© 2023 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Document Version: 1.6
2023-07-26
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Contents
1. Cryptographic Module Overview.............................................................................................................4
1.1 Models.......................................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Security Level............................................................................................................................................................................5
2. Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................................5
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.....................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Approved Algorithms..............................................................................................................................................................5
3. Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................7
4. Identification and Authentication Policy.................................................................................................7
4.1 Crypto Officer Roles ...............................................................................................................................................................7
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) .................................................................................................................................................................7
4.1.2 EraseMaster ........................................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 User Roles.................................................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.1 BandMaster.........................................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.2 Anybody..............................................................................................................................................................................8
4.3 Makers .......................................................................................................................................................................................8
4.4 Authentication Method and Strength....................................................................................................................................8
5. Access Control Policy ................................................................................................................................9
5.1 Roles and Services....................................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Unauthenticated Services..................................................................................................................................................... 10
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)............................................................................................................ 11
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters .......................................................................................................................... 12
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations.......................................................................................................... 13
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access .................................................................................................................................. 14
5.7 Definition of PSP Modes of Access................................................................................................................................... 16
6. Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................18
7. Security Rules ............................................................................................................................................18
7.1 Invariant Rules....................................................................................................................................................................... 18
7.2 Initialization Rules ................................................................................................................................................................ 19
7.3 Zeroization Rules.................................................................................................................................................................. 20
8. Physical Security Policy............................................................................................................................21
8.1 Mechanisms ........................................................................................................................................................................... 21
8.2 Operator Responsibility ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ........................................................................................................21
10. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................21
11. Acronyms...................................................................................................................................................24
12. References..................................................................................................................................................25
12.1 NIST Specifications.............................................................................................................................................................. 25
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications ........................................................................................................................ 25
12.3 International Standards ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
12.4 Corporate Documents.......................................................................................................................................................... 26
12.5 SCSI Commands................................................................................................................................................................... 26
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Tables
Table 1 Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD Models ...................................................................4
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification..............................................................................................5
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms ............................................................................................................6
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation...................................6
Table 5 - Ultrastar DC HC550 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces ..............................................7
Table 6 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...............................................................8
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services ...........................................................................................................10
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services...............................................................................................................10
Table 9 - CSPs..................................................................................................................................................12
Table 10 - Public Security Parameters ..........................................................................................................13
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services.............................................................................15
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services.............................................................................16
Table 13 - PSP Access Rights within Roles & Services .............................................................................17
Table 14 - SCSI Commands...........................................................................................................................26
Figures
Figure 1: Ultrastar DC HC550 Cryptographic Module................................................................................4
Figure 2: Tamper-Evident Seal......................................................................................................................21
Figure 3: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal...............................................................................................21
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1. Cryptographic Module Overview
The self-encrypting Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD, hereafter referred to as Ultrastar DC HC550,
Cryptographic Module, or CM is a multi-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. The
Cryptographic Module complies with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive
enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. See Figure 1: Ultrastar DC HC550 Cryptographic Module. All
components within this boundary satisfy FIPS 140-2 requirements. The physical interface to the Cryptographic
Module is the SAS connector and SIO port pins. In FIPS Approved mode and non-Approve mode, the
Cryptographic Module disables the SIO port pins (red box in Figure 1) to the right of the SAS connector. The logical
interface is the industry standard TCG SWG [TCG Core] and [TCG Enterprise] protocols, which uses the SAS
transport interface [SAS]. The primary function of the Cryptographic Module is to provide data encryption, access
control, and cryptographic erase of data stored on the hard drive media. The operator of the Cryptographic Module
interfaces with the Cryptographic Module through a “host” application on a host system. Except for the four-
conductor motor control cable, all components within the cryptographic boundary tested as compliant with FIPS 140-
2 requirements. The control cable is not security relevant and therefore excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Figure 1: Ultrastar DC HC550 Cryptographic Module
1.1 Models
Multiple models define the scope of the Cryptographic Module. The different models vary in storage capacity and
disk format type. Table 1 provides the model numbers, characteristics, and firmware versions associated with each
validated model.
Model Number Firmware Description
WUH721814AL5205 R6A0, R6D2, R6D3 14 TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
WUH721816AL5205 R290, R650, R680, R684, R6A0, R6D2,
R6D3, UM05, UM06, UM08
16 TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
WUH721818AL5205 R290, R650, R680, R684, R6A0, R6D2,
R6D3, UM05, UM06, UM08
18 TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
WUH721814AL4205 R6A0, R6D2, R6D3 14 TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
WUH721816AL4205 R290, R650, R680, R684, R6A0, R6D2,
R6D3, UM05, UM06, UM08
16 TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
WUH721818AL4205 R290, R650, R680, R684, R690, R6A0,
R6D2, R6D3, UM05, UM06, UM08
18 TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
Table 1 Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD Models
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1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section FIPS 140-2 Security Level Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation. Configuration and policy determine the
Cryptographic Module’s FIPS mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved Mode after
successful completion of the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions. See Section 7.2 for information on the
Cryptographic Module’s initialization rules. An operator can determine if the Cryptographic Module is operating in a
FIPS Approved mode by invoking the Level 0 Discovery service1. The Cryptographic Module disables authentication
to the Makers Authority after the Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved mode. After initialization, setting any
Authority PIN to MSID and power cycling the Cryptographic Module causes the Cryptographic Module to transition
to non-Approved mode. After the Cryptographic Module transitions to non-Approved mode, the Crypto Officer shall
execute the Zeroize service. If the Crypto Officer, subsequently, executes the Initialize Cryptographic service
instructions provided in Section 7.2 with the intent of placing the Cryptographic Module in FIPS Approved mode, the
Crypto Officer shall first execute the Zeroize service.
The chapter titled FIPS 140 Crypto Officer Instructions within the Ultrastar DC HC550 Product Manual provides
information on how to execute the Initialize Cryptographic service as well as the TCG Revert Method.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with NIST SP 800-131A.
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standards and Function
AES 3580
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38E] AES
Function: AES-CBC-256 encrypts and decrypts CSPs.
Mode: ECB, CBC, XTS
Key Size: 1282, 256
Key Strength: 128 bits and 256 bits
1 The InFIPS bit is set to one when FIPS Approved mode has been configured.
2 Tested AES ECB-128, AES ECB-256, AES-CBC-128, AES-XTS-128, and AES-XTS-256. However, the cryptographic module does not use
these algorithms.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standards and Function
AES A670
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38E] AES
Function: Used to encrypt and decrypt data-at-rest in a storage application
Mode: ECB, XTS
• 256-bit XTS Tweak Key does not equal to the 256-bit AES Encryption Key
Key Size: 1283, 256
Key Strength: 128 bits and 256 bits
DRBG A13894, A1390
[SP 800-90A, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38D] DRBG
Function: Deterministic random number generator (DRBG). Uses an AES-256 block cipher
derivation function to generate encryption keys.
Mode: CTR AES-256
Key Size: 384
Key Strength: 256 bits
Prerequisite: AES Cert. #3580
HMAC 2280
[FIPS 198-1] HMAC
Function: Used to sign and verify CSPs and derive keys in PBKDF2.
Mode: SHA-15, SHA2-224, and SHA2-256
Key Size: 256
Key Strength: 256 bits
Prerequisite: SHS Cert. #2942
PBKDF A1389, A13906
[ SP 800-132] PBKDF2
Function: PBKDF2 utilizes a 32-character PIN (password) and 256-bit KDF Salt to generate
256-bit Derived Authority Keys.
Mode: HMAC-SHA2-256
Key Size: 256
Key Strength: 256 bits
Prerequisite: SHS Cert. #2942, HMAC Cert. #2280
RSA A1389, A1390
[FIPS 186-4] RSA
Function: Digital signature verification with SHA2-256
Mode: PKCS#1 v1.5
Key size: 2048
Key Strength: 256 bits
Prerequisite: SHS Cert. #2942
SHS 2942
[FIPS 180-4] SHS
Functions: Digital signature verification and in used in the HMAC function
Mode: SHA-17, SHA2-224 SHA2-256
Key Size: 160, 224, and 256
Key Strength: 256 bits
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Description Rationale
CKG
[SP800 133] Cryptographic Key Generation
Function: Generated from the DRBG without further
modification or post processing
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.12
[SP 800 133] Sections 6.1, 6.2.3 and 6.3
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
3 Tested AES ECB-128 and AES-XTS-128. However, the cryptographic module does not use these algorithms.
4 A1389 is only applicable to firmware release R290 and later in the R200 code brand
5 Tested HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2-224. However, the cryptographic module does not use these algorithms.
6 A1390 is only applicable to firmware release R650 and later in the R600 code branch
7 Tested SHA-1 and SHA2-224. However, the cryptographic module does not use these algorithms.
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The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithm:
• A hardware NDRNG seeds the Approved [SP800-90A] DRBG. Available entropy does not modify the
security strength of the cryptographic keys generated by the module. Each 32-bit sample block contains at
least 2.9277 bits of min-entropy. Each time the DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, one hundred sixty (160)
32-bit samples seed the DRBG. This equates to 5120 bits of entropy data and translates to at least 468.432
bits of min-entropy. The nonce consumes approximately 156 bits. Therefore, approximately 312 bits of
entropy remain to determine the bit strength of the keys generated by the DRBG. The bit security strength
of an AES based CTR-DRBG implementation limits the bit strength to 256 bits. A security strength of 256
bits exceeds the minimum requirement of 256 bits of security strength established by NIST.
3. Ports and Interfaces
The drive uses the standard 29-pin Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) connector that conforms to the mechanical
requirements of SFF 8680. Table 5 identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The serial connector
is a two-wire port that consists of signal and ground. Western Digital disables the serial connector (SIO) at its
manufacturing facility prior to shipment of the Cryptographic Module. The Cryptographic Module does not provide
a maintenance access interface.
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Port Connector Pins
Power Power connector
Control Input SAS connector, Serial connector(disabled)
Status Output SAS connector, Serial connector (disabled)
Data Input SAS connector, Serial connector (disabled)
Data Output SAS connector, Serial connector (disabled)
Table 5 - Ultrastar DC HC550 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN). The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator
roles. Table 6 maps TCG authorities to their respective FIPS 140-2 roles.
4.1 Crypto Officer Roles
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID)
This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Admin SP Secure ID (SID) Authority as defined in the TCG Storage
Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise].
4.1.2 EraseMaster
This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP EraseMaster Authority as defined in the TCG Storage
Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. The EraseMaster is a single dedicated authority
used to reset one or more LBA Ranges by invoking the Erase method on the Locking object representing that Range.
It can disable User roles.
4.2 User Roles
4.2.1 BandMaster
This user role corresponds to the Locking SP Bandmaster Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security
Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. BandMasters lock and unlock LBA ranges and
configure LBA bands (user data regions) to control the ability of an operator to read and write data to the
Cryptographic Module. The EraseMaster Authority can disable a BandMaster. The Cryptographic Module supports a
maximum of sixteen (16) active BandMaster Authorities.
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4.2.2 Anybody
The Anybody role executes services that do not require authentication. With two exceptions, these services do not
disclose, modify, or substitute Critical Security Parameters when using an Approved security function, or otherwise
affect the security of the Cryptographic Module. The Generate Random service provides an output from the SP 800-
90A DRBG. The Zeroize service utilizes the TCG Revert method to cryptographically erase CSPs and return the
Cryptographic Module to its original manufactured state.
4.3 Makers
For failure analysis purposes, authorized Western Digital personnel can enable a logical diagnostic port to perform
diagnostics and gather data on the failure within a Western Digital facility. A power cycle automatically disables the
logical diagnostic port. An operator must authenticate to the SID authority and the Makers authority to enable the
logical diagnostic port. Authentication to the Makers authority is blocked in FIPS Approved mode. Authenticating to
the Makers authority requires access to secure server controlled by Western Digital. A signed secure message, which
includes a unique ID, issued by the secure server is necessary to authenticate to the Makers authority.
TCG Authority Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID
The SID Authority is a Crypto Officer role that
initializes the Cryptographic Module and
authorizes Firmware downloads.
Role-based
CO Identity (SID
Authority) and PIN (SID
Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
The EraseMaster Authority is a Crypto Officer
role that zeroizes Media Encryption keys and
disables Users.
Role-based
CO Identity (EraseMaster
Authority) and PIN
(EraseMaster PIN)
BandMasterN
(N = 0 to 15)
The BandMaster Authority is a User role that
controls read/write access to LBA Bands. Role-based
User Identity (BandMaster
Authority) and PIN
(BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
Anybody is a role that does not require
authentication.
Unauthenticated N/A
Makers
Completion of the Initialize Cryptographic
Module service blocks authentication to the
Makers Authority
Role-based
CO Identity (SID
Authority) and PIN
(Makers PIN)
Table 6 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
4.4 Authentication Method and Strength
Operator authentication occurs within a TCG session. At any one time, only a single session can be open. After
opening an Admin SP session or a Locking SP session, an operator uses the Authenticate service to authenticate to a
role. Authentications persist until the session closes or the Cryptographic Module powers down.
Operators utilize an Authority PIN to authenticate to the Crypto Officer, User or Makers role. Authority PINs are
32-byte TCG credentials. For any Authority PIN, there are 2256 possible values. Values from 0x00 to 0xFF are
allowed at each byte position. Assuming all possible values have an equal chance of use, the probability of guessing
the correct value is one chance in 2256 or approximately 8.64 x 10-78, which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000.
The TCG Enterprise security model includes a TryLimit attribute, which if exceeded, locks out further Admin SP or
Locking SP authentication attempts. Assuming the TryLimit is not set to zero8, an Authority_Locked_Out state
exists if the Tries count value exceeds the TryLimit value associated with either the Admin SP or Locking SP. Each
authentication attempt consumes approximately 848 microseconds. Hence, at most, approximately 70,720 (TryLimit
= 0) authentication attempts are possible in one minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs within a
8 When TryLimit is set to zero the module places no limit on the number of authentication attempts.
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one-minute interval is approximately 6.1 x 10-73 (8.64 x 10-78 x 70,720), which is significantly less than 1 chance in
100,000.
5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-
Approved
Initialize Cryptographic
Module9
Crypto Officer provisions the
Cryptographic Module from the
organizational policies
CO (SID) X X
Activate
The Activate method allows the TPer
owner to “turn on” a Security Provider (SP)
that was created in manufacturing. LBA
ranges are configured, and data encryption
and access control credentials (re)generated
and/or set on the Cryptographic Module.
Access control is configured for LBA range
unlocking.
CO (SID) X X
Authenticate Input a TCG Credential for authentication
CO (SID, EraseMaster),
Users (BandMasters),
Makers
X X
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware
Download service
CO (SID) X X
Firmware Download
RSA2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA-256
verify the entire firmware image. After a
successful download, the SED executes the
new firmware object code.
CO (SID) X X
Set
Write data structures; access control
enforcement occurs per data structure field.
This service can change PINs.
CO (SID, EraseMaster)
Users (BandMasters)
X X
Set Band Attributes
Set the starting location, size, and attributes
of an LBA band.
Users (BandMasters) X X
Lock/Unlock LBA Band Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band Users (BandMasters) X X
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data into
ciphertext and write in a LBA band.
Users (BandMasters) X X
Read Data
Read ciphertext from a LBA band and
output user plaintext data.
Users (BandMasters) X X
Set Data Store
Write a stream of bytes to unstructured
storage.
Users (BandMasters) X X
Erase LBA Band
This service cryptographically erases user
data within a specific LBA Range and resets
the access control of that LBA Range
CO (EraseMaster) X X
9 See the Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning section within the Ultrastar DC HC550 Product Manual.
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Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-
Approved
Field FA
This service provides basic drive health
analysis testing and media verification. The
service does not leak any clear text user data
to the host interface. This service is limited
to performing the following functions:
• Basic health tests
• Media verification.
• All Host Read/Write Commands are
inhibited.
CO (SID) Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Diagnostics
A non-Approved service that is unavailable
after the Initialize Cryptographic Module
service completes. For failure analysis
purposes, the vendor can enable a logical
diagnostic port to perform diagnostics and
gather data on the failure.
Makers X
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services
5.2 Unauthenticated Services
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services lists the unauthenticated services the Cryptographic Module provides.
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Level 0 Discovery TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic Module
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
SCSI [SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage device.
See Table 13 - SCSI Commands
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor10
This service reports the FIPS 140 revision as well as the Cryptographic Module’s overall
security level, hardware revision, firmware revision and module name.
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
The TCG Revert method cryptographically erases CSPs and returns the Cryptographic
Module to its original manufactured state.
SecureDrive Command
The SAS native protocol IF-SEND and IF-RCV transport secure commands to and
from the Cryptographic Module. The SD SM Key verifies secure commands.
SoC Rebuild
The SoC Rebuild service utilizes the SecureDrive Command service to zeroize and
regenerate the Root Keyset and the Global Active Keyset
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services
10 See Security Features for SCSI Commands [SFSC] for further details
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5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the CSPs listed in Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys. Zeroization of CSPs
complies with the purge requirements for SCSI Hard Disk drives within [SP800-88], Guidelines for Media
Sanitization.
Name Type Description
NDRNG 5120-bit Entropy output Entropy source for DRBG
DRBG.Seed 256-byte Entropy input Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A] CTR_DRBG
using AES-256
Sourced from NDRNG
DRBG.Key 256-bit value Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A] CTR_DRBG
using AES-256
DRBG.V 128-bit value Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A] CTR_DRBG
using AES-256.
Authority Digest 256-bit digest An HMAC-SHA2-256 digest of an Authority PIN and its
associated SED AdminSP Active key or SED LockingSP
Active key.
Authority PIN 32-byte value Values from 0x00 to 0xFF are allowed for each byte position.
A PBKDF2 algorithm uses an Authority PIN to authenticate
the credential of a TCG Authority.
BandMaster PIN
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
Authority PIN A 256-bit data used to authenticate the TCG Authority
credential of a BandMaster.
Crypto Officer PIN Authority PIN A 256-bit data used to authenticate the TCG Authority
credentials of the SID.
EraseMaster PIN Authority PIN A 256-bit data used to authenticate the TCG Authority
credential of the EraseMaster.
Root Keyset Set of 256-bit keys:
Root Encryption Key
Root Signing Key
The Root Encryption Key encrypts the Global Active Keyset.
The HMAC-SHA256 Root Signing Key signs the Global
Active Keyset.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification.
Global Active Keyset
(AEK)
Set of 256-bit keys:
Global Active Key,
Global Active Signing
Key
The Global Active Key encrypts the SED Active Keyset and
the Namespace Keys.
The HMAC-SHA256 Global Active Signing Key signs the
SED Active Keyset.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification
SED Active Keyset Set of 256-bit keys:
SED Active Key
SED Active Signing
Key
The SED Active Key encrypts/decrypts the SED Admin SP
Active Keyset and the SED Locking SP Active Keyset.
The HMAC-SHA256 SED Active Signing Key signs the SED
Admin SP Active Keyset and the SED Locking SP Active
Keyset.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification
SED Admin SP Keyset Set of 256-bit keys:
SED Admin SP Key
SED Admin SP
Signing Key
The SED Admin SP Key encrypts/decrypts CSPs that belong
to the Admin SP.
The HMAC-SHA256 SED Admin SP Signing Key signs CSPs
that belong to the Admin SP.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification
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Name Type Description
SED Locking SP Keyset Set of 256-bit keys:
SED Locking SP Key
SED Locking SP
Signing Key
The SED Locking SP Key encrypts/decrypts CSPs that
belong to the Locking SP.
The HMAC-SHA256 SED Locking SP Signing Key signs
CSPs that belong to the Locking SP.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification
SED Volatile Keyset Set of 256-bit keys:
SED Volatile Key
SED Volatile Signing
Key
The SED Volatile Key encrypts/decrypts keys stored in
IRAM.
The HMAC-SHA256 SED Volatile Signing Key signs keys
that are stored in IRAM.
The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each key
without modification.
Admin Authority Key (Ka) 256-bit key This PBKDF2 derived key encrypts and decrypts UAKs and
the UMK. The Ka key is destroyed after use.
Non-Admin Authority
Key (Ku)
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
256-bit key These PBKDF2 derived keys encrypt and decrypt all UAKs
except UAKa. Ku keys are destroyed after use.
User Access Key (UAK)
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
256-bit key UAKs encrypt and decrypt RAKs. The Cryptographic
Module’s DRBG generates each key without modification.
Anybody User Access
Key11 (UAKa)
256-bit key The Anybody Authority uses UAKa to decrypt the RAK of
unlocked LBA bands. The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG
generates each key without modification.
User Management Key
(UMK)
256-bit key The CM uses the UMK to decrypt UAKs. The Cryptographic
Module’s DRBG generates each key without modification.
Range Access Key (RAK) 256-bit key RAKs encrypt/decrypt LRKs. The Cryptographic Module’s
DRBG generates each key without modification.
Locking Range Key (LRK)
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
Set of 256-bit keys:
LRK.AES Key,
LRK.XTS Key
An LRK is used in combination with an NSK to create an
MEK. The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each
LRK.AES Key and LRK.XTS Key without modification.
Namespace Key (NSK)
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
Set of 256-bit keys:
NSK.AES Key,
NSK.XTS Key
An NSK is used in combination with an LRK to create an
MEK. The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates each
NSK.AES Key and NSK.XTS Key without modification.
MEK - Media Encryption
Keyset
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
Derived set of 256-bit
keys:
MEK.AESEnc Key,
MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak
Key
The MEK encrypts and decrypts LBA bands. The
MEK.AESEnc Key is an XOR of an LRK.AES Key and an
NSK.AES Key.
The MEK.XTS.Tweak Key is an XOR of an LRK.XTS Key
and an NSK.XTS Key
The MEK.AESDec key is the last entry of key schedule for an
MEK.AESEnc key.
Table 9 - CSPs
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify that firmware downloaded to the module is
authentic and to verify specific steps in the secure boot process. The Cryptographic Module uses RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 to verify each signature within the asymmetric key tree to establish a chain of trust. The private key used in this
process is stored within a Hardware Security Module (HSM), which is used to generate the RSA Public/Private key
pairs. The Cryptographic Module rejects the downloaded firmware image if the digital signature verification process
fails.
11 The AEK encrypts the UAKa.
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Key Name Type Description
PSID12 32-character
alphanumeric string
The PSID is derived from a 32-byte value generated by the
Cryptographic Module’s DRBG, without modification. The
alphanumeric string is derived by passing the 32-byte value
through an Alphanumeric Character Conversion process.
The value is displayed on the module’s product label. The
PSID provides authentication data and proof of physical
presence for the Zeroize service.
MSID13 32-character
alphanumeric string
The MSID is derived from a 32-byte value generated by the
Cryptographic Module’s DRBG, without modification. The
alphanumeric string is derived by passing the 32-byte value
through an Alphanumeric Character Conversion process.
KDF Salt 256-bit key
The PBKDF2 implementation utilizes unique KDF Salts to
derive each UAK and the UMK. The Cryptographic
Module’s DRBG generates KDF Salts without modification.
Storage Device Certification
Authority Key (SD_CA Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The SD_CA Key is the Master RSA Public Key used to verify
the Secure Loader image.
Storage Device Boot FW
Key (SD_BFW Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The SD_BFW Key is public key used to verify all boot flash
images.
Storage Device Secure
Message Key (SD_SM Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The SD_SM Key verifies secure messages used for
manufacturing, development, and failure analysis
Security Core Firmware Key
(SC_FW Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The SC_FW Key verifies the Access Control Module (ACM)
images containing security core firmware.
Security Protocol Firmware
Key (SP_FW Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The SP_FW Key verifies ACM firmware images that contain
security protocol and services _
Product Group Key (PROD
GROUP Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The PROD GROUP Key verifies OEM.x Key certificates.
OEM Firmware Key (OEM
FW Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The OEM FW Key verifies OEM firmware images and
packages.
OEM_Release Key
(OEM_Release Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The OEM Release Key verifies the outer signature of an
OEM firmware package.
OEM Original Factory State
Key (OEM_OFS Key)
RSA 2048 PKCS#1
v1.5 public key
The OEM_OFS Key verifies the OEM Original Factory
Settings files.
Table 10 - Public Security Parameters
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
• The Cryptographic Module utilizes an HMAC-SHA-256 based [SP800 132] Password Based Key Derivation
Function (PBKDF2) that complies with Option 2a of SP800-132.
• Security Policy rules set the minimum Authority PIN length at 32-bytes. The Cryptographic Module allows
values from 0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of the Authority PIN.
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing an Authority PIN is 2-256. The difficulty of guessing the
Authority PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
12 The SED Active Key is used to encrypt the PSID. An HMAC SHA2-256 digest of the PSID is store in the Reserved Area. The TCG Revert
method regenerates the digest.
13 An HMAC SHA2-256 digest of the MSID is store in the Reserved Area. The TCG Revert method regenerates the digest.
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• Derived Authority Keys, Ka, and Ku ([SP800 132] Master Keys) are derive by processing a clear-text 32-
character Authority PIN ([SP800 132] Password) and a 256-bit KDF Salt though an PBKDF2 algorithm
[SP800 132]. The Cryptographic Module creates a Ka key to protect the EraseMaster UMK and unique Ku
keys to protect each BandMaster UAK.
• Each Ka and Ku has a security strength of 256-bits against a collision attack.
• Each 256-bit KDF Salt is a random number generated using the [SP800 90A] DRBG.
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 11 and Table 12 define the relationship between access to Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and the listed
Cryptographic Module services. The definitions shown below define the access modes listed in Table 11 and Table
12.
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the [SP800-90A] DRBG, derives a CSP with
the PBKDF2 Key Derivation Function or generates an HMAC-SHA-256 hash to sign a CSP.
• I = Input: The Cryptographic Module imports a CSP from outside the cryptographic boundary.
• O = Output: The Cryptographic Module does not support the output of CSPs outside the cryptographic
boundary.
• E = Execute: The module executes a service that uses the CSP.
• S = Store: The Cryptographic Module stores a CSP persistently on media within the Cryptographic Module.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP that is stored in volatile or non-volatile memory.
Service
Authority
Digest
Authority
PIN
(BandMaster
PIN,
Crypto
Officer
PIN,
EraseMaster
PIN)
DRBG
NDRNG
MEK
K
a
K
u
LRK
RAK
Initialize Cryptographic
Module
GS IE GE GE GS GS GS GS GS
Activate GE GS GS GS GS GS
Authenticate E IE E E
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Firmware Download
Set I
Set Band Attributes
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
Write Data E E E
Read Data E E E
Set Data Store E E E
Field FA
Erase LBA Band GSZ GSZ GSZ
Self-Test (KATs)
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Service
Authority
Digest
Authority
PIN
(BandMaster
PIN,
Crypto
Officer
PIN,
EraseMaster
PIN)
DRBG
NDRNG
MEK
K
a
K
u
LRK
RAK
Reset Module
(Power on Reset)
GE GE S S S
Status Output
Level 0 Discovery
Start Session
End Session
Generate Random GE
Get Data Store E E E E
Get
Zeroize (TCG Revert) GZ Z GE GSZ Z Z GSZ GSZ
SoC Rebuild
SCSI
SecureDrive Command
Diagnostics
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
Service
UAK
UMK
NSK
Root
Keyset
Global
Active
Keyset
(AEK)
SED
Active
Keyset
SED
Admin
SP
Keyset
SED
Locking
SP
Keyset
SED
Volatile
Keyset
Initialize Cryptographic Module GS GS GS
Activate GS GS GS
Authenticate
Lock/Unlock Firmware Download
Control
Firmware Download
Set
Set Band Attributes
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
Write Data E E E E E E E E E
Read Data E E E E E E E E E
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Service
UAK
UMK
NSK
Root
Keyset
Global
Active
Keyset
(AEK)
SED
Active
Keyset
SED
Admin
SP
Keyset
SED
Locking
SP
Keyset
SED
Volatile
Keyset
Set Data Store E E E E E E E E E
Field FA
Erase LBA Band E GSZ
Self-Test (KATs)
Reset Module
(Power on Reset)
S S GS
Status Output
Level 0 Discovery
Start Session
End Session
Generate Random
Get Data Store E E E E E E E E E
Get
Zeroize (TCG Revert) GSZ GSZ GSZ GSZ GSZ GSZ GSZ
SoC Rebuild GSZ GSZ
SCSI
SecureDrive Command
Diagnostics
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
5.7 Definition of PSP Modes of Access
Table 13 defines the relationship between access to Public Security Parameters (PSP) and the listed Cryptographic
Module services. The definitions shown below define the access modes listed in Table 13.
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a PSP from the [SP800-90A] DRBG, derives a PSP
with the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-256.
• I = Input: The Cryptographic Module imports a PSP from outside the cryptographic boundary.
• O = Output: The Cryptographic module outputs the value of selective PSPs.
• E = Execute: The module executes a service that uses the PSP.
• S = Store: The Cryptographic Module stores a PSP persistently on media within the Cryptographic Module.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a PSP that is stored in volatile or non-volatile memory.
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Service
MSID
PSID
KDF
Salt
SD_CA
Key
SD_BFW
Key
SD_SM
Key
SC_FW
Key
SP_FW
Key
PROD_GROUP
Key
OEM_FW
Key
OEM_Release
Key
OEM_OFS
Key
Initialize Cryptographic
Module
OE GS
Activate
Authenticate E
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Firmware Download E ES ES E
Set
Set Band Attributes
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
Write Data
Read Data
Set Data Store
Field FA E
Erase LBA Band
Self-Test (KATs)
Reset Module (Power on
Reset)
E E E E E E
Status Output
Level 0 Discovery
Start Session
End Session
Generate Random
Get Data Store
Get
Zeroize (TCG Revert) I GSZ
SoC Rebuild
SCSI
SecureDrive Command E
Diagnostics
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor
Table 13 - PSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
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6. Operational Environment
The Cryptographic Module’s operating environment is non-modifiable. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2 operational
environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits
additions, deletions, or modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses
an authenticated download service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. If the download operation is successful,
authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set. Firmware
loaded into the module that is not on the FIPS 140-2 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
7. Security Rules
The Cryptographic Module enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents
the security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Crypto Officer and User. The
module also supports an additional role, the Makers role. Initialization blocks authentication to the Makers
role.
2. Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
3. After the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed all self-tests and initialized according to the
instructions provided in Section 7.2, it is in FIPS Approved mode.
4. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access
to any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
5. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic
Module enters a soft error state. The Cryptographic module reports the error condition by transmitting
an UEC via the [SCSI] protocol. After entering the soft error state, the Cryptographic Module does not
process functional commands unless a power cycle occurs.
a. Power up Self-Tests
i. SHA-256 KAT, Cert. #SHS 2942
ii. HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, Cert. #HMAC 2280
iii. AES Encrypt ECB KAT, Cert. #AES 3580
iv. AES Decrypt ECB KAT, Cert. #AES 3580
v. RSA 2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 Verify KAT, Certs. #A1389 and #A1390
vi. SP 800-90B Entropy Source Health Test
vii. Firmware Integrity, RSAPKCS#1 v1.5 2048 Digital Signature, Certs. #A1389 and #A1390
viii. DRBG KAT14, Certs. #A1389 and #A1390
ix. PBKDF2 KAT, Certs. #A1389, and #A1390
x. AES Encrypt ECB KAT, DEE, Cert. #A670
xi. AES Decrypt ECB KAT, DEE, Cert. #A670
b. Conditional Tests
i. The Cryptographic Module performs a Repetition Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test on
the hardware NDRNG entropy source.
14 The DRBG KAT is inclusive of the instantiate, generate and reseed function health tests required in [SP 800-90A]
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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ii. The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on each LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS
and NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset to assure compliance with IG A.9 XTS-AES Key
Generation Requirements.
iii. Firmware Download Test, RSA 2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 (Certs #A1389 and #A1390), SHA-256
(Cert. #SHS 2942)
6. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power
cycling the device.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the
Cryptographic Module.
10. The Zeroize service deletes all plaintext keys and CSPs.
11. The SoC Rebuild service deletes the Root Keyset and Global Active Keyset.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support a maintenance role.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
17. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
18. The Cryptographic Module requires operators to re-authenticate to TCG Authorities after power cycling
the module or upon execution of the End Session service.
19. The Crypto Officer shall assure that all host issued Authority PINs are 32-bytes in length.
20. After a Firmware Download, the Crypto Officer shall execute “Set Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked =
True”.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall initialize the modules cryptographic services by executing the TCG methods listed below.
The FIPS 140 Crypto Officer Instructions section of the Ultrastar DC HC550 Product Manual provides the same
instructions. The Crypto Officer shall follow the delivery and operational instructions within the Delivery &
Operation (Crypto Officer’s) Manual for acceptance and end of life procedures.
1. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Admin SP’
a. Get MSID
b. Use the MSID to authenticate to the SID.
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module
c. Set ‘SID PIN’ to a new 32-byte value
d. Set ‘Makers.Enabled = FALSE’
e. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked = True’
f. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.LockOnReset = PowerCycle’
2. EndSession
3. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Locking SP’
a. Use the MSID to authenticate to the EraseMaster
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module
b. Set ‘EraseMaster PIN’ to a new 32-byte value
c. Erase Band0
d. Use the MSID to authenticate to BandMaster0.
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module.
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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e. Set ‘BandMaster0 PIN’ to a new 32-byte
f. Repeat steps 3.d and 3.e for BandMaster1 to BandMaster15.
4. EndSession
5. Power cycle or reset the Cryptographic Module.
At the end of the initialization process, the Cryptographic Module will be in a FIPS Approved Mode of operation.
While in FIPS Approved mode, only an authenticated Crypto Officer can change the state of the firmware download
service.
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall use the Zeroize service to zeroize all CSP, apart from the Root Keyset and the Global Active
Set. After successfully executing the Zeroize service, the Crypto Officer shall power cycle the module. Power cycling
the module assures the erasure of all CSPs stored in volatile memory.
The SoC Rebuild service zeroizes and regenerates the Root Keyset and the Global Active Keyset. Executing this
process exhausts an SoC life. The module is inoperable when the life count reaches zero. The Crypto Officer shall
assure that SoC Rebuild service is never execute unless necessary to protect the integrity of the Cryptographic Module.
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Western Digital applies one tamper-evident security seal during manufacturing. See Figure 2.
• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering. In addition, it is difficult to replicate the of tamper-evident security seal.
Figure 2: Tamper-Evident Seal
8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Crypto Officer and/or User shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure at installation and at least once a
year thereafter for evidence of tampering. See Figure 3: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal. If the inspection reveals
evidence of tampering, the Crypto Officer should return the module to Western Digital.
Figure 3: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of the requirements within
FIPS 140-2.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted, and legacy use. [SP800-131A]
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
1
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• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the Cryptographic Module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the
security of a Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds
of a Cryptographic Module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement approved
security functions contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
• Crypto Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions. [FIPS140]
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media when the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Drive Writes per Day (DWPD): Drive Writes per Day defines how many times the entire capacity of the
HDD can be overwrite every single day of its usable life without failure during the warranty period.
• Hardware Security Module (HSM): A hardware security module is a physical computing device that
safeguards and manages digital keys, performs encryption and decryption functions for digital signatures,
strong authentication, and other cryptographic functions.
• Integrity: A cryptographic property to assure sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an
unauthorized and undetected manner.
• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module. The handling of authentication data is
representative of a key management activity.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
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• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique default value assigned to each SED during manufacturing. An
externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive the MSID from other information printed
on the drive. The MSID is readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for all TCG
credentials. [TCG Core]
• Method: A remote procedure call to an SP that initiates an action on the SP. [TCG Core]
• OFS file: OFS files are used to reset the Cryptographic Module’s configuration back to its original factory
setting during the Revert operations (e.g., TCG Revert).
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Unencrypted data.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that. A port provides access to the
Cryptographic Module’s physical signals. [FIPS140]
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): A SED unique value printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service.
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information, that if modified can compromise the security of the
Cryptographic Module (e.g., a public key).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• SD_CA Key: Storage Device Certification Authority Key (X509v3). This key serves as the Cryptographic
Module’s Master RSA Public Key and is the root source of verification for all other key certificates. The
SD_CA Key signs the SecureLoader. This key is injected at manufacturing time and a hash of this key is
stored as OTP bits.
• Security Identifier (SID): The authority that represents the TPer owner. Crypto Officer serves in this role.
[TCG Core]
• Security Provider (SP): A TCG term used to define a collection of Tables and Methods with access control.
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services, which automatically
encrypts all user data written to the device and automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Small Form Factor (SFF): Small form factor is a computer form factor designed to minimize the volume
and footprint of a desktop computer
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• Table: The basic data structures within a Security Provider (SP). The tables store persistent SP state data
defined in TCG Core specification. [TCG Core]
• TPer: A Trusted Peripheral. [TCG Core]
• Triple Level Cell (TLC): Triple level cells refer to NAND flash devices that store three bits of information
per cell, with eight total voltage states.
• User Data: Data transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
Ultrastar DC HC550 TCG Enterprise HDD FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• AEK: Active Encryption Key
• AES: Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS
197)
• CBC: Cipher Block Chaining, an operational
mode of AES
• CM: Cryptographic Module
• CO: Crypto Officer [FIPS140]
• CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• DEE: Data Encryption Engine
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• DW/D: Drive Writes per Day
• EDC: Error Detection Code
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FSEC: Flash Security Data
• FID: Flash Internal Data
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing
Standard
• HDD: Hard Disk Drive
• IV: Initialization Vector
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• KDF: Key Derivation Function
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID: Manufactured Security Identifier
• NAND: Negative AND Flash Memory
technology
• NOR: Negative OR Flash Memory
technology
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random
Number Generator
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and
Technology
• OFS: Original Factory Setting
• PBKDF2: Password Base Key Derivation
Function
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• POR: Power on Reset
• PSID: Physical Security Identifier
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• RID: Reserved Area Internal Data
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SECD: Security Data
• SED: Self-Encrypting Drive
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SD_CA: Storage Device Certification
Authority
• SED: Self Encrypting Drive
• SFF: HDD Form Factor or Small Form
Factor
• SID: Security Identifier, The TCG authority
representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• SIO: Serial Input/Output
• SOC: System-on-a-Chip
• SP: Security Provider or Security Partition
(TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140)
• SSC: Subsystem Class
• SSD: Solid-state Drive
• SWG: Storage Work Group
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• TLC: Triple Level Cell
• UEC: Universal Error Code
• XTS: A mode of AES that utilizes
"Tweakable" block ciphers
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12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, November 2001
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, July 2013
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, December 2002
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
• [SP800 38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, NIST,
December 2001
• [SP800 38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, January 2010
• [SP800 38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
December 2012
• [SP800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, January 2016
• [SP800 90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
• [SP800 90B] Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST, January
2018
• [SP800 131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths (Revision 2), NIST, March 2019
• [SP800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
• [SP800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation (Revision 2), NIST, June 2020
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [TCG Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00
(January 10, 2011)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version
1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
• TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.02, (2011)
12.3 International Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands (SPC-5)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI (SAS-4)
• [SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands
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12.4 Corporate Documents
• [Product Manual] Ultrastar DC HC550 2.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) Solid-State Drive Product
Manual, Version 1.0 (March 2020), https://www.westerndigital.com/support
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar DC HC550 Product Brief, (November 2019),
https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-sas-series-HDD
12.5 SCSI Commands
Table 14 - SCSI Commands
Description Code Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h RESERVE 16h
INQUIRY 12h RESERVE 56h
LOG SELECT 4Ch REZERO UNIT 01h
LOG SENSE 4Dh SANITIZE 48h
MODE SELECT 15h SEEK (6) 0Bh
MODE SELECT 55h SEEK (10) 2Bh
MODE SENSE 1Ah SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
MODE SENSE 5Ah SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh START STOP UNIT 1Bh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h TEST UNIT READY 00h
READ (6) 08h UNMAP 42h
READ (10) 28h VERIFY (10) 2Fh
READ (12) A8h VERIFY (12) AFh
READ (16) 88h VERIFY (16) 8Fh
READ (32) 7Fh/09h VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
READ BUFFER 3Ch WRITE (6) 0Ah
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h WRITE (10) 2Ah
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h WRITE (12) AAh
READ DEFECT DATA 37h WRITE (16) 8Ah
READ DEFECT DATA B7h WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
READ LONG 3Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS 1Ch WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
RELEASE 17h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
RELEASE 57h WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
REPORT LUNS A0h WRITE SAME (10) 41h
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Description Code Description Code
REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION
CODES
A3h/0Ch WRITE SAME (16) 93h
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h