Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.
Marvell LS2 HSM Family
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
DocumentVersion:1.2
Date:19Aug2026
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 2 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Table of Contents
1 – General................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 9
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 9
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................19
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................28
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................29
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................29
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................30
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................31
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................32
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................32
3.2 Additional Information......................................................................................................32
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................33
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................33
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................33
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................35
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................83
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................92
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................93
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................93
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................93
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................94
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................94
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................95
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................95
7.2 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................96
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................96
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................97
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................98
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9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................98
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................98
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................99
9.4 SSPs .............................................................................................................................100
9.5 Transitions.....................................................................................................................133
9.6 Additional Information....................................................................................................133
10 Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................135
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ..........................................................................................135
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................135
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information......................................................................................135
10.4 Error States .................................................................................................................138
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ...................................................................................138
10.6 Additional Information..................................................................................................138
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .........................................................................................................140
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures........................................................140
11.2 Administrator Guidance ...............................................................................................141
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................143
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................143
11.5 Maintenance Requirements.........................................................................................144
11.6 End of Life ...................................................................................................................144
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................146
References and Definitions .....................................................................................................147
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 9
Table 3: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................16
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................16
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms .............................................................................17
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................17
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................18
Table 9: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................27
Table 10: Entropy Certificates...................................................................................................29
Table 11: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................29
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................32
Table 13: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................33
Table 14: Roles.........................................................................................................................34
Table 15: Approved Services ....................................................................................................82
Table 16: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................91
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................95
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................96
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................96
Table 20: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................98
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................98
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................99
Table 23: SSP Table 1............................................................................................................118
Table 24: SSP Table 2............................................................................................................132
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests......................................................................................135
Table 26: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.......................................................................136
Table 27: Conditional Periodic Information..............................................................................137
Table 28: Error States.............................................................................................................138
Table 29 References...............................................................................................................147
Table 30 Acronyms and Definitions.........................................................................................148
List of Figures
Figure 1: HSM Cryptographic boundary ..................................................................................... 8
Figure 2: Module Side 1............................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3: Module Side 2 with epoxy ........................................................................................... 8
Figure 4: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 9
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1 – General
1.1 Overview
The Marvel LS2 HSM Family module (hereafter referred to as the module or HSM) by Marvell is
a high-performance purpose-built security solution for key management and crypto acceleration.
The module provides a FIPS 140-3 overall Level 3 security solution. The module is deployed in
a PCIe slot to provide crypto and protocol acceleration in a secure manner to the system host. It
is typically deployed in a server or an appliance to provide crypto offload for the keys stored on
the HSM. The module’s functions are accessed over the PCIe interface via opcode defined by
the module.
The HSM is a hardware multi-chip embedded cryptographic module with firmware programmed
on the HSM. The module provides cryptographic primitives to accelerate approved, allowed and
non-approved algorithms to support use cases including PKI, code signing, document signing,
Root Of Trust, and TLS. The cryptographic functionality includes asymmetric (RSA/EC) and
symmetric (AES and Triple-DES) ciphers, signatures, and random number generation, along
with protocol-specific complex instructions to support TLS 1.2.
The module implements password-based single factor authentication at FIPS 140-3 Level 3
security and an optional public-key-based authentication. The physical boundary of the module
is the outer perimeter of the PCIe card itself as depicted in section 2.1.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 – Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Marvell LS2 HSM module is a multi-chip PCIe adapter with firmware. It consists of multiple
components, including an operating system, applications exposing services and interfaces
related to secure key management, crypto operations, and policy management of the module.
Important hardware components of the module are: general purpose, ARM-based control
processor, ARM-based microcontroller, RAM memory, NOR and eMMC flash for persistent
storage, USB interfaces, and RJ45 and PCIe gen-4 x8 with SMBus interfaces.
• Partitions
The LS2 HSM adapter is an SR-IOV enabled intelligent PCIe adapter with one physical
function and 64 virtual functions. The physical device is referred to as Physical Function
(PF) while the virtual devices are referred to as Virtual Functions (VF). Allocation of the
VF can be dynamically controlled by the PF via registers encapsulated in the capability.
Each VF's PCI configuration space can be accessed by its own Bus, Device and
Function Number (Routing ID). And each VF also has PCI Memory Space, which is used
to map its register set. VF device driver operates on the register set so it can be
functional and appear as a real existing PCI device.
In addition to crypto offloads, this adapter can provide secure key storage with up to 42
logical partitions, including a master partition. Each partition will have dedicated
resources that are logically and securely isolated from other partitions. A partition will
have its own specific policies and controls, and its own user accounts to manage what
can be done with a partition and by a user of a partition. Consequently, each partition is
treated as a virtual HSM and referred as a pHSM (or HSM Partition).
An LS2 HSM always has one default partition called the master partition, which exposes
the interfaces to create, delete, and update the remaining partitions. LS2 HSM can either
be in host virtualization mode or non-virtualization mode. One or more applications on a
host/virtual machine/container can make use of different partitions available on the HSM.
Each partition will have dedicated communication channels; these channels are linked to
the PCIe devices.
In virtualization mode, channels will be linked to PCIe VFs, otherwise linked to PCIe PF.
Communication channels have basic checks to identify that an application is
communicating with an intended partition on the HSM. HSM FW provides the following
mechanisms to ensure only an authorized user or application of a specific partition can
communicate with it. It is optional to use either mechanism based on the deployment
scenarios and risk assessment.
• Basic Channel
These channels depend on the Host OS security for device binding and application
isolation. In this case, HSM does basic session validation.
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o To run any authorized operation on an HSM partition, a user needs to login, get a
random session handle, and use the session handle in all future communications
to bind the authorization information.
o Security critical operations (user management, key management,
backup/restore, etc.) are all protected by encryption using keys that are
(optionally derived from) set up during key ceremony.
• Encrypted Communication Channels
The end-to-end encryption feature in the module allows an application to initiate a TLS
connection with the firmware to ensure the confidentiality of the data communicated to
the HSM. The connection is based on TLS v1.2 with the cipher-suite
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384(known to OpenSSL as
ECDHE_RSA_AES128-GCM-SHA256 and ECDHE_RSA_AES256-GCM-SHA384). The
module will act as server, and the host application will act as client. The server private
key will be the partition private key (PAK), which is generated for each pHSM when it is
created. The server certificate used for the SSL connection is the partition certificate
(PAC). The complete chain will be validated by host applications before establishing the
TLS connection. The end-to-end encryption feature is enabled using the initialization
configuration parameters. Once this feature is enabled, all commands except initialize
and open session are encrypted.
• HSM Master Partition
This is the default partition with only one user, called the Master Crypto Officer (MCO).
This partition will expose authorized services to manage (create, delete, update,
backup/restore) other partitions and set policies or conditions for them to operate.
Additionally, it exposes anonymous services like fetching module information, etc. Refer
to section 4.3 Roles, Services, and CSP Access for details about the services supported
by the master partition. The master partition must be initialized and the MCO logged in to
execute any authorized service.
• HSM Partition
Each partition will have a different set of users to manage it and a dedicated key storage
and crypto resources associated with it. A partition will have default configuration or
policies supplied by the master partition. Some policies can be changed by the partition
administrator or PCO. When a partition is created by the MCO, it will be in a zeroized
state and must be initialized to do any key management or crypto operations. Partition
initialization will create the Partition Crypto Officer (PCO). The PCO can later create up
to 1024 users (PCO or PCU) on demand. Each user will have a unique username to
identify themselves. The user has to log in to the partition/vHSM to issue any authorized
commands. Users are authenticated using passwords submitted during the user
creation.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
Cryptographic Boundary:
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The following images depict the module’s cryptographic boundary depicted in the dashed line.
NOTE: Components outside the cryptographic boundary are not part of the evaluation can be
and will need to be evaluated separately.
Figure 1: HSM Cryptographic boundary
Figure 2: Module Side 1
Figure 3: Module Side 2 with epoxy
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Figure 4: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features
LS2-B0 / LS2-G-
A050-XX-Y-B0
CN9310410-03 C -
LS2-G-A050-XX-Y-B0
MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.23-0602,
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.02-
1200-SB
Octeon_TX2
Offers 50% of full
card capacity.
LS2-B0 / LS2-G-
A100-XX-Y-B0
CN9310410-03 C -
LS2-G-A100-XX-Y-B0
MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.23-0602,
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.02-
1200-SB
Octeon_TX2
Offers 75% of full
card capacity.
LS2-B0 / LS2-G-
A300-XX-Y-B0
CN9310410-03 C -
LS2-G-A300-XX-Y-B0
MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.23-0602,
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.02-
1200-SB
Octeon_TX2
Offers full card
capacity.
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no excluded components in the module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
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Mode Name Description
Types
of
Service
s
Status
Indicato
r
Uninitialized/Zeroize
d mode
When received by the end user, the module is not configured or
initialized; this state is called uninitialized/zeroized mode. In this
mode, the user can query for basic information about the module,
such as version details and vendor information, using an
unauthenticated role.
Non-
Approved
fips_mod
e = -1
Approved mode
In this mode, the module allows only
Approved/nonApprovedAllowed/nonApprovedAllowedNSCalgorith
ms. Request for anynonApprovedNotAllowedalgorithm is rejected.
Approved
fips_mod
e = 2 or 3
Non-approved
mode
In this mode, the module also allows Approved or allowed
algorithms
Non-
Approved
fips_mod
e = 0
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module is initialized into approved or non-approved mode during the module initialization
period. The value of the parameter fipsState passed into the call specifies the mode. As the
module supports multiple partitions, each partition maintains its own independent fipsState. The
following values are allowed for the fipsState parameter:
1 - Uninitialized/Zeroized Mode
0 - Non-Approved mode.
2 - Approved mode with single-factor authentication mechanism.
3 - Approved mode with certificate-based dual-factor authentication mechanism.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The indicator of Approved mode is obtained by using the Get Status service. The fipsState field
of the Get Status service indicates the mode. CSPs are not shared between the approved and
non-approved modes of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC
A1948,
A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A7544
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 112, 128, 32, 48, 64, 80, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 56, 64, 72, 80, 88, 96, 104
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-256 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-8192 Increment 8
SP 800-38C
AES-CMAC A1948
Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
MAC Length - MAC Length: 32-128 Increment 8
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38B
AES-CMAC A7544
Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
MAC Length - MAC Length: 16-128 Increment 8, MAC Length:
32-128 Increment 8
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38B
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CTR
A1948,
A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128 Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value - No
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB
A1948,
A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A1948
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 8-1024 Increment 8
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96-128 Increment 32
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A1948
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 8-1024 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96-128 Increment 32
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A1948
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-4096 Increment 64
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A1948
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-4096 Increment 8
SP 800-38F
Counter DRBG A1948
Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A1948
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7545
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A1948 Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A1948
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7544
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Component - No, Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A1948
Curve - P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-512
Component - Yes
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7544
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A7544
Prediction Resistance - Yes
Supports Reseed - No
Mode - SHA2-512
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 2048
Nonce - Nonce: 2048
Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length:
0-2048 Increment 8
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0-2048 Increment 8
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A1948
MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA-1 A7544
MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A1948
MAC - MAC: 224
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A7544
MAC - MAC: 224
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A1948
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7544
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A1948
MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7544
MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A1948
MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7544
MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224 A1948
MAC - MAC: 112, 128, 160, 192, 224
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224 A7544
MAC - MAC: 112-224 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256 A1948
MAC - MAC: 128, 192, 256
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256 A7544
MAC - MAC: 128-256 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A1948
MAC - MAC: 192, 256, 320, 384
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A7544
MAC - MAC: 192-384 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A1948
MAC - MAC: 256, 320, 384, 448, 512
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A7544
MAC - MAC: 256-512 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC Sp800-
56Ar3
A1948
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-521
Function - Key Pair Generation, Partial Validation
iutId - 123456ABCD
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - Initiator, Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Auxiliary Function Methods -
Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-512
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Fixed Info Pattern - l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation
Key Length - 512
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A1948
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - B-233, B-283, B-
409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521
Scheme -
staticUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A7544
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
Scheme -
staticUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-IFC-SSC A1948
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-crt
Scheme -
KAS1 -
KAS Role - initiator
KAS2 -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1
A1948
Fixed Info Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo||l
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-4096
Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1
A1948
Auxiliary Function Methods -
Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-224
Fixed Info Pattern - label||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-1024
Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA TwoStep
Sp800-56Cr1
A1948
MAC Salting Methods - random
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 1-4096
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Fixed Info Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo||l
KDF Mode - counter
MAC Modes - CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-
AES256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512
Counter Lengths - 16, 24, 32, 8
Fixed Data Order - after fixed data, before fixed data
The KDF supports an empty IV - No
The KDF requires an empty IV - No
Derived Key Length - 4096
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-1024
Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF ANS 9.63
(CVL)
A1948
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Field Size - 224, 521
Shared Info Length - Shared Info Length: 224, 528
Key Data Length - Key Data Length: 128, 4096
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108 A1948
KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-
AES256, CMAC-TDES, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 64-2048 Increment 8
Fixed Data Order - After Fixed Data, Before Fixed Data, In the
Middle of Fixed Data
Counter Length - 16, 24, 32, 8
Supports Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 0
KDF SP800-108 A7544
KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-
AES256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 64-2048 Increment 8
Fixed Data Order - After Fixed Data, Before Fixed Data, In the
Middle of Fixed Data
Counter Length - 16, 24, 32, 8
Supports Empty IV - No
Requires Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 0
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A1948
Function - partialVal
IUT ID - 0123456789CAFECAFE
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA3-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 320
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7545
Function - partialVal
IUT ID - 0123456789CAFECAFE
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 320
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption
Primitive (CVL)
A1948 Modulus Length - 2048 FIPS 186-4
RSA Decryption
Primitive Sp800-
56Br2 (CVL)
A7544
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed, random
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A1948
Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192
p mod 8 - 0
Primality Tests - 2pow100
q mod 8 - 0
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Info Generated By Server - No
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 15 of 149
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7545
Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
p mod 8 - 0
Primality Tests - 2pow100
q mod 8 - 0
Info Generated By Server - No
Private Key Format - crt
Public Exponent Mode - fixed, random
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A1948
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA3-512
Salt Length - 64
Mask Function - MGF1
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA Signature
Primitive (CVL)
A1948
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature
Primitive (CVL)
A7544
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - crt, standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed, random
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A1946
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A1948
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA3-512
Salt Length - 64
Mask Function - mgf1
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pss
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7545
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
Mask Function - mgf1
Public Exponent Mode - fixed, random
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A1948
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA1
FIPS 180-4
SHA-1 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224
A1948,
A7544
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A1946
Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA2
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A1948
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA2
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A1948
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA2
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A1948
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA2
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 16 of 149
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA3-224 A1948
Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No
Supports Empty Message - Yes
FIPS 202
SHA3-224 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A1948
Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No
Supports Empty Message - Yes
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A1948
Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No
Supports Empty Message - Yes
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A1948
Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No
Supports Empty Message - Yes
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A7544 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
TDES-CBC
A1948,
A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Keying Option - 1
SP 800-67
Rev. 2
TDES-ECB A7544
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Keying Option - 1
SP 800-67
Rev. 2
TDES-KW A1948 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-38F
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A7544
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Key Block Length - Key Block Length: 1024
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the above Approved algorithms. There are algorithms,
modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any approved
service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli
used by the module in approved mode are listed in the above table.
Note: All symmetric key sizes represent the key strength.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG1
Key Type:Asymmetric and
Symmetric
N/A
SP800-133rev2 Section 4 Example 1 and IG
D.H
CKG2 Key Type:Symmetric N/A
SP800-133rev2 Section 4 Example 2 and IG
D.H
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the above Vendor Affirmed Algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CPT-AES-CBC
(unwrap)
AES:Legacy Key unwrap only CBC mode: Decrypt;
128, 192, and 256-bit
LS2-CPT
Key
unwrapping.
Per IG D.G
CPT-AES-ECB
(unwrap)
AES:AES : Legacy Key unwrap only ECB mode:
Decrypt; 128, 192, and 256-bit
LS2-CPT
Key
unwrapping.
Per IG D.G
EC Diffie-Hellman
with non-NIST
Curve Types:Secp256K1 (128 bits)
brainpoolP224r1(112 bits), brainpoolP256r1(128
LS2-CPT
Per IGs D.F
and C.A.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 17 of 149
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Name Properties Implementation Reference
recommended
curves
bits), brainpoolP320r1(160 bits),
brainpoolP384r1(192 bits), brainpoolP512r1(256
bits), Prime order curve, generated as per FIPS
186-5 Section 6
ECDSA with non-
NIST recommended
curves
Curve types:Secp256K1 (128 bits)
brainpoolP224r1(112 bits), brainpoolP256r1(128
bits), brainpoolP320r1(160 bits),
brainpoolP384r1(192 bits), brainpoolP512r1(256
bits), Prime order curve, generated as per FIPS
186-5 Section 6
LS2-CPT Per IG C.A
SW-AES-CBC
(unwrap)
AES:Legacy Key unwrap only CBC mode: Decrypt;
128, 192, and 256-bit
LS2-SW-Crypto
Key
unwrapping.
Per IG D.G
SW-AES-ECB
(unwrap)
AES:Legacy Key unwrap only ECB mode: Decrypt;
128, 192, and 256-bit
LS2-SW-Crypto
Key
unwrapping.
Per IG D.G
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the above non-Approved algorithms, which are allowed for
use in Approved mode.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
SHA1
No security claimed per IG 2.4.A, Scenario 1. Use of a non-
approved cryptographic algorithm to "obfuscate" a CSP
Used for Key fingerprint/KCV
computation
Triple-DES SP
800-38B
No security claimed per IG 2.4.A, Scenario 1. Use of a non-
approved cryptographic algorithm to "obfuscate" a CSP
Used for Key fingerprint/KCV
computation
PBKDF
No security claimed per IG 2.4.A, Scenario 2. Use of an
algorithm for a purpose that is not security relevant or is
redundant.
Used for hashing of
authentication passwords
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
The cryptographic module supports the above non-Approved algorithms; they are allowed in the
Approved mode of operation with no security claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES (non-
compliant)
Key wrap (TR31/TR34/AES-CBC/AES-GCM, wrap/unwrap), Decimal Table/Data/PIN
Encryption/Decryption. FF1/FF3-1 Data Encryption/Decryption * In Non-Approved mode,
AES GCM supports the IV length from 1 byte to 16 bytes
DES MAC (non-
compliant)
MAC generation and Verification
Double-DES (non-
compliant)
Derive unique key per transaction (DUKPT), EMV key derivation. Derive PIN from Offset.
Derive Offset from PIN. PIN Verification. PVV generation and Verification. CVV generation
and verification. Export Symmetric key/Export Asymmetric key pair using TR31 wrapping.
Import/Export using TR34. Import Decimal Table. EMV script. EMV ARQC/ARPC. Data/PIN
encryption/decryption
EC-AES EC-AES wrap/unwrap (EC BYOK)
ECDH KDF Key derivation using ECDH followed by HMAC/CMAC counter KDF
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 18 of 149
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Name Use and Function
ECDSA (non-
compliant)
Key generation, Sign, Verify P192, Secp192k1, brainpoolP160r1, brainpool192r1, K-163
and B-163 (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
KAS-ECC (non-
compliant)
EC Key generation and ECDH Curve25519 (128 bits), Curve448 (224 bits)
ML-DSA ECDSA
Sign (non-
compliant)
Signature generation function which generates a concateneated signature of ML_DSA and
ECDSA
ML-DSA ECDSA
Verify (non-
compliant)
Signature verification function which verifies a concateneated signature of ML_DSA and
ECDSA
RSA (non-
compliant)
TR34 Import TR34 Export PIN block decryption BYOK Encrypt/Decrypt Asymmetric key
encapsulation and un-encapsulation using PKCS#1-v1.5 padding with modulus size bits
2048-, 3072- and 4096-bits Key generation, Sign, Verify (1024-bit)
PBE Key generation
Shamir Key Share
(non-compliant)
Key share
SW-Counter-DRBG
(Allowed Per IG
2.4.A) (non-
compliant)
Random number generation for user, keys, internal IVs, and salt
Triple-DES (non-
compliant)
Derive unique key per transaction (DUKPT) EMV key derivation. Derive PIN from Offset
Derive Offset from PIN Verification PVV generation and verification CVV generation and
verification Export Symmetric key/Export Asymmetric key pair using TR31 wrapping
Import/Export using TR34 Import Decimal Table EMV script. EMV ARQC/ARPC Data/PIN
encryption/decryption
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the above non-Approved algorithms available only in non-
Approved mode of operation.
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SW-KeyGen CKG
Symmetric Key
Generation
Counter DRBG: (A1948)
AES-CTR: (A1948)
CKG1: ()
CPT-
KeyGen
CKG
Symmetric Key
Generation
Hash DRBG: (A7544)
CKG1: ()
ENT (P) (SP
800-90B)
ENT-ESV Physical Entropy
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-Full
TLS v1.2 KDF to
create the end to
end tunneling.
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7544)
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A7544)
KAS-ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-Full
ECDH key derivation
and ECDH-AES key
wrap
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
KDF ANS 9.63: (A1948)
KAS-KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-Full
ECDH key derivation
and ECDH-AES key
wrap
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
KDA HKDF Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
KAS-KDA-
ONESTEP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-Full
ECDH key derivation
and ECDH-AES key
wrap
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
KAS-KDA-
TWOSTEP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-Full
ECDH key derivation
and ECDH-AES key
wrap
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
KDA TwoStep Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
AES-CMAC: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA3-512: (A1948)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
KAS-Full
PEK and KLK
generation and
certificate
authentication and
cloning
IG:IG D.F Scenario
1 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
method provides
112 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-IFC-SSC: (A1948)
KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CKG2: ()
Key Type: Symmetric
SW-AES-
GCM-Wrap
KTS-Wrap
Authenticated Data
encryption, key-
wrap
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-GCM: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
KTS-Unwrap
Authenticated
Datadecryption, key-
unwrap
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-GCM: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-AES-
GCM-Enc
BC-
AuthEncrypt
Authenticated Data
encryption
AES-GCM: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-AES-
GCM-Dec
BC-
AuthDecrypt
Authenticated Data
decryption
AES-GCM: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-KAS-
ECC (KAS)
KAS-SSC Cloning protocol
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
SW-AES-
KW-Wrap
(KTS)
KTS-Wrap Key wrapping
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-KW: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-AES-
KW-Unwrap
(KTS)
KTS-Unwrap Key unwrapping
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-KW: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 21 of 149
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SW-KTS-
IFC-Encap
(KTS)
KTS-Encap
Asymmetric key
encapsulation
IG D.G:Approved
Key confirmation:No
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 150 bits of
encryption strength
KTS-IFC: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A1948)
SW-KTS-
IFC-Decap
(KTS)
KTS-Decap
Asymmetric key
decapsulation
IG D.G:Approved
Key confirmation:No
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 150 bits of
encryption strength
KTS-IFC: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A1948)
LEGACY-
SW-TDES-
KW (KTS)
KTS-Unwrap
Key unwrapping*
Legacy use only
IG D.G:Allowed
Caveat:Key
unwrapping as Per
IG D.G
TDES-KW: (A1948)
TDES-CBC: (A1948)
FW-KTS-
IFC-Encap
(KTS)
KTS-Encap
Asymmetric key
encapsulation
IG D.G:Approved
Key confirmation:No
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 150 bits of
encryption strength
KTS-IFC: (A7545)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA3-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7545)
FW-KTS-
IFC-Decap
(KTS)
KTS-Decap
Asymmetric key
decapsulation
IG D.G:Approved
Key confirmation:No
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 150 bits of
encryption strength
KTS-IFC: (A7545)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA3-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7545)
LEGACY-
SW-AES-
CBC-
UNWRAP
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Legacy Key unwrap
only CBC mode:
Decrypt; 128, 192,
and 256-bit
Caveat:Key
unwrapping as Per
IG D.G.
AES-CBC: (A1948)
LEGACY-
SW-AES-
ECB-
UNWRAP
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Legacy Key unwrap
only ECB mode:
Decrypt; 128, 192,
and 256-bit
Caveat:Key
unwrapping as Per
IG D.G.
AES-ECB: (A1948)
LEGACY-
CPT-AES-
CBC-
UNWRAP
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Legacy Key unwrap
only CBC mode:
Decrypt; 128,192,
and 256-bit
Caveat:Key
unwrapping as Per
IG D.G.
AES-CBC: (A7544)
LEGACY-
CPT-AES-
ECB-
UNWRAP
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Legacy Key unwrap
only ECB mode:
Decrypt; 128, 192,
and 256-bit
Caveat:Key
unwrapping as Per
IG D.G.
AES-ECB: (A7544)
CPT-ECDH-
NON-NIST
KAS-SSC
EC Diffie-Hellman
with non-NIST
recommended
curves
Caveat:as Per IGs
D.F and C.A.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7544)
Curve Types: Secp256K1 (128
bits) brainpoolP224r1(112 bits),
brainpoolP256r1(128 bits),
brainpoolP320r1(160 bits),
brainpoolP384r1(192 bits),
brainpoolP512r1(256 bits),
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 22 of 149
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Prime order curve, generated as
per FIPS 186-5 Section 6
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-NIST
DigSig-SigGen
ECDSA with non-
NIST recommended
curves
Caveat:as Per IG
C.A.
ECDSASigGen: (FIPS186-4)
CPT-AES-
CBC-ENC
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
LS2-CPT Encryption AES-CBC: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
CBC-DEC
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT Decryption AES-CBC: (A7544)
SW-AES-
CBC-
UNWRAP
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-SW-Crypto
Decryption
AES-CBC: (A1948)
SW-AES-
CBC-WRAP
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
LS2-SW-Crypto
Encryption
AES-CBC: (A1948)
CPT-AES-
CCM-ENC
BC-
AuthEncrypt
LS2-CPT
Authenticated
Encryption
AES-CCM: (A7544)
AES-CBC: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
CCM-DEC
BC-
AuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT
Authenticated
Decryption
AES-CCM: (A7544)
AES-CBC: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
CMAC
MAC LS2-CPT MAC
AES-CMAC: (A7544)
AES-CBC: (A7544)
SW-AES-
CMAC
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
MAC
AES-CMAC: (A1948)
AES-CBC: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
CTR-ENC
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
LS2-CPT Encryption AES-CTR: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
CTR-DEC
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT Decryption AES-CTR: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
ECB-ENC
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
LS2-CPT Encryption AES-ECB: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
ECB-DEC
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT Decryption AES-ECB: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
GCM-ENC
BC-
AuthEncrypt
LS2-CPT
Authenticated
Encryption
AES-GCM: (A7544)
AES-ECB: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
GCM-DEC
BC-
AuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT
Authenticated
Decryption
AES-GCM: (A7544)
AES-ECB: (A7544)
CPT-AES-
GMAC
MAC LS2-CPT
AES-GMAC: (A7544)
AES-ECB: (A7544)
SW-AES-
GMAC
MAC LS2-SW-Crypto
AES-GMAC: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
SW-AES-
KWP-Wrap
(KTS)
KTS-Wrap
LS2-SW-Crypto Key
Wrap
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-KWP: (A1948)
AES-CBC: (A1948)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
KTS-Unwrap
LS2-SW-Crypto Key
Unwrap
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-KWP: (A1948)
AES-CBC: (A1948)
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
DRBG
LS2-SW-Crypto
DRBG
Counter DRBG: (A1948)
AES-CTR: (A1948)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SW-ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
Key Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4):
(A1948)
CKG1: ()
Counter DRBG: (A1948)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
FW-ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
LS2-FW-Crypto ECC
Key Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7545)
CKG1: ()
Hash DRBG: (A7544)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7544)
SW-ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
key Verification
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4):
(A1948)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
DigSig-SigGen
LS2-CPT ECC
Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7544)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA2-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
SW-ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
DigSig-SigGen
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4):
(A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
DigSig-SigVer
LS2-CPT ECC
Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A7544)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA2-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
SW-ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
DigSig-SigVer
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-Hash-
DRBG
DRBG LS2-CPT DRBG
Hash DRBG: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA-1
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC-
SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1: (A7544)
SHA-1: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA-1
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA2-224
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA2-224
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA2-256
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA2-256
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA2-384
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A7544)
SHA2-384: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA2-384
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CPT-HMAC-
SHA2-512
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA2-512
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA2-512
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA2-512
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA3-224
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA3-224
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A7544)
SHA3-224: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA3-224
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA3-224
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A1948)
SHA3-224: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA3-256
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA3-256
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A7544)
SHA3-256: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA3-256
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA3-256
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A1948)
SHA3-256: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA3-384
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA3-384
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A7544)
SHA3-384: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA3-384
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA3-384
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A1948)
SHA3-384: (A1948)
CPT-HMAC-
SHA3-512
MAC
LS2-CPT HMAC
SHA3-512
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A7544)
SHA3-512: (A7544)
SW-HMAC-
SHA3-512
MAC
LS2-SW-Crypto
HMAC SHA3-512
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A1948)
SHA3-512: (A1948)
SW-KAS-
ECC-Sp800-
56Ar3
KAS-Full
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
key agreement
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2).
Key Confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(tested as part of
KAS certificate)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
CPT-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAS-SSC
LS2-CPT ECC Key
Agreement Shared
Secret
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7544)
SW-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAS-SSC
LS2-SW-Crypto ECC
Key Agreement
Shared Secret
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A1948)
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
KAS-SSC
LS2-SW-Crypto IFC
Key Agreement
Shared Secret
KAS-IFC-SSC: (A1948)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4):
(A1948)
SW-KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAS-56CKDF
LS2-SW-Crypto IFC
Key Agreement
Shared Secret
KDA HKDF Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
SW-KDA-
OneStep-
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAS-56CKDF
LS2-SW-Crypto
One-Step Key
derivation function
KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
SW-KDA-
TwoStep-
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAS-56CKDF
LS2-SW-Crypto
Two-Step Key
derivation Function
KDA TwoStep Sp800-56Cr1:
(A1948)
AES-CMAC: (A1948)
AES-ECB: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A1948)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
SW-KDF-
ANS-9.63
KAS-135KDF
LS2-SW-Crypto ANS
9.63 Key derivation
Function
KDF ANS 9.63: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-KDF-
SP800-108
KBKDF
LS2-CPT SP800-108
Key derivation
Function
KDF SP800-108: (A7544)
AES-CMAC: (A7544)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A7544)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A7544)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7544)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A7544)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A7544)
SHA-1: (A7544)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA2-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
CKG2: ()
SW-KDF-
SP800-108
KBKDF
LS2-SW-
CryptoSP800-108
Key derivation
Function
KDF SP800-108: (A1948)
AES-CMAC: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-KDF-
TLS
KAS-135KDF
LS2-CPT TLS based
end to end
encryption
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A7544)
SW-PBKDF PBKDF LS2-SW-Crypto
PBKDF: ()
HMAC-SHA-1: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A1948)
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-224: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
SHA3-224: (A1948)
SHA3-256: (A1948)
SHA3-384: (A1948)
SHA3-512: (A1948)
CKG2: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CPT-RSA-
Decryption-
Primitive
KTS-Decap
LS2-CPT Decryption
Primitive
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2: (A7544)
SW-RSA-
Decryption-
Primitive
KTS-Decap
LS2-SW-Crypto
Decryption Primitive
RSA Decryption Primitive:
(A1948)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
LS2-FW-
CryptoAsymmetric
Key-Pair Generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7545)
KTS-IFC: (A7545)
CKG1: ()
FW-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
LS2-FW-
CryptoSignature
Verification
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A7545)
SHA2-224: (A7544)
SHA2-256: (A7544)
SHA2-384: (A7544)
SHA2-512: (A7544)
SHA3-224: (A7544)
SHA3-256: (A7544)
SHA3-384: (A7544)
SHA3-512: (A7544)
SW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
LS2-SW-
CryptoAsymmetric
Key-Pair Generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A1948)
KTS-IFC: (A1948)
KAS-IFC-SSC: (A1948)
CKG1: ()
SW-RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
DigSig-SigGen
LS2-SW-Crypto
Signature
Generation
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
SW-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
DigSig-SigVer
LS2-SW-
CryptoSignature
Verification
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A1948)
SHA-1: (A1948)
SHA2-256: (A1948)
SHA2-384: (A1948)
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-RSA-
Signature-
Primitive
DigSig-SigGen
LS2-CPT Signature
Primitive
RSA Signature Primitive:
(A7544)
SW-RSA-
Signature-
Primitive
DigSig-SigGen
LS2-SW-Crypto
Signature Primitive
RSA Signature Primitive:
(A1948)
UB-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
DigSig-SigVer
LS2-UBOOT
Signature
Verification
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A1946)
SHA2-256: (A1946)
CPT-SHA-1 SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA-1: (A7544)
SW-SHA-1 SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA-1: (A1948)
CPT-SHA2-
224
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA2-224: (A7544)
CPT-SHA2-
256
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA2-256: (A7544)
SW-SHA2-
256
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA2-256: (A1948)
CPT-SHA2-
384
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA2-384: (A7544)
SW-SHA2-
384
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA2-384: (A1948)
CPT-SHA2-
512
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA2-512: (A7544)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SW-SHA2-
512
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA2-512: (A1948)
CPT-SHA3-
224
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA3-224: (A7544)
SW-SHA3-
224
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA3-224: (A1948)
CPT-SHA3-
256
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA3-256: (A7544)
SW-SHA3-
256
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA3-256: (A1948)
CPT-SHA3-
384
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA3-384: (A7544)
SW-SHA3-
384
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA3-384: (A1948)
CPT-SHA3-
512
SHA LS2-CPT Digest SHA3-512: (A7544)
SW-SHA3-
512
SHA
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHA3-512: (A1948)
CPT-
SHAKE-128
XOF LS2-CPT Digest SHAKE-128: (A7544)
SW-SHAKE-
128
XOF
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHAKE-128: (A1948)
CPT-
SHAKE-256
XOF LS2-CPT Digest SHAKE-256: (A7544)
SW-SHAKE-
256
XOF
LS2-SW-Crypto
Digest
SHAKE-256: (A1948)
CPT-TDES-
CBC
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT
Unauthenticated
Decryption
TDES-CBC: (A7544)
LEGACY-
CPT-TDES-
ECB
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
LS2-CPT
Unauthenticated
Decryption
TDES-ECB: (A7544)
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
The cryptographic module supports the above Security Function Implementations available in
Approved mode of operation.
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• AES-GCM (A7544)
o IG C.H Scenario #1:
▪ TLS 1.2 or other applications can offload GCM operations.
▪ For TLS 1.2, the IV is constructed as described in RFC 5288.
▪ For TLS 1.2 AES GCM the following cipher suites are supported:
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
▪ IV is generated internally to the cryptographic module.
▪ The module triggers a handshake to establish new encryption keys and
IVs when the IV exhausts the maximum possible values for the given
session key.
▪ SP 800-38D §8.2.2 is used for GCM IV construction.
o IG C.H Scenario #2:
▪ IVs are generated randomly and IG C.H Option #2 applies.
▪ IV’s free field is a 4-byte counter.
▪ IV’s random field is a 96-bit random number.
▪ IV’s random field is incremented by 1. IV’s random field wouldn’t overflow
96-bits in the lifetime of the module.
▪ For IV restoration conditions guidance, refer to section 11.5 User
Guidance.
▪ Internal Approved RBG (Hash DRBG # A7544): SP 800-90A DRBG,
HASH_DRBG SHA2-512.
• AES-GCM (A1948)
o IG C.H Notes:
▪ IVs are generated randomly, and IG C.H Option #2 applies.
▪ IV is generated internally to the cryptographic module.
▪ SP 800-38D §8.2.2 is used for GCM IV construction.
▪ IV’s random field is a 128-bit random number.
▪ If the module’s power is lost and then restored, the module will generate
new IVs.
▪ Approved RBG (Hash DRBG # A7544): SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG,
HASH_DRBG SHA2-512.
• PBKDF (SP 800-132)
o PBKDF is used only for password hashing as allowed by SP 800-63B. PBKDF is
not used to derive a Data Protection Key for storage applications.
o PBKDF with HMAC password strength
▪ The password is a minimum of 8 characters, case-sensitive alpha-
numeric. As such there are (26*2+10)^8 = 62^8 possible minimum-length
passwords, and the false acceptance rate is 1 in 62^8 which is less than 1
in 1,000,000.
▪ A maximum of 20 password attempts is possible before permanent
lockout. Therefore, the probability of false authentication over any
timeframe is 20 in 62^8, which is less than 1 in 100,000. (The number of
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allowed login attempts prior to lockout is configured during module
initialization but cannot exceed 20.)
▪ Lockout of MCO automatically zeroizes the module in the next reboot. In
all other cases, lockout can be unset by destroying the partition.
o PBKDF with HMAC Iteration Count and Justification
▪ Iteration count used by the module is 311,000, following the
recommendation in SP800-132r2.
▪ Salt length is 128 to 4096 bits.
• EC Diffie-Hellman and ECDSA with non-NIST recommended curves
o NIST SP 800-186 (H1)
▪ brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1,
and brainpoolP512r1 are allowed to be used for interoperability reasons.
o NIST SP 800-186 (H2)
▪ secp256k1 is allowed to be used only for blockchain-related applications.
• Legacy Algorithms
o Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated
prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M
▪ TDES-CBC (SP 800- 38A) (A7544): Data decryption for data encrypted
before 2024
▪ TDES-ECB (SP 800- 38A) (A7544): Data decryption for data encrypted
before 2024
▪ TDES-ECB (A1948): Prerequisite for TDES-KW for data encrypted before
2024
▪ TDES-KW (KTS) (SP 800-38F) (A1948): Key unwrapping for key
wrapped before 2024
▪ TDES-KW (SP 800- 38F) (A1948): Key unwrapping for key wrapped
before 2024
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert Number Vendor Name
E231 Marvell Semiconductor, Inc
Table 10: Entropy Certificates
Name Type
Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
OCTEON HW
RBG
Physical OCTEON TX2 128 bits 2.673 bits N/A
Table 11: Entropy Sources
The OCTEON TX2 HW unit generates random bits from the 8-free running oscillators from a
total of 128-free running oscillators. The random bits generated are already run through HW-
level health tests (APT and RCT).
2.9 Key Generation
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• CKG SP 800-133Rev2 (Vendor affirmed)
o IG D.H
▪ SP 800-133Rev2 Section 5.1 Asymmetric signature key generation using
unmodified DRBG output.
▪ SP 800-133Rev2 Section 5.2 Asymmetric key establishment key
generation using unmodified DRBG output.
▪ SP 800-133Rev2 Section 6.1 Direct symmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output.
▪ SP 800-133Rev2 Section 6.2.1 Derivation of symmetric keys from a key-
agreement shared secret.
▪ SP 800-133Rev2 Section 6.2.2 Derivation of symmetric keys from a pre-
shared key.
2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
• Key Agreement Scheme (IG D.F)
The Module supports the following Scenario 1 key agreement schemes.
o KAS-IFC-SSC (SP 800-56Br2) (A1948)
o KAS-IFC OneStep (SP800-56Br2)(A1948) Scenario 1 path (2)
The Module supports the following Scenario 2 key agreement schemes as per IG D.F.
o KAS-ECC-SSC (SP800-56Ar3) (A7544)
o KAS-ECC (KAS) (SP 800-56Ar3) (A1948) Scenario 2 path (2)
o KAS-ECC (SP800- 56Ar3) (A1948)
o KAS TLS (SP 800- 56Ar3) (A7544) Scenario 2 path (2)
o KAS ANS 9.63 (SP 800-56Ar3) (A1948) Scenario 2 path (2)
o KAS KDA HKDF (SP 800-56Ar3) (A1948) Scenario 2 path (2)
o KAS KDA ONESTEP (SP 800-56Ar3) (A1948) Scenario 2 path (2)
o KAS KDA TWOSTEP (SP 800-56Ar3) (A1948) Scenario 2 path (2)
Key Transport Information
• Key Transport Method (IG D.G)
Key Encapsulation
o KTS-IFC (KTS) (SP 800-56Br2) (A1948) (key encapsulation and
unencapsulation)
o KTS-IFC (SP 800- 56Br2) (A1948)
o KTS-IFC (KTS) (SP 800-56Br2) (A7545)
Key Wrapping
o AES-KW (KTS) (SP 800-38F) (A1948)
o AES-KWP (KTS) (SP 800-38F) (A1948)
o TDES-KW (KTS) (SP 800-38F) (A1948) (Key unwrapping)
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2.11 Industry Protocols
• TLS 1.2 Cipher Suites
The module supports the algorithms for the following cipher suites using Approved and
allowed algorithms and key sizes:
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
For cipher suites using GCM, the IV is generated per RFC 7627. The module supports
GCM cipher suites compatible with SP 800- 52 Rev2.
No parts of the TLS and ANS 9.63 protocols, other than the approved cryptographic
algorithms and the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
USB (FTDI USB to
Multi-Channe)
Status Output Log messages of MCU UART,SMBus, Diagnostics
PCIe
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Primary interface to communicate with the module. Provides APIs
for the software on the host to communicate with the module
PCIeSMBus Status Output Log message of Diagnostics and System management
LED Status Output Operation status
Tamper PIN Control Input No data; only a signal from high to low
Zeroize push button Control Input No data; only a signal
Power connector No data; external power connector
Battery interfaces No data; external power connector
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not contain any control output interface.
The RJ45 Connector depicted in cryptographic boundary view is disabled in firmware.
3.2 Additional Information
The PCIe data interface is the only interface that accepts the security services always
accessible from the module; the host system cannot read or write data over this interface. The
module will start reading commands from the Host system only after the power-on self-tests are
run and the firmware is loaded. After the module is zeroized, the firmware enforces that the
PCIe data interface only provides basic versioning and informational output. When the module
enters the error state, the PCIe data interface will report the error state and no other data.
Other interfaces are all meant for informational services to read temperature, logs, and
diagnostic information but no other data.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 33 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description
Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Username
and
password
The password is a
minimum of 8 characters
(case-sensitive, alpha-
numeric).
SW-AES-
KWP-Unwrap
(KTS)
The password is a
minimum of 8
characters (case-
sensitive, alpha-
numeric. As such,
there are (26*2+10)^8
= 62^8 possible
minimum-length
passwords,and the
false acceptance rate
is 1 in 62^8
A maximum of 20
password attempts are
possible before a user is
permanently locked out.
Therefore, the probability
of false authentication over
any time frame is 20 /62^8
(The number of allowed
login attempts prior to
lockout is configured
during module initialization
but cannot exceed 20.)
Digital
signature
Authentication is
performed using SHA2-
256 based RSA 2048-bit
PKCS#1-v1.5
signatures(provides 112
bits of strength).
Corresponding public key
is associated with the
identity.
SW-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will occur
is approximately
1/(2^112).
For each failed signature
verification, the module will
block for 2 seconds.
Therefore, the probability
that a random attempt will
succeed in a one-minute
period is approximately
30/(2^112)
Table 13: Authentication Methods
The module supports the above identity-based authentication methods.
The module also supports the multi-factor Authentication, which is performed using SHA2-256
based RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1-v1.5 signatures (provides 112 bits of strength). The
corresponding public key is associated with the identity.
The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur is
approximately 1 in 2^112.
4.2 Roles
A role is explicitly selected at authentication; the MCO role is associated with the master
partition and the PCO, AU and PCU roles are associated with user partitions (see section 4
Roles, Services, and Authentication for details). The module allows multiple operators per role,
per partition with a caveat of one AU per Partition.
A username is used as the identity of a user. This means for a given partition, each username
needs to be unique.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
MCO Identity Crypto Officer Username and password
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 34 of 149
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
MCO (2FA) Multi-Factor Identity Crypto Officer
Username and password
Digital signature
Pre-CO Identity Crypto Officer Username and password
PCO Identity Crypto Officer Username and password
PCO (2FA) Multi-Factor Identity Crypto Officer
Username and password
Digital signature
PCU Identity Crypto User Username and password
PCU (2FA) Multi-Factor Identity Crypto User
Username and password
Digital signature
AU Identity Audit User Username and password
Table 14: Roles
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 35 of 149
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4.3 Approved Services
The Approved Services indicator for all Approved services in the table below is successful
execution when the partition is operated in the approved mode.
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
GP_PARTITION_MGMT
Provides services
to manage user
and master
partitions
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-
RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
MCO
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY): G,E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key Public
RSA
(HVFUVKYPUBRSA
): E
- HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z,G
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 36 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
SHA2-
256
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVE
CC): E
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): E
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): Z,G
- HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY): E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): G,Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 37 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
PCO
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY): E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): G
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
Pre-CO
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): G
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 38 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key Public
ECC
(HVFUVKYPUBECC
): E
GP_PARTITION_SSP_M
GMT
Provides services
to manage user
and master
partition SSPs
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
SW-AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-KAS-
ECC
(KAS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
CPT-
ECDH-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-
NIST
SW-AES-
GMAC
SW-AES-
MCO
- HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB): W
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): E
- Partition User
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA-1
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
SW-
HMAC-
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): E
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): W
- HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement
Certificate ECC
(HMEDCTECC): E
- HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement Key
Private ECC
(HMEDKYPRVECC):
E
PCO
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-KAS-
ECC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-KDF-
ANS-
9.63
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
SHA2-
256
(PUGPMSK): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): E
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
GP_PARTITION_TIME_
MGMT
Provides services
to manage user
time
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
MCO
Unauthenticated
GP_LICENSE_MGMT
Provides services
to manage license
of the software
running on the
HSM
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
SHA2-
256
MCO
- HSM Vendor
License Key Public
RSA
(HVLICKYPUBRSA):
E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): E
GP_QUORUM_CONTR
OL
Provides quorum
control (MofN)
services
Success
with
fips_stat
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
SW-
Pre-CO
PCO
- Partition DRBG
CTR V State
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
e = 2 or
3
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
(PXDRBGCTVST):
G,E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
CTR Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST):
G,E
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
PCU
- Partition DRBG
CTR V State
(PXDRBGCTVST):
G,E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
CTR Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST):
G,E
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
GP_USER_MGMT
Provides services
to manage user
accounts and
Success
with
fips_stat
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
KAS-
PCU
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 42 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
roles within the
HSM.
e = 2 or
3
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-
PBKDF
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
- Partition User TLS
E2E Client
Authentication
Certificate
(PUTLSE2ECACT):
E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): W,E,Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
MCO
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E,G
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): W,E,Z
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 43 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
E
- Partition User
Password Encryption
Key Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUPEEKPUB):
Z,E,W
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
Shared Secret
(PXPESZ): Z,G,E
PCO
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E,W
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E,G
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): Z,E,W
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition User
Password Encryption
Key Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUPEEKPUB):
Z,E,W
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
Shared Secret
(PXPESZ): Z,G,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
AU
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): E,Z,W
Pre-CO
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): E,Z,W
Unauthenticated
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
E
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): E
GP_BACKUP_RESTOR
E
Provides
Backup/Restore
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-
KeyGen
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
SW-AES-
CBC-
WRAP
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
Counter-
MCO
- Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK): G,E,W,R
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: R,W
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
DRBG
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-
SHA2-
256
(PUGPKYPUB): R,W
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY): E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): R
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): R,W
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): R,W
PCO
- Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK): G,E,R,W
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: R,W
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 47 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): R,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): R,W
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY): E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): R,W
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 48 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
GP_KBK_MGMT
Provides service
to manage Key
Backup Key (KBK)
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
SW-AES-
CBC-
WRAP
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
MCO
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): G,E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): G,E
- HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY): E
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): E
PCO
- Partition Key
Backup Key
(PXKBKY): W,R,E
- Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK): E
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
W,R,E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): E
GP_AUDIT_LOG_MGMT
Provides audit log
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
CPT-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
RSA-
Signature
-Primitive
PCO
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
AU
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
MCO
GP_INFO_DIAGNOSTIC
Provides info and
diagnostic
services including
Get Status, Get
Version and Run
Self-tests.
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-AES-
GCM-
Enc
MCO
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
PCO
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
PCU
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 49 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SW-AES-
GCM-
Dec
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
LEGACY
-SW-
TDES-
KW
(KTS)
LEGACY
-CPT-
AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
LEGACY
-CPT-
AES-
ECB-
UNWRA
P
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
CMAC
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
DEC
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
AU
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
Unauthenticated
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): E
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 50 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 51 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA3-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA3-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA3-
256
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA3-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA3-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA3-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA3-
384
SW-
HMAC-
SHA3-
512
SW-KAS-
ECC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
CPT-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 52 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SW-KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
CPT-
KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
CPT-
KDF-TLS
SW-
PBKDF
CPT-
RSA-
Decryptio
n-
Primitive
SW-
RSA-
Decryptio
n-
Primitive
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5)
CPT-
RSA-
Signature
-Primitive
SW-
RSA-
Signature
-Primitive
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
CPT-
SHA-1
SW-
SHA-1
CPT-
SHA2-
256
SW-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
SHA2-
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 53 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
512
SW-
SHA2-
512
SW-
SHAKE-
128
SW-
SHAKE-
256
CPT-
TDES-
CBC
SW-
SHA3-
224
SW-
SHA3-
256
SW-
SHA3-
384
SW-
SHA3-
512
GP_E2E
Provides e2e
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-4)
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
CPT-
RSA-
Unauthenticated
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT): E
- Partition TLS E2E
Pre Master Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS):
Z,G,E
- Partition TLS E2E
Master Secret Key
(PXTLSE2EMSKY):
G,E
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): G
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 54 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Signature
-Primitive
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
SHA2-
512
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key
Private EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPRV
ECC): G
- Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key
Public EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPUB
ECC): G,R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): R
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition User TLS
E2E Client
Authentication
Certificate
(PUTLSE2ECACT):
E,W
- Partition User TLS
E2E Ephemeral Key
Public EC
(PUTLSE2EEKPUB
ECC): E,W
GP_SESSION_MGMT
Provides services
to manage
sessions and
tokens
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
PBKDF
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
Unauthenticated
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 55 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
E
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): E
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: E
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): E
MCO
- Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK): Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
PCO
- Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK): Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 56 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): Z
- Partition TLS E2E
Master Secret Key
(PXTLSE2EMSKY):
Z
PCU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): Z
- Partition TLS E2E
Master Secret Key
(PXTLSE2EMSKY):
Z
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 57 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
AU
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
GP_KEY_MGMT
Provides services
to manage keys
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-
KeyGen
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
KAS-
ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
TWOSTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
SW-AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-AES-
MCO
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): E
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVE
CC): E
- HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY): E
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): E
PCO
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): E
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 58 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-KAS-
ECC
(KAS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
SW-KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
LEGACY
-SW-
TDES-
KW
(KTS)
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
LEGACY
-SW-
AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
LEGACY
-SW-
AES-
ECB-
UNWRA
P
LEGACY
-CPT-
AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
LEGACY
-CPT-
AES-
ECB-
UNWRA
P
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB):
Z,R,E,W
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB):
R,E,W
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): G
- Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXKLKEKPRV):
Z,G,E
- Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXKLKEKPUB):
Z,G,E,R
- Partition User Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUKLKEKPUB):
Z,E,W
- Partition Key
Loading Key Shared
Secret (PXKLSZ):
Z,G,E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 59 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
CPT-
ECDH-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
SW-AES-
CMAC
SW-AES-
GMAC
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-4)
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA-1
CPT-
HMAC-
E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
Z,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z,E
PCU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY):
Z,W,G,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 60 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SHA2-
224
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-
KDA-
OneStep-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-
KDA-
TwoStep-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-KDF-
ANS-
9.63
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-
RSA-
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK):
Z,W,G,E,R
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): E
- Partition Wrap
Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ):
Z,E
Pre-CO
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): G,W
- Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXKLKEKPRV):
Z,G,E
- Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXKLKEKPUB):
Z,G,E
- Partition User Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUKLKEKPUB):
Z,E,W
- Partition Key
Loading Key Shared
Secret (PXKLSZ):
Z,G,E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 61 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
FW-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
UB-RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
SHA-1
SW-
SHA2-
256
SW-
SHA2-
384
SW-
SHA2-
512
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
AU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
Z,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z,E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB):
Z,E,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): R
- Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXWEKPRV):
G,E,Z
- Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXWEKPUB):
G,R,Z
- Partition User Wrap
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 62 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Unwrap Ephemeral
Key Public
(PUWUEKPUB):
G,R,Z
- Partition Wrap
Unwrap Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUEEK): G,E,Z
- Partition Wrap
Unwrap Intermediate
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUIEK):
G,W,E,Z
Unauthenticated
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): R
GP_POLICY_MGMT
Provides services
to HSM/Partition
policies
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
MCO
PCO
Pre-CO
PCU
AU
Unauthenticated
GP_CRYPTO_FASTPAT
H
Provides
crypto/fastpathser
vices
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
LEGACY
-CPT-
TDES-
ECB
CPT-
RSA-
Decryptio
n-
Primitive
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
SHA2-
512
SW-AES-
CMAC
CPT-
SHA3-
512
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
CPT-
PCU
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E,G
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): E
- Partition User
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 63 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SHA-1
CPT-
SHAKE-
128
CPT-
SHAKE-
256
CPT-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
AES-
GMAC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
DEC
CPT-
SHA3-
256
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
DEC
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
RSA-
Signature
-Primitive
CPT-
SHA2-
224
CPT-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
DEC
CPT-
SHA3-
224
CPT-
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): E
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): E
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): E
PCO
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
Pre-CO
- Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
Unauthenticated
- Partition TLS E2E
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 64 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
AES-
CTR-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CTR-
DEC
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
CPT-
SHA3-
384
SW-KAS-
ECC
(KAS)
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
CPT-
ECDH-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-
NIST
SW-KDF-
ANS-
9.63
SW-AES-
GMAC
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY): E
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
GP_ZEROIZATION
Provides
zeroization
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
SW-AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
MCO
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 65 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
- Partition Key
Backup Key
(PXKBKY): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): Z
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): Z
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 66 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: Z
- HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB): Z
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): Z
- HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement Key
Private ECC
(HMEDKYPRVECC):
Z
- HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY): Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA): Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVE
CC): Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
Z
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): Z
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): Z
- HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement
Certificate ECC
(HMEDCTECC): Z
- HSM Manufacturer
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 67 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY):
E,Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY): Z
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): Z
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
Z
PCO
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 68 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY): E
PCU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Data
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 69 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
AU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 70 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
Pre-CO
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 71 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(HXMEKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Key
Backup Key
(PXKBKY): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): Z
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: Z
- HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB): Z
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): Z
Unauthenticated
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 72 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(PUGPASKPRV): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): Z
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB): Z
- HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY): Z
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): Z
- Partition Key
Backup Key
(PXKBKY): Z
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): Z
- Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
Z
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): Z
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): Z
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): Z
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): Z
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 73 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): Z
- Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
: Z
- HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB): Z
- Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA): Z
GP_CERT_AUTH
Provides cert auth
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5)
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
PCO
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
E,R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E,R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
E,R
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 74 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(POOTACT): W,E,R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): W,E,R
- Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared
Secret (PXCASSZ):
Z,G,E,R
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared
Secret (PXCATSZ):
G,Z,E,W
- Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK): G
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT):
Z,W,R
PCU
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 75 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
E,R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E,R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
E,R
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E,R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): E,R
- Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared
Secret (PXCASSZ):
Z,G,E,R
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared
Secret (PXCATSZ):
G,Z,E,W
- Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK): G
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT): R
AU
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 76 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
E,R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E,R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
E,R
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E,R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): E,R
- Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared
Secret (PXCASSZ):
Z,G,E,R
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared
Secret (PXCATSZ):
G,Z,E,W
- Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK): G
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 77 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT): R
Unauthenticated
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
E,R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): E,R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): W,E,R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
W,E,R
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): E,R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 78 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Certificate
(POOAUCT): E,R
- Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared
Secret (PXCASSZ):
Z,G,E,R
- Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):
E
- Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared
Secret (PXCATSZ):
G,Z,E,W
- Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK): G
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT): R
MCO
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): R
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 79 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
W,R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): W,E,R
Pre-CO
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA): R
- HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC): R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):
R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):
R
- FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA):
R
- HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT): R
- Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT): W,R
- Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT): W,R
- Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT): R
- Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT): W,R
GP_CLONING
Provides cloning
services
Success
with
fips_stat
e = 2 or
3
Opco
de
Inputs
Opcod
e
Output
s
CPT-
KeyGen
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
PCO
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): W,R
- Partition Key
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
SW-AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
SW-AES-
CMAC
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS186
-4)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-KDF-
SP800-
108
SW-
PBKDF
SW-
RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5)
SW-
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): W,R
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY):
W,E,R,G
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
- Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXCLEKPRV):
Z,G,E
- Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXCLEKPUB):
Z,G,R
- Partition Cloning
Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ): Z,G,E
- Partition Cloning
Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLEEK): Z,G,E
- Partition Cloning
MAC Ephemeral Key
(PXCLMEK): Z,G,E
- Partition User
Cloning Ephemeral
Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB):
Z,E,W
PCU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 81 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SHA-1
SW-
SHA2-
256
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB):
W,R
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
AU
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY): W,R
- Partition User
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 82 of 149
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Input
s
Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK):
W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB): W,R
- Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB):
W,R
- Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY): E
- Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY): W,R
- Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY): W
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):
G,E,Z
- FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):
G,E,Z
- Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):
E
- Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):
E
- Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY): E
Table 15: Approved Services
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4.4 Non-Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:
Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
CN_GENERATE_PB
E_KEY
Generate PBE DES3 key with the given password, salt, and iteration
count. Make sure that HSM is initialized with fips_state=0.The fips_state
parameter can be found in the hsm_configfile.
SW-
Coun
ter-
DRB
G
(Allo
wed
Per
IG
2.4.A
)
(non-
comp
liant)
PBE
PCU
LSPAY_GENERATE
_ASYMM_KEY
Generates RSA KEY Pair (mod_len>= 2048-bit). Generates EC KEY
PAIR (Curves: Nist P256, 224, 384, 521, Brain pool (Curves: P160,
P192, P224, P256, P320, P384, P512), x25519/448 and Secp256K1
and FRP256v1)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_GENERATE
_SYMM_KEY
Generates symmetric key AES, TDEA keys used for LSPay operations
SW-
Coun
ter-
DRB
G
(Allo
wed
Per
IG
2.4.A
)
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_EXPORT_P
UBLIC_KEY
Exports public key for BYOK. PCU
LSPAY_IMPORT_K
PK
Imports OAEP wrapped or ECDH_AES_PAD wrapped symmetric key.
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 84 of 149
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
LSPAY_IMPORT_T
R34_KEY
Import symmetric keys using TR- 34 unwrap.
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_EXPORT_K
EY
Exports symmetric key wrapped with TR31,AES_CBC/
AES_CBC_PAD.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_EXPORT_T
R34_KEY
Exports symmetric keys wrapped with TR34 mechanism
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_TRANSLAT
E_KEY
Translates wrapped key from one KPK to another KPK.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_IMPORT_C
ERTIFICATE
Imports peer's certificate to read public key required in TR34. Import
X901 certificate into HSM.
PCU
LSPAY_IMPORT_D
ECIMAL_TABLE
Imports encrypted decimal table to be used in PIN APIs to decimalize
native PIN.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_GENERATE
_CSR
Create CSR with given key pair.
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_DERIVE_KE
Y
Derives DUKPT working key from the BDK.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_ENCRYPT Encrypts input data or PIN.
AES
(non-
comp
PCU
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
LSPAY_DECRYPT Decrypts input data or PIN.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Doub
le-
DES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_DECRYPT_
THEN_ENCRYPT
Decrypts the input cipher text with one key and encrypts with another
key.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Doub
le-
DES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_MAC_GEN Computes MAC on input data. Algorithm used: DES/Triple-DES
DES
MAC
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_MAC_VERI
FY
Verifies MAC with calculated AMC on input data.
DES
MAC
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_MAC_TRAN
SLATE
Translates MAC by using new key on input data.
DES
MAC
PCU
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 86 of 149
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
LSPAY_FPE_ENCR
YPT
Performs FPE FF1/FF3-1 encrypt operation on input data.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_FPE_DECR
YPT
Performs FPE FF1/FF3-1 decrypt operation on input data.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_SIGN Performs sign and verify on input data.
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_SIGN_VERI
FY
Verifies sign on input data.
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_PINBLK_TR
ANSLATE
Decrypts the input PIN using decryption key, translates to given PIN
format and encrypts with another key.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_DERIVE_PI
N_FROM_OFFSET
Derive PIN from given offset. Encrypts validation data with DES EDE.
Derives native PIN, then offset will be added to derive IBM PIN. PIN will
be encoded in given ISO format. Encrypt encoded PIN with PIN
encryption key.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 87 of 149
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
LSPAY_DERIVE_O
FFSET_FROM_PIN
Generates IBM offset from given PIN. Decrypt and decode received
PIN. Generate native from given validation data. Subtract decoded PIN
from native PIN t to get PIN offset.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_VERIFY_PI
N
Verifies given PIN .Decrypt and decode received PIN. Generate native
from given validation data. Add offset to native PIN. Compare resultant
PIN with received PIN.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_PVV_GEN Perform PVV generation on PIN and PAN data.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_PVV_VERIF
Y
Verifies given PVV.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_EMV_GENV
ERIFY
Perform EMV crypto operations. Generate ARPC. Generate or Verify
ARQC.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_EMV_SECU
RE_MSG_GEN
Generates MAC over secure message.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_CVV_GEN Generates CVV, CVV2,iCVVon given card details.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
LSPAY_CVV_VERIF
Y
Verifies CVV with given card details
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_KEY_SHAR
E_CREATE
Creates components of Key
Sha
mir
Key
Shar
e
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_KEY_SHAR
E_EXPORT_COMP
ONENT
Exports created components in encrypted format
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_KEY_SHAR
E_COMBINE_INIT
Starts combine keyinit. PCU
LSPAY_KEY_SHAR
E_COMBINE_KEY
Combines all components of the key.
Sha
mir
Key
Shar
e
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_KEY_SHAR
E_ZEROIZE
Erases all components of the key. PCU
LSPAY_MFK_GENE
RATE
Generates MFK key.
SW-
Coun
ter-
DRB
G
(Allo
wed
Per
IG
2.4.A
)
(non-
comp
liant)
PCO
LSPAY_MFK_GET_I
NFO
Returns MFK information for partition. PCO
LSPAY_MFK_SET_
PRIMARY
Sets MFK as primary. PCO
LSPAY_MFK_DELE
TE
Deletes MFK. PCO
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 89 of 149
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
LSPAY_FUNCTION
ALITY_GET
Gets status of enabled/disabled LSPay services PCO
LSPAY_FUNCTION
ALITY_SET
Enable/Disable services PCO
LSPAY_EXPORT_K
PK
Export a Key Block Protection Key (KBPK)
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_IMPORT_P
UBLIC_KEY
Import an RSA public key
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
LSPAY_VALIDATE_
PUBLIC_KEY
Validates the RSA public key
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_GENERATE_KE
Y_PAIR (non-
compliant)
Generates asymmetric keys (RSA/ ECC). Updates the public and
private key handles in the output on return. Caveats in Non Approved
apart from approved mode: RSA 1024 bits allowed along with all odd
public exponent i.e. even lesser than
65537.NID_X9_62_prime192v1/NID_sect163k1/NID_ED25519/NID_se
ct163r2/NID_secp192k1/NID_brainpoolP160r1/NID_brainpoolP192r1/NI
D_X25519/NID_X448
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
KAS-
ECC
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_GENERATE_KE
Y (non-compliant)
Generates a symmetric key of given key type and length. Caveats in
Non-Approved apart from approved mode:DES token key is allowed.
SW-
Coun
ter-
DRB
G
(Allo
wed
Per
IG
2.4.A
)
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_CREATE_OBJE
CT (non-compliant)
Imports a public key into HSM. Caveats in Non Approved apart from
approved mode:RSA-1024 bits allowed,
NID_ED25519/NID_secp192k1/NID_brainpoolP160r1/NID_brainpoolP1
92r1/NID_X25519/NID_X448
PCU
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
(non-compliant)
Unwraps a key with an AES/Triple-DES/RSA private key existing on
HSM or KLK. Takes the output wrapped data of wrapKey2 command.
Caveats in Non Approved apart from approved mode:RSA-1024 bit,
RSAPKCS1V1.5 Unwrap,NID_X9_62_prime192v1/
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
PCU
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
NID_sect163k1/NID_ED25519/NID_sect163r2/NID_secp192k1/NID_bra
inpoolP160r1/NID_brainpoolP192r1/NID_X25519/NID_X448,Triple-DES
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
CN_WRAP_KEY
(non-compliant)
Wraps sensitive (private and symmetric) keys from the HSM to the host.
Caveats in Non Approved apart from approved mode: AES-ECB mode,
AES-CBC mode, AES-CBC-PAD mode, Triple-DES ECB mode, Triple-
DES CBC mode, Triple-DES NIST Wrap mode, RSA-PKCS1V1.5 Wrap
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_EXTRACT_MAS
KED_OBJECT (non-
compliant)
Extracts a masked object; i.e., retrieves an object by wrapping it with a
masking key shared by the process of cloning.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU,P
CO,AU
CN_STORE_FW_SI
GNING_KEY (non-
compliant)
Configure an RSA or EC public key into HSM as AO attestation key.
These keys can be of modulus 1024, 2048, 3072, and 4096 or a
supported 256 bits, 384 bits or 521 bits EC curve. Caveats in Non
Approved is 192-bit curves supported
ECD
SA
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
MCO
MAJOR_OP_ME_P
KCS_LARGE (non-
compliant)/MAJOR_
OP_ME_PKCS (non-
compliant)
PKCS#1v1.5 encrypt and decrypt
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_STORE_VEND
OR_PRE_SHARED_
KEY
(CN_STORE_KBK_
SHARE) (non-
compliant)
Stores fixed keys (KBK) for backup. Including PKCS#1v1.5
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
MCO
CN_INSERT_MASK
ED_OBJECT (non-
compliant)
Inserts a masked object into an HSM that is extracted from another
HSM.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU,P
CO,AU
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Name Description
Algo
rith
ms
Role
CN_ENCRYPT_SES
SION (non-
compliant)
Enables encrypted communication channel. Caveat is Non Approved
mode allow the additional Cipher suite
E2E_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
Unaut
hentic
ated
CN_ENCRYPT_SES
SION_V2 (non-
compliant)
Enables encrypted communication channel. Caveat is Non Approved
mode allow the additional nonapproved cipher suites
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
Unaut
hentic
ated
CN_DERIVE_KEY
(non-compliant)
Derives a key using a supported KDF mechanism with the params
given by the user.
AES
(non-
comp
liant)
EC-
AES
ECD
H
KDF
RSA
(non-
comp
liant)
Triple
-DES
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_PQC_CRYPTO
_HYBRID_SIG_GEN
(non-compliant)
Generates a signature using ML-DSA and ECDSA sign algorithm.
ML-
DSA
ECD
SA
Sign
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
CN_PQC_CRYPTO
_HYBRID_SIG_VER
IFY (non-compliant)
Verifies a signature using ML-DSA and ECDSA sign algorithm.
ML-
DSA
ECD
SA
Verify
(non-
comp
liant)
PCU
Table 16: Non-Approved Services
The non-approved services will fail FIPS POLICY MISMATCH when partition is operated in the
approved mode.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 92 of 149
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4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module uses the following services to upload the signed firmware to update the module
using RSA 2048 signatures and SHA2-256:
• GP_PARTITION_MGMT - CN_FW_UPDATE_BEGIN: This service initiates the
firmware update process.
• GP_PARTITION_MGMT - CN_FW_UPDATE: This service proceeds with the actual
firmware image transfer. It manages the data transfer securely, ensuring that the
firmware data is correctly received and written.
• GP_PARTITION_MGMT - CN_FW_UPDATE_END: This service concludes the
firmware update process. It performs integrity checks such as verifying digital
signatures to ensure that the firmware has been correctly and securely updated.
During the firmware update process the data is inhibited.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 93 of 149
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):
• Component 1: executable – binary
• Component 2: non-modifiable operating system – binary
Firmware integrity is verified by the bootloader during the boot up using EDC (CRC32) for itself
and using RSA 2048 signatures and SHA2-256 for next level image. The integrity test can be
run on-demand by resetting the module by power-cycling it or by PCIe function reset.
As part of firmware load operation, the new firmware’s integrity and authenticity is verified by the
active firmware using RSA 2048 signatures and SHA2-256.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Reboot the HSM for the firmware integrity on demand.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 94 of 149
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The Module has a limited operational environment and has been assessed for Physical Security
at Level 3 under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. Therefore per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual
Section 7.5 Partial validations and non-applicable areas this section is not applicable.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 95 of 149
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism
Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Epoxy
Coating
12 Months
Examine surface of module for scratched or damaged epoxy, especially
if circuitry shows.
Battery life 6 Months
If the HSM has not been powered on in the last six months, then power
it on for at least an hour.
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module’s cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer perimeter of the hard epoxy
enclosure containing the hardware and firmware components. The module is opaque and
completely conceals the internal components of the cryptographic module. The epoxy enclosure
of the module prevents physical access to any of the internal components without having to
destroy the module. There is no operator required actions.
The module is coated in hard epoxy, such that any physical breach attempt leaves behind
evidence of tamper. This is shown in the figure below
While the module is designed to prevent successful tampering (any physical breach to module
circuitry is likely to destroy the module, as per FIPS 140-3 Level 3 Physical Security
requirements), the module should still be checked periodically for attempts. Guidelines are
provided in the table above.
If the module is found to be meaningfully damaged or tampered with (e.g., circuitry is showing or
other significant damage has occurred), it should be removed from use and destroyed.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 96 of 149
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7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or Voltage
EFP or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -20C (+/- 2C) EFP Shutdown
HighTemperature 47C EFP Shutdown
LowVoltage
2.998V (PCIe 3.3V Aux), 3.132V (PCIe 3.3V Rail), 11.926V
(PCIe 12V Rail)
EFP Shutdown
HighVoltage
3.658V (PCIe 3.3V Aux), 3.794V (PCIe 3.3V Rail), 13.098V
(PCIe 12V Rail)
EFP Shutdown
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature Type Temperature
LowTemperature -20C (Junction temperature)
HighTemperature 47C (Junction temperature)
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 97 of 149
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8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A due to the module not claiming to implement any non-invasive security protection
mechanisms.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 98 of 149
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type
DDR4 Ephemeral RAM Dynamic
NOR read/write memory Static
MCU read/write memory Static
eMMC read/write memory Static
FUSE OTP memory Static
Table 20: Storage Areas
The module supports the above storage areas for SSP management.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
Password-Input-
Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KWP-
Unwrap (KTS)
Key-Transport-
Output-Method
NOR External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-KTS-IFC-
Encap (KTS)
Key-Transport-Input-
Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-KTS-IFC-
Decap (KTS)
AES-Wrap-Output-
Method
eMMC External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KW-Wrap
(KTS)
AES-Wrap-Pad-
Output-Method
eMMC External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KWP-
Wrap (KTS)
AES-GCM-Wrap-
Output-Method
eMMC External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-GCM-
Wrap
AES-Unwrap-Input-
Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KW-
Unwrap (KTS)
AES-Unwrap-Pad-
Input-Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KWP-
Unwrap (KTS)
AES-GCM-Unwrap-
Input-Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-GCM-
Unwrap
Public-Key-Plain-
Output-Method
eMMC External Plaintext Automated Electronic
Public-Key-Plain-
Input-Method
Entered eMMC Plaintext Automated Electronic
Shared-Secret-Plain-
Output-Method
eMMC External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-KTS-IFC-
Encap (KTS)
Shared-Secret-Plain-
Input-Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-KTS-IFC-
Decap (KTS)
Restore-Key-Input-
Method
Entered eMMC Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KWP-
Unwrap (KTS)
Backup-Key-Output-
Method
eMMC External Encrypted Automated Electronic
SW-AES-KWP-
Wrap (KTS)
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module supports the above Input-Output methods.
Private/Secret keys are always encrypted when performing export/import.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 99 of 149
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9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
D
Manually zeroized (via GP_KEY_MGMT -
CN_DESTROY_OBJECT service)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_DESTROY_OBJECT
E
Zeroized right after use (Memory is wiped with
zeros, immediately after use)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
immediately after use
MFZ
Zeroize all Partition's SSPs, including the HSM
adapter owner programmed ones (Brings HSM to
factory state. Factory reset via GP_ZEROIZATION -
CN_ZEROIZE service with factory-reset as
argument with MCO credentials)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_ZEROIZE
MZ
Zeroize all Partition's SSPs, except vendor
programmed ones (HSM zeroize via
GP_ZEROIZATION - CN_ZEROIZE service with
MCO credentials)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_ZEROIZE
PD
Zeroize all SSPs in the Partition and then delete the
User Partition (via GP_PARTITION_MGMT -
CN_DELETE_PARTITION service )
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_DELETE_PARTITION
PFZ
Zeroize all SSPs in the Partition (Factory reset via
GP_ZEROIZATION - CN_ZEROIZE service with
factory-reset as argument with PCO credentials)
wipes all
SSPs
withzeros in
1 second
CN_ZEROIZE
PZ
Zeroize all User SSPs in the Partition Regular p
(User Partition Regular zeroize via
GP_ZEROIZATION - CN_ZEROIZE service with
PCO credentials)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_ZEROIZE
S
Zeroized on session close (Session Close via
GP_SESSION_MGMT - CN_CLOSE_SESSION,
CN_APP_FINALIZE and
CN_CLOSE_PARTITION_SESSIONS)
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_CLOSE_SESSION
VZ
Vendor zeroize (Zeroizes all SSPs including vendor
programmed configuration and CSPs. Makes the
module unusable; the module must be sent back to
the vendor for re-programming.) via
GP_ZEROIZATION - CN_VENDOR_ZEROIZE
service
wipes all
SSPs with
zeros in 1
second
CN_VENDOR_ZEROIZE
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods
The module supports above SSP zeroization methods.
The SSPs are zeroized securely by writing zeros to memory.
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9.4 SSPs
The HSM Manufacturer Hardware Unique 1 Key (HMHU1KY) is stored in plaintext in FUSE and
HSM Manufacturer Hardware Unique 2 Key (HMHU2KY) is stored in NOR encrypted with HSM
Manufacturer Hardware Unique 1 Key (HMHU1KY). All other keys and CSPs stored in the
persistent memory are encrypted by the HMHU2KY, HSM Master Encryption Key (HXMEKY), or
Partition Master Encryption Key (PXMEKY). All general-purpose user CSPs are
generated/created by the PCU, and these CSPs can be shared between multiple PCUs.
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST)
The entropy input
string and seed for the
Approved DRBG.
13472-bits
- N/A
Entropy -
CSP
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD)
DRBG seed derived
from entropy input.
12672-bits
- N/A
DRBG
Seed -
CSP
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON)
DRBG nonce derived
from entropy input.
6400-bits
- N/A
DRBG
Nonce -
CSP
ENT (P)
(SP 800-
90B)
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
Partition DRBG CTR
V State
(PXDRBGCTVST)
The internal state (V)
for the Counter
DRBG.
128-bits -
256-bits
Internal
States -
CSP
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
Partition DRBG CTR
Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST)
The internal state
(Key) for the Counter
DRBG.
256-bits -
256-bits
Internal
States -
CSP
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
SW-
Counter-
DRBG
Partition DRBG
Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST)
The internal state (V)
for the Hash DRBG.
896-bits -
256-bits
Internal
States -
CSP
CPT-Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
Partition DRBG
Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST)
The internal state (C)
for the Hash DRBG.
896-bits -
256-bits
Internal
States -
CSP
CPT-Hash-
DRBG
CPT-
Hash-
DRBG
HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY)
AES 256-bit key used
to encrypt
manufacturer keys
stored in persistent
storage of the HSM.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY)
AES 256-bit key used
to encrypt Master
Partition CSPs and
authentication data
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
stored in persistent
storage of the HSM.
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY)
AES 256-bit key used
to encrypt partition
CSPs and
authentication data
stored in persistent
storage of the HSM
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY)
AES 256-bit key used
to wrap PAK
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer
Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVR
SA)
A unique 4096-bit
RSA private key.
Used to identify the
HSM when in the
FIPS operating mode.
4096-bits
- 150-bits
Private -
CSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer
Master
Authentication Key
Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVE
CC)
A unique ECC P521
private key. Used to
identify the HSM
when in the FIPS
operating mode.
521-bits -
256-bits
Private -
CSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-4)
HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement Key
Private ECC
(HMEDKYPRVECC)
A unique ECC P256
private key. Used to
identify the HSM
when in the FIPS
operating mode.
256-bits -
128-bits
Private -
CSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-4)
Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA)
A unique 2048-bit
RSA private key used
to identify the HSM
partition
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Private -
CSP
SW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared
Secret (PXCASSZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800-56Br2 KAS2,
using PAK and POAC
512-bits -
112-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared
Secret (PXCATSZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800-56Br2 KAS2,
using PAK and POAC
512-bits -
112-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800-56Br2 KAS2,
using PAK and POAC
512-bits -
112-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-KDF-
SP800-108
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800-56Ar3 KAS2,
using Peer's public
key and User's private
key in
CN_WRAP_KEY and
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
128-bits -
256-bits -
112-bits -
256-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SW-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY)
AES-256 key for
encrypting user
passwords during
user creation and
authentication.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-KDA-
OneStep-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA)
String of 8 to 32
alphanumeric
characters.
8 to 32
Character
s - 62^8
Authenticat
ion Data -
CSP
SW-
PBKDF
Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXKLKEKPRV)
ECC 521-bit key used
in SP 800-56Ar3
C(2,0, ECC DH) to
agree on Z during key
loading.
ECC:521-
bits -
ECC:256-
bits
Private -
CSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Partition Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXKLKEKPUB)
ECC 521-bit
ephemeral public key
used in SP 800-56Ar3
C (2,0, ECC DH) key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z.
ECC:521-
bits -
ECC:256-
bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Partition User Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUKLKEKPUB)
ECC 521-bit or
RSA2048- bit
ephemeral public key
used in SP 800-56Br2
KAS2 - bilateral -
confirmation key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z.
RSA:2048
-bits -
RSA:112-
bits
Public -
PSP
KAS-
IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
Partition Key
Loading Key Shared
Secret (PXKLSZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800-56Ar3 C (2,0,
ECCDH) or SP800-
56Br2 KAS2.
256-bits -
256-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SW-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
SW-
KDA-
OneStep
-Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-
KDA-
TwoStep
-Sp800-
56Cr1
Partition Key
Loading Key
(PXKLKY)
A 256-bit AES key
derived from Z; used
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-KDA-
ONESTEP
(SP800-
SW-
AES-
GCM-
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
to decrypt the
imported CSPs
56Ar3)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
Wrap
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
LEGACY
-SW-
AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY)
AES 256-bit key used
to derive KBK.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY)
AES 256-bit key used
to double encrypt the
manufacturer keys
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Key
Backup Key
(PXKBKY)
Key used to
encrypt/decrypt the
backup session key.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-KDF-
SP800-108
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK)
Key used to backup
and restore partition
data.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
CBC-
UNWRA
P
SW-
AES-
CBC-
WRAP
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Masking
Key (PXMSKY)
AES-256 key for key
wrapping. Used to
import/export CSPs
and masked objects
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXCLEKPRV)
ECC 521-bit or RSA
2048-bit ephemeral
Private Key used in
SP 800-56Ar3 C (2,0,
ECC DH) or SP 800 -
56Br2KAS2 -bilateral -
ECC:521-
bits;
RSA:2048
-bits -
ECC:256-
bits;
Private -
CSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
SW-RSA-
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
confirmation key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z. At HSM
partition level, used to
establish secure
channel for cloning
process (to export
partition masking
key).
RSA:112-
bits
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
KAS-
IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
Partition Cloning
Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800- 56Ar3 C (2,0,
ECC DH) or SP 800-
56Br2. KAS2 -bilateral
-confirmation scheme
256-bits -
256-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SW-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
Partition Cloning
Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLEEK)
AES 256 key for
encryption and
decryption of partition
masking key.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-KDA-
ONESTEP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Cloning
MAC Ephemeral
Key (PXCLMEK)
HMAC SHA256 key
used for key
confirmation during
SP 800-56Ar3 key
agreement.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-KDA-
ONESTEP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Key
Private
(PUGPAKYPRV)
RSA/ECDSA/ECDH
general purpose keys.
RSA:2048
-bits,
3072-bits,
4096-bits;
ECDSA:2
24-bits,
256-bits,
384-bits,
521-bits; -
RSA:112-
bits, 128-
bits, 150-
bits;
ECDSA:1
12-bits,
128-bits,
192-bits,
256-bits;
Private -
CSP
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
ECDSA
with non-
NIST
recommen
ded curves
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-4)
SW-
RSA-
Decrypti
on-
Primitive
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 106 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
CPT-
RSA-
Decrypti
on-
Primitive
CPT-
RSA-
Signatur
e-
Primitive
SW-
KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
SW-
KAS-
ECC
(KAS)
CPT-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-
KDF-
ANS-
9.63
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAS-
ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
TWOST
EP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 107 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
CPT-
ECDH-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-
NIST
Partition User
General Purpose
Asymmetric Session
Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV)
RSA/ECDSA/ECDH
general purpose keys.
RSA:2048
-bits,
3072-
bits,4096-
bits;
ECDSA:2
24-bits,
256-bits,
384-bits,
521-bits; -
RSA:112-
bits, 128-
bits,150-
bits;
ECDSA:1
12-bits,
128-bits,
192-bits,
256-bits;
Private -
CSP
ECDSA
with non-
NIST
recommen
ded curves
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-4)
SW-
RSA-
Decrypti
on-
Primitive
SW-
RSA-
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
CPT-
RSA-
Decrypti
on-
Primitive
CPT-
RSA-
Signatur
e-
Primitive
SW-
KTS-
IFC-
Decap
(KTS)
SW-
KAS-
ECC
(KAS)
CPT-
KAS-
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 108 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
SW-
KDF-
ANS-
9.63
SW-
KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAS-
ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
TWOST
EP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
CPT-
ECDH-
NON-
NIST
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigGen-
NON-
NIST
Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY)
Triple-DES or AES
general purpose keys.
AES:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits;
Triple-
DES:192-
bits -
AES:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits;
Triple-
DES:112-
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
ECB-
DEC
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 109 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
CPT-
AES-
CTR-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CTR-
DEC
LEGACY
-CPT-
TDES-
ECB
CPT-
TDES-
CBC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
GMAC
CPT-
AES-
CMAC
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
CMAC
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 110 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
LEGACY
-SW-
TDES-
KW
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-
AES-
GMAC
Partition User
General Purpose
Symmetric Session
Key (PUGPSSK)
Triple-DES or AES
general purpose keys.
AES:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits;
Triple-
DES:192-
bits -
AES:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits;
Triple-
DES:112-
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Wrap
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Enc
SW-
AES-
GCM-
Dec
SW-
AES-
GMAC
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
CPT-
AES-
CBC-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CCM-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
CMAC
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 111 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
SW-
AES-
CMAC
CPT-
AES-
CTR-
ENC
CPT-
AES-
CTR-
DEC
CPT-
AES-
GMAC
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
CPT-
TDES-
CBC
LEGACY
-CPT-
TDES-
ECB
Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY)
HMAC general
purpose keys
(minimum key size of
112 bits).
112-bits -
6400-bits
- 112-bits
- 256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA-1
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
SW-
HMAC-
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 112 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
SHA2-
512
Partition User
General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK)
HMAC general
purpose keys
(minimum key size of
112 bits).
112-bits -
6400-bits
- 112-bits
- 256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA-1
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
CPT-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
SW-
HMAC-
SHA-1
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
SW-
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key
Private EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPRV
ECC)
Used for key
agreement as part of
TLS-1.2 handshake
protocol.
256-bits -
512-bits -
128-bits -
256-bits
Private -
CSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
CPT-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key
Public EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPUB
ECC)
Used for key
agreement as part of
TLS-1.2 handshake
protocol.
256-bits -
512-bits -
128-bits -
256-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
Partition User TLS
E2E Client
Authentication
Certificate
(PUTLSE2ECACT)
RSA or EC certificate
presented by client
during E2E/TLS
handshake to allow
E2E/ TLS client
authentication.
RSA:2048
-,3072-
bits;
EC:256-,
384-bits -
RSA:112-
bits - 150-
bits;
EC:128-
bits - 256-
bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition User TLS
E2E Ephemeral Key
Public EC
(PUTLSE2EEKPUB
ECC)
Used for key
agreement as part of
TLS-1.2handshake
protocol.
256-bits -
512-bits -
128-bits -
256-bits
Public -
PSP
CPT-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 113 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY)
AES 256 key used for
encrypting TLS
sessions.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
CPT-
AES-
GCM-
ENC
Partition TLS E2E
Pre Master Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS)
pre-master secret,
used to derive master
secret.
256-bits -
521-bits -
128-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CPT-KAS-
ECC-SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
Partition TLS E2E
Master Secret Key
(PXTLSE2EMSKY)
TLS master secret of
size 384-bit used to
derive session keys
384-bits -
128-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-TLS
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key
Public RSA
(HVFUVKYPUBRSA
)
RSA 2048-bit public
key used to
authenticate new FW
images uploaded into
the module. The FW
image is signed by the
manufacturer using an
RSA private key and
the signature is
verified before
upgrading to the new
image using the public
key
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key
Public ECC
(HVFUVKYPUBEC
C)
ECDSA 521-bit public
key used to
authenticate new FW
images uploaded into
the module. The FW
image is signed by the
manufacturer using an
ECDSA private key
and the signature is
verified before
upgrading to the new
image using the public
key
521-bits -
256-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA)
RSA 4096-bit public
key certificate used to
issue FMAC
certificates.
4096-bits
- 150-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer
Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA)
RSA 4096-bit public
key certificate of
FMAK used to identify
the HSM FIPS
operating mode.
4096-bits
- 150-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC)
ECC P521 public key
certificate used to
issue FMAEC
certificates.
521-bits -
256-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer
Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC)
ECC P521 public key
certificate of FMAEK
used to identify the
HSM FIPS operating
mode.
521-bits -
256-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 114 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement
Certificate ECC
(HMEDCTECC)
ECC P256 public key
certificate of HSMEK
used to identify the
each HSM
independently
256-bits -
128-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT)
RSA 2048-bit public
key certificate used as
trust anchor of MCO.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
FIPS Partition HSM
Owner
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA)
RSA 2048-bit public
key certificate of
FMAK used to identify
the HSM owner
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition
Authentication
Certificate
(PXPACT)
RSA 2048-bit public
key certificate of PAK
used to identify the
partition.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Owner
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POOTACT)
RSA 2048-bit public
key certificate used as
trust anchor of PCO.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT)
RSA 2048-bit public
key certificate of PAK
used to identify the
partition owner.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXCLEKPUB)
ECC 521-bit
ephemeral public key
used in SP 800-56Ar3
C (2,0, ECC DH) key
agreement - bilateral -
confirmation key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z.
ECC:521-
bits -
ECC:256-
bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
KAS-
IFC-
OneStep
(SP800-
56Br2)
HSM Owner
Attestation Key
Public
(HOOATKYPUB)
Adapter Owner
Attestation Public key
(AOAPubK)
RSA:2048
-bits -
4096-bits;
EC:224-
bits - 521-
bits -
RSA:112-
bits - 150-
bits;
EC:112-
bits - 256-
bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
Partition User
Cloning Ephemeral
ECC 521-bit or RSA
2048- bit ephemeral
public key used in SP
ECC:521-
bits;
RSA:2048
Public -
PSP
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 115 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB)
800-56Br2 KAS2 -
bilateral - confirmation
key agreement to
generate shared
secret Z.
-bits -
ECC:256-
bits;
RSA:112-
bits
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
Partition Password
Encryption Key
Shared Secret
(PXPESZ)
Shared secret Z for
SP 800- 56Ar3 C (2,0,
ECC DH) or SP 800-
56Br2. KAS2 -bilateral
-confirmation scheme
256-bits -
256-bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SW-KAS-
IFC-SSC
SW-
KDF-
SP800-
108
Partition User
Password
Encryption Key
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PUPEEKPUB)
RSA 2048-bit public
key loaded by the
host used for SP 800-
56Br2 key agreement
to generate
PswdEncKey.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
Partition User Two-
Factor
Authentication Key
Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA
)
RSA 2048-bit public
key used to verify
signature on
encrypted passwords
during user creation
and login and/or to
verify signatures on
MofN authentication
tokens.
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition User
General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB)
RSA/ECDSA/ECDHg
eneral purpose public
keys.
RSA:2048
-bits,
3072-bits,
4096-bits;
ECDSA:2
24-bits,
256-bits,
384-bits,
521-bits; -
RSA:112-
bits, 128-
bits, 150-
bits;
ECDSA:1
12-bits,
128-bits,
192-bits,
256-bits;
Public -
PSP
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
SW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
SW-
KDF-
ANS-
9.63
KAS-
ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 116 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
TWOST
EP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
SW-
KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
Partition User
General Purpose
Session Key Public
(PUGPSKYPUB)
RSA/ECDSA/ECDH/
ML-DSA/ML-KEM
general purpose
public keys.
RSA:2048
-bits,
3072-bits,
4096-bits;
ECDSA:2
24-bits,
256-bits,
384-bits,
521-bits;
ML-DSA
security
level:2, 3,
5; ML-
KEM
security
level:1, 3,
5; -
RSA:112-
bits, 128-
bits, 150-
bits;
ECDSA:1
12-bits,
128-bits,
192-bits,
256-bits;
ML-
DSA:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits; ML-
KEM:128-
bits, 192-
bits, 256-
bits;
Public -
CSP
FW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
FW-RSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5)
SW-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-4)
CPT-
ECDSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
FW-KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
SW-
KDF-
ANS-
9.63
KAS-
ANS-
9.63
(Sp800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
HKDF
(SP800-
56Ar3)
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 117 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
KAS-
KDA-
ONESTE
P
(SP800-
56Ar3)
KAS-
KDA-
TWOST
EP
(SP800-
56Ar3)
SW-
KTS-
IFC-
Encap
(KTS)
HSM Vendor
License Key Public
RSA
(HVLICKYPUBRSA)
RSA 2048-bit public
key used to verify
signature on license
file uploaded by MCO
user
2048-bits
- 112-bits
Public -
PSP
Other (Pre-
loaded)
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Owner
Client Authentication
Trust Anchor
Certificate
(POCAUTACT)
Public key certificate
used as trust anchor
of PCO for
e2eauthentication
RSA:2048
-bits to
4096-bits;
ECC: 256-
bitsto 521-
bits - 112-
bits to
256-bits
Public -
PSP
SW-
RSA-
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXWEKPRV)
ECC 224-bit to 521-bit
ephemeral private key
used in SP 800-56Ar3
KAS-ECC-SSC key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z in
CN_WRAP_KEY and
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
operations.
224-bits -
521-bits -
112-bits -
256-bits
private -
CSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
SW-
KAS-
ECC-
SSC-
Sp800-
56Ar3
Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXWEKPUB)
ECC 224-bit to 521-bit
ephemeral public key
used in SP 800-56Ar3
KAS-ECC-SSC key
agreement to
generate shared
secret Z in
CN_WRAP_KEY and
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
operations.
224-bits -
521-bits -
112-bits -
256-bits
public -
PSP
SW-
ECDSA-
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4)
Partition User Wrap
Unwrap Ephemeral
Key Public
(PUWUEKPUB)
ECC 224-bit to 521-bit
ephemeral public key
provided by the
user/peer for SP 800-
56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC
key agreement to
generate shared
secret Z in
CN_WRAP_KEY and
224-bits -
521-bits -
112-bits -
256-bits
public -
PSP
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 118 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establish
ed By
Used
By
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
operations.
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUEEK)
Derived key using
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ)
256 bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-KDA-
HKDF-
Sp800-
56Cr1
SW-KDF-
ANS-9.63
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Partition Wrap
Unwrap
Intermediate
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUIEK)
Generated Ephemeral
AES temp key for
RSA AES Mechanism
256 bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SW-
KeyGen
CPT-
KeyGen
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Wrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KWP-
Unwrap
(KTS)
SW-
AES-
KW-
Unwrap
(KTS)
Table 23: SSP Table 1
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Entropy
Source
(FOHXDRBGENST)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Derives
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Derives
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition DRBG Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):Derives
Partition DRBG Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):Derives
Partition DRBG CTR V State
(PXDRBGCTVST):Derives
Partition DRBG CTR Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST):Derives
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Used with
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG
Entropy Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):Derived
from
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 119 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
FIPS Octeon HSM
DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition DRBG Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):Derives
Partition DRBG Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):Derives
Partition DRBG CTR V State
(PXDRBGCTVST):Derives
Partition DRBG CTR Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST):Derives
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Used with
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG
Entropy Source
(FOHXDRBGENST):Derived
from
Partition DRBG CTR
V State
(PXDRBGCTVST)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Derived from
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Derived from
Partition DRBG CTR Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST):Used with
Partition DRBG CTR
Key State
(PXDRBGCTKST)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Derived from
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Derived from
Partition DRBG CTR V State
(PXDRBGCTVST):Used with
Partition DRBG Hash
V State
(PXDRBGHAVST)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Used with
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Used with
Partition DRBG Hash C State
(PXDRBGHACST):Used with
Partition DRBG Hash
C State
(PXDRBGHACST)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Seed
(FOHXDRBGSD):Used with
FIPS Octeon HSM DRBG Nonce
(FOHXDRBGNON):Used with
Partition DRBG Hash V State
(PXDRBGHAVST):Used with
HSM Manufacturer
Hardware Unique 2
Key (HMHU2KY)
NOR:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVRSA):Wraps
FIPS Partition HSM Vendor Key
Backup Key
(FPHVKBKY):Wraps
HSM Manufacturer Endorsement
Key Private ECC
(HMEDKYPRVECC):Wraps
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVECC):Wraps
HSM Manufacturer Endorsement
Certificate ECC
(HMEDCTECC):Wraps
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 120 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
HSM Master
Encryption Key
(HXMEKY)
MCU:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
MZ
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Wraps
Partition Data Encryption Key
(PXDEKY):Wraps
Partition Master
Encryption Key
(PXMEKY)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
E
HSM Master Encryption Key
(HXMEKY):Wrapped By
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Key Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
HMAC Key (PUGPMKY):Wraps
Partition User Login Password
Data (PULPDA):Wraps
Partition Password Encryption
Key (PXPEKY):Wraps
Partition Key Loading Key
(PXKLKY):Encrypts
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wraps
Partition Key Backup Key
(PXKBKY):Encrypts
Partition Data
Encryption Key
(PXDEKY)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
or
module
powered
off
PD
E
HSM Master Encryption Key
(HXMEKY):Wrapped By
Partition Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):Wraps
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVRS
A)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
HSM Manufacturer Hardware
Unique 2 Key
(HMHU2KY):Wrapped By
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA):Paired With
HSM Owner Recovery Key
(HOREKY):Wrapped by
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key
Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVEC
C)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
HSM Manufacturer Hardware
Unique 2 Key
(HMHU2KY):Wrapped By
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC):Paired With
HSM Owner Recovery Key
(HOREKY):Wrapped by
HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement Key
Private ECC
(HMEDKYPRVECC)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
HSM Manufacturer Hardware
Unique 2 Key
(HMHU2KY):Wrapped By
Partition
Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA)
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
Partition Data Encryption Key
(PXDEKY):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition Cert Auth Source
Shared Secret
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 121 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Input-
Method
(PXCASSZ):Encrypt
Partition Cert Auth Target
Shared Secret
(PXCATSZ):Decrypt
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PXPACT):Paired
With
Partition Cert Auth
Source Shared Secret
(PXCASSZ)
Shared-
Secret-
Plain-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition Cert Auth Ephemeral
Key (PXCAEK):Derives
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PXPACT):Encrypted
By
Partition Cert Auth
Target Shared Secret
(PXCATSZ)
Shared-
Secret-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition Cert Auth Ephemeral
Key (PXCAEK):Derives
Partition Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):Decrypted
By
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PXPACT):Signature
Verify
Partition Cert Auth
Ephemeral Key
(PXCAEK)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition Cert Auth Source
Shared Secret
(PXCASSZ):Derives
Partition Cert Auth Target
Shared Secret
(PXCATSZ):Derives
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB):Derived From
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Session Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV):Derived From
Partition Wrap Unwrap
Encryption Ephemeral Key
(PXWUEEK):Derives
Partition Password
Encryption Key
(PXPEKY)
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition User Login Password
Data (PULPDA):Encrypts
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition Password Encryption
Key Shared Secret
(PXPESZ):Derived From
Partition User Login
Password Data
(PULPDA)
Passwor
d-Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
E
Partition Password Encryption
Key (PXPEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 122 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Partition Key Loading
Key Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXKLKEKPRV)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Key Loading Key
Shared Secret
(PXKLSZ):Establishes
Partition Key Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Public
(PXKLKEKPUB):Paired With
Partition Key Loading
Key Ephemeral Key
Public
(PXKLKEKPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Key Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Private
(PXKLKEKPRV):Paired With
Partition User Key
Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUKLKEKPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Key Loading Key
Shared Secret
(PXKLSZ):Encrypts
Partition Key Loading Key
Shared Secret
(PXKLSZ):Derives
Partition Key Loading
Key Shared Secret
(PXKLSZ)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Key Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Private
(PXKLKEKPRV):Established by
Partition Key Loading Key
(PXKLKY):Derives
Partition User Key Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUKLKEKPUB):Established by
Partition User Key Loading Key
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUKLKEKPUB):Encrypted by
Partition Key Loading
Key (PXKLKY)
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
VZ
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Key Loading Key
Shared Secret
(PXKLSZ):Derived From
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped by
FIPS Partition HSM
Vendor Key Backup
Key (FPHVKBKY)
NOR:Encrypte
d
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
HSM Manufacturer Hardware
Unique 2 Key
(HMHU2KY):Wrapped By
HSM Owner Recovery Key
(HOREKY):Wrapped By
Partition Key Backup Key
(PXKBKY):Derives
HSM Owner
Recovery Key
(HOREKY)
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
MCU:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
MFZ
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVRSA):Wraps
FIPS Partition HSM Vendor Key
Backup Key
(FPHVKBKY):Wraps
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVECC):Wraps
Partition Key Backup
Key (PXKBKY)
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
Zeroized
right
after use
MFZ
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM Vendor Key
Backup Key
(FPHVKBKY):Derived From
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 123 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted by
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wraps
Partition Backup
Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Key Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
HMAC Key (PUGPMKY):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB):Wraps
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wraps
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PXPACT):Wraps
Partition User Two-Factor
Authentication Key Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA):Wraps
Partition Password Encryption
Key (PXPEKY):Wraps
Partition Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):Wraps
Partition Key Loading Key
(PXKLKY):Wraps
Partition Key Backup Key
(PXKBKY):Wrapped by
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY)
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Cloning Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLEEK):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Key Private
(PUGPAKYPRV):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Symmetric Key
(PUGPSKY):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
HMAC Key (PUGPMKY):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
HMAC Session Key
(PUGPMSK):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Session Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV):Wraps
Partition User General Purpose
Symmetric Session Key
(PUGPSSK):Wraps
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 124 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXCLEKPRV)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Cloning Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ):Establish
Partition Cloning Ephemeral Key
Public (PXCLEKPUB):Paired
With
Partition Cloning
Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Cloning Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLEEK):Derives
Partition Cloning MAC
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLMEK):Derives
Partition User Cloning
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB):Established By
Partition Cloning Ephemeral Key
Private
(PXCLEKPRV):Established By
Partition Cloning
Encryption Ephemeral
Key (PXCLEEK)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User Cloning
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB):Derived From
Partition Cloning Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ):Derived From
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Encrypts
Partition Cloning MAC
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLMEK)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User Cloning
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB):Derived From
Partition Cloning Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ):Derived From
Partition User General
Purpose Asymmetric
Key Private
(PUGPAKYPRV)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Pad-
Output-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Pad-
Input-
Method
AES-
DDR4:Plaintex
t
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
Zeroized
right
after use
D
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 125 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
GCM-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Partition User General
Purpose Asymmetric
Session Key Private
(PUGPASKPRV)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Pad-
Output-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Pad-
Input-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
D
S
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition User General
Purpose Symmetric
Key (PUGPSKY)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Pad-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
Zeroized
right
after use
D
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 126 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Pad-
Input-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Partition User General
Purpose Symmetric
Session Key
(PUGPSSK)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Pad-
Output-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Pad-
Input-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap-
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
D
S
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 127 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Input-
Method
Partition User General
Purpose HMAC Key
(PUGPMKY)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Pad-
Output-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
Zeroized
right
after use
D
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition User General
Purpose HMAC
Session Key
(PUGPMSK)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
AES-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Wrap-
Output-
Method
AES-
Unwrap-
Input-
Method
AES-
GCM-
Unwrap-
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
D
S
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Input-
Method
Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key
Private EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPRVE
CC)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition TLS E2E Pre Master
Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS):Established
Partition TLS E2E Ephemeral
Key Public EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPUBECC):Paired
With
Partition TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key Public
EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPUBE
CC)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition TLS E2E Ephemeral
Key Private EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPRVECC):Paired
With
Partition TLS E2E Pre Master
Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS):Established
Partition User TLS
E2E Client
Authentication
Certificate
(PUTLSE2ECACT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
E
Partition User TLS
E2E Ephemeral Key
Public EC
(PUTLSE2EEKPUBE
CC)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition TLS E2E Pre Master
Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS):Established
Partition TLS E2E
Symmetric Key
(PXTLSE2EKY)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition TLS E2E Master Secret
Key (PXTLSE2EMSKY):Derived
from
Partition TLS E2E Pre
Master Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition TLS E2E Master Secret
Key (PXTLSE2EMSKY):Derives
Partition TLS E2E Ephemeral
Key Private EC
(PXTLSE2EEKPRVECC):Establi
shed by
Partition User TLS E2E
Ephemeral Key Public EC
(PUTLSE2EEKPUBECC):Establi
shed by
Partition TLS E2E
Master Secret Key
(PXTLSE2EMSKY)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
S
Partition TLS E2E Symmetric
Key (PXTLSE2EKY):Derives
Partition TLS E2E Pre Master
Secret
(PXTLSE2EPMS):Derived From
HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key Public
RSA
(HVFUVKYPUBRSA)
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
HSM Vendor
Firmware Update
Validation Key Public
ECC
(HVFUVKYPUBECC)
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 129 of 149
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate RSA
(HVARCTRSA)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
NOR:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHMMACTRSA)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
NOR:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private RSA
(FPHMMAKYPRVRSA):Paired
With
HSM Vendor
Authentication Root
Certificate ECC
(HVARCTEC)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
NOR:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication
Certificate ECC
(FPHMMACTECC)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
NOR:Plaintext
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Manufacturer Master
Authentication Key Private ECC
(FPHMMAKYPRVECC):Paired
With
HSM Manufacturer
Endorsement
Certificate ECC
(HMEDCTECC)
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
VZ
E
HSM Manufacturer Hardware
Unique 2 Key
(HMHU2KY):Wrapped by
HSM Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(HOOTACT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
MFZ
VZ
E
FIPS Partition HSM
Owner Authentication
Certificate RSA
(FPHOOAUCTRSA)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
MFZ
VZ
E
Partition
Authentication
Certificate (PXPACT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PD
E
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition Cert Auth Source
Shared Secret
(PXCASSZ):Encrypts
Partition Authentication Key
Private RSA
(PXPAKYPRVRSA):Paired With
Partition Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(POOTACT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PFZ
PD
E
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Partition Owner
Authentication
Certificate
(POOAUCT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PFZ
PD
E
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition Cloning
Ephemeral Key Public
(PXCLEKPUB)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Cloning Ephemeral Key
Private (PXCLEKPRV):Paired
With
HSM Owner
Attestation Key Public
(HOOATKYPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
MFZ
VZ
E
Partition User Cloning
Ephemeral Key Public
(PUCLEKPUB)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Cloning Shared Secret
(PXCLSZ):Established by
Partition Cloning Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLEEK):Derives
Partition Cloning MAC
Ephemeral Key
(PXCLMEK):Derives
Partition Password
Encryption Key
Shared Secret
(PXPESZ)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User Password
Encryption Key Ephemeral Key
Public (PUPEEKPUB):Wrapped
By
Partition Password Encryption
Key (PXPEKY):Derives
Partition User
Password Encryption
Key Ephemeral Key
Public (PUPEEKPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Password Encryption
Key Shared Secret
(PXPESZ):Wraps
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Input-
Method
Partition User Two-
Factor Authentication
Key Public RSA
(PU2FAKYPUBRSA)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PZ
E
HSM Master Encryption Key
(HXMEKY):Wrapped By
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped by
Partition User General
Purpose Key Public
(PUGPKYPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
Restore-
Key-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
eMMC:Encrypt
ed
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
D
E
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted By
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
Partition User General
Purpose Session Key
Public
(PUGPSKYPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
on
session
close
D
S
Partition Masking Key
(PXMSKY):Wrapped By
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PXMEKY):Encrypted by
HSM Vendor License
Key Public RSA
(HVLICKYPUBRSA)
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Owner Client
Authentication Trust
Anchor Certificate
(POCAUTACT)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
Backup-
Key-
Output-
Method
Restore-
eMMC:Plaintex
t
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
PFZ
PZ
PD
E
Partition Backup Ephemeral Key
(PXKBEK):Wrapped By
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storag
e
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Key-
Input-
Method
Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key
Private (PXWEKPRV)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Wrap Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ):Establish
Partition Wrap Ephemeral Key
Public (PXWEKPUB):Paired
With
Partition Wrap
Ephemeral Key Public
(PXWEKPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Wrap Ephemeral Key
Private (PXWEKPRV):Paired
With
Partition User Wrap
Unwrap Ephemeral
Key Public
(PUWUEKPUB)
Public-
Key-
Plain-
Input-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Wrap Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ):Derives
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Encryption
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUEEK)
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition Wrap Unwrap Shared
Secret (PXWUSZ):Derived From
Partition Wrap
Unwrap Intermediate
Ephemeral Key
(PXWUIEK)
Key-
Transpor
t-Input-
Method
Key-
Transpor
t-Output-
Method
DDR4:Plaintex
t
Zeroized
right
after use
E
Partition User General Purpose
Asymmetric Key Public
(PUGPAKYPUB):Wrapped By
Table 24: SSP Table 2
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 133 of 149
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9.5 Transitions
This section identifies cryptographic algorithms and key sizes implemented in the module that
are subject to NIST or CMVP transition-related guidance.
SHA-1
Per NIST SP 800-131A, SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation in the Approved
mode of operation. The module implements SHA-1 in the Approved mode for HMAC and
signature verification purposes only, consistent with current NIST/CMVP guidance.
Operators should plan to transition applications relying on SHA-1 to SHA-2 or SHA-3, as NIST
guidance continues to narrow the permitted uses of SHA-1 and it is expected to be fully
disallowed in a future revision of SP 800-131A.
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 186-4 has been superseded by FIPS 186-5. The module implements ECDSA and RSA
signature verification using legacy FIPS 186-4 parameters for the purposes of verification of
existing legacy signatures.
Triple-DES
The module implements Triple-DES (TDEA) for decryption of legacy-encrypted data only. Per
NIST SP 800-131A Revision 2, Triple-DES encryption is disallowed as of December 31, 2023.
TDEA remains Approved only for decryption of previously TDES-encrypted data (legacy use).
Minimum Security Strength: 112-bit to 128-bit Transition (2030)
Per NIST's cryptographic transition guidance, the minimum Approved security strength for
cryptographic algorithms increases from 112 bits to 128 bits effective December 31, 2030. After
this date, algorithms and key sizes providing only 112 bits of security strength will no longer be
Approved for use.
9.6 Additional Information
Definition of Session Keys
The cryptographic module supports the generation/import/export of user keys that are bound to
a session and are termed as session keys. The following points apply to session keys:
• Session keys are stored in RAM and are lost across reboots.
• Session key access is restricted to the application in which it is created.
• PCU can share the session keys with other users so that other sessions can use it.
• Every session in an application will have access to the keys created by every other
session in the same application.
• When a session is closed, the session keys created by that session are destroyed.
• If a session key is shared, then it will be deleted only after closing all the sessions
sharing the key.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 134 of 149
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While the SSPs cannot and are not shared between the approved and non-approved modes,
they are of same size and cryptographic strength in both approved and non-approved
operational modes.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 135 of 149
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
CRC32 firmware
integrity
CRC32 KAT
SW/FW
Integrity
successful
boot
checksum
Firmware Integrity
Test
RSA-2048 SigVer KAT
SW/FW
Integrity
successful
boot
firmware signature
verify
Temperature monitor
test
Temperature
monitor
CF
Critical
Function
successful
boot
Temperature
monitor
Voltage monitor test Voltage monitor CF
Critical
Function
successful
boot
Voltage monitor
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the above pre-operational self-tests. The module performs the pre-
operational Firmware integrity tests (#A1946) RSA 2048-bit SHA2-256 signature verification
every 24 hours and on demand be rebooting the module or by the GP_INFO_DIAGNOSTIC –
CN_INVOKE_FIPS service.
The pre-calculated signature is in the FW to be used for the FW integrity test
The voltage monitoring happens continuously by the module which samples the voltage rails for
every 400 micro-seconds.
The temperature monitoring happens continuously by the module for every 30 seconds.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below
N/A for this module.
The module performs the above Conditional Self-Tests.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 136 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
CRC32 firmware integrity KAT SW/FW Integrity daily automatic
Firmware Integrity Test KAT SW/FW Integrity daily automatic
Temperature monitor test CF Critical Function 30 Seconds automatic
Voltage monitor test CF Critical Function 400 micro Seconds automatic
Table 26: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test
Test
Method
Test
Type
Period
Periodic
Method
FW- AES-CBC (SP 800-38A) Encrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-AES-CBC (SP 800-38A) Decrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
AES-CCM (SP 800-38C) Encrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
AES-CCM (SP 800-38C) Decrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-AES-CMAC (SP 800-38B) Sign KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-AES-CMAC (SP 800-38B) Verify KAT CAST daily automatic
AES-GCM (SP 800-38D) Decrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-AES-GCM (SP 800-38D) Encrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
Hash DRBG (SP 800-90Ar1) KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-KAS-ECC-SSC (SP800-56Ar3) KAT CAST daily automatic
KBKDF (SP800-108) KAT CAST daily automatic
KDF TLS (CVL) (SP 800-135r1) KAT CAST daily automatic
RSA Decryption Primitive (CPT) KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-RSA Signature Primitive (CVL)
(FIPS 186-4)
KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-AES-CBC (SP 800-38A) Decrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-AES-CBC (SP 800-38A) Encrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-AES-CMAC (SP 800-38B) Sign KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-AES-CMAC (SP 800-38B) Verify KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-AES-GCM (SP 800-38D) Encrypt KAT CAST daily automatic
AES-KW (SP 800-38F) Unwrap KAT CAST daily automatic
AES-KW (SP 800-38F) Wrap KAT CAST daily automatic
Counter DRBG (SP 800-90Ar1) KAT CAST daily automatic
ECDSA SigGen KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-ECDSA SigGen KAT CAST daily automatic
ECDSA SigVer KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-ECDSA SigVer KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA-1 (FIPS-198-1) KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA2-256 (FIPS-198-1) KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA2-512 (FIPS-198-1) KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA3- 256(FIPS-202) KAT CAST daily automatic
KAS-ECC (SP800-56Ar3) KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-KAS-ECC-SSC (SP800-56Ar3) KAT CAST daily automatic
KAS-IFC-SSC (SP 800-56Br2) KAT CAST daily automatic
KDA HKDF Sp800-56Cr1 KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT CAST daily automatic
HMAC-SHA3-256 KAT CAST daily automatic
KDA OneStep (SP800-56Cr1) KAT CAST daily automatic
KDA TwoStep (SP800-56Cr1) KAT CAST daily automatic
KDF ANS 9.63 (SP 800-135r1) KAT CAST daily automatic
KDF (SP800-108) CMAC KAT CAST daily automatic
KDF (SP800-108) HMAC KAT CAST daily automatic
KDF TLS (SP 800-135r1) KAT CAST daily automatic
PBKDF (SP 800-132) KAT CAST daily automatic
RSA Decryption Primitive (SW) KAT CAST daily automatic
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 137 of 149
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Algorithm or Test
Test
Method
Test
Type
Period
Periodic
Method
SW-RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-RSA Signature Primitive (CVL)
(FIPS 186-4)
KAT CAST daily automatic
FW-RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT CAST Daily automatic
TDES-KW (SP 800-38F) Unwrap KAT CAST daily automatic
TDES (A7544) Unwrap KAT CAST daily automatic
UBOOT-RSA SigVer KAT
SW/FW
Load
daily automatic
DRBG-Hash Health Tests Health Test CAST daily automatic
DRBG-AES-CTR Health Tests Health Test CAST daily automatic
KTS-IFC KAT CAST daily automatic
SW-ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) PCT PCT
on key generation and
import operation
automatic
FW-ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-5) PCT PCT
on key generation and
import operation
automatic
SW-RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-5) PCT PCT
on key generation and
import operation
automatic
FW-RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-5) PCT PCT
on key generation
andimport operation
automatic
Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition
Count Test (RCT)
RCT CAST on-power automatic
Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive
Proportion Test (APT)
APT CAST on-power automatic
Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition
Count Test (RCT)
RCT CAST on-power automatic
Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive
Proportion Test (APT)
APT CAST on-power automatic
Table 27: Conditional Periodic Information
The module performs above periodic self-test after every 24 hours.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 138 of 149
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10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
FIPS self-test
failure
Module is no longer operational. The
data output is inhibited. Only
Unauthenticated status output is
available.
FIPS self-test
failure
Reboot
Red LED
ON
Hardware RBG
failure
Module is no longer operational. The
data output is inhibited. Only
Unauthenticated status output is
available.
Hardware RBG
failure
Reboot
Blue LED
ON
Pairwise
consistency test
failure
Module is no longer operational. The
data output is inhibited. Only
Unauthenticated status output is
available.
Any pairwise
consistency test
failure
Reboot
Blue LED
ON
Table 28: Error States
On successful completion of the FIPS tests, the DA Green LED remains in the “ON” state.
If any other LED remains in the permanent glow, the card’s is in ERROR state. Any of these
fatal errors will cause the module to reject all future commands received. Resetting the module
is required to recover from the situation.
Bootloader-level self-test failures will reset the board automatically. There is no separate LED
indication for this error.
All these fatal errors are shown on UART when the issue is observed. In addition, the latest
errors are reported on UART on bootup. Because the logs are maintained within the module’s
flash memory, which has no direct access to external users/ applications, they are not
vulnerable to any tampering.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator can command the module to perform the CASTs with the
GP_INFO_DIAGNOSTIC – CN_INVOKE_FIPS service. The operator can also execute self-test
by cycling power or resetting the module. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator
action.
10.6 Additional Information
The module always executes the self-tests without operator intervention regardless of approved
or non-approved mode or any other configuration.
Failure of any of the self-tests causes the module to go into an error state. If the failure happens
during periodic execution of Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTs), then the module will
reject all future commands received.
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 139 of 149
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The module needs to be reset to recover from the situation. Only status output is allowed, and
Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Status output information
does not contain CSPs or sensitive data. The conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests
(CASTs) run periodically. The periodicity is configurable by the MCO and by default runs every
24 hours.
The execution of CASTs causes a momentary (less than a second) service interruption.
• Conditional pair-wise consistency test
o ECDSA/ECDH Pairwise Consistency Test (ECDSA FIPS 186-5 & KAS-ECC-
SSC) are performed at the time of key generation and import.
o RSA Pairwise Consistency Test (RSA FIPS 186-4 & SP 800-56Br2) are
performed at the time of key generation and import.
• Periodic Conditional self-tests
o Module performs periodic self-tests CASTs every 24 hours or as configured by
MCO.
o Temperature monitor test: every 30 Seconds
o Voltage monitor test: every 400 micro seconds
Copyright Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2026 Version 1.2 Page 140 of 149
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Delivery
The LS2 HSMs are shipped directly to the operator using a trusted and trackable carrier. Each
unit box is packaged in a tamper-evident bag. The packaging includes a packing slip listing
product name, unique serial number and part number.
Upon receipt of the LS2 HSM, the customer is required to perform the following verification
steps:
• Confirm that the shipping label accurately reflects the intended recipient’s name and the
correct serial number and part number.
• Inspect the Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) bag in which the HSM is placed in the
shipping container is sealed and has not been tampered with.
• Verify that the external labels match the expected delivery information and the product
details.
• Match the hardware serial number and part number printed on the device with those
listed on the shipping bag label and documentation.
• Verify that there is no evidence of physical tampering on the HSM itself.
Installation
After this is verified, the customer can physically insert the HSM into the PCIe on the host
server.
The host must meet the following requirements:
• Support low-profile PCIe Gen 3/Gen 4 (x4 or x8 slot)
• SR-IOV support enabled.
After the HSM is physically installed, the LS2 driver and utilities that communicate with the HSM
are installed on the host using standard Linux/Operating system tools. The user must be logged
in as the host as root/Administrator to perform the installation.
The HSM owner then completes the following steps to claim ownership of the HSM and enable
the approved mode:
1. Loads the driver (command: insmod ).
2. Invokes Cfm2Master Utility and logs in as default crypto officer (CO) and default
password provided as part of the User Guide and initializes the HSM.
For example:
Command: initHSM -p -sO -fips_state [2 | 3]
As part of initializing the HSM:
• The Master Crypto Officer is created with username/password.
• The fips_state flag is set on the HSM (non-Approved, Approved with single- or dual-
factor authentication, or Approved with dual-factor authentication required).
As a final step, the HSM owner claims the HSM by loading the adapter owner certificates
(AOTAC and AOAC) on the HSM and import the HSM owner fixed backup key (OKBK). These
steps are taken by the MCO using Cfm2MasterUtil.
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Example command syntax:
Command: storeCert -s <cert-type> -f <Adapter Owner Trust Anchor Cert (AOTAC).crt
Command: storeCert -s <cert-type> -f <Adapter Owner Auth Cert (AOAC).crt
Command: storeMCOFixedKey -f <OKBK file>
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The specific tasks that can be performed by users on the HSM are strictly limited by their user
role (see Table 8 for details).
A user of the module can query the module’s device information, operational parameters,
operating mode by invoking the command getHSMInfo from the Cfm2MasterUtil. “FIPS state”
member of the output will indicate the module to be in one of the following modes:
• Approved mode with 1FA (“2”)
• Approved mode with 2FA (“3”)
• Non-Approved mode (“0”)
• Zeroized (“-1”)
Example command syntax:
Command: getHSMInfo
The following compliance-specific conditions are applicable to the HSM module:
• Crypto Officer must maintain control of the module while the zeroization process is
executing.
• There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
• The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
• The module does not support bypass capabilities. The module does not support manual
key entry.
• The module has no CSP feedback to operators.
• The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
• The module does not output intermediate key values part of any operation.
• The module has no CSP feedback to operators. The module does not output
intermediate key values part of any operation.
• The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on power cycle. The module
does not let access SSPs between approved/non-approved and requires zeroization of
the HSM/partition.
• When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access
to any cryptographic services.
• The module is delivered to the users using the following secure distribution mechanism.
• The module is attached with a specific part number and serial number labels. And, kept
in a tamper evident ESD bag with the same labels.
• Then the ESD bags are put inside a shipping box and delivered to customers using any
preferred shipping carriers.
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• Optionally the modules are locked to a given customer using the AOTAC cert during the
manufacturing process and is locked to not run any other commands unless AOAC
loaded as per the steps mentioned above.
HSM Zeroization
The instances of zeroization mentioned below are executed through the utilities.
There are different types of zeroization which can be executed through utilities:
• zeroizeHSM --> example command: Cfm2MasterUtil singlecmd zeroizeHSM.
This zeroizeHSM will delete all the Partition which in turn will zeroize all the partition
CSPs, including cleanup all the temporary SSPs.
o This maps to GP_ZEROIZATION - CN_ZEROIZE service
• zeroizeHSM along with option (-factory_reset) can be used by operator to zeroize all
non-vendor specific CSSPs.
o This maps to GP_ ZEROIZATION - CN_ZEROIZE service with –factory_reset
option
• VENDOR zeroizeHSM can be used to zeroize all SSPs.
To operate a VENDOR zeroizeHSM the operator must log-in as Crypto Officer with its
credentials. Without the credentials of the crypto officer, the vendor zeroize can’t be
executed.
o This maps to GP_ ZEROIZATION - CN_VENDOR_ZEROIZE service
Notes:
• Temporary SSPs (like in this case: session keys and Integrity test values) are forcefully
memset to 0 during session close, application close, partition deletion and zeroization of
the partition or the HSM
• Reboot is a power cycle operation which will lead to the zeroization of temporary SSPs
like session Keys.
• Zeroization of a partition or HSM execution can take a few minutes to complete. The
zeroization request command is blocked until the execution is completed only after
zeroization of required CSPs is completed. User is notified about delay with a notification
log as depicted below. The Operator must remain in control of the module while the
zeroization process is executing.
For example: (the output below is executed through Marvell provided driver utilities):
Cfm2MasterUtil singlecmd zeroizeHSM
Version info, Driver Version: 10.02.11.01, SDK API Version: 10.02.11.01
Cfm2AppInitWithExtNonce () returned app id : 000e0000
Cfm2OpenSession2() returned 0x00 : HSM Return: SUCCESS
Command: zeroizeHSM
Successful zeroization of HSM will reboot the HSM and
Host-HSM handshake will be re-done.
Please wait, this may take few minutes.
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Cfm2ZeroizeHSM returned: 0x00 : HSM Return: SUCCESS
Current FIPS mode is: ffffffff
Note: Unsigned ffffffff indicates zeroized, which is –1.
• DRBG context : On zeroizeHSM command DRBG related contexts are reset. This
means that the internal state of the context with respect to DRBG become unusable.
• In case the power is lost unexpectedly and if the TDES keys are permanent keys, then
the module can continue to use the TDES keys for encryption after the module restart as
well, until the encryption limit is reached.
• On a routine basis, the MCO can verify that the HSM is correctly operating in approved
mode by providing MCO credentials and invoking the command “fipsTest” from the
Cfm2MasterUtil utility. The fipsTest utility invokes GP_INFO_DIAGNOSTIC -
CN_INVOKE_FIPS service to perform the CAST.
Example command syntax:
Command: fipsTest
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A
11.4 Design and Rules
Rules of Operation
1. The Module provides three distinct operator roles: Crypto User, Audit User and Cryptographic
Officer.
2. The Module provides role-based/identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle (Level 2-4).
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an
authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or
resetting the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, sw/fw loading and error
states.
8. Cryptographic operations are inhibited in all error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
10. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
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11. The Module does support concurrent operators.
12. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
13. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
14. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output
of data.
15. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs
17. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
18. The Module does not provide bypass services for ports/interfaces.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
N/A
11.6 End of Life
Sanitization of the module is achieved through factory-reset which is a zeroization command for
the module. Zeroization of a partition or HSM execution can take a few minutes to complete.
The zeroization request command is blocked until the execution is completed only after
zeroization of required CSPs is completed. The operator is notified about a delay with a
notification log as depicted below. The operator must remain in control of the module while the
zeroization process is executing.
For example: (the output below is executed through Marvell provided driver utilities):
Version info, Driver Version: 10.23.06.01, SDK API Version: 10.23.06.01
Cfm2AppInitWithExtNonce () returned app id : 0076c000
Cfm2OpenSession2() returned 0x00 : HSM Return: SUCCESS
Cfm2LoginHSM returned: 0x00 : HSM Return: SUCCESS
Command: zeroizeHSM -vendor
###Warning: Zeroizes HSM including vendor configuration. This operation cannot be reversed and HSM
may not be recovered.
Do you want to continue [y/Y or n/N]
Successful zeroization of HSM will reboot the HSM and
Host-HSM handshake will be re-done.
Please wait, this may take few minutes.
Cfm2VendorZeroizeHSM returned: 0x00 : HSM Return: SUCCESS
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The Sanitization can also be done with the button zeroize by pressing the button for 3 seconds.
Once the zeroization is performed, it is recommended to put 8 drills across the module for
Shredding.
More specific details can be provided on the need basis.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A - No mitigation of other attacks is implemented by the module.
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References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 29 References
Abbreviation
*
Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December
2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, September 2, 2025
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108rev1, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), February 2024
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133rev2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[186-5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 3, 2023.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005
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Abbreviation
*
Full Specification Name
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special Publication
800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D,
November 2007
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019
[56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
Table 30 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym* Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptative Proportion Test
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Cryptographic Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
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Acronym* Definition
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Derivation Function
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ESV Entropy Source Validation
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
KAS Key Agreement Schema
KAT Know Answer Test
KTS Key Transport Schema
KW AES Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
PCT Pairwise consistency test
RNG Random Number Generator
RCT Repetition Count Test
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TDES Triple-DES