Apple Inc.
©2019 Apple Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
March, 2019
Prepared for:
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
www.apple.com
Prepared by:
atsec information security Corp.
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION / COPYRIGHT................................................................................................................. 4
1.3 EXTERNAL RESOURCES / REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 4
1.3.1 Additional References............................................................................................................... 4
1.4 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 7
2.1 MODULE DESCRIPTION.......................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.1 Module Validation Level ........................................................................................................... 7
2.1.2 Module components................................................................................................................. 7
2.1.3 Tested Platforms ....................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 MODES OF OPERATION .......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.1 Approved Security Functions:................................................................................................... 9
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions:......................................................................................... 13
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY ................................................................................................................... 15
2.4 MODULE USAGE CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................................................ 15
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES.......................................................................................16
4 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................................................17
4.1 ROLES .............................................................................................................................................................. 17
4.2 SERVICES .......................................................................................................................................................... 17
4.3 OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION ................................................................................................................................ 20
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ........................................................................................................................................21
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................................22
6.1 APPLICABILITY.................................................................................................................................................... 22
6.2 POLICY ............................................................................................................................................................. 22
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................23
7.1 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION........................................................................................................................... 23
7.2 KEY / CSP GENERATION ...................................................................................................................................... 23
7.3 KEY / CSP ESTABLISHMENT .................................................................................................................................. 23
7.4 KEY / CSP ENTRY AND OUTPUT ............................................................................................................................ 23
7.5 KEY / CSP STORAGE ........................................................................................................................................... 23
7.6 KEY / CSP ZEROIZATION ...................................................................................................................................... 24
8 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMI/EMC) ....................................25
9 SELF-TESTS......................................................................................................................................................26
9.1 POWER-UP TESTS .............................................................................................................................................. 26
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests................................................................................................ 26
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests ....................................................................................... 26
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests............................................................................................................. 27
9.2 CONDITIONAL TESTS ........................................................................................................................................... 27
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test ........................................................................ 27
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test ...................................................................................................... 27
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Assurance Tests.................................................................................................... 27
9.2.4 Critical Function Test............................................................................................................... 27
10 DESIGN ASSURANCE ...................................................................................................................................28
10.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT........................................................................................................................... 28
10.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION................................................................................................................................... 28
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10.3 DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................................................................. 28
10.4 GUIDANCE ........................................................................................................................................................ 28
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance ............................................................................................. 28
10.4.2 User Guidance......................................................................................................................... 28
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................29
List of Tables
Table 1: Module Validation Level.................................................................................................................... 7
Table 2: Tested Platforms ............................................................................................................................... 8
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions.......................................................... 13
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions..................................................................... 14
Table 5: Roles............................................................................................................................................... 17
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode ....................................................................... 18
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode............................................................................ 20
Table 8: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests ........................................................................................................ 26
List of Figures
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram................................................................................................................... 15
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for
Intel. It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic services it provides. This
document also defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for operating the module.
This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic
modules and is intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.
FIPS 140-2 details the requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada for
cryptographic modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.
For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program please refer to the
NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program.
Throughout the document “Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel”, “cryptographic module”,
“CoreCrypto” or “the module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Apple CoreCrypto Module
v9.0 for Intel. macOS 10.14 Mojave is the fifteenth release of macOS (previously OS X).
Throughout the document it is generically referred to as macOS Mojave or macOS.
1.2 Document Organization / Copyright
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its
original entirety without any revision, ©2019 Apple Inc.
1.3 External Resources / References
The Apple website (http://www.apple.com) contains information on the full line of products from
Apple Inc. For a detailed overview of the operating system macOS and its security properties
refer to [MACOS] and [SEC]. For details on macOS releases with their corresponding validated
modules and Crypto Officer Role Guides refer to the Apple Knowledge Base Article HT201159 - “
Product security certifications, validations, and guidance for macOS”
(https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201159)
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and
Apple Inc. contact information.
1.3.1 Additional References
FIPS 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, “FIPS PUB 140-2 Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” May 2001
FIPS 140-2
IG
NIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program,” November, 2018
FIPS 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
FIPS 198 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
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SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation”, December 2001
SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality”, May 2004
SP800-38 D NIST Special Publication 800-38D, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC”, November 2007
SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices”, January
2010
SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping”, December 2012
SP800-57P1NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1:
General (Revised),” July 2012
SP 800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90, “Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised),” January 2012
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132, “Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation”, December 2010
MACOS macOS Technical Overview
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/#documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OS
X_Technology_Overview/About/About.html
SEC Security Overview
https://developer.apple.com/security/
UG User Guide
Location: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201159
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1.4 Acronyms
Acronyms found in this document are defined as follows:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BS Block Size
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation
CFB Cipher Feedback mode of operation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter mode of operation
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook mode of operation
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EC Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman based on ECC
ECDSA DSA based on ECC
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KPI Kernel Programming Interface
KS Key Size (Length)
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback (mode of operation)
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-based Key Derivation Function
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
RNG Random Number Generator
SHS Secure Hash Standard
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Description
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel is a software cryptographic module running on a
multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform.
The cryptographic services provided by the module are:
 data encryption / decryption  random number generation
 generation of hash values  key generation
 key wrapping  signature generation / verification
 message authentication  key derivation
2.1.1 Module Validation Level
The module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The
following table shows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the
validation.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1: Module Validation Level
2.1.2 Module components
In the following sections the components of the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel are listed
in detail. There are no components excluded from the validation testing.
2.1.2.1 Software components
CoreCrypto has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported algorithms.
These implementations include proprietary optimizations of algorithms that are fitted into the
CoreCrypto framework.
2.1.2.2 Hardware components
AES-NI hardware acceleration is included within the cryptographic module boundary.
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2.1.3 Tested Platforms
The module has been tested on the following platforms with and without AES-NI:
Manufacturer Model Operating System
Apple Inc. Mac mini with Intel i5 CPU macOS Mojave
1
10.14
Apple Inc. MacBook Pro with Intel i7 CPU macOS Mojave 10.14
Apple Inc. MacBook Pro with Intel i9 CPU macOS Mojave 10.14
Apple Inc. iMac Pro with Intel Xeon CPU macOS Mojave 10.14
Apple Inc. MacBook with Intel Core M CPU macOS Mojave 10.14
Table 2: Tested Platforms
2.2 Modes of operation
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel has an Approved and non-Approved mode of
operation. The Approved mode of operation is configured by default and cannot be changed. If
the device starts up successfully the CoreCrypto framework has passed all self-tests and is
operating in the Approved mode. Any calls to the non-Approved security functions listed in Table
4 will cause the module to assume the non-Approved mode of operation.
The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved
ciphers as all keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP) handled by the module are ephemeral
and there are no keys and CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests
or integrity tests is not required.
Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the
self-tests are always performed during initialization time of the module.
The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed below. If multiple
implementations of the same cipher are present, the module automatically selects which cipher is
used based on internal heuristics. This includes the hardware-assisted AES implementation
(AES-NI).
The Approved security functions are listed in Table 3. Column four (Algorithm Certificate) lists the
validation numbers obtained from NIST for successful validation testing of the implementation of
the cryptographic algorithms on the platforms as shown in Table 2 under CAVP.
Refer to http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html for the current standards, test
requirements, and special abbreviations used in the following table.
1
macOS 10.14 Mojave is the fifteenth release of macOS (previously OS X). Throughout the document it is
generically referred to as macOS Mojave or simply macOS.
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2.2.1 Approved Security Functions:
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm Certificate
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation
[SP 800-90] DRBG Generic Software (C) Implementation
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
HMAC_DRBG
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397
Generic Software (C) Implementation
using Assembler Implementation of ECB
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368
VNG Implementation using Assembler
Implementation of ECB
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AES-NI
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX
HMAC_DRBG
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX2
HMAC_DRBG
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with SSE3
HMAC_DRBG
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2388
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm Certificate
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
[FIPS 197]
AES
SP 800-38 A
SP 800-38 C
SP 800-38 D
SP 800-38 E
SP 800-38 F
Generic Software (C) Implementation
(Based on LibTomCrypt):
Modes:
CBC ECB
CCM GCM
CFB128 KW
CFB8 OFB
CTR XTS
1
5800, 5801, 5802, 5803, 5804
Generic Software (C) Implementation
(Based on Gladman):
Modes:
CBC
5789, 5790, 5791, 5792, 5793
Generic Software (C) Implementation
using Assembler Implementation of
ECB:
CBC ECB
CCM GCM
CFB128 KW
CFB8 OFB
CTR XTS
1
5769, 5770, 5771, 5772, 5773
Optimized Assembler Implementation:
CBC XTS
1
ECB
5784, 5785, 5786, 5787, 5788
Optimized Assembler Implementation
using AES-NI:
Modes:
CBC XTS
1
ECB
5774, 5775, 5776, 5777, 5778
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AES-NI PAA:
Modes:
CBC ECB
CCM GCM
CFB128 KW
CFB8 OFB
CTR XTS
1
5779, 5780, 5781, 5782, 5783
VNG Implementation using (C)
Implementation of ECB:
ECB
CCM
CTR
5805, 5806, 5807, 5808, 5809
1
XTS approved with 128-bit and 256-bit key size only; The XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage
applications.
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm Certificate
VNG Implementation using Assembler
Implementation of ECB:
CCM GCM
CTR
ECB
5810, 5811, 5812, 5813, 5814
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES
Triple-DES
(Keying Option: 1; All Keys
Independent)
Modes:
CBC CTR
CFB64 ECB
CFB8 OFB
2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860
Digital Signature
and Asymmetric
Key Generation
[FIPS186-4]
RSA
PKCS #1.5
Key Generation (ANSI X9.31),
Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5)
Key Sizes (Modulo):
2048
3072
Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5)
Key Sizes (Modulo):
1024
2048
3072
3073, 3074, 3075, 3076, 3077
[FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
Key Pair Generation (PKG):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Public Key Validation (PKV):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Generation:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Verification:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
1553, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557
ECDSA Signature Generation
Component:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
CVL:
2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109
[FIPS 186-4]
DSA
2
used for
Diffie-Hellman key
generation only
Key Generation
Key Sizes:
L=2048, N=256
1468, 1469, 1470, 1471, 1472
Message Digest [FIPS 180-4]
SHS
Generic Software (C) Implementation
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4610, 4611, 4612, 4613, 4614
2
The DSA key pair generation is not available as an explicit service. It is used to create Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
SP800-56A Key Establishment.
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm Certificate
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with SSE3:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4597, 4598, 4599, 4600, 4606
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4601, 4602, 4603, 4604, 4605
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX2:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4592, 4593, 4594, 4595, 4596
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198]
HMAC
Generic Software (C) Implementation
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3835, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3839
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with SSE3
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3822, 3823, 3824, 3825, 3831
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3826, 3827, 3828, 3829, 3830
Generic Software (C) Implementation
with AVX2:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3817, 3818, 3819, 3820, 3821
Key Agreement
and
Establishment
[SP800-56A]
DLC Primitive
Diffie-Hellman
Public key size 2048-bits or larger and
Private key size 224-bits or 256-bits
CVL:
2092, 2093, 2095, 2096, 2097
[SP800-56A]
DLC Primitive
EC Diffie-Hellman
NIST Curves: P-256, P-384
Key Derivation [SP 800-132]
PBKDF
Password Based Key Derivation using
HMAC with SHA-1 or SHA-2
Vendor Affirmed
RSA
Key Wrapping
[SP 800-56B] KTS-OAEP Vendor Affirmed
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[FIPS 186-4] PKCS#1 v1.5
Modulus size: 2048-bits or 3072-bits
Non-Approved, but allowed
4
Key Agreement ANSI X9.63
SP 800-56A
EC Diffie-Hellman
ECC curves P-256, P-384 Non-Approved, but allowed
5
[ANSI X9.42]
[SP 800-56A]
Diffie-Hellman
Key sizes:
2048 bits
3072 bits
Non-Approved, but allowed
6
MD5 Message Digest Digest Size: 128-bit Non-Approved, but Allowed
7
NDRNG Random Number
Generation
N/A Non-Approved, but Allowed
8
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
Note: PBKDFv2 is implemented to support all options specified in Section 5.4 of SP800-132. The
password consists of at least 6 alphanumeric characters from the ninety-six (96) printable and
human-readable characters. The probability that a random attempt at guessing the password will
succeed or a false acceptance will occur is equal to 1/96^6. The derived keys may only be used
in storage applications. Additional guidance to appropriate usage is specified in section 7.3.
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions:
Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
RSA
Signature
Generation /
Signature
Verification /
Asymmetric Key
Generation
ANSI X9.31
Signature Generation
Key Pair Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Non-Approved
PKCS#1 v1.5
Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
RSA Key
Wrapping
PCKS#1 v1.5
Key Size < 2048
Non-Approved
Diffie-Hellman Key agreement scheme using key sizes <
2048-bits
Non-Approved
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Sig(gen)
Sig(ver)
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
4
RSA key wrapping is used for key establishment. Methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength.
5
EC Diffie-Hellman is used for key establishment. Methodology provides 128 bits or 256 bits of encryption strength.
6
Diffie-Hellman is used for key establishment; Methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength.
7
MD5 is used as part of the TLS key establishment scheme only.
8
NDRNG is provided by the underlying operational environment.
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Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
DES Encryption / Decryption
Key Size 56-bits
Non-Approved
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit increments
Non-Approved
RC4 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits
Non-Approved
RC2 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits
Non-Approved
MD2 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
MD4 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
RIPEMD Message Digest
Digest size 128, 160, 256, 320 -bits
Non-Approved
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192
PKV: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Non-Approved
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point
representation of points
Non-Approved
Integrated
Encryption
Scheme on elliptic
curves
Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key
CBC MAC)
MAC generation Non-Approved
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption
Two Key Implementation
Non-Approved
Optimized Assembler Implementation
Encryption / Decryption
Mode: CTR
Non-Compliant
AES-CMAC AES-128 MAC generation Non-Compliant
SP800-108
KBKDF
Key Based Key Derivation Function
Modes: CTR and Feedback
Non-Compliant
SP800-56C Key Derivation Function Non-Compliant
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions
The encryption strengths included in Table 4 for the key establishment methods are determined
in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance [IG] section 7.5 and NIST Special
Publication 800-57 (Part1) [SP800-57P1].
Note: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved
algorithm, while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm
but the implementation is not validated by the CAVP.
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2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the macOS device that contains
the module. Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multi-chip standalone
cryptographic module.
The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram
2.4 Module Usage Considerations
A user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the
module:
- AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with SP800-38D in compliance with IG A.5
scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS
protocol version 1.2. Users should consult SP 800-38D, especially section 8, for all of the
details and requirements of using AES-GCM mode. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed.
- AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the XTS-
AES data unit does not exceed 220
blocks
- When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the
functions of ccaes_[cbc|ecb|…]_[encrypt|decrypt]_mode.
- When using SHA, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the
functions ccsha[1|224|256|384|512]_di.
- In order to meet the IG A.13 requirement, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to
encrypt more than 216
64-bit blocks of data.
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3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs). In detail these interfaces are the following:
 Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable
service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, APIs and
callable services will be referred to as “API.”
 Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated
parameters, as well as mach-o header holding the HMAC check file.
 Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each
API lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C
language APIs within the module is provided in the header files and the API
documentation. Messages are documented also in the API documentation.
The module is optimized for library use within the macOS user space and does not contain any
terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as an macOS dynamically loadable
library. The dynamically loadable library is loaded into the macOS application and its
cryptographic functions are made available. Any internal error detected by the module is
reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling macOS application must
examine the return code and act accordingly. There is one notable exception: (i) ECDSA and
RSA do not return a key if the pair-wise consistency test fails.
The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes
the system to crash if any self-test fails – see Section 9.
The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented
return codes, thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle
exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.
Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services and authentication mechanisms and methods with
respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
4.1 Roles
The module supports a single instance of the two authorized roles: the Crypto Officer and the
User. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance operator.
Role General Responsibilities and Services (details see below)
User Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.
Crypto Officer (CO) Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.
Table 5: Roles
4.2 Services
The module provides services to authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer roles
according to the applicable FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
Table 6 contains the cryptographic functions employed by the module in the Approved mode. For
each available service it lists, the associated role, the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and
cryptographic keys involved, and the type(s) of access to the CSPs and cryptographic keys.
CSPs contain security-related information (for example, secret and private cryptographic keys)
whose disclosure or modification can compromise the main security objective of the module,
namely the protection of sensitive information.
The access types are denoted as follows:
 ‘R9
’: the item is read or referenced by the service
 ‘W’: the item is written or updated by the service
 ‘Z’: the persistent item is zeroized by the service
Service Roles CSPs &
Crypto Keys
Access
Type
USER CO
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption X X secret key R
AES Encryption / Decryption X X secret key R
AES Key Wrapping X X secret key R
RSA Key Wrapping x x RSA Private Key R
Secure Hash Generation X X none N/A
HMAC generation X X secret HMAC key R
RSA signature generation and verification X X RSA key pair R
W
ECDSA signature generation and verification X X ECDSA key pair R
W
9
The access type of R refers to reading of the CSP. This can be thought as synonymous with execute CSP/key.
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Service Roles CSPs &
Crypto Keys
Access
Type
USER CO
Random number generation X X Entropy input string,
Nonce, V and Key
R
W
Z
PBKDF Password-based key derivation X X secret key, password R
W
Z
ECDSA (key pair generation) X X Asymmetric key pair R
W
RSA (key pair generation) X X Asymmetric key pair R
W
Diffie-Hellman (key pair generation) X X Asymmetric key pair R
W
Diffie-Hellman Key agreement X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA key) and
secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES key)
R
W
EC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA key) and
secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES key)
R
W
Release all resources of symmetric crypto function
context
X X AES/Triple-DES key Z
Release all resources of hash context X X HMAC key Z
Release of all resources of Diffie-Hellman context for
Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman
X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA) and
secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES)
Z
Release of all resources of asymmetric crypto function
context
X X RSA/ECDSA keys Z
Self-test X X Software
integrity key
R
Show Status X X None N/A
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode
Service Roles
Access Type
USER CO
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves
Encryption / Decryption
X X R
DES Encryption / Decryption X X R
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Service Roles
Access Type
USER CO
Triple-DES (Optimized Assembler Implementation)
Encryption / Decryption
Mode: CTR
X X R
Triple-DES (Two-Key implementation)
Encryption / Decryption
X X R
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption X X R
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption X X R
RC4 Encryption / Decryption X X R
W
RC2 Encryption / Decryption X X R
W
MD2 Hash X X R
W
MD4 Hash X X R
W
RIPEMD Hash X X R
W
RSA Key Wrapping using Key Size < 2048 X X R
RSA ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation and Verification X X R
W
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation and Verification
Key Sizes: 1024-4096-bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed
in Table 3
X X R
W
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation
Key sizes (modulus): 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits
not listed in table 3
Public key exponent values: 65537 or larger
X X R
W
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point
representation of points
X X R
W
ECDSA
PKG: curves P-192
PKV: curves P-192
SIG(gen): curves P-192
SIG(ver): curves P-192
X X R
W
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Key Sizes < 2048 bits
X X R
W
Ed25519 Key agreement, Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
X X R
W
SP800-56C Key Derivation Function X X R
W
ANSI X9.63 Hash based Key Derivation Function using X X R
W
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Service Roles
Access Type
USER CO
SP800-108 Key Derivation Function
Modes: Feedback, Counter
X X R
W
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function X X R
W
AES-CMAC AES-128 MAC Generation X X R
W
OMAC MAC Generation X X R
W
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode
4.3 Operator authentication
Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the module does not implement an authentication
mechanism for operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit in the action taken.
The module relies upon the operating system for any operator authentication.
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5 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple CoreCrypto Module
v9.0 for Intel since it is a software module.
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6 Operational Environment
The following sections describe the macOS Mojave 10.14, the operational environment of the
Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel.
6.1 Applicability
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel operates in a modifiable operational environment per
FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. It is part of macOS Mojave 10.14, a commercially available
general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.1.3.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (single-user mode; i.e. concurrent
operators are explicitly excluded).
When the operating system loads the module into memory, it invokes the FIPS Self-Test
functionality, which in turn runs the mandatory FIPS 140-2 tests.
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7 Cryptographic Key Management
The following section defines the key management features available through the Apple
CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel.
7.1 Random Number Generation
A FIPS 140-2 approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified
in NIST SP 800-90A is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is
a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The
module also employs a HMAC-DRBG for random number generation. The deterministic random
bit generators are seeded by /dev/random. The /dev/random generator is a true random number
generator that obtains entropy from interrupts generated by the devices and sensors attached to
the system and maintains an entropy pool. The NDRNG feeds entropy from the pool into the
DRBG on demand. The NDRNG provides 256-bits of entropy.
7.2 Key / CSP Generation
The following approved key generation methods are used by the module:
 The module does not implement symmetric key generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and
using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in
asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation
service for RSA, ECDSA and Diffie-Hellman as well as the SP 800-90A DRBG have been
CAVS tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 3.
It is not possible for the module to output information during the key generating process.
7.3 Key / CSP Establishment
The module provides AES key wrapping, RSA key wrapping, Diffie-Hellman- and EC Diffie-
Hellman-based key establishment services.
The module provides key establishment services in the Approved mode through the SP 800-108
PBKDFv2 algorithm. The PBKDFv2 function is provided as a service and returns the key derived
from the provided password to the caller. The keys derived from SP 800-108 map to section 4.1
of SP 800-133 as indirect generation from DRBG. The caller shall observe all requirements and
should consider all recommendations specified in SP800-132 with respect to the strength of the
generated key, including the quality of the salt as well as the number of iterations. The
implementation of the PBKDFv2 function requires the user to provide this information.
7.4 Key / CSP Entry and Output
All keys are entered from, or output to, the invoking application running on the same device. All
keys entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys are output from
the module in plain text form if required by the calling application. The same holds for the CSPs.
7.5 Key / CSP Storage
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel considers all keys in memory to be ephemeral. They
are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application.
The same holds for CSPs.
The module protects all keys, secret or private, and CSPs through the memory protection
mechanisms provided by the operating system. No process can read the memory of another
process.
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7.6 Key / CSP Zeroization
Keys and CSPs are zeroized when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the
system is powered down.
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8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The EMI/EMC properties of the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel are not meaningful for
the software library. The devices containing the software components of the module have their
own overall EMI/EMC rating. The validation test environments have FCC, part 15, Class B rating.
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9 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and
the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the DRBG requires
continuous verification. The FIPS Self-Tests application runs all required module self-tests. This
application is invoked by the macOS startup process upon device initialization.
The execution of an independent application for invoking the self-tests in the libcorecrypto.dylib
makes use of features of the macOS architecture: the module, implemented in
libcorecrypto.dylib, is linked by libcommoncrypto.dylib which is linked by libSystem.dylib. The
libSystem.dylib is a library that must be loaded into every application for operation. The operating
system ensures that there is a strict CSP separation between the instances used by each
application.
All self-tests performed by the module are listed and described in this section.
9.1 Power-Up Tests
The following tests are performed each time the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel starts
and must be completed successfully for the module to operate in the FIPS approved mode. If any
of the following tests fails the device fails to startup. To invoke the self-tests on demand, the user
may reboot the system.
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Algorithm Modes Test
Triple-DES CBC KAT (Known Answer Test)
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
AES implementations selected by the
module for the corresponding environment
AES-128
CBC, ECB, GCM, XTS KAT
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
DRBG (CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG;
tested separately)
N/A KAT
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-512
N/A KAT
RSA Signature Generation /
Signature Verification;
Encrypt / Decrypt
KAT, pair-wise consistency test
Separate encryption /decryption
operations are performed
ECDSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
pair-wise consistency test
Diffie-Hellman “Z” computation N/A KAT
EC Diffie-Hellman “Z” computation N/A KAT
Table 8: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests
A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0
for Intel. The CoreCrypto’s HMAC-SHA256 is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity
test. If the test fails, then the device powers itself off.
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9.1.3 Critical Function Tests
No other critical function test is performed on power up.
9.2 Conditional Tests
The following sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple CoreCrypto Module
v9.0 for Intel.
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel performs a continuous random number generator
test on the noise source (i.e. NDRNG), whenever it is invoked to seed the SP800-90A DRBG.
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel does generate asymmetric keys and performs all
required pair-wise consistency tests, the signature generation and verification tests, with the
newly generated key pairs.
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Health Tests
The Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for Intel performs the health tests as specified in section 11.3
of SP 800-90A.
9.2.4 Critical Function Test
No other critical function test is performed conditionally.
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10 Design Assurance
10.1 Configuration Management
Apple manages and records source code and associated documentation files by using the
revision control system called “Git.”
The Apple module hardware data, which includes descriptions, parts data, part types, bills of
materials, manufacturers, changes, history, and documentation are managed and recorded.
Additionally, configuration management is provided for the module’s FIPS documentation.
The following naming/numbering convention for documentation is applied.
<evaluation>_<module>_<os>_<mode>_<doc name>_<doc version (##.##)>
Example: FIPS_CORECRYPTO_MACOS_US_SECPOL_5.0
Document management utilities provide access control, versioning, and logging. Access to the
Git repository (source tree) is granted or denied by the server administrator in accordance with
company and team policy.
10.2 Delivery and Operation
The CoreCrypto is built into macOS Mojave. For additional assurance, it is digitally signed.
10.3 Development
The Apple crypto module (like any other Apple software) undergoes frequent builds utilizing a
“train” philosophy. Source code is submitted to the Build and Integration group (B & I). B & I
builds, integrates and does basic sanity checking on the operating systems and apps that they
produce. Copies of older versions are archived offsite in underground granite vaults.
10.4 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module’s validated
status while in use.
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be
transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in
Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is
operating in the Approved mode.
A Crypto Officer Role Guide is provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the
necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-2 Compliance of macOS Mojave systems.
This guide walks the reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and
the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation. A link to the Guide can be found on
the Product security, validations, and guidance page found in [UG].
10.4.2 User Guidance
As above, the Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only
be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed
in Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is
operating in the Approved mode.
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11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module protects against the utilization of known Triple-DES weak keys. The following keys
are not permitted:
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}