Hardware Security Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version 1.15– February 2019
Futurex GSP3000 HSM Non-Proprietary Security Policy – Page 1
FUTUREX
FIPS 140-2
NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
GSP3000 Hardware Security Module
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
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Table of Contents
1. Module Overview......................................................................................................................................................................3
2. Security Level ..............................................................................................................................................................................4
3. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................................5
3.1. FIPS Approved Mode of Operation ..........................................................................................................................5
3.2. PCI HSM Mode of Operation (non-Approved) ....................................................................................................6
3.3. General Non-Approved Mode of Operation ........................................................................................................7
4. Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................................9
5. Identification and Authentication Policy.......................................................................................................................10
5.1. Assumption of Roles....................................................................................................................................................10
5.2. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication..................................................................................10
5.3. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms...........................................................................................................11
6. Access Control Policy............................................................................................................................................................11
6.1. Unauthenticated Services ..........................................................................................................................................11
6.2. Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................................................12
6.3. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)..............................................................................................16
6.4. Definition of Public Keys ............................................................................................................................................18
6.5. Modes of Access for CSPs .........................................................................................................................................19
7. Operational Environment....................................................................................................................................................23
8. Security Rules...........................................................................................................................................................................23
8.1. Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................................................................... 24
9. Physical Security Policy ........................................................................................................................................................25
9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms..................................................................................................................................25
9.2. Environmental Conditions and Partial Environmental Failure Protection............................................... 25
9.3. Operator Recommended Actions...........................................................................................................................25
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks ...........................................................................................................................................27
11. Design Assurance...............................................................................................................................................................27
11.1. Configuration Management................................................................................................................................27
11.2. Guidance Documents.............................................................................................................................................27
11.3. System Identification and Authentication......................................................................................................27
11.4. Audit Logs and Inspection Frequency.............................................................................................................27
12. Key Loading..........................................................................................................................................................................28
12.1. Key Loading (FIPS/PCI-HSM Modes)................................................................................................................28
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13. Product Identification.......................................................................................................................................................28
13.1. Hardware Identification.........................................................................................................................................28
13.2. Firmware Versioning Scheme and Identification.........................................................................................29
14. TLS Protocols .......................................................................................................................................................................30
14.1. TLS Protocols Supported ......................................................................................................................................30
15. References.............................................................................................................................................................................31
16. Glossary.................................................................................................................................................................................. 32
17. CSP Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................................................32
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1. MODULE OVERVIEW
The GSP3000 (HW P/N 9800-2079 Rev7, Rev8, Rev8C, or Rev8D FW Version 6.2.0.3) Hardware
Security Module (HSM) is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that provides secure data
storage and processing functionality. All sensitive components of the module are physically
protected by a tamper resistant, responsive, and evident casing where all cryptographic
operations are performed. Upon tamper detection, normal operations are halted, and critical
security parameters are erased. The module is assembled from production quality components
and provides high speed interfaces for control and data input, status and data output. The image
below depicts the cryptographic module. The boundary is the entire PCB assembly and protective
epoxy, as shown with the red outline. Components not enclosed within the epoxy are non-
sensitive and have been excluded from the physical security requirements.
Figure 1 – GSP3000 Hardware Security Module
None of the components outside the epoxy are relevant to the security of the module. They are
excluded from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
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2. SECURITY LEVEL
The cryptographic module meets the FIPS 140-2 overall security requirements applicable to Level
3.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification
Module Ports and Interfaces
Roles, Services and Authentication
Finite State Model
Physical Security
Operational Environment
Cryptographic Key Management
EMI/EMC
Self-Tests
Design Assurance
Mitigation of Other Attacks
3
3
3
3
3
N/A
3
3
3
3
3
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
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3. MODES OF OPERATION
The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS Approved mode, PCI HSM mode (non-
Approved for FIPS 140), or General non-Approved mode by accessing the System tab on the
module’s web interface. A drop-down menu is shown for FIPS mode (“On” or “Off”) and another
for PCI HSM mode. Once a selection is chosen and confirmed, the module automatically reboots
into the chosen mode.
When used in the Vectera parent device, the mode of operation is also displayed on its LCD
screen. When transitioning between modes, the module will zeroize CSPs before entering the
selected mode of operation and restart. The user can determine which mode the cryptographic
module is in by accessing the Status tab on the module’s web interface.
3.1. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
In FIPS Approved mode, the module supports the following algorithms:
Approved Functions
• AES ECB, CBC, CFB (1, 8, 128), and OFB with 128, 192, and 256 bit keys for encryption and
decryption (AES Cert. #4117)
• AES CMAC with 128, 192, 256 bit keys for MAC generation and verification (AES Cert.
#4118)
• AES GCM with 256 bit keys for decryption (AES Cert. #4118)
• CKG (vendor affirmed):
o [SP 800-133]
o §6: Asymmetric (FIPS 186-4, SP800-56A)
o §7: Symmetric (Direct output from DRBG)
Note: The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified output
from a DRBG.
• CTR DRBG (using AES-256) for random number generation (DRBG Cert. #1240)
• ECC P-192 for digital signature verification (FIPS 186-4; ECDSA Cert. #935)
• ECC P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 for key generation, digital signature generation, and
verification (FIPS 186-4; ECDSA Cert. #935)
• HMAC SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 for keyed message authentication (HMAC
Cert. #2689)
• KDF CMAC Triple-DES (3-key) (KBKDF Cert. #104)
• KDF CMAC AES with 128, 192, 256 bit keys (KBKDF Cert. #104)
• KDF TLS 1.0/1.1, and 1.2 (CVL Cert. #925)
 Note: No parts of TLS, other than the KDF, have been tested by CAVP or CMVP.
• KTS [SP 800-38F] (symmetric) using:
o AES KWP (AES Cert #4118) authenticated encryption
o AES CBC (AES Cert. #4117) encryption and AES CMAC (AES Certs. #4118)
authentication
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o AES CBC (AES Cert. #4117) encryption and HMAC (HMAC Cert. #2689)
authentication; see TLS cipher suite listing
o Triple-DES CBC (Triple-DES Cert. #2248) encryption and HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC
Cert. #2689) authentication; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
• RSA with 1024 bit keys for digital signature verification (RSA Cert. #2226)
• RSA 2048 and 3072 bit keys for key generation, digital signature generation and
verification (RSA Cert. #2226)
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 for hashing (SHS Cert. #3387)
Note: SHA-1 is not available for digital signature creation.
• Triple-DES (2-key, 3-key) TECB, TCBC, TCFB (1, 8, 64), and TOFB for decryption (Triple-DES
Cert. #2248)
• Triple-DES (3-key) TECB, TCBC, TCFB (1, 8, 64) and TOFB for encryption (Triple-DES Cert.
#2248)
• CMAC Triple-DES (2-key, 3-key) for MAC verification (Triple-DES Cert. #2254)
• CMAC Triple-DES (3-key) for MAC generation (Triple-DES Cert. #2254)
Allowed Non-Approved Functions
• Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement (2048) (key establishment methodology provides 112 bits
of encryption strength)
• EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement (P-521) (key establishment methodology provides 256
bits of encryption strength)
• NDRNG used for DRBG seed data
• RSA Key Transport (2048) (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength)
3.2. PCI HSM MODE OF OPERATION (NON-APPROVED)
In PCI HSM mode, the module supports the following algorithms in addition to the FIPS Approved
Mode algorithms:
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256],
up to 4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
• Triple-DES (2-key) for encryption, including key wrapping (non-compliant)
Note: The use of two-key Triple-DES for encryption is restricted. The total number of
blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2^20.
• DUKPT: key management technique
• AKB/TR-31: key bundling techniques
• When configured for operation in an issuer environment *
o Clear PIN processing
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• When configured for PIN processing, the following pin block format translation will be
allowed or disallowed.
Destination
Source
ISO 0 ISO 1 ISO 2 ISO 3 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO 0 Yes No No Yes No No
ISO 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ISO 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ISO 3 Yes No No Yes No No
IBM362
4
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
• PIN generation: random and derived
*The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations in this mode of
operation.
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256]
up to 4096 bits), encrypt/decrypt for key transport
3.3. GENERAL NON-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
In General non-Approved mode (not FIPS or PCI HSM), the module supports the following
algorithms in addition to the FIPS Approved Mode and PCI HSM Mode algorithms:
• DES for encryption and decryption
• ECC with 192 bit keys for key generation, digital signature generation and verification (non-
compliant)
• HMAC MD5, HMAC RIPEMD-160 for keyed message authentication
• MD5, RIPEMD-160 for hashing
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256] up to
4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
• Triple-DES (2-key) for all usages without restriction (non-compliant)
• When configured for operation in an issuer environment*
o Clear PIN processing
• When configured for PIN processing, the following pin block format translation will be allowed. *
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Destination
Source
ISO 0 ISO 1 ISO 2 ISO 3 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IBM3624 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 up to 4096 bits),
encrypt/decrypt for key transport
*The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations in this mode of
operation.
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4. PORTS AND INTERFACES
The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces. All physical
ports are within the boundary, but outside the epoxy material.
• Ethernet ports (x2): Control input, data input, data output, status output
 Ethernet ports provide encrypted communication sessions established with the
TLS protocol for control input, data input, data output, and status output.
 These ports include connection status LEDs.
• PCIe connector (x1): Control input, data input, data output, status output
 Provides logical signals for x4 additional Ethernet connections.
• Single-row 4-pin headers (x7): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides USB functionality in the General Non-Approved mode.
• USB Port (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides USB functionality by converting the dual-row 5-pin header to USB in the
General Non-Approved mode.
• DB-9 Serial Port (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides serial connection in the General Non-Approved mode.
• Tamper status LED (x1): Status output
 Reports a module tamper.
• Dual-row 26-pin header (x1): Control input, Power
 RPM signals
 Battery sense
 Main power supply
 Battery power supply
 “Power good” signal
• Single-row 3-pin header (x1): Control input
 Case switch signals
 Reset signal
 Reset default port
• Dual-row 5-pin header (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes
 Provides serial connection in the General Non-Approved mode.
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5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
5.1. ASSUMPTION OF ROLES
The cryptographic module shall support Operations, Crypto-Officer, and Transaction Processing
roles. In FIPS or PCI HSM mode, an Operations or Crypto Officer operator may communicate with
the cryptographic module via an established TLS session. The cryptographic module shall enforce
the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication for all roles.
For Operations and Crypto-Officer, an operator must enter their username and password to log
in. The username is an alphanumeric string of 4 to 16 characters, and the password is an
alphanumeric string of 6 to 64 characters chosen from the 90 printable and human-readable
characters. Default passwords are only used for the default Crypto-Officer roles and must be
updated upon initial login. An operator that provides a valid username and password will be
identified as an Operations or Crypto-Officer and must re-authenticate to change identity or role.
The operator may end the session by logging out or power cycling the module, or the session
shall automatically timeout after a fixed duration or transaction limit. In order to re-establish
communication, an operator must re-authenticate.
All cryptograms used while processing transactions contain authentication data for the
Transaction Processing role, which take the form of key parity bits for Triple-DES, or KWP for AES.
In either case, the symmetric key (AES or 3-key Triple-DES) which is used to encrypt the
cryptogram corresponds to the operator’s identity. For Triple-DES-wrapped keys, the loaded key
is always Triple-DES as well. The module decrypts the key and checks its parity bits. If any bit is
incorrect, the command is rejected. (This prevents an attacker from passing off a random string as
a wrapped Triple-DES key.) For AES-wrapped keys, the key is auth-decrypted according to SP800-
38F (KWP); if this operation fails, the command is rejected.
5.2. ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
Operations Identity-based User name and password
Crypto-Officer Identity-based User name and password
Transaction Processing Identity-based
ID of wrapping key and
wrapped key (KWP/Key
Parity)
Table 2 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
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5.3. STRENGTHS OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Username and
Password
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will
occur is 1/531,441,000,000 (1/906
).
The module allows for 3 failed attempts and then times out for 20 seconds
before retry. The probability of successful authenticating to the module within
one minute is 1/59,049,000,000.
AES-KWP AES-KWP (SP800-38F) provides 64 bits of authentication strength to a wrapped
key. Thus, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/18,446,744,073,709,551,616 (1/264
).
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retry. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/122,978,293,824,730,344.
Key Parity (3-key
Triple-DES)
3-key Triple-DES has 24 parity bits. Thus, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/16,777,216 (1/224
)
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retry. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/111,848
Table 3 - Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
6.1. UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
• Status: This service provides the current status of the cryptographic module via the USB
or Ethernet port.
• Self-Tests: This service will enable an operator to initiate the suite of self-tests via power
cycling the module.
• Factory Reset: This service resets the module back to factory default. (Zeroize CSPs.
Passwords are zeroized and set back to default. Firmware is also restored to version
shipped with HSM.)
• Tamper: There are pins on the HSM that will allow the user to force a tamper event by
shorting them. This will zeroize all CSPs to include default TLS pairs.
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6.2. AUTHENTICATED SERVICES
Role Authorized Service
Operations: • Create Session: This service allows an operator to create a
secure session to the HSM.
• Authenticate: This service allows an operator to send credentials
to be authenticated by the cryptographic module. Sessions will
timeout after one minute of inactivity, fifteen minutes of use, or
7,500 transactions.
• Destroy Session: This service allows an operator to end the
session.
• Logout: This service allows an operator to end authentication.
• View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view
configuration status to include IP, Com, SSL, Time, Features,
Users, IP tools, Logs. This does not allow configuration of these
items.
• Configuration: Allows operator to change IP address, syslog
level, Operations user passwords, and reboot device.
Cryptographic-Officer: • Create Session: This service allows an operator to create a
secure session to the HSM.
• Authenticate: This service allows an operator to send credentials
to be authenticated by the cryptographic module. Sessions will
timeout after one minute of inactivity, fifteen minutes of use, or
7,500 transactions.
• Destroy Session: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to end the
session.
• Initialization: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to
transition the cryptographic module into or out of an Approved
mode. This service shall zeroize the module and restart. If the
module is already in an Approved mode, it will remain in that
Approved mode.
• Zeroize: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to destroy
critical security parameters by zeroization.
• Key Loading: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to load keys
into the module.
• Update Firmware: This service shall enable the Crypto-Officer to
update the cryptographic module’s firmware. Firmware
authenticity is verified using an ECC signature. If the authenticity
of the firmware is not confirmed, the cryptographic module will
reject and delete the update.
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Note: New firmware versions within the scope of this validation
must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other
firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this
validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
• General Configuration: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to
change all configuration options for the module.
• View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view
configuration status to include IP, Com, SSL, Time, Features,
Users, IP tools, Logs. This does not allow configuration of these
items.
• User Administration: This service will allow the Crypto-Officer to
create, manage, and delete users.
• Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end
authentication.
• Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in
Encrypted keys and have the keys translated and stored in the
key table or returned as a cryptogram encrypted under the
master key.
• Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the
commands listed in Futurex TRM. These commands must be
unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for use.
Transaction Processing • Create Session: This service allows a user to create a secure session
to the HSM.
• Destroy Session: This service allows a user to end the session.
• Authenticate: This service allows a user to send credentials to be
authenticated by the cryptographic module.
• Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end
authentication.
• Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in Encrypted
keys and have the keys translated and stored in the key table or
returned as a cryptogram encrypted under the master key.
• Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the
commands listed in Futurex TRM. These commands must be
unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for use.
Table 4 - Authorized Services by Role
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Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output
Create Session Header Info Signed Plaintext
Data
Encrypted Data N/A
Authenticate Header Info Username &
Password
N/A Success / Fail
Destroy Session Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Process Transactions Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status
Data
Logout Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Status N/A N/A N/A Plaintext Status
Data
Initialization Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Success / Fail
Zeroize Header Info N/A N/A Success / Fail
Self-Tests N/A N/A N/A Success / Fail
User Administration Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status
Data
Update Firmware Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status
Data
Factory Reset Header Info N/A N/A Success
View Configuration Header Info N/A N/A Plaintext Status
Data
Configuration Header Info N/A N/A Success/Fail
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General Configuration Header Info and
Configuration
Options
N/A N/A Success/Fail
Tamper Tamper Signal N/A N/A Tamper
Key Loading Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status
Data
Load Encrypted Key Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status
Data
Table 5 - Specification of Service Inputs & Outputs
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6.3. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)
CSPs are secured within the cryptographic boundary as unencrypted plaintext or binary data.
Operators do not have direct access to CSPs within the device. The following are CSPs contained
in the module:
CSP Type Description
Unique Device
Keys
AES-256 Used to Encrypt or Decrypt TLS private keys
Server Private
Keys
ECC 521
RSA 2048
Sign or Decrypt data sent to the device from an operator
during the creation of a TLS session.
Used during creation of a TLS session.
Session
Encryption Key
AES-128
AES-256
3-key Triple-DES
Encrypts / Decrypts data passed between an operator and
the device during an established TLS session
Session Hash Key HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
Used for hashing data passed between an operator and the
device during an established TLS session
Pre-Master
Secret
Keying Material Used to create the TLS session keys
DH Private Key ECC 521
DH 2048
Used for DH TLS exchange
Ephemeral
Asymmetric Key
RSA 2048 or ECC
521
Used to transfer Ephemeral Key between HSM’s for
component transfer
Ephemeral
Symmetric Key
AES 256 Used to encrypt key components
Crypto-Officer
Password
Pass-phrase Used to authenticate the identity of a Crypto-Officer.
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Operations
Password
Pass-phrase Used to authenticate the identity of an Operations user.
Platform Master
Key
AES 256 Used to encrypt AES keys
FTK Key AES 256 Used to encrypt AES keys for PKCS #11
Key Exchange
Key
AES 256 Used to load User Keys as part of Transaction Processing
(key transport)
Backup Key AES 256 Encrypts the User Keys for backup (key transport)
Smart Card
Encryption Key
AES 256 Wraps smart card fragments (keys and other sensitive data)
for storage on smart card.
User Keys 2-key Triple-
DES**; 3-key
Triple-DES; RSA
1024*, 2048, 3072;
AES 128, 192, 256;
ECC 192***, 224,
256, 384, 521;
HMAC
Data encryption, key exchange, CMAC, and HMAC keys
used by user
These keys are available to the Crypto Officer and
Transaction Processing roles.
Seed Value NDRNG value Seed for CTR DRBG.
(The seed provides at least 384 bits of entropy.)
DRBG State Internal RNG state “V” and “Key” internal values for CTR DRBG.
HSM Signing
Private Key
RSA 2048 Used to sign the logs when output
Table 6 - Critical Security Parameters
*NOTE: RSA 1024 can only be used for verification.
**NOTE: 2-key Triple-DES can only be used for decryption.
***NOTE: ECC 192 can only be used for verification.
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6.4. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS
The following are the public keys contained in the module:
• Firmware Public Keys (ECC 521): These public keys are used for signature verification of
the firmware and firmware updates in order to protect against unauthorized modification.
• Customer Admin Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components of the
Administration certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one of the
server private keys.
• Customer Production Excrypt Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production Excrypt certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer Production International Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production International certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer Production Web Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components
of the Production Web certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one
of the server private keys.
• Customer App Administration Public keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Application Administration certificates used for verifying signatures.
This corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer App Production Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys component of
the Application Production certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to
one of the server private keys.
• User public keys (RSA 1024/2048/3072, ECC 192/224/256/384/521): These public keys are
always used by the operator.
• HSM signing public key (RSA 2048/ECC 521): Output to allow host to verify log signature.
• DH Public Key (DH 2048/ECC 521): Used for TLS key exchange
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6.5. MODES OF ACCESS FOR CSPS
Table 7 provides a list of CSP operations supported by the cryptographic module. Per-service
access rights are shown in Table 8. Supported CSP operations are defined as follows:
• Generate: These operations generate a particular CSP within the cryptographic module.
• Load: These operations allow for a particular CSP to be loaded into the cryptographic
module.
• Wrap: These operations use a CSP to perform key wrapping.
• Un-wrap: These operations use a CSP to perform key unwrapping.
• Destroy: These operations erase the CSP from the cryptographic module.
CSP
Operation
Generate Load Wrap Un-wrap Destroy
Unique Device Keys x x x x
Server Private Keys × ×
Session Encryption Key × × × ×
Session Hash Key × × × ×
Pre-Master Secret x x
DH Private Key x x
Ephemeral Asymmetric Key x x x x
Ephemeral Symmetric Key x x x x
Crypto-Officer Password × ×
Operations Password × x
Platform Master Key x x x x
FTK Key x x x x
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Key Exchange Key x x x x
Backup Key x x x x
Smart Card Encryption Key x x x x
User Keys x x x x
Seed Value x x
HSM Signing Private Key x x
DRBG State x x
Table 7 - Supported CSP Operations
Note: Unique Device Key is generated at time of manufacture or re-generated during tamper recovery
and is not associated with any operator roles.
Cryptographic
Keys and CSPs
Access Operation
Service Operations Role CO
Role
Transaction
Processing
U/A*
Generate Session
Encryption and
Hash keys
Create Session x x x
Wrap and un-
wrap with Session
Encryption and
Hash keys
Process
Transactions
x x
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Destroy Session
Encryption and
Hash keys
Destroy Session x x x
(No CSP access) Status x
Generate
Ephemeral Keys;
Wrap and un-
wrap with
Ephemeral Keys
Key Loading x
Destroy
Ephemeral Keys
Key Loading
(upon completion)
x
Destroy Server
Private and Public
Key, CO/User
Names and
Passwords, Key
Exchange Key,
Backup Key, Smart
Card Encryption
Key
Zeroize x
Zeroize and
generate Server
Private and Public
Key
Initialization x
Zeroize all CSPs to
include default
TLS keys
Tamper x
(No CSP access) Self-Tests x
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Load CO/User
Names and
Passwords
Destroy CO/User
Names and
Passwords
User
Administration
x
Verify with
Firmware Public
Key
Update Firmware x
Zeroize CSPs and
restore factory
defaults**
Factory Reset x
Send in
authentication
credentials
Authenticate x x x
No CSP access Logout x x x
No CSP access General
Configuration
x
No CSP access Configuration x x
No CSP access View Configuration x x
Loading of PMK,
FTK, KEK, Backup
Key, SCEK, User
Keys
Key Loading x
Loading of
Encrypted User
Keys
Load Encrypted
Key
x x
Table 8 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
*NOTE 1: U/A = Unauthenticated (no role required).
**NOTE 2: The Factory Reset service does not zeroize the UDK (only a Tamper does that). If the UDK has
been previously zeroized by a tamper event, the Factory Reset service generates a new UDK.
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7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
cryptographic module supports a limited operational environment.
8. SECURITY RULES
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules. This
section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the
security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide three distinct operator roles. These are the
Operations role, the Cryptographic-Officer role, and the Transaction Processing role.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access
to any cryptographic services.
4. The cryptographic module shall encrypt message data using an approved TLS cipher suite
when TLS is used.
5. The cryptographic module shall perform the Power-Up and Conditional self-tests as
specified in section 8.1 below.
6. The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power off/cycle.
7. Any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator shall be capable of
commanding the module to perform the Power-Up self-test.
8. Prior to each use, the DRBG shall be tested using the conditional test specified in FIPS
140-2 §4.9.2.
9. Data output shall be logically inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and
error states using separate system processes.
10. Zeroization shall clear all CSPs in at most one-tenth of a second.
11. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
12. The module shall not support the update of the logical serial number or vendor ID.
13. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for a maximum period of
five minutes, the module shall automatically log-out the operator.
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8.1. SELF-TESTS
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module will perform power-up self-tests without operator
intervention. Self-tests may also be executed at the request of an operator by power cycling the
module. When power cycling the module, no operator intervention is required before self-tests
are performed. If a self-test fails, the device will transition to the Fatal Error state and report an
error to its parent device. If all tests pass, the module powers up normally and reports success to
its parent device.
Power-Up and Periodic Self Tests
The following tests shall be performed at power-up:
• Firmware integrity and authenticity tests (ECDSA signature) are performed in all modes of
operation.
• Known answer tests are executed in FIPS and PCI modes of operation for:
o AES 128/192/256 Encrypt and Decrypt
o Triple-DES Keying Option 1/2 Encrypt and Decrypt
o SHA1/SHA224/SHA256/SHA384/SHA512
o RSA 1024 Verify
o RSA 2048/3072 Sign and Verify
o ECC 192/224/256/384/521 Sign and Verify
o HMAC SHA1/SHA256/SHA384/SHA512
o DRBG Known Answer
o Triple-DES CMAC Generate and Verify
o AES CMAC Generate and Verify
o KDF Counter Mode using CMAC
o KWP
Conditional Self-Tests
The device will perform the following conditional self-tests:
• Firmware load test (ECC signature verification) is performed in all modes of operation.
• The following conditional self-tests are executed in FIPS and PCI modes of operation
o Continuous random number generator tests for NDRNG and DRBG.
o DRBG Health Checks (SP800-90A §11.3)
o Pair-wise consistency test for RSA, ECC key generation
o Firmware load test (ECC signature verification)
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9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
9.1. PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS
The multi-chip embedded cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms:
• Hard, opaque potting material encapsulates the security relevant portion of the module,
and intrusion attempts will result in serious damage which will cause the module to stop
functioning.
• The module is protected by a tamper sensing envelope, which responds to physical
tampering with CSP zeroization.
• Environmental monitoring sensors will trigger a tamper response and CSP zeroization to
prevent the module from being compromised from altering certain environmental or
operational conditions.
9.2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND PARTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE PROTECTION
The following environmental conditions should be maintained for the module:
• Operating environment temperature: 10 to 35°C
• Storage temperature: -20 to 65°C
Partial Environmental Failure Protection will trigger a shutdown or tamper response should the
module detect environmental conditions outside of these specifications:
• Temperature: -20 to 65°C
• Voltage: 2.3 to 4.4 V DC on internal 3V line.
9.3. OPERATOR RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
• The operator may be required to periodically inspect the unit for forced entry.
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection / Test
Inspection / Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Potting Monthly, and prior to module
Initialization
Inspect hard potting for
removal/penetration attempts.
Table 9 - Inspection / Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
The figures below show the module with its tamper evident potting intact, and a sample of the
potting after a tamper attempt has been made.
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Figure 2 – GSP3000 with its Tamper Potting Intact
Figure 3 – Examples of Tamper Attempts on the GSP3000 Potting
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10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module mitigates emitting compromising emanations through suppression and containment
of side channel signals. The module’s physical enclosure functions as a Faraday cage to attenuate
such signals. The module also provides Partial Environmental Failure Protection, as described in
Section 9.
11. DESIGN ASSURANCE
11.1. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Documentation for the cryptographic module, which includes hardware specifications, firmware
source code, guidance documents, and FIPS documents, is maintained using a version control
repository. All configuration management items are uniquely identified by a path and filename
within the repository. All configuration management items within the version control repository
are uniquely identifiable.
11.2. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
Provided with the cryptographic module are all Crypto-Officer and user guidance documents that
specify the following:
• Administrative functions, physical ports, and interfaces
• Procedures describing how to securely administer the cryptographic module
• Approved security functions
• User responsibilities for securely operating the cryptographic module
11.3. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Procedures for system identification and authentication of the module are detailed in the Futurex
PCI HSM User Guide Addendum.
11.4. AUDIT LOGS AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY
Understanding of the operation and initialization of the module is requisite to configure logging.
Procedures to configure audit logging are detailed in the Futurex PCI HSM User Guide
Addendum.
• The module supports secure logging of transactions, data, and events to enable auditing.
• Operator restrictions for accessing, archiving, or deleting logs are configured by settings
and policies established by system administrators.
• Logs should be audited daily, and an appropriate notification tree should be established
for escalating and investigating any suspicious log activity
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12. KEY LOADING
12.1. KEY LOADING (FIPS/PCI-HSM MODES)
When operating in FIPS or PCI-HSM Modes, all key loading traffic to HSM must be encrypted. This
is accomplished by using a Futurex Securus. The Securus is a fully functional TRSM that will
encrypt all data between it and the HSM using TLS.
13. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
13.1. HARDWARE IDENTIFICATION
To identify a GSP3000 refer to the product identification label, as seen in Figure 4
Figure 4 - Product Identification Label
The GSP3000 is typically sold as an embedded component inside of other Futurex devices and its
product identification label is not visible without opening the chassis. Internal inspection is not
possible without specialized tools only available to authorized service technicians. As such,
Futurex places product identification labels on the exterior of the chassis that supports the
GSP3000. Figure 5 shows an example of a chassis label that references the existence of an
embedded GSP3000.
Figure 5 - Chassis Label
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Figure 6 and Figure 7 show typical placements of chassis labels.
Figure 6 - 1U Chassis Label Location
Figure 7 - 2U Chassis Label Location
13.2. FIRMWARE VERSIONING SCHEME AND IDENTIFICATION
The firmware version is made of four components concatenated with periods in the form of
Major.Audit.Branch.Release where:
• Major - The major number shall only be incremented when large scale changes have been
made to the release in question. Its value will be updated when Futurex believes the scope of
the changes warrants an update.
• Audit - The audit number shall only be incremented when changes have been made that
require a full 3rd party security audit. This would typically be necessary when new security
features are added or when branches are merged.
• Branch - This is incremented when a new branch is created. Branches are typically used to
distinguish unique packaging of existing security features, introduction of low-impact
security changes, or the introduction of new non-security features.
• Release - This is incremented when a new release happens off a branch. Changes to this
component represents either bug fixes or refinements to the functionality of existing
features. Releases typically represent non-impactful security changes but may have a low-
impact.
The firmware version can be found on the LCD screen, web portal, or in Excrypt Manager. Please
refer to images below for reference. Also provided in this view is the enabled feature identifier
that may be concatenated to the end of the firmware version and indicated by one or more of the
following characters: ‘i’ International Restriction Crypto, ‘c’ Clear PIN Support, or ‘k’ RSA Support.
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Figure 8 - Firmware Version through Web Portal
Figure 9 - Firmware Version through Excrypt Manager
14. TLS PROTOCOLS
14.1. TLS PROTOCOLS SUPPORTED
The list below contains all the TLS Protocols supported.
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
Note: While the component algorithms have been tested by the CAVP, the TLS protocol itself
has not been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
The module limits data block encryptions with the same Triple-DES key to 2^32 operations.
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15. REFERENCES
1. FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2001 May 25.
2. Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010
January 27.
3. Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007 June
14.
4. Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2009 July 21.
5. Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2009 October 08.
6. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 March 24.
7. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology
8. NIST Special Publication 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS):
Requirements and Procedures, National Institute of Standards and Technology, February
1998.
9. NIST Special Publication 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): Requirements and Procedures, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, April 2000.
10. ANSI X9.31-1998, Digital Signature using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., 1998.
11. The RSA Validation System (RSAVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004
November 09.
12. FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2004 February 25.
13. The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2004 July 22.
14. The Random Number Generator Validation System (RNGVS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2005 January 31.
15. FIPS PUB 198, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2002 March 06.
16. The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 December 03.
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16. GLOSSARY
Term Definition
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certificate Authority
CO Cryptographic Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. ECDH, ECDSA)
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
HMAC-SHA-1 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code using SHA-1
I2
C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IP Internet Protocol
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
MD5 Message Digest 5
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adelman public key algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TRM Technical Reference Manual
17. CSP ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
KEK Key Exchange Key
PMK Platform Master Key
SCEK Smart Card Encryption Key
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