FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Cambium Networks
PTP 820G,
PTP 820C,
PTP 820S,
PTP 820C-HP,
PTP 820N,
PTP 820A,
PTP 850C,
PTP 850E
Firmware:
12.0.1
Hardware:
PTP 820N and PTP 820A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components:
• PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003
• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005
• PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004
PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850E (Rev. 6)
Prepared by:
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd
Rockville, MD 20850
www.acumensecurity.net
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Cambium Networks Ltd. assumes no liability resulting from any inaccuracies or omissions in this document, or
from use of the information obtained herein. Cambium reserves the right to make changes to any products
described herein to improve reliability, function, or design, and reserves the right to revise this document and to
make changes from time to time in content hereof with no obligation to notify any person of revisions or changes.
Cambium does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of any product, software, or circuit
described herein; neither does it convey license under its patent rights or the rights of others. It is possible that
this publication may contain references to, or information about Cambium products (machines and programs),
programming, or services that are not announced in your country. Such references or information must not be
construed to mean that Cambium intends to announce such Cambium products, programming, or services in your
country.
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Party software products described in this document may include or
describe copyrighted Cambium and other 3rd
Party supplied computer programs stored in semiconductor
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Party supplied software certain exclusive rights for copyrighted material, including the exclusive right to
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Party software supplied material contained in the
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of the software or documentation may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or
translated into any language or computer language, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission
of Cambium.
License Agreements
The software described in this document is the property of Cambium and its licensors. It is furnished by express
license agreement only and may be used only in accordance with the terms of such an agreement.
High Risk Materials
Cambium and its supplier(s) specifically disclaim any express or implied warranty of fitness for any high-risk
activities or uses of its products including, but not limited to, the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation
or aircraft communication systems, air traffic control, life support, or weapons systems (“High Risk Use”). Any
High Risk is unauthorized, is made at your own risk and you shall be responsible for any and all losses, damage or
claims arising out of any High-Risk Use.
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Table of Contents
Purpose .........................................................................................................................................................5
Document Organization................................................................................................................................5
1. General..................................................................................................................................................6
2. Cryptographic Module Specification.....................................................................................................6
2.1 Cryptographic Boundary...............................................................................................................6
2.2 Modes of Operation....................................................................................................................10
2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms...........................................................................................................11
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces.......................................................................................................21
4. Roles, services, and authentication ....................................................................................................32
4.1 Authorized Roles.........................................................................................................................32
4.2 Authentication Mechanisms.......................................................................................................34
4.3 Services .......................................................................................................................................35
5. Software/Firmware Security...............................................................................................................40
6. Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................41
7. Physical Security..................................................................................................................................41
8. Non-invasive Security..........................................................................................................................52
9. Sensitive security parameter management........................................................................................53
9.1 Generation..................................................................................................................................62
9.2 Import/Export .............................................................................................................................62
9.3 Storage........................................................................................................................................62
9.4 Zeroization Procedures...............................................................................................................62
10. Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................63
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..........................................................................................................63
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................63
10.3 Self-Tests Error Handling.............................................................................................................64
11. Life-cycle assurance ............................................................................................................................64
11.1 Secure Operation ........................................................................................................................65
11.2 Installation ..................................................................................................................................65
11.3 Initialization.................................................................................................................................65
11.4 Management...............................................................................................................................67
11.4.1 SSH Usage .........................................................................................................................67
11.4.2 TLS Usage..........................................................................................................................67
11.5 Maintenance...............................................................................................................................68
12. Mitigation of other attacks .................................................................................................................68
List of Tables
Table 1 - Security Levels................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration ..............................................................................10
Table 3 – Approved Algorithms ..................................................................................................................20
Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation ..........................20
Table 5 – PTP 820G Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................22
Table 6 – PTP 820C Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................23
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Table 7 – PTP 820S Ports and Interfaces.....................................................................................................24
Table 8 – PTP 820C-HP Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................26
Table 9 – PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces .........................27
Table 10 –PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces..........28
Table 11 – PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces......................28
Table 12 – PTP 850C Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................30
Table 13 – PTP 850E Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................32
Table 14 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output ...........................................................................34
Table 15 – Roles and Authentication..........................................................................................................35
Table 16 – Approved Services.....................................................................................................................40
Table 17 – Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................................40
Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................41
Table 19 – SSPs............................................................................................................................................61
Table 20 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification................................................62
List of Figures
Figure 1 – PTP 820G......................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 – PTP 820C ......................................................................................................................................7
Figure 3 – PTP 820S.......................................................................................................................................7
Figure 4 – PTP 820C-HP.................................................................................................................................8
Figure 5 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A...............................................................................................................8
Figure 6 – PTP 850C ......................................................................................................................................8
Figure 7 – PTP 850E (Rev. 6) .........................................................................................................................9
Figure 8 – PTP 820G Physical Ports.............................................................................................................21
Figure 9 – PTP 820C Physical Ports .............................................................................................................22
Figure 10 – PTP 820S Physical Ports............................................................................................................24
Figure 11 – PTP 820C-HP Physical Ports......................................................................................................25
Figure 12 – PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports ................................26
Figure 13 – PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports..................27
Figure 14 – PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports...............................28
Figure 15 - PTP 850C Physical Ports............................................................................................................29
Figure 16 - PTP 850E Physical Ports ............................................................................................................31
Figure 17 – PTP 820G TEL Application Locations........................................................................................42
Figure 18 – PTP 820C TEL Application Locations ........................................................................................44
Figure 19 – PTP 820C-HP TEL Application Locations...................................................................................45
Figure 20 – PTP820S TEL Application Locations..........................................................................................48
Figure 21 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Bottom ..............................................................................................49
Figure 22 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A Front .................................................................................................49
Figure 23 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Top.....................................................................................................50
Figure 24 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A Back ..................................................................................................50
Figure 25 – PTP 850C/PTP 850E TEL Application Locations........................................................................51
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Introduction
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Cambium Networks Ltd. and the following
Cambium Networks products: PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP
850C, and PTP 850E. Below are the details of the certified products:
Hardware Version #:
• PTP 820N and PTP 820A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components:
o PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003
o PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005
o PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004
• PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C, and PTP 850E (Rev. 6)
Firmware Version #: 12.0.1
FIPS 140-3 Security Level: 2
Purpose
This document was prepared as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3
validation process. The document describes how the Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S,
PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C and PTP 850E meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-
3. It also provides instructions to individuals and organizations on how to deploy the product in a secure
Approved mode of operation. The target audience of this document is anyone who wishes to use or
integrate any of these products into a solution that is meant to comply with FIPS 140-3 requirements.
Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-3 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Acumen
Security, LLC. under contract to Cambium Networks. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security
Policy, the FIPS 140-3 Submission Package is proprietary to Cambium Networks and is releasable only
under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.
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1. General
The Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C and
PTP 850E (the module) are multi-chip standalone hardware modules validated at FIPS 140-3 Security Level
2. Specifically, the modules meet that following security levels for individual sections in FIPS 140-3
standard:
Section FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Table 1 - Security Levels
2. Cryptographic Module Specification
The PTP 820 and PTP 850 series radios provide a service-centric microwave platform for HetNet1
hauling.
The platform includes a full complement of wireless products that provide backhaul and fronthaul
solutions.
Powered by a software-defined engine and sharing a common operating system, PTP 820 and PTP 850
Release 12.0.1, the PTP 820 and PTP 850 platforms deliver ultra-high capacities while supporting any radio
transmission technology, any network topology, and any deployment configuration.
2.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary for the modules is defined as encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right,"
and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane" of the case. The following figures
provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic modules:
1
Heterogenous Network
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Figure 1 – PTP 820G
Figure 2 – PTP 820C
Figure 3 – PTP 820S
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Figure 4 – PTP 820C-HP
Figure 5 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A
Figure 6 – PTP 850C
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Figure 7 – PTP 850E (Rev. 6)
The PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850E are fixed configuration.
The PTP 820N and PTP 820A are modular configuration, and have slots to insert the following cards:
• Traffic and Control Card (TCC): The Traffic Control Card (TCC) provides the control functionality for
the PTP 820N and PTP 820A units. It also provides Ethernet management and traffic interfaces.
There are two variants of this card:
o PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations.
Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE optical interfaces, 2 x GbE electrical
interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or cascading interfaces.
o PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005: Provides 6 x 1/10GE optical interfaces and 2 x RFU or 1/2.5
GbE electrical PoE interfaces. Two of the optical interfaces (1 and 2) can be configured as
cascading interfaces. Supports up to two Multi-Carrier ABC groups, with capacity of 2.5 Gbps
(non-configurable). Supports multiple high-capacity configurations with Link Bonding.
• Radio Modem Card-B (PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004): The Radio Modem Card (RMC) provides the
modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio Frequency Unit (RFU).
The models included in this validation have been tested in the following configurations:
Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
PTP 820G PTP 820G 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
IDU2
. See Table 5
PTP 820C PTP 820C 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
ODU3
. See Table 6
PTP 820S PTP 820S 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
ODU. See Table 7
PTP 820C-HP PTP 820C-HP 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
ODU. See Table 8
2
Indoor unit
3
Outdoor unit
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Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
PTP 820N PTP 820N with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2
and with components:
o PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC:
N000082H003
o PTP820 TCC-U:
N000082H005
o PTP820 RMC-B:
N000082H004
12.0.1 Modular IDU.
• Single or dual TCC
• Dual RMC-B
• Dual Power supplies
See Table 9, Table 10
and Table 11
PTP 820A PTP 820A with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2
and with components:
o PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC:
N000082H003
o PTP820 TCC-U:
N000082H005
o PTP820 RMC-B:
N000082H004
12.0.1 Modular IDU.
• Single or dual TCC
• Dual RMC-B
• Dual Power supplies
See Table 9, Table 10
and Table 11
PTP 850C PTP 850C 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
ODU. See Table 12
PTP 850E PTP 850E (Rev. 6) 12.0.1 Fixed configuration
ODU. See Table 13
Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
Additionally, the following cards can be configured on PTP 820N and PTP 820A modules. These cards
provide port density, but do not contain any security-relevant functionality:
• Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (E/XLIC)
• STM-1/OC3
• STM-1 RST
• TDM E1/T1
• 10Gb Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (LIC-X-E10)
• Radio Interface Card (RIC-D)
2.2 Modes of Operation
The module operates in the Approved mode of operation (when configured as per the instructions in
Section 11 of this document). Any usage of the non-Approved services described in Table 17 would result
in a non-Approved mode of operation.
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2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms
The following table lists the Approved algorithms supported by the modules:
CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware)
A2758 AES
(FIPS
197)
CBC Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 128, 256
Used for control/
management plane
encryption/
decryption
ECB Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 128, 256
CTR Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Payload Length: 8-128 Increment 8
Incremental Counter
Counter Tests Performed
CFB128 Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 128
GCM4
Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation: Internal
IV Generation Mode: 8.2.1
Key Length: 128, 256
Tag Length: 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120, 128
IV Length: 96-1024 Increment 8
Payload Length: 8-65536 Increment 8
AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
KW Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher: Cipher, Inverse
Key Length: 256
Payload Length: 128-524288 Increment
128
SHS
(FIPS
180-4)
SHA-1
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Used for control/
management plane
message digests.
SHA-1 is permitted
within SSH, TLS and
IPSec protocols,
and legacy
4
GCM IV generation tested in accordance with IG C.H, scenario 1 TLSv1.2 following RFCs 5516, 5246, 5288, and
5289 as well as SSH following RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and 5647. The IV is generated only for use with GCM
encryption within the protocol being used. The TLS cipher suites supported by the module are identified in section
11.4.2 of this document which are included in SP 800-52 Rev2 section 3.3.1. The module also internally generates
IVs for TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) in accordance with scenario 5 in IG C.H. In the case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with AES-GCM encryption/decryption is established.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
signature
verification only.
HMAC
(FIPS
198-1)
HMAC-
SHA1
MAC: 32-160 Increment 8 Key Length: 8-
524288 Increment 8
Used for control/
management plane
message
authentication
HMAC-
SHA2-256
MAC: 32-256 Increment 8 Key Length: 8-
524288 Increment 8
HMAC-
SHA2-384
MAC: 32-384 Increment 8 Key Length: 8-
524288 Increment 8
HMAC-
SHA2-512
MAC: 32-512 Increment 8 Key Length: 8-
524288 Increment 8
DRBG
(SP800-
90Arev1)
CTR_DRBG Capabilities:
Mode: AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled: Yes
Additional Input: 0-256 Increment 256
Entropy Input: 2048 Increment 128
Nonce: 128
Personalization String Length: 0-256
Increment 256
Returned Bits: 256
Used for control/
management plane
random bit
generation
ECDSA
(FIPS
186-4)
KeyGen,
KeyVer,
SigGen,
SigVer
Capabilities: Curve: P-256 Hash Algorithm:
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Secret Generation Mode: Testing
Candidates
Used for control/
management plane
key generation,
signature
generation, and
signature
verification
DSA
(FIPS
186-4)
KeyGen Capabilities:
L: 2048
N: 224
L: 2048
N: 256
L: 3072
N: 256
Used for control/
management plane
FCC key generation
RSA
(FIPS
186-4)
KeyGen Capabilities:
Key Generation Mode: B.3.3
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Primality Tests: Table C.2
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Primality Tests: Table C.2
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
Used for control/
management plane
key generation,
signature
generation, and
signature
verification
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Primality Tests: Table C.2
Info Generated By Server
Public Exponent Mode: Random
Private Key Format: Standard
SigGen Capabilities:
Signature Type: PKCS 1.5
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Capabilities:
Signature Type: PKCSPSS
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Salt Length: 28
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Salt Length: 64
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Salt Length: 64
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Salt Length: 64
Capabilities:
Signature Type: ANSI X9.31
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
SigVer Capabilities:
Signature Type: PKCS 1.5
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Capabilities:
Signature Type: ANSI X9.31
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Properties:
Modulo: 4096
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Capabilities:
Signature Type: PKCSPSS
Properties:
Modulo: 2048
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Salt Length: 64
Properties:
Modulo: 3072
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Salt Length: 64
Properties:
Moduli: 4096
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Salt Length: 32
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384
Salt Length: 48
Hash Pair:
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512
Salt Length: 64
Public Exponent Mode: Random
KTS-1 AES AES-256 in KW mode Used for key
transport on the
data plane; key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
encryption
strength
KTS-2 AES AES-128 and AES-256 in GCM mode Used for key
transport on the
management plane
within TLS and SSH;
key establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
encryption
strength
KTS-3 AES
HMAC
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 in CTR
mode with HMAC SHA-1
Used for key
transport on the
management plane
within SSH; key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption
strength
KTS-5 AES
HMAC
AES-128 and AES-256 in CBC mode with
HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC SHA-256
Used for key
transport on the
management plane
within TLS; key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
256 bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-FFC-
SSC
(SP800-
56arev3)
Diffie-
Hellman
Domain Parameter Generation Methods:
FB, FC, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072
Scheme:
dhEphem:
KAS Role: initiator, responder
Used for key
transport on the
management plane
using Diffie-
Hellman; key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 and
128 bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-
SSC
(SP800-
56arev3)
Ephemeral
Unified
Domain Parameter Generation Methods:
P-256
Scheme:
ephemeralUnified:
KAS Role: initiator, responder
Used for key
transport on the
management plane
using Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman; key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 bits of
encryption
strength
CVL
RFC 7627
KDF
TLSv1.2
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Used for key
derivation within
management
protocols
CVL
RFC 8446
KDF
TLSv1.3
HMAC Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes: DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE
CVL5
(SP800-
135-r1)
KDF SSHv2 AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Vendor-
affirmed
CKG6
SP800-
133rev2
§4: Using the Output of a Random Bit
Generator
§5: Generation of Key Pairs for
Asymmetric-Key Algorithms
Symmetric key and
asymmetric seed
generation
5
Note that no parts of the SSH, SNMPv3, IKEv1 and TLS protocols, other than the approved cryptographic
algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
6
In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as
per SP 800-133r2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys and the seed used in the asymmetric
key generation are the unmodified output from an NIST SP 800-90A DRBG.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
§6.1: The “Direct Generation” of
Symmetric Keys §6.2: Derivation of
Symmetric Keys
A2758
A2756
KAS-1 KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2758 with CVL Certs.
#A2758 and #A2756
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072 providing 112 and
128 bits of encryption strength
Diffie-Hellman key
establishment
using KAS-FFC-SSC
with SP 800-135
SSHv2 KDF, IKEv1
KDF, RFC 7627
TLSv1.2 KDF and
RFC 8446 TLSv1.3
KDF
A2758
A2756
KAS-2 KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2758 with CVL Certs.
#A2758, #A2756 and #A2757
P-256 providing 128 bits of encryption
strength
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman key
establishment
using KAS-ECC-SSC
with SP 800-135
SSHv2 KDF, IKEv1
KDF, RFC 7627
TLSv1.2 KDF and
RFC 8446 TLSv1.3
KDF
IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware)
A2756 KDF
IKEv1
CVL
(SP800-
135-r1)
KDF IKEv1 Capabilities: Authentication Method: Pre-
shared Key Initiator Nonce Length: 64-
2048 Increment 8 Responder Nonce
Length: 64-2048 Increment 8 Preshared
Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8 Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 3072 Hash
Algorithm: SHA2-256
Used for key
derivation within
IPsec
Not implemented
on Freescale P1021
or ARM based
platforms
SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware)
A2757 CVL
(SP800-
135-r1)
KDF
SNMPv3
Password Length: 64, 256
Engine ID:
3078313130663331626636303532333062
64,
3078333964653663643936303437353165
63
Used for key
derivation within
management
protocols
Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware)
A2755 AES
(FIPS
197)
CBC Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length:
256; tested but not used on Freescale
P1012 or ARM based platforms
Used for data
encryption/
decryption within
IPsec
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CAVP
Cert
Algorith
m and
Standar
d
Mode/Me
thod
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
HMAC
(FIPS
198-1)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
MAC: 128; Key Length: 256; tested but not
used on Freescale P1012 or ARM based
platforms
Used for message
authentication
within IPSec
SHS
(FIPS
180-4)
SHA2-256 Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8;
not used on Freescale P1012 or ARM
based platforms
Used for message
digests within IPsec
KTS-4 AES
HMAC
AES-256 in CBC mode with HMAC SHA-256 Used for key
transport on the
management plane
within IPsec; key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
encryption
strength
AES Core Implementation (Hardware)
AES 4014 AES
(FIPS
197)
OFB Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 256
Used for data plane
encryption/
decryption (PTP
820C, 820S, 820C-
HP)
A680 AES
(FIPS
197)
CTR Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length: 256
Payload Length: 128
Incremental Counter
Counter Tests Performed
Used for data plane
encryption/
decryption (PTP
850C, 850E, 820G,
820A, 820N)
Entropy Source
ENT (P) Ring-oscillator noise source with no conditioning
function
Conformant to SP 800-90B and IG D.J and D.K. Min-
entropy: 1.9 bits per byte
Table 3 – Approved Algorithms
*Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not
used by any approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key
lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by an approved service of the module.
Algorithm/Function Use/Function
MD5 RADIUS
TACACS+
Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
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3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The modules provide a number of physical ports/logical interfaces to the device, and the physical ports
provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-3 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output,
control input, and status output. The physical ports/logical interfaces and their mapping are described in
the following diagrams/tables:
Figure 8 – PTP 820G Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) FE Management Interfaces7
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or
Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Data traffic (TNC, GbE, E1/DS1)
(1x) FE Management Interfaces
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or
Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Data traffic (TNC, GbE, E1/DS1)
(1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(1x) FE Management Interfaces
Control Input Clock signaling (Sync)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
7
Note that only one FE interface appears in the figure. With the addition of a Y-connector, the single port can be
used to provide two FE interfaces.
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Serial console (Terminal)
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(1x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
LEDs
Status Output Alarm signaling (DB9)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Serial console (Terminal)
Activity (LED)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface Power Input N/A
Table 5 – PTP 820G Ports and Interfaces
Figure 9 – PTP 820C Physical Ports
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna
Ports)
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna
Ports)
(1x) Source Sharing
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Control Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Signaling (Source Sharing)
(1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Status Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
RSL signaling (RSL)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
Power Input N/A
Table 6 – PTP 820C Ports and Interfaces
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Figure 10 – PTP 820S Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(1x) Antenna Ports
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna
Ports)
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(1x) Antenna Ports
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna
Ports)
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Control Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
(1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Status Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
RSL signaling (RSL)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
Power Input N/A
Table 7 – PTP 820S Ports and Interfaces
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Figure 11 – PTP 820C-HP Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45 Management)
Data traffic (Data Ports,
Antenna Ports)
(1x) RJ-45 Data Port
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45 Management)
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(2x) Data port (Electrical or
Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data traffic (Data Ports,
Antenna Ports)
(1x) Source Sharing
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Control Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
Signaling (Source Sharing)
(1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management
Interface
Status Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
RSL signaling (RSL)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface Power Input N/A
Table 8 – PTP 820C-HP Ports and Interfaces
Figure 12 – PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(6x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Gbe Electrical Interfaces
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (FE)
Data traffic (GbE)
(6x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Gbe Electrical Interfaces
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (FE)
Data traffic (GbE)
(1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Control Input Clock signaling (Sync)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (FE)
Serial console (Terminal)
Signaling (Synchronization)
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output Alarm signaling (DB9)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (FE)
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) RJ45 External Alarms
Serial console (Terminal)
Activity (LED)
Alarm signaling (RJ45)
Table 9 – PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces
Figure 13 – PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) FE Management Interfaces8
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or
Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Data traffic (GbE)
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or
Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Data traffic (GbE)
(1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Control Input Clock signaling (Sync)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Serial console (Terminal)
Signaling (Synchronization)
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
Status Output Alarm signaling (DB9)
TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(FE)
Serial console (Terminal)
Activity (LED)
Alarm signaling (DB9)
8
Note that only one FE interface appears in the figure. With the addition of a Y-connector, the single port can be
used to provide two FE interfaces.
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Table 10 –PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces
Figure 14 – PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) TNC RFU Interface Data Input Data traffic
(1x) TNC RFU Interface Data Output Data traffic
(1x) TNC RFU Interface Control Input Data plane control signaling
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) Link LED
(1x) RFU LED
Status Output Activity
Table 11 – PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces
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Figure 15 - PTP 850C Physical Ports9
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) 1/2.5/10GbE Electrical
Interface
(1x) 1/2.5 GbE Electrical or
Optical Interface
(2x) 1/10GbE Electrical or
Optical Interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (RJ-45)
Data traffic (Antenna ports,
GbE)
(1x) 1/2.5/10GbE Electrical
Interface
(1x) 1/2.5 GbE Electrical or
Optical Interface
(2x) 1/10GbE Electrical or
Optical Interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (RJ-45)
Data traffic (Antenna ports,
GbE)
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
Control Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (RJ-45)
9
The WiFi port is disabled.
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) Source Sharing Signaling (Source Sharing)
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(1x) RSL Indication
Status Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3
management traffic (RJ-45)
RSL signaling (RSL)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface Power Input N/A
Table 12 – PTP 850C Ports and Interfaces
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Figure 16 - PTP 850E Physical Ports
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) 1/2.5GbE Multiband
Interface
(1x) 4x1/10GbE or 1x40GbE
Electrical or Optical Interface
(1x) 1/10GbE Electrical Interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec)
Data traffic (Antenna ports,
GbE)
(1x) 1/2.5GbE Multiband
Interface
(1x) 4x1/10GbE or 1x40GbE
Electrical or Optical Interface
(1x) 1/10GbE Electrical Interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec)
Data traffic (Antenna ports,
GbE)
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(1x) Source Sharing
(1x) Protection/XPIC
Control Input TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec)
Signaling (Source Sharing)
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface
(1x) RSL Indication
Status Output TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and
SNMPv3 management traffic
(RJ-45)
XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec)
RSL signaling (RSL)
(1x) -48V DC Power Interface
(1x) RJ-45 GbE Management
Interface (PoE)
Power Input N/A
WIFI Port N/A This port is disabled
Table 13 – PTP 850E Ports and Interfaces
4. Roles, services, and authentication
The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these roles are
authenticated, and the services the roles are authorized to access.
4.1 Authorized Roles
The module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer roles and a User
role.
Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels depending upon the
role assigned. There are multiple levels of access for a Cryptographic Officer as follows:
• Security Officer, admin, SNMP User: Entities assigned this privilege level have complete access to
configure and manage the module.
• Tech, Operator, Viewer: These entities have more limited access to manage the module. For
example, they can only manage the configuration of the data traffic interface.
The Users of the module are the remote peers to and from which backhaul traffic is transmitted. The Users
are connected over a secure session protected using the Session keys. The Session keys are established
from the remote peer using the Master Key to encrypt them. Successful decryption of the Session keys
by the module, authenticates the User to the module. The CO is responsible for configuring the Master
Key and the User role to pass encrypted data. Once the User is authenticated to the module, encrypted
data can be transferred to and from the remote peer. If the CO does not configure the data-path for
encryption, the User can still send un-encrypted data (bypass mode).
The following table specifies roles, with corresponding service with input and output:
Role Service Input Output
Crypto Officer Show Status Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
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Role Service Input Output
Crypto Officer Perform Self-
Tests
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Change
Password
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
User Transmit/Receive
Data
Data plane packets Data plane packets
Crypto Officer Administrative
access over SSH
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Administrative
access over Web
EMS
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer SNMPv3 Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Key Entry Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer IPSEC Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Zeroize Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
N/A Cycle Power N/A N/A
N/A Status LED
Output
N/A LED Status
Crypto Officer View Summaries Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Platform
Management
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
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Role Service Input Output
Crypto Officer Fault
Management
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Radio
Configuration
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Ethernet
Configuration
Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Sync Settings Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer Utilities Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Crypto Officer RBN Web GUI forms, CLI
commands
Web GUI status, CLI return
messages
Table 14 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
4.2 Authentication Mechanisms
The module supports role-based authentication. Module operators must authenticate to the module
before being allowed access to services, which requires the assumption of an authorized role. The module
employs the authentication methods described in the table below to authenticate Crypto-Officers and
Users.
Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the module.
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
CO Password/Username All passwords must be at least 8 characters and must
include letters, numbers, and special characters. If (8)
integers are used for an eight-digit password, the
probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is
less than one (1) in 1,000,000 (this calculation is based
on the assumption that the typical standard American
QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 integer digits, 33
special characters, and 52 letter characters. The
calculation should be 958
= 6,634,204,312,890,625).
Therefore, the associated probability of a successful
random attempt is less than 1 in 1,000,000. In order to
successfully guess the sequence in one minute would
require the ability to make over 110,570,071,881,510
guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational
capabilities of the module.
Users AES-256 Master Key When using AES key-based authentication, the key has a
size of 256-bits. Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in
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Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
2^256 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is
much stronger than the one in a million chance. For AES
based authentication, to exceed a 1 in 100,000
probability of a successful random key guess in one
minute, an attacker would have to be capable of
approximately 3.25X10^32 attempts per minute, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules
to support.
Table 15 – Roles and Authentication
4.3 Services
The services (approved and non-approved) that require operators to assume an authorized role (Crypto-
Officer or User) as well as unauthenticated services are listed in the tables below. The module supports
a global indicator of “enabled” when the module is in the Approved mode and an indicator of “disabled”
when the module is in the non-Approved mode. Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security
Parameters (SSPs) listed below use the following indicators to show the type of access required:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
Show Status Provides
status of the
module and
module
versioning
N/A N/A CO N/A N/A
Perform Self-
Tests
Used to
initiate on-
demand
self-tests
(via power-
cycle)
N/A N/A CO N/A N/A
Change
Password
Update
password
with a new
value
N/A Crypto Officer
Password
CO Password
Hash
CO Crypto Officer Password
(R/W)
CO Password Hash (E)
N/A
Transmit/Receiv
e Data
Encrypt/Dec
rypt data
passing
through the
module
AES-OFB
AES-ECB
AES-CTR
AES-KW
Session Key Tx
Session Key Rx
Master Key
User Session Key Tx (R/W/Z)
Session Key Rx (R/W/Z)
Master Key (R)
Admin
status
(enabled)
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
(Bypass
mode when
feature is
not
enabled)
KTS (AES-
KW)
Administrative
access over SSH
Secure
remote
command
line
appliance
administrati
on over an
SSH tunnel.
AES-CTR
HMAC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KTS
RSA
SHS
SSH KDF
DRBG
CKG
DSA
ECDSA
DRBG entropy
input
DRBG Seed
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Diffie-Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
Shared Secret
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
private key
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
SSH Private Key
SSH Public Key
SSH Session
Key
SSH Integrity
Key
CO DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC
Diffie Hellman Shared
Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman private key
(R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman public key
(R/W/Z)
SSH Private Key (R/W)
SSH Public Key (R/W)
SSH Session Key (R/W/Z)
SSH Integrity Key
(R/W/Z)
Admin
status
(enabled)
and
session
logs
Administrative
access over
Web EMS
Secure
remote GUI
appliance
administrati
on over a
TLS tunnel.
AES-CBC
AES-GCM
HMAC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KTS
SHS
RSA
TLSv 1.2
KDF
TLS v1.3
KDF
DRBG
CKG
DRBG entropy
input
DRBG Seed
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Diffie-Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
Shared Secret
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
private key
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
CO DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC
Diffie Hellman Shared
Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman private key
(R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman public key
(R/W/Z)
TLS Private Key (R/W)
TLS Public Key (R/W)
Admin
status
(enabled)
and
session
logs
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 37 of 68
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
DSA
ECDSA
Hellman public
key
TLS Private Key
TLS Public Key
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
TLS Master
Secret
TLS Session
Encryption Key
TLS Session
Integrity Key
TLS Pre-Master Secret
(G/E/Z)
TLS Master Secret
(G/E/Z)
TLS Session Encryption
Key (G/E/Z)
TLS Session Integrity Key
(G/E/Z)
SNMPv3 Secure
remote
SNMPv3-
based
system
monitoring.
AES-
CFB128
HMAC
SHS
SNMP KDF
SNMP Session
Key
SNMP Session
Authentication
Key
SNMPv3
password
CO SNMP Session Key
(R/W/Z)
SNMP Session
Authentication Key
(R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 password
(R/W/Z)
Admin
status
(enabled)
and
session
logs
Key Entry Enter key
over
managemen
t interfaces
KTS Master Key CO Master Key (R/W) Admin
status
(enabled)
and
session
logs
IPSec10
Control
plane traffic
encryption
using IKEv1
for key
exchange
(Self-
initiated
cryptograph
ic output
capability)
AES-CBC
HMAC
SHS
KTS
KAS-FFC-
SSC
DSA
IKEv1 KDF
IKE session
encrypt key
IKE session
authentication
key
ISAKMP
preshared key
IPsec
encryption key
IPsec
authentication
key
Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret
Diffie Hellman
private key
CO IKE session encrypt key
(R/W/Z)
IKE session
authentication key
(R/W/Z)
ISAKMP preshared key
(R/W)
IPsec encryption key
(R/W/Z)
IPsec authentication key
(R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman Shared
Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman private
key (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman public
key (R/W/Z)
Admin
status
(enabled)
10
Only available on MIPS CPU based models
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 38 of 68
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
Diffie Hellman
public key
Zeroize Zeroize all
CSPs
N/A All CSPs CO All CSPs (Z) Admin
status
(enabled)
Cycle Power Reboot of
module
N/A DRBG entropy
input
DRBG Seed
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Diffie-Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
Shared Secret
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman
private key
Diffie Hellman
/ EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
SSH Session
Key
SSH Integrity
Key
SNMPv3
session key
SNMPv3
session
authentication
key
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
TLS Master
Secret
TLS Session
Encryption Key
TLS Session
Integrity Key
IKE session
encrypt key
N/A DRBG entropy input (Z)
DRBG Seed (Z)
DRBG V (Z)
DRBG Key (Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC
Diffie Hellman Shared
Secret (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman private key (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman public key (Z)
SSH Session Key (Z)
SSH Integrity Key (Z)
SNMPv3 session key (Z)
SNMPv3 session
authentication key
TLS Pre-Master Secret
(Z)
TLS Master Secret (Z)
TLS Session Encryption
Key (Z)
TLS Session Integrity Key
(Z)
IKE session encrypt key
(Z)
IKE session
authentication key (Z)
IPsec encryption key (Z)
IPsec authentication key
(Z)
Session Key Tx (Z)
Session Key Rx (Z)
Console
log
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 39 of 68
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
IKE session
authentication
key
IPsec
encryption key
IPsec
authentication
key
Session Key Tx
Session Key Rx
Status LED
Output
View status
via the
modules’
LEDs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
View Summaries View unit
summary
information
(Unit, Radio,
Security)
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Platform
Management
Shelf
managemen
t, unit
configuratio
n,
interfaces,
firmware
settings,
activation
key, and
statistics
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Fault
Management
Alarm
settings
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Radio
Configuration
Radio
interface
settings
(includes
Bypass
setting and
status)
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Ethernet
Configuration
Ethernet
interface
settings
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 40 of 68
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Role
s
Access rights to
Keys/SSP’s
Indicator
Sync Settings Manage
synchroniza
tion
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Utilities Generic
utilities
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
RBN Bandwidth
notification
N/A N/A CO N/A Admin
status
(enabled)
Table 16 – Approved Services
Service Description Algorithms
Accessed
Role Indicator
SNMPv1/v2c Secure remote
SNMPv1, v2c-
based system
monitoring.
N/A CO Admin status (disabled)
RADIUS RADIUS
authentication
MD5 Admin status (disabled)
TACACS+ TACACS+
authentication
MD5 Admin status (disabled)
HTTP Plaintext HTTP N/A Admin status (disabled)
Hot Standby Hot Standby N/A Admin status (disabled)
Syslog Audit log
forwarding
N/A Admin status (disabled)
NTP Network Time
Protocol servers
N/A Admin status
(disabled)
Telnet Plaintext CLI access N/A Admin status
(disabled)
Table 17 – Non-Approved Services
5. Software/Firmware Security
The module performs a Firmware Integrity Test using a 160-bit error detection code (EDC) at power-on.
If the EDC fails to compute properly, the module enters a hard error state where all cryptographic
functions are disabled. Repeated failures of the integrity test will result in a reset to the factory default
state. The integrity test may be performed on-demand by power-cycling the module. The module also
performs a firmware load test (RSA 4096 with SHA2-256) covering the entire binary image, when a new
FW is uploaded to the module. The signature is calculated and verified upon uploading of the new FW. If
the test fails, the image will be discarded.
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 41 of 68
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6. Operational Environment
FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable since the module is a hardware
module with a limited operational environment. The module runs Release 12.0.1 which includes Wind
River Linux 4.1.0 or 4.14 depending on the CPU architecture.
7. Physical Security
The appliances have a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The appliances are contained in a hard metal
chassis, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The appliances’ chassis is opaque
within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the appliances have been designed to satisfy Level 2 physical
security requirements.
Each of the appliances needs Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) to meet Security Level 2 requirements. These
labels are installed (as seen in the respective model images) at the factory before delivery to the customer,
for the PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850 E. For PTP 820N and PTP820A,
the CO must place the twenty (20) TELs according to Figure 21-24 (below).
The preparation instructions of the module prior to installation of the tamper seals are as follows:
• Use caution to avoid touching the adhesive in such a way as to leave fingerprints and damage
the labels.
• The curing time (drying time) for the labels is at least sixty minutes.
• The labels must be replaced whenever cards are added to or removed from the unit.
Replacement labels can be ordered from Cambium Networks, part number BS-0341-2.
• When replacing a label, gently cut the label, replace the module, and apply a new label in place
of the previous label.
The extra tamper seals shall be in possession of the CO at all times. The CO shall observe any changes to
the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper evident seals are removed or installed to ensure
the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to an Approved
mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall periodically (defined by organizational security policy,
recommendation is once a month) monitor the state of all applied TELs for evidence of tampering. If
tamper is detected, the CO must take the device out of commission, inspect it and if deemed safe, return
it to the Approved state.
Physical Security Mechanism Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Tamper Evidence Label During regular physical
maintenance operations. At
least every six months.
Inspect the labels for obvious
signs of damage/removal.
Placement should be according
to the figures below.
Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 42 of 68
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Figure 17 – PTP 820G TEL Application Locations
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Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 44 of 68
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Figure 18 – PTP 820C TEL Application Locations
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 45 of 68
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Figure 19 – PTP 820C-HP TEL Application Locations
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 46 of 68
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Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 47 of 68
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Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 48 of 68
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Figure 20 – PTP820S TEL Application Locations
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 49 of 68
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Figure 21 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Bottom
Figure 22 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A Front
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 50 of 68
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Figure 23 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Top
Figure 24 – PTP 820N and PTP 820A Back
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 51 of 68
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Figure 25 – PTP 850C/PTP 850E TEL Application Locations
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8. Non-invasive Security
FIPS 140-3 Non-invasive Security requirements are not applicable.
9. Sensitive security parameter management
The following table identifies each of the Keys/SSPs associated with the modules:
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
DRBG entropy
input (CSP)
256-bit DRBG
A2758
Generated
using
module
entropy
source
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Used for control/
management plane
random bit generation
DRBG Seed (CSP) 256-bit DRBG
A2758
Generated
using SP
800-90Ar1
DRBG seed
construction
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Seed used for DRBG
instantiation and reseed
DRBG V (CSP) 256-bit DRBG
A2758
SP 800-
90Ar1 DRBG
Internal
State
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Used for control/
management plane
random bit generation
DRBG Key (CSP) 256-bit DRBG
A2758
SP 800-
90Ar1 DRBG
Internal
State
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Used for control/
management plane
random bit generation
Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret
(CSP)
112 and
128 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
2048 bits
and 3072
bits A2758
N/A N/A Established
using SP
800-
56Arev3
KAS-SSC
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Diffie-Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
Termination
of protocol
session
112 and 128 bits of
encryption strength
EC Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret (CSP)
128-bit KAS-ECC-
SSC P-256
A2758
N/A N/A Established
using SP
800-
56Arev3
KAS-SSC
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
128 bits of encryption
strength
Diffie Hellman
private key (CSP)
112 and
128 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
2048 bits
and 3072
bits A2758;
DSA A2758
Generated
according to
SP 800-
56Arev3
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Diffie-Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
112 and 128 bits of
encryption strength
EC Diffie
Hellman private
key (CSP)
128-bit KAS-ECC-
SSC P-256
A2758;
ECDSA
A2758
Generated
according to
SP 800-
56Arev3
N/A N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
128 bits of encryption
strength
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
Diffie Hellman
public key (PSP)
112 and
128 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
2048 and
3072 bits
A2758;
DSA A2758
Generated
according to
SP 800-
56Arev3
Output in
plaintext
N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Diffie-Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
112 and 128 bits of
encryption strength
EC Diffie
Hellman public
key (PSP)
128-bit KAS-ECC-
SSC P-256
A2758;
ECDSA
A2758
Generated
according to
SP 800-
56Arev3
Output
electronically
in plaintext
N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key transport on
the management plane
using Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman; key
establishment
methodology provides
128 bits of encryption
strength
SSH Private Key
(CSP)
112-bit RSA 2048-
bit A2758
Generated
according to
FIPS 186-4
Entered
electronically
in encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-2, KTS-3
or KTS-5
N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for control and
management plane
authentication
SSH Public Key
(PSP)
112-bit RSA 2048-
bit
A2758
Generated
according to
FIPS 186-4
Output
electronically
in plaintext
N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for control and
management plane
authentication
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
SSH Session Key
(CSP)
128, 192
or 256-
bits
AES-CTR
(128, 192,
256), AES-
GCM (128,
256), SSH
KDF A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for control and
management plane
privacy
SSH Integrity Key
(CSP)
160,
256 or
512-bits
HMAC, SSH
KDF A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for message integrity
check in the control and
management plane
SNMPv3
password (CSP)
Shared
Secret, at
least eight
characters
SNMP KDF
A2757
N/A Entered
electronically
in encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-2, KTS-3
or KTS-5
N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for key derivation
within management
protocols
SNMPv3 session
key (CSP)
128-bit SNMP KDF
A2757, AES
CFB128
A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for
encryption/decryption
within management
protocols
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
SNMPv3 session
authentication
key (CSP)
160-bit SNMP KDF
A2757,
HMAC
A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for message integrity
check within management
protocols
TLS Private Key
(CSP)
112-bit RSA 2048-
bit
A2758
Generated
according to
FIPS 186-4
N/A N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for authentication
within management
protocols
TLS Public Key
(PSP)
112-bit RSA 2048-
bit
A2758
Generated
according to
FIPS 186-4
Output
electronically
in plaintext
N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for authentication
within management
protocols
TLS Pre-Master
Secret (CSP)
384-bit KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS-ECC-
SSC A2758
N/A N/A Established
according to
SP 800-
56Arev3
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key derivation
within the TLS
management protocol
TLS Master
Secret (CSP)
384-bit TLS 1.2 KDF
A2758
N/A N/A Calculated
as an
element of
the TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for key derivation
within the TLS
management protocol.
Derived from the TLS Pre-
Master Secret
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
TLS Session
Encryption Key
(CSP)
128 or
256- bits
AES GCM,
AES CBC
A2758
TLS KDF
A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for
encryption/decryption
within management
protocols
TLS Session
Integrity Key
(CSP)
160, 256
or 384-
bits
HMAC SHA-
1, SHA2-
256, SHA2-
384
A2758
TLS KDF
A2758
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for message integrity
check in the control and
management plane
IKE session
encrypt key
(CSP)
256-bit AES CBC
A2755,
IKEv1 KDF
A2756
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for
encryption/decryption
within IPsec
IKE session
authentication
key (CSP)
256-bit HMAC
A2755,
IKEv1 KDF
A2756
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Used for message
authentication within
IPsec
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
Termination
of protocol
session
ISAKMP
preshared (CSP)
Secret,
32
characters
IKEv1 KDF
A2756
N/A Entered
electronically
in encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-2, KTS-3
or KTS-5
N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Zeroization
command
Used for key derivation
within IPsec
IPsec encryption
key (CSP)
256-bit AES CBC
2755,
IKEv1 KDF
A2756
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for
encryption/decryption
within IPsec
IPsec
authentication
key (CSP)
256-bit HMAC,
SHA2-256
A2755,
IKEv1 KDF
A2756
N/A N/A Derived
using SP
800-
135rev1
KDF
Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
cleared after
use
Termination
of protocol
session
Used for message
authentication within
IPsec
Session key Tx
(CSP)
256-bit AES CTR
A680
or
Generated
using DRBG
Electronically
entered and
output in
N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle or
Used for
encryption/decryption
within data plane
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
AES OFB
4014
encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-1 or KTS-
4
cleared after
use
Data plane
rekey
Session key Rx
(CSP)
256-bit AES CTR
A680
Or AES OFB
4014
Generated
using DRBG
Electronically
entered and
output in
encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-1 or KTS-
4
N/A Plaintext
temporarily
in RAM
Device power
cycle
Data plane
rekey
Used for
encryption/decryption
within data plane
Master key (CSP) 256-bit AES KW
AES ECB
A2758
N/A Electronically
entered via
KTS-2, KTS-3
or KTS-5
N/A Plaintext
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for session key
encryption for session key
exchange between local
and remote units
Crypto Officer
Password (CSP)
958
N/A N/A Electronically
entered in
encrypted
form via
approved
KTS-2, KTS-3
or KTS-5
N/A SHA2-512
hash
persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used for Crypto Officer
login
CO Password
Hash
SHA2-512 SHA2-512
A2758
Generated
upon
N/A N/A Persistently
in Flash
Zeroization
command
Used to verify Crypto
Officer login
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Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength
Security
Function
and
Cert.
Number
Generation
Import/Export
Establishment
Storage
Zeroisation
Use
&
related
keys
password
creation
Table 19 – SSPs
9.1 Generation
The module generates symmetric and asymmetric keys in compliance with the requirements of the FIPS
140-3 standard. Specifically, symmetric keys are generated using output of the Approved SP 800-90A
DRBG and in compliance with IG D.H. Asymmetric keys are generated as part applicable key generation
standards. See Table 19 for additional details.
9.2 Import/Export
All keys are entered into or output from the module in a secure manner. Specifically, the Session Keys are
output from the module encrypted with an approved KTS using a Master Key with the AES-KW algorithm.
Additionally, SSPs provisioned by an operator can be entered using an approved KTS employing AES-GCM
or AES and HMAC within the SSH, TLS, or IPsec protocols. See Table 19 for additional details.
9.3 Storage
SSPs are stored in plaintext in non-volatile and volatile memory. See Table 19 for additional details.
9.4 Zeroization Procedures
SSPs stored in volatile memory are zeroized automatically when no longer needed. SSPs stored in non-
volatile memory are zeroized after repeated failure of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests or upon hard-
zeroization command issued. The zeroization will permanently erase SSPs stored in Flash by overwriting
with zeroes. When zeroization occurs via power cycle or the zeroization command the module provides
an indicator in the console log. When zeroization occurs via session termination the zeroization indicator
is provided via session log. For CSPs that are zeroized after use, the indicator is that the service continues.
If there is a zeroization error, the service in process will be terminated. See Table 19 for additional details.
Entropy Sources Minimum number of bits of
entropy
Details
ENT (P) The entropy source provides 2.79
bits of entropy per 8-bit sample.
To achieve a security strength of
256 bits, the DBRG’s deviation
function will require a seed length
of at least 138 samples. The DRBG
is seeded with 2048 bits (256
samples) of data providing
approximately 714 bits of entropy
which is sufficient for generating
the largest module SSPs of a
maximum of 256 bits of security
strength.
Ring-oscillator noise source with
no conditioning function.
Conformant to SP 800-90B and IG
D.J and D.K
Table 20 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
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10. Self-tests
Self-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms within the module are operating
correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-3 broadly fall within two categories:
1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests
2. Conditional Self-Tests
When the module is powered on, its power-up self-tests are executed without any operator intervention.
CASTs are performed prior to first usage of an algorithm. The operator may run periodic self-tests by
power-cycling the module.
Conditional tests are performed when a specific condition is met, such as usage of the entropy source or
generation of key-pair.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following Pre-Operational Self-Tests on:
o Firmware Integrity Test: 160-bit Error detection code (EDC)
o Pre-operational Bypass Test
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The HW-based entropy source is conditionally tested (when entropy is consumed by any of the FW
components). Tests are APT and RCT (mentioned in the SP 800-90B document).
The cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests:
o Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2758):
o HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST
o SHA-1 CAST
o SHA2-512 CAST
o AES-128 ECB Decrypt CAST
o AES KeyWrap Encrypt CAST
o AES KeyWrap Decrypt CAST
o AES-256 GCM Encrypt CAST
o RSA PKCS#1 Sign/Verify CASTs
o ECDSA Sign/Verify CASTs
o DH Shared Secret Computation CAST
o ECDH Shared Secret Computation CAST
o TLS 1.2 KDF CAST
o TLS 1.3 KDF CAST
o SSH KDF CAST
o DRBG CAST
o IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2756):
o IKE KDF CAST
o SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2757):
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o SNMP KDF CAST
o Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2755):
o AES-256 CBC Encrypt CAST
o AES-256 CBC Decrypt CAST
o HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST
o SHA2-256 CAST
o AES Core Implementation (Hardware):
o AES-256 OFB Encrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014)
o AES-256 OFB Decrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014)
o AES-256 CTR Encrypt CAST (Cert. #A680)
o AES-256 CTR Decrypt CAST (Cert. #A680)
o Entropy Self-tests
o SP 800-90B Repetition Count Test
o SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test
o SP 800-90A Health Tests
• Conditional Pair-wise Consistency Self-Tests:
o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA
o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for ECDSA
o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for DSA
• Conditional software/firmware load test
o Firmware Load Test (RSA 4096/SHA2-256 Signature Verification)
• Conditional Bypass Test
10.3 Self-Tests Error Handling
If any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational state and will instead provide
an error message “Failed powerOnSelfTest”. If the failure persists after power-cycle, the module will then
be placed in a Default State (where all keys/CSPs are zeroized) and the Approved mode enabled flag is
reset to disabled. The module will enter the non-approved mode. Event logs will be updated accordingly.
If either of the SP 800-90B self-tests fail, the repeated random numbers are discarded, and an error is
reported. If the PWCT fails, the key pair is discarded, and an error is reported. If the Firmware Load Test
fails, the new firmware is not loaded. If the conditional Bypass self-test fails, the error is reported, and the
module does not transition into or out of bypass.
During execution of the self-tests, firmware loading, zeroization, and while in an error state, data output
is inhibited.
11. Life-cycle assurance
This section describes the configuration and administration of the cryptographic module.
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 65 of 68
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11.1 Secure Operation
When configured as per this section of the Security Policy, the module only runs in the Approved mode of
operation, with the exception of the non-Approved Services identified in Table 17. The non-Approved
services described may make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms or plaintext data transfers.
Use of these services is prohibited in an Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer is responsible
for ensuring that any of the non-Approved Services (Table 17) in Section 4.3 are not used. Once the
module is properly configured as outlined below, the non-Approved Services will not be available for use.
11.2 Installation
The module hardware is shipped in sealed boxes to indicate tamper. Upon delivery, the recipient should
inspect the package to verify that there has been no tampering. PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-
HP, PTP 850C, and PTP 850E have a fixed configuration with TELs applied at factory. The Crypto Officer
must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact.
PTP 820N, and PTP 820A have variable configurations and the CO must verify that they are configured as
per one of the approved configurations identified in Section 2.1, Table 2. Moreover, the Crypto Officer
must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact. The tamper evident seals installed as
indicated in Section 7 is required for the module to be operated in the Approved mode of operation.
Please refer to the figures in Section 7 of this document for the proper placement of TELs.
11.3 Initialization
The CO must follow these steps to place the module in an Approved mode of operation. For the exact CLI
command syntax or GUI instructions, please refer to the below referenced sections of the FIPS Security
Configuration Guide for precise details.
1. Enable Password Enforcement to enforce password strength.
7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings
- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Access Control.
- In the Password change for first login field, select Yes.
- In the Enforce password strength field, select Yes.
2. Configure failure login attempts for wrong passwords to 3 attempts (default value).
7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings
- In the Failure login attempts to block user field, select the number of failed login attempts (3) that will
trigger blocking.
3. For radio encryption mode, configure Master Key and enable Payload Encryption.
7.5 Configuring AES-256 Payload Encryption
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4. Enable SNMP v3 (default) and disable SNMPv1 and v2. Add SNMP users as appropriate following the
password complexity requirements specified for CO operators in Section 4 above. Ensure that “AES”
and “SHA” are selected for the privacy and authentication ciphers, respectively.
7.9 Configuring SNMPv3
- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols. The Quick Configuration Security Protocols
page opens (Figure 41).
- In the SNMP Admin field, select Enable to enable SNMP
- In the V1V2 Blocked field, select Yes to block SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 access so that only SNMPv3
access will be enabled.
5. Disable Telnet
7.8 Blocking Telnet Access
- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols.
- In the Telnet Admin field, select Disable.
- Click Apply.
6. Disable HTTP and enable HTTPS
7.7 Configuring HTTPS
- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols.
- In the HTTP protocol field, select HTTPS
7. [Optional step] in case of External Protection configuration (relevant for PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S,
PTP 820C-HP), enable Protection Admin and supply a pre-shared key.
- 8.1 Encrypting the Protection Link
8. [Optional step] In case of TCC Redundancy (relevant for PTP 820N, PTP 820A), enable Protection Admin,
and make sure TCC Protection switch mode is set to Cold Switch Over
Note: Hot Switch Over (HSO) shall not be used in the Approved Mode
- Web GUI: Platform > Shelf Management > Main Card Redundancy
(In the TCC Protection switch mode field, select Cold Switch Over)
9. Change the default CO password
- 3.4 Changing Your Password
10. Enable Approved Admin configuration, i.e., set operation mode to ‘Approved mode’.
Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 67 of 68
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- 7.1 Enabling ‘Approved Mode’
Once the final step is performed the module will prompt the CO to reboot. Upon successful reboot the
module will enter the Approved mode of operation.
Once the module has been configured, the Approved mode status can be verified by selecting the Security
Summary from the Web EMS main menu. The field for “FIPS Mode Admin” shows “enabled”.
- 6 Viewing the Security Parameters
11.4 Management
Protocols such as Telnet, RADIUS, TACACS+, HTTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv2, Syslog, Hot Standby, NTP are
not approved for use in the Approved mode and shall remain disabled.
When in FIPS 140-3 compliant mode, only the following algorithms are used for SSH and TLS
communications.
11.4.1 SSH Usage
When in the Approved mode, the module supports only the following symmetric encryption algorithm:
• aes128-ctr
• aes192-ctr
• aes256-ctr
• aes128-gcm@openssh.com
• aes256-gcm@openssh.com
The following Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is supported in the Approved mode:
• hmac-sha1
The following key exchange algorithms are supported in the Approved mode:
• ecdh-sha2-nistp256
• ecdh-sha2-nistp384
• ecdh-sha2-nistp521
• diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
• diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
• diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
11.4.2 TLS Usage
When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.2 communications:
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
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When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.3 communications:
• TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
11.5 Maintenance
There are no specific maintenance actions required.
12. Mitigation of other attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those specified in FIPS 140-3.