1 Jun 16, 2026
KIOXIA Corporation
KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class B1
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Rev 1.3.0
2 Jun 16, 2026
Table of Contents
1 General ......................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................5
1.3 Additional Information..........................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..........................................................................................6
2.1 Description ..........................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .........................................7
2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................7
2.4 Modes of Operation.............................................................................................................7
2.5 Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................8
2.6 Security Function Implementations .....................................................................................9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information...........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols............................................................................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.............................................................................................10
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................10
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................11
4.1 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................11
4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................11
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................11
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................20
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .................................................................................20
5 Software/Firmware Security.....................................................................................................20
5.1 Integrity Techniques..........................................................................................................20
5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................21
6 Operational Environment .........................................................................................................21
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...........................................................21
7 Physical Security......................................................................................................................21
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required...................................................................................21
8 Non-Invasive Security..............................................................................................................22
8.1 Mitigation Techniques .......................................................................................................22
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...........................................................................22
9.1 Storage Areas ...................................................................................................................22
3 Jun 16, 2026
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...............................................................................................23
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................23
9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................24
10 Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................25
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................25
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................26
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information .........................................................................................27
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................28
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.......................................................................................29
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................29
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................29
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................29
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ...........................................................................................30
11.4 Design and Rules............................................................................................................30
11.5 Maintenance Requirements ............................................................................................30
11.6 End of Life .......................................................................................................................30
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.....................................................................................................30
12.1 Attack List........................................................................................................................30
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness...................................................................................................30
4 Jun 16, 2026
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware .......................................................................7
Table 3: Modes List and Description.............................................................................................7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.......................................................................................................8
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms............................................................................................8
Table 6: Security Function Implementations.................................................................................9
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.......................................................................................................10
Table 8: Entropy Sources ...........................................................................................................10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................11
Table 10: Roles...........................................................................................................................11
Table 11: Approved Services......................................................................................................20
Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................21
Table 13: Storage Areas.............................................................................................................23
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................23
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................23
Table 16: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................24
Table 17: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................25
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................26
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................27
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..........................................................................27
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information .................................................................................28
Table 22: Error States.................................................................................................................28
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram ...............................................................................................................6
Figure 2: TC58NC1137GTC 0002 SoC ......................................................................................22
Figure 3: TC58NC1138GTC 0002 SoC ......................................................................................22
5 Jun 16, 2026
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document explains precise specification of the security rules about KIOXIA FIPS
TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class B1. The Cryptographic Module
(CM) meets the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 1 Overall.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CM Cryptographic Module
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
HMAC The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication code
KAT Known Answer Test
RCT Repetition Count Test
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
POST Power on Self-Test
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
PSID Printed SID
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SID Security ID
TCG Trusted Computing Group
LBA Logical Block Address
6 Jun 16, 2026
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class B1 (listed in
Section2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification) is used for solid
state drive data security. The CM is a single chip hardware module implemented as a sub-chip
compliant with IG 2.3.B in the TC58NC1137GTC 0002 SoC and TC58NC1138GTC 0002 SoC
(see Figure 2,3 in Section 7.1). The CM is embedded in TCG OPAL compliant solid state drive
controllers which provides user data encryption/decryption through build-in HW engines.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics: SubChip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the set of TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC
CRPT module as soft circuity core and SC82DN as associated firmware, and the physical
perimeter is defined as the surface of TC58NC1137GTC 0002 SoC and TC58NC1138GTC
0002 SoC.
Components of the CM is shown with gray background include processor and memories
(volatile and non-volatile memory) and HW circuitry for cryptographic processing. Physical ports
bordering outside the CM’s boundary and the data passing over them are also indicated (see
Section 3.1 for details on physical ports and interfaces).
Overview block diagram of the CM is shown below.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
7 Jun 16, 2026
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardwar
e
Version
Firmwar
e
Version
Processor
s
Features
KIOXIA FIPS
TC58NC1137GT
C Crypto Sub-
Chip Class B1
0002 SC82DN Cortex-M3 Single-Chip: TC58NC1137GTC-
0002; Soft Circuitry core:
TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138G
TC CRPT module 0001
KIOXIA FIPS
TC58NC1138GT
C Crypto Sub-
Chip Class B1
0002 SC82DN Cortex-M3 Single-Chip: TC58NC1138GTC-
0002; Soft Circuitry core:
TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138G
TC CRPT module 0001
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved mode Approved mode Approved None*
Table 3: Modes List and Description
* The CM has one approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of
operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11.1). In approved mode, the CM
provides services defined in Table 11 in Section 4.3.
8 Jun 16, 2026
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5952 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A5952 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A5952 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38E
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6045 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6045 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A6007 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5952 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
KDF SP800-108 A6026 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported
Lengths: 512
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5952 Modulo - 2048, 3072
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A5952 Message Length - Message Length:
8-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A5952 Message Length - Message Length:
8-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
ECB mode is used as a prerequisite of XTS mode. ECB is not directly used in services of the
Cryptographic Module. The CM performs a check that the XTS Key1 and XTS Key2 are
different according to IG C.I. AES-XTS is only used for encryption/decryption of data stored in
solid state drives equipped with this CM.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric N/A SP800-133 r2, Section 4, example 1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
9 Jun 16, 2026
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KDK Generation CKG Generate KDK
with random
number
Hash DRBG:
(A6007)
MEKs Generation KBKDF Derive MEKs
to be used in
external AES
circuit based
on KDK
KDF SP800-
108: (A6026)
HMAC
Generation/Verification
MAC HMAC
generation and
verification for
arbitrary data
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5952)
Key Transport KTS-Wrap Transport data
to/from
external
memory area
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5952)
AES-CBC:
(A5952)
User Data
Encryption/Decryption
BC-UnAuth Encryption /
Decryption of
user data
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A5952)
AES-ECB:
(A5952)
FW digital signature
verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
firmware image
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5952)
SHA2-384:
(A5952)
Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Signature
generation for
arbitrary data
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6045)
Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
arbitrary data
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6045)
Hash calculation SHA Calculate hash
for the arbitrary
data
SHA2-256:
(A5952)
SHA2-384:
(A5952)
Random Number
Generation
DRBG Generate
Random
Number
Hash DRBG:
(A6007)
Entropy Generation ENT-ESV Entropy
Source (E188)
: ()
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
10 Jun 16, 2026
The CM does not implement any Non-Approved Security Function Implementations in the
Approved Mode of Operation.
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
There is no algorithm specific information.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E188 KIOXIA Corporation
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Entropy
Source
Physical TC58NC1137GTC-0002,
TC58NC1138GTC-0002
1 bit 0.673
bit
N/A
Table 8: Entropy Sources
The Entropy Source is a hardware module inside the CM boundary. The Entropy Source
supplies the Hash_DRBG with 1024 bits entropy input. From Table 8 this input contains about
689 bits of entropy, which is sufficient entropy to obtain 256 bits of security strength.
2.9 Key Generation
Please refer to Section 9.4.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Mailbox Data Input Mailbox input parameter
Mailbox Data Output Mailbox output parameter
Mailbox Control Input Mailbox command information
11 Jun 16, 2026
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Mailbox Status Output Mailbox command result
AES circuit Data Input User data
AES circuit Data Output User data
DMAC Data Input Mailbox input parameter
DMAC Data Output Mailbox output parameter
Lock Checker Data Input Read/Write destination address information
Lock Checker Control Input Lock status confirmation request signal
Lock Checker Status Output Lock status confirmation result signal
Power PIN Power Power
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
Control output is omitted in the table above because the CM does not implement this type of
interface.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
AdminSP.SID Role CO None
AdminSP.Admin1 Role CO None
LockingSP.Admin1-4 Role CO None
LockingSP.UserX (X=1,
...192)
Role CO None
Table 10: Roles
The CM only supports Crypto Officer Role.
The CM is FIPS140-3 Level 1 certification and does not comply with the authentication
mechanisms specified in FIPS140-3. However, it does support the authentication function for
TCG Role authentication defined by the TCG Opal specification. Each Role is explicitly
assumed using the TCG Start Session Method.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Band
Lock/Unloc
k
Lock or
unlock
read / write
of user
Mailbo
x
comm
Mailbox
comman
d / input
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK: E
- MEKs: G,Z
12 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
data in a
band.
and
result
paramet
er
Generation/Verifi
cation
- System MAC
Key: E
Band
Lock/Unloc
k for Band
of Single
User Mode
Lock or
unlock
read / write
of user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK: E
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
Check
Lock State
Check a
lock state
of band
that read /
write user
data.
N/A Lock
status
confirma
tion
request
signal
Lock
status
confirma
tion
result
signal
None Unauthenticat
ed
Data
Read/Write
Encryption
/
Decryption
of user
data to /
from
unlocked
band of
SSD.
Reada
ble /
Writabl
e
signal
from
Lock
Check
er
LBA,
User
Data of
ciphertex
t /
plaintext
(read /
write)
LBA,
User
Data of
plaintext
/
ciphertex
t (read /
write)
User Data
Encryption/Decr
yption
Unauthenticat
ed
- MEKs: E
Cryptograp
hic Erase
Erase user
data (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Cryptograp
hic Erase
for Band of
Single
User Mode
Erase user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
- MEKs: G,Z
13 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Cryptograp
hic Erase
and
Initialize
Band State
Erase user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key, and
initialize
the band
state
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Download
Port
Lock/Unloc
k
Lock /
unlock
firmware
download
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None AdminSP.SID
Firmware
Verification
Digital
signature
verification
for
firmware
outside the
CM
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
FW digital
signature
verification
Unauthenticat
ed
Firmware
Download
Download
a firmware
image
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
FW digital
signature
verification
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PubKey1:
W,E
Random
Number
Generation
Provide a
random
number
generated
by the CM.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Random
Number
Generation
Unauthenticat
ed
- DRBG
Internal Value:
E
Set Band
Position
and Size
Set the
location
Mailbo
x
comm
Mailbox
comman
d / input
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
14 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
and size of
the band
and
result
paramet
er
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Set Band
Position
and Size
for Band of
Single
User Mode
Set the
location
and size of
the band
"X" of
single user
mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- MEKs: G,Z
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Set PIN Set PIN
(authentica
tion data)
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Key Transport
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- PINs: W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- PINs: W,E
15 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Set PIN for
Band of
Single
User Mode
Set PIN
(authentica
tion data)
of authority
for band X
of single
user mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Key Transport
Hash calculation
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- PINs: W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Authority
Enable/Dis
able
Enable/Dis
able the
authority.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Key Transport AdminSP.SID
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Revert Initialize
the band
State and
disable
band lock
setting.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
16 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Data
Locking
Protection
Enable
Enable
Data
protection
with band
lock
setting.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Key Transport
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Sanitize Erase all
user data
(in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Format
Namespac
e
Erase user
data (in
cryptograp
hic means)
on
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
17 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Namespac
e by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Namespac
e
Create/Del
ete
Create and
delete
Namespac
e.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
18 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Band Set
Enable
Set the
location,
size and
lock state
of the
band.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Band Set
Disable
Initialize
the
location,
size and
lock state
of the
band.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
Key Transport
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Signature
Generation
Generate a
signature
of the data
by using a
private key
entered
from
outside of
the CM.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Signature
Generation
Unauthenticat
ed
- Key Pair
Private Key:
W,E,Z
Signature
Verification
Verify input
signature
by using a
Mailbo
x
comm
Mailbox
comman
d / input
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Signature
Verification
Unauthenticat
ed
- Key Pair
19 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
public key
entered
from
outside of
the CM.
and
result
paramet
er
Public Key:
W,E,Z
Calculate
Hash
Digest
Hash the
data
entered
from
outside of
the CM
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Hash calculation Unauthenticat
ed
Show
Status
(Show
Version)
Report
status of
the CM
and
versioning
information
.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None Unauthenticat
ed
Zeroization Zeroize
SSPs.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None Unauthenticat
ed
- RKey: Z
- KDK: Z
- MEKs: Z
- PINs: Z
- System MAC
Key: Z
- System Enc
Key: Z
- DRBG
Internal Value:
Z
Reset
(Power-
OFF)
Delete
SSPs in
SRAM.
N/A N/A N/A None Unauthenticat
ed
- KDK: Z
- MEKs: Z
- PINs: Z
- System MAC
Key: Z
- System Enc
Key: Z
- DRBG
Internal Value:
Z
- PubKey1: Z
Reset
(Power-
ON) (Self
Test)
Runs
various
self-tests
to be
N/A N/A N/A MEKs
Generation
Key Transport
FW digital
Unauthenticat
ed
- RKey: E
- KDK: W,E
20 Jun 16, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
performed
at power-
on (
POSTs,
CASTs,
Firmware
Load test )
and
generate /
import
some
SSPs.
Derive
MEKs if
the
correspond
ing band
has been
unlocked
by the
appropriat
e roles.
signature
verification
Hash calculation
Entropy
Generation
- MEKs: G,Z
- PINs: W
- System MAC
Key: G,E
- System Enc
Key: G,E
- DRBG
Internal Value:
G
- DRBG Seed:
G,E,Z
- PubKey1:
W,E
Table 11: Approved Services
Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the zeroization service.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The CM performs signature verification on Firmware loaded from external memory using
RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 (SHA2-384, 3072-bit key).The Firmware is verified at separated
memory from the current firmware, and it is loading if the firmware verification is successful.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
Firmware Security of components in this CM is shown below.
MaskROM Code:
・ Form of the executable code: Binary
・ Integrity verification method: 32bit CRC
21 Jun 16, 2026
Firmware image (User Code):
・ Form of the executable code: Binary
・ Integrity verification method: Approved signature verification (RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5)
5.2 Initiate on Demand
MaskROM Code, Firmware image (User Code)
・ Initiate on demand integrity verification: Power cycling
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM does not employ
operating systems and operates in a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3
definitions. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module
certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a success of firmware load test and
a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Passivated opaque
package
Every month or every two
months
Confirmation that there is no visual
damage
Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The CM is a sub-chip enclosed in a single chip that is an opaque package. Gathering
information of the module’s internal construction or components is impossible without forcing the
package to open. In this case, it is confirmed package damage as a tamper-evidence.
Operators of the CM can ensure that the physical security is maintained to confirm the package
has no obvious attack damage. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be
removed.
Front Back
22 Jun 16, 2026
Figure 2: TC58NC1137GTC 0002 SoC
Front Back
Figure 3: TC58NC1138GTC 0002 SoC
8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The CM does not apply Non-invasive security.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
S1 OTP: One Time Programmable area Static
S2 SRAM: Storage area to store FW components and SSPs as volatile
information
Dynamic
S3 AES Circuit HW Register: Write Only Storage area to store MEKs of
unlock band
Dynamic
S4 DRAM: Outside the cryptographic module Dynamic
23 Jun 16, 2026
Table 13: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
IE1 S2 S4 Encrypted Automated Electronic Key Transport
IE2 S4 S2 Encrypted Automated Electronic Key Transport
IE3 S4 S2 Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Z1 Overwriting S1
with All 1
S1 is overwritten, All
1 key is not allowed.
Zeroization
Z2-1 Overwriting S2
with All 0
S2 is overwritten, All
0 key is not allowed.
Zeroization, Services that allow
setting the range length to zero*
Z2-2 Overwriting S3
with All 0
S3 is overwritten, All
0 key is not allowed.
Zeroization, Services that allow
setting the range length to zero;
Services that allow locking the
corresponding band**
Z3-1 Overwriting S2
with random
value
S2 is overwritten
with newly
generated random
value.
Services that update key***
Z3-2 Overwriting S3
with random
value
S3 is overwritten
with newly
generated random
value.
Services that update key
Z4 Overwriting
immediately
after use
The CM overwrites
SSP with All 0
immediately
N/A
Z5 Clear the data in
volatile memory
S2 and S3, S4 are
cleared when
Power-off
Reset(Power-OFF) service
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods
* Services that allow setting the range length to zero: Set Band position and Size, Set Band
Position and Size for Band of Single User Mode, Namespace Create/Delete, Band Set Enable
and Band Set Disable.
** Services that allow locking the corresponding band: Band Lock/Unlock, Cryptographic Erase
and initialize Band State, Revert, and Band Set Enable.
*** Services that update key: The following service are applicable, Cryptographic Erase,
Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode, Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band
State, Set Band Position and Size, Revert, Sanitize and Format Namespace.
24 Jun 16, 2026
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Categor
y
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
RKey Derivation of
System Enc Key
and System MAC
Key
256 -
256
Symmet
ric -
CSP
Hash
DRBG
(A6007)
KDF SP800-108
(A6026)
System
Enc
Key
Data Encryption /
Decryption for
KTS
256 -
256
Symmet
ric -
CSP
KDF
SP800-
108
(A6026)
Key Transport
System
MAC
Key
Message
Authentication
Code generation
and verification
for KTS
256 -
256
Symmet
ric -
CSP
KDF
SP800-
108
(A6026)
HMAC
Generation/Verific
ation
Key Transport
KDK Derivation of
MEKs
256 -
256
Symmet
ric -
CSP
KDK
Generati
on
Key
Transport
MEKs Generation
MEKs Data
encryption/decry
ption
512 -
256
Symmet
ric -
CSP
MEKs
Generati
on
User Data
Encryption/Decryp
tion
PINs User
authentication
PIN
256 -
128
PIN -
CSP
Key Transport
Hash calculation
Key
Pair
Private
Key
Imported Private
Key for ECDSA
384 -
192
Private -
CSP
Signature
Generation
DRBG
Internal
Value
DRBG state(V:
440 bits, C: 440
bits)
880 -
256
DRBG
Internal
State -
CSP
Hash
DRBG
(A6007)
Random Number
Generation
DRBG
Seed
DRBG seed 1024 -
256
Seed -
CSP
Entropy
Generati
on
Hash DRBG
(A6007)
PubKe
y1
Signature
verification key
for RSA
3072 -
128
Public -
PSP
FW digital
signature
verification
Key
Pair
Public
Key
Imported Public
key for ECDSA
384 -
192
Public -
PSP
Signature
Verification
Table 16: SSP Table 1
25 Jun 16, 2026
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
RKey S1:Plaintext Until zeroization Z1 System Enc
Key:Derives
System MAC
Key:Derives
System
Enc Key
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
RKey:Derived
From
KDK:Wraps
PINs:Wraps
System
MAC Key
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
RKey:Derived
From
KDK IE1
IE2
S2:Plaintext While the band
exist, Until Power-
Off
Z2-1
Z2-2
Z3-1
Z5
System Enc
Key:wrapped by
MEKs:Derives
MEKs S3:Plaintext While the band is
unlocked, Until
Power-Off
Z2-2
Z3-2
Z5
KDK:Derived
From
PINs IE1
IE2
IE3
S2:Obfuscated Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z4
Z5
System Enc
Key:wrapped by
Key Pair
Private Key
IE3 S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
DRBG
Internal
Value
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
DRBG
Seed
S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
PubKey1 IE3 S2:Plaintext
S1:Obfuscated
Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
Key Pair
Public Key
IE3 S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
Table 17: SSP Table 2
PINs are stored in S2, and PubKey1 is stored in S1 as hashed value. “Obfuscated” in “Storage”
column of these SSPs means hashed value.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Firmware
integrity test
integrity 32 bit
CRC
SW/FW
Integrity
Implicit error
reporting by
stopping the startup
sequence
Verify MaskROM
code integrity with
32bit CRC
26 Jun 16, 2026
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Firmware load test is also run at the time of Power-up, and the integrity of the Firmware loaded
into the CM can be confirmed.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A5952)
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x24
Encrypt,
Decrypt
Power-on
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A5952)
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x23
Encrypt,
Decrypt
Power-on
SHA2-256
(A5952)
Digest Size
: 256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x25
Digest Power-on
SHA2-384
(A5952)
Digest Size
: 384 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x25
Digest Power-on
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5952)
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x26
Digest Power-on
Hash DRBG
(A6007)
Hash
based:
SHA2-256
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x18/0x19
DRBG Power-on
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5952)
Key Size:
2048 and
3072 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x27
Signature
Verification
Power-on
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6045)
Curve: P-
384
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x36
Signature
Generation
Before first
use
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6045)
Curve: P-
384
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x36
Signature
Verification
Before first
use
KDF SP800-
108 (A6026)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x28
KDF Power-on
Entropy
Source
(Health tests
of noise
source at
startup)
Cut off RCT:
60, APT:
744
RCT,
APT
CAST 0x01 or
0x2C/2D
Entropy
Generation
Power-on
Entropy
Source
(Continuous
noise source
health tests
during
operation)
Cut off RCT:
60, APT:
744
RCT,
APT
CAST 0x01 or
0x2C/2D
Entropy
Generation
Entropy
output
request
27 Jun 16, 2026
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Firmware load
test at Power
on
hash type:
SHA2-384;
key length:
3072 bit
sigVer SW/FW
Load
0x01 or
0x13
Verify
signature of
loaded
firmware
image
Power on
Firmware load
test at FW
download
hash type:
SHA2-384;
key length:
3072 bit
sigVer SW/FW
Load
0x01 or
0x13
Verify
signature of
downloaded
firmware
image
FW
download
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests
If the Conditional Self-Tests are successful, the CM will return 0x01 as an indicator; if they fail, it
will return Error Code in Table22.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware
integrity test
32 bit CRC SW/FW Integrity On Demand Power cycling
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
(A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
AES-XTS
Testing Revision
2.0 (A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
SHA2-256
(A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
SHA2-384
(A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Hash DRBG
(A6007)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5952)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6045)
KAT CAST On Demand First provided
service after
power cycling
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6045)
KAT CAST On Demand First provided
service after
power cycling
28 Jun 16, 2026
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
KDF SP800-108
(A6026)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Entropy Source
(Health tests of
noise source at
startup)
RCT, APT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Entropy Source
(Continuous
noise source
health tests
during
operation)
RCT, APT CAST On Demand Provided service
with generating
entropy
Firmware load
test at Power on
sigVer SW/FW Load On Demand Power cycling
Firmware load
test at FW
download
sigVer SW/FW Load On Demand Provided service
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Boot Error
State
The CM has failed
Pre-operational self-
test and
cryptographic
algorithm test
excluded ECDSA
Pre-operational self-
test and
cryptographic
algorithm test
excluded ECDSA
Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x23 0x24,
0x25, 0x26, 0x18,
0x19, 0x27, 0x28,
0x2C, 0x2D and/or
no response
Error State The CM has failed
ECDSA algorithm
test and continuous
noise source health
tests
ECDSA algorithm
test and continuous
noise source health
tests Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x2C, 0x
2D, 0x36 and/or
no response
Power Up
Load Test
Error State
The CM has failed
FW Load at power up
FW Load at power
up Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x13 and/or
no response
Conditional
Load Test
Error State
The CM has failed
FW update
FW update Failure N/A Indicated Error
Code: 0x13
Table 22: Error States
If the self-tests fail, the CM reports error status and enters to the error state. In this case, the
CM must be powered-off to clear error condition (i.e. Recovery Method). When power-on is
executed again, self-tests are also executed like an on-demand operator reset. If the CM
continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to
factory to recover from error state. When the CM is in an error state except for Conditional Load
29 Jun 16, 2026
Test Error State, cryptographic functions cannot be executed by the CM. If the CM enters
Conditional Load Test Error State, it reports Error code and transitions from error state to
normal state, and continues to operate with FW before download.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
Operator can also initiate self-test on-demand for periodic testing by using the Reset service
which is automatically invoked when the module is powered-off and powered-on (rebooted).
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
In the SSD’s manufacturing process, installation is executed as below:
1. The Firmware described in Section 2.2 is downloaded into the CM.
2. Initial SSPs are generated.
3. Initial authentication information is set to the CM.
4. System area including SSPs generated in Step2 and Step3 are encrypted and calculated
message authentication code.
Once installation is successfully completed, the CM is always in the Compliant state indicated
by the bits [22:20] and bit [9] of mailbox status being set to 1 as a response for “Show Status
(Show Version)” service.
Initial operations to setup this CM are following:
 Load Firmware into the CM.
 Load system area including SSPs into the CM.
 Execute range state setting method (Set the location and size of all range).
 Execute download port setting method (Lock / unlock firmware download).
 Execute namespace setting method (Create Namespace).
 Execute service execution state setting method (Enable CM settings (location and size of all
range, lock/unlock firmware download, namespace status)).
The CM switches to approved mode after the initial operation success. When the initial
operation succeeds, the CM indicates success on the Status Output interface. Operators can
confirm that the CM is in approved mode by executing Show Status (Show Version) service and
checking that the startup is successfully completed. Some additional information for SSD’s
manufacturing process and initial operation to setup is described in ‘XD8 configuration guide at
manufacturing’.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
After the procedure written in section 11.1, the CM can be used as an approved mode. Users
can confirm that the CM is in approved mode by executing Show Status (Show Version) service
and checking that the startup is successfully completed. Guidance for this module is provided to
solid state drive developers who embed the CM. The usage and maintenance of solid state
drives with the CM built-in are outside of the scope of this document.
30 Jun 16, 2026
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module implements only the Crypto Officer. There are no guidances for non-administrators.
11.4 Design and Rules
N/A for this module.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
As described in Section 2, the CM is used by being embedded in the solid state drive.
Therefore, there are no maintenance requirements for the CM alone.
11.6 End of Life
The user needs to erase CPSs by executing Revert service for secure sanitization.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The CM implements mitigation for no authorized user execution of service.
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness
The CM implements authentication function defined by the TCG Opal specification by verifying
whether the PIN entered by the user matches the information stored inside the CM. PINs are
hashed with SHA2-256 to store them on the CM. The PIN entered by the user is hashed and
compared to the stored PIN hash.