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DRAEGER WCM9113 802.11ABGN
VG2 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................4
2 Cryptographic Boundary...................................................................................................................5
3 Security Level Specification..............................................................................................................8
4 Identification and Authentication Policy............................................................................................9
5 Approved Modes of Operation....................................................................................................... 10
5.1 Non-FIPS Approved Mode ......................................................................................................... 10
5.2 FIPS Approved Mode ................................................................................................................. 10
6 Approved and Non-Approved Algorithms...................................................................................... 12
6.1 Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................. 12
6.2 Non-Approved, Allowed in FIPS Mode Algorithms..................................................................... 13
6.3 Non-Approved, Not Allowed in FIPS Mode Algorithms .............................................................. 14
7 Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces ........................................................................................... 15
8 Security Rules................................................................................................................................ 16
9 Access Control Policy.................................................................................................................... 19
9.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...................................................................... 19
9.1.1 SP800-90A DRBG CSPs................................................................................................. 19
9.1.2 WPA2 802.11i CSPs and Keys........................................................................................ 19
9.1.3 TLS CSPs and Keys ........................................................................................................ 19
9.1.4 EAP-TLS CSPs and Keys................................................................................................ 19
9.1.5 EAP-TTLS CSPs and Keys ............................................................................................. 19
9.1.6 EAP-PEAP CSPs and Keys............................................................................................. 20
9.1.7 Wireless Firmware Update CSPs .................................................................................... 20
9.2 Definition of Public Keys............................................................................................................. 21
9.2.1 TLS Public Keys............................................................................................................... 21
9.2.2 EAP-TLS Public Keys ...................................................................................................... 21
9.2.3 EAP-TTLS Public Keys.................................................................................................... 21
9.2.4 EAP-PEAP Public Keys ................................................................................................... 21
9.2.5 Firmware Update Public Key ........................................................................................... 21
10 Physical Security Policy.............................................................................................................. 26
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy............................................................................................... 27
12 References ................................................................................................................................. 28
13 Appendix A: Critical Security Parameters .................................................................................. 29
14 Appendix B: Public Keys ............................................................................................................ 34
15 Revision History.......................................................................................................................... 36
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Table of Figures
Figure 1: Top Side of the Cryptographic Module..................................................................................... 5
Figure 2: Bottom Side of the Cryptographic Module ............................................................................... 5
Figure 3: Front Side of the Cryptographic Module .................................................................................. 5
Figure 4: Right Side of the Cryptographic Module .................................................................................. 6
Figure 5: Back Side of the Cryptographic Module................................................................................... 6
Figure 6: Left Side of the Cryptographic Module..................................................................................... 6
Figure 7: Cryptographic Module Block Diagram...................................................................................... 7
Table of Tables
Table 1: Description of Block Diagram Abbreviations ............................................................................. 7
Table 2: Security Levels .......................................................................................................................... 8
Table 3: Roles and Required Authentication Mechanism ....................................................................... 9
Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms.................................................................................. 9
Table 5: Approved algorithms................................................................................................................ 12
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed algorithms in FIPS mode .................................................................. 13
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not allowed algorithms in Fips mode ............................................................. 14
Table 8: Specification of Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and Interfaces.................................... 15
Table 9: Services Authorized for Roles, Access Rights within Services ............................................... 22
Table 10: Non-Approved Services only allowed in Non-FIPS Approved Mode .................................... 25
Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ........................................................... 26
Table 12: Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................... 27
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1 Introduction
The DRAEGER WCM9113 802.11ABGN VG2 herein after referred to as “cryptographic module” or
“module”, (Part Number: MS32018 Rev. 03; FW Version: 1.8.2 with bootloaders 1.7 and 1.8) is a FIPS
140-2 Level 1 multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that has been licensed to Draeger Medical
Systems, Inc. for exclusive use by Redpine Signals, Inc.
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2 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer perimeter of a production grade multi-
chip embedded printed circuit board that includes a cryptographic processor, RF and
peripheral memory which are contained within the production grade metal enclosure.
Figure 1: Top Side of the Cryptographic Module
Figure 2: Bottom Side of the Cryptographic Module
Figure 3: Front Side of the Cryptographic Module
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Figure 4: Right Side of the Cryptographic Module
Figure 5: Back Side of the Cryptographic Module
Figure 6: Left Side of the Cryptographic Module
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Figure 7: Cryptographic Module Block Diagram
Abbreviation Description
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
USB-CDC Universal Serial Bus- Communications Device Class
USB Universal Serial Bus
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
BBP Base Band Processor
MAC Media Access Control
AFE Analog Front End
RF Radio Frequency
XTAL Crystal
GPIO General - Purpose Input/Output
Table 1: Description of Block Diagram Abbreviations
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3 Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Area Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2: Security Levels
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4 Identification and Authentication Policy
The cryptographic module supports a Cryptographic Officer and User role. The roles are
implicitly assumed by the operator.
The Cryptographic Officer can access all the services and CSPs of the module.
Additionally, the Cryptographic Officer is responsible for initializing the module in a
secure manner for the first time as described in Section 5.
The User can access all the services and CSPs of the module.
This module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 security requirements, therefore
authentication requirements are not applicable.
The following table defines the roles, type of authentication, and associated authenticated
data types supported by the cryptographic module:
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
Cryptographic Officer N/A N/A
User N/A N/A
Table 3: Roles and Required Authentication Mechanism
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism:
Random Attempted
Breach
Strength of Mechanism:
Multiple Consecutive
Attempts in One-Minute
Period
N/A N/A N/A
Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
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5 Approved Modes of Operation
The cryptographic module supports a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation and a FIPS
Approved mode of operation. CSPs defined in the FIPS Approved mode of operation
cannot be accessed or shared while in the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation.
5.1 Non-FIPS Approved Mode
The cryptographic module may enter the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation during
the initialization procedure by the Cryptographic Officer. The Cryptographic Officer must
enter the fips_mode_enable command with the value “0” immediately after the init
command during the initialization procedure:
fips_mode_enable: 0
The fips_mode_enable command is only available during the initialization procedure.
In order to enable the FIPS Approved mode from the non-FIPS Approved mode, the
Cryptographic Officer must perform the Zeroize service and reboot the module.
NOTICE: If the module has been configured for FIPS Approved mode as described in
Section 5.2 below, the Cryptographic Officer and User are required to abide by the
restrictions documented in Section 8 below. In the event that the Cryptographic Officer or
User violates or attempts to violate such restrictions, the module is in strict violation of
this Security Policy and is deemed fully non-compliant and unfit for service to protect
sensitive unclassified data with cryptography.
5.2 FIPS Approved Mode
FIPS approved mode can be enabled at power-up through the boot loader.
The Cryptographic Officer, physically present at the cryptographic boundary must follow
the following guidelines to initialize the module in a secure manner for the first time:
1) Pins (TMS, TCK and TDI) shall be tied low.
2) Firmware Version RS9113.N00.WC.FIPS.OSI.1.8.2 with Bootloader version 1.7 / 1.8
is mandatory for using FIPS mode.
3) Power up the module.
4) In Binary mode enable FIPS mode by calling rsi_select_option() API with macro
RSI_ENABLE_FIPS_MODE as an argument, which will write 0xAB46 value into
HOST_INTERACT_REG_IN(0x41050034) register in the module.
5) Module will return 0xAB46 return code indicating the operator has successfully
enabled the FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.
6) Disable boot loader interaction by calling rsi_select_option() API with macro
RSI_ENABLE_BOOT_BYPASS as an argument, which will write 0xAB37 value into
HOST_INTERACT_REG_IN(0x41050034) register.
7) Reboot the module.
The module will automatically perform power-up self-tests and upon successful
completion, will enter FIPS Approved Mode of operation and sends card ready message
to host.
Once the module successfully enters the FIPS Approved Mode of operation, the module
cannot exit this mode unless the Cryptographic Officer explicitly performs the following
procedures:
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1) Perform the Zeroize service via rsi_fips_key_zeroization command.
2) Reboot the cryptographic module.
3) Enter the fips_mode_enable command with the value “0” immediately after the init
command.
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6 Approved and Non-Approved Algorithms
6.1 Approved Algorithms
CAVP
Cert#
Algorithm Standard Model/
Method
Key
Lengths,
Curves, or
Moduli
Use
3223 AES FIPS-197,
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC,
AES-ECB,
128,192,25
6
Data encryption
and decryption
2058 AES FIPS-197,
SP 800-38C
AES-CCM,
AES-ECB
128 Data encryption
and decryption
440 CVL SP 800-135 TLS
1.0/1.1/1.2
Key derivation for
TLS
C138 CVL SP 800-56A DHEphem FB -
L = 2048,
N = 224;
FC –
L = 2048,
N = 256
Key agreement
and
establishment
908 DRBG SP 800-90A SHA-256
HASH DRBG
Deterministic
Random Bit
generation
C138 DSA FIPS 186-4 L = 2048 ,
N= 224
L = 2048,
N= 256
Generation of
private key and
public key
2026 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-
256
Message integrity
and
authentication
45 KDF SP 800-108 HMAC-SHA-1 Key derivation
3223 KTS SP 800-38F AES-KW 128 key transportation
1639 RSA FIPS 186-4 RSA PKCS1
V1.5
2048 Signature
generation and
verification
2661 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-
256
Message Digest
Table 5: Approved algorithms
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6.2 Non-Approved, Allowed in FIPS Mode Algorithms
Algorithm Caveat Use
Hardware non-
deterministic random
number generator
Only used to seed the
Hash_DRBG
For seeding Approved
DRBG
Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman (CVL
Cert. #C138 with CVL
Cert. #440, key
agreement; key
establishment
methodology provides
112 bits of encryption
strength)
Key agreement and
key establishment
methodology
MD5 Used as per SP 800-
135 Rev1 Section
4.2.1; MD5 is not
exposed to the
operator
Used in TLS v1.0 KDF
HMAC-MD5 Used as per SP 800-
135 Rev1 Section
4.2.1; HMAC-MD5 is
not exposed to the
operator
Used in TLS v1.0 KDF
HMAC-MD5 Used to support
RADIUS for operator
authentication only;
HMAC-MD5 is not
exposed to the
operator
RADIUS
RSA RSA (key wrapping;
key establishment
methodology provides
112 bits of encryption
strength)
key wrapping , key
establishment
methodology
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed algorithms in FIPS mode
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6.3 Non-Approved, Not Allowed in FIPS Mode Algorithms
The following algorithms are non-Approved and not allowed in the FIPS Approved Mode
of Operation. These algorithms shall only be used in the non-FIPS Approved mode of
operation with Non-Approved Services as per Table 10 in this security policy.
Algorithm Use
AES-CCM (128-bit) (non-compliant) Encryption and decryption
AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-bit) (non-
compliant)
Encryption and decryption
DES Encryption and decryption
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit, 1024-bit, 2048-
bit, 4096-bit)
Key agreement and key establishment
DRBG (Hash_Drbg_256) (non-compliant) Random Bit Generation
HMAC-MD4 Data authentication and integrity
HMAC-MD5 (non-compliant) Data authentication and integrity
HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit) (non-
compliant)
Data authentication and integrity
HMAC-SHA-256 (256-bit) (non-
compliant)
Data authentication and integrity
RC4 Encryption and decryption
RSA (512-bit, 1024-bit, 2048-bit,
4096-bit)
Key wrapping , key establishment,
signature generation and signature
verification
TLS v1.0 KDF (non-compliant) Key derivation
TLS v1.2 KDF (non-compliant) Key derivation
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not allowed algorithms in Fips mode
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7 Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces
The cryptographic module does not contain a maintenance interface. The following table
summarizes the physical ports and logical interfaces:
Physical Port FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
SDIO (Not applicable; disabled; reserved for future use)
SPI Interface Data Input/ Data Output/Control Input/ Status Output
USB 2.0 Data Input/ Data Output/Control Input/ Status Output
UART Data Input/ Data Output/Control Input/ Status Output
RF Data Input/ Data Output
I2S and PCM (Not applicable; disabled; reserved for future use)
PMU Interface Power
ULP PMU Interface Power
GPIO Data Input/ Data Output/Control Input/ Status Output
Power Port Power
LED Status Output; indicator that module is ON or OFF
Table 8: Specification of Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and Interfaces
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8 Security Rules
The following specifies security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate
in accordance with FIPS 140-2:
• NOTICE: The Cryptographic Officer or User “shall not” enable the EAP-FAST
service in FIPS Approved mode of operation. The type “FAST” shall not be used
as argument to rsi_set_eap() API. If the operator enables the EAP-FAST service,
it is an explicit violation of this Security Policy and the module is considered to be
in non-FIPS mode.
• NOTICE: The Cryptographic Officer or User shall only load certificates with RSA
2048-bit keys into the module. RSA 1024/4096-bit certificates “shall not” be
loaded into the module by the Cryptographic Officer or User; loading of
aforementioned RSA 1024/4096-bit certificates is an explicit violation of this
Security Policy and the module is considered to be in non-FIPS mode. In FIPS
mode, loading RSA 1024 /4096-bit certificates will cause a failure of the TLS
handshake, and module will report error 0x45
• NOTICE: The Cryptographic Officer or User shall only use Diffie-Hellman 2048-
bit keys. Using Diffie-Hellman Keys other than 2048-bit is an explicit violation of
this Security Policy and the module is considered to be in non-FIPS mode.
• NOTICE: The Cryptographic Officer or User “shall not” enable TCP/IP features
DHCP(BIT(2)), HTTP(BIT(1)), HTTPS(BIT(12)), SNMP(BIT(9)), DNS(BIT(19)),
FTP(BIT(15)), SNTP(BIT(16)), SMTP(BIT(20)), OTAF(BIT(30)), RAW-
SOCKET(BIT(18)) and POP3(BIT(29)). These bits shall not be enabled in
‘rsi_opermode()’ API. Using these features is an explicit violation of this Security
Policy and the module is considered to be in non-FIPS mode.The cryptographic
module provides logical separation between all of the data input, control input,
data output and status output interfaces. The module receives external power
inputs through the defined power interface.
• The data output interface is inhibited during self-tests and when error states
exist.
• When the cryptographic module is in an error state, it ceases to provide
cryptographic services, inhibits all data outputs, and provides status of the error.
• The cryptographic module does not support multiple concurrent operators.
• The cryptographic module protects CSPs from unauthorized disclosure,
unauthorized modification, and unauthorized substitution.
• The cryptographic module protects public keys from unauthorized modification,
and unauthorized substitution.
• The cryptographic module satisfies the FCC EMI/EMC requirements for radios.
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• The cryptographic module implements the following self-tests:
1) Power-up tests
* Cryptographic algorithm test
- SHA-1 KAT
- SHA-256 KAT
- HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
- HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
- RSA 2048 SHA-256 Signature Generation KAT
- RSA 2048 SHA-256 Signature Verification KAT
- AES-128 CBC Encrypt KAT
- AES-128 CBC Decrypt KAT
- AES-256 CBC Encrypt KAT
- AES-256 CBC Decrypt KAT
- SP800-38F AES Key Wrap Encrypt KAT
- SP800-38F AES Key Wrap Decrypt KAT
- SP800-90A DRBG KAT
- SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF KAT
- SP800-135 TLS v1.2 KDF KAT
- SP800-108 KDF KAT
- AES-CCM KAT
* Software/firmware test
- Firmware integrity test (32-bit checksum)
- Bootloader integrity test (32-bit checksum)
* Critical functions test
- SHA-1 checksum of configuration parameters
2) Conditional tests
* Firmware load test – RSA 2048 with SHA-256 Signature Verification
* Manual key entry test - WPA2 Pre-shared Key (PSK) (256-bit) and RADIUS
server password (1024-bit)
* Continuous random number generator test
- Continuous test on SP800-90A DRBG
- Continuous test on non-Approved NDRNG
* Bypass test: N/A
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• The cryptographic module does not support bypass capability and does not
implement bypass tests.
• The status indicator output by the module when power-on self-tests
succeeds is indicated through a card ready message RSI_RSP_CARD_READY
(0x89) with status 0x00 to the host.
• The status indicator output by the module when a power-on self-test fails is
through FIPS Failure Indication message. with response frame type as
RSI_RSP_FIPS_FAILURE (0xFA) to the host.
• The status indicator output by the module when a conditional self-test fails is
through FIPS Failure Indication. with response frame type as
RSI_RSP_FIPS_FAILURE (0xFA) to the host.
• The status indicator output by the module upon entry into the error state is
through FIPS Failure Indication. with response frame type as
RSI_RSP_FIPS_FAILURE (0xFA) to the host.
• Split-knowledge processes are not supported.
• All maintenance related services (i.e. maintenance role, physical maintenance
interface, logical maintenance interface) are not applicable.
• Plaintext CSP output is not supported.
• The cryptographic module supports manual key entry and manual key entry test.
• The power interfaces cannot be used to drive power to external targets.
• The continuous comparison self-tests related to twin implementations are not
applicable.
• The requirements of FIPS 140-2 Section 4.6 are not applicable; there exists no
support for the execution of un-trusted code. All code loaded from outside the
cryptographic boundary is cryptographically authenticated via the firmware load
test.
• The requirements of FIPS 140-2 Section 4.11 are not applicable; the
cryptographic module was not designed to mitigate specific attacks beyond the
scope of FIPS 140-2.
• The module can clear the error condition only by performing hard reset followed
by successful completion of self tests.
• On demand self tests can be performed by power cycling the module.
• The module will generate seeds for asymmetric key generation from the
unmodified output of SP800-90A DRBG as per the requirements in SP800-133.
Notes: The module does not generate keys for symmetric key algorithms, hence
the ‘CKG’ entry is not applicable.
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9 Access Control Policy
The access control policy lists the supported roles, services, cryptographic keys and
CSPs, and types of access to the cryptographic keys and CSPs that are available to each
of the authorized roles via the corresponding services.
9.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following are the CSPs contained in the module:
9.1.1 SP800-90A DRBG CSPs
• SP800-90A DRBG Seed Material
• SP800-90A DRBG Internal State
9.1.2 WPA2 802.11i CSPs and Keys
• SP800-90A DRBG CSPs (NOTE: Refer to Section 9.1.1 above)
• WPA2 Pre-shared Key (PSK) (256-bit)
• 802.11i KDF Internal State
• 802.11i Temporal keys (AES-CCM 128-bit)
• 802.11i MIC keys (KCK) (HMAC-SHA-1 128-bit)
• 802.11i Key Encryption Key (KEK) (AES-KW 128-bit)
• 802.11i Group Temporal Keys (GTK) (AES-CCM 128-bit)
9.1.3 TLS CSPs and Keys
• SP800-90A DRBG CSPs (NOTE: Refer to Section 9.1.1 above)
• Diffie-Hellman Private keys (2048-bit)
• Diffie-Hellman Shared secret (2048-bit)
• TLS KDF Internal State
• TLS Encryption Key (AES-CBC 128-bit, 256-bit)
• TLS Integrity Key (HMAC-SHA-1 160-bit, HMAC-SHA-2 256-bit)
• TLS Master Secret (384-bit)
• TLS Pre-Master Secret (384-bit)
• RSA Private Key of client certificate (RSA 2048-bit)
9.1.4 EAP-TLS CSPs and Keys
• TLS CSPs and Keys
• EAP-TLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit)
9.1.5 EAP-TTLS CSPs and Keys
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• EAP-TLS CSPs and Keys (NOTE: Refer to Section 9.1.4 above)
• EAP-TTLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit)
• RADIUS server password (1024-bit)
9.1.6 EAP-PEAP CSPs and Keys
• EAP-TLS CSPs and Keys (NOTE: Refer to Section 9.1.4 above)
• EAP-PEAP Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit)
• RADIUS server password (1024-bit)
9.1.7 Wireless Firmware Update CSPs
• WPA2 802.11i CSPs and Keys (NOTE: Refer to Section 9.1.2 above)
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9.2 Definition of Public Keys
The following are the public keys contained in the module:
9.2.1 TLS Public Keys
• Module Diffie-Hellman Public Keys (2048-bit)
• Server Diffie-Hellman Public Keys (2048-bit)
• CA certificate RSA Public Key (RSA 2048-bit)
• Intermediate CA certificate RSA Public Key (RSA 2048-bit)
9.2.2 EAP-TLS Public Keys
• TLS Public Keys (NOTE: Refer to section 9.2.1 above)
• Module certificate EAP-TLS (RSA 2048-bit)
• Server certificate EAP-TLS (RSA 2048-bit)
9.2.3 EAP-TTLS Public Keys
• TLS Public Keys (NOTE: Refer to section 9.2.1 above)
• Server certificate EAP-TTLS (RSA 2048-bit)
9.2.4 EAP-PEAP Public Keys
• TLS Public Keys (NOTE: Refer to section 9.2.1 above)
• Server certificate EAP-PEAP (RSA 2048-bit)
9.2.5 Firmware Update Public Key
• Firmware Update Public Key
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User
Role
Cryptographic
Officer Role
Service Type(s) of Access to Cryptographic Keys, CSPs
and Public Keys
W = Write the item into memory
Z = Zeroize
U = Use
X Module
Initialization
N/A
X X Self-Tests N/A
X X Show-status N/A
X X Zeroize Z – All CSPs
X X Manual key
entry
W – WPA2 Pre-shared Key (PSK) (256-bit)
W – RADIUS server password (1024-bit)
X X Import
Certificates
W – RSA Private Key of client certificate (RSA
2048-bit)
W – Module certificate EAP-TLS (RSA 2048-bit)
W – CA certificate RSA Public Key (RSA 2048-bit)
X X Firmware
Update
U – Firmware Update CSPs
U – Firmware Update Public Key
X X TLS U - TLS CSPs and Keys
U - TLS Public keys
X X EAP-TLS U – EAP-TLS CSPs and Keys
U – EAP-TLS Public Keys
X X EAP-TTLS U – EAP-TTLS CSPs and Keys
U – EAP-TTLS Public Keys
X X EAP-PEAP U – EAP-PEAP CSPs and Keys
U – EAP-PEAP Public Keys
X X WPA2 802.11i U – WPA2 802.11i CSPs and Keys
U – EAP-TLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit)
U – EAP-TTLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit)
U – EAP-PEAP Master Session Key (MSK) (512-
bit)
Table 9: Services Authorized for Roles, Access Rights within Services
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Certain services are available within the Non-FIPS Approved mode of operation, which are otherwise
not available in the FIPS Approved Mode of operation as described in Table 10 below:
User
Role
Cryptographic
Officer Role
Service Non-FIPS Approved
Algorithms
Description
X X TLS RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (1024-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit)
Provide Wireless
connection with
Access Point
x x EAP-TLS RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (1024-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit)
X X EAP-TTLS RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4, RSA
(1024-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit)
X X EAP-PEAP RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (1024-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit)
X X Open No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
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User
Role
Cryptographic
Officer Role
Service Non-FIPS Approved
Algorithms
Description
X X WEP RC4
X X WPA RC4
X X EAP-FAST RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (1024-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit)
X X DHCP No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X HTTP No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X HTTPS RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (512-bit, 1024-bit,
2048-bit, 4096-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit, 2048-bit, 4096-
bit),
AES-CCM (128-bit)
(non-compliant),
AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-
bit) (non-compliant),
HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit)
(non-compliant),
HMAC-SHA-256 (256-
bit) (non-compliant),
TLS v1.0 KDF (non-
compliant),
TLS v1.2 KDF (non-
compliant),
DRBG (Hash_Drbg_256)
(non-compliant)
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User
Role
Cryptographic
Officer Role
Service Non-FIPS Approved
Algorithms
Description
X X SNMP SNMPv2 - No Ciphers
are used (no
cryptography)
X X DNS No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X FTP No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X SNTP No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X SMTP RC4,
DES,
HMAC-MD5 (non-
compliant),
HMAC-MD4,
RSA (512-bit, 1024-bit,
2048-bit, 4096-bit),
Diffie-Hellman (512-bit,
1024-bit, 2048-bit, 4096-
bit),
AES-CCM (128-bit)
(non-compliant),
AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-
bit) (non-compliant),
HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit)
(non-compliant),
HMAC-SHA-256 (256-
bit) (non-compliant),
TLS v1.0 KDF (non-
compliant),
TLS v1.2 KDF (non-
compliant),
DRBG (Hash_Drbg_256)
(non-compliant)
X X OTAF No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X RAW-
SOCKET
No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
X X POP3 No Ciphers are used (no
cryptography)
Table 10: Non-Approved Services only allowed in Non-FIPS Approved Mode
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10 Physical Security Policy
The cryptographic module implements the following physical security mechanisms:
• Production grade components.
The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to
ensure that physical security is maintained.
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Production grade
components
N/A N/A
Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
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11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The cryptographic module is not designed to mitigate against attacks outside the scope
of FIPS 140-2.
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
Table 12: Mitigation of Other Attacks
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12 References
• FIPS PUB 140-2
• FIPS PUB 140-2 DTR
• FIPS PUB 140-2 Implementation Guidance
• FIPS 180-4
• FIPS 186-4
• FIPS 197
• FIPS 198
• NIST SP800-38C
• NIST SP800-38F
• NIST SP800-90A
• NIST SP800-108
• NIST SP800-131A
• NIST SP800-133
• NIST SP800-135
• RFC 3748
• RFC 5247
• RFC 5281
• NIST SP800-52
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13 Appendix A: Critical Security Parameters
The module supports the following critical security parameters:
1. SP800-90A DRBG Seed Material:
Description - The seed (384-bit) for the Approved DRBG
Generation - Internally from hardware non-deterministic random number generator;
acceptable as per FIPS 140-2 Section 4.7.1
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Hardware Register and RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – DRBG Process
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
2. SP800-90A DRBG Internal State:
Description - The internal state of the DRBG (Note: The values of V (440-bit) and C (440-
bit) are the “secret values” of the internal state)
Generation - Approved SP800-90A HASH_DRBG; Approved as per FIPS 140-2 Annex C
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – DRBG Process
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
3. WPA2 Pre-shared key (PSK) (256-bit):
Description - 256-bit shared secret used for pre-shared key authentication and session
key establishment; used as PMK for 802.11i KDF
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry - Manually transported, electronically entered in plaintext through command from
host (Manual Key Entry Test)
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
4. 802.11i KDF Internal State:
Description - Used for key derivation (SP800-108 KDF(HMAC-SHA-1) with 256-bit PMK
as input) to calculate the WPA2 session keys
Generation – SP800-108 KDF (HMAC-SHA-1); acceptable as per FIPS 140-2 IG 7.10
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
5. 802.11i Temporal keys (AES-CCM 128-bit):
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Description - AES-CCM 128-bit keys used for session encryption/decryption
Generation – N/A
Establishment – Dynamically via SP800-108 KDF(HMAC-SHA-1); acceptable as per FIPS
140-2 IG 7.10
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Hardware Register and RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
6. 802.11i MIC keys (KCK) (HMAC-SHA-1 128-bit):
Description – Key Confirmation Keys (HMAC-SHA-1 128-bit) used for message
authentication during session establishment
Generation – N/A
Establishment – Dynamically via SP800-108 KDF (HMAC-SHA-1); acceptable as per
FIPS 140-2 IG 7.10
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
7. 802.11i Key Encryption Key (KEK) (AES-KW 128-bit):
Description – AES 128-bit key used for key wrapping of the 802.11i Group Temporal Key
(GTK)
Generation – N/A
Establishment – Dynamically via SP800-108 KDF (HMAC-SHA-1); acceptable as per
FIPS 140-2 IG 7.10
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
8. 802.11i Group Temporal Keys (GTK) (AES-CCM 128-bit):
Description - 802.11i session key (AES-CCM 128-bit) for broadcast communications
Generation - N/A
Establishment – Key Transport: AES key wrapped with 802.11i Key Encryption Key (KEK)
(AES-KW 128-bit); Approved as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.9
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Hardware Register and RAM
Entry – Key Transport: AES key wrapped with 802.11i Key Encryption Key (KEK) (AES-
KW 128-bit); Approved as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.9
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - WPA2 protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
9. Diffie-Hellman Private Keys (2048-bit)
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Description – Used in TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP to establish a shared
secret
Generation – As per SP800-133 Section 6.2, the random value (K) needed to generate
key pairs for the finite field is the output of the SP800-90A DRBG; this is an allowed
method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity –TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, and EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
10. Diffie-Hellman shared secret (2048-bit)
Description – 2048-bit Shared Secret used to facilitate TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, and
EAP-PEAP.
This is also known as a TLS Pre-Master Secret.
Generation – N/A
Establishment- As per SP800-56A section 6.1.2.1
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity –TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, and EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
11. TLS KDF Internal State
Description – Values of the TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.2 KDF internal state used in TLS, EAP-
TLS, EAP-TTLS, and EAP-PEAP. For TLS v1.0 KDF, module implements MD5 and SHA-
1. For TLS v1.2 KDF module implements SHA-256 PRF as per SP800-135.
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed
method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – TLS,EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, and EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
12. TLS Encryption Key (AES-CBC 128-bit, 256-bit):
Description - AES-CBC (128, 256 bit) key used to encrypt TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and
EAP-PEAP session data
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed
method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
13. TLS Integrity Key (HMAC-SHA-1 160-bit, HMAC-SHA-2 256 bit):
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Description – HMAC keys used for TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP integrity
protection
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed
method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
14. TLS Master Secret (384-bit):
Description – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP shared secret (Master Secret)
Generation – N/A
Establishment – Master secret is established with TLS Pre-Master Secret or Diffie-
Hellman shared secret as an input to TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF as per SP800-135 Section
4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
15. TLS Pre-Master Secret (384-bit):
Description – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP shared secret (Pre-Master Secret)
Generation – When the module behaves as a TLS client, shared secret is generated by
the Approved SP800-90A DRBG; Approved as per FIPS 140-2 Annex C
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – When the module behaves as a TLS Client, this entry is N/A. When the module
behaves as a TLS Server, the shared secret is entered RSA key wrapped by the module;
allowed as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.9
Output – When the module behaves as a TLS Server, this entry is N/A. When the module
behaves as a TLS Client, the shared secret is output RSA key wrapped with the Server’s
Public Key.
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP protocols
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
16. EAP-TLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit):
Description – 512-bit session key, where 256-bit MSB are used as PMK for 802.11i KDF
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF with TLS Master Secret as input as per SP800-
135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - EAP-TLS protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
17. RSA Private Key of client certificate (RSA 2048-bit):
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Description - RSA 2048-bit private key portion of the Module certificate EAP-TLS for
Digital Signature generation within EAP-TLS
Generation – N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry - Manually transported, electronically entered in plaintext as per FIPS 140-2 IG 7.7
through command from host
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – EAP-TLS Protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
18. RADIUS server password (1024-bit):
Description - Password used to authenticate the RADIUS server during EAP-TTLS and
EAP-PEAP protocols
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry - Manually transported, electronically entered in plaintext through command from
host (Manual Key Entry Test)
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - RADIUS server
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
19. EAP-TTLS Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit):
Description - 512-bit session key, where 256-bit MSB are used as PMK for 802.11i KDF
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF with TLS Master Secret as input as per SP800-
135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - EAP-TTLS protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
20. EAP-PEAP Master Session Key (MSK) (512-bit):
Description - 512-bit session key, where 256-bit MSB are used as PMK for 802.11i KDF
Generation – N/A
Establishment – TLS v1.0/TLS v1.2 KDF with TLS Master Secret as input as per SP800-
135 Section 4.2.1 & 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - EAP-PEAP protocol
Destruction - Actively overwritten via Zeroize service
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14 Appendix B: Public Keys
The module supports the following public keys:
1. Module Diffie-Hellman Public Keys (2048-bit)
Description – Used in TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP to establish a shared
secret
Generation – As per FIPS 186-4 where public key is derived from the private key. SP800-
133 Section 6.2, the random value (K) needed to generate key pairs for the finite field is
the output of the SP800-90A DRBG; this is an allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8
Scenario 4
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry - N/A
Output – Plaintext; output to Server during TLS exchanges
Key-To-Entity - TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
2. Server Diffie-Hellman Public Keys (2048-bit)
Description – Used in TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, and EAP-PEAP to establish a shared
secret
Generation – N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – Plaintext; entered during TLS exchanges
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity - TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
3. Module certificate EAP-TLS (RSA 2048-bit)
Description - Client certificate in EAP-TLS used by the server to authenticate the client
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry - Manually transported, electronically entered in plaintext through command from
host Output - Plaintext; output to EAP-TLS server during EAP-TLS hand shake
Key-To-Entity – EAP-TLS protocol
4. Server certificate EAP-TLS (RSA 2048-bit):
Description - Server certificate in EAP-TLS used by the client to authenticate the server
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – Plaintext; entered into the module during EAP-TLS exchanges
Output – N/A
Key-To-Entity – EAP-TLS protocol
5. Server certificate EAP-TTLS (RSA 2048-bit):
Description - Server certificate in EAP-TTLS used by the client to authenticate the server
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Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – Plaintext; entered into the module during EAP-TTLS exchanges
Output – N/A
Key-To-Entity – EAP-TTLS protocol
6. Server certificate EAP-PEAP (RSA 2048-bit):
Description - Server certificate in EAP-PEAP used by the client to authenticate the server
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in RAM
Entry – Plaintext; entered into the module during EAP-PEAP exchanges
Output – N/A
Key-To-Entity – EAP-PEAP protocol
7. CA certificate RSA Public Key (RSA 2048-bit):
Description - Public key (RSA 2048-bit) in the CA certificate
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry - Manually transported, electronically entered in plaintext through command from
host
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
8. Intermediate CA certificate RSA Public Key (RSA 2048-bit):
Description - Public key (RSA 2048-bit) in the CA certificate
Generation – N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry – Plaintext; when behaving as TLS client, entered into the module during TLS, EAP-
TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP exchanges. When behaving as TLS server, it is manually
transported, electronically entered in plaintext through command from host
Output - When behaving as TLS server, output in plain text during the TLS, EAP-TLS,
EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP exchanges
Key-To-Entity – TLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP protocols
9. Firmware Update Public Key
Description - RSA 2048-bit key used to verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signatures for
secure Firmware Update Service
Generation - N/A
Establishment – N/A
Storage - Plaintext; stored in Flash and RAM
Entry – N/A; installed into the module in the secure factory
Output - N/A
Key-To-Entity – Firmware Update process
*****
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15 Revision History
Revision Author Description Date: (DD.MM.YYYY)
04 Bill Dowd Initial Release 25.11.2015
05 Bill Dowd Updated for New Redpine FW
1.8.2 with bootloaders 1.7 / 1.8
30.08.2019
06 Bill Dowd Updated CVL and DSA cert
numbers in Approved Algorithms
table
30.09.2020