1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 1 of 22 RDX SATA III FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Revision: B December 2018 Public Material ‐ May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 2 of 22 Table of Contents 1 Overview ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Versions, Configurations, and Modes of Operation.........................................................................................5 1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.............................................................................................6 2 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................. 9 2.1 Critical Security Parameters ...........................................................................................................................10 2.2 Public Security Parameters.............................................................................................................................10 3 Roles, Authentication, and Services ................................................................................................................11 3.1 Authentication................................................................................................................................................11 3.2 Services...........................................................................................................................................................11 4 Self‐Test..........................................................................................................................................................16 4.1 Power‐On Self‐Tests .......................................................................................................................................16 4.2 Conditional Self‐Tests .....................................................................................................................................16 5 Physical Security Policy ...................................................................................................................................17 5.1 RDX 3.5 Inch (Two (2) Tamper‐Evident Seals Required).................................................................................17 5.2 RDX 5.25” (Four (4) Tamper‐Evident Seals Required) ....................................................................................18 6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................................18 7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ...........................................................................18 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy...................................................................................................................18 9 Security Rules and Guidance ...........................................................................................................................19 9.1 Invariant Rules ................................................................................................................................................19 9.2 Procedural Rules.............................................................................................................................................19 9.3 Cryptographic Officer Initialization.................................................................................................................19 10 Non‐security Related Services.........................................................................................................................20 10.1 Non‐security Related SCSI Commands ...........................................................................................................20 10.2 Non‐security Related ATA Commands............................................................................................................21 11 Multiple Approve Modes ................................................................................................................................21 List of Tables Table 1: References ....................................................................................................................................................3 Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions.............................................................................................................................4 Table 3: Security Level of Security Requirements ......................................................................................................5 Table 4: Module Configurations.................................................................................................................................6 Table 5: Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................................................8 Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions ............................................................................................................9 Table 7 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................10 Table 8: Critical Security Parameters .......................................................................................................................10 Table 9: Public Security Parameters.........................................................................................................................10 Table 10: Authenticated Roles .................................................................................................................................11 Table 11: Authentication Description.......................................................................................................................11 Table 12: Unauthenticated Services.........................................................................................................................12 Table 13: Authenticated Services.............................................................................................................................13 FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 3 of 22 Table 14: Key and CSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................14 Table 15: Power‐On Self‐Test...................................................................................................................................16 Table 16: Individual Approved Mode Access ...........................................................................................................21 List of Figures Figure 1: Block Diagram..............................................................................................................................................7 Figure 2: Tandberg Data RDX SATA III 5.25 Inch Configuration .................................................................................7 Figure 3: Tandberg Data RDX SATA III 3.5 Inch Configuration....................................................................................8 Figure 4: RDX 3.5 Inch Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations............................................................................................17 Figure 5: RDX 5.25 Inch Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations..........................................................................................18 References Table 1: References Acronym Full Specification Name [FIPS140‐2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001 [FIPS197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001 [FIPS 180‐4] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180‐4, March 2012 [FIPS 186‐4] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186‐4, July 2013 [IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140‐2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, last updated 19 January 2018 [SATA] SATA‐IO Serial ATA Rev 3.0, June 2009 [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC‐3) [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands‐4 Rev 33 (SPC‐4) [SP 800‐90A] NIST Special Publication 800‐90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, January 2012 [SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, January 2011 [SP800‐132] NIST Special Publication 800‐132, Recommendation for Password‐Based Key Derivation, December 2010 [SSC] SCSI Stream Commands‐3 Rev 22 (SSC‐3) [ACS] INITCS 482‐2012 ATA/ATAPI Command Set – 2 (ACS‐2) FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 4 of 22 Acronyms and Definitions Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions Acronym Definition ATA Advanced Technology Attachment CBL Customer Build Level CSP Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140‐2] HDD Hard Disk Drive KAT Known Answer Test LBA Logical Block Address NVM Non‐Volatile Memory (e.g., EEPROM, Flash) PSP Public Security Parameter SATA Serial ATA SCSI Small Computer System Interface SED Self‐Encrypting Drive SID Security Identifier SSC SCSI Stream Commands SSD Solid‐state Drive FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 5 of 22 1 Overview This document defines the Security Policy for the Tandberg Data RDX SATA III cryptographic module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module is a multiple chip embedded docking station compliant with SSC, SCSI, and SATA specifications. The Module is intended to interact with a computer host and a storage cartridge that may be inserted or ejected from the Module; storage cartridges are not considered to be part of the cryptographic boundary. The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Table 3: Security Level of Security Requirements Security Requirement Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 3 Self‐Tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Level 2 1.1 Versions, Configurations, and Modes of Operation There are two Approved Modes. Following successful completion of power‐on self‐tests, the Module automatically transitions into the Approved No Cartridge Accessible (NCA) Mode. If a cartridge is inserted in the Module at any point during operation, the Module automatically performs the necessary self‐tests to transition into the Approved Cartridge Accessible (CA) Mode. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 6 of 22 If the Module is not configured as specified in Section 9.3, it is then in a non‐Approved Mode. When switching from the NCA Mode to the CA mode, non‐Approved algorithms are used to validate the inserted cartridge and are considered to only be available during the Module initialization period as specified in IG 9.5. Table 4: Module Configurations HW Part Number FW Version HW Version (CBL) Description 1 8812‐RDX 0253 3078‐0006 RDX QuikStor Internal 3.5 SATA 3 SINGLE PACK Tandberg Data 2 8813‐RDX 0253 3079‐0006 RDX QuikStor Internal 5.25 SATA 3 SINGLE PACK Tandberg Data 3 8815‐RDX 0253 3080‐0006 RDX QuikStor Internal 5.25 SATA 3 10 PACK Tandberg Data 4 8816‐RDX 0253 3081‐0006 RDX QuikStor Internal 3.5 SATA 3 10 PACK Tandberg Data 5 8826 0253 3095‐0003 RDX QuikStor Internal 5.25 SATA 3 SINGLE PACK Quantum 1022445 N/A N/A Tamper‐Evident Seals 1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary The Module is provided as a multi‐chip embedded cartridge dock with several internal form factors, as listed in Table 4. The Module block diagram is depicted in Figure 1. In the figure, the red outline depicts the physical cryptographic boundary. The following components are non‐security relevant and have been excluded from FIPS 140‐2 requirements:  LVDS clock generator  Coil inductor  FERRITE CHIP (x2)  Resistor (x7)  Jumper  Test point (x23)  Capacitor (x6)  Diode (x2)  FET  HALL EFFECT SWITCH FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 7 of 22 Figure 1: Block Diagram The dock enclosure is the physical boundary as shown in Figure 2 (5.25‐inch configuration) and Figure 3 (3.5‐inch configuration). These figures represent the different hardware model configurations described by the Security Policy. Other model numbers differ only by silkscreen labeling and branding as well as whether they are bundled with other units in a shipment. I/O and Power ports are exposed as well as Control Inputs and Status Outputs. Figure 2: Tandberg Data RDX SATA III 5.25 Inch Configuration FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 8 of 22 Figure 3: Tandberg Data RDX SATA III 3.5 Inch Configuration The module only has one processor which is implemented within the Altera Arria II GX FPGA. Specifically, the Module boundary contains the soft‐core Altera Nios Classic.  The Module implements two SATA interfaces used for control, status and data I/O.  The module stores keys and CSPs in internal flash and RAM.  HW used to store data can vary and is specific to the cartridge inserted into the Module. Cartridges inserted into the Module are considered to be outside the cryptographic boundary. Table 5: Ports and Interfaces Port Description Logical Interface Type Host SATA Host SATA Connector Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out Cartridge SATA HDD SATA Connector Control in, Data in, Data out SATA Power Power Connector Power Eject Button Cartridge eject button Control Input Emergency Eject Emergency cartridge eject pinhole Control Input Write Enable Write Enable Switch Control Input Dock LED Error LED Status Output Cartridge LED Light Pipe sent from the dock through the cartridge Status Output FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 9 of 22 2 Cryptographic Functionality The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. Refer to Section 11 for a mapping of algorithms utilized in each Approved Mode. Table 6: Approved Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Reference Description Cert # AES [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Mode: ECB Key Size: 256 bits #4811 [SP 800‐38E] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Mode: XTS Key Size: 256 bits * XTS‐AES is only used for storage applications #4813 CKG [SP 800‐133 Section 7.1] Direct Symmetric Key generation using unmodified DRBG output Vendor Affirmed IG D.12 DRBG [SP 800‐90A] Function: Hash DRBG Security Strength: 256 bits #1673 HMAC [FIPS 198‐1] Functions: Generation, Verification SHA Size: SHA‐256 #3216 PBKDF [SP 800‐132] Option: Option 2a Function: HMAC‐based KDF using SHA‐256 *Keys derived from PBKDF are only used for storage applications Vendor Affirmed IG D.6 RSA [FIPS 186‐4, PKCS #1 v2.1] Function: Signature Verification Key Size: 2048 bits, SHA‐256 #2635 SHA [FIPS 180‐4] Functions: Digital Signature Verification, non‐Digital Signature Applications SHA Size: SHA‐256 #3955 FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 10 of 22 Table 7 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Reference Description NDRNG [IG G.13] Hardware True Random Number Generator; minimum of 32 bits per access. The NDRNG output is used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG. The non‐Approved cryptographic algorithms listed below are used by the Module. These algorithms are used automatically during the initialization period when transitioning from the NCA to the CA Approved Mode:  XTEA  RSA 1024 signature verification; implemented for purposes other than legacy‐use 2.1 Critical Security Parameters All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs and PSPs is described in the services detailed in Table 14. To identify the CSPs accessed in each approved Mode, refer to the services in Section 11 and compare to the CSP Accesses in Table 15. Table 8: Critical Security Parameters CSP Description / Usage TRNG‐OUT 384‐bit TRNG output used to derive DRBG‐SEED. Provides 327.552 bits of entropy. DRBG‐NONCE 256‐bit nonce used to derive DRBG‐SEED. Provides 218.368 bits of entropy. DRBG‐SEED 440‐bit entropy input used to derive the initial value of DRBG‐STATE. DRBG‐STATE Hash DRBG internal state consisting of a 440‐bit value (V), a 440‐bit constant (C) and an 8‐bit reseed counter. MK 512‐bit XTS‐AES/ HMAC Master Key used to wrap/unwrap and authenticate the DPK. DPK 512‐bit XTS‐AES Data Protection Key used to encrypt/decrypt data stored on a cartridge. PH 512‐bit password hash1 used to derive MK. Dock PH 512‐bit DRBG output used to derive MK. Dock PH is used in place of PH if the Module is configured for automatic decryption. 1 The module does not ensure PH is a hash, but in practice it always will be. 2.2 Public Security Parameters Table 9: Public Security Parameters Key Description / Usage FW‐SVK 2048‐bit public component of an RSA key pair, used for signature verification by the FW download service. MK‐SALT 256‐bit salt used to derive MK. PH‐SALT 256‐bit password hash salt. Sent to the host as a public input parameter to derive PH. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 11 of 22 3 Roles, Authentication, and Services The module supports the User, Cryptographic Officer (CO), and FW load roles. A User or CO role is defined by the permissions assigned to a given key slot, and each role will have its own key slot and password. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles by enforcing re‐authentication with the appropriate password hash or digital signature when changing roles. Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support concurrent operators, bypass, or a maintenance role. Authentication is cleared on each power cycle. Table 10: Authenticated Roles Role Name Description / Corresponding Roles Authentication Data Authentication Type CO The cryptographic officer that initializes the Module on first‐time use. This role exists to creates and delete key slots. Password Hash Role‐based User The everyday user of the Module. Password Hash Role‐based FW Load An operator loading FW into the Module. Public Key, Digital Signature Identity‐based 3.1 Authentication The module enforces password hash authentication for the User and CO roles, and signature verification for the FW Load role. The strength of authentication is described in Table 11. Table 11: Authentication Description Authentication Method Description Password Hash Password Hashes are 512 bits, providing 2512 possible values. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1/2512. Password Hash verification takes at least one (1) second per attempt. Therefore, the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one‐minute interval is at most 60/2512. Signature Verification RSA‐2048 w/ SHA‐256 PKCS #1 v2.1 signature verification is used to authenticate an operator loading FW to the Module. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1/22048. Signature verification takes more than 300ms per attempt, not counting overhead in SCSI packets. Therefore, the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one‐ minute interval is at most 200/22048. 3.2 Services All services implemented by the Module in the Approved Mode are listed in Table 12 and Table 13. CSP usage for each Approved Mode service described is specified in Table 15. Refer to Section 11 for a mapping of services utilized in each Approved Mode. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 12 of 22 Table 12: Unauthenticated Services Service Description Initialize First Key Slot CO initialization procedures to setup User and CO authentication credentials on a cartridge inserted into the Module. The Authenticate service is called as part of establishing authentication credentials. Zeroize SECURITY PROTOCOL OUT SCSI command used to write zeroes to the Dock PH stored in flash. All other keys/CSPs are stored only in RAM and can be cleared by power cycling the Module. Authenticate An operator attempts to authenticate to the Module as either a CO or User role. Authenticating a role locks the encryption key to the key slot being authenticated. Show Status LOG SENSE SCSI command used to send status messages, as well as the dock LED (FIPS errors) and light pipe (generic errors) output. Read Encrypted Data The module may send encrypted data from the cartridge to the host on request. This service is only useful if the host has the password hash necessary to derive the DPK. Read Data (unauthenticated) Decrypt and read encrypted data stored on a cartridge inserted into the Module. This service does not create, disclose or modify CSPs and is only available if the CO allows it via the Configure Automatic Decryption service. Write Data (unauthenticated) Write and encrypt data onto a cartridge inserted into the Module. This service does not create, disclose or modify CSPs and is only available if the CO allows it via the Configure Automatic Decryption service. Self‐Tests SEND DIAGNOSTIC SCSI command used for an operator to perform all algorithm self‐tests on demand. All power‐on self‐tests, including the FW integrity test can be performed on demand by power cycling the Module. Provide Authentication Parameters SECURITY PROTOCOL IN SCSI command used to send MK‐SALT, PH‐SALT and the PBKDF2 iteration count to host software which uses these parameters to transform the password to a Password Hash (PH). The Provide Authentication Parameters service can also tell you whether you are currently locked to an auto decrypt slot. Delete Key Slot (unauthenticated) Deletes a key slot. Note that deleting the last key slot will cause a cartridge’s encrypted data to become unreadable. This service is only available to an unauthenticated or User role if a CO sets the permissions to allow it. Non Security Related SCSI/ATA Commands Non‐security related SCSI and ATA commands. See Sections 10.1 and 10.2 respectively. All commands listed are unauthenticated. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 13 of 22 Table 13: Authenticated Services Service Description CO User FW Load Configure Automatic Decryption This service configures the Read Data and Write Data services to be either authenticated or unauthenticated. Each configuration is specific to the cartridge inserted into the Module. This service is only available to the User role if a CO sets the permission to allow it. A User/CO may configure the Read Data and Write Data services to be unauthenticated on a specific Module and cartridge pair for one of the following two reasons: 1. The User/CO has decided the data stored on the cartridge does not have sensitive information and therefore can be considered publicly available. 2. The User/CO has confirmed that unauthorized physical and remote access to the Module (and its associated host computer) is sufficiently restricted while the cartridge is inserted. X Create Additional or Modify Key Slot Create an additional key slot or modify an existing key slot. This service creates new User and CO roles. X Delete Key Slot (authenticated) Deletes a key slot. Note that deleting the last key slot will cause a cartridge’s encrypted data to become unreadable. X X Read Data (authenticated) Decrypt and read encrypted data stored on a cartridge inserted into the Module. X X Write Data (authenticated) Write and encrypt data onto a cartridge inserted into the Module. X X Provide Encrypted DPK SECURITY PROTOCOL IN SCSI command used to obtain the encrypted DPK associated with a given key slot used for host side password validation. Only allowed when authentication is successful. X X FW Download DOWNLOAD MICROCODE SCSI command used to load a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the Module is authenticated with RSA Signature Verification performed over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate to remain in an Approved Mode. X Services available in the non‐Approved Mode are listed in Table 14. Note that non‐Approved Mode services are a subset of the services available in the Approved Mode aside from the Read Plaintext Data and Write Plaintext Data services. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 14 of 22 Table 14: Services in the Non‐Approved Mode Service Description Initialize First Key Slot CO initialization procedures to setup User and CO authentication credentials on a cartridge inserted into the Module. The Authenticate service is called as part of establishing authentication credentials. Zeroize SECURITY PROTOCOL OUT SCSI command used to write zeroes to the Dock PH stored in flash. All other keys/CSPs are stored only in RAM and can be cleared by power cycling the Module. Authenticate An operator attempts to authenticate to the Module as either a CO or User role. Authenticating the role locks the encryption key to the key slot being authenticated. Show Status LOG SENSE SCSI command used to send status messages, as well as the dock LED (FIPS errors) and light pipe (generic errors) output. Read Plaintext Data Read the plaintext data stored on a cartridge inserted into the Module. Write Plaintext Data Write the plaintext data onto a cartridge inserted into the Module. Self‐Tests SEND DIAGNOSTIC SCSI command used for an operator to perform all algorithm self‐ tests on demand. All power‐on self‐tests, including the FW integrity test can be performed on demand by power cycling the Module. Provide Authentication Parameters SECURITY PROTOCOL IN SCSI command used to send MK‐SALT, PH‐SALT and the PBKDF2 iteration count to host software which uses these parameters to transform the password to a Password Hash (PH). Delete Key Slot Deletes a key slot. Non Security Related SCSI/ATA Commands Non‐security related SCSI and ATA commands. See Sections 10.1 and 10.2 respectively. All commands listed are unauthenticated. Create Additional or Modify Key Slot Create an additional key slot or modify an existing key slot. Provide Encrypted DPK SECURITY PROTOCOL IN SCSI command used to obtain the encrypted DPK associated with a given key slot used for host side password validation and DPK calculation. Only allowed when authentication is successful. FW Download DOWNLOAD MICROCODE SCSI command used to load a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated with RSA Signature Verification performed over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate to remain in an Approved Mode. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 15 of 22 Table 15: Key and CSP Access within Services Service CSPs/ PSPs TRNG‐OUT DRBG‐NONCE DRBG‐SEED DRBG‐STATE MK DPK PH Dock PH FW‐SVK MK‐SALT PH‐SALT Initialize First Key Slot G,X G,X G,X G,X G,X,W G,O,X X ‐ ‐ G,X,O I,O Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ Authenticate1 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ G,X,W I,W I,X R,X2 ‐ I,X ‐ Read Encrypted Data ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Show Status ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Self‐Tests G,X G,X G,X G,X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Provide Authentication Parameters ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ I,O I,O Non‐Security Related SCSI/ATA Commands ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Provide Encrypted DPK ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ O ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Configure Automatic Decryption G,X G,X G,X G,X G,X,W R,O,X ‐ G,W,X ‐ ‐ ‐ Create Additional or Modify Key Slot G,X G,X G,X G,X G,X,W R,O,X X ‐ ‐ G,X,O I,O Delete Key Slot (unauthenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Delete Key Slot (authenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Read Data (authenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Read Data (unauthenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Write Data (authenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Write Data (unauthenticated) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ FW Download ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X,I ‐ ‐ 1 Note that the Authenticate service does not authenticate to the Module when automatic decryption is configured; rather, the Module authenticates to the cartridge. 2 Dock PH will only be executed in place of PH if automatic decryption is configured. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 16 of 22 Definitions of symbols used in this table:  G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the Key/ CSP.  R = Read: The Module reads the parameter from nonvolatile XTS hardware registers or flash.  X = Execute: The Module executes the parameter; the parameter is used internally by the Module.  W = Write: The Module writes the parameter to nonvolatile XTS hardware registers or flash.  I = Input: The Module receives the parameter input from either the cartridge or the host.  O = Output: The Module outputs the parameter to either the cartridge or the host.  Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the parameter.   = Not accessed by the service. 4 Self‐Test 4.1 Power‐On Self‐Tests On power‐on or reset, the Module performs self‐tests as described in Table 16. The individual self‐tests performed in each Approved Mode are specified in Section 11. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module may attempt to recover either by re‐performing self‐tests on request using the SCSI SEND DIAGNOSTICS command or by cycling the power. Table 16: Power‐On Self‐Tests Test Target Description Firmware Integrity 32‐bit CRC performed over all code located in flash. DRBG Performs a fixed input DRBG Hash KAT, inclusive of the instantiate, generate and reseed health tests. TRNG The SP 800‐90B Repetition Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test are performed on power‐up. RSA‐2048 Performs RSA Signature Verification KAT using an RSA 2048 bit key. HMAC Performs HMAC w/ SHA‐256 KAT. SHA‐256 Tested as part of the DRBG Hash KAT and HMAC KAT. XTS‐AES Performs a fixed input XTS‐AES KAT. 4.2 Conditional Self‐Tests  On every call to the HW TRNG, the Module performs the AS09.42 continuous RNG test to assure that the output is different than the previous value.  SP 800‐90B Repetition Count Test (RCT).  SP 800‐90B Adaptive Proportion Test (APT).  Periodic DRBG generate health test as specified in SP 800‐90A.  IG A.9 XTS key comparison test.  When new firmware is loaded into the Module using the FW Download service, the Module verifies the integrity of the new firmware using RSA 2048 w/ SHA‐256 signature verification. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 17 of 22 5 Physical Security Policy The Module is a multi‐chip embedded implementation that meets commercial‐grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The Module uses standard passivation techniques and is protected by a steel dock enclosure. For physical security, the Module requires tamper‐evident seals to allow detection of the opening of the device. The Crypto Officer shall install the tamper evident seals for the module to operate in the Approved Mode of operation. Seals are available for order from Tandberg Data (www.tandbergdata.com): part number 1022445. Tamper‐evident seal application procedure:  Clean and dry the module surfaces where the seals are to be applied.  Using finger/thumb pressure, slowly roll back the liner (backing material) to expose the adhesive side (underside) of the seal, taking care not to touch the adhesive with your fingers – otherwise the seal may show as being tampered with.  Place seal on module by applying very firm pressure across the entire seal surface. Start pressure at one corner to ensure no air bubbles form.  A curing time is required for maximum adhesion. We recommend 1 hour minimum. Full adhesion is achieved after 24 hours. Apply the seals on the Module at enclosure locations shown below depending on the size of the RDX hardware configuration. 5.1 RDX 3.5 Inch (Two (2) Tamper‐Evident Seals Required) The SATA III RDX 3.5” has two (2) tamper‐evident seals applied to the bottom of the module (Figure 4). Figure 4: RDX 3.5 Inch Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations Locate seals over features as shown. (BOTTOM) 1 2 FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 18 of 22 5.2 RDX 5.25” (Four (4) Tamper‐Evident Seals Required) The SATA III RDX 5.25 Inch has four (4) tamper‐evident seals applied to the module, two on the top and two on the bottom (Figure 5). Figure 5: RDX 5.25 Inch Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations The Crypto Officer must inspect the device and tamper evident seals on a periodic basis to ensure that they are intact. The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and always having control of all the unused security seals. The Crypto Officer is responsible for the direct control and observation of any changes to the device, such as reconfigurations where the tamper evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the Module is maintained during such changes and the device is returned to a FIPS approved state. Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service. 6 Operational Environment The Module is designated as a non‐modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation. 7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) The Module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B. 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The Module does not implement any mitigation of attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140‐2. Seal 1 & 2, right and left side. Locate as shown. (TOP) Seal 3 & 4. Locate over rubber grommet and 5.25” brackets as shown. (BOTTOM) 1 2 3 4 FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 19 of 22 9 Security Rules and Guidance This section documents the security rules enforced by the Module and the Cryptographic Officer instructions that are necessary to implement to maintain compliance with FIPS 140‐2 security requirements. 9.1 Invariant Rules The Module implementation enforces the following security rules:  No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to CSPs.  Data output is inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.  There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.  The module does not support manual key entry.  The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.  Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 9.2 Procedural Rules The following security rules are enforced by policy:  The CO shall initialize the Module as specified in Section 10.3 below.  If the Configure Automatic Decryption service is used to configure Read Data and Write Data as unauthenticated services for a specific cartridge, it is the CO’s responsibility to ensure that either 1) data stored on the cartridge is not sensitive and may be considered public, or 2) physical and remote access to the Module (and the associated host computer) is sufficiently restricted during the time the cartridge is inserted. The CO shall not configure Read Data and Write Data to be unauthenticated services under any other circumstances.  An operator shall ensure CSPs are not shared between the Approved Mode and non‐Approved Mode by zeroizing the Module when switching between password protection and XTS encryption configurations. For more information please refer to the RDX Manager Product Manual section “Delete Automatic Drive Media Authentication from RDX Drive.” 9.3 Cryptographic Officer Initialization The Module is initialized by the Cryptographic Officer (CO) when a cartridge that does not already have authentication credentials available is inserted into the Module. The CO shall format the cartridge, create a key slot, select XTS‐AES encryption for the slot and enter in a password hash to generate the MK. For more information please refer to the RDX Manager Product Manual section “Enable Cartridge Encryption or Password Protection.” The DPK is encrypted by the MK and stored on the cartridge. The generated DPK is used for all other key slots the CO may choose to create. If the CO configures a key slot for password protection in place of XTS‐AES encryption the Module is in a non‐Approved Mode. FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 20 of 22 10 Non‐security Related Services 10.1 Non‐security Related SCSI Commands Command Name Operation Code INQUIRY 12h LOG SELECT 4Ch LOG SENSE 4Dh MODE SELECT (6) 15h MODE SELECT (10) 55h MODE SENSE (6) 1Ah MODE SENSE (10) 5Ah PREVENT ALLOW MEDIA REMOVAL 1Eh READ BUFFER 3Ch RECEIVE DIAGNOSTIC RESULTS 1Ch RELEASE (6) 17h RELEASE (10) 57h REPORT LUNS A0h REQUEST SENSE 03h RESERVE (6) 16h RESERVE (10) 56h SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh TEST UNIT READY 00h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh READ ATTRIBUTE 8Ch WRITE ATTRIBUTE 8Dh REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION CODES A3h FORMAT UNIT 04h PRE‐FETCH (10) 1 34h READ (6) 08h READ (10) 28h READ (16) 3 88h READ CAPACITY (10) 25h READ CAPACITY (16) 3 9Eh/10h SEEK (10) 2 2Bh START STOP UNIT 1Bh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h VERIFY (10) 2Fh VERIFY (16) 3 8Fh WRITE (6) 0Ah WRITE (10) 2Ah WRITE (16) 3 8Ah WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 3 8Eh GET EVENT STATUS NOTIFICATION 4Ah FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 21 of 22 10.2 Non‐security Related ATA Commands Command Name Command Code NOP 00h DEVICE RESET 08h READ SECTORS 20h EXECUTE DEVICE DIAGNOSTIC 90h IDENTIFY PACKET DEVICE A1h PACKET A0h IDENTIFY DEVICE ECh SET FEATURES EFh STANDBY IMMEDIATE E0h IDLE IMMEDIATE E1h CHECK POWER MODE E5h SLEEP E6h 11 Multiple Approved Modes Table 17 maps the algorithms, services and self‐tests performed in each of the Approved Modes. Table 17: Individual Approved Mode Access Mode Authorized Roles Algorithms Services Self‐Tests No Cartridge Accessible (NCA)  FW Load  SHA  HMAC  RSA Signature Verification Unauthenticated Services:  Show Status  Self‐Tests  Non‐Security Related SCSI/ATA Commands Authenticated Services:  FW Download Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:  SHA KAT  HMAC KAT  RSA Signature Verification KAT FW Integrity Test:  32‐bit CRC Conditional Tests:  FW Load Test Cartridge Accessible (CA)  CO  User  FW Load  DRBG  AES  SHA  HMAC  PBKDF  RSA Signature Verification  XTS‐AES Unauthenticated Services:  Initialize First Key Slot  Zeroize  Authenticate  Show Status  Read Encrypted Data  Read Data (unauthenticated)  Write Data (unauthenticated)  Self‐Tests  Provide Authentication Parameters  Delete Key Slot (unauthenticated) Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:  DRBG KAT  AES KAT  TRNG RCT & APT  SHA KAT  HMAC KAT  XTS‐AES KAT  RSA Signature Verification KAT Conditional Tests:  CRNGT  RCT  APT  Periodic Generate Health Test  FW Load Test  XTS Check FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Public Material 1022471_B (December 2018) ©2018 Tandberg Data Page 22 of 22  Non Security Related SCSI/ ATA Commands Authenticated Services:  Configure Automatic Decryption  Create Additional or Modify Key Slot  Delete Key Slot (authenticated)  Read Data (authenticated)  Write Data (authenticated)  FW Download  Provide Encrypted DPK