module or CM, validated to FIPS 140-2 overall
Level 2, is a “contact and contactless” secure controller module implementing the Global Platform
operational environment, with Card Manager, the IDPrime applet (associated to MSPNP applet V1.2) and
FIDO applet.
The Module is a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a
firmware load function to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this
validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is
out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements
The CM implementation is compliant with:
 [ISO 7816] Parts 1-4
 [JavaCard]
 [GlobalPlatform]
 [MD]
 [CTAP]
 [U2F]
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
1.1 IDPrime Applet
IDPrime Applet (V4.5) is a Java applet that provides all the necessary functions to integrate a smart card
in a public key infrastructure (PKI) system, suitable for identity and corporate security applications. It is also
useful for storing information about the cardholder and any sensitive data. IDPrime Applet implements
state–of–the–art security and conforms to the latest standards for smart cards and PKI applications. It is
also fully compliant with digital signature law.
The IDPrime Applet, designed for use on JavaCard 3.0.5 and Global Platform 2.2.1 compliant smart cards.
The main features of IDPrime Applet are as follows:
 Digital signatures—these are used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of a message. (RSA,
ECDSA)
 Storage of sensitive data based on security attributes
 PIN management.
 Secure messaging based on the AES algorithms.
 Public key cryptography, allowing for RSA keys and ECDSA keys
 Storage of digital certificates—these are issued by a trusted body known as a certification
authority (CA) and are typically used in PKI authentication schemes.
 CVC verification
 Decryption RSA , ECDH
 On board key generation (RSA, ECDSA)
 Mutual authentication between IDPrime Applet and the terminal (ECDH)
 Support of integrity on data to be signed.
 Secure Key Injection according to Microsoft scheme.
 Touch Sense feature (not available on smart card, only on Token)
 PIN Single Sign On (PIN SSO)
 Reinit feature
 Extended APDU support
MSPNP applet is associated to IDPrime applet and offers:
 GUID tag reading, defined in Microsoft Mini Driver specification.
1.2 FIDO Applet
FIDO Applet (V2.0) is a Java applet that provides all the necessary functions for an authenticator device,
suitable for identity and corporate security applications. FIDO Applet implements state–of–the–art security
and conforms to the latest standards for smart cards and FIDO Certification (Level 1).
The FIDO Applet is designed for use on JavaCard 3.0.5 and Global Platform 2.2.1 compliant smart cards.
The main features of FIDO Applet are as follows:
 Multi-factor authenticator
 Digital signatures - used to ensure integrity and authenticity of sensitive date - (ECDSA)
 PIN & Key Handle management.
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 9/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
 Session Keys based on the AES algorithm.
 Public key cryptography, allowing for ECDSA keys
 Storage of digital certificates (Attestation Certificate)
 On board key generation (ECDH)
 Test of User Presence and verification
 Cloning Detection
 Extended APDU support
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 10/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
2.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, passport, USB key, secure element etc.,
with a contact plate connection and/or RF antenna. The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure
1 (to scale). The cryptographic boundary is defined as the surfaces and edges of the packages as shown
in Table 4 and figure 1. The Module relies on [ISO 7816] and/or [ISO 14443] card readers as input/output
devices.
WORLD Combi RLT module (SLE78CLFX400VPH - A1714221)
Oblong punching
Top View – Combi Plate Bottom View – Black Epoxy with RLT technology
SMDR DFN8 - MFF module (SLE78CLFX400VPH - A1633310)
Top View – DFN8 Plate
Bottom View – DFN8 Plate
Figure 1– Physical form and Cryptographic Boundary
2.1.1 PIN Assignments and Contact Dimensions
WORLD Combi RLT module has access to contact and contactless interfaces.
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 11/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
Contact No. Description Logical interface type
VCC Supply voltage Power
RST Reset signal Control in
CLK Clock signal Control in
GND Ground Power
I/O Input/output Data in, data out, control in, status out
LA Antenna coil connection Power, Data in, Data out, Control in, Status out
LB Antenna coil connection Power, Data in, Data out, Control in, Status out
Table 4 – World Combi RLT Module - Physical Ports and Corresponding Logical Interfaces
SMDR DFN8 module has only access to contact interfaces.
Contact No. Description Logical interface type
VCC Supply voltage Power
RST Reset signal Control in
CLK Clock signal Control in
GND Ground Power
I/O Input/output Data in, data out, control in, status out
Table 5 – DFN8 Contact Module - Physical Ports and Corresponding Logical Interfaces
For contact interface operation, the Module conforms to [ISO 7816] part 1 and part 2. The electrical
signals and transmission protocols follow the [ISO 7816] part 3. The conditions of use are the following:
Conditions Range
Voltage 1.8V, 3 V and 5.5 V
Frequency 1MHz to 10MHz
Table 6 - Voltage and Frequency Ranges
For contactless interface operation, the Module conforms to [ISO 14443] part 1 for physical
connections, and to [ISO 14443] parts 2, 3 and 4 for radio frequencies and transmission protocols.
The conditions of use are the following:
Conditions Range
Supported bit rate 106 Kbits/s, 212 Kbits/s, 424 Kbits/s, 848 Kbits/s
Operating field Between 1.5 A/m and 7.5 A/m rms
Frequency 13.56 MHz +- 7kHz
Table 7 – Contactless voltage and Frequency Ranges
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 12/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
3 Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 2 below depicts the Module operational environment and applets.
Hardware
Native / Hardware Abstraction layer
Timers
Sensors
RAM
ROM
EEPROM
MMU
CPU
Power
Mgmt
Clock
Mgmt
HW RNG
RSA / ECC
Engine
CRC
ISO 7816
(UART)
DES
Engine
AES Engine
CLK
VCC, GND
Reset Mgmt
RST
Memory
Manager
Communication
(I/O)
Crypto Libraries
Virtual Machine
JC 2.2.2
Runtime Environment
JC 2.2.2
API
JavaCard 2.2.2 /
Gemalto Proprietary
Card Manager
GP API
2.1.1
IC
Layer
IDCore30
Javacard
Platform
Layer
Applet
Layer
IDPrimeMD
Applet
Hardware
Native / Hardware Abstraction layer
IDPrime3930
Timers
Sensors
RAM
FLASH
EEPROM
MMU
CPU
(SLE78)
Power
Mgmt
Clock
Mgmt
HW RNG
RSA / ECC
Engine
CRC
ISO 7816
(UART)
DES
Engine
AES Engine
CLK
VCC, GND
Reset Mgmt
RST
Memory
Manager
Communication
(I/O)
Crypto Libraries
Virtual Machine
JC 3.0.5
Runtime Environment
JC 3.0.5
API
JavaCard 3.0.5 /
Gemalto Proprietary
Card Manager
GP API
2.2.1
IC
Layer
IDCore
3130
Javacard
platform
layer
Applet
Layer
ISO 14443
(RF)
LA, LB (RF)
FIDO
MsPnP
Figure 2 - Module Block Diagram
The CM supports [ISO7816] T=0 and T=1, and also [ISO14443] T=CL communication protocols.
The CM provides services to both external devices and internal applets as the IDPrime, MsPnP and
FIDO.
Applets, as IDPrime and FIDO, access module functionalities via internal API entry points that are not
exposed to external entities. External devices have access to CM services by sending APDU commands.
The CM provides an execution sandbox for the IDPrime and FIDO applets and performs the requested
services according to its roles and services security policy.
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 13/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
The CM inhibits all data output via the data output interface while the module is in error state and during
self-tests.
The JavaCard API is an internal interface, available to applets. Only applet services are available at the
card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary).
The Javacard Runtime Environment implements the dispatcher, registry, loader, logical channel and RMI
functionalities.
The Virtual Machine implements the byte code interpreter, firewall, exception management and byte code
optimizer functionalities.
The Card Manager is the card administration entity – allowing authorized users to manage the card content,
keys, and life cycle states.
The Memory Manager implements services such as memory access, allocation, deletion, garbage collector.
The Communication handler deals with the implementation of ATR/ATS, PSS, T=0 T=1 and T=CL
protocols.
The Cryptography Libraries implement the algorithms listed in Table 16 – List of the algorithms/modes
utilized by the module.
3.2 Versions and mode of operation
Hardware: SLE78CLFX400VPH (A1714221), SLE78CLFX400VPH (A1633310)
Firmware: IDCore3130 - Build12G, IDPrime 3930 Applet V4.5.0F, MSPNP Applet V1.2, FIDO
V2.0.4B Applet.
The CM is always in the approved mode of operation. To verify that a CM is in the approved mode of
operation, select the Card Manager and send the GET DATA commands shown below:
Field CLA INS
P1-P2
(Tag)
Le (Expected
response length)
Purpose
Value 00 CA
9F-7F 2A Get CPLC data
01-03 1D
Identification information (proprietary
tag)
Table 8 – Tags for tracking data (Approved Mode)
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 14/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
The CM responds with the following information:
IDPrime 3930 FIDO - CPLC data (tag 9F7F)
Byte Description Value Value meaning
1-2 IC fabricator 4090h Infineon
3-4 IC type 7861 SLE78CLFX400VPH
5-6 Operating system identifier 1291 Thales
7-8
Operating system release date
(YDDD) – Y=Year, DDD=Day in the year
7334 Operating System release Date
9-10 Operating system release level 0100h V1.0
11-12 IC fabrication date xxxxh Filled in during IC manufacturing
13-16 IC serial number xxxxxxxxh Filled in during IC manufacturing
17-18 IC batch identifier xxxxh Filled in during IC manufacturing
19-20 IC module fabricator xxxxh Filled in during module manufacturing
21-22 IC module packaging date xxxxh Filled in during module manufacturing
23-24 ICC manufacturer xxxxh Filled in during module embedding
25-26 IC embedding date xxxxh Filled in during module embedding
27-28 IC pre-personalizer xxxxh Filled in during smartcard preperso
29-30 IC pre-personalization date xxxxh Filled in during smartcard preperso
31-34 IC pre-personalization equipment identifier xxxxxxxxh Filled in during smartcard preperso
35-36 IC personalizer xxxxh Filled in during smartcard personalization
37-38 IC personalization date xxxxh Filled in during smartcard personalization
39-42 IC personalization equipment identifier xxxxxxxxh Filled in during smartcard personalization
Table 9 – Card Production Life Cycle data
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
IDPrime 3930 FIDO - Identification data (tag 0103)
Byte Description Value Value meaning
1 Thales Family Name B0 Javacard
2 Thales OS Name 84 IDCore family
3 Thales Mask Number 65 G286
4 Thales Product Name 66 IDCore3130 for IDPrime 3930 FIDO
5 Thales Flow Version XX XX is the version of the flow:
 01h for flow version 01
6 Thales Filter Set 00  Major nibble: filter family = 00h
 Lower nibble: version of the filter = 00h
7-8 Chip Manufacturer 4090 Infineon
9-10 Chip Version 7861 SLE78CLFX400VPH
11-12 FIPS configuration 8F00
MSByte:
b8 : 1 = conformity to FIPS certificate
b7 : 0 = not applicable
b6 : 0 = not applicable
b5 : 0 = not applicable
b4 : 1 = ECC supported
b3 : 1 = RSA CRT supported
b2 : 1 = RSA STD supported
b1 : 1 = AES supported
LSByte:
b8 .. b5 : 0 = not applicable
b4 : 0 = not applicable (ECC in contactless)
b3 : 0 = not applicable (RSA CRT in contactless)
b2 : 0 = not applicable (RSA STD in contactless)
b1 : 0 = not applicable (AES in contactless)
For instance:
8F 00 = FIPS enable (CT only)–AES-RSA CRT/STD-ECC (Full FIPS)
8D 00 = FIPS enable (CT only)–AES-RSA CRT-ECC (FIPS PK CRT) *
85 00 = FIPS enable (CT only)–AES-RSA CRT (FIPS RSA CRT)
00 00 = FIPS disable (CT only)–No FIPS mode (No FIPS)
(* default configuration)
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
13
FIPS Level for IDPrime
product
02 02 = FIPS Level 2
14-15 Specific chip ID 31 30 31 30 = Combi (IDPrime 3930 FIDO product)
16-29 RFU xx..xxh -
Table 10 – Versions and Mode of Operations Indicators
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
Ref: R1R29508_IDPrime3930-FIDO_001_SP_L2 Rev: 1.2 23/11/2021 Page 17/41
© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
The IDPrime 3930 is identified with an applet version and a software version as follow:
Field CLA INS P1-P2 (Tag) Le (Expected response length) Purpose
Value 00 CA
DF-30 07 Get Applet Version
7F-30 19 Get Software Version
Table 11 – IDPrime Applet Version and Software Version imput data
The Applet version is returned without any TLV format as follows:
IDPrime 3930 – Applet Version Data (tag DF30)
Value Value Meaning
34 2E 35 2E 30 2E 46
Applet Version
Display value = ‘4.5.0.F’
Table 12 – IDPrime Applet Version returned value
The Software Version is returned in TLV format as follows:
IDPrime 3930 – Software Version Data (tag 7F30)
Tag Length
7F30 17
Tag Length Value Value meaning
C0 0E 34 2E 35 2E 30 2E 46
Software Version
Display value = ‘4.5.0.F’
C1 07
49 41 53 20 43 6C 61 73 73
69 63 20 76 34
Applet Label
Display value = ‘IAS Classic v4’
Table 13 – IDPrime Software Version returned Values
The FIDO is identified with an applet version as follow:
Field CLA INS P1-P2 (Tag) Le (Expected response length) Purpose
Value 00 CA DF-4F 07 Get Applet Version
Table 14 – FIDO Applet Version
IDPrime 3930 FIDO
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
The Applet version is returned without any TLV format as follows:
FIDO – Applet Version Data (tag DF4F)
Value Value Meaning
32 2E 30 2E 34 2E 42
Applet Version
Display value = ‘2.0.4.B’
Table 15 – FIDO Applet Version returned value
3.3 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module operating system implements the FIPS Approved and Non-FIPS Approved cryptographic
function listed in Tables below.
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm. The Module supports
128-, 192- and 256-bit key lengths with ECB and CBC encrypt/ decrypt
modes.
A1930
AES CMAC
[SP 800-38B] The Module supports generation and verification with 128-,
192- and 256-bit key lengths.
A1930
CKG
[SP 800-133] Section 6.1, Section 7.1: The Module generates symmetric
keys and seeds to be used in asymmetric key generation directly from
unmodified DRBG output.
Vendor
Affirmed
DRBG [SP 800-90A] Deterministic Random Bits Generator (256-bit security
strength CTR-DRBG based on AES).
A1930
ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4] Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm using the NIST
defined curves.
 Key pair generation: P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves.
 Signature generation: P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves with
SHA-2.
 Signature verification: P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves
(approved SHA sizes of the CM).
A1930
KBKDF [SP 800-108] The Module supports AES CMAC 128-, 192- and 256-bit key
lengths.
A1930
KTS
Use of approved [FIPS 197] AES encryption method with the combination of
approved Authentication method [SP 800-38B] AES CMAC
The Module supports 128-, 192- and 256-bit key lengths. The Module
supports 256-bit key length for Applet Secure Messaging.
A1930
SHA-1
SHA-2
[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard compliant one-way (hash) algorithms.
The Module supports the SHA-1 (160 bits), SHA-2 (224- bit, 256-bit, 384-bit,
512-bit) variants.
A1930
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
Triple-DES
[SP 800-67] Triple Data Encryption Algorithm. The Module supports the 3-
Key options; CBC and ECB decrypt modes. The CM restricts Triple-DES
decryptions to 2^16 per key. After a counter for a given key reach 2^16, the
key is blocked.
A1930
RSA
[FIPS 186-4] [PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS] RSA algorithms.
 Key pair generation using 2048-bit keys.
 Signature generation using 2048-bit keys with SHA-2.
 Signature verification using 1024, 2048-bit keys (approved SHA
sizes of the CM). Note that RSA-1024 verification and the use of
SHA-1 for any RSA verification is allowed for legacy-use only.
A1930
RSA CRT
[FIPS 186-4] [PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS] RSA CRT algorithm.
 Key pair generation using 2048-, 3072- and 4096-bit keys;
 Signature generation using 2048-, 3072- and 4096-bit keys with
SHA-2;
 Signature verification using 1024-, 2048-, 3072- and 4096-bit keys
(approved SHA sizes of the CM). Note that RSA-1024 verification
and the use of SHA-1 for any RSA verification is allowed for legacy-
use only.
A1930
KAS SSC ECC [SP 800-56A] standalone Key Agreement Scheme SSC (section 5.7.1.2:
ephemeral Unified) using the NIST defined curves: P-521.
A1930
KTS-RSA [SP 800-56B] RSA key transport scheme (section 9.2.3 KTS-OAEP-basic)
using 2048-, 3072- and 4096-bit keys.
A1930
DP RSA (CVL) [SP 800-56B] RSA decryption primitive (section 9.2.3 KTS-OAEP-basic)
using 2048-bit keys.
A1930
KDA [SP 800-56C] Key Agreement Scheme Key Derivation function (section 4:
One-step Key Derivation – Option 1 with approved hash function) using the
NIST defined curve: P-521, and SHA-256.
A1930
KAS Use of [SP 800-56A] KAS SSC ECC with the combination of key derivation
function [SP 800-56C] KAS KDF. Provides 128 bits of encryption strength.
A1930
HMAC
[FIPS198-1] Keyed-hash message authentication code using approved
SHA-256 algorithm.
A1930
Table 16 – List of the algorithms/modes utilized by the module
Note: Not all algorithms/modes that appear on the module’s CAVP certificates are utilized by the
module.
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Algorithm Description
RSA key wrap
Key unwrapping using 2048, 3072 or 4096 bit keys.
Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of strength (for
PKCS1 v1.5)
Table 17 – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
The CM includes an uncallable DES implementation. This algorithm is not used and no security claims are
made for its presence in the Module.
FIPS approved security functions used specifically by the IDPrime Applet are:
 DRBG
 AES CMAC
 AES
 Triple-DES
 RSA
 ECDSA
 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
 KAS SSC ECC
 KAS KDF one-step
(Note: no security function is used in MSPNP applet)
FIPS approved security functions used specifically by the FIDO Applet are:
 DRBG
 AES
 ECDSA
 SHA-256
 KAS SSC ECC
 HMAC SHA-256
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4 Module Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the CM are described in this section. All usages of these CSPs by the CM are described
in the services detailed in Section 5. In addition, all keys stored in RAM are zeroized upon power-cycle of
the CM.
4.1 Platform Critical Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
OS-DRBG-EI
1664-bit random drawn by an external entropy source populated during CM
initialization and used as entropy input for the [SP800-90A] DRBG implementation.
Provides at least 256 bits of entropy.
OS-DRBG-STATE
16-byte AES state V and 32-byte AES key (or Nonce) used in the [SP800-90A] CTR
DRBG implementation.
OS-GLOBALPIN
4 to 16 byte Global PIN value managed by the ISD. Character space is not restricted
by the OS. The PIN Policy is managed by applet.
OS-MKDK AES-128 (SCP03) key used to encrypt OS-GLOBALPIN value.
SD-KENC AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) master key used by the CO role to derive SD-SENC.
SD-KMAC AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) master key used by the CO role to derive SD-SMAC.
SD-KDEK
AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) decryption key used by the CO role to decrypt secure
channel data.
SD-SENC
AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Session encryption key used by the CO role to encrypt /
decrypt secure channel data.
SD-SMAC
AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Session MAC key used by the CO role to verify secure
channel data integrity.
DAP-SYM
AES-128 (DAP) key optionally loaded in the field and used to verify the MAC signature
of packages loaded into the Module.
DAP-ASYM
2048-bit public part of RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature verification used
to verify the signature of packages loaded into the Module.
DM-TOKEN-SYM AES-128 Delegate Management Token Symmetric key.
DM-RECEIPT-SYM AES-128 Delegate Management Receipt Symmetric key.
DM-TOKEN-ASYM 2048-bit public part of RSA key pair used for Delegated Management Token
Table 18 - Platform Critical Security Parameters
Keys with the “SD-“ prefix pertain to a Global Platform Security Domain key set. The module supports the
Issuer Security Domain at minimum, and can be configured to support Supplemental Security Domains.
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4.2 IDPrime Applet Critical Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
IDP-SC-SMAC-AES AES 256 Session key used for Secure Messaging (MAC)
IDP-SC-SENC-AES AES 256 Session key used for Secure Messaging (Decryption)
IDP-AS-RSA 2048/3072/4096- private part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature
IDP-AS-ECDSA P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA key pair used for Asymmetric
signature
IDP-AC-RSA 2048/3072/4096- private part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Cipher (key wrap, key
unwrap)
IDP-ECDH-ECC P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDH key pair used for shared key
mechanism
IDP-KG-AS-RSA 2048/3072/4096- private part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IDP-KG-AS-ECDSA P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for
Asymmetric signature
IDP-KG-AC-RSA 2048/3072/4096- private part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric cipher (key
unwrap)
IDP-KG-AC-ECDH P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for shared
key mechanism
IDP-ECDSA-AUTH-
ECC
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA private key used to Authenticate the
card
IDP-SC-DES3 3-Key Triple-DES key used for Admin (ICAA Role) authentication.
IDP-SC-P-SKI-AES AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Key Injection
IDP-SC-T-SKI-AES AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Key Injection
IDP-SC-PIN-TDES 3-Key Triple-DES key used for PIN encryption (PIN History)
IDP-OWNERPIN 4 to 64 byte PIN value managed by the Applet.
IDP-INITK-AES 256bits AES key used to authenticate in IO Role
Table 19 – IDPrime Applet Critical Security Parameters
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4.3 FIDO Applet Critical Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
FID-SC-SMAC-AES AES 256-bit Session key used for Secure Messaging (MAC)
FID-SC-SENC-AES AES 256-bit Session key used for Secure Messaging (Decryption)
FID-KG-AS-ECDSA P-256 private part of the user key pair
FID-AT-ECDSA P-256 private part of the of the authenticator attestation key pair. The public part is stored in
the device attestation certificate
FID-SC-ENC-AES AES authenticator secret key used for encryption and decryption of key handles with AES
CBC
FID-SC-AUTH-HMAC HMAC 128-bit authenticator secret key used for authentication of key handles with HMAC-
SHA256
FID-UV-PIN The reference user verification data (4 to 63 bytes) used to authenticate the user
FID-ECDH-ECC P-256 private part of the ECDH key pair used for shared secret mechanism
FID-TOKEN-NONCE 128 bits nonce used to authenticator client commands in the Client PIN protocol V1
(equivalent to a session PIN)
FID-HMAC-NONCE 256 bits nonce, used to process the hmac-secret extension (for non-Resident Credential)
FID-KG-RK-ECDSA P-256 private part of the user key pair ECDSA for Resident Credential
FID-RK-HMAC-
NONCE
256 bits nonce, used to process the hmac-secret extension for Resident Credential
Table 20 – FIDO Applet Critical Security Parameters
4.4 IDPrime Applet Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
IDP-KA-ECDH
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 ECDH key pair used for Key Agreement (Session Key
computation)
IDP-AS-CA-ECDSA-
PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 CA ECDSA Asymmetric public key entered into the module used
for CA Certificate Verification.
IDP-AS-IFD-ECDSA-
PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 IFD ECDSA Asymmetric public key entered into the module
used for IFD Authentication.
IDP-AS-RSA-PUB 2048- public part of RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature
IDP-AS-ECDSA-PUB P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of ECDSA key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IDP-AC-RSA-PUB
2048/3072/4096 public part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Cipher (key wrap, key
unwrap)
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IDP-ECDH-ECC-PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDH key pair used for shared key
mechanism
IDP-KG-AS-RSA-PUB 2048/3072/4096- public part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IDP-KG-AS-ECDSA-
PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for
Asymmetric signature
IDP-KG-AC-RSA-PUB 2048/3072/4096- public part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric cipher
IDP-KG-AC-ECDH-
PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for shared
key mechanism
IDP-ECDSA-AUTH-
ECC-PUB
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA key pair used to Authenticate the card
Table 21 – IDPrime Applet Public Keys
4.5 FIDO Applet Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
FID-KG-AS-ECDSA-PUB P-256 public part of the user key pair
FID-AT-ROOT-PUB
Root key attestation certificate shared by at least 100k units of the same authenticator
model
FID-ECDH-ECC-PUB P-256 public part of the ECDH key pair used for shared key mechanism
FID-KG-RK-ECDA-PUB P-256 public part of the user key pair ECDSA for Resident Credential
Table 22 – FIDO Applet Public Keys
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5 Roles, Authentication and Services
The Module supports Identity-based authentication.
Table 23 lists all operator roles supported by the Module. This Module does not support a maintenance
role. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle. The Module supports GP logical
channels, allowing multiple concurrent operators. Authentication of each operator and their access to roles
and services is as described in this section, independent of logical channel usage. Only one operator at a
time is permitted on a channel. Applet de-selection (including Card Manager), card reset or power down
terminates the current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to
authenticated services. Authentication data is encrypted during entry (by SD-SDEK), is stored encrypted
(by OS-MKDK) and is only accessible by authenticated services.
Role ID Role Description
CO (Cryptographic Officer) This role is responsible for card issuance and management of card
data via the Card Manager applet. Authenticated using the SCP authentication method
with SD-SENC.
IUSR (User) The IDPrime User, authenticated by the IDPrime applet – see below for
authentication mechanism.
ICAA (Card Application Administrator) The IDPrime Card Application Administrator
authenticated by the IDPrime applet – see below for authentication mechanism.
IO Initialization Officer. This role is responsible for recycling/reinitializing the card using Reinit
Authentication - see below for authentication mechanism.
FUSR (User) The FIDO user role is allowed to perform cryptographic authentication operation
with the PIN (key handles) when user verification is required by the Relaying Party. This
role is responsible for changing the PIN as well.
UA Unauthenticated role
Table 23 - Role Description
5.1 Secure Channel Protocol (SCP) Authentication (CO)
The Open Platform Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is performed when the EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE service is invoked after successful execution of the INITIALIZE UPDATE command.
These two commands operate as described next.
The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used along with other information to derive the SD-SENC and SD-
SMAC keys, respectively. The SD-SENC key is used to create a cryptogram; the external entity participating
in the mutual authentication also creates this cryptogram. Each participant compares the received
cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram and if this succeeds, the two participants are mutually
authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the Module in the CO role).
For SCP03, AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 keys are used for Global Platform secure channel operations,
in which the Module derives session keys from the master keys and a handshake process, performs mutual
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authentication, and decrypts data for internal use only. The Module encrypts a total of one block (the mutual
authentication cryptogram) over the life of the session encryption key; no decrypted data is output by the
Module. AES key establishment provides a minimum of 128 bits of security strength. The Module uses the
SD-KDEK key to decrypt critical security parameters, and does not perform encryption with this key or
output data decrypted with this key.
The strength of GP mutual authentication relies on AES key length, and the probability that a random
attempt at authentication will succeed is:
 







128
2
1
for AES 16-byte-long keys;
 







192
2
1
for AES 24-byte-long keys;
 







256
2
1
for AES 32-byte-long keys;
Based on the maximum count value of the failed authentication blocking mechanism, the minimum
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 255/2^128.
5.2 IDPrime User Authentication (IUSR)
This authentication method compares a PIN value sent to the Module to the stored PIN values if the two
values are equal, the operator is authenticated. This method is used in the IDPrime Applet services to
authenticate to the IUSR role. There can be several OWNER PIN and one GlobalPIN. Both kind are User
PINs.
The module enforces string length of 4 bytes minimum (16 bytes maximum for Global PIN / 64 bytes
maximum for OWNER PIN).
For the User PIN, an embedded PIN Policy allows at least a combination of Numeric value (‘30’ to ‘39’) or
alphabetic upper case (‘A’ to ‘Z’) or alphabetic lower case (‘a’ to z’), so the possible combination of value
for the User PIN is at minimum 62^4 ,greater than 10^7. Consequently the strength of this authentication
method is as follow:
 The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is lower than 1/10^6
 Based on a maximum count of 15 for consecutive failed service authentication attempts, the
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is lower than 15/10^7
5.3 IDPrime Card Application Administrator Authentication (ICAA)
The 3-Key Triple-DES key establishment provides 168 bits of security strength. The Module uses the IDP-
SC-DES3 to authenticate the ICAA role.
 The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is 1/2^64 (based on
challenge size)
 Based on the maximum count value of the failed authentication blocking mechanism, the
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 255/2^64
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
5.4 IDPrime Init Key Authentication (Initialization Officer Role)
The AES-256 key provides 256 bits of security strength. The Module uses the IDP-INITK-AES to
authenticate the IO role.
 The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is 1/2^256 (based on
challenge size)
 Based on the maximum count value of the failed authentication blocking mechanism, the
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 15/2^256
5.5 FIDO User Authentication (FUSR)
This authentication method compares a PIN value sent to the Module to the stored FID-UV-PIN.if the two
values are equal, the operator is authenticated. This method is used in the FIDO Applet services to
authenticate to the FUSR role.
The module enforces string length of 4 bytes minimum and 63 bytes at maximum.
Consequently the strength of this authentication method is as follow:
 The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is lower than 1/2^32
 Based on a maximum count of 8 for consecutive failed service authentication attempts, the
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 8/2^32.
5.6 Platform Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also
describes all usage of CSPs by the service.
Service Description
Context Select an applet or manage logical channels.
Module Info (Unauth) Read unprivileged data objects, e.g., module configuration or status information.
Module Reset Power cycle or reset the Module. Includes Power-On Self-Test if self-test flag is set.
Run Cryptographic
KATs
Resets a flag so that cryptographic KATs may be performed on demand via Module
Reset.
Table 24 - Unauthenticated Services
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Service Description CO
Lifecycle Modify the card or applet life cycle status. X
Manage Content Load and install application packages and associated keys and data. X
Module Info (Auth)
Read module configuration or status information (privileged data
objects).
X
Secure Channel Establish and use a secure communications channel. X
Table 25 – Authenticated Card Manager Services
All of the above commands use the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys for secure channel communications,
and SD-SMAC for firmware load integrity.
The card life cycle state determines which modes are available for the secure channel. In the SECURED
card life cycle state, all command data must be secured by at least a MAC. As specified in the GP
specification, there exist earlier states (before card issuance) in which a MAC might not be necessary to
send Issuer Security Domain commands. Note that the LOAD service enforces MAC usage.
1
“E” for Secure Channel keys is included for situations where a Secure Channel has been established and all traffic
is received encrypted. The Secure Channel establishment includes authentication to the module.
CSPs
Service
OS-DRBG-SEI
OS-DRBG-STATE
OS-GLOBALPIN
OS-MKDK
SD-KENC
SD-KMAC
SD-KDEK
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
DAP-SYM
DAP-ASYM
DM-TOKEN-SYM
DM-RECEIPT-SYM
DM-TOKEN-ASYM
Module Reset
ZE
W
ZE
G
W
-- -- -- -- -- Z Z -- -- -- -- --
Run Cryptographic
KATs
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Module Info
(Unauth)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E1
E1
-- -- -- -- --
Context -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z Z -- -- -- -- --
Secure Channel -- EW -- E E E E
GE
1
GE
1 -- -- -- -- --
Manage Content -- -- W E W W W E1
E1
E E E E E
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Table 26 –
Platform CSP Access by Service
 G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The Module reads the CSP (read access to the CSP by an outside entity).
 E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The Module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the Module or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP. For the Context service, SD session keys are destroyed
on applet deselect (channel closure)
 -- = Not accessed by the service.
5.7 IDPRIME Services
All services implemented by the IDPrime applet are listed in the table below.
Service Description ICAA IUSR UA IO
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
Authenticates the external terminal to the card.
Sets the secure channel mode.
X X X X
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
Authenticates the card to the terminal X X X X
SELECT
Selects a DF or an EF by its file ID, path or
name (in the case of DFs).
X X X X
CHANGE
REFERENCE DATA
Changes the value of a PIN.
(Note : User Auth is always done within the
command itself by providing previous PIN)
Secure Messaging is enforced for this
command.
X X
RESET RETRY
COUNTER
Unblocks and changes the value of a PIN
Secure Messaging is enforced for this
command.
X X
CSPs
Service
OS-DRBG-SEI
OS-DRBG-STATE
OS-GLOBALPIN
OS-MKDK
SD-KENC
SD-KMAC
SD-KDEK
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
DAP-SYM
DAP-ASYM
DM-TOKEN-SYM
DM-RECEIPT-SYM
DM-TOKEN-ASYM
E E W W W W W
Lifecycle Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Module Info (Auth) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E1
E1
-- -- -- -- --
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Service Description ICAA IUSR UA IO
CREATE FILE
Creates an EF under the root or the currently
selected DF or creates a DF under the root.
X X X
DELETE FILE Deletes the current DF or EF. X X X
DELETE
ASYMMETRIC KEY
PAIR
Deletes an RSA or ECDSA Asymmetric Key Pair X X X
ERASE
ASYMMETRIC KEY
Erases an RSA or ELC Asymmetric Key Pair X X X
GET DATA
(IDPrime Applet
Specific)
Retrieves the following information:
■ CPLC data
■ Applet version
■ Software version (includes applet version -
BER-TLV format)
■ Available EEPROM memory
■ Additional applet parameters
■ PIN Policy Error
■ Applet install parameter (DF0Ah tag)
X X X X
GET DATA OBJECT
Retrieves the following information:
■ Public key elements
■ KICC
■ The contents of a specified SE
■ Information about a specified PIN
■ Key generation flag
■ Touch Sense flag
X X X X
PUT DATA
(IDPrime Applet
Specific)
Creates or updates a data object
■ Create container2
■ Update public/private keys(2)
X X
PUT DATA
(IDPrime Applet
Specific)
Creates or updates a data object
■ Access Conditions
■ Applet Parameters (Admin Key, Card Read
Only and Admin Key Try Limit )
■ PIN Info
X X
2
Secure Messaging in Confidentiality is mandatory
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Service Description ICAA IUSR UA IO
PUT DATA
(IDPrime Applet
Specific)
Creates or updates a data object
■ Update DES or AES Secret keys(2)
X X X
READ BINARY Reads part of a binary file. X X X X
ERASE BINARY Erases part of a binary file. X X X
UPDATE BINARY Updates part of a binary file. X X X
GENERATE
AUTHENTICATE
Used to generate secure messaging session
keys between both entities (IFD and ICC) as
part of elliptic curve asymmetric key mutual
authentication.
X X X X
GENERATE KEY
PAIR
Generates an RSA or ECDSA key pair and
stores both keys in the card. It returns the public
part as its response.
X X
PSO – VERIFY
CERTIFICATE
Sends the IFD certificate C_CV.IFD.AUT used in
asymmetric key mutual authentication to the
card for verification. No real reason to use it in
the personalization phase, but it is allowed.
X X X X
PSO - HASH
Entirely or partially hashes data prior to a PSO–
Compute Digital Signature command or
prepares the data if hashed externally
X X
PSO - DECIPHER
(RSA) Deciphers an encrypted message using a
decipher key stored in the card.
(ECDSA) Generates a shared symmetric key.
Secure Messaging is enforced for this
command.
X X
PSO – COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
Computes a digital signature. X X
PUT SECURE KEY
Secure Key Injection Scheme from Microsoft
Minidriver spec V7
X
UNAUTHENTICATE
EXT
Breaks a secure messaging session, or
invalidates an MS3DES3 External
Authentication.
X X X X
CHECK RESET AND
APPLET SELECTION
Tells the terminal if the card has been reset or
the applet has been reselected since the
previous time that the command was performed.
X X X X
GET CHALLENGE Generates an 8, 16 or 32-byte random number. X X X X
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Service Description ICAA IUSR UA IO
MANAGE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
Supports two functions, Restore and Set.
■ Restore: replaces the current SE by an SE
stored in the card.
■ Set: sets or replaces one component of the
current SE.
X X X X
VERIFY
Authenticates the user to the card by presenting
the User PIN. The User Authenticated status is
granted with a successful PIN verification.
Secure Messaging is enforced for this
command.
X
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATION
(ADMIN)
Performs external authentication for ADMIN role
(using Triple-DES challenge response)
X
REINIT (Authenticate)
Command used to grand the IO role using a
challenge based AES256 authentication.
X
REINIT (Key Update)
Updates the Init Key used for IO role
authentication and its ratification counter.
X
REINIT (Reinit)
Process the reinit command, actions depends
on options (in any cases, erase of all user keys).
During reinit process IO can process all the
commands for which he has rights.
X
REINIT (End Reinit) End the reinit process X X X X
REINIT (Get
Counters)
Get ratification and retry counters for Init Key X X X X
PUT DATA (PIN)
Creates PIN objects on card (only possible if the
PIN was not existing, or erased during reinit
process)
X
Table 27 – IDPrime Applet Services and CSP Usage
All services implemented by the MSPNP applet are listed in the table below.
Service Description ICAA IUSR UA
GET DATA
(MSPNP applet
specific)
Retrieves the following information:
■ GUID
X
Table 28 – MSPNP applet Services
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CSP
Service
IDP-SC-SMAC-AES
IDP-SC-SENC-AES
IDP-AS-RSA
IDP-AS-ECDSA
IDP-AC-RSA
IDP-ECDH-ECC
IDP-KG-AS-RSA
IDP-KG-AS-ECDSA
IDP-KG-AC-RSA
IDP-KG-AC-ECDH
IDP-ECDSA-AUTH-
ECC
IDP-SC-DES3
IDP-SC-P-SKI-AES
IDP-SC-T-SKI-AES
IDP-SC-PIN-TDES
IDP-OWNERPIN
/
OS-
GLOBALPIN
IDP-INITK-AES
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- --
SELECT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CHANGE REFERENCE
DATA
E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E
E
W
Z
--
RESET RETRY
COUNTER
E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- E
E
W
Z
--
CREATE FILE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
DELETE FILE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
DELETE ASYMMETRIC
KEY PAIR
-- -- Z Z Z Z Z Z Z -- Z -- -- -- -- -- --
ERASE ASYMMETRIC
KEY
-- -- Z Z Z Z Z Z Z -- Z -- -- -- -- -- --
GET DATA
(IDPrime MD Applet
Specific)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
GET DATA OBJECT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PUT DATA
(IDPrime MD Applet
Specific)
E E WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ -- WZ -- -- -- -- -- --
PUT DATA
(IDPrime MD Applet
Specific)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
W
Z
-- -- -- -- --
READ BINARY -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ERASE BINARY -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
UPDATE BINARY -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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CSP
Service
IDP-SC-SMAC-AES
IDP-SC-SENC-AES
IDP-AS-RSA
IDP-AS-ECDSA
IDP-AC-RSA
IDP-ECDH-ECC
IDP-KG-AS-RSA
IDP-KG-AS-ECDSA
IDP-KG-AC-RSA
IDP-KG-AC-ECDH
IDP-ECDSA-AUTH-
ECC
IDP-SC-DES3
IDP-SC-P-SKI-AES
IDP-SC-T-SKI-AES
IDP-SC-PIN-TDES
IDP-OWNERPIN
/
OS-
GLOBALPIN
IDP-INITK-AES
GENERATE
AUTHENTICATE
G G -- -- -- E -- -- -- GE -- -- -- -- -- -- --
GENERATE KEY PAIR E E -- -- -- -- G G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PSO – VERIFY
CERTIFICATE
E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PSO - HASH -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PSO – DECIPHER -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PSO – COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
-- -- E E -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PUT SECURE KEY -- -- WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ WZ -- WZ -- E EWZ -- -- --
UNAUTHENTICATE EXT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CHECK RESET AND
APPLET SELECTION
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
GET CHALLENGE E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
MANAGE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
VERIFY E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E --
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATION
(ADMIN)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E --
REINIT (Authenticate) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E
REINIT (Key Update) E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
W
Z
REINIT (Reinit) E E Z Z Z -- Z Z Z -- -- --
W
Z
-- -- -- --
REINIT (End Reinit) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
REINIT (Get Counters) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PUT DATA (PIN) E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E WZ --
Table 29 – IDPrime CSP Access by Service
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5.8 FIDO Services
All services implemented by the FIDO applet are listed in the table below.
Service Description CO FUSR UA
Context Select an applet. X X
Personalize Content Create Files, store keys and certificates. X
Applet Info Read applet info, capabilities and version X X
Secure Channel Establish and use a secure communication channel. X
U2F protocol Register and authenticate with U2F protocol X
U2F protocol info Get U2F protocol version X
CTAP2 protocol Register and authenticate with CTAP2 protocol X
CTAP2 protocol info Get CTAP2 protocol version X
CTAP2 Client PIN
protocol
Manage Client PIN and PIN Token X X
Applet Reset Reset or Deactivate the applet X
Table 30 – FIDO applet Services
CSP
Service
FID-SC-SMAC-AES
FID-SC-SENC-AES
FID-KG-AS-ECDSA
FID-AT-ECDSA
FID-SC-ENC-AES
FID-SC-AUTH-HMAC
FID-UV-PIN
FID-ECDH-ECC
FID-TOKEN-NONCE
FID-HMAC-NONCE
FID-KG-RK6ECDSA
FID-RK-HMAC-NONCE
Context -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G G -- -- --
Personalize Content -- -- -- W W W -- -- -- -- -- --
Applet Info -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure Channel E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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CSP
Service
FID-SC-SMAC-AES
FID-SC-SENC-AES
FID-KG-AS-ECDSA
FID-AT-ECDSA
FID-SC-ENC-AES
FID-SC-AUTH-HMAC
FID-UV-PIN
FID-ECDH-ECC
FID-TOKEN-NONCE
FID-HMAC-NONCE
FID-KG-RK6ECDSA
FID-RK-HMAC-NONCE
U2F protocol -- --
G/
E
E E E -- -- -- -- -- --
U2F protocol info -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CTAP2 protocol -- --
G/
E
E E E E -- E
E/
G
E/
G
E/
G
CTAP2 protocol info -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CTAP2 Client PIN protocol -- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- --
Applet Reset -- -- -- -- W W Z -- -- -- -- --
Table 31 – FIDO CSP Access by Service
6 Finite State Model
The CM is designed using a finite state machine model that explicitly specifies every operational and error
state.
The CM includes Power on/off states, Cryptographic Officer states, User services states, applet loading
states, Key/PIN loading states, Self-test states, Error states, and the GP life cycle states.
An additional document (Finite State Machine document) identifies and describes all the states of the
module including all corresponding state transitions.
7 Physical Security Policy
The CM is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power,
temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The CM uses standard passivation techniques and is
protected by passive shielding (metal layer coverings opaque to the circuitry below) and active shielding (a
grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response). A tamper event detected by the active shield places
the Module permanently into the Card Is Killed error state.
The CM is mounted in a plastic smartcard; physical inspection of the Module boundaries is not practical
after mounting. Physical inspection of modules for tamper evidence is performed using a lot sampling
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technique during the card assembly process. The Module also provides a key to protect the Module from
tamper during transport and the additional physical protections listed in Section 12 below.
8 Operational Environment
This section does not apply to CM. No code modifying the behavior of the CM operating system can be
added after its manufacturing process.
Only authorized applets can be loaded at post-issuance under control of the Cryptographic Officer. Their
execution is controlled by the CM operating system following its security policy rules.
9 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The Module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of Federal Regulations,
Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.
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10 Self-test
10.1 Power-on Self-test
On power-on or reset, the CM performs the self-tests described in table below. All KATs must be completed
successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module
enters the Card Is Mute error state or Card is Killed error state, depending on number of failures.
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity
16 bit CRC performed over all code located in FLASH and EEPROM memory
(for OS, Applets).
AES
Performs decrypt KAT using an AES 128-bit key in ECB mode. AES encrypt is
self-tested as an embedded algorithm of AES-CMAC.
DRBG
Performs DRBG SP 800-90A Section 11.3 instantiate and generate health test
KAT with fixed inputs (derivation function and no reseeding supported).
KAS SSC ECC Performs a KAS SSC ECC KAT using an ECC P-224 key.
ECDSA
Performs separate ECDSA signature and verification KATs using an ECC P-
224 key.
KBKDF AES-CMAC
Performs a KDF AES-CMAC KAT using an AES 128 key and 32-byte derivation
data. The KAT computes session keys and verifies the result. Note that KDF
KAT is identical to an AES-CMAC KAT; the only difference is the size of input
data.
RSA
Performs separate RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and verification KATs using an
RSA 2048 bit key, and a RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature KAT using the RSA CRT
implementation with a 2048 bit key. RSA CRT signature verification is tested as
part of the RSA signature verification KAT as described above.
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption KAT with a 2048 bit key is also performed.
SHA-1, SHA-2 Performs separate KATs for SHA-1 and SHA-512.
Triple-DES
Performs separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using 3-Key TDEA in ECB
mode.
HMAC Performs KAT using HMAC 16-byte Key with SHA-256.
KAS KDF
Performs a KAS KDF KAT using “One-step key derivation” scheme as in SP800-
56C rev2. The KAT uses a 4-byte counter, a 32-byte shared secret and 1-byte
fixedInfo, and computes a SHA-256 of the input data, then compared the result
with the expected one.
Table 32 – Power-On Self-Test
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10.2 Conditional Self-tests
On every call to the [SP 800-90A] DRBG, the CM performs the FIPS 140-2 Continuous RNG test (CRNGT)
to assure that the output is different than the previous value. Note that the DRBG is seeded only once per
power cycle and therefore a CRNGT is not required to be performed on the NDRNG per IG 9.8.
When any asymmetric key pair is generated (for RSA or ECC keys) the CM performs a pairwise consistency
test.
When new firmware is loaded into the CM using the Manage content service, the CO verifies the integrity
and authenticity of the new firmware (applet) using the SD-SMAC key for MAC process.
Optionally, the CO may also verify a MAC or a signature of the new firmware (applet) using the DAP-SYM
key or DAP-ASYM key respectively. The signature or MAC block in this scenario is generated by an external
entity using the key corresponding to the asymmetric key DAP-ASYM or the secret key DAP-SYM.
The CM also performs the required assurances from [SP800-56A-rev3] (public Key Validation).
10.3 Reducing the number of Known Answer Tests
The CM implements latest [IG], reducing the number of Known Answer tests (KAT) described at chapter
9.11.
On the 1st reset of the CM, it performs “Firmware Integrity” test and all Cryptographic KATs.
On each next reset of the CM, it performs only “Firmware Integrity test” as permitted by [IG]] document.
The cryptographic KATs are also available on demand and can be played by any operator with the Run
Cryptographic KATs service (see Section 5.6– Platform Services).
11 Design Assurance
The CM meets the Level 3 Design Assurance section requirements.
11.1 Configuration Management
An additional document (Configuration Management Plan document) defines the methods, mechanisms
and tools that allow to identify and place under control all the data and information concerning the
specification, design, implementation, generation, test and validation of the card software throughout the
development and validation cycle.
11.2 Delivery and Operation
Some additional documents (‘Delivery and Operation’, ‘Reference Manual’, ‘Card Initialization
Specification’ documents) define and describe the steps necessary to deliver and operate the CM
securely.
11.3 Guidance Documents
The Guidance document provided with CM is intended to be the ‘Reference Manual’. This document
includes guidance for secure operation of the CM by its users as defined in the section: Roles,
Authentication and Services.
11.4 Language Level
The CM operational environment is implemented using a high level language. A limited number of
software modules have been written in assembler to optimize speed or size.
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© Copyright Thales 2021. May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision].
The IDPrime Applet is a Java applet designed for the Java Card environment.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module implements defenses against:
 Fault attacks
 Side channel analysis (Timing Analysis, SPA/DPA, Simple/Differential Electromagnetic Analysis)
 Probing attacks
 Card tearing
13 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules:
 No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to
CSPs.
 Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
 There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
 The Module does not support manual key entry, output plaintext CSPs or output intermediate key
values.
 Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
At the time the card is issued, the IDPrime Applet shall be personalized with the appropriate data in
order to be initialized into the Approved mode. Personalization includes IDPrime keys and PIN values, as
listed below:
 IDP-AS-RSA: RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature
 IDP-AS-ECDSA: ECDSA key pair used for Asymmetric signature
 IDP-AC-RSA: RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Cipher (key wrap, key unwrap)
 IDP-ECDH-ECC: ECDH key pair used for shared key mechanism
 IDP-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC: ECDSA key used to Authenticate the card
 IDP-SC-DES3: 3-Key Triple-DES key used for authentication.
 IDP-SC-P-SKI-AES: AES session key used for Secure Key Injection
 IDP-OWNERPIN: PIN value managed by the Applet.
 IDP-INITK-AES: AES key used to authenticate IO Role
The following rules must be observed for conformance to FIPS 140-2, when used with a PIN Pad reader:
 The PIN shall be at least 6 bytes composed of numeric characters.
At the time the card is issued, the FIDO Applet shall be personalized with the appropriate data in order to
be initialized into the Approved mode. Personalization includes attestation certificate private key, wrap &
mac keys, as listed below:
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 FID-AT-ROOT-ECDSA: P-256 authenticator attestation key pair. The public part is stored in the
device attestation certificate
 FID-SC-ENC-AES: AES 128-bit authenticator secret key used for encryption and decryption of
key handles with AES CBC
 FID-SC-AUTH-HMAC: HMAC 128-bit authenticator secret key used for authentication of key
handles with HMAC-SHA256
END OF DOCUMENT