Avaya, Inc.
Secure Router 2330
Hardware Version: SR2330; Firmware Version: 10.3.0.100
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 1.6
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Avaya, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
211 Mt. Airy Road
Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
USA USA
Phone: +1 (866) 462-8292 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
http://www.avaya.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................3
2 SECURE ROUTER 2330..........................................................................................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................6
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................9
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................11
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................12
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................12
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................16
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................16
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................................16
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................16
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................17
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................17
3.2 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................17
3.2.1 Initialization...........................................................................................................................................................18
3.2.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................................18
3.2.3 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................18
3.3 USER GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................19
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................20
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – SR2330 ROUTER...................................................................................................................................................4
FIGURE 2 – SR2330 DEPLOYED AS A BRANCH OFFICE ROUTER.......................................................................................5
FIGURE 3 – SR2330 ROUTER FRONT PANEL (WITH CARD SLOT COVERS INSTALLED)..................................................7
FIGURE 4 – SR2330 REAR PANEL............................................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 5 - TAMPER EVIDENT LABELS 1, 2, 3....................................................................................................................... 17
FIGURE 6 - TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL 4................................................................................................................................. 17
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 – SR2330 FRONT PANEL PORTS AND INTERFACES ..............................................................................................7
TABLE 3 – SR2330 REAR PANEL PORTS AND INTERFACES..................................................................................................8
TABLE 4 – SR2330 SYSTEM AND FAN LED STATUS INDICATIONS....................................................................................8
TABLE 5 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS ......................................................................................................8
TABLE 6 – OPERATOR SERVICES..............................................................................................................................................9
TABLE 7 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM........................................................................................................................ 11
TABLE 8 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 12
TABLE 9 –CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS................................................ 14
TABLE 10 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 20
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Secure Router 2330 from Avaya,
Inc.. This Security Policy describes how the Secure Router 2330 meets the security requirements of
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian
Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard
and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Secure Router 2330 is
referred to in this document as SR2330, the router, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
 The Avaya website (http://www.avaya.com/usa/products/products-a-z) contains information on the
full line of products from Avaya.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model document
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to Avaya. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2
Submission Package is proprietary to Avaya and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Avaya.
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2 Secure Router 2330
2.1 Overview
The Avaya Secure Router 2330 (or SR2330), a converged voice/data branch solution, is a powerful
modular system that combines routing, voice gateway, security and multimedia traffic forwarding into a
single cost-effective platform for enterprises. The SR2330 delivers fast, secure, reliable, and scalable wide
area network (WAN) access, making it ideal for enterprises requiring high-speed IP1
or Internet access.
The major features of SR2330 are:
 Powerful Routing Services: The SR2330 provides full IPv4 and IPv6, BGP2
-4, and multicast
routing for sophisticated enterprise deployments.
 Bridge Voice and Data: An integrated voice media gateway allows you to connect to the PSTN3
or
traditional telephony devices.
 WAN Connectivity: The SR2330 offers a wide range of WAN connectivity options, including
T1/E1, serial, ISDN4
, and ADSL5
2+.
 Security: A stateful firewall and high-speed VPN6
encryption allows you to connect securely to
the Internet or an IP network.
 Maximum Uptime: Hot-swappable cards, redundant power and port/platform resilience features
reduce service interruptions.
The router is a 1U7
rack-mountable appliance. A picture of the SR2330 is shown below in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – SR2330 Router
The SR2330 is primarily intended to act as a branch office router that securely communicates with a central
office and remote offices. As depicted in Figure 2, the SR2330 is intended to be deployed as the
connection between a branch or regional office and a public internet. The SR2330 can connect with other
Avaya Secure Router products, or any other compatible VPN devices.
1
IP – Internet Protocol
2
BGP – Border Gateway Protocol
3
PSTN – Public Switched Telephone Network
4
ISDN – Integrated Services Digital Network
5
ADSL – Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
6
VPN – Virtual Private Network
7
U – Unit
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Figure 2 – SR2330 Deployed as a Branch Office Router
The SR2330 allows users to create IP VPNs using Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) or IPsec8
.
Administrators can then locally or remotely manage the SR2330 with a management Command Line
Interface (CLI) via the serial console or via Secure Shell (SSH) version 2 (SSH2). The serial console is
accessed through an RJ459
port on the front of the SR2330.
The Secure Router 2330 is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels listed in Table 1 below. The overall
security level of the module is 2.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A10
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC11
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
8
IPsec – Internet Protocol Security
9
RJ45 – a registered jack connector type used in telephone/networking installations
10
N/A – Not Applicable
11
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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Section Section Title Level
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
14 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2
2.2 Module Specification
The Secure Router 2330 is a hardware module Hardware Version: SR2330; Firmware Version: 10.3.0.100
with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The cryptographic boundary of the Secure Router 2330 is
defined by the chassis of the router.
The boundary includes three small card interfaces. A list of cards that can be placed in the small card
interface slots is given below:
 2-port T1/E1 Small Card (Assembly Number: 333-70225-01 Rev 4)
 2-port Serial Small Card (Assembly Number: 333-70240-01 Rev 02.0011)
 1-port ADSL2+ Annex A Small Card (Assembly Number: 333-70260-01 Rev 01)
The SR2330 contains a security internal card, which is required for VPN acceleration and IPsec. The
SR2330 comes installed with a Safenet 1141/1741 chip as a hardware cryptographic accelerator providing
VPN acceleration and some IPsec functionalities.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The SR2330 consists of Ethernet ports, a console port, an external compact flash port, external card
interface slots and status LED12
s. The external compact flash port is disabled. The three small card
interface slots (external card interface) are 68-pin PCMCIA13
-style connectors, which can be used to
add/replace networking or communication cards.
The physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
Data input/output are the packets utilizing the services provided by the module. These packets enter and
exit the module through the network ports (Ethernet ports). Control input consists of Configuration or
Administration data entered into the module through the Command Line Interface (CLI) management
interface. Any user can be given administrative permissions by the Crypto Officer (CO). Status output
consists of the status provided displayed via the LEDs and log information.
The front panel of the SR2330 is shown in Figure 3. Descriptions of all ports present in the front panel are
given in Table 2.
12
LED – Light Emitting Diode
13
PCMCIA – Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
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Figure 3 – SR2330 Router Front Panel (with Card Slot Covers Installed)
Table 2 – SR2330 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
Item Description
1 Small Card slot 1
2 Small Card slot 2
3 Small Card slot 3
4 Power input
5 Four Fast Ethernet ports (FE14
0/1 through FE 0/4)
6 Two 10/100/1000Base-T ports (GE15
0/5 and 0/6), which use dual RJ16
-
45 connector with integrated Gigabit Ethernet magnetics
7 Two Small Form-factor Pluggable (SFP) ports (GE 0/7 and 0/8), for
plug-in SFP cards
8 Console port (management port)
9 Compact Flash slot (CF1)
10 Ground lug
The rear panel of the SR2330 is shown in Figure 4. Descriptions of all ports present in rear
panel are given in
Table 3.
Figure 4 – SR2330 Rear Panel
14
FE –Fast Ethernet
15
GE – Gigabit Ethernet
16
RJ – Registered Jack
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Table 3 – SR2330 Rear Panel Ports and Interfaces
Item Description
1 System LED indicator
2 Fan LED indicator
3 Redundant 12VDC power input
Each Ethernet port has a LED associated with it, which indicates the status of the port. If the cable is not
connected or no link is established, then the LED is OFF. When a cable is connected and a link is
established, the LED turns GREEN. The System and Fan LED Status indications are described in Table 4.
Table 4 – SR2330 System and Fan LED Status Indications
LED Color Definition
System Status LED
(SYS)
OFF The Secure Router 2330 is not powered.
GREEN The Secure Router 2330 is powered and
is operating normally.
RED The Secure Router 2330 is powered, but
one or more tasks have failed.
Fan Status LED
(FAN)
GREEN The internal fans are functional.
RED There is a fan fault condition.
All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in
Table 5 below.
Table 5 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Ethernet (FE or GE) 4 (FE)
2 (GE)
 Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
SFP ports 2  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
Small Card Interface
slots
3  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
Console 1  Control Input
 Status Output
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Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
LEDs 10  Status Output
Power 2  Power Input
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. Each operator is associated with a specific role. There are
two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may be assigned: a Crypto Officer role
and a User role.
The Crypto Officer (CO) role is the administrator for the router and can perform the setup, module
maintenance, and new User management tasks. The User role has the ability to perform configuration and
monitoring tasks.
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer and User roles are provided in the Table 6
below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in the table indicate the
type of access required using the following notation:
 R – Read: The CSP is read.
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Table 6 – Operator Services
Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Commission
the module 
Commission the
module by following
the Security Policy
guidelines
None None None
Create
users 
Create, edit; and delete
users; define user
accounts and assign
permissions.
Command
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Change CO
Password

Change the Crypto
Officer password
Command
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Change
User
Password

Change the User
password
Command
Command
response and
status output
User password – W

Note: For the list of non-approved services, please refer to section 3.2.1 below.
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Access the
CLI  
Access the CLI via
Console or Ethernet
port to configure or
monitor status of the
system
Command
and
parameters
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Preshared key – X
IKE17
Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
SSH Session key – W
DSA18
private keys –
X
DH19
private keys – X
Configure
routing
services
 
Configure IP stack and
firewall related features
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
Preshared key – X
IKE Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
SSH Session key – W
DSA private keys – X
DH private keys – X
Employ SSH
service
 
Manage the module
using SSH2 protocol.
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
SSH Session key – W
DSA private keys – X
Employ
VPN service  
Establish VPN session,
authenticate and use
VPN services
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
Preshared key – X
IKE Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
DSA private keys – X
DH private keys – X
Zeroize
Keys  
Zeroize unprotected
keys and CSPs
Command
and
parameters
such as
“reboot”,
“password”
or file
delete
commands
Command
response
Crypto Officer
password – W
User password – W
Perform Self
Tests  
Perform Power-up Self
Tests on demand.
Command
Command
response
None
17
IKE – Internet Key Exchange
18
DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm
19
DH – Diffie Hellman
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Show Status  
Facilitates the user to
check whether the
module is in FIPS-
Approved mode or not
None None None
All services provided by the module require the operator to assume a role, and the module authenticates the
role before providing any services. The module performs role-based authentication.
Operators authenticate to the module using a username and password. When authenticating with a Crypto
Officer role credential, the operator explicitly assumes both the Crypto Officer and User roles. When
authenticating with a User role credential, the operator explicitly assumes the User role. Table 7 lists the
authentication mechanisms used by the module. A Crypto Officer or a User communicating via SSH client
can be authenticated via public-key authentication or password based authentication.
Table 7 – Authentication Mechanism
Authentication Type Strength
Password The minimum length of the password is eight, with 62 different case-
sensitive alphanumeric characters and symbols possible for usage. The
chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1:628
, or
1:218,340,105,584,896. The fastest network connection supported by the
module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 109
=)
6,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the
probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will
occur in one minute is less than 1: (628
/ 6×109
), or 1: 291,120, which is less
than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Public key certificates The module supports RSA and DSA digital certificate authentication of users
during IPsec/IKE. Using conservative estimates and equating a 1024 bit RSA
or DSA key to an 80 bit symmetric key, the probability for a random
attempt to succeed is 1:280
or 1: 1,208,925,819,614,629,174,706,176. The
fastest network connection supported by the module is 100 Mbps. Hence at
most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 109
=) 6,000,000,000 bits of data can be
transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is less
than 1: (280
/ 6×109
), or 1: 201,487,636,602,438, which is less than 100,000 as
required by FIPS 140-2.
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) services are provided without authentication. An
unauthenticated operator uses a community string to access the SNMP services. The SNMP implemented in
the routers only allows the unauthenticated operator to get non-security-relevant system condition
information. The SNMP services do not affect the security of the module.
2.5 Physical Security
The Secure Router 2330 is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. It is enclosed in a hard and
opaque metal case that completely encloses all of its internal components. There are only a limited set of
vent holes provided in the case, and the view of the internal components of the module is obscured by the
baffling provided by the power supply unit (on the left hand side) and the Fan unit (on the right hand side).
Tamper-evident labels are applied to the case as well as all removable cards and covers to provide physical
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evidence of attempts to gain access to the module’s internal components. All of the module’s components
are production grade. The placement of tamper-evident labels can be found in Section 3.1 of this
document.
The module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15,
Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Secure Router 2330, because the module
does not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS) to the user. The Secure Router 2330 employs a
VxWorks-based kernel; it is a non-modifiable OS that provides only a limited operational environment, and
only the module’s custom written image can be run on the system. All firmware updates are digitally-
signed using RSA and a self-test is performed during each update.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 8 below.
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Certificate Number
Firmware Hardware
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in CBC20
mode (128, 192, 256-
bit keys)
1606 96
Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) in CBC mode (Three-Key) 1051 210
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 1419 187
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) using SHA-1 942 N/A
RSA21
signature verification (PKCS22
#1 v1.5) (2048, 3072, 4096-bits) 788 N/A
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) key generation, signature
generation/verification
497 N/A
SP23
800-90 Hash-Based DRBG24
(SHA-256) 80 N/A
SHA-256 for DRBG 1419 N/A
The module uses the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90 Hash DRBG to generate cryptographic keys. It uses a
DRBG implementation from Network Security Services (NSS), release version 3.12.8. The module does
not receive a seed value for PRNG from outside; rather, it is seeded via a Non-Deterministic Random
Number Generator (NDRNG), which is generated from cryptographic hardware accelerator chip, Safenet
1140/1741. The SHA-256 is used only for DRBG implementation and it is not accessible for any other
purposes.
Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations:
 MD525
used in TACACS+26
, VoIP27
, and routing services
20
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
21
RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman
22
PKCS – Public-Key Cryptography Standards
23
SP – Special Publication
24
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
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 Hardware random number generator – for seeding the FIPS-Approved DRBG
 Blowfish
 DES
 RSA key-pair generation
 RSA signature generation
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during IPsec: 1024, 1536, 2048 or 3072-bit keys (provides 80,
96, 112 or 128 bits of security, respectively).
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during SSH: 1024-bit key (provides 80 bits of security).
The module utilizes the following algorithm implementations that are FIPS-Allowed but deprecated (the
user must accept some risks). For further details regarding deprecation please refer to NIST special
publication, SP800-131A.
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during IPsec (1024 and 1536-bit keys).
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during SSH (1024-bit key).
 SHA-1 for digital signature generation and verification.
 HMAC (with key length >= 80-bits but < 112-bits)
 DSA (1024-bit).
25
MD5 – Message Digest 5
26
TACACS – Terminal Access Controller Access Control Systems Plus
27
VoIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol
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The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) listed below in Table 9.
Table 9 –Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
IKE Preshared key Shared secret Entered by the CO or
User
Can be exported
by the CO or
User in plaintext
over the console
port
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM28
File deletion using
CLI commands
Peer Authentication
of IKE session
IKE Phase 1
Symmetric key
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits symmetric
keys generated via DH
key agreement
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM
Reboot or session
termination
Exchanging shared
secret during IKE
IPsec Phase 2
Symmetric key
AES-128, 192, 256 or
TDES key
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM
Reboot or session
termination
Encryption or
decryption of IPSec
packets
SSH Symmetric key 1024-bit Symmetric
key generated via DH
key agreement
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Encryption or
decryption during
SSH
HMAC key Shared key generated
via DH key agreement
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
IKE negotiation and
support isakmp
messages
DRBG seed C value Random value Generated internally by
the hardware NDRNG.
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generate random
number
DRBG seed V value Random value Generated internally by
the hardware NDRNG.
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generate random
number
Password for Private-
key file
Passphrase used to
obscure the DSA
private-key files
Entered by the CO or
User
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
To obscure the DSA
private key files
using AES-128
28
NVRAM – Non Volatile Random Access Memory
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA public key 1024, 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Enters the module in
plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM File deletion using
CLI commands
Keys used during
SSH authentication
and Firmware load
tests
DSA public key 1024 bits The module’s Public key is
generated internally for
PKI authentication, IKE
authentication and SSH key
negotiation; while public
key of a peer enters the
module in plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM File deletion using
CLI commands
Keys used for PKI
authentication and
during IPsec/IKE and
SSH key negotiation
DSA private key 1024 bits Generated internally for
PKI authentication, IKE
authentication and SSH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Plaintext or
encrypted in NVRAM
File deletion using
CLI commands
Private key used for
PKI authentication ,
and during IPsec/IKE
and SSH key
negotiation
DH public key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits
The module’s Public key is
generated internally; while
public key of a peer enters
the module in plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generation of IKE
Key Agreement key
and SSH Session key
DH private key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits
Generated internally Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generation of IKE
Key Agreement key
and SSH Session key
Crypto Officer
password
Minimum of eight
characters of
alphanumeric string
Entered into module via a
console port or over SSH
Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
Used for
authenticating the
Crypto Officer
User password Minimum of eight
characters of
alphanumeric string
Entered into module via a
console port or over SSH
Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
Used for
authenticating the
User
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 16 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.8 Self-Tests
The module implements cryptographic algorithms using firmware (OpenSSL and NSS) as well as hardware
accelerator, and the module performs various Self-Tests (Power-Up Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests)
to verify their functionality and correctness. Upon self-test failure, the module goes into “Critical Error
state” and it disables all access to cryptographic functions and CSPs. All data outputs are inhibited upon a
self-test failure. A permanent error status will be recorded to the system log file and/or event audit log file.
The task that invoked the failed self-test will be suspended. The current operation will not complete and
the module goes into “Critical Error state”, which halts the module. This error state is visible via the
console or terminal, where the module does not respond to any commands. The CO must reboot the
machine to clear the error condition and return to a normal operational state.
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The Secure Router 2330 performs the following self-tests at power-up to verify the integrity of the
firmware binaries and the correct operation of the FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations employed by
the module:
 Firmware integrity check using 32-bit CRC29
for boot ROM30
image
 Firmware integrity check using 32-bit CRC for run-time application image
 Cryptographic algorithm tests:
o AES-CBC-256 Known Answer Tests (KAT) for OpenSSL and Safenet chip
implementations.
o Triple-DES31
KATs for both OpenSSL and Safenet chip implementations.
o RSA sign/verify test for OpenSSL implementation.
o DSA sign/verify test for OpenSSL implementation.
o DSA pairwise consistency test for OpenSSL implementation.
o SP 800-90 DRBG KAT for NSS implementation.
o SHA-1 KATs for both OpenSSL and Safenet chip implementations.
o HMAC SHA-1 KATs for both OpenSSL and Safenet chip implementations.
 Critical function tests for DRBG instantiation and reseed, as specified in SP 800-90. DRBG will
go through reseed process only when its lifetime gets expired.
The CO can perform the power-up self-tests at any time by power-cycling the module or issuing a reboot
command over the module’s CLI.
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Secure Router 2330 performs the following conditional self-tests:
 DSA Pairwise consistency test for OpenSSL implementation.
 Continuous DRBG test for NSS implementation.
 Continuous RNG test for non-approved NDRNG, which is used to seed DRBG.
 Bypass mode test
 Firmware update test
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2
Level 2 requirements for this validation.
29
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
30
ROM – Random Access Memory
31
DES – Data Encryption Standard
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 17 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3 Secure Operation
The Secure Router 2330 meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to
place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The CO is responsible for commissioning the router and powering it up. Before powering-up the router,
the CO must ensure that the required tamper-evident labels (included in the FIPS kit) are correctly applied
to the router enclosures following the instructions below.
It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to apply the tamper-evident labels to the module. The
instructions for applying the tamper evident labels are as follows:
1. The surface must be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol (99%) to remove surface contaminants.
a. Rubbing alcohol is not acceptable because it may contain oils to minimize the drying
effect on skin; these oils can interfere with the adhesion.
b. Lower concentrations of alcohol (90%, 70%, etc) are not recommended, because the non-
alcohol portion is not a cleaning agent and may inhibit optimum adhesion.
2. The surface must be dried using a clean paper towel or cotton cloth (allowing to air dry is not
recommended).
3. The surface temperature must be minimum +50F.
4. The labels must be applied 72 hours before the module is placed into operation.
Four tamper evident labels must be placed as follows to provide the required physical security:
1. Two small-sized labels must be applied horizontally between the front panel chassis and the front
panel removable cards (or blanks, in case the cards are not present) in slot 1 and slot 3, as shown
by the red-dotted lines in Figure 5.
2. One small-sized label must be applied vertically between the bare-metal bottom chassis and the
front panel removable card (or blank, in case the card is not present) in slot 2, as shown by blue-
dotted lines in Figure 5.
3. One big-sized label must be applied between the rear panel and bare-metal bottom chassis (in
horizontal position), covering the center screw head as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5 - Tamper Evident Labels 1, 2, 3
Figure 6 - Tamper Evident Label 4
3.2 Secure Management
The SR2330 has a non-modifiable OS and by default it is in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 18 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3.2.1 Initialization
As soon as the module is powered-up, it boots and performs start-up self-tests and enters in to FIPS-
Approved mode of operation. The following features/services shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved
mode of operation:
 Debugging services
 Telnet
 FTP32
services
 RSA key-pair generation
 RSA signature generation
 External Compact Flash slot
It is the Crypto Officer’s responsibility to ensure that the module boots correctly, to verify that the
services/features that are supposed to be disabled as mentioned above, are disabled, and configure the
module properly. The module is shipped with a default administrator ID and password. The CO is
required to change the default password as part of initial configuration. The Crypto Officer password must
be at least 8 characters in length. If the CO had to change any configurations to make the module FIPS
compliant, then the CO must follow the zeroization procedure as mentioned in section 3.2.3, save the
configuration and perform a reboot. Upon reboot, initialization of the module in FIPS compliant mode is
complete and the module is now configured securely. The CO should not enable any of the disabled
services mentioned previously, if any of the non-approved services are enabled then the module is not in
the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. In that case, the CO must disable the non-approved services and
perform a reboot.
3.2.2 Management
The Crypto Officer must be sure to only configure cryptographic services for the module using the FIPS-
Approved algorithms as listed in the Cryptographic Key Management section above. IPsec and SSH must
only be configured to use FIPS-Approved cipher suites, and only digital certificates generated with FIPS-
Approved algorithms may be utilized. The module implements RSA key-pair generation method that is
non-conformant to the FIPS 140-2 standard and hence shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The CO shall not import or export keys via the FTP client. The CO can modify the bypass
functionality by modifying the configuration of the IPsec tunnel and then enabling the IPsec tunnel.
If any catastrophic event (such as high power surge) results in damaging the removable cards, the module
should be sent back to the manufacturing factory or the CO is allowed to replace a removable card. The
CO must power down the module, replace the required removable card/s, re-apply the tamper evident label,
following the procedure as described in section 3.1 and power-up the module. The CO must ensure at all
times that the labels do not show any signs of tampering. Evidence of tampering can be indicated by any of
the following:
 Deformation of the label
 Label appearing broken or torn
 Missing label (in parts of full) from its expected position
 Label showing “OPENED” or “VOID” text
3.2.3 Zeroization
The module stores the preshared key and the security keys as plaintext in Flash memory.
There are many critical security parameters (CSP) within the Secure Router cryptographic boundary,
including private keys, certificate secret credentials, system configuration files and logon passwords. All
ephemeral keys used by the module are zeroized on reboot or session termination. CSPs reside in multiple
32
FTP – File Transfer Protocol
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 19 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
storage media including the system memory, non-volatile memory, and device private memory. These
keys are zeroized when the module is rebooted. The Crypto Officer must wait until the module has
successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed. Other keys and CSP such as public
and private keys that are stored in the Flash within a file can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer by deleting
the files using CLI commands.
3.3 User Guidance
The User is capable of making configuration changes, but configuration changes must be approved by a
Crypto Officer before implementation. The module implements RSA key-pair generation method that is
non-conformant to the FIPS 140-2 standard and hence shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The user shall not use DH with key size 768-bits. The User shall not import or export keys via
the FTP client. The User must be diligent to pick strong passwords (alphanumeric with minimum 8
characters), and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to
protect any secret/private keys in their possession, such as IPsec session keys. The User should report to
the Crypto Officer if any irregular activity is noticed.
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 20 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 10 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CAMA Centralized Automatic Message Accounting
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DID Direct Inward Dial
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FE Fast Ethernet
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FXO Foreign Exchange Office
FXS Foreign Exchange Station
GE Gigabit Ethernet
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
Avaya Secure Router 2330 Page 21 of 22
© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Acronym Definition
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
NVRAM Non Volatile Random Access Memory
OS Operating System
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RJ Registered Jack
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SFP Small Form-Factor Pluggable
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access Control Systems
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
VoIP Voice Over Internet Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
USA
Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com