Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware
Firmware Version: 4.40
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 1.0
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development
LP
Corsec Security, Inc.
11445 Compaq Center Dr. W.
Houston, TX 77070
United States of America
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 (281) 370-0670 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
http://www.hpe.com http://www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................3
2 HP BLADESYSTEM ONBOARD ADMINISTRATOR FIRMWARE................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................5
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................8
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................9
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role..............................................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 User Role................................................................................................................................................................12
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................13
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................13
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................13
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................19
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................19
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................................19
2.8.3 Critical Function Tests........................................................................................................................................19
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................19
3 SECURE OPERATION ...............................................................................................20
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................20
3.2 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................20
3.2.1 Management ........................................................................................................................................................21
3.2.2 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................21
3.3 USER GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................21
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................22
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – HP BLADESYSTEM ONBOARD ADMINISTRATOR FIRMWARE CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY.....................5
FIGURE 2 – HARDWARE BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR 440EPX PROCESSOR ..............................................................................7
FIGURE 3 – BLADESYSTEM C7000 ONBOARD ADMINISTRATOR WITH KVM...................................................................8
FIGURE 4 – BLADESYSTEM C3000 TRAY WITH EMBEDDED DDR2 ONBOARD ADMINISTRATOR.................................8
FIGURE 5 – BLADESYSTEM C3000 DUAL DDR2 ONBOARD ADMINISTRATOR................................................................8
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS ......................................................................................................9
TABLE 3 – CRYPTO-OFFICER SERVICES ............................................................................................................................... 10
TABLE 4 – USER SERVICES ..................................................................................................................................................... 12
TABLE 5 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 14
TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS................................. 16
TABLE 7 – ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 22
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the HP BladeSystem Onboard
Administrator Firmware (Firmware Version: 4.40) from Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP This
Security Policy describes how the HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware meets the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S.
and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-
2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The HP BladeSystem
Onboard Administrator Firmware is referred to in this document as the Onboard Administrator, OA1
,
cryptographic module, or the module, and the Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP is referred to as
HP.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following
sources:
 The HP website (www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model document
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to HP. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2
Submission Package is proprietary to HP and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.
For access to these documents, please contact HP.
1
OA – Onboard Administrator
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2 HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware
2.1 Overview
The HP BladeSystem is a blade server enclosure designed to maximize power while minimizing costs. The
enclosure holds the server blades and supplies them with power, cooling, networking, and data storage,
resulting in a reduction in power redistribution units, cabling, switches, and other clutter.
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is the enclosure management and the firmware base
used to support the HP BladeSystem c-Class Enclosure and all the managed devices contained within the
enclosure. The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is designed to manage all power flow
and access permissions for every blade within the enclosure. This involves IP2
addressing for the server
blade’s management interface, power management for the server blades, fans, and other modules, utilizing
Integrated Lights-Out (iLO).
HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware provides a single access point to perform basic
management tasks on server blades and switches within the enclosure. HP BladeSystem Onboard
Administrator Firmware provides configuration information for the enclosure, enables run-time management
and configuration of the enclosure components, and informs administrators of problems within the enclosure
through email, or the Insight Display.
HP recommends that the administrator read the specific HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator User Guide
for enclosure-specific information before proceeding with Onboard Administrator setup. This user guide
provides information on the initial setup and operation of the HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator. It
also covers use of the Onboard Administrator GUI3
and the use of the enclosure Insight Display. The
Onboard Administrator Command Line Interface Guide covers the use of the CLI 4
.
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware provides several features designed to simplify
management of c-Class blades and interconnects. The BladeSystem c7000 and c3000 enclosures can be
configured with redundant OA modules to provide uninterrupted manageability of the entire enclosure and
blades in the event of a failure of the primary OA module or network outage.
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section
levels:
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A5
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC6
1
2
IP – Internet Protocol
3
GUI – Graphical User Interface
4
CLI – Command-Line Interface
5
N/A – Not applicable
6
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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Section Section Title Level
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
14 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 1
2.2 Module Specification
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is a firmware module with a multiple-chip
standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 1. The cryptographic boundary of the
HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is defined by all the firmware that runs on the HP
BladeSystem Onboard Administrator blade, operating within the c3000 and c7000 BladeSystem c-Class
enclosures. The physical cryptographic boundary of the module is drawn around the hardware blade (red
dotted line in Figure 2 below), from this point forward referred to as the ‘host appliance’, that it runs on. The
logical cryptographic boundary is drawn around the module code that runs entirely on the host appliance’s
Central Processing Unit (CPU), and is depicted in Figure 1 below.
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware module provides many communication pathways for
an administration of the BladeSystem enclosure. The module’s cryptographic functions are utilized for
securing management traffic being sent and received by the module.
Onboard Administrator Module
Insight Display Subsystem
Administration
Subsystem
Enclosure Management
Subsysten
Logging
Subsystem
Core Subsystem Notification
Subsystem
Security
Manager
Subsystem
CLI
Cryptographic
Engine
NVRAM
XML/HTTPS
Management
Workstation
Web
Serial
SSH
HPSIM
OA User
VGA USB
Enclosure
Downlink
Ethernet
Enclosure
Uplink
Ethernet
SDRAM
Flash
LDAP
LED
External Enclosure
Management LAN Ethernet
RESET LCD
Legend
Cryptographic
Module
Subsystem
Internal Interface
Cryptographic
Module
Boundary
Syslog
SMTP
Data Input /
Data Output
Status Output
Control Input
LAN – Local Area Network HTTPS – Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure
LED – Light-Emitting Diode SSH – Secure Shell
VGA – Video Graphics Array XML – Extensible Markup Language
USB – Universal Serial Bus HPSIM – HP Systems Insight Manager
LCD – Liquid Crystal Display SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Authorization Protocol SDRAM – Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory
SOAP – Simple Object Access Protocol NVRAM – Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory
SOAP
HTTPS
Internal Enclosure
Management LAN
Ethernet
Figure 1 – HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware Cryptographic Boundary
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Figure 1 shows the systems at work within the Onboard Administrator firmware:
 Security Manager Subsystem – Performs user authentication and account management, and also
provides integration into existing LDAP7
directories.
 Administration Subsystem – Exposes logical interfaces accessible via HTTPS8
, and SOAP9
that
allow management of the OA. This shows an interface with HPSIM10
, over SOAP. HPSIM is a
management application that communicates with the OA, iLO, and HP Virtual Connect module in
the c-Class enclosure.
 Cryptographic Engine – Performs all cryptographic functionality offered by OA, including
encryption of management traffic.
 Enclosure Management Subsystem – Monitors and controls enclosure components and provides
status and information on installed devices.
 Insight Display/KVM11
Subsystem – Enables initial configuration through a small LCD12
interface
on the enclosure, as well as provides KVM access to server blade consoles.
 Logging Subsystem – Facilitates the generation and storage of system event logs to provide
administrators with an audit trail of user activity.
 Core Subsystem – Provides a secure, reliable platform on which the other OA subsystems operate,
including the operating system, storage, and working memory.
 Notification Subsystem – Processes enclosure alerts and enables notification via SMTP13
and
SNMPv3.
This firmware is designed to run on an HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator appliance for use in HP
BladeSystem c-Class Enclosures. The module will run on the PowerPC (PPC) 440EPX processor. This
processor executes the module, which is the OA firmware image, stored in flash memory. There are three
forms of Onboard Administrator hardware appliances that support this processor.
The cryptographic module was tested and found compliant on the following platforms:
PowerPC 440EPx:
 c7000 DDR14
2 Onboard Administrator with KVM
 c3000 Tray with Embedded DDR2 Onboard Administrator
 c3000 Dual DDR2 Onboard Administrator
These will be referred to, collectively, as the “host appliance”.
7
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Authentication Protocol
8
HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
9
SOAP – Simple Object Access Protocol
10
HPSIM – HP Systems Insight Manager
11
KVM – Keyboard, Video, Mouse
12
LCD – Liquid Crystal Display
13
SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
14
DDR – Double Data Rate
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Legend
Control Input Status Output
Data Input /
Data Output
Cryptographic
Module Boundary
Figure 2 – Hardware Block Diagram for 440EPx Processor
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2.3 Module Interfaces
The OA implements distinct module interfaces in its firmware design. Physically, the module ports and
interfaces are considered to be those of the host platform that the firmware runs upon. However, the firmware
communicates through a CLI or GUI, which allows it to receive requests and execute function calls for
cryptographic and administrative services. The CLI, GUI, and the physical ports/interfaces can be
categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
These logical interfaces are mapped to the host appliance’s physical interfaces, as described in Table 2.
Figure 3 through Figure 5 below show the host appliances and their physical interfaces.
Figure 3 – BladeSystem c7000 Onboard Administrator with KVM
Figure 4 – BladeSystem c3000 Tray with Embedded DDR2 Onboard Administrator
Figure 5 – BladeSystem c3000 Dual DDR2 Onboard Administrator
All of the physical interfaces of the appliance are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2,
as described in the following table:
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Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interface
Physical Port/Interface HP BladeSystem Onboard
Administrator Firmware
Port/Interface
Data Input  Ethernet RJ4515
connector
 Serial RS232 DB-9 connector with
PC16
standard pinout
 Backplane connector
 TLS17
, SSH18
, and plaintext sessions
(HTTPS, SOAP, LDAP, NTP19
)
Data Output  Ethernet RJ45
connector
 Serial RS232 DB-9 connector with
PC standard pinout
 Backplane connector
 TLS, SSH, and plaintext sessions
(HTTPS, SMTP, LDAP, SOAP)
Control Input  Reset button
 Ethernet RJ45 connector
 Serial RS232 DB-9 connector with
PC standard pinout
 USB 2.0 Type A connector
 Insight Display LCD Buttons
 Backplane connector
 CLI commands
 Web GUI interface
 Keyboard/Mouse input
Status Output  Ethernet RJ45 connector
 Serial RS232 DB-9 connector with
PC standard pinout
 VGA DB-15 connector with PC
standard pinout*
 Backplane connector
 LED indicators
 Insight Display LCD
 Video output from VGA/LCD
 CLI output
 Web GUI interface
 External Syslog
 SMTP
Power Interface Power Interface Not Applicable
* Only on the c7000 OA
The OA connects to the BladeSystem Enclosure backplane providing connection pathways to all of the
enclosure modules and subsystems in order to provide administration.
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-
2) that operators may assume: a Crypto-Officer (CO) role and a User role. See the Onboard Administrator
User Guide and Command Line Interface User Guide for more information about the roles and services
provided by the Onboard Administrator.
15
RJ45 – Registered Jack 45
16
PC – Personal Computer
17
TLS – Transport Layer Security
18
SSH – Secure Shell
19
NTP – Network Time Protocol
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2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Crypto-Officer role has the ability to create User accounts, define permissions, change passwords, and
take the module into or out of a FIPS mode of operation. The Crypto-Officer maps to the “Administrator”
and “OA Administrator” account classifications, as defined in the Onboard Administrator Command Line
Interface User Guide. Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in Table
3, below. The Crypto-Officer has access to all of the services of the User. Please note that the keys and
CSPs20
listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:
 R – Read: The CSP is read.
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Table 3 – Crypto-Officer Services
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Create/modify
Users
Create, edit, and
delete users; define
user accounts and
assign permissions
Command to
create a new user
with
credentials/permiss
ions
User successfully
created with
established
credentials/permissions
None
Change CO
credentials
Change the Crypto-
Officer password or
permissions
Command to
change
password/permissi
ons
Change CO
password/permissions
Password – W
Access the GUI Access the GUI via
HTTPS connection
through web browser
Command to begin
HTTPS connection
via web browser
Connection
established and
administration page
appears
Session key – X
Authentication
key – X
RSA21
public/private
keypair – X
DH22
public/private
components – X
Access the CLI Manage the module
using the CLI
accessed via SSH
protocol over
Ethernet, or directly
via Serial interface
Command to begin
SSH session
Session established Crypto-Officer
credentials – X
Session key – X
Authentication
key – X
RSA
public/private
keypair – X
DH
public/private
components – X
20
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
21
RSA – Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
22
DH – Diffie-Hellman
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Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Access the
SNMPv3
Manage the module
remotely and provide
non-security relevant
information about the
module’s state and
statistics
None Status output SNMPv3 Privacy
Key – R/W/X
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key – R/W/X
Set Factory
Defaults
Unable to be called
directly in FIPS mode.
Triggered by entering
or leaving FIPS mode.
Zeroizes all keys,
certificates, and
users. Resets
Administrator
password to factory
setting
Command to set
factory default
Set Factory Defaults All keys – W
Zeroize Keys Entering the
GENERATE KEY ALL
command in the
module’s CLI forces
the module to
overwrite existing
keys and regenerate
all cryptographic keys
Execute the
GENERATE KEY
ALL command in
the module’s CLI
All keys are zeroized
and regenerated
All keys – W
Set FIPS Mode Enable/disable FIPS
mode of operation.
Calls the Set Factory
Defaults service
CLI command:
SET FIPS MODE
ON/OFF
GUI Interface:
check or uncheck
“FIPS Mode ON”
checkbox
Requires reboot of
module hardware
Set Factory Defaults
service is called. Keys
zeroized, OA reboots.
New TLS and SSH
keys are generated.
Module boots in FIPS
mode
None
Check FIPS Mode
Status
Display FIPS status of
module
CLI command:
SHOW FIPS
MODE
GUI Interface: If
“FIPS Mode ON”
checkbox is
checked, module is
in FIPS mode
CLI: FIPS Mode is On
GUI: Checkbox is
checked
None
Perform Self-
Tests on demand
Run self-tests on
demand
None Status All keys – W
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Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Certificate
Generation
Generate an X.509
Certificate signing
request
Command to
generate certificate
Generated certificate RSA
public/private key
– X
2.4.2 User Role
The User role has the ability to perform management operations for the BladeSystem c-Class Enclosure, as
defined by their user permissions, via interfaces secured by the cryptographic configuration of the module.
The User maps to the “OA operator”, “operator”, “OA user”, and “user” account classifications, as defined
in the Onboard Administrator Command Line Interface User Guide. Descriptions of the services available
to the User role are provided in the Table 4 below.
Table 4 – User Services
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Update Firmware Update the module
firmware
Command to
update firmware
from the web GUI
and the image to
use
Firmware is
updated and the
module is out of
FIPS mode
None
Change User
Credentials
Change the User
password
Command to
change password
Change User
password
Password – W
Access the GUI Access the GUI via
HTTPS connection
through web
browser
Command to
begin HTTPS
connection via
web browser
Connection
established and
administration
page appears
Session key – X
Authentication
key – X
RSA public/private
keypair – X
DH public/private
components – X
Access the CLI Manage the module
using the CLI
accessed via SSH
protocol over
Ethernet, or
directly via Serial
interface
Command to
begin session
Session
established
Session key – X
Authentication
key – X
RSA public/private
keypair – X
DH public/private
components – X
Access the SNMPv3 Manage the module
remotely and
provide non-
security relevant
information about
the module’s state
and statistics
None Status output SNMPv3 Privacy
Key – R/W/X
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key – R/W/X
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Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Key Wrapping Perform key
wrapping operation
Data to encrypt
and encryption
key
Encrypted data RSA public key –
X
Key Unwrapping Perform key
unwrapping
operation
Data to decrypt
and decryption
key
Decrypted
plaintext data
RSA private key –
X
Signature Generation Generate a
signature
Data to sign Digitally signed
data
RSA public/private
key – WX
Signature Verification Verify the digital
signature attached
to data
Data to verify Hash value of data
to be verified
RSA public/private
key – WX
Generate Symmetric
Keys
Calls the DRBG23
to generate
symmetric keys
DRBG parameters Key of requested
size
Entropy Input
String – RX
DRBG Seed –
WRX
TLS Session key –
X
SSH Session
Encryption key –
X
Generate Asymmetric
Keys
Call the DRBG for
primes/keying
material
DRBG parameters Key or prime of
requested size
RSA keypair –W
For more information on the non-security relevant services of the module, please refer to the HP
BladeSystem Onboard Administrator User Guide (http://h20628.www2.hp.com/km-ext/kmcsdirect/emr_na-
c00705292-43.pdf).
2.5 Physical Security
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The module consists of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques.
2.6 Operational Environment
As a firmware module, the operational environment requirements of FIPS 140-2 do not apply to the HP
BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware. The OS24
included in the firmware does not allow the
loading of new applicationgs; therefore, the operational environment of the module is a non-modifiable
operational environment.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 5 below.
23
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
24
OS – Operating System
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Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Certificate
Number
Symmetric Key Algorithm
AES encryption/decryption in CBC25
, CTR26
, ECB modes (128, 192, 256-
bit key)
3333
AES GCM27
encryption/decryption/generation/verification (128, 192, 256-
bit)
3333
Triple-DES28
encryption/decryption in CBC, ECB modes (Keying options
1 and 2)
1903
Asymmetric Key Algorithm
RSA (FIPS 186-4) key generation (2048-bit), signature generation (2048-
bit), signature verification (2048-bits)
1712
Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA)
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 2767
SHA-1 (Integrity Test) 2766
SHA-256 2768
Message Authentication Code (MAC) Function
HMAC29
using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 2124
Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG)
SP30
800-90A based CTR_DRBG (AES), no derivation function 780
Component Validation List (CVL)*
Section 4.2, TLS – Key Derivation Function (KDF) 487
Section 5.2, SSH – KDF 487
Section 5.4, SNMP31
v3 – KDF 487
* The TLS, SSH and SNMP v3 protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or the CMVP. Only the Key
Derivation Functions, that are being implemented and used by these protocols have been tested by the CAVP.
NOTE: The following security functions have been deemed “deprecated” or “restricted” by NIST. Please refer to
NIST Special Publication 800-131A for further details.
 The use of two-key Triple DES for encryption is restricted after December 31, 2010.
 After December 31, 2013, key lengths providing less than 112 bits of security strength shall not be used in the
Approved mode of operation to generate keys or digital signatures.
 For additional information on the risks associated with the use of a particular algorithm or given key length
please consult the transition tables available at the CMVP Web site (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/).
Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-Approved algorithm implementations that are allowed
to be used in Approved mode of operation:
25
CBC – Cipher-Block Chaining
26
CTR – Counter
27
GCM – Galois/Counter Mode
28
DES – Data Encryption Standard
29
HMAC – (Keyed) Hash Message Authentication Code
30
SP – Special Publication
31
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
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 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
 MD532
(for TLS use)
 RSA key wrapping (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
 /dev/urandom – a non-Approved NDRNG33
used for entropy gathering
32
MD5 – Message Digest Algorithm
33
NDRNG – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
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The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) listed below in Table 6.
Table 6 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SSH/TLS Session
Authentication Key
HMAC SHA-1 Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Authenticate SSH or
TLS session
SSH Session
Encryption Key
AES 128-, 192-,
256-bit key
Triple-DES 168-bit
key
Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Encryption/Decryption
for SSH sessions
TLS Session Key AES 128-, 192-,
256-bit key
Triple-DES 168-bit
key
Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Encryption/
Decryption forTLS
sessions
RSA Private Key RSA 2048-bit Key Internally generated –
Generated by call
during first boot
Never output from
module
Stored in Flash
memory
Factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Signature generation,
decryption, key
exchange, certificate
generation (TLS
sessions), TLS and
SSH authentication
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA Public Key RSA 2048-bit Key Internally generated –
Generated by call
during first boot
Output from
module in plaintext
Stored in Flash
memory
Factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Signature verification,
encryption, key
exchange with 2048-
bit only, certificate
generation (TLS
sessions), TLS and
SSH authentication
Entropy Input String 256-bit random
value
Gathered from system
entropy (/dev/urandom)
Never output from
module
Stored in NVRAM Removing NVRAM
battery, host reboot
Generate seed and
finally random number
using the DRBG
DRBG Seed 384-bit random
value
Internally generated
using entropy input
string
Never output from
module
Stored in NVRAM Removing NVRAM
battery, host reboot
Generate random
number using the
DRBG
DH Public
Components
Public components
of DH protocol
(2048-bit key)
Internally generated Output from
module via Data
Output interface in
plaintext
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Key exchange (TLS,
SSH sessions)
DH Private
Components
Private components
of DH protocol
(256-bit key)
Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Key exchange (TLS,
SSH sessions)
SNMPv3 Privacy
Key
AES 128-, 192-,
256-bit or Triple-
DES 168-bit
Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Encrypting SNMPv3
packets.
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SNMPv3
Authentication Key
HMAC-SHA-1-96 Internally generated Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
End session, power
cycle, host reboot,
factory reset,
leaving FIPS mode,
or GENERATE KEY
command
Authenticating
SNMPv3 packets.
Operator password Minimum of eight
characters of
alphanumeric string
Initial CO password
hardcoded, password
changes entered into
module over TLS or
SSH
Initially login
password provided
to the CO,
changed password
never exits the
module
Hashed on Flash
memory and in
RAM
Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
Authenticating the
Operator
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2.8 Self-Tests
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware performs the following self-tests at power-up:
 uBoot CRC Firmware Integrity Test (CRC34
-32)
 uBoot SHA-1 Firmware Integrity Test (SHA-1)
 Cryptographic Library Integrity Tests (HMAC SHA-1 and SHA-256)
 Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o AES ECB mode encryption KAT
o AES ECB mode decryption KAT
o AES GCM mode encryption KAT
o AES GCM mode decryption KAT
o Triple-DES ECB mode encryption KAT
o Triple-DES ECB mode decryption KAT
o RSA signature generation KAT
o RSA signature verification KAT
o HMAC SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC SHA-224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 KATs
o SHA-256 KAT
o SP 800-90A based CTR_DRBG KAT
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous Random Generator Test (CRNGT) for SP 800-90A based CTR_DRBG
 CRNGT for the NDRNG
 RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
2.8.3 Critical Function Tests
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware implements the SP 800-90A HMAC_DRBG as its
random number generator. The SP 800-90A specification requires that certain critical functions be tested
conditionally to ensure the security of the DRBG. Therefore, the following critical function tests are
implemented by the cryptographic modules:
 SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Instantiate Critical Function Test
 SP 800-90A CTR _DRBG Generate Critical Function Test
 SP 800-90A CTR _DRBG Reseed Critical Function Test
 SP 800-90A CTR _DRBG Uninstantiate Critical Function Test
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate one or more specific attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1
requirements for this validation.
34
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
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3 Secure Operation
The HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The
sections below describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The module must be properly initialized in order to be considered to be in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Once configured for FIPS mode, the module only operates in FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The FIPS
mode requires specific levels of entropy35
in the random number generation functions. In order to ensure that
the brand new appliance has the appropriate levels of entropy available, and before performing the initial
configuration of the device, the Crypto-Officer should power on the module and allow it to fully boot up.
Then on the command line interface, the Crypto-Officer should enter “RESTART OA” which will cause a
reboot of the device. The reboot can also be performed using the GUI by navigating to the “Enclosure
Information”, then to the “Active Onboard Administrator”, then selecting the “Virtual Buttons” tab, and
clicking the “Reset” button. Once the module has completed the boot up cycle for the second time the Crypto-
Officer must configure the HP BladeSystem c-Class Enclosure.
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for making sure that the module is configured to operate in FIPS mode.
In order to do this, a Crypto-Officer must log into either the CLI over SSH or the GUI through an Ethernet
interface, with the proper credentials for Crypto-Officer administration.
In the GUI, the Crypto-Officer must navigate to “Enclosure Settings” within the “Enclosure Information”
collapsible drop-down menu. Within that, the CO must select the “Network Access” page, and then select
the “FIPS” tab. If there is a Virtual Connect (VC) module connected to the BladeSystem enclosure and VC
domain exists, it may be necessary to clear VC domian, using the “Clear VC Mode” button. This will take
the enclosure out of VC mode and clear all VC settings. Once this is complete, the Crypto-Officer must
check the radio button labeled “FIPS MODE ON” and input a new OA Administrator password. This new
password must contain at least eight characters. There must be at least one character of each of four character
types: uppercase, lowercase, numeric, and non-alphanumeric.
If setting FIPS mode via the CLI, the Crypto-Officer must first check that the OA is not in Virtual Connect
mode, by using the “show vcmode” command. If it returns “Virtual Connect Mode: Enabled”, then the
Crypto-Officer must use the “clear vcmode” command. The Crypto-Officer must then input the “SET FIPS
MODE ON” command into the CLI, and supply a new OA Administrator password, following the same
conventions outlined above.
After this is completed, the OA will reboot and initialize self-tests in order to operate in FIPS mode.
If a redundant OA is to be used, then it must be properly connected to the enclosure. The Crypto-Officer
must first power-on the OA module. If this is the first power-on of the module, or if it has undergone a
factory reset, it will begin to generate keys and certificates. The active OA module will pass a hash of the
password in an unencrypted form to the redundant OA.
3.2 Secure Management
This section provides guidance which ensures that the module is always operated in the FIPS mode of
operation. It will generally include services and activities allotted to the Crypto-Officer. An example is
provided below.
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for making sure the module is running in FIPS-Approved mode of
operation.
35
Note: The module comes preloaded with at least 128 bits of entropy from the factory.
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The Crypto-Officer can check the module’s FIPS mode status in several ways:
 CLI - The “show fips mode” command will return “FIPS Mode is On” if the module is currently
operating in FIPS mode. Additionally, when in FIPS mode, the CLI prompt will have a “[FIPS]”
prefix.
 GUI - The FIPS Mode ON radio button will be selected on the “FIPS” tab of the “Network Access”
page, discussed above, if the module is operating in FIPS mode. Additionally, after logging in when
the module is in FIPS mode, the header of the web page will show an icon which contains the text
“FIPS”. Mouse-over text of this icon will display the current FIPS mode of the module: “FIPS
Mode ON Enabled”.
3.2.1 Management
The module may be managed through a CLI via the Serial or Ethernet interface, utilizing getty, or a Web
GUI via Ethernet interface, utilizing HTTPS (TLS). Through these interfaces, a Crypto-Officer can configure
and enable the FIPS mode. The Crypto-Officer can also gain access to OA controls over the BladeSystem
enclosure via a KVM interface, which connects via the optional KVM Module in the enclosure. Access
through these interfaces is controlled by role-based authentication.
The KVM and Insight Display LCD are locked, by default, in FIPS mode. However, the Crypto-Officer can
unlock these interfaces through the Web GUI. Unlocking these interfaces requires the configuration of a PIN
code that must be used to access these management interfaces. This PIN code, set by the Crypto-Officer,
must be 1 to 6 characters long. The characters supported are upper and lower-case letters, and numbers.
Note that only TLS is supported by the module, when operating in FIPS mode. Other versions of SSL (v3.0
and under) are unsupported.
The OA can communicate with HP iLO modules. The iLO modules, to be used with the OA, must be
configured to use AES encryption for communication traffic.
3.2.2 Zeroization
The Crypto-Officer is able to force zeroization of the module CSPs, both stored and ephemeral, via the
management interface. Ephemeral keys can be zeroized by power-cycling the module. Stored keys require
the Crypto-Officer to perform a factory reset, to call the GENERATE KEY ALL command from the CLI, or
to transition out of FIPS mode. This will overwrite all stored certificates and keys, requiring another set to
be generated before the module can resume cryptographic services.
3.3 User Guidance
The User is neither authorized nor able to modify the FIPS-Approved configuration of the module. Users
may only utilize the services listed in Table 4. Although the User does not have any ability to modify the
configuration of the module, they should report to the Crypto-Officer if any irregular activity is observed.
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4 Acronyms
Table 7 in this section defines the acronyms.
Table 7 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command-Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DDR Double Data Rate
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HP Hewlett-Packard
HPSIM HP Systems Insight Manager
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
iLO Integrated Lights-Out
IP Internet Protocol
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
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Acronym Definition
KDF Key Derivation Function
KVM Keyboard-Video-Mouse
LAN Local Area Network
LCD Liquid-Crystal Display
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LED Light-Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest 5
N/A Not Applicable
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
OA Onboard Administrator
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PC Personal Computer
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PPC PowerPC
RJ45 Registered Jack 45
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic RandomAccess Memory
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SP Special Publication
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDES Triple-Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
Triple-DES Triple- Data Encryption Standard
USB Universal Serial Bus
VC Virtual Connect
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Acronym Definition
VGA Video Graphics Array
XML Extensible Markup Language
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com