Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2024 Version 1.3 Page 1 of 31
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Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto
Engine (MACE) – Security Level 3
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.3
Date: October 4, 2024
The MACE is used in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. subscribers. Visit the Motorola Solutions, Inc.
website to verify your subscriber has this module by viewing the subscriber specifications sheet.
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Table of Contents
1 General............................................................................................................................4
2 Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................5
2.1 Operational Environment.............................................................................................................5
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary ..............................................................................................................5
2.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................6
2.3.1 Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation.......................................................7
2.4 Security Functions ........................................................................................................................7
2.5 Overall Security Design.................................................................................................................9
2.6 Rules of Operation .................................................................................................................... 10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services and Authentication................................................................................12
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services ............................................................................... 12
4.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 13
4.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 13
5 Firmware Security..........................................................................................................17
6 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................18
7 Physical Security............................................................................................................19
8 Non-Invasive Security ....................................................................................................20
9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management ..........................................................21
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP).......................................................................................... 22
10 Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................25
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ......................................................................................................27
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures................................................................... 27
11.1.1 Installation and Initialization........................................................................................ 27
11.1.2 Delivery ........................................................................................................................ 27
11.2 Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................ 27
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.................................................................................................... 27
11.4 Maintenance Requirements...................................................................................................... 27
11.5 End of Life.................................................................................................................................. 27
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...........................................................................................28
13 References and Definitions............................................................................................29
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Security Levels............................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration................................................................................5
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms.............................................................................................5
Table 4 – Approved Mode Indicator ............................................................................................................ 7
Table 5 – Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................... 7
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ..................................................................9
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions with No Security Claimed.........................9
Table 8 – Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 11
Table 9 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output..............................................................................12
Table 10 – Roles and Authentication..........................................................................................................13
Table 11 – Approved Services..................................................................................................................... 13
Table 12 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................19
Table 13 – EFP/EFT...................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 14 – Hardness testing temperature range........................................................................................19
Table 15 – SSP Management Methods.......................................................................................................21
Table 16 – SSPs Management..................................................................................................................... 22
Table 17 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification................................................24
Table 18 – Error States and Indicators........................................................................................................25
Table 19 – Pre-Operational Self-Test..........................................................................................................25
Table 20 – Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................26
Table 21 – References................................................................................................................................. 29
Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................30
List of Figures
Figure 1: MACE Chip (Top)............................................................................................................................ 6
Figure 2: MACE Chip (Interfaces).................................................................................................................. 6
Figure 3: Cryptographic Boundary................................................................................................................ 6
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2024 Version 1.3 Page 4 of 31
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1 General
This document defines the Security Policy for the Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
(MACE) – Security Level 3, hereafter denoted the MACE. The MACE is implemented as a single-chip
cryptographic module to meet FIPS 140-3 level 3 physical security requirements as defined by FIPS 140-3
and embedded in the Motorola Solutions subscribers. The MACE provides secure key management, Over-
the-Air-Rekeying (OTAR), and voice and data encryption for multiple Motorola Solutions subscribers. Visit
the Motorola Solutions website to verify your subscriber has this cryptographic module by viewing the
subscriber specifications sheet.
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the MACE are as follows:
Table 1 – Security Levels
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6
[Number below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 3
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 3
10 Self-Tests 3
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 3
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The MACE cryptographic module is a single chip hardware cryptographic module. The MACE is used in
multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. subscribers. The MACE cryptographic module is intended for use by US
Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated overall security level 3.
2.1 Operational Environment
The MACE cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
Model HW P/N, Version
Base
Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
Astro Subscriber Motorola
Advanced Crypto Engine
(MACE)
5185912Y03, 5185912Y05,
5185912T05
R01.13.04 Single chip embodiment
The MACE cryptographic module supports the following approved algorithms which may be installed
separately from the MACE base firmware using the program update service. While the installation of AES
may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the MACE includes this firmware.
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms
Algorithm Algorithm FW Version Base FW Version Cert. #
AES256 (ECB, CBC, and OFB) R01.00.00 R01.13.04 A2261
AES256 (ECB, CBC, OFB, and GCM) R01.00.01 R01.13.04 A2262
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the MACE cryptographic module is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The MACE is a
single chip embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is drawn around the perimeter of the MACE IC as
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 1: MACE Chip (Top) Figure 2: MACE Chip (Interfaces)
The MACE IC has an SSI port, a KVL port when connected to the Motorola Key Variable Loader (KVL), Self-
Test Indicator Interface, and Power Connections.
2.3 Modes of Operation
The MACE is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved mode of
operation. The MACE must be installed, initialized, and configured, including a required change of the
factory-default password, in order to be in an approved mode. Documented below are the additional
configuration settings that are required for the MACE to be used in an Approved Mode of operation at
overall security level 3. At any given time, the module status service can be used to determine whether
the MACE is operating at overall security level 3.
There is no non-approved mode.
CPLD
The MACE
Cryptographic
Boundary
Power SSI Port
KVL Port
Status KYLD
1.8V
Status Indicator
OMAP
Audio
CODECs
SSI RX
SSI TX
Figure 3: Cryptographic Boundary
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Table 4 – Approved Mode Indicator
Approved Mode Indicator Value Meaning
303B030002 Approved Mode at overall Security Level 3
The Module status service can be used to verify the firmware version matches an approved version
listed on NIST’s website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/validated-modules
Also, the module status service will output the AES-256 DIA version installed with a display of 52 (ASCII
"R") 01 00 00 -> R01.00.00 - AES256 DIA or 52 (ASCII "R") 01 00 01 -> R01.00.01 - AES256 DIA.
2.3.1 Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation
In order to configure the MACE into an approved mode, the Module configuration service must be used
to ensure the following parameters are disabled.
1. Motorola Data Communication Over The Air Rekeying (MDC OTAR)
2. Key Loss Key (KLK) generation
3. Red Keyloading
4. Infinite UKEK Retention
The operator shall configure the periodic self-tests timer as part of the Module configuration, refer to
Section 11 for further details.
Additionally, the MACE supports “drop-in algorithms” via the program update service. Drop-in
algorithms may be added or removed from the MACE independent of the base FW. In order to remain in
the Approved mode, only Approved and Allowed algorithms are loaded into the MACE during
initialization; in particular AES-256 (Cert #A2261 and #A2262). The loading and unloading of any
firmware within the validated cryptographic module invalidates the Module’s validation and zeroizes all
SSPs except those entered at manufacturing. The Module is then in a non-compliant state.
2.4 Security Functions
The MACE implements the Approved Mode and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in the tables below.
Note: The brackets [] reference the corresponding documents that can be found in the References section
- Table 21
Table 5 – Approved Algorithms
Cert # Algorithm Mode
Description / Key Size(s) /
Key Strength(s)
Use/Functions
A2260 AES [197]
CFB8 [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
OFB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
A2261 AES [197]
ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
OFB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
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Cert # Algorithm Mode
Description / Key Size(s) /
Key Strength(s)
Use/Functions
A2262 AES [197]
ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
OFB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D]1
Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
A2263 AES [197] KW [38F] Forward Key Sizes: 256
Authenticated Encrypt, Decrypt for
storing SSPs
A2264 AES [197] KW [38F] Forward Key Sizes: 256 Authenticated Decrypt for KTS
VA CKG [IG D.H]
[133] Sections 4 and 5.2 Asymmetric key
establishment key generation using unmodified
DRBG output
Key Generation
[133] Section 4 and Section 6.1 Direct symmetric
key generation using unmodified DRBG output
[133] Section 6.3 Symmetric Keys Produced by
Combining (Multiple) Keys and Other Data
A2265 DRBG [90A]
CTR with derivation
function
AES-256 Deterministic Random Bit Generation2
A655 ECDSA [186-4] P-384 (SHA2-384) Key Generation
HMAC
1796
HMAC [198] SHA2-384
Key Sizes: 32 bytes
λ = 48 bytes
Message Authentication
A2266
KAS-ECC
[56Ar3]
ECC (Initiator,
Responder), KPG,
Partial, oneStepKdf
(SP800-56Cr1)
P-384
SHA2-384
Key Agreement Scheme
Key establishment methodology
provides 192 bits of encryption strength
A2264 KTS [38F] KW AES KW Cert. #A2264
Decrypt OTAR Key blocks encrypted
with AES256 keys.
Key establishment methodology
provides 256 bits strength
A5253 RSA [186-5] PKCS1_v1.5 2048 SigVer
RSA 396 RSA [186-2]3
PKCS1_v1.5 2048 SigVer
SHS 817 SHS [180] SHA2-256
Message Digest Generation, Password
Obfuscation
SHS 2399 SHS [180] SHA2-384 Message Digest Generation
1
Per IG C.H Scenario 2, the MACE generates GCM IVs randomly as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using
approved DRBG (Cert #A2265) and the IV length is 96 bits.
2
The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is determined by the operator of the MACE which is outside of the
module’s physical and logical boundary. The operator shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength
required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and set
required bits into the module by using Load Entropy service listed in Section 4.3. Since entropy is loaded passively
into the module, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. The MACE will not operate in
an approved mode if the module is not seeded by the external entropy.
3
RSA SigVer [FIPS 186-2] is approved for legacy use only: verifying signatures that were performed starting
September 1, 2020 and onwards is a not a FIPS 140-3 compliant use of this algorithm/service and cannot claim
security. Verifying signatures generated before September 1, 2020 is the approved legacy use of RSA SigVer [FIPS
186-2].
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Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use/Function
KTS [38F]
key unwrapping only; Key establishment
methodology provides 256 bits strength
[IG D.G]
AES CBC Cert. #A2261 or #A2262
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions with No Security Claimed
Algorithm Caveat Use/Function
AES MAC N/A
[IG 2.4.A]
P25 AES OTAR. No Security Claimed. AES MAC is used as part of OTAR but
is considered obfuscation. KTS encryption is performed on the OTAR key
components using AES KW and decrypted using AES KW Cert. #A2264
Note: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms and Not Allowed Cryptographic
Functions in the Approved Mode of Operation.
2.5 Overall Security Design
1. The MACE provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The MACE provides identity-based authentication.
3. The MACE clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The MACE allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the
MACE.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the MACE.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The MACE does not support concurrent operators.
11. The MACE does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The MACE does not support manual SSP establishment method.
13. The MACE does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The MACE does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
15. The MACE does not output intermediate key values.
16. The MACE does not provide bypass services on ports/interfaces.
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2.6 Rules of Operation
The MACE shall be installed in the Motorola Solutions subscriber products. After authentication with the
default password, the operator shall change the default password for the User role. The MACE is not
usable until the factory default password is changed for the User role. Note that this makes it very
important that physical access to the MACE is strictly controlled.
The MACE shall be operated such that only approved Drop-in algorithms listed in the Table 3 are installed
including section 11 secure installation, initialization, startup and operation of the MACE.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The MACE’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 8.
Table 8 – Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface Data That Passes Over Port/Interface
Serial Synchronous
Interface (SSI)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
The main physical port provided by the MACE. It provides access to
the majority of the supported interfaces.
KVL Port
Data Input
Control Input
Status Output
This interface provides the input and output to a Key Variable Loader
(KVL).
Power Power Input This interface powers all circuitries.
Self-Test Indicator Status Output
This interface provides status output to indicate all power-up self-
tests completed successfully.
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services
The MACE supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). Table 9 lists all
operator roles supported by the MACE and their related services. In addition, the MACE supports services
which does not require to be authenticated, listed UA in Table 9.
The MACE does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability.
Table 9 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role
Service Input Output
CO User UA
X − − Program Update Firmware Image The MACE is upgraded to new firmware.
− X − Load Entropy DRBG Seed The DRBG is seeded and initialized. Success/failure
status.
− X − Import Keys Over
KYLD Interface
Encrypted Keys Keys imported into the MACE. Success/failure status.
− X − Privileged APCO
OTAR
Encrypted Keys Keys imported into the MACE. Success/failure status.
− X − Change Active
Keyset
Keyset Index Changed the active keyset as requested. Success/failure
status.
− X − Change Password Password Updated the User password. Success/failure status.
− X − Encrypt Plaintext Ciphertext. Success/failure status.
− X − Decrypt Ciphertext Plaintext. Success/failure status.
− X − Zeroize Key Key Index Zeroized the key. Success/failure status.
− X − Key/Keyset Check Key/Keyset Index Success/failure status.
− X − Generate
Signature
Service Request Signature out. Success/failure status.
− X − Key Agreement
Process
Service Request Keys imported into the MACE. Success/failure status.
− X − Zeroize All Keys
and password
Command In Success/failure status.
− − X Module Status Command In
Module HW version, version information, and FIPS
status.
− − X Self-Tests Command In Success/Reset.
− − X Validate Password Password Successful authentication will allow access to the
services allowed for User role.
− − X Extract Error Log Command In Error logs out. Success/Failure status.
− − X Clear Error Log Command In Success/Failure status.
− − X Reset Command In Reset the MACE.
− − X Module
Configuration
Configuration
Parameters
The MACE is configured as requested. Success/Failure
status.
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4.2 Authentication Methods
The MACE supports one distinct operator role (Crypto-Officer). The MACE uses a 10-digit password to
authenticate the Crypto-Officer.
The module ensures that there is no visible display of the authentication data.
Table 10 – Roles and Authentication
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
CO Identity-based: The User role is
authenticated to the MACE
over SSI interface with 10-digit
hexadecimal number.
The strength of the authentication method is 1/1610
.
The MACE limits the number of 15 consecutive failed authentication
attempts. 15 consecutive failed authentication attempts cause all TEKs
and KEKs to be invalidated and the password to be reset to the factory
default. The probability of a successful random attempt during a one-
minute period is 15/1610
.
4.3 Services
All services implemented by the MACE are listed in Table 11. The MACE does not allow any non-approved
service while operating in FIPS 140-3 level 3 mode and indicated use is based on the Module being in
Approved mode per Table 4.
The SSPs modes of access shown in Table 11 are defined as:
• G = Generate: The MACE generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the MACE (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the MACE.
• E = Execute: The MACE uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The MACE zeroizes the SSP
Table 11 – Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access
Rights
Indicator
Program
Update
Update the MACE firmware.
Firmware upgrades are
authenticated using a digital
signature. The Program
Update Public Signature Key
is used to validate the
signature of the firmware
image being loaded before
it is allowed to be executed.
RSA [186-5], Cert.
#A5253
FW-LD-Pub
UA
Z
Approved
Mode
IDK-ROM E
IDK-Block EZ
IDK Z
BKK Z
UKKPK Z
PEK Z
KPK Z
KEK Z
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access
Rights
Indicator
TEK Z
Password Z
PWD Hash Z
PKPK Z
DH-Priv Z
DH-Pub Z
DH-SS Z
DH-CLI-Pub Z
Load Entropy
Load entropy into the
MACE.
AES Key Unwrap, AES
Certs. #A2261 or
#A2262, DRBG Cert.
#2265
DRBG-
EI/Seed
CO
WE
Approved
Mode
DRBG-State G
BKK E
Import keys
over KYLD
interface
Imports keys to the MACE
via a Key Variable Loader
(KVL) encrypted
CKG,
AES Cert. #A2260.
AES Key Unwrap,
(KTS), AES Cert.
#A2261, #A2262.
AES Cert. #2264
BKK
CO
E
Approved
Mode
KPK E
KEK W
TEK W
Privileged
APCO OTAR
Import, modify and query
the keys.
KW [38F], Cert.
#A2264.
AES Certs. #A2261 or
#A2262.
KPK
CO
E
Approved
Mode
KEK WEZ
TEK WEZ
Change Active
Keyset
Modify the currently active
keyset used for selecting
keys for
encryption/decryption
services.
N/A N/A CO N/A
Approved
Mode
Change
Password
Modify the current
password used to identify
and authenticate the User
role.
CKG, AES-256, Cert.
#A2260.
SHS [180], Cert. #817
UKKPK
CO
E
Approved
Mode
PEK E
KPK GEZ
KEK Z
TEK Z
Password GEZ
PWD Hash GEZ
CKG, IDK-ROM CO EZ
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access
Rights
Indicator
Symmetric Key
Generation
Generates the symmetric
keys
AES [197] CBC Cert.
#A2261 or #A2262
AES CFB-8 Cert.
#A2260, DRBG Cert.
#A2265
IDK-Block EZ
Approved
Mode
IDK GZ
KPK GZ
Encrypt
Encrypt digital voice or
data.
AES [197], Cert.
#A2261 or #A2262
DRBG Cert. #2265
TEK CO E
Approved
Mode
Decrypt
Decrypt digital voice or
data.
AES [197], Cert.
#A2261 or #A2262
TEK CO E
Approved
Mode
Zeroize Keys
Zeroize selected key
variables from the MACE.
N/A
KEK
CO
Z Approved
Mode
TEK Z
Key/Keyset
Check
Obtain status information
about a specific key/keyset.
N/A N/A CO N/A
Approved
Mode
Generate
Signature
Generate HMAC-SHA2-384
signature.
HMAC [198], Cert.
#1796
TEK CO E
Approved
Mode
Key
Agreement
Process
Perform a key agreement
process to create an ECDH
Shared Secret, and ECDH
Public and Private Keys.
CKG,
DRBG Cert. #2265
KAS-ECC [56Ar3],
Cert. #A2266, ECDSA
Cert. #A655
KEK
CO
W
Approved
Mode
PKPK GE
DH-Priv GE
DH-Pub GRE
DH-SS GE
DH-CLI-Pub WE
DRBG-State GE
Zeroize all
keys and
password
Zeroize the KPK and all keys
and CSPs in the key
database and causes a new
KPK to be generated.
Resets the password to the
factory default.
N/A
UKKPK
CO
E
Approved
Mode
KPK GZ
KEK Z
TEK Z
Password Z
PWD Hash Z
PKPK Z
DH-Priv Z
DH-Pub Z
Module Status
Provide module version,
firmware version, FIPS
status
N/A N/A UA N/A
Approved
Mode
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access
Rights
Indicator
Self-Tests
Perform module self-tests
comprised of cryptographic
algorithm tests, firmware
integrity test, and critical
functions test. Initiated by
module reset or transition
from power off state to
power on state.
N/A FW-LD-Pub UA E
Approved
Mode
Validate
Password
Validate the current
password used to identify
and authenticate the User
role.
AES-256, Cert.
#A2260.
SHS [180], Cert. #817
UKKPK
UA
E
Approved
Mode
PEK E
KPK GEZ
KEK Z
TEK Z
Password Z
PWD Hash Z
Extract Error
Log
Provide the history of error
events.
N/A N/A UA N/A
Approved
Mode
Clear Error Log Clears the history of error
events.
N/A N/A UA N/A
Approved
Mode
Reset
Reset/power cycle the
MACE.
N/A
DRBG-
EI/Seed
UA
Z
Approved
Mode
DRBG-State Z
DH-SS Z
DH-CLI-Pub Z
Module
Configuration
Download configuration
parameters used to specify
module behavior.
N/A
KPK
UA
GEZ
Approved
Mode
KEK Z
TEK Z
Password WZ
PWD Hash Z
Note: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Services and only provides an Approved mode
of operation.
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5 Firmware Security
The MACE is composed of base firmware version identified in Table 2. On top of that customer shall load
at least one of the Drop-in algorithms listed in Table 3.
The firmware components are protected with the approved firmware integrity technique described in
Table 19.
The Module includes a firmware verification and load service to support necessary updates for the base
firmware.
The operator can initiate the firmware integrity test on demand by power cycling the MACE.
The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):
• non-modifiable operating system - binary
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6 Operational Environment
The MACE has a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions with a Physical
Security at Level 3 therefore this section in not applicable.
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7 Physical Security
The MACE is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-3 and is
designed to meet level 3 physical security requirements. The information below is applicable to
cryptographic module hardware kit numbers 5185912Y03, 5185912Y05, and 5185912T05, which have
identical physical security characteristics.
The MACE is covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper
with the MACE. The security provided from the hardness of the MACE's epoxy encapsulate is claimed at
ambient temperature (-40 to 85 degrees Celsius) only. No assurance of the epoxy hardness is claimed for
this physical security mechanism outside of this range. The MACE does not contain any doors, removable
covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures
are required to maintain physical security of the MACE while delivering to operators.
There are two (2) voltage powers that power the MACE. VDDCORE voltage powers all MACE chip functions
while VDDBU voltage powers the MACE chip battery. VDDCORE and VDDBU voltages enter the
cryptographic boundary of the module separately; and therefore, were tested separately to verify that
they both cause the MACE chip to zeroize SSPs
Table 12 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Covered with a hard-opaque epoxy
coating that provides evidence of
attempts to tamper with the MACE.
Periodically Look for signs of tampering.
Remove from service if
tampering found.
Table 13 – EFP/EFT
Temperature or
Voltage Measurement
EFP Description Results
Low
Temperature
-38.1°C A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset
of the product is triggered.
Shutdown
High
Temperature
101.4°C A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset
of the product is triggered.
Shutdown
Low Voltage 1.65V VDDCORE:
1.350 VVDBU
A general reset of the chip is asserted. Shutdown
High Voltage 2.034V VDDCORE:
2.292V - VVDBU
A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset
of the product is triggered.
Shutdown
Table 14 – Hardness testing temperature range
Hardness Tested Temperature Measurement
Low Temperature -40°C
High Temperature 85°C
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The MACE does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management
The SSPs access methods are described in Table 15 below:
Table 15 – SSP Management Methods
Method Description
G1 Generated external to the MACE and installed during manufacturing
G2 Derived from the DRBG input per SP800-90Ar1
G3 FIPS 186-4 compliant ECDSA key generation, using the internal CAVP validated DRBG
G4 CKG - Symmetric key generated by internal CAVP validated DRBG
G5 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret generation using the internal CAVP validated 56Arev3 protocol
G6 Generated per SP800-133r2 (Section 6.3 #2) via XOR of 2 other keys (IDK ROM and IDK Block)
S1 Stored in the volatile memory (RAM)
S2 Stored in the flash in plaintext, associated by memory location (pointer)
S3 Stored in the flash in encrypted, associated by memory location (pointer)
E1 Electronically input, AES-256 CBC encrypted by the IDK Block and ROM using AES KTS (Cert. #s A2261,
#A2262)
E2 Electronically input, AES-256 ECB encrypted by the BKK using AES KTS (Cert. #s A2261, #A2262)
E3 Electronically input, AES-256 OFB encrypted by the BKK using AES KTS (Cert. #s A2261, #A2262)
E4 Electronically input, AES-256 CFB-8 encrypted by the PEK using AES KTS (Cert. #s A2261, #A2262)
E5 Electronically input using SP800-38F AES key transport by the KEK or TEK using AES KW Cert. #A2264
E6 Electronically established through ECDH Key Agreement Process (SP 800-56A KASrev3, Cert. #A2266)
Z1 Zeroized by program update service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s” *
Z2 Zeroized by module power cycle or hard reset by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s” *
Z3 Zeroized by the “zeroize keys” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern of “0s”
Z4 Zeroized by the “zeroize all keys and password” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern of “0s”
Z5 Zeroized by the “validate password” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s”
Z6 Zeroized by the “change password” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s”
Z7 Zeroized by the “module configuration” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s”
Z8 Zeroized by the “privileged APCO OTAR” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s”
Z9 Zeroized by the “import keys over KYLD interface” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern “0s”
Note: For zeroization methods with an asterisk, once zeroization is complete the Module will reboot,
indicating successful zeroization. The output status of all other methods of success of zeroization are
implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error.
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9.1 Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP)
All SSPs (CSPs and PSPs) used by the MACE are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the
MACE is described in the services detailed in 4.3.
Table 16 – SSPs Management
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert. #
Genera-
tion
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
CSPs
DRBG-
EI/Seed
N/A N/A N/A E2 N/A S1 Z2
Externally generated, a
minimum of 48 bytes
are passively entered
into the MACE by the
User.
DRBG-
State
256
DRBG Cert.
#A2265
G2 N/A N/A S1 Z2
CTR_DRBG internal
state: V (128 bits) and
Key (AES 256) and
derived from DRBG-
EI/Seed
IDK ROM 256
AES CBC Cert.
#A2261 or
#A2262
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
A 256-bit AES CBC key
used in the re-
construction of IDK per
SP800-133r2 (Section
6.3 #2) via XOR using
IDK Block
IDK Block 256
AES CBC Cert.
#A2261 or
#A2262
G1 E1 N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
A 256-bit AES CBC key
used in the re-
construction of IDK per
SP800-133r2 (Section
6.3 #2) via XOR using
IDK ROM
IDK 256
AES CBC Cert.
#A2261 or
#A2262
G6 N/A N/A S1 Z2
A 256-bit AES CBC key
used to decrypt
downloaded firmware
images.
BKK 256
AES ECB/OFB
Cert. #A2261,
#A2262
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
A 256-bit AES key used
for decrypting Load
entropy (ECB) and
TEK/KEK (OFB) into the
MACE.
UKKPK 256
AES CBC Cert.
#A2261 or
#A2262
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
256-bit AES Key used
for encrypting the KPK
in flash.
PEK 256
AES CBC Cert.
#A2261 or
#A2262
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
256-bit AES CFB-8 key
used for decrypting
passwords.
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Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert. #
Genera-
tion
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
KPK 256
AES CFB-8 Cert.
#A2260, DRBG
Cert. #A2265
G4 N/A N/A S1, S3
Z1, Z2, Z3,
Z4, Z5, Z6,
Z7
256-bit AES CFB-8 key
used to encrypt all
TEKs and KEKs stored
in flash.
KEK 256
AES KW Cert.
#A2264, AES
OFB Cert.
#A2260
N/A
E3, E5,
E6
N/A S1, S3
Z1, Z2, Z3,
Z4, Z5, Z6,
Z7, Z8, Z9
256-bit AES Keys used
for decrypting key
blocks in the OTAR
service.
TEK 256
AES KW Cert.
#A2264 AES
OFB Cert.
#A2260
N/A E3, E5 N/A S1, S3
Z1, Z2, Z3,
Z4, Z5, Z6,
Z7, Z8, Z9
256-bit AES key used
for voice and data
decryption.
Password N/A
AES CFB-8 Cert.
#A2260
N/A E4 N/A S1
Z1, Z2, Z4,
Z5, Z6, Z7
10-digit hexadecimal
number user
authentication
password
PWD
Hash
128
SHS [180] Cert.
#817
SHA2-256
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2
Z1, Z2, Z4,
Z5, Z6, Z7
256-bit password hash
stored in the non-
volatile memory.
PKPK 256
AES KW
#A2263
G4 N/A N/A S1, S3 Z1, Z2, Z4
256-bit AES KW used
to store encrypted, the
ECDH generated
private key.
DH-Priv 192
KAS #A2266,
ECDSA Cert.
#A655
G3 N/A N/A S1, S3 Z1, Z2, Z4
The Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
private key used for
establishing a shared
secret over an
insecure channel.
DH-SS 192 KAS #A2266 N/A N/A G5 S1 Z2
The Elliptic Diffie-
Hellman (DH) Shared
Secret (SS) is
established as a part of
DH key agreement
scheme.
PSPs
FW-LD-
Pub
112
AES CBC
#A2261 or
#A2262,
RSA Cert.
#A5253
G1 N/A N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
2048-bit RSA key used
to validate the
signature of the
firmware image before
it is allowed.
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Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert. #
Genera-
tion
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
DH-Pub 192
KAS Cert.
#A2266, ECDSA
Cert. #A655
G3 E6 N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
The Elliptic Curve (EC)
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
public key, used for
establishing a shared
secret over an
insecure channel.
DH-CLI-
Pub
192
KAS Cert.
#A2266
N/A E6 N/A S1, S2 Z1, Z2
The Elliptic Curve (EC)
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
public key from the
other party, used for
establishing a shared
secret over an
insecure channel.
Table 17 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
Entropy Sources
Minimum Number of
Bits of Entropy
Details
External 384 bits of entropy
The Load Entropy service provides the security strength required for
the random number generation mechanism
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10 Self-Tests
The MACE performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the MACE. Per FIPS 140-3 these are
categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Both pre-operational and
conditional self-tests are executed automatically by the Self-test service when the module is initiated by
module reset or transitions from power off state to power on state. All KATs (including the integrity test)
are passed before the module transitions to an operational state. While the module is executing all self-
tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until all tests
are successfully completed. No operator intervention is required.
Pre-operational self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the MACE. Conditional self–tests are
periodically performed by the MACE as configured by the operator during module configuration as shown
in Section 11.1.1. The MACE will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the
commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the MACE at the end of periodic self-test when the
I/O buffer is emptied. The MACE will reset if any self-tests fail, otherwise it will continue to operate
normally. The MACE logs the most recent self-test errors to the internal flash; the operator (UA) can
extract the error logs using Extract Error Log service list in section 4.3.
The self-tests error states and status indicator are described in table below:
Table 18 – Error States and Indicators
Error state Description Indicator
ES1 The MACE fails a KAT. The MACE enters the critical error state. In this state, the MACE stores
the status into the internal flash memory and then halts all further
operation by entering an infinite loop. The operator may correct this
state by power cycling the MACE.
ES2 The MACE fails a firmware
loading during program
upgrade and/or firmware
integrity pre-operational
self-test.
The MACE enters the firmware signature validation failure state. In this
state, the MACE halts all further operations by entering the flash
programming mode. The operator may correct the issue by power cycle
and/or re-flashing a new image.
ES3
The MACE fails an ECDSA
PCT.
The MACE enters a temporary error state. The generated key is not
used, and the Module returns an error code (0x1) to the operator. The
key is discarded, and the process abandoned.
The MACE performs the following pre-operational self-tests:
Table 19 – Pre-Operational Self-Test
Security
Function
Method Description
Error
state
Firmware
integrity
RSA (Cert. #396
and #A5253),
SHA2-256 (Cert.
#817)
A digital signature is generated over the Boot Block and Base firmware
using RSA-2048 (Cert. #A5253) code when it is built. Drop-in algorithms
code uses RSA-2048 (Cert. #396) and is stored with the code upon
download into the MACE. When the MACE is powered up, the digital
signature is verified. If the digital signature matches, then the test passes,
otherwise it fails.
ES2
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The MACE performs the conditional self-tests listed in the table below. All KATs are performed during
boot up of the module and before the module transitions to an operational state.
Table 20 – Conditional Self-Tests
Security Function Method Description Error state
AES – ECB
(Cert. #A2261)
KAT
AES-256 ECB encryption KAT - Inclusive to AES CBC and OFB
encryption mode testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – ECB
(Cert. #A2261)
KAT
AES-256 ECB decryption KAT – Inclusive to AES CBC and OFB inverse
function testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – ECB
(Cert. #A2262)
KAT
AES-256 ECB encryption KAT – Inclusive to AES CBC and OFB
encryption mode testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – ECB
(Cert. #A2262)
KAT
AES-256 ECB decryption KAT – Inclusive to AES CBC and OFB inverse
function testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – CFB8
(Cert. #A2260)
KAT
AES-256 CFB-8 encryption KAT – Inclusive to AES-256 OFB testing with
256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – CFB8
(Cert. #A2260)
KAT
AES-256 CFB-8 decryption KAT – Inclusive to AES-256 OFB testing with
256-bit key per IG 10.3.A
ES1
AES – GCM
(Cert. #2262)
KAT AES-256 GCM encryption KAT as per IG 10.3.A ES1
AES – GCM
(Cert. #2262)
KAT AES-256 GCM decryption KAT as per IG 10.3.A ES1
AES KW
(Cert. #A2263)
KAT AES-256 key wrapping KAT ES1
AES KW
(Cert. #A2263)
KAT AES-256 key unwrapping KAT ES1
AES KW
(Cert. #A2264)
KAT AES-256 key unwrap KAT ES1
DRBG
(Cert. #A2265)
KAT
AES-256 CTR_DRBG Health Tests (instantiation, generate, and reseed)
KATs performed before the first random data generation.
ES1
ECDSA Key
Generation
PWCT
ECDSA P-384 Key Generation Pair-Wise Consistency Test every time
the Key Agreement Process service requests a key pair.
ES3
Firmware Load
(Cert. #A5253)
RSA-2048
SigVer
A digital signature is generated over the code when it is built using
SHA2-256 and RSA-2048 (FIPS 186-5). The digital signature is verified
upon download into the MACE during the Program Update service.
ES2
HMAC
(Cert. #1796)
KAT HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT ES1
KAS-ECC
(Cert. #2266)
KAT
Per IG D.F, separately tested KAS Shared Secret generation with P-384
and SP 800-56Cr2 one-step KDA
ES1
RSA SigVer
(Cert. #A5253)
KAT
RSA-2048 SigVer, performed before FW integrity tests. Inclusive for
186-2 (Cert. #396)
ES2
SHS 256-bit
(Cert. #817)
KAT SHA2-256 KAT, performed before FW integrity tests. ES2
SHS 384-bit
(Cert. #2399)
KAT SHA2-384 KAT ES1
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
11.1.1 Installation and Initialization
The Module is originally a non-compliant module and must be initialized to be in approved mode. There
is no non-approved mode. During initialization the operator shall configure the MACE from the
instructions below:
1. Upon first access, the operator will use the default password provided by Motorola in a separate
communication.
2. The operator will then change the default password based on the requirements in Table 10 –
Roles and Authentication.
3. The operator will then configure the MACE using the Module configuration service as specified
in the section 2.3.1.
4. Finally, the operator will set the periodic self-tests timer as part of the Module configuration in
every X minutes, where X is a minimum value = 1 minute and maximum value = 712,800 minutes
(495 days). Note: the default minimum = 0* but must be changed to a minimum of 1.
* Periodic self-tests will not perform if minimum = 0
11.1.2 Delivery
The MACE is embedded in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. radios (aka, subscribers). Motorola uses
commercially available courier systems such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL with a tracking number and requires
a signature at the end by an authorized client.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations.
11.4 Maintenance Requirements
The MACE does not require any special maintenance.
11.5 End of Life
After the end-of-life, the operator should zeroize all SSPs using the “Zeroize all keys and password”
service listed in the Section 4.3 followed by shredding the MACE chip.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The MACE does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2024 Version 1.3 Page 29 of 31
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13 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 21 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques — Test
requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques — Test
requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program,
November 2021.
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2,
June 2020
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1,
June 2015.
[OTAR] Project 25 – Digital Radio Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Messages and Procedures [TIA-
102.AACA-A], September 2014
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Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BKK Black Keyloading Key
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DH-CLI-Pub Diffie-Hellman Client Public Key
DH-Priv Diffie-Hellman Private Key
DH-Pub Diffie-Hellman Public Key
DH-SS Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FW Firmware
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HSM Hardware Security Module
IDK Image Decryption Key
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDA Key Derivation Algorithm
KPK Key Protection Key
KEK Key Encryption Key
KYLD Keyload
KVL Key Variable Loader
MAC Message Authentication Code
MACE Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
MDC Motorola Data Communication
OFB Output Feedback
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Acronym Definition
OTAR Over The Air Rekeying
PEK Password Encryption Key
PKPK Private Key Protection Key
PWCT Pair-Wise Consistency Test
PWD Hash Password Hash
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SSI Synchronous Serial Interface
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
UA Unauthenticated Service
UKEK Universal Key Encryption Key
UKKPK Universal Key for Key Protection Key