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NTT DATA Group Corporation
Cryptographic Library for OpenSSL powered by NTT DATA
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview...................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................15
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................16
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................17
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................18
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................18
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................18
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................18
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................18
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................19
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................19
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................19
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................25
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................25
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................25
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................25
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................26
5.3 Open-Source Parameters................................................................................................26
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................26
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................26
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................26
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................26
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................27
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................27
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................27
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................27
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9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................27
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................28
9.6 Additional Information......................................................................................................33
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................33
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................33
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................34
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................37
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................38
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................38
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................38
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................41
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................42
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................42
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................42
12.1 Attack List......................................................................................................................42
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 7
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 7
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................11
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................15
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................18
Table 8: Roles...........................................................................................................................19
Table 9: Approved Services ......................................................................................................24
Table 10: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................27
Table 11: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................27
Table 12: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................27
Table 13: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................31
Table 14: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................33
Table 15: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................34
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................36
Table 17: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................37
Table 18: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................38
Table 19: Error States...............................................................................................................38
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 6
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document explains the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the "Cryptographic
Library for OpenSSL powered by NTT DATA" (hereinafter referred to as "the cryptographic
module") version 1.0.
This document describes the security rules that derive from the requirements of the FIPS 140-
3 standard and specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module operates.
This non-proprietary security policy may only be reproduced and distributed perfectly in its
entirety, including this notice. All other documents are the property of their respective authors.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic software library that
provides cryptographic services executed in a cryptographically protected region in Intel SGX
memory to applications operating outside the Intel SGX environment through a C language
application programming interface (API).
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
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Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic module is based on the OSS cryptographic products "Crypto API Toolkit"
and "OpenSSL," which provide PKCS#11 functionality for Intel SGX.
The cryptographic boundary of the cryptographic module consists of a part corresponding to the
OpenSSL FIPS Provider, which is implemented using the provider architecture adopted from
OpenSSL version 3, and a module that verifies the operation of cryptographic processing within
the FIPS140-3 certification scope implemented in said part corresponding to OpenSSL FIPS
Provider. The combination of these two components constitutes the FIPS 140-3 certification
scope (crypto boundary) of the cryptographic module.
The "Crypto API Toolkit" incorporates the part corresponding to OpenSSL FIPS Provider and
the module that verifies the operation of cryptographic processing within the scope of FIPS140-
3 certification, which together constitute this cryptographic boundary.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary and operating environment of the cryptographic
module, as well as the flow of information between the cryptographic module and the application
(shown by arrows).
Figure 1: Block Diagram
"Part corresponding to OpenSSL FIPS Provider" in Figure 1 consists of the object file
"libsgx_tsgxssl_fipsprov.o" that implements cryptographic functionality within the FIPS 140-3
certification scope and the source file "fips_hash.c" that stores the HMAC values used for
integrity tests.
Crypto API Toolkit(Shared Library “libp11SgxEnclave.signed.so”)
OpenSSL libcrypto(Static Library)
Part corresponding to
OpenSSL FIPS Provider
fips_hash.c
Trusted area
FIPS140-3 certification Scope
(Cryptographic Boundary)
examEnclave.o
(Object file，For
execution in trusted
area)
exam_hash.c
exam_program_enclave
libsgx_tsg
xssl_fipsp
rov.o
RAM
OS
HW(Intel CPU) RDRAND
Non-trusted area
exam_program_app
(Application，For
execution in the
non-trusted area)
RDRAND itself is
outside the scope of
FIPS140-3 certification
data and control input
data and status output
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"exam_program_enclave" section in Figure 1 is composed of the object file "examEnclave.o,"
which is provided with functionality to verify cryptographic operations, and the source file
"exam_hash.c," which stores the HMAC values used for integrity tests.
“Part corresponding to OpenSSL FIPS Provider” and "exam_program_enclave" will eventually
be incorporated into the Crypto API Toolkit's shared library ”libp11SgxEnclave.signed.so”.
In addition, Figure 1 also shows that the cryptographic module receives a LOAD command
containing entropy obtained from an entropy source (an Intel CPU processor with the RDRAND
instruction). However, since the RDRAND instruction itself is outside the scope of development,
it is excluded from the FIPS 140-3 certification scope. For more information about the entropy
generated by the RDRAND instruction, see "2.8 RBG and Entropy."
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/
Firmware Version
Features Integrity Test
libp11SgxEnclave.signed.so 1.0 N/A HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
MIRACLE Linux
8.8 (64bit)
FR2100TX
model 700
Xeon W-1270TE
(2.0GHz)
No N/A 1.0
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
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2.3 Excluded Components
No components are exempt from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Automatically input whenever an
approved service is requested
Approved Equivalent to the indicator of
the requested service
Table 4: Modes List and Description
If the cryptographic algorithms of the integrity tests and CASTs performed when the
cryptographic module is loaded are successful, the cryptographic module automatically enters
Approved mode, and cryptographic services using cryptographic algorithms become available
via the logical interface. Conversely, when a cryptographic module is unloaded, all
cryptographic services are no longer available.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
Cryptographic services are only available in Approved mode. The status indicators for the
mode of operation are the same as those for the requested service.
Degraded Mode Description:
This cryptographic module does not implement Degraded mode.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A6710 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CFB1 A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CMAC A6710 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-OFB A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A6710 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG A6710 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA2-512/256
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA2-512/256
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen A6710 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen A6710 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - No
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer A6710 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - No
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A6710 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA2-512/256, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC DRBG A6710 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA2-512/256, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A6710 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC CDH-
Component SP800-
56Ar3 (CVL)
A6710 Function - Full Public Key Validation, Key
Pair Generation, Partial Public Key
Validation
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6710 Domain Parameter Generation Methods -
P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KTS-IFC A6710 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Key Generation Mode -
probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6710 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6710 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-128 A6710 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 FIPS 202
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHAKE-256 A6710 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 FIPS 202
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The cryptographic module does not implement vendor-affirmed cryptographic algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The cryptographic module does not implement non-approved cryptographic algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode
of operation with no security claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The cryptographic module does not implement non-approved cryptographic algorithms without
security claims.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric
Encryption with
AES
BC-UnAuth Symmetric
encryption using
AES
AES-
CBC:128:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB1:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-
CFB128:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB8:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CBC:
(A6710)
AES-CFB1:
(A6710)
AES-CFB128:
(A6710)
AES-CFB8:
(A6710)
AES-CTR:
(A6710)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-CTR:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-OFB:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:128,
256 bits
AES-OFB:
(A6710)
AES-XTS
Testing Revision
2.0: (A6710)
Symmetric
Decryption with
AES
BC-UnAuth Symmetric
decryption using
AES
AES-CBC:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB1:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-
CFB128:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB8:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CTR:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-OFB:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:128,
256 bits
AES-CBC:
(A6710)
AES-CFB1:
(A6710)
AES-CFB128:
(A6710)
AES-CFB8:
(A6710)
AES-CTR:
(A6710)
AES-OFB:
(A6710)
AES-XTS
Testing Revision
2.0: (A6710)
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG Random
Number
Generation (IG
D.R compliant)
Counter
DRBG:128, 192,
256 bits
HMAC
DRBG:128, 256
bits
Hash DRBG:128,
256 bits
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
HMAC DRBG:
(A6710)
Hash DRBG:
(A6710)
Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):P-
256, P-384, P521
(128, 192, 256
bits)
EDDSA SigGen
:(FIPS186-5):
ED448, ED25519
(128, 256 bits)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-
5):2048, 3072,
4096 bits (112,
128, 140 bits)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
EDDSA SigGen:
(A6710)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):P-
256, P-384, P521
(128, 192, 256
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
EDDSA SigVer:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
bits)
EDDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-
5):ED448,
ED25519 (128,
256 bits)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-
5):2048, 3072,
4096 bits (112,
128, 140 bits)
(A6710)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
Message
Authentication
Code
MAC Message
Authentication
Code
HMAC
hashes:SHA2-
256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512,
SHA2-512/256,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
AES key:128,
192, 256 bits
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6710)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6710)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6710)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256:
(A6710)
HMAC-SHA3-
256: (A6710)
HMAC-SHA3-
384: (A6710)
HMAC-SHA3-
512: (A6710)
AES-CMAC:
(A6710)
AES-GMAC:
(A6710)
Counter DRBG:
256bit
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
Message digest SHA
XOF
Message digest SHA2-256:
(A6710)
SHA2-384:
(A6710)
SHA2-512:
(A6710)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6710)
SHA3-256:
(A6710)
SHA3-384:
(A6710)
SHA3-512:
(A6710)
SHAKE-128:
(A6710)
Page 14 of 46
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHAKE-256:
(A6710)
Authenticated
Symmetric
Encryption
BC-Auth Authenticated
Symmetric
Encryption
Key:128, 192,
256 bits
AES-CCM:
(A6710)
AES-GCM:
(A6710)
Counter DRBG:
256bit
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
Authenticated
Symmetric
Decryption
BC-Auth Authenticated
Symmetric
Decryption
Key:128, 192,
256 bits
AES-CCM:
(A6710)
AES-GCM:
(A6710)
Key Pair
Generation with
ECDSA
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation for
ECDSA
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):P-
256, P-384, P521
(128, 192, 256
bits)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
Counter DRBG:
256bit
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
Key Pair
Generation with
EDDSA
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation for
EDDSA
EDDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5):ED448,
ED25519(128,
256 bits)
EDDSA
KeyGen:
(A6710)
Counter DRBG:
256bit
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
Key Pair
Generation with
RSA
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation for
RSA
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5):2048, 3072,
4096 bits (112,
128, 140 bits)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6710)
Counter DRBG:
256bit
Counter DRBG:
(A6710)
KAS-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
with ECDH
KAS-SSC Shared Secret
Computation
using EC Diffie-
Hellman
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(1)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6710)
KAS-ECC CDH-
Component
SP800-56Ar3:
(A6710)
Key transport AsymKeyPair-
Decap
AsymKeyPair-
Encap
Key transport KTS-IFC KTS-
OAEP-basic SP
800-56B
Rev.2:2048,
3072, 4096 bits
(112, 128, 140
bits)
KTS-IFC:
(A6710)
Page 15 of 46
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key Generation
Methods:rsakpg1-
crt
KAS
Role:initiator,
responder
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
SHA-3:
The cryptographic module implements the SHA-3 algorithm both as a stand-alone and as
part of a high-level algorithm (compliant with FIPS 140-3 IG C.C). As explained in "2.6
Security Function Implementations," cryptographic algorithms that use SHA-3 include RSA
signature generation and verification, ECDSA signature generation and verification, and
HMAC. Furthermore, implementation of the expandible output functions SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 has been verified to work standalone.
RSA sigGen, sigVer:
The module implements the approved RSA modulus sizes of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for
signature generation. For signature verification, the module implements the approved RSA
modulus size of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. These RSA modulus sizes comply with FIPS 140-
3 IG C.F and have been tested by CAVP.
EdDSA:
The cryptographic module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.K as follows.
 Key pair generation, signature generation, and signature verification have been
tested and verified with the elliptic curves ED448 and ED25519 that can be used by
CAVP tests.
 ED448 signature generation and signature verification generates SHAKE256 hash
value of the message to be signed, and ED25519 signature generation and
signature verification generates SHA2-512 hash value of the message to be signed.
Key Agreement:
The cryptographic module implements the following approved key agreement methods,
which have been tested and verified by CAVP.
 KAS-ECC-SSC per SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (FIPS 140-3 IG D.F Scenario 2, path 1)
 KAS ECC CDH-Component that is only used internally within the context of a SP
800-56Arev3 KAS as required in FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.B.
The module has obtained the key agreement assurance required by FIPS 140-3 IG D.F.
 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 in accordance with Section 5.6.2 (Section 5.6.2.1.2, 5.6.2.1.4,
5.6.2.3.3, 5.6.2.3.4 are applicable).
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS).
However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality
to be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS.
Page 16 of 46
Key Transport:
The cryptographic module implements the following key distribution method, which has been
tested and verified by CAVP.
 KTS-OAEP-basic with modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits, with rsakpg1-crt as
the RSA key generation method (key confirmation is not supported), with both the
encapsulation and un-encapsulation methods supported, and with assurances per
SP 800-56B Rev.2 Section 6.4.1.2.3. (FIPS 140-3 IG D.G)
 The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme
(KTS).
However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an
external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.
AES-GCM:
The cryptographic module provides AES GCM that accepts external IV generated by the
operator using approved DRBG. The IV generation with approved DRBG must be provided as
an API of the cryptographic module, but the length of the IV must always be 96 bits or higher
to comply with Scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.
AES XTS:
According to SP 800-38E, the AES-XTS algorithm is used to ensure confidentiality on
storage devices. The module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.I in the following ways:
 By following instruction in Section 11.2, Key_1 and Key_2 are separately generated
according to the rules for component symmetric keys in SP 800-133 Rev.2, Section
6.3.
 The module explicitly checks that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before processing any data with
the key in the AES-XTS algorithm, and if Key_1 = Key_2, the module returns an
error code.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
In the cryptographic module, entropy and seed material for the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG are
provided by an application that executes an externally called RDRAND instruction (not the
cryptographic module) and is outside the cryptographic boundary of the cryptographic module.
The cryptographic module receives a LOAD command containing entropy obtained from an
entropy source (an Intel CPU processor with the RDRAND instruction).
Note that RDRAND is an instruction that returns a random number from the Intel on-chip
hardware random number generator, which is seeded by an on-chip entropy source. The
generation of SSPs that require random numbers uses random numbers from a DRBG that
complies with SP 800-90 Ar1. The entropy source that is input to the random number generation
of that DRBG must provide at least 112 bits of entropy in order to satisfy the security strength
required for the random number generation mechanism specified in SP 800-90Ar1.
Therefore, the minimum number of bits of entropy requested when the module makes a call to
the DRBG is at least 112 bits.
Page 17 of 46
Per the IG 9.3.A Entropy Caveats, the following caveat applies: No assurance of the minimum
strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys).
The specifications of the DRBG implemented in the cryptographic module are shown below.
Counter DRBG:
Entropy Size：128-384bit
Seed：256, 320, 348 bits
DRBG internal state(V value, Key)：128, 192, 256 bits
Used By：Random Number Generation
AES-GMAC
AES-GCM
ECDSA KeyGen
ECDSA SigGen
EDDSA KeyGen
RSA KeyGen
Hash DRBG:
Entropy Size：128-384bit
Seed：440, 888 bits
DRBG internal state (V value, C value)：440, 888 bits
Used By：Random Number Generation
HMAC DRBG:
Entropy Size：128-384bit
Seed：160, 256, 512 bits
DRBG internal state(V value, Key)：128, 192, 256 bits
Used By：Random Number Generation
2.9 Key Generation
The cryptographic module implements cryptographic key generation that complies with SP
800-133r2. If random values are required, they are obtained from an SP 800-90Ar1-approved
DRBG(Counter DRBG 256bit) that complies with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2.
 RSA key pair generation: Compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS
186-5.
 ECC (ECDH and ECDSA) key pair generation: Compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1,
which maps to FIPS 186-5.
In addition, the cryptographic module implements the following key pair generation methods:
 EDDSA key pair generation: Compliant with RFC8032, Section 5.1.5 (ED25519) and 5.2.5
(ED448), which are mapped to FIPS 186-5.
Page 18 of 46
The generated key pair is output through the application program interface (API) coded in C on
the cryptographic module, but intermediate values are explicitly set to zero after the service
processing, without being output.
2.10 Key Establishment
The cryptographic module provides Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) shared key
generation that complies with SP 800-56Ar3, as per FIPS 140-3 IG D.F. Scenario 2 (1).
For ECDH, three NIST-defined elliptic curves (P-256, P-384, and P-521) are supported,
providing 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit security strengths as approved modes of operation.
To generate an ECDH shared key, it is necessary to generate an ECC key pair as described in
"2.9 Key Generation." The ECC key pair generation uses random values obtained from the 256-
bit Counter DRBG approved by SP 800-90Ar1.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The cryptographic module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG D.C references regarding support for
industry protocols, but does not provide API entry points for schemes compliant with SP 800-
56A Rev. 3 or for use with TLS, nor does it include complete implementation of these industry
protocols. Therefore, it has not been tested against industry protocols by CAVP and CMVP.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters for data
N/A Control Input API function calls
N/A Data Output API output parameters for data
N/A Status Output Status Output API
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces
For the cryptographic module, control of the physical ports is outside the scope of the module.
However, when the cryptographic module is performing self-tests or is in an error state, all
output on the logical data output interface is prohibited, and only error return values are
returned.
The module does not support a “control output” interface.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
Page 19 of 46
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
The cryptographic module does not support authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 8: Roles
This module supports only the Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer role is always implicitly
assumed by the operator of the cryptographic module when performing services.
The cryptographic module does not support simultaneous operation by multiple operators.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Symmetric
Encryption
Symmetri
c
encryptio
n of an
entry
plaintext
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Plaintext,
AES key, IV
Cipherte
xt
Symmetric
Encryption
with AES
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
Symmetric
Decryption
Symmetri
c
decryptio
n of an
entry
ciphertext
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
CipherPlaint
ext, AES
key, IV
Plaintext Symmetric
Decryption
with AES
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
Authenticated
Encryption
Symmetri
c
encryptio
n of an
entry
plaintext,
including
AEAD
modes
(CCM,
GCM)
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Plaintext,
AES key, IV
Cipherte
xt, Tag
Authenticat
ed
Symmetric
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
Authenticated
Decryption
Symmetri
c
decryptio
n of an
entry
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
CipherPlaint
ext, AES
key, IV, Tag
Plaintext Authenticat
ed
Symmetric
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
Page 20 of 46
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ciphertext
,
including
AEAD
modes
(CCM,
GCM)
Message
Authentication
Code
Compute
a MAC
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Message,
AES key or
HMAC key
MAC
output
value.
Message
Authenticat
ion Code
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
- HMAC
Key: W,E
Message Digest Generate
a
message
digest
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Message Messag
e digest
Message
digest
Crypto
Officer
Shared Secret
Computation
Compute
a shared
secret
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
key; EC
private key,
EC public
key
Shared
secret
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n with
ECDH
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Private
key: W,E
- EC
Public
key: W,E
- Shared
Secret:
G,R
- SP800-
56Ar3
domain
paramete
rs: E
Signature
Generation
Generate
a digital
signature
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Message,
private key
Signatur
e
Signature
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
private
key: W,E
- EC
Private
key: W,E
- ED448
or ED
25519
Private
key: W,E
Page 21 of 46
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Signature
Verification
Verify a
digital
signature
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Message,
public key,
signature
Pass/fail
result of
verificati
on
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
public
key: W,E
- EC
Public
key: W,E
- ED448
or ED
25519
Public
key: W,E
Key Pair
Generation with
ECDSA
Generate
an
ECDSA
key pair
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Curve EC key
pair
Key Pair
Generation
with
ECDSA
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Private
key: G,R
- EC
Public
key: G,R
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
G,R,W,Z
Key Pair
Generation with
EDDSA
Generate
an
EDDSA
key pair
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Curve EDDSA
key pair
Key Pair
Generation
with
EDDSA
Crypto
Officer
- ED448
or ED
25519
Private
key: G,R
- ED448
or ED
25519
Public
key: G,R
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
G,R,W,Z
Key Pair
Generation with
RSA
Generate
an RSA
key pair
API
returns
Modulus bits RSA key
pair
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
Page 22 of 46
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
1(FIPS_
OK)
private
key: G,R
- RSA
public
key: G,R
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
G,R,W,Z
RSA Key Pair
Generation for
CAVP
Generate
a RSA
key pair
for CAVP
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Modulus
bits; Public
Exponent;
Prime
Num(p, q, p-
1, p-2, q-1,
q-2)
RSA key
pair
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
private
key: G,R
- RSA
public
key: G,R
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
G,R,W,Z
Key
transport(encryp
tion)
Asymmet
ric
encryptio
n of an
entry
plaintext
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
plaintext,
public key
cipherte
xt
Key
transport
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
public
key: W,E
Key
transport(decryp
tion)
Asymmet
ric
decryptio
n of an
entry
ciphertext
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
ciphertext,
private key
plaintext Key
transport
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
private
key: W,E
Random
Number
Generation
Generate
random
bytes
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Output
length
Random
bytes
Random
Number
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- Entropy
input:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value, C
value):
G,W,E
Page 23 of 46
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value,
Key):
G,W,E
- DRBG
seed:
G,W,E
Random
Number
Generation for
CAVP
Generate
random
bytes for
CAVP
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
Output
length;
entropy_inp
ut; nonce;
personalizati
on;
prediction
resistance f
lag;
additional
input
Random
bytes
Random
Number
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- Entropy
input:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value, C
value):
G,W,E
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value,
Key):
G,W,E
- DRBG
seed:
G,W,E
Show status Show the
current
status of
the
module
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
N/A Module
status
None Crypto
Officer
Show module
name and
version
Show
module
name and
the
version of
the
module
API
returns
1(FIPS_
OK)
N/A Name
and
version
informati
on
None Crypto
Officer
Self-test Perform
CASTs
and
integrity
test
None N/A Pass/fail
result of
self-
tests
None Crypto
Officer
Zeroization Zeroize
SSPs.
None Any SSP N/A None Crypto
Officer
Page 24 of 46
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- AES
key: Z
- HMAC
Key: Z
- RSA
private
key: Z
- RSA
public
key: Z
- EC
Private
key: Z
- EC
Public
key: Z
- ED448
or ED
25519
Private
key: Z
- ED448
or ED
25519
Public
key: Z
- Shared
Secret: Z
- Entropy
input: Z
- DRBG
seed: Z
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value, C
value): Z
- DRBG
internal
state (V
value,
Key): Z
- SP800-
56Ar3
domain
paramete
rs: Z
Table 9: Approved Services
Page 25 of 46
The cryptographic module provides services to operators who bear the available roles. All
services are detailed in the API documents (manual pages). When specifying the type of access
that a service has for each SSP, the following rules apply.
 Generate (G): The cryptographic module generates an SSP.
 Read (R): The SSP is read from the cryptographic module (Example: output to a higher-
level application).
 Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the cryptographic module.
 Execute (E): The cryptographic module uses the SSP when performing cryptographic
operations.
 Zeroize (Z): The cryptographic module sets the SSP to zero.
 N/A: The cryptographic module does not access the SSP during operation.
To interact with the cryptographic module, the calling application must use the APIs provided
by this cryptographic module (APIs beginning with "exam_"). Within these APIs, services are
used via the OpenSSL EVP API layer. In addition, approved service indicators can be obtained
using the API provided by the cryptographic module.
Furthermore, the cryptographic module provides an API to obtain the current status, name, and
version.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
N/A for this module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
As a measure to ensure software security in the cryptographic module, the integrity of the
modules belonging to the two cryptographic boundaries indicated in Figure 1 in 2.1 Description
is checked (integrity test) when execution starts.
Specifically, first, the HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated from "libsgx_tsgxssl_fipsprov.o",
which corresponds to the part of OpenSSL FIPS Provider indicated in Figure 1, is compared
with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored in "fips_hash.c" (the former is calculated at runtime, and
the latter is calculated at build time).
Next, the HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated from "examEnclave.o" in
"exam_program_enclave" in Figure 1 is compared with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored in
"exam_hash.c" (the former is calculated at runtime, and the latter is calculated at build time).
Page 26 of 46
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The integrity check (integrity test) described in "5.1 Integrity Techniques" is executed as part of
the pre-operation self-test performed within the cryptographic module load API
(exam_start_fips) that is provided by the cryptographic module. If necessary, should you want to
perform this integrity check again, execute the cryptographic module unload API
(exam_end_fips) once, and then execute the cryptographic module load API (exam_start_fips)
again.
5.3 Open-Source Parameters
To build the cryptographic module, the compiler gcc version 8.5 is necessary.
There are no specific control parameters required to build the cryptographic module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
No operating environment restrictions are required for operation in Approved mode. All the
conditions for the module to operate in Approved mode are stated in "2.4 Modes of Operation."
How Requirements are Satisfied:
All SSPs contained within the cryptographic module are protected by process isolation and
memory isolation mechanisms, and the cryptographic module has sole control over these SSPs.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The cryptographic module must be installed as described in "11.1 Installation, Initialization, and
Startup Procedures." When properly installed, an operating system provides process isolation
and memory protection mechanisms that ensure that memory access is properly separated
between processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data, and
uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. Instrumentation tools like gdb
and strace, frameworks like ftrace and systemtap provided by Linux, and other tracing
mechanisms should not be used in a production environment (as the use of these tools results
in the cryptographic module being run in a production environment that has not been validated).
7 Physical Security
N/A for this module.
Since the cryptographic module consists only of software, this section is not applicable.
Page 27 of 46
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
The cryptographic module does not require non-invasive security techniques.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Random access memory Dynamic
Table 10: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
API input
parameters
Operator
calling
application
RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
API output
parameters
RAM Operator
calling
application
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 11: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Cleanse Caller invocation of
OPENSSL_cleanse.
Overwrites with
zeros
Caller invocation of
OPENSSL_cleanse
Teardown Module unload - invokes
cleanse internally.
Overwrites with
zeros
Caller invocation of
OPENSSL_cleanse
Table 12: SSP Zeroization Methods
Of the SSP/keys generated within the cryptographic module, those temporarily stored within
the cryptographic module are zeroized (overwritten with 0) when they become unnecessary.
Specifically, the zeroization of the SSP is performed within the OpenSSL "Free cipher handle"
family of functions that are called within the APIs that perform the services of the cryptographic
module (APIs beginning with "exam_").
Furthermore, since zeroization is performed in the memory, the time required for zeroization is
close to zero seconds, essentially preventing the possibility for the SSP to be compromised.
Page 28 of 46
The SSP provided to the application must be zeroized on the application side. For specific
instructions, see (B) of "11.2 Administrator Guidance."
9.4 SSPs
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
AES key AES key
used for
encryption,
decryption,
and
computing
MAC tags
AES-XTS:
256, 512
bits Other
modes:
128, 192,
256 bits -
AES-XTS:
256, 512
bits Other
modes:
128, 192,
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
Symmetric
Encryption
with AES
Symmetric
Decryption
with AES
Authenticate
d Symmetric
Encryption
Authenticate
d Symmetric
Decryption
HMAC Key Compute a
MAC
112 -
524288
bits - 128
- 256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
Message
Authenticati
on Code
RSA
private key
RSA private
key
2048,
3072,
4096 bits
- 112,
128, 140
bits
Private key
- CSP
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Signature
Generation
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Key
transport
RSA public
key
RSA public
key
2048,
3072,
4096 bits
- 112,
128, 140
bits
Public key
- PSP
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Signature
Verification
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
Key
transport
EC Private
key
EC Private
key
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Private key
- CSP
Key Pair
Generation
with
ECDSA
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computati
on with
ECDH
Signature
Generation
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n with
ECDH
EC Public
key
EC Public
key
P-256, P-
384, P-
Public key
- PSP
Key Pair
Generation
Signature
Verification
Page 29 of 46
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
with
ECDSA
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computati
on with
ECDH
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n with
ECDH
ED448 or
ED 25519
Private key
ED448 or
ED25519
Private key
ED448,
ED25519
- 128, 256
bits
Private key
- CSP
Key Pair
Generation
with
EDDSA
Signature
Generation
ED448 or
ED 25519
Public key
ED448 or
ED25519
Public key
ED448,
ED25519
- 128, 256
bits
Public key
- PSP
Key Pair
Generation
with
EDDSA
Signature
Verification
Shared
Secret
Shared
secret
generated
by ECDH
shared
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computati
on with
ECDH
Entropy
input
An entropy
input is a
input data
stream
generated
from
entropy
collected
from
outside the
cryptograph
ic module's
boundary,
and the
entropy
input data
stream is
used to
seed the
DRBG (IG
D.L
compliant)
128 - 384
bits - 128
- 384 bits
Entropy
Input -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG
seed
DRBG seed
derived
from
entropy
Counter
DRBG:
256, 320,
348 bits
Seed -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
Random
Number
Generation
Page 30 of 46
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
input (IG
D.L
compliant)
HMAC
DRBG:
160, 256,
512 bits
Hash
DRBG:
440, 888
bits -
Counter
DRBG:
128, 192,
256 bits
HMAC
DRBG:
128, 192,
256 bits
Hash
DRBG:
128, 256
bits
DRBG
internal
state (V
value, C
value)
Internal
state of the
Hash
DRBG (IG
D.L
compliant)
440, 888
bits - 128,
256 bits
Internal
state -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG
internal
state (V
value,
Key)
Internal
state of the
Counter
DRBG and
HMAC
DRBG (IG
D.L
compliant)
Counter
DRBG:
128, 192,
256 bits
HMAC
DRBG:
256, 384,
512 bits -
Counter
DRBG:
128, 192,
256 bits
HMAC
DRBG:12
8, 192,
256
Internal
state -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
Random
Number
Generation
Intermedia
te Key
Generation
Value
Intermediat
e key pair
generation
value
generated
224-4096
bits - 112,
256bits
Intermedia
te - CSP
Key Pair
Generation
with
ECDSA
Key Pair
Generation
Key Pair
Generation
with
ECDSA
Key Pair
Generation
Page 31 of 46
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
during key
generation
with
EDDSA
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
with
EDDSA
Key Pair
Generation
with RSA
SP800-
56Ar3
domain
parameter
s
SP800-
56Ar3
domain
parameters
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
domain
parameter
s - PSP
KAS-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n with
ECDH
Table 13: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
AES key API input
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse
HMAC Key API input
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse
RSA private
key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse RSA public
key:Paired With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
RSA public
key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse RSA private
key:Paired With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
EC Private
key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse EC Public key:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
SP800-56Ar3 domain
parameters:Generate
d From
Page 32 of 46
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
EC Public
key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse Shared Secret:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
SP800-56Ar3 domain
parameters:Generate
d From
ED448 or
ED 25519
Private key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse ED448 or ED 25519
Public key:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
ED448 or
ED 25519
Public key
API input
parameter
s
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse ED448 or ED 25519
Private key:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated
From
Shared
Secret
API output
parameter
s
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse EC Private
key:Established By
EC Public
key:Established By
Entropy
input
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
generation
until DRBG
seed is
created
Teardown DRBG seed:Derived
From
DRBG seed RAM:Plaintex
t
While the
DRBG is
instantiated
Teardown Entropy input:Derived
From
DRBG internal state
(V value, C
value):Generates
DRBG internal state
(V value,
Key):Generates
DRBG
internal
state (V
value, C
value)
RAM:Plaintex
t
From DRBG
instantiation
until DRBG
termination
Cleanse DRBG
seed:Generated
From
Page 33 of 46
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
DRBG
internal
state (V
value, Key)
RAM:Plaintex
t
From DRBG
instantiation
until DRBG
termination
Cleanse DRBG
seed:Generated
From
Intermediat
e Key
Generation
Value
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until API
return
Cleanse RSA private
key:Generates
RSA public
key:Generates
EC Private
key:Generates
EC Public
key:Generates
ED448 or ED 25519
Private
key:Generates
ED448 or ED 25519
Public key:Generates
SP800-
56Ar3
domain
parameters
RAM:Plaintex
t
From
service
invocation
until
cipherhandl
e is freed
Cleanse EC Private
key:Generates
EC Public
key:Generates
Table 14: SSP Table 2
9.6 Additional Information
The generation of SSPs that require random numbers uses random numbers from a DRBG
that complies with SP 800-90. The entropy source that is input to the random number
generation of that DRBG must provide at least 112 bits of entropy in order to satisfy the security
strength required for the random number generation mechanism specified in SP 800-90Ar1.
RDRAND is an instruction that returns a random number from the Intel on-chip hardware
random number generator, which is seeded by an on-chip entropy source.
In the cryptographic module, entropy and seed material for the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG are
provided by an application that executes an externally called RDRAND instruction (not the
cryptographic module) and is outside the cryptographic boundary of the cryptographic module.
The cryptographic module receives a LOAD command containing entropy obtained from an
entropy source (an Intel CPU processor with the RDRAND instruction).
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Page 34 of 46
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A6710)
256-bits
key
Message
authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Pre-
Operational
Self-Tests
result(1 is
success, 0
is error)
This test is performed on
the two cryptographic
boundaries shown in
Figure 1, "Part
corresponding to
OpenSSL FIPS Provider"
and
"exam_program_enclave".
Table 15: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A6710)
HMAC-SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
key Message
authentication
Before
performing
the SW
integrity test,
it is carried
out on
module load
and SW/FW
integrity.
SHA2-512
(A6710)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Message
digest
Performed
on module
load.
SHA3-256
(A6710)
SHA3-256 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Message
digest
Performed
on module
load.
AES-
GCM-ENC
128bit KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Encrypt Performed
on module
load.
AES-
GCM-DEC
128bit KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Decrypt Performed
on module
load.
AES-CBC
(A6710)
128bit KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
Decrypt Performed
on module
load.
Page 35 of 46
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
success, 0
is error)
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
2048-bit with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign Performed
on module
load.
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
2048-bit with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Verify Performed
on module
load.
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
P-521 with
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign Performed
on module
load.
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
P-521 with
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Verify Performed
on module
load.
EDDSA
SigGen
(A6710)
Edwards448,
Edwards25519
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign Performed
on module
load.
EDDSA
SigVer
(A6710)
Edwards448,
Edwards25519
KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Verify Performed
on module
load.
Hash
DRBG
(A6710)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Instantiate
Generate
Reseed
Performed
on module
load.
Counter
DRBG
(A6710)
AES128bit KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Instantiate
Generate
Reseed
Performed
on module
load.
HMAC
DRBG
(A6710)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Instantiate
Generate
Reseed
Performed
on module
load.
Page 36 of 46
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6710)
P-256 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Shared secret
computation
Performed
on module
load.
KTS-IFC
(A6710)
k=2048 KAT CAST Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2 Encrypt
for Basic, SP
800-56B Rev.
2 Decrypt for
Basic
Performed
on module
load.
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
- PCT PCT Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign, Verify Performed
on ECC
(ECDSA)
key pair
generation,
prior to
returning the
key pair on
conclusion of
the call.
EDDSA
KeyGen
(A6710)
- PCT PCT Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign, Verify Performed
on Edwards
(EdDSA) key
pair
generation,
prior to
returning the
key pair on
conclusion of
the call.
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A6710)
- PCT PCT Conditional
Self-Tests
result (1 is
success, 0
is error)
Sign, Verify Performed
on IFC
(RSA, KTS-
IFC) key pair
generation,
prior to
returning the
key pair on
conclusion of
the call.
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests
During the conditional self-tests, data output via the data output interface is prohibited. The
cryptographic module does not return control to the calling application until the test is complete.
If any of these tests fail, the cryptographic module enters an error state.
Page 37 of 46
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6710)
Message
authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
Table 17: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-512
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA3-256
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM-ENC KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM-DEC KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CBC
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
EDDSA SigGen
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
EDDSA SigVer
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
Hash DRBG
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC DRBG
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
KTS-IFC
(A6710)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
PCT PCT - On Key Pair
Generation
Page 38 of 46
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
EDDSA KeyGen
(A6710)
PCT PCT - On Key Pair
Generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6710)
PCT PCT - On Key Pair
Generation
Table 18: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error The self test failure or
Pairwise consistency test
failure error state
Integrity test failure,
KAT failure, or PCT
failure
Module
load
Returns 0 if
integrity test, KAT,
or PCT fails.
Table 19: Error States
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
In the cryptographic module, the following two cryptographic boundary modules are built and
provided in the shared library of the Crypto API Toolkit, as shown in Figure 1.
 Module of the part corresponding to OpenSSL FIPS Provider
 Module for verifying the operation of cryptographic processing on the part corresponding
to OpenSSL FIPS Provider
The build procedure for the cryptographic module is shown below. Note that the build is
executed using the test configuration shown in Table 3.
(A) Advance preparation
Use the development environment shown in Table 20.
Item
No.
Classification Product name Version Remarks
1 SDK Intel SGX SDK 2.24 Used in the
production of
programs for Intel
SGX
2 C/C++ compiler gcc 8.5 Used to build the
cryptographic module
3 Go language
development
environment
Go 1.21.13 Used to build the
Crypto API Toolkit
Page 39 of 46
Table 20 Development environment
In this development environment, the following tools should be installed in advance.
(1) build-essential
(2) ocaml
(3) Intel SGX SDK
(4) Intel SGX PSW
(5) libcppunit-dev
The installation method for (1) is shown below. The execution directory is arbitrary.
* Execute as root user.
> dnf groupinstall "Development Tools"
> dnf install kernel-devel kernel-headers
The installation method for (2) is shown below. The execution directory is arbitrary.
* Execute as root user.
> dnf config-manager --set-enabled 8-latest-PowerTools
> dnf install ocaml ocaml-ocamlbuild
The installation method for (3) is shown below. The execution directory is arbitrary.
* Execute as root user.
> dnf install redhat-rpm-config openssl-devel wget rpm-build git cmake perl python3
> wget https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx-linux/2.24/distro/centos8.3-
server/sgx_linux_x64_sdk_2.24.100.3.bin
> bash sgx_linux_x64_sdk_2.24.100.3.bin --prefix=/opt/intel
> vi ~/.profile
(Added below)
source /opt/intel/sgxsdk/environment
The installation method for (4) is shown below.
* Execute as root user.
> cd /opt/intel
> wget https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx-linux/2.24/distro/centos8.3-
server/sgx_rpm_local_repo.tgz
> tar xvf sgx_rpm_local_repo.tgz
> yum-config-manager --add-repo file:/opt/intel/sgx_rpm_local_repo
> dnf --nogpgcheck install libsgx-urts libsgx-launch libsgx-epid libsgx-quote-ex libsgx-dcap-
ql
The installation method for (5) is shown below. The execution directory is arbitrary.
* Execute as root user.
> dnf install cppunit-devel
(B) Provided files
The provided files used to build the cryptographic module are shown in Table 21.
Item No. Provided file Description
1 Upgrade_sgx.patch Intel SGX SSL, OpenSSL FIPS Provider Change Patch
2 Upgrade_CTK.patch Crypto API Toolkit Change Patch
Page 40 of 46
3 golang_tool.tar.gz Go language build tool
Generates HMAC values for self-test (integrity test),
embedded in the shared library of the Crypto API Toolkit
Table 21 Files provided by the cryptographic module
(C) Build method
Build Intel SGX SSL (including the FIPS Provider of OpenSSL) and Crypto API Toolkit in that
order.
(Intel SGX SSL)
* Execute as root user.
(1) Download Intel SGX SSL using the git command.
> git clone https://github.com/intel/intel-sgx-ssl.git -b 3.0_Rev4
(2) Copy "Upgrade_sgx.patch" from item 1 of Table 21 to the intel-sgx-ssl directory.
> cp -p <storage location of the provided files>/Upgrade_sgx.patch intel-sgx-ssl/
(3) Apply the copied "Upgrade_sgx.patch."
> patch -p1 < ./intel-sgx-ssl/Upgrade_sgx.patch
(4) Download openssl-3.2.3 using the wget command.
> wget https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-3.2.3/openssl-
3.2.3.tar.gz
(5) Move the downloaded "openssl-3.2.3.tar.gz" to the intel-sgx-ssl/openssl_source
directory.
> mv openssl-3.2.3.tar.gz intel-sgx-ssl/openssl_source/
(6) Move to the intel-sgx-ssl/Linux directory.
> cd intel-sgx-ssl/Linux
(7) Run make.
> make
(8) Run make install. Library files, header files, and other files necessary for building
Crypto API Toolkit are placed in the /opt/intel/sgx directory.
> make install
(9) Move to the directory where (1) was executed.
> cd ../..
(Crypto API Toolkit)
* Execute as root user.
(1) Download the Crypto API Toolkit using the git command.
> git clone https://github.com/intel/crypto-api-toolkit.git
(2) Move to the crypto-api-toolkit directory.
> cd crypto-api-toolkit
(3) Run autogen.sh.
> ./autogen.sh
(4) Run configure.
> ./configure
(5) Move to the directory where (1) was executed.
> cd ..
(6) Copy "Upgrade_CTK.patch" from item 2 of Table 21 to the crypto-api-toolkit directory.
> cp -p <storage location of the provided files>/Upgrade_CTK.patch crypto-api-toolkit/
(7) Apply the copied "Upgrade_CTK.patch."
> patch -p1 < ./crypto-api-toolkit/Upgrade_CTK.patch
Page 41 of 46
(8) Create a new directory called golang_tool and extract "golang_tool.tar.gz" in item 3 of
Table 21.
> mkdir golang_tool && tar xvzf golang_tool.tar.gz -C golang_tool
(9) Copy the files under the golang_tool directory into crypto-api-toolkit/src/p11/trusted.
> cp -rp golang_tool/* crypto-api-toolkit/src/p11/trusted
(10) Move to the crypto-api-toolkit directory.
> cd crypto-api-toolkit
(11) Run make.
> make
(12) Run make install. The libraries required for building and running the application are
placed in the /usr/local/lib directory, and the header files are placed in the /usr/local
directory.
The following libraries are required to build and run the application.
libp11SgxEnclave.signed.so (internal Enclave shared library)
libp11sgx.so (external Enclave shared library
11.2 Administrator Guidance
(A) Notes on building applications
When building an application that uses the cryptographic module, in addition to the
application source files, you must also use the following header files and source files
generated by building the Crypto API Toolkit described above.
(Header file)
crypto-api-toolkit/config.h
crypto-api-toolkit/src/p11/untrusted/p11Enclave_u.h
(Source file)
crypto-api-toolkit/src/p11/untrusted/p11Enclave_u.c
(B) Notes on running the application
When executing an application that uses the cryptographic module, you must set the
environment LD_LIBRARY_PATH as follows.
> export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/lib:/usr/lib64:/opt/intel/sgxsdk/lib64
As mentioned in "9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods", the application must zeroize the SSP
provided by the cryptographic module through the API. Specifically, the application must
zeroize the SSP using the C standard memset function.
(C) Other
 The cryptographic module performs runtime checks related to the application of security
parameters, such as minimum key security strength, valid key sizes, and the use of
approved curves during public key operations such as signature generation.
 When using AES-GCM, the IVs prepared by the application must meet the following
conditions.
(a) It must be generated using DRBG of the cryptographic module.
Page 42 of 46
(b) The size must be 96 bits or higher.
 When using AES-XTS, the keys prepared by the application must meet the following
conditions.
(a) Key_1 and Key_2 must be separately generated according to the rules for
component symmetric keys in SP 800-133 Rev.2, Section 6.3.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A for this module.
11.6 End of Life
To dispose of the cryptographic module, simply delete the shared library of the Crypto API
Toolkit.
Note that the storage location of the SSP generated during the use of the cryptographic
module is volatile memory, meaning SSPs in this location are not stored persistently.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The cryptographic module implements the following two mitigation techniques against timing-
based side-channel attacks.
 Constant-time implementation
 Blinding of values
Constant-time implementation protects cryptographic implementations inside the module from
timing analysis. Timing-based side-channel attacks exploit differences in execution time
depending on cryptographic operations, but with constant-time implementation, the variation in
execution time cannot be traced back to keys, CSPs, or secret data.
The blinding of values protects RSA and ECDSA algorithms from timing attacks. These
algorithms are vulnerable to such attacks because attackers can measure the time taken for
signature processing or RSA decryption. To mitigate this, the cryptographic module generates a
random blinding factor internally and applies it to the input of signature processing or RSA
decryption. The blinding factor is discarded after the processing is completed. This makes it
difficult for attackers to perform timing attacks on these operations without knowing the blinding
factor, preventing them from correlating the time taken for signature processing or RSA
decryption with the RSA and ECDSA secret keys.
Appendix1 Glossary
Term Meaning
AEAD An acronym for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. It
is an encryption mode that provides data confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity simultaneously. Also called encryption with
authentication or authenticated encryption.
Page 43 of 46
Term Meaning
AES An acronym for Advanced Encryption Standard, one of the
symmetric key ciphers.
CBC An acronym for Cipher Block Chaining, one of the AEAD modes.
Each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block
before encryption.
CCM An acronym for Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Authentication Code, a mode of operation for cryptographic block
ciphers. It is a derivation of CTR with authentication using CBC-
MAC.
CFB An acronym for Cipher Feedback, a mode of operation for
cryptographic block ciphers. It is characterized by the execution of
exclusive OR (XOR) between the ciphertext of the previous block,
which is further encrypted, and the plaintext of the current block.
CMAC An acronym for Cipher-based Message Authentication Code, a
cryptographic technique for message authentication. The
authentication data is calculated from a symmetric key (MAC key)
and the message, based on the block cipher used in symmetric
key cryptography.
CRYPTREC An acronym for Cryptography Research and Evaluation
Committee. A project that evaluates and monitors the security of
government-recommended cryptography and investigates proper
implementation and operation of cryptographic technologies.
CTR An acronym for Counter, a mode of operation for cryptographic
block ciphers. It generates a counter, encrypts it, and XORs it with
the plaintext.
ECDH An acronym for Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman key exchange. This
is a type of elliptic curve cryptography and public-key
cryptography.
FIPS An acronym for Federal Information Processing Standards. It is a
set of information processing standards issued by the U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS 140-
3 is the third version of the document summarizing the security
requirements for cryptographic modules.
GCM An acronym for Galois Counter Mode, one of the AEAD modes. It
is a derivation of CTR that generates an authentication code
using operations on a Galois field GF(2n).
GMAC An acronym for Galois Message Authentication Code, a
cryptographic technique for message authentication. The
authentication data is generated using operations on a Galois
field GF(2n).
GPL An acronym for GNU General Public License. A representative
open-source license used for the development and distribution of
open-source software.
HMAC An acronym for Hash Based Message Authentication Code, a
cryptographic technique for message authentication. The
authentication data is calculated based on a hash function using a
symmetric key (MAC key) and the message (data).
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United
States.
Page 44 of 46
Term Meaning
OFB An acronym for Output Feedback, a mode of operation for
cryptographic block ciphers. The encrypted initialization vector is
XORed with the current plaintext block.
OpenSSL Open-source software developed and provided for the SSL and
TLS protocols.
RSA One of the classic public-key cryptographic algorithms.
SHA-2 A set of hash function algorithms with six variations: SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, and SHA2-
512/256.
SHA-3 A set of hash function algorithms with six variations: SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256.
Mode of
operation for
cryptographic
block ciphers
A mechanism for encrypting messages longer than the block
length using block ciphers.
Symmetric key
cypher
Encryption where the same key is used for both encryption and
decryption. Also called symmetric key encryption.
Block cipher A type of symmetric key cipher that processes fixed-length data
(referred to as blocks) as units.
Public key
encryption
Encryption where different keys are used for encryption and
decryption. Also called asymmetric key encryption.
Digital signature A cryptographic technique that enables data integrity and non-
repudiation of the signer by generating a signature with a signing
key and verifying the validity of the signature with a verification
key.
SSP An acronym for Sensitive Security Parameters, a general term for
Critical Security Parameters (CSP) and Public Security
Parameters (PSP).
CSP An acronym for Critical Security Parameters, security-related
information whose disclosure or alteration could compromise the
security of the cryptographic module.
PSP An acronym for Public Security Parameters, security-related
public information whose alteration could compromise the security
of the cryptographic module.
Intel SGX An acronym for Intel Software Guard Extensions, one of the
security functions developed by Intel. It protects data from various
unauthorized attacks by encrypting memory with hardware.
Enclave It refers to a cryptographically secured region in memory,
generated by Intel SGX.
Trusted
Execution
Environment
Also referred to by the acronym TEE.
It is a trusted area that is considered safe for sensitive data.
Rich Execution
Environment
Also referred to by the acronym REE.
It is an untrusted area outside the TEE (Trusted Execution
Environment), which is considered unsafe for sensitive data.
Table 22 Glossary
Page 45 of 46
Appendix2 References
Standard Title & Reference URL
FIPS 140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS 180-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
February 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Output Function
August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/197/final/docs/fips-197.pdf
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/198-1/final/docs/fips-198-
1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
SP 800-38A Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication
800-38a.pdf
SP 800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-
38b.pdf
SP 800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication
and Confidentiality
May 2004
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication
800-38c.pdf
SP 800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and
GMAC
November 2007
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication
800-38d.pdf
Page 46 of 46
Standard Title & Reference URL
SP 800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-
AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication
800-38e.pdf
SP 800-56Ar3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
May 2013
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800
-56Ar2.pdf
SP 800-56Br2 NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2 - Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization
Cryptography
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800
-56Br2.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 -
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800
-90B.pdf
SP 800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy
Requirements
March 2020]
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800
-140B.pdf
Table 23 References