FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java)
Document Version 1.1 © CTERA Networks Ltd. Page 1 of 36
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java)
Software Version 3.0.1
Document Version 1.1
November 16, 2021
Prepared For: Prepared By:
CTERA Networks Ltd.
CTERA Networks NA HQ
205 E. 42nd Street,
New York, NY, 10017
www.ctera.com
SafeLogic Inc.
530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94301
www.safelogic.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java)
Document Version 1.1 © CTERA Networks Ltd. Page 2 of 36
Overview
This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the CTERA Crypto Module™
(Java).
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java)
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 About FIPS 140 .............................................................................................................................................5
1.2 About this Document....................................................................................................................................5
1.3 External Resources .......................................................................................................................................5
1.4 Notices..........................................................................................................................................................5
2 CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java).......................................................................................................................6
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................6
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail .............................................................................................................................6
2.1.2 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................6
2.1.3 Module Configuration..............................................................................................................................7
2.1.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .......................................................................................................9
2.1.5 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms.........................................................................15
2.1.6 Non-Approved Mode of Operation .......................................................................................................15
2.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys .............................................................................................17
2.2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................................17
2.2.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................19
2.3 Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................................................20
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...........................................................................................................21
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles ..............................................................................................................................21
2.4.2 Services ..................................................................................................................................................21
2.5 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................25
2.6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................25
2.6.1 Use of External RNG...............................................................................................................................26
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................26
2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................27
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................28
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................28
3 Security Rules and Guidance .......................................................................................................................30
3.1 Basic Enforcement......................................................................................................................................30
3.1.1 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager..........................................................................30
3.1.2 Basic Guidance.......................................................................................................................................30
3.1.3 Enforcement and Guidance for AES GCM IVs ........................................................................................31
3.1.4 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF ................................................................31
3.1.5 Software Installation..............................................................................................................................32
4 References and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................33
4.1 References..................................................................................................................................................33
4.2 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................34
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section...........................................................................................................6
Table 2 – Available Java Permissions.............................................................................................................................8
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates..........................................................................................................13
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation..........................................................14
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms ...............................................................................15
Table 6 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only ....................................................17
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters.........................................................................................................................18
Table 8 – Public Keys ...................................................................................................................................................19
Table 9 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping ............................................................................................21
Table 10 – Description of Roles ...................................................................................................................................21
Table 11 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions..................................................................................................23
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services..............................................................................................................25
Table 13 – Power-Up Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................28
Table 14 – Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................28
Table 15 – References .................................................................................................................................................34
Table 16 – Acronyms and Terms..................................................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram.................................................................................................20
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified
environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP
accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS
140 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS
140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java) from CTERA
Networks Ltd. (“CTERA”) provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets
the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
The CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java) may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
1.3 External Resources
The CTERA website (https://www.ctera.com/) contains information on CTERA services and products. The
Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and CTERA
contact information.
1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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2 CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java)
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The CTERA Crypto Module™ (Java) is the FIPS validated cryptographic provider for the CTERA Portal.
The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the Java Archive (JAR) file (ccj-3.0.1.jar). The module is a
multi-chip standalone embodiment installed on a General Purpose Device. The module is a software
module and relies on the physical characteristics of the host platform. The module’s physical
cryptographic boundary is defined by the enclosure of the host platform.
All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal
daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail
The following table lists the module’s level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
2.1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-
approved mode when the appropriate transition method is called. To verify that a module is in the
Approved Mode of operation, the user can call a FIPS-approved mode status method
(CryptoServicesRegistrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()). If the module is configured to allow approved and
non-approved mode operation, a call to CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the
current thread of user control into approved mode.
In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will
be called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved Mode.
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2.1.3 Module Configuration
In default operation, the module will start with both approved and non-approved mode enabled.
If the module detects that the system property com.safelogic.cryptocomply.fips.approved_only is set to
true the module will start in approved mode and non-approved mode functionality will not be available.
If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed, the module will be running in
approved mode with secret and private key export disabled.
Use of the module with a Java Security Manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow
the module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to
examine secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly with
a Java Security Manager are indicated by a Y in the Req column of Table 2 – Available Java Permissions.
Permission Settings Req Usage
RuntimePermission “getProtectionDomain” Y Allows checksum to be
carried out on jar
RuntimePermission “accessDeclaredMembers” Y Allows use of reflection
API within the provider
PropertyPermission “java.runtime.name”, “read” N Only if configuration
properties are used
SecurityPermission "putProviderProperty.BCFIPS" N Only if provider installed
during execution
CryptoServicesPermission “unapprovedModeEnabled” N Only if unapproved
mode algorithms
required
CryptoServicesPermission “changeToApprovedModeEnabled” N Only if threads allowed
to change modes
CryptoServicesPermission “exportSecretKey” N To allow export of secret
keys only
CryptoServicesPermission “exportPrivateKey” N To allow export of
private keys only
CryptoServicesPermission “exportKeys” Y Required to be applied
for the module itself.
Optional for any other
codebase.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsNullDigestEnabled” N Only required for TLS
digest calculations
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled” N Only required if TLS is
used with RSA
encryption
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Permission Settings Req Usage
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsAlgorithmsEnabled” N Enables both NullDigest
and PKCS15KeyWrap
CryptoServicesPermission “defaultRandomConfig” N Allows setting of default
SecureRandom
CryptoServicesPermission “threadLocalConfig” N Required to set a thread
local property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
CryptoServicesPermission “globalConfig” N Required to set a global
property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
Table 2 – Available Java Permissions
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2.1.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program.
CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
4702 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
ECB, CBC, OFB,
CFB8, CFB128, CTR
128, 192, 256 Encryption, Decryption
Based on
4702
AES-CBC
Ciphertext
Stealing (CS)
Addendum to
SP 800-38A,
Oct 2010
CBC-CS1,
CBC-CS2,
CBC-CS3
128, 192, 256 Encryption, Decryption
4702 CCM SP 800-38C AES 128, 192, 256 Generation, Authentication
4702 (AES)
2494 (Triple-
DES)
CMAC SP 800-38B AES, Triple-DES AES with 128, 192, 256
Triple-DES with
2-key1
,
3-key
Generation, Authentication
4702 GCM/GMAC2
SP 800-38D AES 128, 192, 256 Generation, Authentication
1600 DRBG SP 800-90A Hash DRBG, HMAC
DRBG,
CTR DRBG
112, 128, 192, 256 Random Bit Generation
1
220
block limit is enforced by module for legacy operations only
2
GCM with an internally generated IV, see section 3.1.3 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5.
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
1244 DSA3
FIPS 186-4 PQG Generation,
PQG Verification,
Key Pair
Generation,
Signature
Generation,
Signature
Verification
1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only
for SigVer)
Digital Signature Services
1160
1343 (CVL)
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature
Generation
Component, Key
Pair Generation,
Signature
Generation,
Signature
Verification, Public
Key Validation
P-192*, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521,
K-163*, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571,
B-163*,
B- 233, B-283, B-409, B-571
* Curves only used for Signature
Verification and Public Key Validation
Digital Signature Services
3114 HMAC FIPS 198-1 SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512,
SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
Various (KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS) Generation, Authentication
3
DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
130 KAS4
SP 800-56A KAS-FFC,
KAS-ECC
FB (L=2048, N=224),
FC (L=2048, N=256),
EB (P-224), EC (P-256),
ED (P-384), EE (P-521)
Key Agreement
1344 (CVL) KAS Component SP 800-56A ECC-CDH Primitive P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-
233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233,
B-283, B-409, B-571
Key Agreement Primitive
1342 (CVL) KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific5
SP 800-135 TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF,
TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH
KDF, X9.63 KDF,
IKEv2 KDF, SRTP
KDF
Various (See CVL #1342 for
details)
KDF Services
145 KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions6
SP 800-108 Counter Mode,
Feedback Mode,
Double-Pipeline
Iteration Mode
CMAC-based KDF with AES, 2-
key Triple-DES, 3-key Triple-DES
or HMAC-based KDF with SHA-1,
SHA- 224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
KDF Services
4
Keys are not established directly into the module using the key agreement algorithms
5
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
6
Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not be used in approved mode.
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
4702 (AES)
2494 (Triple-
DES)
Key Wrapping
Using Block
Ciphers (KTS)7
SP 800-38F KW, KWP, TKW AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, 3-
key Triple-DES
Key Transport
For AES, the key establishment
methodology provides between
128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength
For Triple-DES, key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
2562
1345 (CVL)
RSA FIPS 186-4
FIPS 186-2
Padding from:
ANSI X9.31-1998
PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS
and PKCS1.5)
1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096
bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only for
SigVer)
Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature Verification,
Component Test
3849 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512,
SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
N/A Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification, non-
Digital Signature Applications
7
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use
24 SHA-3, SHAKE FIPS 202 SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512,
SHAKE128,
SHAKE256
N/A Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification, non-
Digital Signature Applications
2494 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TECB, TCBC,
TCFB64, TCFB8,
TOFB, CTR
2-key8
, 3-key9
Encryption, Decryption
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates
8
220
block limit is enforced by the module, encryption is disabled.
9
3-key Triple-DES encryption must not be used for more than 232
blocks for any given key.
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The following Approved cryptographic algorithms were implemented with vendor affirmation.
Algorithm IG Reference Use
CKG using output from
DRBG
Vendor Affirmed IG
D.12
[SP 800-133]
Section 6.1 (Asymmetric from DRBG)
Section 7.1 (Symmetric from DRBG)
Using DRBG #1600
KAS10
using SHA-512/224 or
SHA-512/256
Vendor Affirmed IG
A.3, D.1-rev2
[SP 800-56A-rev2]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: FB, FC, EB, EC, ED, EE11
Using CVL #1344
KDF, Password-Based Vendor Affirmed IG
D.6
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Using HMAC #3114
Key Wrapping Using RSA Vendor Affirmed IG
D.4
[SP 800-56B]
RSA-KEMS-KWS with, and without, key
confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Key Transport Using RSA Vendor Affirmed IG
D.4
[SP 800-56B]
RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
10
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
11
Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with EE.
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2.1.5 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in
the Approved mode of operation.
Algorithm Use
Non-SP 800-56A-rev2 Compliant
DH
[IG D.8]
Diffie-Hellman 2048-bit key agreement primitive for use with
system-level key establishment; not used by the module to
establish keys within the module (key agreement; key
establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
Non-SP 800-56B compliant RSA
Key Transport
[IG D.9]
RSA may be used by a calling application as part of a key
encapsulation scheme.
Key sizes: 2048 and 3072 bits (key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2, IG 1.23 example 2a]
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
2.1.6 Non-Approved Mode of Operation
The module supports a non-approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to
be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
Algorithm Use
AES (non-compliant12
) Encryption, Decryption
ARC4 (RC4) Encryption, Decryption
Blowfish Encryption, Decryption
Camellia Encryption, Decryption
CAST5 Encryption, Decryption
DES Encryption, Decryption
DSA (non-compliant13
) Public Key Cryptography
DSTU4145 Public Key Cryptography
ECDSA (non-compliant14
) Public Key Cryptography
12
Support for additional modes of operation.
13
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
14
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
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Algorithm Use
ElGamal Public Key Cryptography
GOST28147 Encryption, Decryption
GOST3410-1994 Hashing
GOST3410-2001 Hashing
GOST3411 Hashing
HMAC-GOST3411 Hashing
IDEA Encryption, Decryption
KAS (non-compliant15
) Key Agreement
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or
SHA-512/256 (non-compliant)
KDF
MD5 Hashing
HMAC-MD5 Hashing
OpenSSL PBKDF KDF
PKCS#12 PBKDF KDF
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF KDF
RC2 Encryption, Decryption
RIPEMD128 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD128 Hashing
RIPEMD-160 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD160 Hashing
RIPEMD256 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD256 Hashing
RIPEMD320 Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD320 Hashing
X9.31 PRNG Random Number Generation
RSA (non-compliant16
) Public Key Cryptography
RSA KTS (non-compliant17
) Public Key Cryptography
SCrypt KDF
SEED Encryption, Decryption
Serpent Encryption, Decryption
SipHash Hashing
SHACAL-2 Encryption, Decryption
TIGER Hashing
HMAC-TIGER Hashing
TripleDES (non-compliant18
) Encryption, Decryption
15
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
16
Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional key sizes.
17
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
18
Support for additional modes of operation.
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Algorithm Use
Twofish Encryption, Decryption
WHIRLPOOL Hashing
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL Hashing
Table 6 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only
2.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
2.2.1 Critical Security Parameters
The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:
CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key [FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A] AES
(128/192/256) encrypt key19
AES Decryption Key [FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A] AES
(128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DH Agreement key [SP 800-56A-rev2] Diffie-Hellman (>= 2048) private key agreement key
DRBG(CTR AES)
V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(CTR Triple-DES)
V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(Hash)
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(HMAC)
V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy
input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >= 224 bits) private
key agreement key
EC Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >= 224 bits) signature
generation key
HMAC Authentication
Key
[FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size determined by security
strength required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2
PRF
19
The AES-GCM key and IV are generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum of
96 bits. In the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-
GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
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CSP Description / Usage
PBKDF Secret Value
[SP 800-132] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified PRF
RSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (>= 2048) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (>=2048) key transport (decryption) key
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
[SP 800-56A-rev2] Secret value used in construction of key for underlying
PRF
SP 800-108 KDF Secret
Value
[SP 800-108] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF
SRTP Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP
PRF
SSH Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH
PRF
TLS KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified TLS PRF
Triple-DES
Authentication Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (112/192) CMAC key
Triple-DES Encryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) decryption key
Triple-DES Wrapping
Key
[SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping key, (128
unwrapping only)
X9.63 KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified X9.63 PRF
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters
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2.2.2 Public Keys
The table below provides a complete list of the public keys used within the module:
Public Key Description / Usage
DH Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev2] Diffie-Hellman (>= 2048) public key agreement key
DSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) public key
agreement key
EC Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature
verification key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (>=2048) key transport (encryption) key
RSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (>= 1024) signature verification key
Table 8 – Public Keys
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2.3 Module Interfaces
The figure below shows the module’s physical and logical block diagram:
Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram
The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary are shown above. When operational, the module does not
transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a software cryptographic module.
Therefore, the module’s interfaces are purely logical and are provided through the Application
Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The logical interfaces expose services that
applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be called by a referencing application
(see Section 2.4 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module
distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined
API.
The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces: data input, data output,
control input, and status output. Each of the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces relates to the module’s callable
interface, as follows:
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FIPS 140-2 Interface Logical Interface Module Physical Interface
Data Input API input parameters – plaintext and/or
ciphertext data
Network Interface
Data Output API output parameters and return values –
plaintext and/or ciphertext data
Network Interface
Control Input API method calls – method calls, or input
parameters, that specify commands and/or
control data used to control the operation of
the module
Keyboard Interface, Mouse
Interface
Status Output API output parameters and return/error
codes that provide status information used to
indicate the state of the module
Display Controller, Network
Interface
Power None Power Supply
Table 9 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
As shown in Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram and Table 11 – Module Services, Roles,
and Descriptions, the output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected
from processes performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the
data output interface when the module zeroizes keys.
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
2.4.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, which are the User and Crypto Officer (CO). The
cryptographic module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the
thread that instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
The module does not support a Maintenance role or bypass capability. The module does not support
authentication.
Role Role Description Authentication Type
CO Crypto Officer – Powers on and off the module N/A – Authentication is not
a requirement for Level 1
User User – The user of the complete API N/A – Authentication is not
a requirement for Level 1
Table 10 – Description of Roles
2.4.2 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions.
The second column provides a description of each service, and availability to the Crypto Officer and User is
indicated in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
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Service Description CO User
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module
initialization.
X
Show Status A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if the
module is ready. CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode()
can be called to determine the FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread termination. X
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Authentication Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures. X
DRBG (SP800-90A)
output
Used for random number, IV and key generation. X
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest, SHAKE
output.
X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-master secret and
additional input.
X
SP 800-108 KDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SSH Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
X9.63 Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
IKEv2 Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SRTP Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
PBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an
encoding of a password and an additional function such as a
message hash.
X
Key Agreement Schemes Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800- 56A, Diffie-
Hellman).
X
Key Wrapping Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
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Service Description CO User
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided
function.
X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs. X
Table 11 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions
Note: The module services are the same in the approved and non-approved modes of operation. The only
difference is the function(s) used (approved/allowed or non-approved/non-allowed).
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke non-
approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as approved mode only. In
approved only mode no non-approved services are accessible. In the presence of a Java SecurityManager
approved mode services specific to a context (such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS) require specific
permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Cryptographic Officer or User.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the
different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module uses the
CSP.
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into
the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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Services
CSPs
AES
Keys
DH
Keys
DRBG
Keys
DSA
Keys
EC
Agreement
Key
ECDSA
Keys
HMAC
Keys
KDF
Secret
Values
RSA
Keys
Triple-DES
Keys
Initialize Module and
Run Self-Tests on
Demand
Show Status
Zeroize / Power-off
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption
R R
Data Decryption
R R
MAC Calculation
R R R
Signature
Authentication
R R R
Signature Verification
R R R
DRBG (SP800-90A)
output
G G G,R G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message
Hashing
R
TLS Key Derivation
Function
R
SP 800-108 KDF
R
SSH Derivation
Function
R
X9.63 Derivation
Function
R
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
R
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Services
CSPs
AES
Keys
DH
Keys
DRBG
Keys
DSA
Keys
EC
Agreement
Key
ECDSA
Keys
HMAC
Keys
KDF
Secret
Values
RSA
Keys
Triple-DES
Keys
IKEv2 Derivation
Function
R
SRTP Derivation
Function
R
PBKDF
G,R
Key Agreement
Schemes
G R R R R G
Key
Wrapping/Transport
(RSA, AES,
Triple-DES)
R R R R
Key Unwrapping (RSA,
AES,
Triple-DES)
R R R R
NDRNG Callback
G
Utility
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services
2.5 Physical Security
The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational
environment list in this section. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a
logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that
instantiates the module within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.
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The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager and starts in FIPS-approved mode by default when
used with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java Security
Manager, it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.
The module was tested on the following platforms:
• CentOS 6 and OpenJDK 1.7 running on HP ProLiant DL360 G7 Server with Intel Xeon X5670
FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operating system
family where the module source code is unmodified, and the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are
met. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation
certificate.
The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by
47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B.
2.6.1 Use of External RNG
The module does not include an entropy source. Entropy is loaded via callbacks using the NDRNG Callback
service. The module does not exercise control over the amount or quality of the entropy that is provided
to it in response to callbacks, therefore the caveat “no assurance of the minimum strength of generated
keys” is applicable.
The operator should use an appropriate entropy source to provide entropy when required. The module
will request entropy using callbacks, as appropriate to the security strength and seeding configuration for
the DRBG that is using the entropy. In approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that would be
requested is 112 bits, with a larger minimum being set if the security strength of the operation requires it.
The module will wait until the callback returns the requested amount of entropy, blocking if necessary.
2.7 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data has not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 13 – Power-Up Self-
Tests. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If
one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed
error message when FipsStatus.isReady() is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the
module and calling FipsStatus.isReady() again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.
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2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
Test Target Description
Software Integrity Check HMAC-SHA-256 (HMAC Cert. #3114)
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
FFC KAS KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation Parameter Sets/Key sizes:
FB
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-
256
GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
ECC KAS KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
Extendable- Output
functions (XOF)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs: SHAKE128, SHAKE256
Key Agreement Using RSA KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
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Test Target Description
Key Transport Using RSA KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 13 – Power-Up Self-Tests
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number
generation (respectively):
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the NDRNG.
DH DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key
pair generation.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the DRBG.
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key
pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key
pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key
pair generation.
DRBG Health Checks Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section
11.3.
SP 800-56A Assurances Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2,
and/or 5.6.3. Required per IG 9.6.
Table 14 – Conditional Self-Tests
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against its internal
implementations. There are two countermeasures used.
The first countermeasure is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms
by strictly avoiding “fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a
MAC, signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.
The second countermeasure is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which
both protect the RSA algorithm.
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Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input
into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input
makes it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the
operation as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the
operation tells them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification
operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or
signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the
correctness of the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected
errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the
private value of the RSA key.
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3 Security Rules and Guidance
3.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator may command the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or
resetting the module.
4. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.
3.1.1 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager
In the presence of a Java SecurityManager approved mode services specific to a context (such as DSA and
ECDSA for use in TLS) require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the
Cryptographic Officer or User. The SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the ability of particular
code bases to examine CSPs. See Section 2.1.3 – Module Configuration for further advice on this.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
3.1.2 Basic Guidance
The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate to
its use in applications running on the JVM.
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Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that
provide access to the FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module. A more
abstract level of access can also be gained using strings providing operation names passed into the
module's Java cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography Architecture
(JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).
When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of
algorithms which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.
3.1.3 Enforcement and Guidance for AES GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly. Where an IV is not generated randomly, the module supports the
importing of GCM IVs.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved
DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In approved mode, importing a GCM IV is non-conformant unless the source of the IV is also FIPS
approved for GCM IV generation.
Per IG A.5, Section 2.2.1 of this Security Policy also states that in the event module power is lost and
restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or
decryption are re-distributed.
3.1.4 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be used
for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.
In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112
bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF
should be as large as practical.
As the module is a general purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use for
the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain enough
entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for
the key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII, a 14-byte password is
unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, “Security
Considerations” of SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count selection.
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3.1.5 Software Installation
The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the
general public. The module and its host application are to be installed on an operating system specified in
Section 2.6 or on an operating system where portability is maintained.
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4 References and Acronyms
4.1 References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31 X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
SP 800-20 Modes of Operation Validation System for Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TMOVS)
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
SP 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then- Expansion
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application–Specific Key Derivation Functions
Table 15 – References
4.2 Acronyms
The following table defines acronyms found in this document:
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSTU4145 Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
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Acronym Term
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
JAR Java ARchive
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
JVM Java Virtual Machine
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Non Applicable
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
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Acronym Term
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XOF Extendable-Output Function
Table 16 – Acronyms and Terms