Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ## Apricorn Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version: 1.1 Date: September 3, 2026 This document may be copied without the author's permission, provided that it is copied in its entirety without any modification. Apricorn is a trademark or a registered trademark of Apricorn in certain countries. All Apricorn product names and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Apricorn in certain countries. All other company and product names and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners in certain countries. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 1 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ## Table of Contents | 1 General | ................................................................................................................................... 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................ | 5 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ........................................ | 8 | | 2.3 Excluded Components | .....................................................................................................10 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation | .........................................................................................................10 | | 2.5 Algorithms | .......................................................................................................................10 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................12 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information | .........................................................................................13 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................13 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................13 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment | .........................................................................................................13 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols | ..........................................................................................................14 | | 2.12 Additional Information | ....................................................................................................14 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................14 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................14 | | 3.2 Trusted Channel Specification .........................................................................................14 | | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................15 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods | ...................................................................................................15 | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................16 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................16 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services | ...................................................................................................24 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................24 | | | 5 Software/Firmware Security | ...................................................................................................24 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................24 | | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................24 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................24 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ..........................................................24 | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................24 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................25 | | | 7.2 EFP/EFT Information | .......................................................................................................25 | | 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges | ..........................................................................25 | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................25 | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 2 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................25 | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................25 | | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ..............................................................................................26 | | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................26 | | | 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................27 | | | 10 Self-Tests | .............................................................................................................................32 | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................32 | | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................32 | | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................33 | | | 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................34 | | | 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................36 | | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................36 | | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................36 | | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................37 | | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................38 | | | 11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................38 | | | 11.5 End of Life .....................................................................................................................39 | | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................40 | | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 3 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels ............................................................................................................. | 5 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware ..................................................................... | 8 | | Table 3: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10 | | | Table 4: Approved Algorithms | ...................................................................................................11 | | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | ........................................................................................11 | | Table 6: Security Function Implementations ..............................................................................13 | | | Table 7: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................13 | | | Table 8: Entropy Sources | ..........................................................................................................13 | | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces | ....................................................................................................14 | | Table 10: Authentication Methods .............................................................................................16 | | | Table 11: Roles | .........................................................................................................................16 | | Table 12: Approved Services | ....................................................................................................24 | | Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | ...........................................................................25 | | Table 14: EFP/EFT Information .................................................................................................25 | | | Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................25 | | | Table 16: Storage Areas | ...........................................................................................................26 | | Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................26 | | | Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods ..........................................................................................27 | | | Table 19: SSP Table 1 | ..............................................................................................................29 | | Table 20: SSP Table 2 | ..............................................................................................................32 | | Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ........................................................................................32 | | | Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests | ...............................................................................................33 | | Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................33 | | | Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................34 | | | Table 25: Error States ...............................................................................................................35 | | | List of Figures | | | Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary and TOEPP .......................................................................... Figure 2: Block Diagram ............................................................................................................. | 7 8 | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 4 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This security policy document contains a description of the Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module (also referred to herein as the cryptographic module, or simply the module). This document contains a specification of the security rules under which the module must operate as derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-3. ### 1.2 Security Levels Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 3 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 3 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 3 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 3 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 3 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 3 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 3 | | 10 | Self-tests | 3 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 3 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 3 | ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ##### Purpose and Use: The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. Specifically, the module is a USB to Solid State Memory Module which implements hardware-based authenticated encryption. The module provides secure encrypted (XTS-AES-256) storage and ensures that only authorized operators have access to the protected data. Access is granted by use of an embedded alpha-numeric keypad whereby the authorized operator inputs a personal identification number (PIN) to access and unlock the secured data. Three (3) LEDs, each a different color, indicate the module status during authentication and operation. Electronic components containing critical security parameters (CSPs) are encapsulated within a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy. The modules also incorporate a strong, tamper-resistant, non-removable, hard metal enclosure that defines the cryptographic boundary. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 5 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy This software-free, embedded authentication approach allows the module to be agnostic to the operating system running on the host. The cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 3 cryptographic module requirements for the storage of user credentials and file systems. The modules will only operate in the 'Approved' mode of operation. They must be configured according to the initial setup instructions in Section 11.1 before being operational. A non-Approved mode is not supported. ##### Module Type : Hardware ##### Module Embodiment : Multi-Chip Standalone ##### Cryptographic Boundary: The entire physical module boundary (including the USB port) is the boundary of the cryptographic module ##### Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The TOEPP of the module is the same as the physical cryptographic boundary. The Aegis Secure Key 3.0 (ASK3) is a level 3 multi-chip standalone module, and as such the perimeter of the tested operational environment is the entire module © Apricorn 1.0 Page 6 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary and TOEPP © Apricorn 1.0 Page 7 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Figure 2: Block Diagram ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ##### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------| | ASK3-16GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 16GB | | ASK3-30GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 30GB | | ASK3-60GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 60GB | | ASK3-120GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 120GB | | ASK3-240GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 240GB | | ASK3-480GB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 480GB | | ASK3-1TB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 1TB | | ASK3-2TB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 2TB | | ASK3-4TB | Rev. 0.1 | 1.0.6 | AFSC-Q01 06- 0108 | 4TB | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 8 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy The module's Module identifier can be retrieved by querying the device's USB Device Descriptor fields; specifically, the idProduct field: - idProduct will display 1407 for the module's PID (Product Identifier) The module version can be verified by running the show version service (Diagnostics Mode): 1. Push the Unlock button to bring the module out of a sleep state or plug into a powered USB port. 2. Push the Lock + 1 keys at the same time and release. 3. Push and hold the 0 key. The LEDs will flash Red and Blue for five (5) seconds then all LEDs will illuminate for one second. Release the 0 key. 4. The LEDs will flash the Firmware version (Major.Minor.Patch) and the Hardware version (Major.Minor). Each version number of 1 or greater will blink the Blue LED. If the version is 0, then there is no Blue LED blink and only the Red LED will blink as an indicator of the decimal delimiter (.). The ASK3 module has Firmware version of 1.0.6 and Hardware version Rev. 0.1. After releasing the 0 key, the module will blink the LEDs per the sequence below: - a. One Blue LED blink = 1 - b. One Red LED blink = . (delimiter) - c. Zero Blue LED blinks = 0 - d. One Red LED blink = . (delimiter) - e. Six Red LED blinks = 6 - f. One Red LED blink = . (delimiter) - g. Zero Blue LED blinks = 0 - h. One Red LED blink = . (delimiter) - i. One Blue LED blink = 1 - j. One Red LED blink = . (delimiter) - k. X Blue and Y Red LED blinks = Ignore This module version is Firmware 1.0.6; Hardware Rev. 0.1. ##### Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. ##### Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. ##### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. ##### Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 9 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ### 2.3 Excluded Components N/A for this module ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ##### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Types of Services | Status Indicator | |---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| | Approved Mode | Module has been initialized per initialization instructions | Approved | Solid RED LED indicating the module is locked and in Approved mode | Table 3: Modes List and Description The Aegis Secure Key 3.0 only operates in an approved mode of operation when the module is configured according to the initial setup instructions in section 11.1. ### 2.5 Algorithms ##### Approved Algorithms: | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC, AES- ECB | A5907, A7346 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 | A7346 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-65536 Increment 128 Tweak Mode - Number Data Unit Length - Data Unit Length: 128- 4096 Increment 128 Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - No | SP 800-38E | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A6008 | Curve - P-256 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) | A6008 | Curve - P-256 | FIPS 186-5 | | Hash DRBG | A5943 | Prediction Resistance - No Supports Reseed - No Mode - SHA2-256 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 1024 Nonce - Nonce: 0 Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 0, 0 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 10 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | | | Additional Input - Additional Input: 0, 0 Returned Bits - 256 | | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A7825 | MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 256 Message Length - Message Length: 64-1536 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A6008 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P- 256 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KDA OneStep SP800-56Cr2 | A7826 | Auxiliary Function Methods - Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-256 MAC Salting Methods - default Fixed Info Pattern - algorithmId||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation Derived Key Length - 512 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 256 | SP 800-56C Rev. 2 | | SHA2-256 | A7824 | Message Length - Message Length: 64-2048 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | Table 4: Approved Algorithms NOTE: Only the algorithms specified in this section are supported by the module in approved mode of operation. ##### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |----------|----------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------| | CKG AES | AES:Symmetric | N/A | SP800-133r2 Section 6.3 approved method 1 | | CKG DRBG | AES:Symmetric ECC-CDH Private Key:Asymmetric | N/A | SP800-133r2 Section 4 example 1 | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: © Apricorn 1.0 Page 11 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CKG AES | CKG | Derivation of Symmetric Keys using the output of an RBG | | CKG AES: () AES: Symmetric | | Block Cipher | BC- UnAuthDecrypt BC- UnAuthEncrypt | Block Cipher for data encryption/decryption | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A7346) AES-ECB: (A7346) | | DRBG Function | DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator | | Hash DRBG: (A5943) | | Entropy Source - ESV | ENT-ESV | Physical Entropy Source (ESV#46) | | | | Password Hash | SHA | Used to store passwords in hashed form | | SHA2-256: (A7824) | | KTS | KTS-Unwrap | AES-CBC + HMAC to unwrap message blob from configurator service | Standard:SP 800- 38F IG D.G:approved from IG D.G | AES-CBC: (A5907) HMAC- SHA2-256: (A7825) | | CKG DRBG | CKG | Derivation of Symmetric or Asymmetric Keys using the output of an RBG | | CKG DRBG: () AES: Symmetric ECC-CDH Private Key: Asymmetric | | KAS | KAS-Full | Key Agreement P-256 curve with 128-bits of security strength | IG:IG D.F Scenario 2, path (2), split Key confirmation:No Key derivation:KDA (separately tested) Caveat:Key establishment ,methodology provides 128 bits of security strength | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6008) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A6008) KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2: (A7826) KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A6008) | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 12 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 6: Security Function Implementations ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information This section provides additional details regarding the implementation and usage of approved cryptographic algorithms within the Aegis Secure Key 3.0 module: - AES-XTS Key Validation : The module implements AES-XTS in accordance with IG C.I. The module verifies that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 prior to usage. If the keys are found to be equal, the module enters a FIPS error state and indicates failure via 16 RED LED blinks. - Password Hashing : PINs and other authentication data are hashed using SHA2-256 prior to storage or verification. ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy Table 7: Entropy Certificates | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|--------------------------| | E46 | Microchip Technology Inc | | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |---------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | NRBG Entropy Source | Physical | ATECC608B | 1 bit | 0.5071 | | Table 8: Entropy Sources The entropy source produces 0.5071 bits of entropy per sample. For 1024 bits of entropy input the security strength is over 256 bits of entropy strength (1024 bits x 0.5071 = 519.2704 bits) ### 2.9 Key Generation All key generation is performed within the cryptographic boundary of the module. Symmetric keys are generated using the direct output of the SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG. The DRBG is seeded by a non-deterministic entropy source (ATECC608B, ESV (#E46) providing 0.5071 bits of entropy per sample. ### 2.10 Key Establishment All key establishment is performed within the cryptographic boundary of the module - Key Derivation Function (KDA) : The module uses the SP 800-56C Rev. 2 One-Step KDF with SHA2-256 for deriving keys from shared secrets established via ECDH. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 13 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy - Key Agreement Scheme (KAS) : The module supports KAS-ECC-SSC as defined in SP 800-56A Rev. 3 using the P-256 curve. This is used in conjunction with the Configurator service for secure key establishment. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module follows the Universal Serial Bus protocol requirements. ### 2.12 Additional Information The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. Security rules enforced by the Module are described in the appropriate context of this document. ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Table 9: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Universal Serial Bus (USB) Connector | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output Power | Data Stored on the devices hard drive/memory Encrypted data packets from the configurator service during module initialization Status output for module identifier | | Physical Keypad | Data Input Control Input | Keypad is used to enter PINs for device authentication, and allows crypto officer to change settings | | Status LEDs | Status Output | LEDs used to communicate module state, settings, and module information | Note: The module does not support a Control Output Interface. ### 3.2 Trusted Channel Specification The module implements a trusted channel for the input of plaintext authentication data (SSP) in the form of passwords (PINs) via the module's keypad interface. The trusted channel is intended for the operator to both create authentication data in the form of PINs and then use the established authentication data to access the module. The user stays in control of the trusted channel by having full physical control of the module, as the module is a handheld device. The user can prevent unauthorized tampering by checking for evidence of tampering each time the module is used. Physical characteristics of the trusted channel: Each key is mapped to a dedicated, physically separated channel. The trusted channel is protected by the physical security mechanisms inherent within the module which includes the industrial grade enclosure with tamper evidence. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 14 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Controls to maintain the trusted channel: There are no extra controls needed to maintain the trusted channel. The trusted channel (physical keypad) functions as part of the module normal operation without any necessary extra tools required by the CO or user. Instructions for setup and operation of the trusted channel: to setup and operate the trusted channel, the CO and User can reference PIN creation and PIN use instructions in the ASK3 modules user manual included with the module. - Trusted channel for PIN establishment - Section 11.1 below specifies specific command procedures required for PIN establishment as well as status LED output indications that occur during PIN establishment - Trusted channel for module authentication - pressing the unlock button on the module will establish the trusted channel with the status indication of a solid RED LED. The user can then enter their plaintext authentication data and press the unlock button. If authentication data is accepted, the module will Unlock with a Green LED. If the authentication data is not accepted, the module will end the trusted channel and the RED LED will flash. The modules implementation and use of plaintext authentication data through the trusted channel conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.C. ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | PIN Code Verification | A minimum eight- digit PIN is used, with each digit selected from ten (10) possible characters. There are 10^8 (one hundred million) possible PIN combinations | Known Secret | The probability of a random attempt to authenticate to the module is 1/100,000,000 | The probability of multiple consecutive attempts to authenticate to the module during a one- minute period is 20/100,000,000 | | Configurator EC Diffie- Hellman | The modules support ECC- CDH public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of curve P-256 | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) (A6008) | Since P-256 curve is used, the probability that a random attempt to authenticate to the module is 1/(2^128) which is much less than 1/1,000,000. | One authentication attempt is allowed before a User reset must be performed which takes approximately 30 seconds to complete the procedure, therefore there could be ~2 attempts per minute. Given this, the probability of multiple | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 15 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | consecutive attempts to authenticate to the module during a one- minute period is 2/(2^128) which is much less than 1/100,000. | Table 10: Authentication Methods For more information on the Configurator, see section 11.1 ### 4.2 Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-----------------|----------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------| | User | Identity | User | PIN Code Verification | | Admin | Identity | Crypto Officer | PIN Code Verification Configurator EC Diffie-Hellman | | Unauthenticated | Identity | Unauthenticated | None | Table 11: Roles The Module supports the Admin (Cryptographic Officer (CO)) operator role and a general User operator role. When authenticating to the module, the Admin and User have access to the same data on the storage media. The Admin has access to alter device settings (services) and manage authentication data (PINs) via the modules admin mode as referenced in the ASK3 user manual. ### 4.3 Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------|------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Unlock | Authenticates the operator to the module | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - AES Encryption Key: E - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E User - AES Encryption Key: E - User PIN: W,E,Z | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 16 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - Hashed User PIN: E | | Lock | Locks the module to prevent any access | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin User | | Write Data | Write user data/files on the disk storage area | Global Indicator | Plaintext Data | None | Block Cipher | Admin - AES Encryption Key: E User - AES Encryption Key: E | | Read Data | Read user data/files on the disk storage area | Global Indicator | None | Plaintex t Data | Block Cipher | Admin - AES Encryption Key: E User - AES Encryption Key: E | | Establish User PINs | Create Admin or User PIN | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: G,W User - User PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed User PIN: G,W | | Change PINs | Change Admin or User PIN | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: G,W,E User - User PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed User PIN: G,W,E | | Set Self- Destruct | Enable or Disable Self- | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Self-Destruct PIN: Z | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 17 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Destruct feature | | | | | - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z | | Self- Destruct PIN | Create self destruct PIN (Self destruct must be enabled) | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Self-Destruct PIN: G,W,E,Z - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: G,W User - Self-Destruct PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: G,W | | Self- Destruct | Use self- destruct PIN to zeroize user data/files on disk storage area | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Block Cipher Password Hash | Admin - Self-Destruct PIN: W,E,Z - AES Encryption Key: W - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: W - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed User PIN: Z User - Self-Destruct PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z - Hashed Admin PIN: W - AES | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 18 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Encryption Key: W - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed User PIN: Z | | Delete All User PINs | Deletes all user and recovery PINs. Only Admin PIN remains | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E - Hashed User PIN: Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z | | Set Unattende d Auto Lock | Sets a timer to automatically lock the device after a period of inactivity | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | Set Read Only | Set the drive to read only mode | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E User - User PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed User PIN: E | | Set Lock Override | Setting to prevent device from locking during a system reboot | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | Create Recovery PINs | Create PINs that can be used for a user recovery if a user PIN is forgotten | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Recovery PIN: W,Z - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 19 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - Hashed Recovery PIN: G,W | | Use Recovery PIN | Use a recovery PIN to allow user to set new PIN | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | Password Hash | Admin - Recovery PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - User PIN: G,W,E User - Recovery PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - User PIN: G,W,E - Hashed User PIN: W | | Setup Forced Enrollment | Puts device in a mode for user to create a PIN before use | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | Set Minimum PIN Length | Set required minimum PIN length for new PINs | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | Set LED Flicker | Set device so LEDs flicker when buttons are pressed | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | Configurat or | Allows automated setup of device PINs and features | Global Indicator | Encrypted payloads sent from the configurat or service | ECC- CDH Public Key | DRBG Function Password Hash KTS CKG DRBG KAS | Admin - User PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed User PIN: G,W - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: G,W - Recovery | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 20 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: G,W - Self-Destruct PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: G,W - AES-CBC Decryption Key: G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key: G,R,Z - ECDH Private Key: G,E,Z - ECDH Shared Secret "Z": G,E,Z - SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State: G,E,Z - Host EC DH Public Key: W,E - Module HMAC MAC: G,W,E,Z - Host HMAC MAC: W,E,Z - HMAC Shared Key: G,W,E,Z | | Show Version | Diagnostics Mode - Unauthenticate d service to check module version and test functionality of all keypad buttons | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Unauthenticate d | | Show Status | LED indication for the status of the module | Global Indicator | None | None | None | User Admin | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 21 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Unauthenticate d | | Set Brute Force Attempts | Sets the number of failed unlock attempts before module zeroizes | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | | On- Demand Self Tests | Perform module self- tests on demand | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Unauthenticate d | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) | Zeroize Service | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | CKG AES DRBG Function Entropy Source - ESV CKG DRBG KAS | Admin - AES Encryption Key: G,W,Z - Hashed User PIN: Z - Hashed Admin PIN: Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z - HASH-DRBG Internal State: G,E,Z - ECDH Private Key: G,W,Z - SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State: Z - HASH DRBG Seed: G,E,Z - Entropy Input: G,E,Z User - AES Encryption Key: G,W,Z - Hashed User PIN: Z - Hashed | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 22 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|--------------|----------|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | Admin PIN: Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z - HASH-DRBG Internal State: G,E,Z - ECDH Private Key: G,E,Z - SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State: Z - HASH DRBG Seed: G,E,Z - Entropy Input: G,E,Z Unauthenticate d - AES Encryption Key: G,W,Z - Hashed User PIN: Z - Hashed Admin PIN: Z - Hashed Recovery PIN: Z - Hashed Self- Destruct PIN: Z - HASH-DRBG Internal State: G,E,Z - ECDH Private Key: G,W,Z - SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State: Z - HASH DRBG Seed: G,E,Z | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 23 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 12: Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicato r | Inputs | Output s | Security Function s | SSP Access | |----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - Entropy Input: G,E,Z | | Provision Lock | Changes module function so zeroize can only be called by Admin | Global Indicator | Keypad | None | None | Admin - Admin PIN: W,E,Z - Hashed Admin PIN: E | Global Indicator is the successful completion of a service as an implicit indicator for the use of an approved service. ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. The Aegis Secure Key 3.0 does not support any Non-Approved services. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module does not support external software/firmware loading ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The module Firmware is non-modifiable. A CRC-16 integrity check is run on the module FW during every startup and authentication action. A failure of the integrity check will result in the module being placed into an error state as referenced in section 10.4 ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The FW integrity can be checked by performing the on-demand self-test service ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ##### Type of Operational Environment : Non-Modifiable ## 7 Physical Security ##### Epoxy coating © Apricorn 1.0 Page 24 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy The modules incorporate a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy coating encapsulating all electrical components containing critical security parameters. Attempts to remove the epoxy will cause damage to these components. ##### Tamper-Resistance The module incorporates a strong, tamper-resistant, hard metal enclosure that defines the cryptographic boundary. ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy coating and metal enclosure | In accordance with the Administrator role organizational security policy or every 3 months. | Inspect the cryptographic boundary for scratches, gouges, scrapes, deformations, and any other suspicious signs of malice and tampering. If any evidence of tampering exists, the Administrator role is required to cease use of the cryptographic module immediately. | ### 7.2 EFP/EFT Information Table 14: EFP/EFT Information | Temp/Voltage Type | Temperature or Voltage | EFP or EFT | Result | |---------------------|--------------------------|--------------|----------| | LowTemperature | -15 C | EFP | Shutdown | | HighTemperature | 80 C | EFP | Shutdown | | LowVoltage | 4 VDC | EFP | Shutdown | | HighVoltage | 5.25 VDC | EFP | Shutdown | ### 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures | Temperature Type | Temperature | |--------------------|---------------| | LowTemperature | -40 C | | HighTemperature | 85 C | ## 8 Non-Invasive Security The module does not provide protections against non-invasive security methods. ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------|--------------------| | RAM | Random Access Memory | Dynamic | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 25 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 16: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | EEPROM | Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory | Static | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distributio n Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorith m | |-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------|---------------------| | PINs - Keypad | EXT: Trusted Channel | INT | Plaintext | Manual | Direct | Password Hash | | PINs - Configurator | EXT: Configurato r Service | INT | Encrypte d | Automated | Electroni c | KTS | | Public Key | INT | EXT: Configurato r Service | Plaintext | Automated | Electroni c | KAS | | Host HMAC Authenticatio n Tag | EXT: Configurato r Service | INT | Encrypte d | Automated | Electroni c | KTS | ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) | CO/User issues Reset command | The zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in storage areas | User reset service | | Self-Destruct | Self Destruct service | Self-Destruct shall zeroize the module | Self-Destruct Service | | Delete all user PINs | Delete all user PINs service | Deleted PINs are no longer be accessible and are overwritten with zeros | Delete all User PINs service | | Change PIN | Change PIN service | PIN is overwritten with new PIN | Change PIN Service | | Configurator | Public Key, HMAC Shared Key and HMAC MAC Destruction | Temporary keys used for HMAC and ECDH shall be zeroized when no longer needed | Initialize Module | | After Use | Temporary Stored RAM values for Plaintext PINs | Plaintext PINs are only used to create hash values and verify against hashed PIN values | N/A | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 26 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy ####### Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods ### 9.4 SSPs | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------| | AES Encryptio n Key | 256-bit AES- XTS key used to encrypt/decryp t protected data | 256-bits - 256- bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | CKG AES Hash DRBG (A5943) | | Block Cipher | | User PIN | Plaintext authentication data for the General User | 8 to 16 digit PIN - 64-bit | Authenticatio n - CSP | | | Passwor d Hash | | Hashed User PIN | SHA2-256 Hashed value of the plaintext PIN | 256 bytes - 256 | Authenticatio n - CSP | SHA2-256 (A7824) | | | | Admin PIN | Plaintext authentication data for the Admin (CO) | 8 to 16 digit PIN - 64-bit | Authenticatio n - CSP | | | Passwor d Hash | | Hashed Admin PIN | SHA2-256 Hashed value of the plaintext PIN | 256 bytes - 256 | Authenticatio n - CSP | SHA2-256 (A7824) | | | | Recovery PIN | Plaintext authentication data for the General User/ Administrator | 8 to 16 digit PIN - 64-bit | Authenticatio n - CSP | | | Passwor d Hash | | Hashed Recovery PIN | SHA2-256 Hashed value of the plaintext PIN | 256 bytes - 256 | Authenticatio n - CSP | SHA2-256 (A7824) | | | | Self- Destruct PIN | Unique PIN that performs a cryptographic erase of the module, deletes PINs and assigns the self- destruct PIN | 8 to 16 digit PIN - 64-bit | Authenticatio n - Neither | | | Passwor d Hash | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 27 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------| | | to the admin PIN | | | | | | | Hashed Self- Destruct PIN | SHA2-256 Hashed value of the plaintext PIN | 256 bytes - 256 | Authenticatio n - Neither | SHA2-256 (A7824) | | | | HASH- DRBG Internal State | Values of V and C of HASH DRBG mechanism | 880-bit - 256 | Critical values of internal state on SP 800- 90A - CSP | Hash DRBG (A5943) | | CKG AES CKG DRBG | | HASH DRBG Seed | Entropy Input from the ECC608B NRBG used to seed the SP 800-90A HASH DRBG | 256 - 256 | Critical values of internal state on SP 800- 90A - CSP | Entropy Source - ESV | | DRBG Function | | Entropy Input | Input String from the Entropy Source for the DRBG | 1024 - 256 | Entropy Input to the Approved DRBG - CSP | Entropy Source - ESV | | Hash DRBG (A5943) | | AES-CBC Decryptio n Key | 256-bit AES- CBC key used to decrypt protected data | 256-bit - 256-bit | Symmetric Key - CSP | | KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2 (A7826) | KTS | | ECDH Private Key | The module's P-256 SP 800- 56A ECDH private key | 256-bit - 128 | Private - CSP | Hash DRBG (A5943) CKG DRBG | | KAS | | ECDH Public Key | The module's P-256 SP 800- 56A ECDH public key | 256-bit - 128 | Public - PSP | Hash DRBG (A5943) CKG DRBG | | KAS | | ECDH Shared Secret "Z" | The module's 256-bit SP 800-56A EC DH Shared Secret "Z" used in EC DH key | 256-bit - 256 | Public/Privat e - CSP | | KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A6008) | KAS | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 28 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Host EC DH Public Key | Host's P-256 SP 800-56A EC DH Public Key | 256-bit - 128 | Public/Privat e - PSP | | | KAS | | Module HMAC MAC | used to authenticate the encrypted message from Configurator service | 256-bit - 256 | Public/Privat e - CSP | | KAS KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A6008) KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2 (A7826) | KTS | | Host HMAC MAC | received from the Configurator service | 256-bit - 256 | Public/Privat e - CSP | | | KTS | | HMAC Shared Key | Mac Key for HMAC | 256-bit - 256 | Public/Privat e - CSP | | KAS KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A6008) KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2 (A7826) | KTS | | SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State | Client's Internal state of the ECC CDH One step key derivation function (SHA2-256) | 256 - 256 | KDF Internal State - CSP | | KDA OneStep SP800- 56Cr2 (A7826) | | Table 19: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | AES Encryptio n Key | | EEPROM:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Self- Destruct | HASH-DRBG Internal State:Derived From | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 29 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | User PIN | PINs - Keypad PINs - Configurator | RAM:Plaintext | Usage Session | After Use | | | Hashed User PIN | | EEPROM:Obfuscat ed | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Self- Destruct Delete all user PINs Change PIN | User PIN:Derived From | | Admin PIN | PINs - Keypad PINs - Configurator | RAM:Plaintext | Usage Session | After Use | | | Hashed Admin PIN | | EEPROM:Obfuscat ed | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Self- Destruct Change PIN | Admin PIN:Derived From | | Recovery PIN | PINs - Keypad PINs - Configurator | RAM:Plaintext | Usage Session | After Use | | | Hashed Recovery PIN | | EEPROM:Obfuscat ed | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Self- Destruct Delete all user PINs Change PIN | Recovery PIN:Derived From | | Self- Destruct PIN | PINs - Keypad PINs - Configurator | RAM:Plaintext | Usage Session | After Use | Hashed Admin PIN:Derived From | | Hashed Self- Destruct PIN | | EEPROM:Obfuscat ed | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Delete all user PINs | | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 30 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | HASH- DRBG Internal State | | RAM:Plaintext | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) | | | HASH DRBG Seed | | RAM:Plaintext | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) | | | Entropy Input | | RAM:Plaintext | | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) After Use | HASH-DRBG Internal State:generate s HASH DRBG Seed:generate s | | AES-CBC Decryptio n Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | SP 800-56Cr2 KDF Internal State:Derived From | | ECDH Private Key | Public Key | EEPROM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Configurato r | ECDH Public Key:Paired With HASH-DRBG Internal State:Derived From | | ECDH Public Key | Public Key | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | ECDH Private Key:Derived From | | ECDH Shared Secret "Z" | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | Host ECC CDH Public Key:Derived From Client ECC CDH Private Key:Derived From | | Host EC DH Public Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | | | Module HMAC MAC | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | HMAC Shared Key:Derived From | | Host HMAC MAC | Host HMAC Authenticatio n Tag | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | | | HMAC Shared Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | Configurato r | SP 800-56Cr2 KDF Internal | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 31 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |----------------------------------|------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------| | | | | | | State:Derived From | | SP 800- 56Cr2 KDF Internal State | | RAM:Plaintext | Configurato r Usage Session | User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) | | Table 20: SSP Table 2 ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |---------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------| | 16-Bit FW Integrity Tests | CRC-16 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Global Indicator | Verify | Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------|-------------------------| | SHA2-256 | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up & Authenticate | | Hash_DRBG | SHA2-256; SP 800-90A Section 11.3 health tests for Instantiate and Generate functions | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up & Authenticate | | ECDH PCT | Module Key Pair | PCT | PCT | Global Indicator | Verify | Configurator Service | | HMAC- SHA2-256 | HMAC- SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up & Authenticate | | AES-256 CBC Encrypt | 256-bit | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Encrypt | Power up & Authenticate | | AES-256 CBC Decrypt | 256-bit | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Decrypt | Power up & Authenticate | | ECDH | P-256 | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 32 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------| | One Step KDF | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | N/A | Power up | | 90B RCT & APT Health tests | 1024-bit | APT/RCT | Critical Function | Global Indicator | Health- Test with sub- elements | Power up & Authenticate | | XTS-AES 256 Encrypt | 256-bit | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Encrypt | Power up & Authenticate | | XTS-AES 256 Decrypt | 256-bit | KAT | CAST | Global Indicator | Decrypt | Power up & Authenticate | | Partial Key Validation 1 | Module Public Key P-256 | PCT | PCT | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up | | Partial Key Validation 2 | Host Public Key P-256 | PCT | PCT | Global Indicator | Verify | Power up | | XTS-AES Key Compare | 256-bit | Comparison | Critical Function | Global Indicator | Verify | Zeroization | | Manual PIN Entry | N/A | Duplicate Key Entry | Manual Entry | Global Indicator | Requires PINs be entered twice | Establishing PINs | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------| | 16-Bit FW Integrity Tests | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Power Up; Authenticate | Manual | | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------| | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | Hash_DRBG | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | ECDH PCT | PCT | PCT | On-Demand self-test or Key Generation | Manual | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | AES-256 CBC Encrypt | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | AES-256 CBC Decrypt | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | ECDH | KAT | CAST | Key Generation | Manual | | One Step KDF | KAT | CAST | Key Generation | Manual | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 33 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------| | 90B RCT & APT Health tests | APT/RCT | Critical Function | Authenticate | Manual | | XTS-AES 256 Encrypt | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | XTS-AES 256 Decrypt | KAT | CAST | Authenticate | Manual | | Partial Key Validation 1 | PCT | PCT | Key Generation | Manual | | Partial Key Validation 2 | PCT | PCT | Configurator Service | Manual | | XTS-AES Key Compare | Comparison | Critical Function | Key Generation | Manual | | Manual PIN Entry | Duplicate Key Entry | Manual Entry | PIN Establishment | Manual | ### 10.4 Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| | WDT Reset | Watch Dog Timer Reset - Communication error | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 3 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | Configurator | Configurator Service Failure | Power up | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 4 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | FW Integrity | Computed Checksum does not match stored checksum | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 5 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | SHA2-256 KAT | SHA2-256 KAT failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 6 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | HASH-DRBG KAT | HASH-DRBG KAT failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 7 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | © Apricorn 1.0 Page 34 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Table 25: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | XTS-AES 256 Self-test | XTS-AES 256 Self- test failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 8 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | AES-256-CBC KAT | AES-256-CBC KAT failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 9 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | KAS or KDF KAT | KAS or KDF KAT failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 10 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | ECC Public Key Generation | Failed to Generate Public Key | Power up | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 11 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 12 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | SP800-90B Health Test | SP800-90B health test failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 13 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | Key Comparison | XTS-AES Key Comparison failure | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 16 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | | EEPROM Load | Failed to load XTS- AES key during unlock | Power up Authenticate | On-Demand Self- Tests or Device Reset (zeroization) | RED LED Blinks 20 times followed by BLUE LED Blink | The module design prohibits cryptographic operations while the module is in any error state, until such a time as error recovery occurs. Data output and control output information are also inhibited while in the error state; only status output is allowed. The module does not log or store previous error occurrences. When the module is in an error state, it cannot be operated normally and will continuously report the error until error recovery is attempted through an invocation of on-demand self-tests or by performing a user reset (zeroize) service. If self-tests pass, the module will transition to an operational state, otherwise, the error state shall persist. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 35 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy The module's error operation and logging function meets the resolutions set forth in FIPS 140 -3 IG 10.3.D as of the publication of this security policy. To recover from an error state, the operator can perform a complete reset or invoke the ondemand self-tests. Only if all self-tests are completed successfully, will the module transition to an operational state. ### 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests On-demand self-tests can be performed from the standby state. To invoke these tests, first ensure the device is not plugged into a powered USB port (this prevents damaging the USB plug) and wake the device by pressing the UNLOCK button. Next press the LOCK + 8 buttons simultaneously. The solid red LED will transition to a blinking green LED for ten (10) seconds. Within these ten seconds, plug the device into a powered USB port and the device will automatically perform on-demand self-tests. Otherwise, the device will time out and return to standby state. Successful self-tests completion will be indicated by the following LED sequence: solid RED followed by solid GREEN followed by solid BLUE. The device will then return to standby state. ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The Administrator role (CO) is responsible for the overall security of the module and initializing the cryptographic module into the Approved mode of operation and adding an additional user role to the module. The Administrator shall perform one (1) of the following two (2) procedures to set the initial Admin PIN and initialize the module into Approved mode: 1. Wake up the module by pressing the Unlock button. The BLUE and GREEN LEDs will glow solidly. - a. Press UNLOCK + 9 at the same time. The BLUE LED will glow solidly, and the GREEN LED will be blinking (this establishes the trusted channel for PIN creation). - b. Enter the series of numbers that you will use for the Admin PIN and press the UNLOCK button. - c. Re-enter that same PIN and press the UNLOCK button again. The GREEN LED will illuminate for one second followed by the BLUE LED glowing solidly by itself (this ends the trusted channel for PIN creation). - d. Push the Lock button. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 36 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2. Execute the 'Configurator' service to perform the initialization of the module and set the admin PIN and setup a user role by either establishing a PIN or setting the module into user forced enrollment. If the module was set to approved mode manually (not using the configurator service), the CO can add a user role following this method: 1. Place the module in admin mode using the following method: - a. From locked standby (solid RED LED), Press and hold UNLOCK + 0 together for five seconds until the RED LED blinks once per second. - b. Enter the Admin PIN and press the UNLOCK button. - c. The Aegis Secure Product is now in Admin Mode, indicated by a solid BLUE LED. 2. Manually set the PIN for the user - a. In admin mode Press the UNLOCK + 1 buttons together, to initiate User Enrollment Mode. The BLUE LED will be solid and the GREEN LED will be flashing. - b. Enter the desired User PIN and press UNLOCK. The GREEN LED will blink three times by itself, then the BLUE LED will glow solidly as the GREEN LED continues blinking. - c. Re-enter that same PIN and press the UNLOCK button again. The GREEN LED will flash solid for 3 seconds and the module will return to admin mode (solid BLUE LED). The Configurator GUI application is outside of the module's FIPS 140 -3 validation scope. It resides on the host pc used by the Cryptographic Officer during module initialization. The Configurator GUI application is the Configurator service that is used for module initialization that is an alternative to manual initialization using the module's keypad trusted channel. The module authenticates the Configurator GUI application using an SP800-56Ar3 ECC-CDH KAS. Each message that is sent from the Configurator GUI application to the module is further protected using the KTS SFI. After module initialization, the Configurator GUI application cannot communicate with the module unless the module is in it's factory OOB state (post user reset). Upon completion of the initialization period, the module's LED status will indicate a solid RED LED. The cryptographic module only supports an Approved mode of operation, therefore a noncompliant configuration is not possible and out of scope for this validation. ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance Upon receipt of the module an operator must follow the initialization procedure outlined in Section 11.1. This establishes the operator as the Admin (Cryptographic Officer (CO)) with a PIN. The module is designed to securely store authorized user's data files using physical and logical security methods. A user may transfer files to the device via a compatible PC or similar device. Over the life of the device an operator may: © Apricorn 1.0 Page 37 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy - Initialize the device as a single operator (CO only). - Initialize the device for multiple operators (CO and User). - Transfer files to the device for secure storage. - Reset the device effectively cryptographically zeroizing all data, CSPs and SSPs. Services available to the CO role are listed in section 4.3. Further Administrator Guidance that is not in this security policy for this module can be found in the owner's manual for the ASK3 product at the link below under 'MANUALS AND DATASHEETS' [https://apricorn.com/aegis-secure-key-3](https://apricorn.com/aegis-secure-key-3) ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance The cryptographic officer must establish access for a general user role. An operator under the User role shall authenticate and transfer files to the device via a compatible PC or similar device. Services available to the User role are listed in section 4.3. Further Non-Administrator Guidance that is not in this security policy for this module can be found in the owner's manual for the ASK3 product at the link below under 'MANUALS AND DATASHEETS' [https://apricorn.com/aegis-secure-key-3](https://apricorn.com/aegis-secure-key-3) ### 11.4 Design and Rules - The cryptographic module always runs in an Approved mode of operation (i.e., nonApproved is not supported). It is possible to determine that the module is in Approved mode by waking up the module and observing LED status as follows: RED LED is solid to indicate self-tests completed successfully; RED LED flashes to indicate an error state, including failure of a power-up self-test as well as failure of a conditional self-test. - Power on self-tests are run automatically when the device is initially powered. This can happen at the time of manufacture or when power is applied through the USB and the batteries have been depleted. - On-demand self-tests can be performed from the standby state. To invoke these tests, first ensure the device is not plugged into a powered USB port (this prevents damaging the USB plug) and wake the device by pressing the UNLOCK button. Next press the LOCK + 8 buttons simultaneously. The solid red LED will transition to a blinking green LED for ten (10) seconds. Within these ten seconds, plug the device into a powered USB port and the device will automatically perform on-demand self-tests. Otherwise, the device will time out and return to standby state. Successful self-tests completion will be indicated by the following LED sequence: solid RED followed by solid GREEN followed by solid BLUE. The device will then return to standby state. - The cryptographic module enforces separation of all data inputs, data outputs, control inputs, status outputs via defined ports and interfaces. - The cryptographic module receives power via its defined power interface either via USB or the internal battery. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 38 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy - The cryptographic module does not support a maintenance interface or bypass capability. - The cryptographic module does not support Firmware loading capability. - The cryptographic module does not support the output of any secret keys, private keys, or CSPs in any form. - During error states, the cryptographic module enforces the inhibition of all data outputs, ceases to provide any cryptographic or otherwise security relevant services, and provides non-security relevant error status. To recover from an error state, the operator can perform a complete reset or invoke the on-demand self-tests. Only if all self-tests are completed successfully, will the module transition to an operational state. - The cryptographic module supports Identity-based authentication. - The Administrator (Crypto Officer) and General User roles are explicitly prohibited from sharing PINs with any other operator. In the event that the Administrator role shares his or her PIN, the cryptographic module is deemed non-compliant and unfit for service to protect sensitive but unclassified data. - The cryptographic module provides a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy encapsulating all electrical components containing CSPs. - The cryptographic module incorporates a strong, tamper-resistant, non-removable, hard metal enclosure that defines the cryptographic boundary. - The cryptographic module enforces a non-modifiable operational environment. - The cryptographic module protects all critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. - The cryptographic module obscures feedback of authentication data - the module does not provide any feedback on which buttons are being pressed to help prevent eavesdropping when entering authentication data. - The cryptographic module provides a non-deterministic hardware random number generator strictly for the purposes of seeding the deterministic random bit generator. - The cryptographic module supports zeroization to destroy all critical security parameters. All CSPs are destroyed with the User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) service. - The cryptographic module conforms to applicable EMI/EMC requirements. - The cryptographic module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are a minimum 256 bits of entropy. - As per IG A.9, the AESXTS implementation verifies that Key_1 ≠ Key_2, before the keys are to be used. If the test fails, the module will enter a FIPS error state, and blink the RED LED 15 times. ### 11.5 End of Life ###### Secure Sanitation The ASK3 Zeroization (User Reset) service sanitizes the module as per SP800-88r1 ###### Secure Destruction © Apricorn 1.0 Page 39 of 40 Aegis Secure Key 3.0 Cryptographic Module Security Policy To physically destroy the module in a secure manner, it is recommended that the module be returned to Apricorn for secure destruction and proof of destruction. Alternatively, a third-party data/electronics destruction company may be used for module destruction. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks This module is not designed to mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements. © Apricorn 1.0 Page 40 of 40