Non-Proprietary Security Policy for DataLocker, Inc., DL4FE
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DATALOCKER, INC.,
DL4FE
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.0
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for DataLocker, Inc., DL4FE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 General..................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Security Levels..............................................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.....................................................................................................................7
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification................................................................8
2.3 Excluded Components..................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................................10
2.5 Algorithms..................................................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations...........................................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information..................................................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy........................................................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation...........................................................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment......................................................................................................................................14
2.11 Industry Protocols......................................................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................................................16
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................................16
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification....................................................................................................................16
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication....................................................................................................................17
4.1 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................................17
4.2 Roles...........................................................................................................................................................17
4.3 Approved Services......................................................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................................24
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .........................................................................................................24
5 Software/Firmware Security...............................................................................................................................24
5.1 Integrity Techniques...................................................................................................................................24
5.2 Initiate on Demand ....................................................................................................................................24
6 Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................................24
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...................................................................................24
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................................................26
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required............................................................................................................26
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7.2 EFP/EFT Information ..................................................................................................................................26
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges .....................................................................................................26
8 Non-Invasive Security .........................................................................................................................................27
8.1 Mitigation Techniques ...............................................................................................................................27
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management......................................................................................................27
9.1 Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................................27
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................................................27
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................................................27
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................................29
10 Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................................32
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................32
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................32
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ...................................................................................................................34
10.4 Error States ................................................................................................................................................37
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.................................................................................................................37
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.......................................................................................................................................37
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................................37
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................................37
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.....................................................................................................................37
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................................................37
11.5 End of Life...................................................................................................................................................38
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................................................38
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels..................................................................................................................................................6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware.......................................................................................................9
Table 3: Modes List and Description ...........................................................................................................................10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................11
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .........................................................................................................................11
Table 6: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................................................13
Table 7: Entropy Certificates .......................................................................................................................................14
Table 8: Entropy Sources .............................................................................................................................................14
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................16
Table 10: Authentication Methods..............................................................................................................................17
Table 11: Roles.............................................................................................................................................................17
Table 12: Approved Services .......................................................................................................................................24
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required..............................................................................................................26
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information....................................................................................................................................26
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ..................................................................................................................26
Table 16: Storage Areas...............................................................................................................................................27
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods..........................................................................................................................27
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods .............................................................................................................................28
Table 19: SSP Table 1...................................................................................................................................................30
Table 20: SSP Table 2...................................................................................................................................................31
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................32
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................34
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................................................34
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information.................................................................................................................36
Table 25: Error States ..................................................................................................................................................37
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List of Figures
Figure 1: DL4FE ..............................................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2: Block Diagram.................................................................................................................................................8
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1 GENERAL
1.1 OVERVIEW
This document defines the Security Policy for the DataLocker, Inc. (DataLocker) DL4FE module, hereafter “the
module”.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1. The module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment as
defined by FIPS 140-3 and conforms to Security Level 3.
1.2 SECURITY LEVELS
The module meets the overall requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
2.1 DESCRIPTION
The module is an encrypted portable storage device, featuring three crypto processors, which provide layers of
cryptographic protection. It requires no additional software or drivers to be installed on the host PC. The module is
intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated encrypted storage.
Figure 1: DL4FE
Purpose and Use:
The DL4FE is a portable encrypted storage hard drive.
Module Type: Hardware
The DL4FE is defined as hardware module (refer to ISO/IEC 19790, Section 7.2.2).
Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand
The DL4FE is defined as a multiple chip standalone cryptographic module.
Module Characteristics:
The critical components within the module are encapsulated inside a hard, opaque, production grade epoxy.
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the perimeter of the epoxy that encapsulates all the module’s
components on the printed circuit board (PCB).
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
N.B. The JTAG Write PIN Interface shown in Figure 2 is used to write firmware on debug devices. On production devices, the configuration setting
is such that the JTAG interface cannot be used to read, erase, or program the STM32 flash memory.
2.2 TESTED AND VENDOR AFFIRMED MODULE VERSION AND IDENTIFICATION
The DL4FE cryptographic module is designed to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3 (refer to
Table 1). The module is available in the following configuration (refer to Table 2):
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features
DL4-500GB-FE DL4FE - 500GB
HDD
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
500GB
HDD
DL4-1TB-FE DL4FE - 1TB HDD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
1TB HDD
DL4-2TB-FE DL4FE - 2TB HDD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
2TB HDD
DL4-SSD-1TB-FE DL4FE - 1TB SSD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
1TB SSD
DL4-SSD-2TB-FE DL4FE - 2TB SSD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
2TB SSD
DL4-SSD-4TB-FE DL4FE - 4TB SSD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
4TB SSD
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Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features
DL4-SSD-7.6TB-FE DL4FE - 7.6TB SSD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
7.6TB SSD
DL4-SSD-15.3TB-
FE
DL4FE - 15.3TB SSD App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
15.3TB
SSD
DL4-SSD-1TB-FE-
G
DL4FE - 1TB SSD -
G
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
1TB SSD
DL4-SSD-2TB-FE-
G
DL4FE - 2TB SSD -
G
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
2TB SSD
DL4-SSD-4TB-FE-
G
DL4FE - 4TB SSD -
G
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
4TB SSD
DL4-SSD-7.6TB-
FE-G
DL4FE - 7.6TB SSD -
G
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
7.6TB SSD
DL4-SSD-15.3TB-
FE-G
DL4FE - 15.3TB SSD
- G
App: 3.09 Bootloader:
1.12
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
15.3TB
SSD
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 EXCLUDED COMPONENTS
Several non-sensitive components within the cryptographic boundary are excluded from the requirements of FIPS
140-3 under AS02.13 & AS02.14. These components are primarily passive in nature (e.g. resistors, capacitors, LED)
or provide additional support to the general functionality of the module (e.g. enclosure, HDD/SSD, LCD touch
panel). Failure or malfunction of these components would not compromise the security of the module.
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2.4 MODES OF OPERATION
Modes List and Description:
The module only supports an Approved mode of operation and cannot be configured to operate in a non-
Approved mode. Once the operator has authenticated, the unlocked screen will display “FIPS 140-3 Security Level
3 AES-256-bit XTS” along with the evaluated firmware version, “DL4FE 3.09”. The Bootloader Version (1.12) can be
verified via the SDK.
Mode
Name
Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved Only Approved services are supported Approved Global Indicator
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The device will not respond to service calls before it has entered its approved mode of operation.
2.5 ALGORITHMS
The DL4FE cryptographic module supports the approved cryptographic algorithms shown in Table 4.
Approved Algorithms:
The module supports the following approved cryptographic algorithms.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CTR AES 3971 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A
AES-GCM AES 3971 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-XTS AES 5695 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38E
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5176 Curve - P-256
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5176 Curve - P-256 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5176 Curve - P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A5176 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC 2589 - FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A5176 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
KDA OneStep Sp800-
56Cr1
A5176 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 256-
2048 Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
PBKDF A5176 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000
Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-64 Increment
1
SP 800-132
SHA2-256 SHS 3275 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 SHS 3299 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 SHS 4565 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A4438 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module supports the following vendor affirmed algorithms (refer to Table 5).
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric
and Asymmetric
N/A SP 800-133r2 and IG D.G per Section 4 example 1, Section
5.2, and Section 6.1.
CKG
XTS
Key Type:Symmetric N/A SP 800-133r2 and IG D.H per Section 6.3 approved method
1 and Section 4 example 1. Applicable to AES-XTS
compliant to IG C.I because Key_1 and Key_2 are
concatenated prior to usage.
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 SECURITY FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CSP Decryption BC-Auth Symmetric
Decryption
Standard:NIST SP
800-38D
AES-GCM: (AES
3971)
Key Type:
Symmetric
Key Size: 256-bit
CSP Encryption BC-Auth Symmetric
Encryption
Standard:NIST SP
800-38D
AES-GCM: (AES
3971)
Key Type:
Symmetric
Key Size: 256-bit
DEC BC-UnAuth Symmetric
Decryption
Standard:FIPS 197 AES-CTR: (AES
3971)
Key Size: 256
AES-XTS: (AES 5695)
Key Size: 256
DRBG Generate DRBG Random Number
Generation using
HASH_DRBG based
on SHA2-256
Standard:NIST SP
800-90A
Hash DRBG:
(A5176)
Mode: SHA2-256
Returned Bits: 256
EG ENT-ESV Entropy Generation Standard:NIST SP
800-90B
SHA3-256: (A4438)
Message Length
Max: 65536 bits
ENC BC-UnAuth Symmetric
Encryption
Standard:FIPS 197 AES-CTR: (AES
3971)
Key Size: 256
AES-XTS: (AES 5695)
Key Size: 256
Integrity SHA Message Digest Standard:FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256: (SHS
4565)
Message Length
Max: 51200 bits
KAS KAS-Full Key Agreement for
establishing secure
session
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2, path 2, split
Key
confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5176)
Scheme: Ephemeral
Unified
Curve: P-256
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1:
(A5176)
Derived Key Length:
2048
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-KG CKG
KAS-KeyGen
Asymmetric key
generation during
KAS
Standard:NIST SP
800-56Ar3
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5176)
Curve: P-256
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
PBKDF PBKDF Password Based Key
Derivation Option
1a
Standard:NIST SP
800-132
PBKDF: (A5176)
Salt Length: 256 bits
Password Length: 8
- 64 bytes
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(HMAC 2589)
SHA2-256: (SHS
3275)
PKV AsymKeyPair-
PubKeyVal
Public key
validation
Standards:NIST SP
800-56Ar3, FIPS
186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5176)
Curve: P-256
SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification
Standard:FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5176)
Curves: P-256
SHA2-256: (SHS
3299)
Message Length
Max: 51200 bits
SymKG CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
Standard:NIST SP
800-133r2
CKG XTS: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric
Hash DRBG:
(A5176)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 ALGORITHM SPECIFIC INFORMATION
The module utilizes only approved algorithms that are tested and validated under the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP).
The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario 2. The module uses the approved Hash DRBG
to generate the IV with a length of 96-bits. The entropy source producing the DRBG seed is located inside the
module’s cryptographic boundary.
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Per IG D.N, the PBKDF iteration count is selected to a value between 1,000 and 10,000. It utilizes the highest
possible value, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the
users.
Compliance to NIST SP 800-56ARev3 assurances:
For KAS-ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). The key derivation function complies with NIST SP
800-56Cr2 (i.e., One-Step KDF). Furthermore, the module obtained the appropriate assurances, as required in
Sections 5.6.2 of NIST SP 800-56Ar3. For KAS-ECC, the module uses C(2e,0s), thus no static key pairs are used as a
part of the KAS schemes per NIST SP 800-56Ar3. Full public key validation is implemented (NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Section 5.6.2.3.3). No key confirmation is implemented.
2.8 RBG AND ENTROPY
The module incorporates a NIST SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG (Cert. #A5176) that is seeded from the module’s NIST SP
800-90B validated entropy source. The unmodified output of the DRBG is used for generating cryptographic key
material or random nonces.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E131 DataLocker, Inc.
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
DataLocker
JENT
Non-
Physical
STMicroelectronics
STM32L452ve
256
bits
Full
entropy
SHA3-256 Cert.
#A4438
Table 8: Entropy Sources
2.9 KEY GENERATION
The module generates symmetric cryptographic keys in conformance with NIST SP 800-133r2 using a NIST SP 800-
90A conforming DRBG (Cert. #A5176) for the encryption and protection of data and cryptographic keys. The
module generates asymmetric cryptographic key pairs in conformance with FIPS 186-5 for the verification of digital
signatures, or for the facilitation of key agreement in conformance with NIST SP 800-56ar3.
2.10 KEY ESTABLISHMENT
The module supports the establishment of cryptographic keys using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) in
conformance with NIST SP 800-56ar3. The module implements KAS-ECC-SSC per NIST SP 800-56A Rev3 (Cert.
#A5176), used in conjunction with KDA per NIST SP 800-56Cr1 (Cert. #A5176). Key establishment methodology
provides at least 128 bits of encryption strength. This is used to establish secure communication sessions.
2.11 INDUSTRY PROTOCOLS
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The module relies upon the standard USB and other serial protocols for communication with general purpose
computer (GPC) systems.
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3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES
3.1 PORTS AND INTERFACES
The module incorporates physical ports and logical interfaces. The physical ports are defined within Table 9 below:
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
LCD Touch Panel Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Authentication and configuration data and status
USB Port Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Power
Plaintext data for encryption/storage and retrieval, status, command inputs
Buzzer Status Output Status
LED Status Output Status
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
3.2 TRUSTED CHANNEL SPECIFICATION
The module provides a physically secured keypad interface for operator entry of plaintext Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs), such as authentication data. Each signal connects through physically separated conductors
directly into the module’s cryptographic boundary. The trusted channel is established when the module is
assembled during manufacturing and cannot be disabled.
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4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION
4.1 AUTHENTICATION METHODS
The module supports authentication methods for the Cryptographic Officer roles. These roles have separate
authentication methods as indicated in Table 10.
Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Password
Verification
Username
and
minimum 8-
character
password
Password between 8
and 64 characters in
length. The password
is selected from 46
possible symbols,
inclusive of numbers,
letters, and special
characters (!, *, -, %, ~,
#, . , @, &, $). The
password is not
allowed to be linear
(e.g., "12345678") or
repetitive (e.g.,
"11111111").
The probability that a
random authentication
attempt will succeed is
at most one in 46^8 -
118 (which is less than
one in 1,000,000). The
reason is that, out of
46^8 possible
passwords, there are
118 linear and
repetitive passwords,
which are disallowed.
The module will self-destruct
and zeroize all CSPs if
enough consecutive failed
authentication attempts are
made. The number of failed
authentication attempts
allowed is between 10 and
50, depending on the
selected configuration.
Therefore, the probability
that a brute force attack will
succeed in one minute is at
most 50 in 46^8 - 118, which
is less than the required
probability of one in
100,000.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
4.2 ROLES
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer (CO) Admin Identity Cryptographic
Officer
Password Verification
Crypto Officer (CO) Standard Identity Cryptographic
Officer
Password Verification
Unauthenticated Role Unauthenticated None
Table 11: Roles
The module does not support concurrent operators. Only one operator is allowed to access the device at any time.
Operator authentication does not persist beyond power-cycling the module. The selection of roles is implicit.
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4.3 APPROVED SERVICES
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Change
Password
Update
operator
passphrase and
SilentKill Code
Successful
service
completion.
New Password Status ENC
DEC
DRBG
Generate
PBKDF
CSP
Encryption
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Change
Settings
Configure the
module
Successful
service
completion
Configuration
parameters
e.g. Lockout
time lengths,
minimum
password
length, screen
brightness,
etc.
Status ENC
DEC
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Create
Secondary
Account
Create
Secondary CO
Standard
account
Successful
service
completion
Password Status ENC
DEC
SymKG
DRBG
Generate
CSP
Encryption
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
- Passphrase: W
- DRBG-State:
G,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,E
Decrypt
Data
Decrypt
operator data
in persistent
storage
Successful
service
completion.
None Plaintext data ENC
DEC
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
Encrypt
Data
Encrypt
operator data
in persistent
storage
Successful
service
completion.
Plaintext data None ENC
DEC
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
Firmware
Update
Update the
firmware or
Virtual CD-ROM
contents (VCD);
the VCD is not
firmware and
only contains
data
Successful
service
completion.
Digitally
signed
firmware
Status ENC
DEC
SigVer
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- VCD-Load-Pub:
E
- FW-Load-Pub: E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- VCD-Load-Pub:
E
- FW-Load-Pub: E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Get Info Retrieve device
information,
such as
firmware
version and
serial number
Successful
service
completion.
None Module
information
data e.g.
Module
name,
version
None Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
Unauthenticated
Lock
Device
Log out the
operator and
lock the device
Successful
service
completion.
None Status None Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Session
Encryption Key
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(SEK): Z
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): Z
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub): Z
- KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): Z
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Session
Encryption Key
(SEK): Z
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): Z
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub): Z
- KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): Z
Login Authenticate to
the module via
the LCD Touch
Panel
Successful
service
completion.
Operator ID
and Password
Status PBKDF
CSP
Decryption
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Remount Dismount and
remount the
private
partition
Successful
service
completion.
None Status CSP
Decryption
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): E
Reset Soft Reset. The
equivalent of
power cycling
Successful
service
completion.
None None None Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): Z
- Session
Encryption Key
(SEK): Z
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): Z
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub): Z
- KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): Z
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): Z
- Session
Encryption Key
(SEK): Z
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): Z
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub): Z
- KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): Z
Secure
Channel
Establish an
AES-CTR
encrypted
secure channel
with Host PC
Successful
service
completion.
None Status PKV
ENC
DEC
DRBG
Generate
KAS-KG
KAS
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- DRBG-State: E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
- Session
Encryption Key
(SEK): G,E
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): G,E
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub):
G,E,R
- KAS-ECC Peer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): E,W
- Shared Secret
(Z): G,E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- DRBG-State: E
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
- Session
Encryption Key
(SEK): G,E
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): G,E
- KAS-ECC Public
Key (KAS-pub):
G,E,R
- KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub): E,W
- Shared Secret
(Z): G,E
Self-
Destruct
The module
may be
configured to
either destroy
device (DEK and
firmware are
destroyed) or
destroy data
only (DEK is
destroyed and
data is lost)
Successful
service
completion.
None None None Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- DRBG-State: Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): Z
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- DRBG-State: Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): Z
Self-Tests Reset the
module by
power-cycling
to invoke self-
tests on
demand
Successful
service
completion.
None Status Integrity
SigVer
Unauthenticated
Show
Status
Status via LCD
Display, buzzer,
and LEDs
Successful
service
completion.
None Module
status
None Unauthenticated
Show
System
Show the
current system
configuration
Successful
service
completion
None Module
configuration
parameters
DEC Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- System Base
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Key (SBK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
SilentKill Destroys all
copies of the
DEK, invalidates
passphrases,
and generates a
new DEK
Successful
service
completion.
Silent Kill code Status ENC
DEC
SymKG
DRBG
Generate
EG
PBKDF
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- DRBG-State:
G,E,Z
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,Z
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Crypto Officer
(CO) Standard
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- DRBG-State:
G,E,Z
- Passphrase:
W,E
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,Z
- System Base
Key (SBK): E
Zeroize
Drive
Destroys all
copies of the
DEK, invalidates
passphrases,
and generates a
new DEK. If the
command is
received via the
SDK, then the
module may be
configured to
destroy device
instead (DEK
Successful
service
completion
None Status ENC
DEC
SymKG
DRBG
Generate
EG
Crypto Officer
(CO) Admin
- DRBG-State:
G,E,Z
- Passphrase:
G,E,Z
- Key Encryption
Key (KEK): Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,E,Z
- KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr): Z
- Session
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
and firmware
are destroyed).
Encryption Key
(SEK): Z
- System Base
Key (SBK): G,E,Z
- DRBG-EI: G,E
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 NON-APPROVED SERVICES
N/A for this module.
4.5 EXTERNAL SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE LOADED
The module supports firmware updates by the Cryptographic Officer role (both Crypto Officer (CO) Admin and
Crypto Officer (CO) Standard) through a secure firmware-loading mechanism. Upon authentication of the
Cryptographic Officer, a Secure Channel (via the Secure Channel service) is established to logically isolate and to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the firmware image during transfer. The Firmware Update service
should then be called. The firmware image is digitally signed using ECDSA P-256 and verified within the module
using an embedded public key prior to installation. The module inhibits all data output interfaces during the
firmware update, and no cryptographic operations are performed. Only after successful verification does the
module write the updated firmware to protected memory and perform a controlled power-cycle to activate the
firmware. This mechanism provides assurance that only authenticated, integrity-verified firmware can be loaded,
satisfying the controls and isolation requirements of ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B and FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A.
5 SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY
5.1 INTEGRITY TECHNIQUES
The module includes the following firmware components that include separate firmware integrity tests:
− Bootloader: Signature Verification (ECDSA, Cert. #A5176), P-256
− Firmware: Signature Verification (ECDSA, Cert. #A5176), P-256
The module will transition to its error state upon the failure of either firmware integrity test.
5.2 INITIATE ON DEMAND
Self-tests may be initiated on demand by power cycling the module or invoking a soft reset via the services.
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
6.1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TYPE AND REQUIREMENTS
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Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module does not contain a modifiable operational environment. The module’s operational environment is
limited. The module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. Firmware versions validated
through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any firmware not identified in
this Security Policy does not constitute the module defined by this Security Policy or covered by this validation.
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7 PHYSICAL SECURITY
7.1 MECHANISMS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED
The DL4FE is protected by an opaque epoxy and conforms to FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3 physical security
requirements.
The operator is required to physically inspect the module for indications of tampering attempts at intervals
specified by their organization’s policies. The fascia can be removed without tamper evidence and should be
inspected when examining for tamper evidence.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper Evidence Each use Examine the outer enclosure for evidence of tampering.
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT INFORMATION
The module does not support environmental failure protection (EFP) mechanisms for high/low voltage and
temperature extremes. The module underwent environmental failure testing (EFT) instead (refer to Table 14).
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -90C EFT Shutdown
HighTemperature 135C EFT Shutdown
LowVoltage 3.7V EFT Shutdown
HighVoltage 8.1V EFT Shutdown
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 HARDNESS TESTING TEMPERATURE RANGES
The module has been tested at the operational, storage and distribution temperatures listed in Table 15. The
module’s epoxy hardness is assured within these ranges.
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -20C
HighTemperature 60C
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY
8.1 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
The module does not provide protection against non-invasive security methods.
9 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS MANAGEMENT
9.1 STORAGE AREAS
The module supports both volatile and persistent storage of SSPs within internal RAM and Flash.
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Plaintext in volatile memory Dynamic
Flash
(Encrypted)
Encrypted with the KEK in the ARM Cortex secure flash along with a SHA2-256
hash
Static
Flash (Plaintext) Plaintext in the ARM Cortex secure flash Static
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP INPUT-OUTPUT METHODS
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
I1 Outside the module RAM Plaintext Manual Direct PBKDF (A5176)
I2 Outside the module RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS
I3 Outside the module Flash (Plaintext) Plaintext Automated Electronic
O1 RAM Outside the module Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP ZEROIZATION METHODS
The zeroization methods described within Table 18 are supported by the module. Zeroization services explicitly
overwrite SSPs with zero values.
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Z1 Zeroised by module after
use
Immediately
overwrites SSPs with 0s
Automatically after use
Z2 Zeroisation, SilentKill, self-
destruct sequence
Immediately
overwrites SSPs with 0s
Zeroisation, SilentKill, or Self-Destruct
Sequence
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Z3 Full Factory Zeroisation Immediately
overwrites SSPs with 0s
Hold "Zeroise Drive" for 5 seconds
followed by holding "YES" for 5 seconds
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPS
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type - Category Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Data Encryption
Key (DEK)
Key used to encrypt user data for persistent
storage.
256 - 256 Symmetric - CSP SymKG DEC
ENC
DRBG-EI DRBG entropy input to the Hash_DRBG. 512 bits - 512 ESV - CSP EG DRBG
Generate
DRBG-State Hash_DRBG internal state secrets, namely V and C. 994 - 256 DRBG - CSP Hash DRBG
(A5176)
DRBG
Generate
FW-Load-Pub ECDSA P-256 Public Key for firmware integrity and
upgrade signature verification. Also used to verify
bootloader integrity.
P-256 - 128 ECDSA - PSP Externally SigVer
KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key (KAS-
peer-pub)
ECC P-256 key used to establish the Session
Encryption Key
P-256 - 128 ECDSA - PSP Externally KAS
KAS-ECC Private
Key (KAS-pr)
ECC key used to establish the Session Encryption
Key.
P-256 - 128 KAS - CSP KAS-KG KAS
KAS-ECC Public Key
(KAS-pub)
ECC P-256 key used to establish the Session
Encryption Key.
P-256 - 128 ECDSA - PSP KAS-KG KAS
Key Encryption Key
(KEK)
Key derived from the passphrase using PBKDF2. The
Key Encryption Key is used to encrypt the Data
Encryption Key.
256 - NA Symmetric - CSP PBKDF CSP
Decryption
CSP
Encryption
Passphrase Operator authentication passphrase 8-64
characters -
Varies
Authentication -
CSP
Externally PBKDF
Session Encryption
Key (SEK)
Symmetric key is established by KAS-ECC and used
for encryption of the USB session with the client
application
256 - 128 Symmetric - CSP KAS DEC
ENC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type - Category Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Shared Secret (Z) The shared secret calculated per NIST SP800-56A-
rev3. Used as input to the SP800-56C-rev1 KDA to
establish the Session Encryption Key.
256 bit - 128 Shared Secret -
CSP
KAS KAS
System Base Key
(SBK)
Symmetric key used to encrypt system
configuration data.
256 - 256 Symmetric - CSP SymKG DEC
ENC
VCD-Load-Pub ECDSA P-256 Public Key for update of the Virtual
CD-ROM contents (operator data stored in a
restricted volume).
P-256 - 128 ECDSA - PSP Externally SigVer
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Data Encryption Key
(DEK)
Flash
(Encrypted):Encrypted
Until use Z2
Z3
Key Encryption Key (KEK):Encrypted
by
DRBG-State:Generated from
DRBG-EI RAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of the
DRBG instantiation process
Z1 DRBG-State:Derives
DRBG-State RAM:Plaintext Until use Z2
Z3
DRBG-EI:Derived From
FW-Load-Pub I3 Flash
(Plaintext):Plaintext
Until use N/A
KAS-ECC Peer Public Key
(KAS-peer-pub)
I2 RAM:Plaintext Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
Shared Secret (Z):Derives
KAS-ECC Private Key
(KAS-pr)
RAM:Plaintext Until Use Z1
Z2
Z3
KAS-ECC Public Key (KAS-pub):Paired
With
DRBG-State:Generated from
Shared Secret (Z):Derives
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
KAS-ECC Public Key (KAS-
pub)
O1 RAM:Plaintext Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
KAS-ECC Private Key (KAS-pr):Paired
With
DRBG-State:Generated from
Key Encryption Key (KEK) RAM:Plaintext Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
Passphrase:Derived From
Data Encryption Key (DEK):Encrypts
Passphrase I1 RAM:Plaintext Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
Key Encryption Key (KEK):Derives
Session Encryption Key
(SEK)
RAM:Plaintext Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
Shared Secret (Z):Derived From
Shared Secret (Z) RAM:Plaintext Until Use Z1
Z2
Z3
Session Encryption Key (SEK):Derives
KAS-ECC Peer Public Key (KAS-peer-
pub):Derived From
KAS-ECC Private Key (KAS-pr):Derived
From
System Base Key (SBK) Flash
(Plaintext):Plaintext
Until use Z1
Z2
Z3
DRBG-State:Generated from
VCD-Load-Pub I3 Flash
(Plaintext):Encrypted
Until use N/A
Table 20: SSP Table 2
N.B. The Key Encryption Key (KEK) is derived using PBKDF (NIST SP 800-132). This algorithm is only approved for use within storage applications.
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10 SELF-TESTS
10.1 PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS
All self-tests must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the
self-tests fails, the module enters the error state and will output an error message to the attached screen prior to
shutting down; otherwise, the module indicates successful completion by presenting the login screen.
If an error is encountered during self-tests, operators must power-cycle the device to reinitiate the power-up self-
tests. The module automatically assumes the Approved mode of operation upon successful completion of the self-
tests.
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity of
Bootloader
ECDSA (Cert.
#A5176) P-256
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Success: No Error
Code; Failure:
Error Code
ECDSA P-256 Digital
Signature
Verification
Firmware
Integrity of
Firmware
ECDSA (Cert.
#A5176) P-256
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Success: No Error
Code; Failure:
Error Code
ECDSA P-256 Digital
Signature
Verification
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS
The following conditional tests are performed upon power-up, on-demand and periodically.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CTR
Encrypt (AES
3971)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
AES-CTR
Decrypt (AES
3971)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
AES-GCM
Encrypt (AES
3971)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
AES-GCM
Decrypt (AES
3971)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-XTS
Encrypt (AES
5695)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
AES-XTS
Decrypt (AES
5695)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5176)
P-256 KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
ECDSA Signature
Verification KAT
Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
Entropy
Source
N/A APT, RCT Critical
Function
Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
APT and RCT Continuous
Hash DRBG
(A5176)
Instantiate,
Generate,
and Reseed
KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Performs a fixed
input KAT and all SP
800-90A health test
monitoring functions
Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5176)
P-256 KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
KAS-ECC Shared
Secret Computation
KAT per IG D.F
Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1
(A5176)
256-bit KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
KDA KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
PBKDF
(A5176)
Salt: 256-bits KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
PBKDF KAT, which
also satisfies HMAC
SHA2-256 KAT
Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
SHA2-256
(SHS 3275)
N/A KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
SHA2-256 KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
SHA2-256
(SHS 3299)
N/A KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
SHA2-256 KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
SHA2-256
(SHS 4565)
N/A KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
SHA2-256 KAT Power-up,
Periodically
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Failure:
Error Code
& on-
demand
SHA3-256
(A4438)
N/A KAT CAST Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
SHA3-256 KAT Power-up,
Periodically
& on-
demand
AES-XTS Key1
Key2 Check
N/A N/A Critical
Function
Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Occurs anytime the
module generates
the DEK. Per IG C.I
this check explicitly
that Key_1 and
Key_2 are distinct.
AES-XTS Key
Generation
Firmware
Load Test
ECDSA P-256 Digital
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Load
Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Firmware load test
occurs during
'Firmware Update'
service.
During
Firmware
Updates
Public Key
Validation
P-256 N/A Critical
Function
Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Occurs during KAS
upon receipt of the
connected host
application public
key (KAS-ECC Peer
Public Key).
During key
agreement
ECC CDH Pair
Wise
Consistency
Test
P-256 PCT PCT Success: No
Error Code;
Failure:
Error Code
Occurs during KAS
upon the generation
of the KAS-ECC
private and public
keypair.
During key
agreement
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 PERIODIC SELF-TEST INFORMATION
The module will perform periodic self-tests at every power-on and every 24 hours. If the module is actively using
the DEK, periodic self-tests will be delayed until the DEK is no longer in use.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Firmware Integrity
of Bootloader
ECDSA Signature
Verification
SW/FW Integrity Every Power-On Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
Firmware Integrity
of Firmware
ECDSA Signature
Verification
SW/FW Integrity Every Power-On Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CTR Encrypt
(AES 3971)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-CTR Decrypt
(AES 3971)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-GCM Encrypt
(AES 3971)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-GCM Decrypt
(AES 3971)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-XTS Encrypt
(AES 5695)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-XTS Decrypt
(AES 5695)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A5176)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
Entropy Source APT, RCT Critical Function Continuous N/A
Hash DRBG (A5176) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A5176)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1
(A5176)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
PBKDF (A5176) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
SHA2-256 (SHS
3275)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
SHA2-256 (SHS
3299)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for DataLocker, Inc., DL4FE
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Page 36 of 38
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
SHA2-256 (SHS
4565)
KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
SHA3-256 (A4438) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatic
invocation of self-
test service
AES-XTS Key1 Key2
Check
N/A Critical Function N/A N/A
Firmware Load Test Digital Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Public Key
Validation
N/A Critical Function N/A N/A
ECC CDH Pair Wise
Consistency Test
PCT PCT N/A N/A
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for DataLocker, Inc., DL4FE
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed, but only in its entirety and without modification.
Page 37 of 38
10.4 ERROR STATES
The module incorporates a single error state (refer to Table 25).
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
The module supports a single error state that is entered
upon identification of a fatal error. Once the error state is
entered, an error message is logged and displayed on the
screen, the buzzer is alarmed, and the module will
shutdown. No cryptographic operations are available
within the Error state. The last error is displayed to the
authorized operator upon each power-on until cleared.
Failure of
any self-test
Power
cycle
Error
message on
screen and
audible
buzzer
Table 25: Error States
10.5 OPERATOR INITIATION OF SELF-TESTS
Self-tests may be invoked on demand by power cycling the module or invoking a soft reset through the services.
11 LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE
There are no specific maintenance requirements.
11.1 INSTALLATION, INITIALIZATION, AND STARTUP PROCEDURES
The module does not include a default passphrase. Upon first use, the module enforces the CO to configure their
own during initialization. If the optional secondary CO Standard role is created, the CO Standard must also
configure a passphrase. There are no other instructions for initializing the module for use in the Approved mode of
operation.
11.2 ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
Before the first use, a Crypto Officer (CO) Admin password (8 – 64 characters) must be set. (This password should
not be disclosed.) After this is done, the module is ready for operation.
The module’s administrator’s guide is shipped with the module.
Performing zeroisation will restore the drive to its factory state (blank and unformatted). A new DEK is generated
immediately after a new password is set, and the Crypto Officer role is assumed.
11.3 NON-ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
There are no non-administrator roles.
11.4 DESIGN AND RULES
All of the following security rules except for the last two items are enforced by the cryptographic module to ensure
the FIPS 140-3 security requirements are met.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for DataLocker, Inc., DL4FE
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1. The module provides two distinct, authenticated operator roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) Admin and
Cryptographic Officer (CO) Standard.
2. The module does not provide any feedback mechanisms when entering passwords.
3. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
4. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of
the module.
5. The module does not support concurrent operators, a maintenance interface, or maintenance role.
6. The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
7. The module does not output intermediate key values or plaintext CSPs; plaintext operator passwords
are entered directly via the touch screen panel.
8. When the module is in an error state, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic service.
9. The cryptographic module does not support a non-approved mode of operation and only operates in
an approved mode of operation.
10. The cryptographic module supports identity-based authentication for all services that utilize CSPs
and approved security functions.
11. The data output interface is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, PIN entry, and when the module
is in an error state.
12. When the cryptographic module is in an error state, it ceases to provide cryptographic services,
inhibits all data outputs, and provides status of the error.
13. When the cryptographic module is powered off and subsequently powered on, the results of previous
authentications are not retained, and the cryptographic module requires the operator to be re-
authenticated in an identity-based fashion.
14. The cryptographic module protects CSPs from unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification,
and unauthorized substitution.
15. The cryptographic module does not support bypass capability and does not implement bypass tests.
16. The module receives external power inputs through the defined power interface. The power
interfaces cannot be used to drive power to external targets.
17. Upon authenticating into a particular role, it is not possible to switch into another role without re-
authenticating.
18. The finite state machine does not support the following states: maintenance and CSP output.
19. The cryptographic module is not a radio and does not support any wireless interfaces or OTAR.
20. The module is an encrypted storage drive that utilizes PBKDFv2 (NIST SP 800-132) and AES-XTS
(FIPS 197 and NIST SP 800-38E). These algorithms can only be used for the protection of data at rest.
21. The cryptographic module performs a 256-bit comparison to ensure XTS key_1 is not equal to key_2.
22. Operators must not disclose their passwords.
23. There are no restrictions on which unprotected SSPs are zeroised by the zeroisation service.
11.5 END OF LIFE
Zeroise the module and dispose of it at a proper e-waste facility.
12 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module is not purposefully designed to mitigate any attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements.