Page 1 of 37
JVCKENWOOD Corporation
Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM)
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.0
Last Modified: 22/10/2025
Page 2 of 37
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................11
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................11
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification.........................................................................................12
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited .........................................................................................12
3.4 Additional Information......................................................................................................12
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................12
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................13
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................25
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................26
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status..............................................................................................26
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................27
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................27
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................27
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................27
5.3 Open-Source Parameters................................................................................................27
5.4 Additional Information......................................................................................................27
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................27
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................27
Page 3 of 37
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................27
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................28
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................28
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................28
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................28
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................28
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................28
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................29
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................29
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................31
9.6 Additional Information......................................................................................................31
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................31
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................31
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................32
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................33
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................34
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................34
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................34
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................35
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................35
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................35
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................36
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................36
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................36
12.1 Attack List......................................................................................................................36
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness .................................................................................................36
13 Acronyms.............................................................................................................................37
Page 4 of 37
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms........................................................................ 9
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................10
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................12
Table 8: Roles...........................................................................................................................12
Table 9: Approved Services ......................................................................................................25
Table 10: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................26
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................28
Table 12: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................28
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................29
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................29
Table 15: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................30
Table 16: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................30
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................31
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................33
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................33
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................33
Table 21: Error States...............................................................................................................34
List of Figures
Figure 1– Physical Form of the SCM.......................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – SCM Block Diagram.................................................................................................. 7
Page 5 of 37
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document defines the FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Secure Cryptographic Module
(SCM).
The SCM is a hardware cryptographic module developed by JVCKENWOOD Corporation to
provide FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic security functionality for the following radio device
series:
TK-5XX0 Series FM/P25 digital two-way radios
NX-/NXR- Series FM/P25/NEXEDGE digital radios
VPxxx0 Series FM/P25 digital two-way radios
VMxxx0 Series FM/P25 digital two-way radios
The SCM is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that meets the overall Level 1
requirements of FIPS 140-3.
It connects to the above radio devices and provides cryptographic services compliant with FIPS
140-3, supporting digital communication standards such as P25, DMR, and NEXEDGE.
・P25 (Project 25) is a digital radio standard developed for public safety communications. It
enables interoperability across agencies and jurisdictions. P25 is defined by the TIA-102 series
of standards.
・DMR (Digital Mobile Radio) is an ETSI standard for professional mobile radio systems, widely
used in commercial and industrial sectors. It supports tiered functionality (Tier I–III) and efficient
spectrum use.
・NEXEDGE is a proprietary digital radio protocol developed by Kenwood. It is designed for
conventional and trunked radio systems. It is often used in private and commercial radio
networks.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
Page 6 of 37
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The cryptographic module is intended to be embedded in JVCKENWOOD radio devices and to
perform cryptographic functions.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical form of the cryptographic module is shown in Figure 1.
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the external surface of the SCM printed circuit board
with the shield cover attached.
The shield cover provides physical protection and is considered part of the cryptographic
boundary.
A block diagram showing the connection between the cryptographic module and external
hardware (radio device) is provided in Figure 2.
The red frame indicates the cryptographic boundary.
The SCM consists of a processor (DSP), non-volatile memory (NVM), clock, tamper detection
circuitry, and a board-to-board connector.
Figure 1– Physical Form of the SCM
Page 7 of 37
Figure 2 – SCM Block Diagram
When loading cryptographic keys, an external key loader device is used in conjunction with the
radio device.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
KWD-
AE30-0
2.0.0 A3.2.0 TI DSP
TMS320C5517
NVM: EN39SL801-70 / 8 Mbit/
EON
KWD-
AE30-1
2.1.0 A3.2.0 TI DSP
TMS320C5517
NVM: EN39SL800-70 / 8 Mbit /
EON
KWD-
AE30-2
2.2.0 A3.2.0 TI DSP
TMS320C5517
NVM: SST39WF800B / 8 Mbit /
Microchip
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Page 8 of 37
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not claim any excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved Mode Approved Show Status
Non-Approved Mode Non-Approved Show Status
Table 3: Modes List and Description
As shown in Table “Modes List and Description”, the cryptographic module includes both
Approved Mode and Non-Approved Mode.
Immediately after power-on, the module starts in Approved Mode.
Mode Change Instructions and Status
The cryptographic module transitions to Non-Approved Mode when any of the following services
are requested by the Crypto Officer:
⚫ A request is received to initialize (key expansion) for DES.
⚫ A request is received for the OTAR Calc MAC DES service.
⚫ A request is received to input a DES key.
⚫ A request is received to delete a DES key.
Conversely, the module transitions to Approved Mode when any of the following services are
requested by the Crypto Officer:
⚫ A request is received to initialize (key expansion) for AES Encryption or Decryption.
⚫ A request is received for the OTAR Calc-MAC service that verifies the integrity of KMM
using CMAC.
⚫ A request is received to input an AES key.
⚫ A request is received to delete an AES key.
⚫ A request is received for the AM Calculation service.
⚫ A request is received for the Firmware Update service.
The operator can confirm the current mode by invoking the Show Status service to check the
value of the cryptographic status flag.
If the flag is set to “1”, the module is in Approved Mode; if set to “0”, it is in Non-Approved Mode.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Page 9 of 37
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-
CMAC
AES 2696 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB AES 2696 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB AES 2696 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
SHA2-256 SHS 2285 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 1
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
The CAVP certificates for the cryptographic module include algorithms and options that are not
used in the Approved mode of the module.
Only the algorithms and options listed in the above table are used in the module's Approved
mode.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
DES-MAC MAC generation
DES encryption, decryption
Table 5: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Block Cipher BC-UnAuth Encryption and
Decryption
Key Length:128,
256 bits
AES-OFB: (AES
2696)
Key Expansion BC-UnAuth Expanding the
key to generate
expanded keys
Key Length:128,
256 bits
AES-OFB: (AES
2696)
Key Decryption BC-AuthDecrypt Decrypts an
encrypted key
that has been
encrypted using
a KEK
Key Length:256
bits
AES-ECB: (AES
2696)
Page 10 of 37
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Secure Hash SHA Secure Hash
Function
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2285)
Firmware
Authentication
MAC Verifies the
authenticity of
received
firmware during
update
Key Length:256
bits
AES-CMAC:
(AES 2696)
Firmware
Integrity
Verification
MAC Verifies the
integrity of
firmware,
including boot
firmware, during
pre-operational
self-tests.
Key Length:256
bits
AES-CMAC:
(AES 2696)
OTAR MAC
Generation
MAC Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
using AES-
CMAC
Key Length:256
bits
AES-CMAC:
(AES 2696)
Link Layer
Authentication
BC-AuthEncrypt Generates the
Response for
link layer
authentication
by encrypting
input RS and
RAND using
AMK with AES-
ECB.
Key Length:128
bits
AES-ECB: (AES
2696)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
Note:
AES Encryption and Decryption services require prior execution of the corresponding
initialization process. Without initialization, the module will return an INVALID_RSP, and the
cryptographic operation will not proceed.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
2.9 Key Generation
N/A for this module.
Page 11 of 37
2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not support key establishment.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The cryptographic module, when integrated with the radio device, supports industry-standard
protocols defined under the Project 25 (P25) suite for secure land mobile radio communications.
Specifically, the module complies with the following protocols:
Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR):
Defined in TIA-102.AACA-A, this protocol enables secure remote distribution and updating of
encryption keys over radio networks.
The module, in conjunction with the radio device, facilitates OTAR functionality to ensure secure
and efficient key management.
Key Fill Device (KFD) Interface Protocol:
Defined in TIA-102.AACD-A, this protocol specifies the interface and procedures for manually
provisioning encryption and authentication keys from external key loaders to mobile radios.
The module operates in coordination with the radio device to support secure key loading via
KFD.
These protocols ensure interoperability and secure key management within P25-compliant
systems.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Vcc Power +3.3V
BUSY Status Output Busy Indicator
TXD Data Output
Status Output
UART data for firmware updating and key loading
RXD Data Input
Control Input
UART data for firmware updating and key loading
TAMPER Data Input Tamper detection information
TAMPER2 Data Input Tamper detection Information
SCK Control Input SPI shift clock
/BFS Status Output Frame sync
MOSI Data Input
Control Input
SPI data
MISO Data Output
Control Input
SPI data
/SS Control Input SPI slave enable
Page 12 of 37
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
/WAKEUP Control Input Wakeup from sleep mode
/Reset Control Input Reset
/REQ Status Output Interrupt request
GND Power Ground
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces
None of the available ports implement the Control Output function.
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification
N/A
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited
N/A
3.4 Additional Information
The cryptographic module does not allow any other services to operate while a service is in
progress.
When the cryptographic module is performing self-tests or executing a zeroization process, all
data output through the data output interface is prohibited.
If the cryptographic module enters an error state, data output is also prohibited; however, status
output remains enabled.
During the firmware load process, all data output through the data output interface is prohibited.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
This module does not support operator authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO Role Crypto-Officer None
User Role User None
Table 8: Roles
The cryptographic module supports two roles: the Cryptographic Officer (CO) and the User.
These roles are implicitly selected by the operator based on the services being accessed.
The module does not support a maintenance role.
Page 13 of 37
• CO Role: Responsible for managing the module. This includes installing the module into
the radio and managing of cryptographic keys.
• User Role: Has access to general cryptographic operations supported by the module.
This includes using cryptographic functions such as encryption and decryption.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Power-
up Self-
test
The
module
perform
s a
series of
self-
tests
upon
power-
up to
verify
the
integrity
of its
firmware
and the
correct
operatio
n of its
cryptogr
aphic
algorith
ms .
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_SELF_TES
T), Success:
"0xAA0100000",
Failure: Any
response not
matching the
defined Success
response
Power Up,
Port:/Reset
SPI
ACK:
Self-
tests
Result
Firmwar
e
Integrity
Verificat
ion
CO
Radio
Pairing
The
module
perform
s
Kenwoo
d ESN
authenti
cation of
the radio
device.
The
module
verifies
whether
the
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_AUTH1 or
ACK_AUTH2),
Success:
"0x81010000" or
"0x92010000",
Failure:
"0x8101FFFF" or
"0x9201FFFF" or"
0x86010000"
SPI Command
(AUTH_CMD1 or
AUTH_CMD2) :
ESN (Electronic
Serial Number)
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess /
Failure
)
Secure
Hash
CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
Page 14 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
connect
ed radio
device is
same as
the
previous
ly
connect
ed one
or not. If
not,
required
process
es (e.g.,
key
zeroizati
on) are
perform
ed.
AES
Encrypti
on
Initializa
tion
The
module
perform
s the
encrypti
on
initializat
ion
process,
includin
g AES
key
expansi
on and
IV
generati
on.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_ENC_INIT),
Success:
"0x82060084" +
Any or "0x8205" +
Any, Failure
(INVALID_RSP):
"0xFF01" + Any
SPI Command
(ENC_INIT_CMD):
[CKR] or
[Algorithm, Key ID]
SPI
ACK:
[Algori
thm
ID,
Key
ID, IV]
or
[CKR,
IV]
Key
Expansi
on
CO
- TEK: E
AES
Decrypti
on
Initializa
tion
The
module
perform
s the
decrypti
on
initializat
ion
process,
includin
g AES
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_DEC_INIT),
Success:
"0x8301" + Any,
Failure
(INVALID_RSP):
"0xFF01" + Any
SPI Command
(DEC_INIT_CMD):
Algorithm, Key ID,
IV
SPI
ACK:C
KR
(Com
mon
Key
Refere
nce)
Key
Expansi
on
CO
- TEK: E
Page 15 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
key
expansi
on.
AES
Encrypti
on
The
module
encrypts
the
given
plaintext
and
outputs
the
resulting
cipherte
xt. It is
needed
that
AES
Encrypti
on
Initializat
ion has
been
execute
d.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_ENC),
Success:
"0x8408" + Any,
Failure
(INVALID_RSP):
"0xFF01" + Any
SPI Command
(ENC_CMD):
Plaintext
SPI
ACK:
Cipher
text
Block
Cipher
User
- TEK: E
AES
Decrypti
on
The
module
decrypts
the
given
cipherte
xt and
outputs
the
resulting
plaintext
. It is
needed
that
AES
Decrypti
on
Initializat
ion has
been
execute
d.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_DEC_INIT),
Success:
"0x8508" + Any,
Failure
(INVALID_RSP):
"0xFF01" + Any
SPI Command
(DEC_CMD):
Ciphertext
SPI
ACK:
Plainte
xt
Block
Cipher
User
- TEK: E
Page 16 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
AM
Calculat
ion
The
module
generat
es the
Respon
se for
Link
Layer
Authenti
cation.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_AM_CALC)
, Success: RES
(Response),
Failure
(INVALID_RSP):
"0xFF01" + Any
SPI Command
(AM_CALC_CMD):
SUID RS (Random
Seed) RAND
(Random
Challenge) Mode
(AM1-AM4)
SPI
ACK:
RES
(Resp
onse)
Link
Layer
Authenti
cation
CO
- AMK: E
Zeroize The
module
zeroizes
designat
ed keys.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_ZERO),
Success:
"0x8601" + Any
SPI
Command(ZERO_
CMD): All key
Request or
Keyset's CKR
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess /
Failure
)
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
KVL
mode
The
module
enables
commun
ication
with a
Key
Variable
Loader
to input
or delete
AES
cryptogr
aphic
keys.
SPI Command
Response
(KVL_MOD_CMD
), Success:
"0x88020000",
Failure: Any
response not
matching the
defined Success
response
SPI Command
(KVL_MOD_CMD):
Enter or exit KVL
Mode, UART Input:
KMM messages
containing key data
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess),
UART
ACK:
Respo
nse,
Key-
related
inform
ation
None CO
- TEK:
W,Z
- KEK:
W,Z
- AMK:
W,Z
Show
Status
The
module
returns
its
current
status in
respons
e to a
status
request.
SPI Command
Response
(STS_RSP),
Success:
"0x8902" + Any
SPI Command
(STS_REQ):
Request
SPI
ACK:
Self-
tests
Status
,
Cipher
Status
None Unauthe
nticated
Firmwar
e
Update
The
module
loads a
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_FIRM_UPD
SPI Command
(FIRM_UPDT_CM
D): Request, UART
SPI
ACK:
Firmwar
e
CO
- FWI:
W,E
Page 17 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
new
firmware
image
and
verifies
authenti
city
through
a
Firmwar
e Load
Test. If
the test
passes,
the
module
reboots
and
activate
s the
newly
loaded
firmware
,
resulting
in a
version
change.
T), Success:
"0x8A01" + Any,
Failure: "0x8A00"
or "0xFF01" + Any
(INVALID_RSP)
Input: Firmware
Data
Check
sum
Authenti
cation
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
Sleep The
module
enters
sleep
mode to
suspend
cryptogr
aphic
operatio
ns and
reduce
power
consum
ption.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_SLEEP),
Success:
"0x8D00"
SPI Command
(SLEEP_CMD):
Request
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess)
None User
Wake-
up
The
module
exits
sleep
mode
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_IDLE),
Success:
"0xAB00"
Interrupt request
for /WAKEUP port
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
None User
Page 18 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
and
resumes
normal
operatio
ns.
(Succ
ess)
Modify
clock
rate
The
module
modifies
the
DSP's
clock
rate.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_CHG_CLK)
, Success:
"0x8E00"
SPI Command
(CHG_CLK_CMD):
Clock Rate
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess)
None User
Beat
Shift
The
module
shifts
the
frequenc
y of its
clock
generat
or.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_BSHIFT),
Success:
"0x8F00"
SPI Command
(BSHIFT_CMD):
ON or OFF
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess)
None User
Show
Version
The
module
returns
its
module'
s
firmware
version
number
in
respons
e to a
version
request.
SPI Command
Response
(VER_SUM_RSP)
, "0x9005"+Any
SPI Command
(VER_SUM_REQ):
Request
SPI
ACK:
Versio
n
None Unauthe
nticated
OTAR
Calc-
MAC
The
module
calculat
es a
Messag
e
Authenti
cation
Code
(MAC)
for a
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_CAL
C_MAC),
:Success:
"0xE00A8100024
1” + Any, Failure:
"0xE0018101" or
"0xE0018104"
SPI KMM
Command
(OTAR_CALC_MA
C_CMD):
Algorithm(AES)
Format(CMAC)
Message
SPI
ACK:
MAC
OTAR
MAC
Generat
ion
CO
- TEK: E
Page 19 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
given
messag
e upon
request.
OTAR
Set-Key
The
module
receives
a key
encrypte
d with
the
KEK,
decrypts
it
internall
y, and
stores it
in the
designat
ed
location.
This
operatio
n is part
of the
P25
AES
OTAR
key
manage
ment
process.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_SET
_KEY), Success:
"0xE0018200",
Failure: Any
response
from"0xE0018201
"through
"0xE0018204"
SPI Command
(OTAR_SET_KEY
_CMD): KEK
information
(Algorithm ID, Key
ID) , Encrypted Key
information (
Keyset ID, SLN,
Algorithm ID, Key
ID, Key Name, Key
Data)
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess /
Failure
)
Key
Decrypti
on
CO
- TEK: W
- KEK:
W,E
OTAR
Set-
KeysetI
nfo
The
module
stores
Keyset
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_SET
_KSI), Success:
"0xE0018300",
Failure:"0xE00183
01" or
"0xE0018304"
SPI Command
(OTAR_SET_KSI_
CMD): Keyset
Information(Keyset
ID, Algorithm ID,
Format, Key
Name)
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess /
Failure
)
None CO
OTAR
Set-RSI
The
module
stores
RSI
informati
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_SET
_RSI), Success:
"0xE0018400",
SPI Command
(OTAR_SET_RSI_
CMD): RSI
information
(Update Type,
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
None CO
Page 20 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
Failure: Any
response from
"0xE0018401"
through
"0xE0018404"
Message Number,
Affected RSI, New
RSI)
ess /
Failure
)
OTAR
Delete-
Key
The
module
deletes
the
specifie
d key
upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_DEL
_KEY), Success:
"0xE0038500" +
Any, Failure:
"0xE0018501"
SPI Command
(OTAR_DEL_KEY
_CMD): Key ID,
Algorithm ID
SPI
ACK:
SLN,
Keyset
ID
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
OTAR
Delete-
Keyset
The
module
deletes
the
specifie
d Keyset
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_DEL
_KSET), Success:
"0xE0018600",
Failure:
"0xE0018601"
SPI Command
(OTAR_DEL_KSE
T_CMD): Keyset ID
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess /
Failure
)
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
OTAR
Chageo
ver-
Keyset
The
module
deletes
the
specifie
d Keyset
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_CO
_KSET), Success:
"0xE0028700" +
Any,
Failure:"0xE00287
01" + Any or
"0xE0028704" +
Any
SPI Command
(OTAR_CO_KSET
_CMD): Keyset ID
SPI Command:
superseded Keyset
ID, Activated
Keyset ID, Erase
mode
SPI
KMM
ACK:
supers
eded
Keyset
ID,
Activat
ed
Keyset
ID
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
OTAR
Zeroize
The
module
deletes
all
stored
keys
(excludi
ng FWI)
upon
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_ZE
RO), Success:
"0xE0018800"
SPI Command
(OTAR_ZERO_CM
D): Request
SPI
KMM
ACK:
None
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
Page 21 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
receivin
g a
request.
OTAR
Get-
KeyIDs
The
module
outputs
all
stored
key
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TKEY), Success:
"0xE” + Any(12bit)
+ “0x8900" + Any,
Failure:"0xE00189
01"
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_KEY
_CMD): Request
SPI
ACK:
Key
Inform
ation
(Key
ID,
Algorit
hm ID,
SLN),
Key
count
None CO
OTAR
Get-
KeysetI
Ds
The
module
outputs
all
stored
Keyset
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TKSET), Success:
"0xE" + Any(12bit)
+ "0x8A00" + Any,
Failure:"0xE0018
A01"
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_KSE
T_CMD): Request
SPI
ACK:
Keyset
inform
ation
(Keys
et ID,
status)
,
Keyset
count
None CO
OTAR
Get-
Keyset
KeyIDs
The
module
outputs
the key
informati
on
within
the
specifie
d Keyset
upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TKSET_KEY),
Success: "0xE” +
Any(12bit) +
“0x8B00" + Any,
Failure:
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_KSE
T_KEY_CMD):
Keyset ID
SPI
ACK:
Keyset
ID,
Key
inform
ation
(Key
ID,
Algorit
hm
None CO
OTAR
Get-
KeysetI
nfo
The
module
outputs
the
specifie
d Keyset
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TKSI), Success:
"0xE” + Any(12bit)
+ “0x8C00" + Any,
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_KSI_
CMD): Keyset ID
SPI
Comm
and:
Keyset
ID
None CO
Page 22 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
Failure:"0xE0018
C01"
OTAR
Get-RSI
The
module
outputs
the RSI
informati
on upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TRSI), Success:
"0xE” + Any(12bit)
+ “0x8D00" + Any,
Failure:"0xE0018
D01"
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_RSI_
CMD): RSI
SPI
ACK:
RSI
Inform
ation
None CO
OTAR
Get-
Capabili
ties
The
module
outputs
the
supporte
d Option
Service
IDs and
Messag
e IDs
upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(OTAR_ACK_GE
TCAPS),
Success:
"0xE0138E00" +
Any
SPI Command
(OTAR_GET_CAP
S_CMD): Request
SPI
ACK:
Capab
ility
None CO
Static
Tamper
Detect
The
module
detects
tamper
events
(such as
removal
from the
radio)
that may
have
occurred
while
power
was not
supplied
. Upon
detectio
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_ZERO),
Success:
"0x86010000”
(ALL), or
"0x87010000”
(RAM only)
Static Tamper Flag SPI
Comm
and:
Respo
nse
(Zeroi
ze
Succe
ss)
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
Page 23 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
n, the
module
initiates
zeroizati
on of
stored
keys.
Active
Tamper
Detect
The
module
detects
tamper
events
(such as
removal
from the
radio)
while
power is
being
supplied
. Upon
detectio
n, the
module
immedia
tely
initiates
zeroizati
on of
stored
keys.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_ZERO),
Success:
"0x86010000”
(ALL), or
"0x87010000”
(RAM only)
Active Tamper Flag SPI
Comm
and
:Resp
onse
(Zeroi
ze
Succe
ss)
None CO
- TEK: Z
- KEK: Z
- AMK: Z
Show
Module
ESN
The
module
outputs
its ESN
and its
Hardwar
e
version
upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(KEN_ESN_RSP),
"0x8B10"+Any
SPI Command
(KEN_ESN_REQ):
Request
SPI
ACK:
Modul
e ESN
None Unauthe
nticated
Show
NVM
ESN
The
module
outputs
SPI Command
Response
SPI Command
(FLSH_ESN_REQ)
: Request
SPI
ACK:
None Unauthe
nticated
Page 24 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
the ESN
stored in
the NVM
upon
receivin
g a
request.
(FLSH_ESN_RSP
), "0x8C08"+Any
NVM
ESN
Show
Module
Model
The
module
outputs
its
model
name
upon
receivin
g a
request.
SPI Command
Response
(MODEL_RSP),
"0x9406"+Any
SPI Command
(MODEL_REQ):
Request
SPI
ACK:
Modul
e
Model
Name
None Unauthe
nticated
SUID
Report
The
module
receives
the
radio's
SUIDs
(WACN
ID,
System
ID,
Subscrib
er ID)
and their
active
status. It
supports
up to 64
SUIDs
per
device.
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_SUID_RPT)
, "0x9600"
SPI Command
(SUID_RPT_CMD)
: SUID
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess)
None User
Factory
Reset
The
module
restores
itself to
the
factory
default
state. It
deletes
SPI Command
Response
(ACK_FIPS_CMP
_CMD),
"0x9D010100"
SPI Command
(FIPS_CMP_CMD)
: Request
SPI
ACK:
Respo
nse
(Succ
ess)
None CO
Page 25 of 37
Name Descrip
tion
Indicator Inputs Outpu
ts
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
all keys
(except
FWI)
and
resets
configur
ation
settings
to their
initial
state.
Table 9: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Zeroize The module zeroizes designated keys. CO
DES Encryption The module encrypts the given plaintext and outputs
the resulting ciphertext.
DES User
DES Decryption The module decrypts the given ciphertext and
outputs the resulting plaintext.
DES User
DES Encryption
Initialization
The module performs the encryption initialization
process, including DES key expansion and IV
generation. Encryption operations must be executed
after this initialization session.
DES CO
DES Decryption
Initialization
The module performs the decryption initialization
process, including DES key expansion. Decryption
operations must be executed after this initialization
session.
DES CO
Sleep The module enters sleep mode to suspend
cryptographic operations and reduce power
consumption.
User
Wake-up The module exits sleep mode and resumes normal
operations
User
SUID Report The module receives the radio's SUIDs (WACN ID,
System ID, Subscriber ID) and their active status. It
supports up to 64 SUIDs per device.
CO
KVL mode N The module enables communication with a Key
Variable Loader to input or delete DES cryptographic
keys.
CO
Modify clock rate The module modifies the DSP's clock rate. User
Beat Shift The module shifts the frequency of its clock
generator.
User
OTAR Calc MAC
DES
The Module calculates a MAC for a given message
using DES in CBC-MAC mode.
DES-MAC CO
Page 26 of 37
Name Description Algorithms Role
OTAR Calc
Checksum
The Module calculates Checksum for a given
message.
CO
OTAR Set-Key N The module receives an encrypted key wrapped with
the KEK, decrypts it internally, and stores it in the
designated location. This operation is part of the P25
DES OTAR key management process.
DES CO
OTAR Set-
KeysetInfo
The module stores Keyset information upon
receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Set-RSI The module stores RSI information upon receiving a
request.
CO
OTAR Delete-
Key N
The module deletes the specified DES key upon
receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Delete-
Keyset
The module deletes the specified Keyset information
upon receiving a request.
CO
OTAR
Changeover-
Keyset
The module changes the active Keyset upon
receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Zeroize The module deletes all stored keys (excluding FWI)
upon receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Get-
KeyIDs
The module outputs all stored key information upon
receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Get-
KeysetIDs
The module outputs all stored Keyset information
upon receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Get-
KeysetKeyIDs
The module outputs the key information within the
specified Keyset upon receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Get-
KeysetInfo
Request the Keyset Information. CO
OTAR Get-RSI The module outputs the specified Keyset information
upon receiving a request.
CO
OTAR Get-
Capabilities
The module outputs the supported Option Service
IDs and Message IDs upon receiving a request.
CO
Factory Reset The module restores itself to the factory default
state. It deletes all keys (except FWI) and resets
configuration settings to their initial state.
CO
Table 10: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The cryptographic module supports a Firmware Update service.
The authenticity and integrity of the firmware image are verified using AES-CMAC before it is
accepted by the module.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
The module does not support bypass capability.
Page 27 of 37
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The module does not support a self-initiated cryptographic output capability.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The cryptographic module performs a firmware integrity test using AES-CMAC (CAVP #A2696)
to verify the integrity of the firmware.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Firmware integrity tests can be initiated by power-on or reboot.
5.3 Open-Source Parameters
The module is not open source.
5.4 Additional Information
- Firmware image format: Intel HEX (.hex).
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
This cryptographic module is designated as operating in a limited operational environment, as
defined by FIPS 140-3.
The operational environment consists of firmware that manages the SSP within the
cryptographic module.
No operating system is present in the module.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The cryptographic module is a hardware module operating in a limited environment.
Firmware components and storage (inside the cryptographic boundary)
- ROM Boot Firmware: stored in DSP internal ROM.
- Boot Firmware: stored in NVM; coordinates loading of the Crypto Firmware.
- Crypto Firmware: stored in NVM; loaded to and executed from RAM.
Boot flow
Page 28 of 37
1) Power ON → ROM Boot Firmware starts.
2) ROM Boot Firmware loads Boot Firmware from NVM.
3) Boot Firmware loads Crypto Firmware from NVM into RAM and transfer’s control.
Note
In case of a Crypto Firmware Update failure, the previously active firmware remains available to
support recovery.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
N/A N/A N/A
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required
This cryptographic module is a standalone unit incorporating multiple integrated circuits and
meets the physical security requirements for FIPS 140-3 Level 1.
It uses commercially available IC chips and is constructed with production-grade materials.
During operation, the module is embedded inside a radio device.
The component side of the module, where the IC chips are mounted, is physically protected by
a shield cover. This shielding ensures that there are no visible gaps that would allow
observation or tampering.
As a result, operators are not required to take any special actions to maintain physical security.
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Temporary SSPs Dynamic
NVM TEK, KEK, FWI, AMK Static
Table 12: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Page 29 of 37
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
SPI_in EXT:
Radio Module
NVM Encrypted Manual Electronic AES-OFB (AES
2696)
KVL_in EXT:
Key Loader
Module
NVM Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods
The methods for inputting SSPs into the cryptographic module are strictly limited.
SSPs can be entered in plaintext using a key loader or in encrypted form via the radio’s OTAR
(Over-the-Air Rekeying) functionality.
When using a Key Variable Loader (KVL), the KFD-P25 Interface Protocol is used.
When using a radio, the P25 OTAR Protocol is used.
No other methods are permitted for inputting or modifying SSPs.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Z1 Zeroizes SSPs (TEK,
KEK, AMK) stored in both
NVM and RAM via SPI
command.
Overwrites the SSPs in NVM
and RAM with zeros (0x00) to
render them unrecoverable.
Used to provide zeroisation
as a service
Initiated by
operator via
Zeroize service or
OTAR Zeroize
service.
Z2 Power cycling the module
to zeroise temporary
SSPs
Power cycling the module to
zeroize temporary SSPs
Initiated by
operator by
powering off the
module.
Z3 If the conditions to
Zeroize are met, the
module will Zeroize the
SSPs SSPs (TEK, KEK,
AMK).
Overwrites the SSPs in NVM
and RAM with zeros (0x00) to
render them unrecoverable.
Module initiated
when the module
is removed from
the radio device
(tamper event).
Z4 FWI is embedded in the
firmware and is zeroized
by replacing the firmware
during the Firmware
Update process.
FWI is overwritten when the
firmware image is replaced,
effectively zeroizing the
embedded key.
Initiated by the
operator via
Firmware Update
service.
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods
The zeroization process overwrites data with zeros.
Once zeroized, the SSPs cannot be reused.
9.4 SSPs
Page 30 of 37
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
TEK Traffic Encryption
Key
128, 256
bit -
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Block
Cipher
Key
Expansion
KEK Key Encryption
Key
256 bit - Symmetric
Key - CSP
Key
Decryption
FWI CMAC key used
to verify the
integrity of Crypto
Firmware and
Boot Firmware
and authenticity
during update
256 bit -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Firmware
Integrity
Verification
AMK Authentication
Mechanism for
P25 Link Layer
Authentication
128 bit - Symmetric
Key - CSP
Block
Cipher
Table 15: SSP Table 1
Note: SSP Table 1 describes only the SSPs used in Approved Mode. SSPs used exclusively in
Non-Approved Mode (e.g., DES-based TEK/KEK) are excluded from this table.
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related
SSPs
TEK KVL_in
SPI_in
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Zeroize service or other
similar services are
performed, or tamper is
detected
Z1
Z2
Z3
KEK SPI_in
KVL_in
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Zeroize service or other
similar services are
performed, or tamper is
detected
Z1
Z2
Z3
TEK:Encrypts
FWI RAM:Plaintext
NVM:Plaintext
until firmware is upgraded. Z2
Z4
AMK KVL_in NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Zeroize service or other
similar services are
performed, or tamper is
detected
Z1
Z2
Z3
Table 16: SSP Table 2
This section describes all SSPs used by the module.
The module does not use public key cryptography.
More than two TEKs or KEKs can be stored in the module. They are managed by CKR, which
associates each key with its KeyID and algorithm (i.e., AES or DES).
TEK or KEK associated with AES can be used only in Approved Mode, and TEK or KEK
associated with DES can be used only in Non-Approved Mode.
Note:
The FWI is implemented as a key embedded within the Crypto firmware.
Page 31 of 37
No Assurance:
TEK, KEK, and AMK are externally loaded. There is no assurance of their strength.
9.5 Transitions
The cryptographic module uses AES-ECB, AES-OFB, AES-CMAC and SHA2-256 as Approved
algorithms.
According to NIST SP 800-131A Rev.2, there are currently no plans for these algorithms to be
removed from the list of Approved algorithms.
Non-Approved algorithms (DES, DES-MAC) are not permitted in Approved mode and are
already considered non-compliant per SP 800-131A Rev.2.
9.6 Additional Information
The cryptographic module does not provide any mechanism for outputting SSPs, in order to
protect this sensitive information.
As a hardware module, it is not possible to externally interfere with the SSP processes.
Therefore, all SSPs are securely protected.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Crypto
Firmware
key size:
256 bits
CMAC SW/FW
Integrity
Corresponding bit of "Self
Test Status" for "Status
Request" SPI command:
0 (Pass), 1 (Fail)
Performed on
Firmware
binary data
Boot
Firmware
key size:
256 bits
CMAC SW/FW
Integrity
Corresponding bit of "Self
Test Status" for "Status
Request" SPI command:
0 (Pass), 1 (Fail)
Performed on
Boot Firmware
binary data
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Each time the cryptographic module is powered on, it performs pre-operational self-tests listed
in the table.
Before performing the firmware integrity test using CMAC, the module first executes a Known
Answer Test (KAT) on the CMAC algorithm to verify its correct operation.
The self-tests can also be initiated on demand by cycling the module’s power.
The firmware consists of Crypto Firmware, Boot Firmware, and ROM Boot Firmware.
The firmware integrity test covers both the Crypto Firmware and the Boot Firmware.
ROM Boot Firmware resides in mask ROM, and its integrity test is not required according to
Section 7.10.2.2 of ISO/IEC 19790:2012.
If the integrity test fails, the SCM enters an error state in which only the Show Status service
remains functional.
Operators can use the Show Status service to confirm that the self-tests have failed.
Page 32 of 37
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
Firmware
Load
AES CMAC MAC
verificatio
n
SW/F
W
Load
"Firmware
Update Ack"
SPI
command:
"0x8A01" +
Checksum
(Pass),
"0x8A00" or
"0xFF01"
(Fail)
Verificatio
n of
loaded
firmware
image
when
firmware is
loaded
AES-ECB
(AES
2696)
key size: 256
bits
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
Encrypt Upon
power-up
AES-ECB
(AES
2696)
key size: 256
bits
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
Decrypt Upon
power-up
AES-
CMAC
(AES
2696)
key size: 256
bits, MAC
Length:128bit
s
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
MAC Upon
power-up
AES-OFB
(AES
2696)
key size: 256
bits
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
Encrypt Upon
power-up
AES-OFB
(AES
2696)
key size: 256
bits
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Decrypt Upon
power-up
Page 33 of 37
Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
SHA2-256
(SHS
2285)
message size:
256 bits
KAT CAST Correspondin
g bit of "Self
Test Status"
for "Status
Request" SPI
command: 0
(Pass), 1
(Fail)
Hash Upon
power-up
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests
Each time the cryptographic module is powered on, it performs cryptographic algorithm tests.
Firmware load test is initiated by requiring Firmware Update service.
If any of the Known Answer Tests (KATs) or the firmware load test fail, the SCM enters an error
state in which only the Show Status service remains functional.
Operators can use the Show Status service to confirm that the self-tests have failed.
The cryptographic module does not implement any critical functions as defined by FIPS 140-3.
Therefore, no critical function tests are required or performed.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Crypto Firmware CMAC SW/FW Integrity On Demand manually
Boot Firmware CMAC SW/FW Integrity On Demand manually
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware Load MAC verification SW/FW Load N/A Provided service
AES-ECB (AES
2696)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
AES-ECB (AES
2696)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
AES-CMAC
(AES 2696)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
AES-OFB (AES
2696)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
AES-OFB (AES
2696)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
SHA2-256 (SHS
2285)
KAT CAST On Demand manually
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information
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Firmware integrity tests and cryptographic algorithm tests can be executed on demand by
cycling the module’s power.
The firmware load test is not executed by power cycling; it is performed only during the firmware
loading process.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error The module transitions
to the Error state when
any of the defined
transition conditions are
met. In this state, only
the "Show Status"
service is operational; all
other services are
disabled.
Failure of a Self-tests
(e.g., KAT, Firmware
Integrity Test, Firmware
Load Test)
CRNG test failure during
encryption/decryption
initialization
Detection of active
tamper
ESN authentication
timeout during boot
the module
shall be re-
booted to
perform
normal
operation
Any bit of
"Self Test
Status" for
"Status
Request" SPI
command is
"1"
Table 21: Error States
The module automatically transitions to an error state when a self-test or firmware load test fails,
without requiring any explicit command.
When the module is in an error state, it only accepts the Show Status service. This service
allows the operator to confirm that the module is in an error state. There is no error state in
which the module does not accept the Show Status service.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Installation
The cryptographic module is intended to be embedded within a radio device.
Just after shipping, the module is not validated one. To cause the module to become validated
one, the following procedures are needed.
The procedure is as follows:
1. The Crypto Officer powers on the cryptographic module and verifies that both the self-
tests and radio authentication have completed successfully.
2. The Crypto Officer sends the SPI FIPS Validated Mode Set command to initiate the
transition to FIPS140-3 Validated mode. (Refer to the SPI Interface Specification for
command details.)
3. Reboot the module to complete the transition.
4. After rebooting, the module becomes the validated one.
5. The validated state can be confirmed by checking the firmware version (A3.2.0),.
Approved Mode can be confirmed by using the Show Status service to check that
the Approved Mode flag within the 16-bit Cipher Status value is set to “1”.
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For details on how to install the module into the radio, refer to the Administrator User
Guidance document.
Initialization
After the module has entered FIPS 140-3 Validated mode, the Crypto Officer must perform
certain operations at each power-on to ensure secure operation.
Specifically, after verifying the completion of self-tests, the Crypto Officer must execute the
Authentication command via the SPI interface to identify the radio device and enable
cryptographic services.
If required, cryptographic keys may also be loaded into the module using the KVL mode service
or the OTAR Set-Key service. However, key loading is not mandatory at every power-on and
should be performed only when necessary.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
For administrative guidance, refer to the Administrator User Guidance document.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
For non-administrative user guidance, also refer to the Administrator User Guidance document.
11.4 Design and Rules
The design of the cryptographic module complies with the security rules defined for FIPS 140-3
Level 1.
This section describes the security rules enforced by the module to meet the applicable
requirements.
1. Physical Security:
All components within the module are production-grade and utilize standard protective
technologies.
2. Restrictions in Error State:
When the module enters an error state, all operations except status checking are
prohibited.
Self-tests, zeroization, and data output are not permitted during this state.
3. Protection of Status Information:
Status information does not include any Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) or other
sensitive data that could compromise the security of the module if misused.
4. Key Input Methods:
Keys are input either in plaintext using a compatible key loader by the Crypto Officer, or
in encrypted form via the OTAR (Over-the-Air Rekeying) function.
5. CSP Output Prohibition:
The Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM) does not output any CSPs.
6. Approved Mode Operation:
Secure communication in approved mode must use AES.
DES are not permitted in approved mode.
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7. Radio Pairing:
The cryptographic module is paired with a specific radio device.
If an invalid radio identifier is detected, the SCM zeroizes the SSPs, including TEK, KEK,
and AMK.
8. Tamper Response Behavior:
The module’s response to tamper detection depends on the Key Retention flag.
• If the flag is set, all SSPs are zeroized upon a tamper event.
• If the flag is not set, only SSPs stored in RAM are zeroized.
9. Secure Development Environment:
The firmware development environment uses Code Composer Studio IDE Version 9.01
and Code Generation Tool Version 4.4.1.
Program code is managed using Git for version control.
To ensure secure code development, a static analysis tool is employed to detect and
remediate potential vulnerabilities during the development process.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The cryptographic module does not require maintenance or inspection.
11.6 End of Life
When the cryptographic module reaches the end of its operational life, the Crypto Officer
executes the Factory Reset service to return the module to its factory default state.
This service deletes all Security Sensitive Parameters (SSPs) and resets configuration settings
to their initial state.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
⚫ Key misuse due to module relocation:
The cryptographic module may be removed from its originally paired radio device and
connected to another device. Stored keys (e.g., TEK, KEK, AMK) may be misused on another
radio device.
⚫ Key misuse via powered interface substitution:
While the module is powered on, an attacker may redirect the interface connection to another
device, enabling unauthorized use of the keys.
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness
⚫ Active Tamper Detection:
If the module is removed from the radio while powered on, immediate zeroization is triggered.
⚫ Static Tamper Detection:
If removal is detected while the module is powered off, zeroization is performed during the next
power-up.
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13 Acronyms
Acronyms Definition
ACK Acknowledgment
AM Authentication Mechanism
AMK Authentication Management Key
CKR Common Key Reference
DSP Digital Signal Processor
ESN Electronic Serial Number
FWI Firmware Integrity
IV Initialization Vector
KEK Key Encryption Key
KFD Key Fill Device
KMM Key Management Message
KVL Key Variable Loader
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OTAR Over the Air Rekeying
P25 Project 25
RSI Radio Set ID
SCM Secure Cryptographic Module
SLN Storage Location Number
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SUID Subscriber Unit ID
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter