## PacketLight Networks Ltd. PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.0 July 2025 PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 1 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### Table of Contents | 1 General ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels .................................................................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................................................................ 6 | | 2.1 Description .......................................................................................................................................................................... 6 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ...................................................................................... 7 | | 2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 | | 2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................................................................... 7 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................................................... 9 | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ......................................................................................................................................... 13 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................................................................... 13 | | 2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................................................. 13 | | 2.10 Key Establishment .......................................................................................................................................................... 13 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols ........................................................................................................................................................... 14 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................................................... 15 | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces .......................................................................................................................................................... 15 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ....................................................................................................................................... 18 | | 4.1 Authentication Methods .................................................................................................................................................. 18 | | 4.2 Roles ................................................................................................................................................................................. 19 | | 4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................................................ 19 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services .................................................................................................................................................... 33 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................................................................ 33 | | 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status ................................................................................................................................................ 33 | | 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................................................................ 34 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security .................................................................................................................................................. 35 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ......................................................................................................................................................... 35 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................................................................... 35 | | 6 Operational Environment ....................................................................................................................................................... 36 | | 36 | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .......................................................................................................... | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required .................................................................................................................................. 37 | | 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals ................................................................................................................................................. 37 | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 2 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ......................................................................................................................... 41 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................................................................... 41 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................................................................... 41 | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods .................................................................................................................................................. 41 | | 9.4 SSPs ................................................................................................................................................................................... 41 | | 10 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................................................... 47 | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................................. 47 | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................................... 47 | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................................................................ 48 | | 10.4 Error States ..................................................................................................................................................................... 50 | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance .............................................................................................................................................................. 51 | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ........................................................................................................ 51 | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................................................................. 51 | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ......................................................................................................................................... 52 | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................................................................. 53 | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 3 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels ................................................................................................................................................................ | 5 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware ...................................................................................................................... | 7 | | Table 3: Modes List and Description ............................................................................................................................................ | 7 | | Table 4: Approved Algorithms ...................................................................................................................................................... | 9 | | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .......................................................................................................................................... | 9 | | Table 6: Security Function Implementations .............................................................................................................................. | 12 | | Table 7: Entropy Certificates ...................................................................................................................................................... | 13 | | Table 8: Entropy Sources ............................................................................................................................................................ | 13 | | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 10: Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................................................. | 19 | | Table 11: Roles ............................................................................................................................................................................ | 19 | | Table 12: Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................................... | 33 | | Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................................................................ | 37 | | Table 14: Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................................................. | 41 | | Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods ......................................................................................................................................... | 41 | | Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................................................................ | 41 | | Table 17: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................................................. | 45 | | Table 18: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................................................. | 46 | | Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................................... | 47 | | Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................................. | 48 | | Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ........................................................................................................................ | 48 | | Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................................................................... | 49 | | Table 23: Error States ................................................................................................................................................................. | 50 | | List of Figures | | | Figure 1: PL-4000M ....................................................................................................................................................................... | 6 | | Figure 2: PL-4000T ........................................................................................................................................................................ | 7 | | Figure 3: PL-4000M (Front) ......................................................................................................................................................... | 15 | | Figure 4: PL-4000T (Front) .......................................................................................................................................................... | 15 | | Figure 5: PL-4000M and PL-4000T (Rear) ................................................................................................................................... | 15 | | Figure 6: PL-40000M (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom) ............................................................................................................. | 38 | | Figure 7: PL-40000T (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom) .............................................................................................................. | 39 | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 4 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the PacketLight Networks Ltd. PL-4000M and PL-4000T cryptographic modules (also referred to as 'the module(s)' hereafter) running firmware version 2.1.0. It contains specification of the security rules, under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard for an overall Security Level 2 module. ### 1.2 Security Levels The table below describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas. Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | The Module has an overall security level of 2. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 5 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ##### Purpose and Use: The PL-4000M and PL-4000T are two product variations of the PL-4000x clone. The hardware modules run the same firmware and provide the same cryptographic security services. The PL-4000M is a cost-effective solution for rolling out multi-rate 10/25/100GbE, 16G FC, OTU2/2e/4 services, or increasing existing network capacity. The device delivers up to 600G in a 1U chassis using dual 400G CFP2-DCO Open ROADM standards-based pluggable coherent modules for metro and long-haul applications. The PL-4000M provides a full demarcation point between the service and the OTN/DWDM network and is interoperable with any third-party switch or router. This provides full visibility and performance monitoring of both line optical transport layer (OTN) and 10/25/100GbE, 16G FC, and OTU2/2e/4 service interfaces. The PL-4000M can be configured to work in the following system modes: - -Single 400G Muxponder: mix of client interfaces aggregated into a 400G uplink - -Dual 100/200/300G Muxponder: mix of client interfaces aggregated into two 100/200/300G uplinks - -Optical Amplifiers: Up to two EDFA modules (optional) - -Optical Switch: 1+1 facility protection (optional) The PL-4000T is a cost-effective high-capacity solution for rolling out 400GbE and 100GbE services or increasing existing network capacity. The device has four 400G pluggable uplink optical modules, delivering up to 1.6T in a 1U chassis. The PL-4000T integrates mux/demux, EDFA and OSW and delivers the entire optical layer. This flexible solution enables pay-as-you-grow architecture. The solution provides a full demarcation point between the service and the DWDM network and is interoperable with any third-party switch or router. This provides full visibility and performance monitoring of both the optical transport layer (OTN) and 100GbE/400GbE/OTU4 service interfaces. The PL-4000T can be configured to work in the following system modes: - -Muxponder: 4x100G clients per 200G/300G/400G slice - -Transponder: 1x400G per 400G - -Optical Amplifiers: Up to two EDFA modules (optional) - -Mux/Demux: 4ch mux/demux module (optional) - -Optical Switch: 1+1 optical switch, 4 x 1+1 optical switches Module Type: ##### Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand ##### Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the modules is defined as the entire outer casing of the chassis as pictured below. The PL-4000T's cryptographic boundary includes uplink module(s) which are protected by Tamper-evident Seals (see Section 7.1). Figure 1: PL-4000M PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 6 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 2: PL-4000T ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ##### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------|------------| | PL-4000M | PL-4000M | 2.1.0 | NXP Layerscape LS1026A | AC/DC PSU | | PL-4000T | PL-4000T | 2.1.0 | NXP Layerscape LS1026A | AC/DC PSU | ### 2.3 Excluded Components None. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ##### Modes List and Description: The table below details the Mode of Operation supported by the module. Table 3: Modes List and Description | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------| | Approved Mode | When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 11 of the Security Policy, and with the tamper evident seals installed as indicated in Section 7 of the Security Policy, the module only runs in the approved mode of operation. | Approved | Global | ### 2.5 Algorithms ##### Approved Algorithms: The table below lists all the Approved Algorithms supported by the module. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | AES-CFB128 | A4261 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A4136 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 7 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CTR | A4261 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A2709 | Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A4261 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A2709 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GCM | A4261 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GMAC | A4136 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38D | | Counter DRBG | A4261 | Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A4261 | Curve - P-384 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) | A4261 | Curve - P-384 | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A4261 | Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384, SHA2-512/224 | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A4261 | Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 | FIPS 186-5 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A4261 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | A4261 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A4261 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 | A4261 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 | A4261 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KDA OneStep SP800-56Cr2 | A4261 | Derived Key Length - 2048 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 | SP 800-56C Rev. 2 | | KDF SNMP (CVL) | A4261 | Password Length - Password Length: 64-160 Increment 8 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 8 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 4: Approved Algorithms | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF SSH (CVL) | A4261 | Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A4261 | Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard | FIPS 186-5 | | Safe Primes Key Generation | A4261 | Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP- 3072, MODP-4096 | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | Safe Primes Key Verification | A4261 | Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP- 3072, MODP-4096 | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | SHA2-256 | A4261 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A4261 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4261 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) | A4261 | Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) | A4261 | HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ##### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The table below lists all the Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms supported by the module. | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key Type:Asymmetric | PacketLight Cryptographic Implementation | IG D.H, SP800-133r2 (Section 4/example 1) The seed used in asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from a NIST SP 800- 90A DRBG. | ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: The module does not support any Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms. N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: The module does not support any Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed. N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: The module does not support any Non-Approved Algorithms that are not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation. N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations The table below lists the Security Function Implementations supported by the module. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 9 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------| | Config File Encrypt/Decrypt | BC-UnAuth | Encryption/Decryption of respective SSPs in configuration files | | AES-CTR: (A4261) Key Length: 256 | | Key File Encrypt/Decrypt | BC-UnAuth | Encryption/Decryption of respective SSPs in key files | | AES-ECB: (A4261) | | SNMPv3 Encrypt/Decrypt | BC-UnAuth | Encryption/Decryption of SNMPv3 packets | | AES-CFB128: (A4261) | | SSH Encrypt/Decrypt 1 | BC-UnAuth | Encryption/Decryption of SSH session packets | | AES-CTR: (A4261) | | SSH Encrypt/Decrypt 2 | BC-Auth | Encryption/Decryption of SSH session packets | | AES-GCM: (A4261) | | TLS Encrypt/Decrypt | BC-Auth | Encryption/Decryption of TLS session packets | | AES-GCM: (A4261) | | Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 1 | BC-Auth | Encryption/Decryption of Client Data (PL- 4000M hardware block) | | AES-CTR: (A4136) AES-GMAC: (A4136) | | Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 2 | BC-Auth | Encryption/Decryption of Client Data (DCO transceiver hardware block, inserted into 4000T) | | AES-GCM: (A2709) AES-ECB: (A2709) | | TLS Key Pair/Certificate Generation | AsymKeyPair-KeyGen | Generation of certificate and keys for TLS server authentication | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4261) Counter DRBG: (A4261) | | SSH Key Pair Generation | AsymKeyPair-KeyGen | Generation of keys for SSH server authentication | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A4261) Counter DRBG: (A4261) | | TLS Key Pair Verification | AsymKeyPair-KeyVer | TLS Key Pair Verification | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A4261) | | TLS Digital Signature Generation | DigSig-SigGen | TLS Digital Signature Generation | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A4261) | | TLS Digital Signature Verification | DigSig-SigVer | TLS Digital Signature Verification | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A4261) | | SSH Message Authentication 1 | MAC | SSH Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4261) | | SSH Message Authentication 2 | MAC | SSH Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4261) SHA2-512: (A4261) | | TLS Message Authentication 1 | MAC | TLS Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4261) | Page 10 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TLS Message Authentication 2 | MAC | TLS Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4261) SHA2-384: (A4261) | | SNMP Message Authentication 1 | MAC | SNMP Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4261) | | SNMP Message Authentication 2 | MAC | SNMP Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4261) SHA2-384: (A4261) | | SNMP Message Authentication 3 | MAC | SNMP Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4261) SHA2-512: (A4261) | | Data Plane KEX Message Authentication | MAC | Data Plane KEX Message Authentication (prevents man-in-the- middle) | | HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4261) SHA2-384: (A4261) | | Verify Firmware Integrity | MAC | Verify Firmware Integrity | | HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4261) SHA2-384: (A4261) | | Verify Firmware Load | MAC | Verify Firmware Load | | HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4261) SHA2-384: (A4261) | | KAS 1 | KAS-Full | Data exchange keys generation and distribution | IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength Caveat:provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2: (A4261) | | KAS 2 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for SSH | IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength Caveat:provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) KDF SSH: (A4261) | | KAS 3 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for SSH | IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength Caveat:provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) Domain Parameter Generation Methods: MODP-2048, MODP- 3072 and MODP-4096 KDF SSH: (A4261) | | KAS 4 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for TLSv1.2 | IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 11 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KAS 5 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for TLSv1.3 | strength IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength Caveat:provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) TLS v1.3 KDF: (A4261) | | KAS 6 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for TLS v1.3 | IG:D.F Scenario 2 path (2) Bit Strength Caveat:provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4261) Domain Parameter Generation Methods: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072 TLS v1.3 KDF: (A4261) | | SNMP Key Derivation | KAS-135KDF | Derives SNMPv3 Keys | | KDF SNMP: (A4261) | | SSH Key Derivation | KAS-135KDF | Derives SSH Keys | | KDF SSH: (A4261) | | TLS Key Derivation | KAS-135KDF | Derives TLS 1.2/3 Keys | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4261) TLS v1.3 KDF: (A4261) | | Password Obfuscation | SHA | Operator Password obfuscation in config file | | SHA2-256: (A4261) | | Entropy Source | ENT-ESV | Entropy Source | | | | KAS Key Pair Generation 1 | KAS-KeyGen | KAS Key Pair Generation (ECDH) | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4261) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A4261) Counter DRBG: (A4261) | | KAS Key Pair Generation 2 | KAS-KeyGen | KAS Key Pair Generation (DH) | | Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4261) Safe Primes Key Verification: (A4261) Counter DRBG: (A4261) | | DRBG | DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generation | | Counter DRBG: (A4261) | Table 6: Security Function Implementations PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 12 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The module's TLS v1.2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The module is compatible with TLS v1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key (in accordance with RFC 5246). In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module's TLS v1.3 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #5. The TLS v1.3 protocol, and specifically the use of the AES-GCM encryption within the TLS v1.3 protocol is defined in RFC 8446. The module supports the acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The IV is generated and used within this protocol's implementation. The module's SSHv2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The SSHv2 implementation is compliant with RFC 4252 and RFC 4253, and the IV generation of SSHv2 AES-GCM implementation is compliant with RFC 5647. The module's hardware AES-GCM implementations conform to IG C.H, scenario #4. The module uses a 96-bit IV, which is constructed deterministically per SP 800-38D Section 8.2.1 from a nonce and counter. PL-4000T - from a Frame Block Counter, Multi-Frame Index (MFI), Multi Frame Alignment Signal (MFAS) and nonce. PL-4000M - from Frame Counter (which is comprised of MFAS and MFI-38 bits and 26 zero pads), and Frame Block Counter (32-bits). Per the requirements specified in Section 8 in NIST SP 800-38D, the probability that the authenticated encryption function ever will be invoked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct sets of input data is no greater than 2 -32 . In all cases the module enforces FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, which states, 'In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.' ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy The tables below detail the modules ESV information. | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|-----------------| | E63 | ID QUANTIQUE SA | Table 7: Entropy Certificates Table 8: Entropy Sources | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |----------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | IDQ Quantis IID QRNG | Physical | IDQ250C2 | 2 bits | 1.75 bits | | ### 2.9 Key Generation Please see SFI table. ### 2.10 Key Establishment Please see SFI table. The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in NIST SP 800-56Arev3. This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurances regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module: PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 13 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3) - Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3) - Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3) ### 2.11 Industry Protocols No parts of the SSH protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. No parts of the TLS protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. No parts of the SNMP protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 14 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Figure 3: PL-4000M (Front) Figure 4: PL-4000T (Front) Figure 5: PL-4000M and PL-4000T (Rear) The table below details the modules Ports and Interfaces. | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | LC ports (4000M) | None | Not in use | | CFP2 400G Uplink ports (4000M) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | Muxponded/Transponded data, Inband management | | SFP+/SFP28 10G/25G Service ports (4000M) | Data Input Data Output Status Output | Data | | OSC ports (4000M) | None | Not in use | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 15 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| | SFP 100/1000M Base-X MNG ports (4000M) | Control Input Status Output | Management | | RJ-45 Control port (4000M) | Control Input Status Output | Local CLI | | RJ-45 Alarm port (4000M) | Status Output | External alarms dry contacts | | QSFP28 100G Service ports (4000M) | Data Input Data Output Status Output | Data | | Interlaken RJ-45 port (4000M) | None | Not in use | | RJ-45 100/1000M Base-T LAN ports (4000M) | Control Input Status Output | Management | | LEDs (4000M) | Status Output | Status | | Power connectors (4000M) | Power | Power | | Mux/Demux MPO port (4000T) | None | Not in use | | LC ports (4000T) | None | Not in use | | QSFP-DD 400G Uplink ports (4000T) | None | Not in use | | CFP2 400G Uplink ports (4000T) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | Transponded data, Inband management | | SFP 100/1000M Base-X MNG ports (4000T) | Control Input Status Output | Management | | RJ-45 Control port (4000T) | Control Input Status Output | Local CLI | | RJ-45 Alarm port (4000T) | Status Output | External alarms dry contacts | | QSFP28 100G ports QSFP28 100G/ QSFP-DD 400G ports (4000T) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | Data | | RJ-45 100/1000M Base-T LAN ports (4000T) | Control Input Status Output | Management | | LEDs (4000T) | Status Output | Status | Page 16 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------| | Power connectors (4000T) | Power | Power | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 17 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods The table below details the modules Authentication Methods. | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth | Grants access to GUI according to role | Username and Password | Passwords are required to be at minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and [$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character password allowing all legal characters (73) with repetition equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1: 806,460,091,894,081 chance of false acceptance. | Assuming 10 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with multiple attempts in a one- minute period is 600/73^8, which is less than 1/100,000. | | SSH/SFTP Auth | Grants access to CLI according to role | Username and Password | Passwords are required to be at minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and [$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character password allowing all legal characters (73) with repetition equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1: 806,460,091,894,081 chance of false acceptance. | Assuming 10 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with multiple attempts in a one- minute period is 600/73^8, which is less than 1/100,000. | | Console Auth | Grants access to CLI according to role | Username and Password | Passwords are required to be at minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and [$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character password allowing all legal characters (73) with repetition equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1: 806,460,091,894,081 chance of false acceptance. | The fastest data rate for the serial port is 115,200 bps. Each ASCII character is 10 bits (1 Start, 8 data, 1 Stop), so that is (115,200 / 10 =) 115,20 characters per second or (115,20 * 60 =) 691,200 characters per minute. Running 100,000 trials in a minute will require a minimum of (4 * 10 * 100,000 =) 4,000,000 characters to be sent. This exceeds the 691,200 limit imposed by the data rate of the serial port. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed in one minute is less than 1/100,000. | | SNMPv3 Auth | Verifying the rights of SNMP based processes to access for | Username and Password | Passwords are required to be at minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and [$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character | Assuming 10 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with multiple attempts in a one- | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 18 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 10: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| | | monitoring and management | | password allowing all legal characters (73) with repetition equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1: 806,460,091,894,081 chance of false acceptance. | minute period is 600/73^8, which is less than 1/100,000. | ### 4.2 Roles The module supports four different roles: Admin, Crypto, Read-Write and Read-Only, which are detailed in the table below. Table 11: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |------------|--------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | Admin | Role | CO | WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth SSH/SFTP Auth Console Auth SNMPv3 Auth | | Crypto | Role | CO | WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth SSH/SFTP Auth Console Auth | | Read-Write | Role | CO | WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth SSH/SFTP Auth Console Auth SNMPv3 Auth | | Read-Only | Role | CO | WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth SSH/SFTP Auth Console Auth SNMPv3 Auth | ### 4.3 Approved Services The table below lists all approved services supported by the module. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------|-----------------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------| | Initialization | Initial Configuration | N/A | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | None | Admin | Page 19 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Manage Accounts | Add, Edit, Delete, View user accounts | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | Password Obfuscation | Admin - Operator Passwords: W | | Change Password | Admin to any except Crypto, each user its own | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | Password Obfuscation | Admin - Operator Passwords: W Crypto - Operator Passwords: W Read-Write - Operator Passwords: W Read-Only - Operator Passwords: W | | Encryption Service | Transfer of encryption data | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 1 Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 2 Data Plane KEX Message Authentication KAS 1 KAS Key Pair Generation 1 | Admin - EC DH Key Pair for DEK: G,E - ECC CDH primitive for DEK: G,E - Data Encryption Key (DEK): G,E - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: R,W,E Read-Write - EC DH Key Pair for DEK: G,E - ECC CDH primitive for DEK: G,E - Data Encryption Key (DEK): G,E - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: R,W,E | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 Page 20 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | Add/Change Pre-Shared Secret | Add/Changes the pre-shared secret used for the authentication of the key exchange messages. | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | Config File Encrypt/Decrypt | Crypto - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: W | | Lock Encrypted Service | Locks the encrypted uplink port. | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Crypto | | Change Provisioning Type | Provisions the service port or remove provisioning from the selected port | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Read-Write | | View System Information | View system specific information | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | View Performance Monitoring | View port performance monitoring info | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | View Faults or Alarms | Used to localize and identify problems in the network | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | Configure Firewall | Configure Firewall rules/policies | N/A | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | None | Admin | | Show Status | Outputs current module status | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | Show Versioning information | Returns module name/identifier and versioning information | N/A | Command | Module versioning information | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | Set Configuration data | Device configuration tool | N/A | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | None | Admin Read-Write | | Establish SSH session | Establish an SSH session | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination | Command | Command response/ status | Key File Encrypt/Decrypt SSH Encrypt/Decrypt | Admin - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 Page 21 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|---------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | with successful completion of service | | | 1 SSH Encrypt/Decrypt 2 SSH Key Pair Generation SSH Message Authentication 1 SSH Message Authentication 2 KAS 2 KAS 3 SSH Key Derivation KAS Key Pair Generation 1 KAS Key Pair Generation 2 | (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key: G,E Crypto - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 22 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Authentication key: G,E Read-Write - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key: G,E Read-Only - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: G,E | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 23 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: G,E - SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key: G,E | | Establish TLS session | Establish a web session using TLS protocol | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | Key File Encrypt/Decrypt TLS Encrypt/Decrypt TLS Key Pair/Certificate Generation TLS Key Pair Verification TLS Digital Signature Generation TLS Digital Signature Verification TLS Message Authentication 1 TLS Message Authentication 2 KAS 4 KAS 5 KAS 6 TLS Key Derivation KAS Key Pair Generation 1 KAS Key Pair Generation 2 | Admin - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - TLS Key Pair: G,E - TLS Premaster Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,E Crypto - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 24 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - TLS Key Pair: G,E - TLS Premaster Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,E Read-Write - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - TLS Key Pair: G,E - TLS Premaster Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,E | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 25 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Read-Only - Operator Passwords: W - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: G,E - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: G,E - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: G,E - TLS Key Pair: G,E - TLS Premaster Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,E | | Configure SNMPv3 | Configure SNMPv3 security profile, authentication, privacy, etc. settings | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command and parameters | Command response/ status | SNMPv3 Encrypt/Decrypt SNMP Message Authentication 1 SNMP Message Authentication 2 SNMP Message Authentication 3 SNMP Key Derivation | Admin - SNMP Privacy Key: G,E - SNMP Authentication Key: G,E - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): W | | SNMPv3 traps | Provide system condition information | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): W Read-Write - SNMPv3 Passwords | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 26 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | (Privacy and Auth): W | | Export Backup of Configuration file over HTTPS/SFTP | Save device and services configuration into file | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | Config File Encrypt/Decrypt Password Obfuscation | Admin - Operator Passwords: R - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: R - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): R | | Restore Configuration file over HTTPS/SFTP | Restore device and services configuration into file | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | Config File Encrypt/Decrypt Password Obfuscation | Admin - Operator Passwords: W - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: W - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): W | | View Network Topology | View the structure of a network | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin Crypto Read-Write Read-Only | | Random Number Generation | Random Number Generation | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | Entropy Source DRBG | Admin - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: E Crypto - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: E | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 Page 27 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|----------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: E Read-Write - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: E Read-Only - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: E - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: E | | Perform Self- Tests On- Demand | Run self-tests | N/A | Command | Command response/ status | Verify Firmware Integrity | Admin Read-Write | | Factory Reset | See Section 9.3 | Status | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin - Operator Passwords: Z - EC DH Key Pair for DEK: Z - ECC CDH primitive for DEK: Z | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 28 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - Data Encryption Key (DEK): Z - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: Z - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: Z - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: Z - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: Z - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: Z - SNMP Privacy Key: Z - SNMP Authentication Key: Z - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): Z - TLS Key Pair: Z - TLS Premaster Secret: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authentication Key: Z - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: Z - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH/SFTP | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 29 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Session Authentication key: Z - Firmware Update Key: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: Z Read-Write - Operator Passwords: Z - EC DH Key Pair for DEK: Z - ECC CDH primitive for DEK: Z - Data Encryption Key (DEK): Z - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: Z - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: Z - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: Z - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: Z - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: Z - SNMP Privacy Key: Z | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 30 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | - SNMP Authentication Key: Z - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): Z - TLS Key Pair: Z - TLS Premaster Secret: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authentication Key: Z - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: Z - SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key: Z - Firmware Update Key: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: Z | | Zeroization | See Section 9.3 (Zeroization) | Status | Command | Command response/ status | None | Admin - Operator Passwords: Z - EC DH Key Pair | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 31 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | for DEK: Z - ECC CDH primitive for DEK: Z - Data Encryption Key (DEK): Z - Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret: Z - Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair: Z - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret: Z - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair: Z - EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret: Z - SNMP Privacy Key: Z - SNMP Authentication Key: Z - SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth): Z - TLS Key Pair: Z - TLS Premaster Secret: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authentication Key: Z - SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair: Z - SSH/SFTP | PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 32 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key: Z - Firmware Update Key: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value: Z - SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value: Z | | Firmware Update | Upload and deploy firmware | Global ("FIPS Compliant Mode") in combination with successful completion of service | Command | Command response/ status | Verify Firmware Load | Admin - Firmware Update Key: G,E Read-Write - Firmware Update Key: G,E | Table 12: Approved Services ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services The module does not support any Non-Approved Services. N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The version signature is verified by HMAC-SHA-384. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. ### 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status The Bypass capability is the ability of a service to partially or wholly circumvent a cryptographic function or process. The following two independent internal actions are required to activate the bypass capability, to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error: 1. The admin shuts down the interface. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 33 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2. Then switches the interface to non-encrypted mode. *Both actions are accompanied by a service impact warning The module shows status to indicate that the bypass capability is alternately activated and deactivated, and that the module is providing some services with cryptographic processing and some services without cryptographic processing, as follows: If the bypass service indicator is 'Bypass is in effect', it means that at least one active service is not encrypted. If the bypass service indicator is 'Bypass in not in effect', it means that all active services are encrypted. ### 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status The Self-initiated cryptographic output capability is the ability of the module to perform cryptographic operations and other approved security functions or SSP management techniques without external operator request. The following two independent internal actions are required to activate the self-Initiated cryptographic output capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error: 1. The admin selects the service type and turns on the interface. 2. The admin confirms the changes. The module shows status to indicate whether the self-Initiated cryptographic output capability is activated through the Admin Status of the respective channel. If the self-Initiated cryptographic output service indicator is 'Up' for a respective channel, it means that the capability is activated. If the self-Initiated cryptographic output service indicator is 'Down' for a respective channel, it means that the capability is not activated. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 34 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The firmware is delivered as an executable file and the module implements a HMAC-SHA2-384 keyed hash firmware integrity test. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The Firmware Integrity Test can be invoked by rebooting the module. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 35 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment : Limited PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 36 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 7 Physical Security ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The table below details the Physical Security Mechanisms supported by the module. Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |-----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Tamper- evident Seals | Minimum of every 30 days. | The CO shall inspect the enclosure and tamper-evident seals for physical signs of tampering or attempted access to the cryptographic module. The physical security of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the tamper-evident seals. | The module has a multi-chip standalone embodiment and is made of commercially available, production grade components meeting commercial specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration. All production-grade components include standard passivation techniques, in the form of a coating applied over the module's circuitry to protect against environmental and other physical damage. The production grade metal enclosure is opaque to the visible spectrum, and all openings are designed in such a way to obscure visual access to the security relevant innards of the module. ### 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals Number: The PL-4000M is sealed with 4-5 tamper-evident seals, and the PL-4000T is sealed with 4-7 tamper-evident seals. Placement: The locations of the tamper-evident seals are indicated by the red rectangles in Figures 6 and 7. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 37 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 6: PL-40000M (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom) PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 38 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ##### Surface Preparation: For optimum adhesion, surfaces must be cleaned with alcohol to remove surface contaminants before affixing the tamper-evident seals: - o Use 90% (or higher) Isopropyl Alcohol - o Apply alcohol to a clean paper towel and wipe the intended surface to remove contaminants. - o Dry the surface with another clean paper towel (some contaminants will remain on the surface if the alcohol is allowed to air dry) - o Apply the label to the clean surface. NOTE: The adhesive side of the label must not be touched during the label placement. If it is inevitable, tweezer must be used for handling. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto-Officer Part Numbers: Holo-Guard FIPS PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 Figure 7: PL-40000T (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom) This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 39 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 8 Non-Invasive Security Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 40 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas The table below lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) storage areas for the module. Section 9.4 below selects from the storage areas listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Storage' column if applicable to a specific SSP. | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------|--------------------| | DDR4 SDRAM | Random memory access | Dynamic | | QSPI FLASH | Flash file system | Static | Table 14: Storage Areas ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The table below lists SSP input and output methods for the module. Section 9.4 below selects from the input and output methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Inputs/Outputs' column if applicable to a specific SSP. | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |--------------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | SSP Input 1 | External | QSPI FLASH | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | | SSP Input 2 | External | QSPI FLASH | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | | | SSP Input 3 | External | DDR4 SDRAM | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | SSP Output 1 | QSPI FLASH | External | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | | | SSP Output 2 | DDR4 SDRAM | External | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section 9.4 below selects from the zeroization methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Zeroization' column if applicable to a specific SSP. | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------| | Session Termination | All session ephemeral keys are zeroized. | Loss of contents | By closing of HTTPS/SSH session. | | Key Lifetime | Data Plane ephemeral keys are zeroized. | Loss of contents | N/A | | Power Cycle | All session ephemeral keys are zeroized. | Loss of contents | Power cycle | | Zeroization Command | All SSPs are zeroized. System IP is restored to default. | Loss of contents | Input zeroization command in console. | | Factory Reset | All SSPs are zeroized. System IP is kept. | Loss of contents | Input factory reset command in console. | Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ### 9.4 SSPs The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module: PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 41 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| | Operator Passwords | Authentication for the Admin, Crypto, Read- Write and Read- Only roles | Minimum of 8 bytes (64 bits) and maximum of 20 bytes (160 bits) string value - Minimum of 8 bytes (64 bits) and maximum of 20 bytes (160 bits) string value | Authentication string - CSP | | | | | EC DH Key Pair for DEK | Key pair used in NIST SP 800- 56Arev3 (Section 5.7.1.2) ECC CDH Primitive computation | P-384 - 192 bits | Public/Private - CSP | KAS Key Pair Generation 1 | | KAS 1 | | ECC CDH primitive for DEK | Shared Secret (Z) value that will be used to derive the DEK | 384-bit string - 192 bits | Key Material - CSP | | KAS 1 | KAS 1 | | Data Encryption Key (DEK) | Used for encrypting or decrypting payload data | 256-bit - 256 bits | Symmetric key - CSP | | KAS 1 | Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 1 Client Data Encrypt/Decrypt 2 | | Peer- Authentication Pre-Shared Secret | Entered by Crypto. Parameter used for Peer- Authentication during key exchange | 384-bit string - 384 bits | Authentication hex string - CSP | | | Data Plane KEX Message Authentication | | Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair | Negotiating TLS/HTTPS or SSH/SFTP sessions | Public: 2048- bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit / Private: 224- bit, 256-bit, 325-bit - 112 | Public/Private - CSP | KAS Key Pair Generation 2 | | KAS 3 KAS 6 | Page 42 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | bits, 128 bits, 152 bits | | | | | | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret | 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit - 112 bits, 128 bits, 152 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS 3 KAS 6 | KAS 3 KAS 6 | | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair | Negotiating TLS/HTTPS or SSH/SFTP sessions | P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits | Public/Private - CSP | KAS Key Pair Generation 1 | | KAS 2 KAS 4 KAS 5 | | EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret | EC Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret | P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS 2 KAS 4 KAS 5 | KAS 2 KAS 4 KAS 5 | | SNMP Privacy Key | Encryption / Decryption of SNMP traffic | 128-bit, 192- bit, 256-bit - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits | Symmetric key - CSP | SNMP Key Derivation | | SNMPv3 Encrypt/Decrypt | | SNMP Authentication Key | Message authentication and verification in SNMP | HMAC-SHA2- 256, HMAC- SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2- 512 - 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits | Symmetric key - CSP | SNMP Key Derivation | | SNMP Message Authentication 1 SNMP Message Authentication 2 SNMP Message Authentication 3 | | SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth) | SNMPv3 Passwords | Minimum of 8 bytes (64 bits) and maximum of 20 bytes (160 bits) string value - Minimum of 8 bytes (64 bits) and maximum of 20 bytes (160 bits) string value | Authentication string - CSP | | | SNMP Key Derivation | | TLS Key Pair | Key Pair used for TLS authentication | P-384 - 192 bits | Public/Private - CSP | TLS Key Pair/Certificate Generation | | TLS Digital Signature Generation TLS Digital | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 43 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Signature Verification | | TLS Premaster Secret | Establish the TLS Master Secret | 384-bit string - 192 bits | Key material - CSP | | KAS 4 KAS 5 KAS 6 | TLS Key Derivation | | TLS Master Secret | Establish the TLS Session Keys | 384-bit string - 192 bits | Key material - CSP | TLS Key Derivation | | TLS Key Derivation | | TLS Session Encryption Key | Used for encrypting/ decrypting TLS messages | 128-bit, 256- bit - 128 bits, 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | TLS Key Derivation | | TLS Encrypt/Decrypt | | TLS Session Authentication Key | Used for authenticating TLS messages | HMAC SHA2- 256, HMAC SHA2-384 - 256 bits, 384 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | TLS Key Derivation | | TLS Message Authentication 1 TLS Message Authentication 2 | | SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair | Key Pair used for SSH/SFTP authentication | 2048-bit - 112 bits | Public/Private - CSP | SSH Key Pair Generation | | | | SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key | Used for Encrypting SSH/SFTP messages | 128-bit, 192- bit, 256-bit - 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | SSH Key Derivation | | SSH Encrypt/Decrypt 1 SSH Encrypt/Decrypt 2 | | SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key | Data authentication for SSH/SFTP sessions | HMAC SHA2- 256, HMAC SHA2-512 - 256 bits, 512 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | SSH Key Derivation | | SSH Message Authentication 1 SSH Message Authentication 2 | | Firmware Update Key | Firmware Update Key | HMAC SHA2- 384 - 384 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | Factory | | Verify Firmware Load | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed | Seeding material for the SP800- 90A CTR_DRBG | 384-bit value - 384-bit value | Key material - CSP | Entropy Source | | DRBG | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input | Entropy Input for the SP800- 90A CTR_DRBG | 384-bit value - 384-bit value | Key material - CSP | Entropy Source | | DRBG | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value | Used for the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG | Internal state value - Internal state value | Internal state value - CSP | DRBG | | DRBG | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value | Used for the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG | Internal state value - | Internal state value - CSP | DRBG | | DRBG | This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 44 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |--------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------| | | | Internal state value | | | | | Table 17: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | Operator Passwords | SSP Input 1 SSP Input 2 SSP Output 1 | QSPI FLASH:Obfuscated | | Zeroization Command Factory Reset | | | EC DH Key Pair for DEK | SSP Input 3 SSP Output 2 | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Key Lifetime Power Cycle | ECC CDH primitive for DEK:Derives | | ECC CDH primitive for DEK | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Key Lifetime Power Cycle | EC DH Key Pair for DEK:Derived From | | Data Encryption Key (DEK) | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Key Lifetime Power Cycle | ECC CDH primitive for DEK:Derived From | | Peer-Authentication Pre- Shared Secret | SSP Input 1 SSP Input 2 SSP Output 1 | QSPI FLASH:Encrypted | | Zeroization Command Factory Reset | | | Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair | SSP Input 3 SSP Output 2 | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret:Derives | | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair:Derived From | | Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair | SSP Input 3 SSP Output 2 | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret:Derives | | EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair:Derived From | | SNMP Privacy Key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth):Derived From | | SNMP Authentication Key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth):Derived From | Page 45 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and Auth) | SSP Input 1 SSP Input 2 SSP Output 1 | QSPI FLASH:Encrypted | | Zeroization Command Factory Reset | SNMP Privacy Key:Derives SNMP Authentication Key:Derives | | TLS Key Pair | | QSPI FLASH:Encrypted | | Zeroization Command Factory Reset | | | TLS Premaster Secret | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | TLS Master Secret:Derives | | TLS Master Secret | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | TLS Premaster Secret:Derived From TLS Session Encryption Key:Derives TLS Session Authentication Key:Derives | | TLS Session Encryption Key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | TLS Master Secret:Derived From | | TLS Session Authentication Key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | TLS Master Secret:Derived From | | SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair | | QSPI FLASH:Encrypted | | Zeroization Command Factory Reset | | | SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | | | SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Session Termination Power Cycle | | | Firmware Update Key | | QSPI FLASH:Encrypted | | N/A | | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input:Derived From | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Entropy Input | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed:Derived From | | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG V value | | DDR4 SDRAM:Plaintext | | Power Cycle | SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed:Derived From | Table 18: SSP Table 2 PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 46 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 10 Self-Tests This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-operational and conditional selftests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Self-Tests are run upon the power up/initialization of the module. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests (and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)) are passed successfully. The design of the modules ensures that all data output, via the data output interface, is inhibited whenever the module is in a pre-operational self-test condition. The Pre-Operational Self-Tests are detailed in the table below. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-----------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | 384-bit | Integrity Test | SW/FW Integrity | Status | Keyed message authentication code-based firmware integrity verification | | SHA2-384 (A4261) | 384-bit | Bypass Test | Bypass | Status | Ensures the correct operation of the logic governing activation of the bypass capability. | ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests Conditional Self-Tests are run when an applicable security function or process is invoked. The Conditional Self-Tests are detailed in the table below. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------|---------------------| | AES-CTR (A4136) | 256-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | AES-GMAC (A4136) | 256-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | AES-ECB (A2709) | 256-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | AES-GCM (A2709) | 256-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | AES-ECB (A4261) | 128-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | AES-GCM (A4261) | 256-bit | KATs | CAST | Status | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt | Power Up | | Counter DRBG (A4261) | 128-bit | KAT | CAST | Status | SP 800-90 A Section 11.3 | Power Up | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | P-384, SHA2-384 | PCT | PCT | Status | - | Key Pair Generation | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | P-384, SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Status | Sign | Power Up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | P-384, SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Status | Verify | Power Up | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | 384-bit | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | Page 47 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4261) | P-256 | KAT | CAST | Status | Ephemeral Unified Shared Secret (Z) Computation | Power Up | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4261) | 2048-bit | KAT | CAST | Status | Ephemeral Unified Shared Secret (Z) Computation | Power Up | | KDA OneStep SP800-56Cr2 (A4261) | SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | KDF SNMP (A4261) | - | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | KDF SSH (A4261) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | 2048-bit | PCT | PCT | Status | - | Key Pair Generation | | Safe Primes Key Generation (A4261) | MODP-2048, MODP- 3072, MODP-4096, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072 | PCT | PCT | Status | - | Key Pair Generation | | SHA2-256 (A4261) | 256-bit | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | SHA2-512 (A4261) | 512-bit | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4261) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | TLS v1.3 KDF (A4261) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Status | - | Power Up | | Firmware Load Test (HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | HMAC-SHA2-384 | - | SW/FW Load | Status | - | Firmware Loading | | SHA2-384 (A4261) | 384-bit | - | Bypass | Status | - | Bypass modification | | Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | - | FD | CAST | Status | SP 800-90B Section 4 | Continuous | | Repetition Count Test (RCT) | - | FD | CAST | Status | SP 800-90B Section 4 | Continuous | Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Pre-operational self-tests can be run on-demand, for periodic testing, by rebooting the module. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | Integrity Test | SW/FW Integrity | On Demand | Power Cycle | | SHA2-384 (A4261) | Bypass Test | Bypass | On Demand | Power Cycle | Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 48 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CTR (A4136) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | AES-GMAC (A4136) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | AES-ECB (A2709) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | AES-GCM (A2709) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | AES-ECB (A4261) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | AES-GCM (A4261) | KATs | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | Counter DRBG (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Power Cycle | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | KDF SNMP (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | KDF SSH (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5) (A4261) | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Power Cycle | | Safe Primes Key Generation (A4261) | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Power Cycle | | SHA2-256 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | SHA2-512 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | TLS v1.3 KDF (A4261) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Power Cycle | | Firmware Load Test (HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4261) | - | SW/FW Load | On Demand | Provided Service | | SHA2-384 (A4261) | - | Bypass | On Demand | Provided Service | | Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | FD | CAST | On Demand & Continuous | Power Cycle | | Repetition Count Test (RCT) | FD | CAST | On Demand & Continuous | Power Cycle | Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 49 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 10.4 Error States If any of the Pre-operational Self-Tests or Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests fail, the module will output an error status and enter a critical error state, where all data output is inhibited. Upon entering a critical error state, an operator can attempt to clear the critical error state by rebooting the module. If the critical error state cannot be cleared, the module must be returned to the manufacturer. The action taken upon failure of a conditional self-test is context dependent. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error States and the status indicators reported. | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |---------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Critical Error | - | Pre-Operational, A4261 CAST, A4136 CAST or 4261 PCT fails | Attempt reboot, if reboot does not clear error return to manufacturer. | "...Self-Test FAILED" | | Data Plane Critical Error | - | A2709 CAST or Conditional Bypass self-test fails | Attempt reboot, if reboot does not clear error return to manufacturer. | "...Self-Test FAILED" | | Soft Error | - | RCT or APT self-test fails | Module returns to operational state once error is logged. | "...Self-Test FAILED" | Table 23: Error States PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 50 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The secure delivery of the modules is guaranteed by the trusted courier (DHL). Upon receipt of the module, the Crypto-Officer is responsible for verifying the packaging information slip and checking the delivery packaging for any irregularities (such as openings or tears). If the Crypto-Officer suspects any tampering, they should immediately contact PacketLight Networks Ltd. If the Crypto-Officer does not suspect tampering upon delivery of the module, they shall follow the steps defined in the Installation section of the PacketLight PL4000M/PL-4000T Security Guides (shipped with the cryptographic module). The operator shall set up the device as defined in the PacketLight PL-4000M/PL-4000T Security Guides ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance The following steps are required to enable the secure operation of the Module: - Verify that the firmware version of the module is 2.1.0. - The default password of the Admin and Crypto shall be changed upon first use. - All operator passwords shall be a minimum of 8 characters in length. - The default Pre-Shared Secret for Data Plane Encryption shall be changed by Crypto prior to enabling the Data Plane Encryption Service. - Admin shall configure firewall to only allow secure protocols. - o Ensure HTTPS is enabled. - o Ensure SSH/SFTP is enabled. - o Ensure that SNMPv3 is enabled, and Authentication is not set to use 'No Auth' or 'No Priv'. - Telnet shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - HTTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - RADIUS shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - TACACS+ shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - FTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - TFTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation. - Ensure Encryption License is installed. - The Crypto-Officer shall be aware that performing the 'Lock Encrypted Service' command will prevent the module from zeroizing SSPs. - RSA keys shall be at least 2048-bits. - The Crypto Officer shall ensure the Key Exchange Period for OTU4 traffic does not exceed 24 hours. - Ensure all traffic is encapsulated in a TLS tunnel as appropriate. Ensure use of Approved algorithms for TLS: 1.2: - o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 1.3: - o TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - o TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - o Curves: P-256:P-384:P-521: ffdehe3072: ffdhe2048 PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 51 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - Ensure use of Approved algorithms for SSH: - o Key Exchange Algorithms: -  ecdh-sha2-nistp256 -  ecdh-sha2-nistp384 -  ecdh-sha2-nistp521 -  diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 (use modulus size 2048 or greater) - o Encryption Algorithms: -  AES128-CTR -  AES192-CTR -  AES256-CTR -  AES128-GCM -  AES256-GCM - o Mac Algorithms: -  HMAC-SHA2-256 -  HMAC-SHA2-512 - Ensure use of Approved algorithms for SNMP: - o Authentication Algorithms: -  SHA-256 -  SHA-384 -  SHA-512 - o Privacy Algorithms: -  AES-CFB128-128 -  AES-CFB128-192 -  AES-CFB128-256 ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 52 of 53 PL-4000M and PL-4000T FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks. PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2025 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Page 53 of 53