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Zebra Technologies Corporation
BoringCrypto
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Date: June 10, 2026
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Table of Contents
1 General ......................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..........................................................................................5
2.1 Description ..........................................................................................................................5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .........................................6
2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................7
2.4 Modes of Operation.............................................................................................................7
2.5 Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................7
2.6 Security Function Implementations ...................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information...........................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..............................................................................................................15
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................15
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................15
2.11 Industry Protocols............................................................................................................16
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.............................................................................................16
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................16
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................16
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................17
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................24
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .................................................................................24
5 Software/Firmware Security.....................................................................................................24
5.1 Integrity Techniques..........................................................................................................24
5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................24
5.3 Open-Source Parameters .................................................................................................24
6 Operational Environment .........................................................................................................25
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...........................................................25
7 Physical Security......................................................................................................................25
8 Non-Invasive Security..............................................................................................................25
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...........................................................................25
9.1 Storage Areas ...................................................................................................................25
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...............................................................................................25
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................26
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9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................26
10 Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................31
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................31
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................32
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information .........................................................................................34
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................36
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................37
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................37
Building for Android .............................................................................................................37
Building for Linux .................................................................................................................38
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................39
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance...........................................................................................39
11.4 Additional Information......................................................................................................39
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.....................................................................................................39
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).....6
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid....................................7
Table 4: Modes List and Description.............................................................................................7
Table 5: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................10
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms..........................................................................................10
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms........................................................................11
Table 8: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................13
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................16
Table 10: Roles...........................................................................................................................16
Table 11: Approved Services......................................................................................................23
Table 12: Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................24
Table 13: Storage Areas.............................................................................................................25
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................26
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................26
Table 16: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................29
Table 17: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................31
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................31
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................34
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..........................................................................34
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information.................................................................................36
Table 22: Error States.................................................................................................................37
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram ...............................................................................................................6
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document describes the cryptographic module Security Policy (SP) for the Zebra
Technologies Corporation BoringCrypto (software version: 2023042800) cryptographic module
(also referred to as the “module” hereafter). It contains a specification of the security rules under
which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the
requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.
The module meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-3.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Zebra Technologies Corporation BoringCrypto module is an open-source, general-purpose
cryptographic library which provides FIPS 140-3 approved cryptographic algorithms to serve
BoringSSL and other user-space applications.
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The boundary of the module is defined as a single object file, bcm.o, and its instantiation in
memory.
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Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The TOEPP is the enclosure of the general purpose computer the module is running on.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software:
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
bcm.o 2023042800 Yes - single
encompassing test
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Operational Environments - Software:
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Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Android 14 TC58E QualComm QCM4490 Yes 2023042800
Android 14 TC58E QualComm QCM4490 No 2023042800
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the
validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module contains no excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved When all self-tests pass and only Approved
algorithms are invoked
Approved Per service
indication
Non-
Approved
When a non-Approved algorithm is invoked Non-
Approved
Per service
indication
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be
in approved mode when all power up self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved
algorithms are invoked (see table below). The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-
Approved algorithm is invoked (see table below).
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module does not enforce a general Approved mode, use the service indicators to determine
whether a given service is operated in an Approved mode.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A6791 Key Length - 128
Tag Length - 32, 64
IV Length - IV Length: 104
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-256
SP 800-38C
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-524288
Increment 8
AES-CTR A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128
Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value
- Yes
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-4096
Increment 64
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A6791 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-4096
Increment 8
SP 800-38F
Counter DRBG A6791 Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0-384
Increment 16
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 384
Nonce - Nonce: 0
Personalization String Length -
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Personalization String Length: 0-384
Increment 16
Returned Bits - 2048
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing
Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/256
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/256
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-160 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-224 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-256 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-384 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-512 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6791 MAC - MAC: 32-256 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6791 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
staticUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6791 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB,
FC
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
A6791 Fixed Info Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Length: 224-65336 Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/256
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Key Generation Mode - B.3.3
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.2
Info Generated By Server - Yes
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6791 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
SHA-1 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6791 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A6791 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Key Block Length - Key Block Length: 1024
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF
(CVL)
A6791 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A Section 4, example 1: U is directly output
without XORing V
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
MD5, MD4 Non-Approved Hashing
POLYVAL Non-Approved authenticated encryption
DES, Triple-DES (non-compliant) Non-Approved encryption/decryption
AES (non-compliant) Non-Approved encryption/decryption
DH (non-compliant) Non-Approved key agreement
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 key wrapping (non-compliant) Non-Approved key wrapping
TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF (non-compliant) Non-Approved TLS key derivation
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authenticated
Decryption
BC-Auth Symmetric
authenticated
decryption of
calling
application data
AES-CCM:
(A6791)
AES-GCM:
(A6791)
Authenticated
Encryption
BC-Auth Symmetric
authenticated
encryption of
calling
application data
AES-CCM:
(A6791)
AES-GCM:
(A6791)
Decryption BC-UnAuth Symmetric
decryption of
calling
application data
AES-CBC:
(A6791)
AES-CTR:
(A6791)
AES-ECB:
(A6791)
Encryption BC-UnAuth Symmetric
encryption of
calling
application data
AES-CBC:
(A6791)
AES-CTR:
(A6791)
AES-ECB:
(A6791)
Hashing SHA Hashing of
calling
application data
SHA-1: (A6791)
SHA2-224:
(A6791)
SHA2-256:
(A6791)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-384:
(A6791)
SHA2-512:
(A6791)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6791)
KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-SSC SP 800-
56Arev3.
KAS_ECC_SSC
per IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(1)
Caveat:providing
128, 192, or 256
bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6791)
KAS-FFC-SSC KAS-SSC SP 800-
56Arev3.
KAS_ECC_SSC
per IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(1)
Caveat:providing
112 bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6791)
Key Derivation
Hash Based
KAS-56CKDF Hash Based Key
Derivation to
support calling
application
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1:
(A6791)
Key Derivation
TLS 1.2
KAS-135KDF Key derivation to
support calling
application's
TLS implement
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A6791)
Key Derivation
TLS 1.3
KAS-135KDF Key derivation to
support calling
application's
TLS implement
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6791)
AES-KeyWrap BC-Auth Symmetric key
wrapping to
support calling
application's key
transport
Caveat:providing
128, 192, or 256
bits of
encryption
strength
AES-KW:
(A6791)
AES-KWP:
(A6791)
Message
Authentication
MAC Message
authentication of
calling
application data
AES-GCM:
(A6791)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6791)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A6791)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6791)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6791)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6791)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6791)
AES-GMAC:
(A6791)
Random Bit
Generation
DRBG Random Bit
Generation
Counter DRBG:
(A6791)
Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Digital signature
generation to
support calling
application
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
Signature Key
Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Generation of
digital signature
key pairs
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
Signature Key
Validation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Verification of
ECDSA digital
signature key
pair
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Verification of
digital signature
to support
calling
application
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A6791)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-CTR
Reuse of a counter value under the same AES key in AES-CTR is a serious cryptographic
vulnerability. The developer integrating the module must prevent this vulnerability by never
providing a counter start value that is the same or earlier than the last counter value used under
that key for AES-CTR encryption.
AES-GCM
In the case of AES-GCM, the IV generation method is user-selectable, and the value can be
computed in more than one manner.
The module does not implement the TLS protocol but offers cryptographic primitives that can be
used by an external operator/application to implement TLS. The following restrictions must be
followed when an external operator/application uses the module’s AES-GCM within a TLS
implementation.
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In the context of the TLS protocol version 1.3, AES-GCM encryption and decryption is used
compliant to Scenario 5 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-
52rev2 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 8446. The module ensures
that it is strictly increasing and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number
of possible values for a given session key, the first party (client or server) to encounter this
condition may either send a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate message to establish a new encryption key, or
fail. In either case, the module prevents any IV duplication and thus enforces the security
property.
In the context of the TLS protocol version 1.2, AES-GCM encryption and decryption is used
compliant to Scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The module is compatible with TLS protocol
version 1.2 using AES-GCM ciphersuites as specified in NIST SP 800-52rev2, Section 3.3.1,
and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The module ensures that it is
strictly increasing and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of
possible values for a given session key, the first party (client or server) to encounter this
condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with
RFC 5246 or fail. In either case, the module prevents any IV duplication and thus enforces the
security property.
The module’s IV is generated internally by the module’s Approved DRBG, which is internal to
the module’s boundary. The IV is 96 bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2 and
FIPS 140-3 IG C.H scenario 2.
The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this cryptographic
module. In approved mode, only internally generated IVs, or the TLS modes described above,
are considered compliant for use.
Per IG C.H, in the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must
ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
AES-KW / AES-KWP
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS).
However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an
external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.
Counter DRBG
The CTR_DRBG is used without a derivation function. IG D.L requires that a CTR_DRNG used
without a derivation function shall be seeded from an entropy source producing full-entropy
outputs, and the entropy source shall be located within the TOEPP. The module relies on
passively provided entropy and it is the responsibility of the developer integrating the module to
ensure that the entropy used to seed the DRBG comes from a source located within the TOEPP
which CMVP has evaluated as producing full entropy output.
KAS-ECC-SSC and KAS-FFC-SSC
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS).
However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used
by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS.
Hashing
The module does not perform truncation of hash outputs except as part of the approved SHA2-
224, SHA2-512/256, and SHA2-384 algorithms. These algorithms inherently produce hash
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outputs of 224, 256, and 384 bits, respectively, as defined by FIPS 180-4. The module complies
with IG C.L because no additional or manual truncation of hash outputs is implemented by the
module in any other context.
Legacy Use Algorithms
SHA-1 is categorized as Legacy Use when using as part of digital signature verification.
Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated prior to the
Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M. It is the responsibility of the developer integrating
the module to ensure this restriction is met.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
The module passively receives entropy, per IG 9.3.A case 2(b), and shall be provided at least
384 bits of entropy. Use a SP 800-90B compliant entropy source with at least 256 bits of
security strength. Entropy is supplied to the Module via callback functions. The callback
functions shall return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. The caveat “No
assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys)” is applicable.
2.9 Key Generation
The module provides several key generation methods.
 Generation of asymmetric keys for key generation per SP 800-133r2 section 5.1 CKG
and FIPS 186-5.
 Generation of asymmetric keys for key establishment per SP 800-133r2 section 5.2 CKG
and SP 800-56Arev3.
 Derivation of symmetric keys for industry standard protocols from a key agreement
shared secret per SP 800-133r2 section 6.2.1 and SP 800-135rev1 TLS v1.2 KDF / RFC
8446 TLS v1.3 KDF.
 Derivation of symmetric keys from a key agreement shared secret per SP 800-133r2
section 6.2.1 and SP 800-56Cr2 KDA HKDF.
The module does not have a key generation service for symmetric keys; however, a calling
application may create one using output from the module’s Approved DRBG.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides the cryptographic building blocks for key agreement in its SP 800-56Arev3
KAS-ECC-SSC and KAS-FFC-SSC algorithms. A calling application may link these to the
module’s SP 800-135rev1 TLS v1.2 KDF or RFC 8446 TLS v1.3 KDF to form a complete key
agreement scheme.
No other part of the TLS protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the
KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any complete industry protocols, however it provides the key
agreement and key derivation cryptographic algorithm building blocks to allow calling
applications to implement the industry standard TLS v1.2 RFC 7627 or TLS v1.3 protocols using
FIPS approved key establishment. The key establishment and generation primitives are
described in sections 2.9 and 2.10, and the use of AES-GCM within them described in section
2.7.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
n/a Data Input API input parameters
n/a Data Output API output parameters and return values
n/a Control Input API input parameters
n/a Status Output API return values
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output
interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface
consists of the actual API input parameters. The Status Output interface includes the return
values of the API functions.
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside the module scope. However, when
the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the module’s logical data
output interfaces is inhibited.
The module does not implement a power interface or a control output interface.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
The module does not support operator authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer (CO) Role Crypto Officer None
Table 10: Roles
Page 17 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
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The cryptographic module only implements a Crypto Officer (CO) role. The CO role is implicitly
assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module. An operator is
considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module and, therefore, only one
concurrent operator is allowed.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Module
Initializati
on
Module
Initializatio
n
N/A N/A Return
Code
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Symmetr
ic
Encryptio
n
Symmetric
encryption
of calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Plaintext,
AAD, IV,
encryptio
n key
Return
code,
ciphertext,
tag
Authenticat
ed
Encryption
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- AES
Key: W,E
- AES-
GCM
Key: W,E
Symmetr
ic
Decrypti
on
Symmetric
decryption
of calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Cipherte
xt, AAD,
IV, tag,
decryptio
n key
Return
code,
plaintext
Authenticat
ed
Decryption
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- AES
Key: W,E
- AES-
GCM
Key: W,E
Keyed
Hashing
Symmetric
message
authenticat
ion of
calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Message
, key
Return
code,
Message
Authenticat
ion Code
Message
Authenticat
ion
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- HMAC
Key: W,E
- AES-
GCM
Key: W,E
Hashing Hashing of
calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Message Return
code, hash
Hashing Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Random
Bit
Generati
on
Generation
of random
bits for
calling
application
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs
Return
code,
random
bits
Random
Bit
Generation
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
-
CTR_DR
BG
Entropy
Input:
W,E
-
Page 18 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
CTR_DR
BG Seed:
G,E
-
CTR_DR
BG V:
G,E
-
CTR_DR
BG Key:
G,E
Signatur
e
Generati
on
Digital
signature
of calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Message
, signing
key
Return
code,
signature
Signature
Generation
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- ECDSA
Signing
Key: W,E
- RSA
Signature
Generatio
n Key:
W,E
-
CTR_DR
BG V: E
-
CTR_DR
BG Key:
E
Signatur
e
Verificati
on
Digital
signature
verification
of calling
application
data
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Signatur
e,
verificatio
n key
Return
code
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- ECDSA
Verificatio
n Key:
W,E
- RSA
Signature
Verificatio
n Key:
W,E
Key
Wrap
Service
Symmetric
key
wrapping
service of
calling
application
key
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs,
unwrapp
ed key,
wrapping
key
Return
code,
wrapped
key
AES-
KeyWrap
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- AES
Wrapping
Key: W,E
-
Page 19 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Unwrapp
ed Key:
W
-
Wrapped
Key: G,R
Key
Unwrap
Service
Symmetric
key
unwrappin
g service
of calling
application
key
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs,
wrapped
key
Return
code,
unwrapped
key
AES-
KeyWrap
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- AES
Wrapping
Key: W,E
-
Wrapped
Key: W
-
Unwrapp
ed Key:
G,R
Key
Agreeme
nt
Service
API
service call
parameter
s
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
Return
code,
shared
secret
Return
code,
shared
secret
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- EC DH
Private
Key: G,E
- EC DH
Public
Key: G,R
- Other
Party EC
DH
Public
Key: W,E
- DH
Private
Key: G,E
- DH
Public
Key: W,E
- Other
Party DH
Public
Key: W,E
- KAS
Shared
Secret:
G,R
Page 20 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
Derivatio
n KDA
Hash
based key
derivation
for calling
application
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs,
shared
secret
Return
code,
derived
keying
material
Key
Derivation
Hash
Based
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- KDA
Shared
Secret:
W,E
- Derived
Keying
Material:
G,R
TLS Key
Derivatio
n
TLS Key
derivation
for calling
application
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs, TLS
master
secret
Return
code, TLS
Key
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.2
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.3
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- TLS
Master
Secret:
W,E
- TLS
Key
Material:
G,R
Key
Generati
on
Asymmetri
c key
generation
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs
Return
code, key
pair
Signature
Key
Generation
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- ECDSA
Signing
Key: G,R
- ECDSA
Verificatio
n Key:
G,R
- RSA
Signature
Generatio
n Key:
G,R
- RSA
Signature
Verificatio
n Key:
G,R
-
CTR_DR
BG V: E
-
CTR_DR
BG Key:
E
Page 21 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
Verificati
on
Asymmetri
c key pair
validation
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs, key
pair
Return
code
Signature
Key
Validation
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- ECDSA
Signing
Key: W,E
- ECDSA
Verificatio
n Key:
W,E
On-
Demand
Self-Test
On-
Demand
Self-Test
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
N/A Return
Code
Authenticat
ed
Decryption
Authenticat
ed
Encryption
Decryption
Encryption
Hashing
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Key
Derivation
Hash
Based
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.2
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.3
Message
Authenticat
ion
Random
Bit
Generation
Signature
Generation
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Zeroisati
on
Zeroisation fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- AES
Key: Z
- AES-
Page 22 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
GCM
Key: Z
- AES
Wrapping
Key: Z
-
Wrapped
Key: Z
-
Unwrapp
ed Key: Z
- ECDSA
Signing
Key: Z
- ECDSA
Verificatio
n Key: Z
- EC DH
Private
Key: Z
- EC DH
Public
Key: Z
- Other
Party EC
DH
Public
Key: Z
- DH
Private
Key: Z
- DH
Public
Key: Z
- Other
Party DH
Public
Key: Z
- KAS
Shared
Secret: Z
- KDA
Shared
Secret: Z
- HMAC
Key: Z
- RSA
Signature
Generatio
Page 23 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
n Key: Z
- RSA
Signature
Verificatio
n Key: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
-
CTR_DR
BG
Entropy
Input: Z
-
CTR_DR
BG Seed:
Z
-
CTR_DR
BG V: Z
-
CTR_DR
BG Key:
Z
- Derived
Keying
Material:
Z
Show
Status
Show
Status
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs
Return
code,
status
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Show
Name
Show
module
name
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs
Return
code,
string of
module
name
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Show
Version
Show
module
version
fips_service_indi
cator set to 1
API call
paramete
rs
Return
code,
string of
module
version
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Table 11: Approved Services
The Approved services supported by the module and access rights within services accessible
over the module’s public interface are listed in the table above.
The corresponding FIPS_service_indicator_xxx function can be called to query the approved
algorithm status of the proceeding service call, or the macro
Page 24 of 39
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CALL_SERVICE_AND_CHECK_APPROVED can be used to automatically check the approved
service indicator and inform the calling application whether the service called through the macro
was FIPSStatus::APPROVED or FIPSStatus::NOT_APPROVED.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF Perform hashing operations
when used with the TLS
protocol version 1.0 and 1.1
TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF
(non-compliant)
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Hashing Perform hashing operations MD5, MD4 Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Hashing for GCM-SIV Used as part of AES-GCM-
SIV
POLYVAL Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
Perform symmetric encryption
and/or decryption operations
DES, Triple-DES
(non-compliant)
AES (non-compliant)
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Key Transport Perform RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
key transport
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
key wrapping (non-
compliant)
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Key Agreement Perform non-compliant DH
key agreement
DH (non-compliant) Crypto
Officer
(CO)
Table 12: Non-Approved Services
Non-Approved Services are listed in the table above.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support external software loading.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The pre-operational integrity test is performed using HMAC-SHA-256.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The integrity test can be executed on demand by power-cycling the host platform and reloading
the module.
5.3 Open-Source Parameters
Page 25 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
The module is open-source. To build the approved version of the module the following tools are
required to build and compile the module.
Target
Platform
Tools
Linux  clang compiler version 16.0.0 (http://releases.llvm.org/download.html)
 go programming language version 1.21.1 (https://golang.org/dl/)
 ninja build system version 1.11.1
(https://github.com/ninjabuild/ninja/releases)
 cmake version 3.27.4 (https://cmake.org/download/)
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The module runs on a GPC, which is a modifiable operational environment, running one of the
operating systems specified in Table 2. Each tested operating system manages processes and
threads in a logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the
calling application that instantiates the module.
No special configuration of the operating system is required. The module is designed to ensure
that the power-up tests are initiated automatically when the module is loaded.
7 Physical Security
As a software module, the physical security requirements are not applicable.
8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not claim any non-invasive security measures.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Ephemeral storage in RAM Dynamic
Table 13: Storage Areas
The module has no persistent SSP storage, all SSPs are stored ephemerally in RAM and are
zeroised once no longer needed.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Page 26 of 39
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
PT Input Calling
Application
RAM Plaintext N/A Electronic
PT
Output
RAM Calling
Application
Plaintext N/A Electronic
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods
The software module inputs and outputs SSP only as part of its API, and normally they are input
or output in plaintext. The exceptions are the services that provide key wrapping or key
unwrapping, where the wrapped key is entered or output encrypted.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Power Cycle
Host
Turn off or power
cycle the host
computer to clear all
RAM contents
All module SSPs are held
ephemerally in RAM, so turning off
or power cycling the computer will
cause them to be irretrievably lost.
Procedural -
turn off or
power cycle
host
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods
The software module has no persistent SSP storage and the zeroisation method for all SSP is
procedural. The operator may power-cycle the host computer to zeroise all SSPs the module
currently holds.
9.4 SSPs
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
AES Key AES Key 128 192
256 -
128 192
256
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Decryption
Encryption
AES-GCM
Key
AES-GCM
Key
128 192
256 -
128 192
256
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Authenticated
Decryption
Authenticated
Encryption
Message
Authenticatio
n
AES
Wrapping
Key
Any calling
application
keying
material the
module
128 192
256 -
128 192
256
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Page 27 of 39
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
AES Key
Wraps
Wrapped
Key
Any calling
application
key the
module
AES Key
Wraps
Any -
Any
Any -
CSP
Unwrapped
Key
Any calling
application
keying
material the
module
AES Key
Unwraps
Any -
Any
Any -
CSP
ECDSA
Signing Key
ECDSA
Signing
Key
P-224 P-
256 P-
384 P-
521 -
112 128
192 256
Private -
CSP
Signature
Key
Generatio
n
Signature
Generation
Signature
Key
Validation
ECDSA
Verification
Key
ECDSA
Verification
Key
P-224 P-
256 P-
384 P-
521 -
112 128
192 256
Public -
PSP
Signature
Key
Generatio
n
Signature
Key
Validation
Signature
Verification
EC DH
Private Key
EC DH
Private Key
P-256 P-
384 P-
521 -
128 192
256
Private -
CSP KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
EC DH
Public Key
EC DH
Private Key
P-256 P-
384 P-
521 -
128 192
256
Public -
PSP KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Other Party
EC DH
Public Key
Other Party
EC DH
Public Key
P-256 P-
384 P-
521 -
128 192
256
Public -
PSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC
DH Private
Key
DH Private
Key
2048 -
112
Private -
CSP KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Page 28 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
DH Public
Key
DH Public
Key
2048 -
112
Public -
PSP KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Other Party
DH Public
Key
Other Party
DH Public
Key
2048 -
112
Public -
PSP
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS
Shared
Secret
KAS
Shared
Secret
At least
112-bit -
At least
112-bit
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KDA
Shared
Secret
KDA
Shared
Secret
At least
112-bit -
At least
112-bit
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Key
Derivation
Hash Based
Derived
Keying
Material
Derived
Key
112 -
512 -
112 -
512
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Key
Derivation
Hash
Based
HMAC Key HMAC Key At least
112-bit -
At least
112-bit
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Message
Authenticatio
n
RSA
Signature
Generation
Key
RSA
Signature
Generation
Key
2048
3072
4096 -
112 128
150
Private -
CSP
Signature
Key
Generatio
n
Signature
Generation
RSA
Signature
Verification
Key
RSA
Signature
Verification
Key
2048
3072
4096 -
112 128
150
Public -
PSP
Signature
Key
Generatio
n
Signature
Verification
TLS Master
Secret
TLS Master
Secret
At least
112-bit -
At least
112-bit
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.2
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.3
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.2
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.3
TLS Key
Material
TLS Keying
material
from TLS
KDF, for
use by
calling
application
TLS
protocol
At least
112-bit -
At least
112-bit
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.2
Key
Derivation
TLS 1.3
Page 29 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
CTR_DRB
G Entropy
Input
CTR_DRB
G Entropy
Input
384 -
384
Entropy
Input -
CSP
CTR_DRB
G Key
CTR_DRB
G Key
256 -
256
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Random
Bit
Generatio
n
CTR_DRB
G Seed
CTR_DRB
G Seed
384 -
384
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Random
Bit
Generatio
n
CTR_DRB
G V
CTR_DRB
G V
128 -
128
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Random
Bit
Generatio
n
Table 16: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES Key PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
AES-GCM
Key
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
AES
Wrapping
Key
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
Wrapped
Key:Encrypts
Unwrapped
Key:Decrypts
Wrapped
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
AES Wrapping
Key:Wrapped By
Unwrapped
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
AES Wrapping
Key:Unwrapped By
ECDSA
Signing Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
ECDSA
Verification
Key:Paired With
ECDSA
Verification
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
ECDSA Signing
Key:Paired With
EC DH
Private Key
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
EC DH Public
Key:Paired With
Other Party EC DH
Page 30 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
PT
Output
Public Key:Used
With
EC DH
Public Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
EC DH Private
Key:Paired With
Other Party
EC DH
Public Key
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
EC DH Private
Key:Used With
KAS Shared
Secret:Establishes
DH Private
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
DH Public
Key:Paired With
Other Party DH
Public Key:Used
With
KAS Shared
Secret:Establishes
DH Public
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
DH Private
Key:Paired With
Other Party
DH Public
Key
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
DH Private
Key:Used With
KAS Shared
Secret:Establishes
KAS Shared
Secret
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
EC DH Private
Key:Established
By
Other Party EC DH
Public
Key:Established
By
DH Private
Key:Established
By
Other Party DH
Public
Key:Established
By
KDA Shared
Secret
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
Derived Keying
Material:Derives
Derived
Keying
Material
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
KDA Shared
Secret:Derived
From
HMAC Key PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
Page 31 of 39
Zebra Technologies Corporation Version 1.0
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirely (without revision)
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
RSA
Signature
Generation
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
RSA Signature
Verification
Key:Paired With
RSA
Signature
Verification
Key
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
RSA Signature
Generation
Key:Paired With
TLS Master
Secret
PT
Input
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
TLS Key
Material:Derives
TLS Key
Material
PT
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
CTR_DRBG
Entropy
Input
PT
Input
RAM:Plaintext Until function
completion
Power
Cycle Host
CTR_DRBG
Seed:Derives
CTR_DRBG
Key
RAM:Plaintext Until DRBG
iunnstantiation
Power
Cycle Host
CTR_DRBG
Seed:Derived
From
CTR_DRBG
Seed
RAM:Plaintext Until DRBG
iunnstantiation
Power
Cycle Host
CTR_DRBG
Entropy
Input:Derived From
CTR_DRBG
V:Derives
CTR_DRBG
Key:Derives
CTR_DRBG
V
RAM:Plaintext Until DRBG
iunnstantiation
Power
Cycle Host
CTR_DRBG
Seed:Derived
From
Table 17: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6791)
Hardcoded
512 bit key
Integrity SW/FW
Integrity
return code of 1
for success, 0 for
failure
Single HMAC
over entire
module
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Pre-operational self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module. The CAST
(Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test) for HMAC-SHA2-256 is performed before the integrity test.
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Self-tests do not require operator intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not
initialize and enter an error state where no services can be accessed.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
AES-
CBC
Encrypt
KAT
128 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "AES-
CBC-encrypt KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
Encrypt module
power-up
AES-
CBC
Decrypt
KAT
128 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "AES-
CBC-decrypt KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
Decrypt module
power-up
AES-
GCM
Encrypt
KAT
128 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "AES-
GCM-encrypt KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
Encrypt module
power-up
AES-
GCM
Decrypt
KAT
128 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "AES-
GCM-decrypt KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
Decrypt module
power-up
Counter
DRBG
KAT
initialize,
reseed,
generate
tests, per
SP 800-
90Arev1
Section
11.3
KAT CAS
T
None on success. "CTR-
DRBG failed" on stderr
on failure.
Instantiat
e,
Reseed,
Generate
module
power-up
ECDSA
SigGen
KAT
P-256 KAT CAS
T
None on success.
"ECDSA-sign KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
Sign On first
use
ECDSA
SigVer
KAT
P-256 KAT CAS
T
None on success.
"ECDSA-verify KAT
failed" on stderr on
failure.
Verify On first
use
HMAC-
SHA2-
256 KAT
128 KAT CAS
T
None on success.
"HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
failed" on stderr on
failure.
MAC module
power-up
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAT
P-256 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "Z-
computation KAT failed."
on stderr on failure.
SSC On first
use
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Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
KAS-
FFC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAT
2048 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "FFDH
failed" on stderr on
failure.
SSC On first
use
KDA
HKDF
Sp800-
56Cr1
KAT
HMAC
SHA-256
KAT CAS
T
None on success. "HKDF
failed" on stderr on
failure.
KDF module
power-up
RSA
SigGen
KAT
2048 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "RSA-
sign KAT failed" on stderr
on failure.
Sign On first
use
RSA
SigVer
KAT
2048 KAT CAS
T
None on success. "RSA-
verify KAT failed" on
stderr on failure.
Verify On first
use
SHA-1
KAT
n/a KAT CAS
T
None on success. "SHA-
1 KAT failed" on stderr on
failure.
Hash module
power-up
SHA2-
256 KAT
n/a KAT CAS
T
None on success. "SHA-
256 KAT failed" on stderr
on failure.
Hash module
power-up
SHA2-
512 KAT
n/a KAT CAS
T
None on success. "SHA-
512 KAT failed" on stderr
on failure.
Hash module
power-up
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7 KAT
SHA-256 KAT CAS
T
None on success.
"TLS12-KDF KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
KDF module
power-up
TLS v1.3
KDF
KAT
SHA-256 KAT CAS
T
None on success.
"TLS13-KDF KAT failed"
on stderr on failure.
KDF module
power-up
ECDSA
KeyGen
PCT
Generate
d key-
pair
Sign/Veri
fy PCT
PCT None on success.
"EC_KEY_generate_key_
fips failed" on stderr on
failure.
Sign/Veri
fy PCT
Keypair
generated
RSA
KeyGen
PCT
Generate
d key-
pair
Sign/Veri
fy PCT
PCT None on success.
"RSA_generate_key_fips
failed" on stderr on
failure.
Sign/Veri
fy PCT
Keypair
generated
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
PCT
Generate
d key-
pair
SP 800-
56Arev3
validity
tests
PCT None on success.
Module aborted on
failure.
SP 800-
56Arev3
validity
tests
Keypair
generated
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Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
KAS-
FFC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
PCT
Generate
d key-
pair
SP 800-
56Arev3
validity
tests
PCT None on success. Module
aborted on failure.
SP 800-
56Arev3
validity
tests
Keypair
generated
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CAST) are run prior to the first use of the
cryptographic algorithm. CASTs do not require operator intervention to run. If any of the tests
fail, the module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed.
Pair-wise consistency tests (PCT) are run during the module’s operation when a new
asymmetric keypair is generated. If any of these tests fail, the module will enter an error state,
where no services can be accessed by the operators.
The module can be re-initialized to clear the error and resume approved mode of operation.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6791)
Integrity SW/FW Integrity On startup Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
Encrypt KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
AES-CBC
Decrypt KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
AES-GCM
Encrypt KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
Decrypt KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
Counter DRBG
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
ECDSA SigGen
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
ECDSA SigVer
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
HMAC-SHA2-
256 KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
RSA SigGen
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
RSA SigVer
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
or restart
module
SHA-1 KAT KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
SHA2-256 KAT KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
SHA2-512 KAT KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
TLS v1.3 KDF
KAT
KAT CAST Operator chosen Manually call
On-Demand
Self-Test service
or restart
module
ECDSA KeyGen
PCT
Sign/Verify PCT PCT n/a n/a
RSA KeyGen
PCT
Sign/Verify PCT PCT n/a n/a
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
PCT
SP 800-56Arev3
validity tests
PCT n/a n/a
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
PCT
SP 800-56Arev3
validity tests
PCT n/a n/a
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information
A level 1 module does not require automatic periodic self-testing, however self-tests can be
rerun by On-
Dem and Sel
f
-
Testser
vi
ce (
BORI
NGSSL_sel
f
_t
est
)orrestarting the module.
10.4 Error States
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
state
The module's
error state
Failure of any
FIPS self-test
Restart the
module
Possible indication of failed
test on stderr. Module
aborts.
Table 22: Error States
The module’s single error state is shows above.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The cryptographic module is initialized by loading the module before any cryptographic
functionality is available. In User Space the operating system is responsible for the initialization
process and loading of the library.
General guidance about the module can be found at
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl. This includes information about the APIs, building
and specific information related to FIPS can be found at
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.git/+/refs/heads/fips-
20230428/crypto/fipsmodule/FIPS.md (note this still mentions 140-2, but the information there is
the same).
The module is open source and must be built on a Linux workstation using the tools in section
5.3 Open Source Parameters.
Building for Android
The necessary Android build tools that are configured as part of the manifest. Running the
envsetup.sh script will ensure that the proper environment is set to build the library for Android.
Download the manifest from
https://ci.android.com/builds/submitted/10050109/aosp_cf_arm64_phone-userdebug/latest by
clicking the Download button.
Verify the manifest using the following command:
sha256sum ~/manifest_10050109.xml
Manually validate that the output from the final command indicates the following expected hash
values for this file:
5f8701016e3c39503e26c81e0facb6ab386319b94f5d2508288907e652060d92
manifest_10050109.xml
The module can be obtained by issuing the following commands:
mkdir aosp
cd aosp
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~/repo init ‐u https://android.googlesource.com/platform/manifest ‐‐depth 1
~/repo init ‐m ~/manifest_10050109.xml
~/repo sync ‐q ‐c ‐j 50
To build the correct test tools (the test_fips components below, not the module), the following
additional steps need to be followed:
cd external/boringssl
git fetch https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/boringssl refs/changes/99/2775199/2 && git
cherry‐pick FETCH_HEAD
git fetch https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/boringssl refs/changes/28/2778328/2 && git
cherry‐pick FETCH_HEAD
cd src/util/fipstools
nano break‐kat.go
Change the first line of the file to be:
//go:build ignore
Save and exit
Once downloaded, the module and testing components can be built using the following
commands:
croot
. build/envsetup.sh
lunch aosp_arm64‐eng
m clean
m test_fips
Building for Linux
Once the above tools have been obtained, issue the following command to create a CMake
toolchain file to specify the use of Clang:
The FIPS 140-3 validated release of the module can be obtained by downloading the tarball
containing the source code at the following location:
https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-fips/boringssl-
a430310d6563c0734ddafca7731570dfb683dc19.tar.xz or by issuing the following command:
wget https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium‐boringssl‐fips/boringssl‐
a430310d6563c0734ddafca7731570dfb683dc19.tar.xz
The set of files specified in the archive constitutes the complete set of source files of the
validated module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during
module build.
The downloaded tarball file can be verified using the below SHA-256 digest value:
2d5339b756dbf1ceb4fdc4b1c8f19e32ded055292dc57827a6592f15ca9d359f
By issuing the following command:
printf "set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER \"clang\")\nset(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER \"clang++\")\n" > ${HOME}/toolchain
sha256sum boringssl‐a430310d6563c0734ddafca7731570dfb683dc19.tar.xz
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The tarball can be extracted using the following command:
After the tarball has been extracted, the following commands will compile the module:
Retrieving Module name and version
The following methods will provide the module name and versions:
• FIPS_module_name() – BoringCrypto
• FIPS_version() – 2023042800
11.2 Administrator Guidance
CSP Sharing
Non-Approved cryptographic algorithms shall not share the same key or CSP as an approved
algorithm. As such, Approved algorithms shall not use the keys generated by the module’s Non-
Approved key generation methods or the converse.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module does not support a non-administrator role.
11.4 Additional Information
The source code for the module is maintained in a git repository. While in development, work on
the code is maintained internally, before eventually being released externally. BoringCrypto is
released publicly to https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl (this is the generic version,
available under the Building for Linux instructions). The version number is determined by the
developer releasing the version, though git attaches hashes to every single file and branch in
the repository.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks that are outside of the scope of FIPS
140-3.
tar xJ < boringssl‐a430310d6563c0734ddafca7731570dfb683dc19.tar.xz
cd boringssl
mkdir build && cd build && cmake ‐GNinja ‐DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=${HOME}/toolchain ‐DFIPS=1 ‐
DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
ninja && ninja run_tests