Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version 2.5 Last Update: 2018-02-23 Prepared by: atsec information security Corp. 9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 2 of 46 1. Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1. Purpose of the Security Policy.................................................................................................. 4 1.2. Target Audience........................................................................................................................ 4 2. Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................... 5 2.1. Description of Module .............................................................................................................. 5 2.2. Description of Approved Mode................................................................................................. 7 2.3. Cryptographic Module Boundary.............................................................................................. 8 2.3.1. Software Block Diagram................................................................................................... 8 2.3.2. Hardware Block Diagram ................................................................................................. 9 3. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces.................................................................................. 10 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication.............................................................................................. 11 4.1. Roles....................................................................................................................................... 11 4.2. Services.................................................................................................................................. 11 4.3. Operator Authentication ........................................................................................................ 29 4.4. Mechanism and Strength of Authentication........................................................................... 29 5. Finite State Machine...................................................................................................................... 30 6. Physical Security ........................................................................................................................... 31 7. Operational Environment .............................................................................................................. 32 8. Cryptographic Key Management................................................................................................... 33 8.1. Random Number Generation ................................................................................................. 34 8.2. Key/CSP Generation ............................................................................................................... 34 8.3. Key/CSP Establishment .......................................................................................................... 34 8.4. Key Entry and Output............................................................................................................. 35 8.5. Key Storage ............................................................................................................................ 35 8.6. Zeroization Procedure ............................................................................................................ 35 9. Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................ 36 9.1. Power-Up Tests ....................................................................................................................... 36 9.2. Integrity Check....................................................................................................................... 37 9.3. Conditional Tests .................................................................................................................... 37 10. Design Assurance........................................................................................................................ 38 10.1. Configuration Management ................................................................................................. 38 10.2. Delivery and Operation ........................................................................................................ 38 10.2.1. Downloading a FIPS 140-2-compatible engine version.............................................. 38 10.3. Cryptographic Officer Guidance........................................................................................... 38 10.3.1. Installation.................................................................................................................. 38 10.3.1.1 Upgrading appliances to the FIPS 140-2-compatible engine version .................... 38 10.3.1.2 Configuring the engine........................................................................................... 39 Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 3 of 46 10.3.1.3 Verifying activation of FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode............................. 39 10.3.1.4 Resetting the appliance to factory settings ........................................................... 40 10.3.1.5 Recovering from a FIPS 140-2 self-test failure ....................................................... 40 10.3.2. Entropy Source........................................................................................................... 40 10.3.3. Initialization................................................................................................................ 41 10.4. User Guidance...................................................................................................................... 41 10.4.1. AES GCM..................................................................................................................... 41 10.4.2. Zeroization ................................................................................................................. 41 10.4.3. Key Export .................................................................................................................. 41 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks ......................................................................................................... 42 12. Glossary and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 43 13. References .................................................................................................................................. 45 Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 4 of 46 1. Introduction This document is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library module. The current version of the module is 2.0. An earlier version of this module has gone through FIPS 140-2 validation under certificate #2031. This document contains a specification of the rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 140-2 for a Security Level 1 multi-chip standalone software module. 1.1. Purpose of the Security Policy There are three major reasons that a security policy is required: • For FIPS 140-2 validation, • Allows individuals and organizations to determine whether the cryptographic module, as implemented, satisfies the stated security policy, and • Describes the capabilities, protection, and access rights provided by the cryptographic module, allowing individuals and organizations to determine whether it will meet their security requirements. 1.2. Target Audience This document is intended to be part of the package of documents that are submitted for FIPS validation. It is intended for the following people: • Developers working on the release • FIPS 140-2 testing lab • Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) • Consumers Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 5 of 46 2. Cryptographic Module Specification This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library and was prepared as part of the requirements to FIPS 140-2, Level 1. The following section describes the module and how it complies with the FIPS 140-2 standard in each of the required areas. 2.1. Description of Module The Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library is a shared library that provides a C-language application programming interface for use by Forcepoint applications. Assembly language optimizations are used in the cryptographic module implementation. The files consisting of the logical boundary of the module are the module binary file libqscrypto.so.2 and the checksums.fips file that contains the HMAC-SHA-256 value needed for the module integrity check. The module contains the following cryptographic functionality: • Pseudo random number generation • Cryptographic hash functions • Message authentication code functions • Symmetric key encryption and decryption • Public key cryptography: key pair generation, digital signature generation and verification • Key agreement and establishment The following table shows the overview of the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation. Security Component Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security 1 Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self Tests 1 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Table 1: Security Levels The module has been tested on the following platforms: Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 6 of 46 Manufacturer Model O/S & Ver. AES-NI Forcepoint MIL-320 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Atom D (single-user mode) Not Supported Forcepoint 5206 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon E5 (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 3206 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon E5 (single-user mode) With and Without AES-NI Forcepoint 3202 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon Processor E5 (single-user mode) With and Without AES-NI Forcepoint 1402 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon Processor E5 (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 1065 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Core i3 (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 1035 Debian GNU/Linux 6.0-based distribution running on Intel Celeron (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 325-C2 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribution running on Intel Atom C (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 2105 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon D (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 3305 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon E5 (single-user mode) With and Without AES-NI Forcepoint 6205 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribution running on Intel Xeon E5 (single-user mode) With AES-NI Table 2A: Tested Platforms The following are vendor affirmed platforms: Manufacturer Model O/S & Ver. AES-NI Forcepoint 321-C2 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribu- tion running on Intel Atom C (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 2101 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribu- tion running on Intel Xeon D (single-user mode) With AES-NI Forcepoint 3301 Debian GNU/Linux 9.0-based distribu- tion running on Intel Xeon E5 (single- user mode) With AES-NI Table 2B: Vendor Affirmed Platforms Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 7 of 46 Note: Per IG G.5, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when the module is ported to the vendor affirmed platforms that are not listed on the validation certificate. 2.2. Description of Approved Mode The cryptographic module supports two modes of operation, a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode and a Non-Approved mode. The mode of operation is implicitly assumed. After the power-on self tests (POSTs) are successful, by default the module is placed in the Approved mode. The calling application can invoke ssh_crypto_get_certification_mode() to check the status of the module. It returns SH_CRYPTO_CERTIFICATION_FIPS_140_2 to indicate that the module is in an operational mode. Any calls to the Non-Approved service listed in Table 5, will implicitly put the module into the Non-Approved mode. The module provides the following algorithms and services: • AES: encryption and decryption; ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB128 and GCM modes • Triple-DES: encryption and decryption; ECB, CBC, OFB and CFB64 modes • DSA: key generation, digital signatures, and verification • RSA: key generation, digital signatures, and verification • ECDSA: key generation, digital signature, and verification • DRBG: random number generation • SHS: hashing • HMAC: message authentication code In addition, the module provides the following key establishment methods: • Diffie-Hellman key agreement as key establishment method • EC Diffie-Hellman: key agreement as key establishment method Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 8 of 46 2.3. Cryptographic Module Boundary 2.3.1. Software Block Diagram The logical boundary of the module is the Cryptographic Library itself, which is indicated by the “Cryptographic Boundary” rectangle as illustrated in the diagram below. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library Data in Physical Boundary Data out Control in Status out Cryptographic Boundary Figure 1: Software Block Diagram Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 9 of 46 2.3.2. Hardware Block Diagram The physical boundary of the module is the enclosure of the appliance that the module is running on. The module was tested on seven separate appliances, all of which are general purpose computers. The hardware block diagram below depicts all test appliances and their internal components and ports (processor, SSD, USB, Ethernet, etc.). Processor Chipset RAM CFast Drive* Ethernet Controller / Ports (6) (8) (4) Disk Controller (10) (7) (9) Serial Controller / Port (5) Power Supply ROM USB Controller / Ports (3) (1) (2) 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 15: Data in, data out, control in, status out 3: Power in 9, 10 and 11: Control in Cryptographic Module Boundary Storage Slot / SSD** (11) Expansion Module Slot / Ethernet Ports *** (13) (12) *) 321, 325, 2101, 2105, MIL-320, 1035, 1065 **) 3301, 3305, 6205, 1402, 3202, 3206, 5206 ***) 325, 2101, 2105, 3301, 3305, 6205, 1035, 1065, 1402, 3202, 3206, 5206 Wireless Module / Radio / Antenna **** (15) (14) ****) 325, MIL-320 Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 10 of 46 3. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces FIPS Interface Physical Ports Logical Ports Data Input Ethernet ports, serial port, wireless radio API input parameters Data Output Ethernet ports, serial port, wireless radio API output parameters Control Input Ethernet ports, serial port, wireless radio API function calls Status Output Ethernet ports, serial port, wireless radio API return values Power Input PC power supply port N/A Table 3: Ports and Interfaces Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 11 of 46 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1. Roles The module implements both a User and a Crypto Officer role. The module does not allow concurrent operators. The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module. No further authentication is required. The Crypto Officer can install and initialize the module. 4.2. Services Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO Symmetric Algorithms AES encryption and decryption ✓ 128, 192, 256 bit keys ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB128, Yes Certs #2948, #2949, #2950, #2951, #2952, #2953, #2954, #2955, #4591, #4592, #4593, #4716 RWX FIPS 197 ssh_cipher_allocate ssh_cipher_free ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_length ssh_cipher_get_iv ssh_cipher_get_iv_l ength ssh_cipher_get_key _length ssh_cipher_get_ma x_key_length ssh_cipher_get_mi n_key_length ssh_cipher_get_sup ported ssh_cipher_has_fix ed_key_length ssh_cipher_is_fips_ approved ssh_cipher_name sh_cipher_set_iv ssh_cipher_support ed ssh_cipher_transfor m ssh_cipher_transfor m_remaining ssh_cipher_transfor Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 12 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO m_with_iv ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_len AES-GCM au- thenticated en- cryption and de- cryption ✓128, 192, 256 bit keys GCM Yes Certs #2948, #2949, #2950, #2951, #2952, #2953, #2954, #2955, #4591, #4592, #4593, #4716 RWX SP 800-38D ssh_cipher_allocate ssh_cipher_free ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_length ssh_cipher_get_iv ssh_cipher_get_iv_l ength ssh_cipher_get_key _length ssh_cipher_get_ma x_key_length ssh_cipher_get_mi n_key_length ssh_cipher_get_sup ported ssh_cipher_has_fix ed_key_length ssh_cipher_is_fips_ approved ssh_cipher_name sh_cipher_set_iv ssh_cipher_support ed ssh_cipher_transfor m ssh_cipher_transfor m_remaining ssh_cipher_transfor m_with_iv ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_len ssh_cipher_is_auth _cipher ssh_cipher_auth_re set ssh_cipher_auth_u pdate ssh_cipher_auth_fi Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 13 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO nal ssh_cipher_auth_di gest_length ssh_cipher_is_auth ssh_cipher_generat e_iv_ctr ssh_cipher_auth_di gest_len Triple-DES en- cryption and de- cryption ✓168 bit keys ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB64 Yes Certs #1752, #1753, #1754, #1755, #1756, #1757, #2443, #2444, #2445 RWX SP 800-67 ssh_cipher_allocate ssh_cipher_free ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_length ssh_cipher_get_iv ssh_cipher_get_iv_l ength ssh_cipher_get_key _length ssh_cipher_get_ma x_key_length ssh_cipher_get_mi n_key_length ssh_cipher_get_sup ported ssh_cipher_has_fix ed_key_length ssh_cipher_is_fips_ approved ssh_cipher_name sh_cipher_set_iv ssh_cipher_support ed ssh_cipher_transfor m ssh_cipher_transfor m_remaining ssh_cipher_transfor m_with_iv ssh_cipher_get_blo ck_len Asymmetric Algorithms Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 14 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO DSA domain pa- rameter genera- tion ✓ L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256 Yes Certs #878, #879, #880, #881, #882, #883, #1217, #1218, #1219 RWX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_ge nerate DSA key pair generation ✓ L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256 Yes Certs #878, #879, #880, #881, #882, #883, #1217, #1218, #1219 RWX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_ge nerate ssh_private_key_de rive_public_key DSA signature generation ✓ L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256 Yes Certs #878, #879, #880, #881, #882, #883, #1217, #1218, #1219 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_si gn ssh_private_key_si gn_async ssh_private_key_si gn_digest ssh_private_key_si gn_digest_async ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_input _len ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_outp ut_len ssh_private_key_de rive_signature_has h ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ sign Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 15 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO DSA signature verification ✓ L=1024, N=160; L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256 Yes Certs #878, #879, #880, #881, #882, #883, #1217, #1218, #1219 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_ver ify_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_digest_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature_with_ digest ssh_public_key_der ive_signature_hash ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ verify DSA public key validation ✓1024, 2048, 3072 bits modulus size N/A RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_vali date RSA key genera- tion ✓ 2048, 3072 modulus size. Public key value 65537. Yes Certs #1549, #1550, #1551, #1552, #1553, #1554, #2502, #2503, #2504 RWX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_ge nerate ssh_private_key_de rive_public_key ssh_mp_fip186_ifc_ aux_prime_create ssh_mp_fips186_ifc _prime_factor sg_mp_fip186_ifc_a ux_prime_create RSA signature generation based on PKCS#1 v1.5 ✓ 2048, 3072 bit modulus SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 Yes Certs #1549, #1550, #1551, #1552, #1553, #1554, #2502, #2503, #2504 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_si gn ssh_private_key_si gn_async ssh_private_key_si gn_digest ssh_private_key_si gn_digest_async ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_input _len Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 16 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_outp ut_len ssh_private_key_de rive_signature_has h ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ sign RSA signature verification based on PKCS#1 v1.5 ✓ 1024, 2048, 3072 bit modulus SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 Yes Certs #1549, #1550, #1551, #1552, #1553, #1554, #2502, #2503, #2504 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_ver ify_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_digest_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature_with_ digest ssh_public_key_der ive_signature_hash ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ verify RSA signature generation based on PSS (probabilistic signature scheme) ✓ 2048, 3072 bit modulus SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 Yes Certs #1549, #1550, #1551, #1552, #1553, #1554, #2502, #2503, #2504 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_si gn ssh_private_key_si gn_async ssh_private_key_si gn_digest ssh_private_key_si gn_digest_async ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_input _len ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_outp ut_len ssh_private_key_de rive_signature_has h ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ sign Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 17 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO RSA signature verification based on PSS (probabilistic signature scheme) ✓ 1024, 2048, 3072 bit modulus SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 Yes Certs #1549, #1550, #1551, #1552, #1553, #1554, #2502, #2503, #2504 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_ver ify_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_digest_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature_with_ digest ssh_public_key_der ive_signature_hash ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ verify RSA public key validation ✓1024, 2048, 3072 bit modulus N/A RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_vali date ECDSA key pair generation ✓224, 256, 384, 521 bit prime modulus Yes Certs #537, #538, #539, #540, #541, #542, #1124, #1125, #1126 RWX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_ge nerate ssh_private_key_de rive_public_key ECDSA signa- ture generation ✓224, 256, 384, 521 bit prime modulus Yes Certs #537, #538, #539, #540, #541, #542, #1124, #1125, #1126 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_private_key_si gn ssh_private_key_si gn_async ssh_private_key_si gn_digest ssh_private_key_si gn_digest_async ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_input _len ssh_private_key_m ax_signature_outp Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 18 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ut_len ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ sign ECDSA signa- ture verification ✓192, 224, 256, 384, 521 bit prime modulus Yes Certs #537, #538, #539, #540, #541, #542, #1124, #1125, #1126 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_ver ify_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_digest_async ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature ssh_public_key_ver ify_signature_with_ digest ssh_public_key_der ive_signature_hash ssh_proxy_key_rgf_ verify ECDSA public key validation ✓192, 224, 256, 384, 521 bit prime modulus Yes Certs #537, #538, #539, #540, #541, #542, #1124, #1125, #1126 RX FIPS 186-4 ssh_public_key_vali date Asymmetric key management ✓Private keys N/A RW ssh_private_key_co py ssh_private_key_fr ee ssh_private_key_ge t_info ssh_private_key_is _fips_approved ssh_private_key_na me ssh_private_key_pr ecompute ssh_private_key_se lect_scheme Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 19 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ssh_public_key_cop y ssh_public_key_cre ate_proxy ssh_public_key_fre e ssh_public_key_get _info ssh_public_key_get _predefined_group s ssh_public_key_get _supported ssh_public_key_is_f ips_approved ssh_public_key_na me ssh_public_key_pre compute Hash Functions SHA-1 ✓ N/A Yes Certs #2482, #2483, #2484, #2485, #2486, #2487, #3765, #3766, #3767 RX FIPS 180-4 ssh_hash_allocate ssh_hash_asn1_oid ssh_hash_asn1_oid _compare ssh_hash_asn1_oid _generate ssh_hash_compare _result ssh_hash_compare _start ssh_hash_digest_le ngth ssh_hash_final ssh_hash_free ssh_hash_get_supp orted ssh_hash_input_blo ck_size ssh_hash_is_fips_a pproved Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 20 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ssh_hash_name ssh_hash_reset ssh_hash_supporte d ssh_hash_update ssh_hash_of_buffer ssh_sha_transform ssh_sha_permuted _transform SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 ✓ N/A Yes Certs #2482, #2483, #2484, #2485, #2486, #2487, #3765, #3766, #3767 RX FIPS 180-4 ssh_hash_allocate ssh_hash_asn1_oid ssh_hash_asn1_oid _compare ssh_hash_asn1_oid _generate ssh_hash_compare _result ssh_hash_compare _start ssh_hash_digest_le ngth ssh_hash_final ssh_hash_free ssh_hash_get_supp orted ssh_hash_input_blo ck_size ssh_hash_is_fips_a pproved ssh_hash_name ssh_hash_reset ssh_hash_supporte d ssh_hash_update ssh_hash_of_buffer Message Authentication Codes (MACs) HMAC-SHA-1 ✓ At least N/A Yes RWX FIPS 198-1 Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. 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Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-384 HMAC-SHA-512 112 bits HMAC key Certs #1869, #1870, #1871, #1872, #1873, #1874, #3039, #3040, #3041 ssh_mac_allocate ssh_mac_final ssh_mac_free ssh_mac_get_block _length ssh_mac_get_max_ key_length ssh_mac_get_min_ key_length ssh_mac_get_supp orted ssh_mac_is_fips_ap proved ssh_mac_length ssh_mac_name ssh_mac_reset ssh_mac_supporte d ssh_mac_update Random Number Generation DRBG ✓ Seed with 256-bit entropy, Entropy input string with 256-bit entropy AES 256 ECB Yes Certs #549, #550, #551, #552, #553, #554, #555, #556, #1532, #1533, #1534, #1605 RWX SP 800-90A ssh_random_add_n oise ssh_random_get_b yte ssh_random_get_ui nt32 ssh_random_stir ssh_random_get_s upported ssh_random_suppo rted ssh_random_is_fips _approved ssh_random_alloca te ssh_random_free ssh_random_name ssh_random_add_e ntropy ssh_random_add_li Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 22 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ght_noise ssh_mprz_aux_mo d_random ssh_mprz_aux_mo d_random_entropy Key Agreement Diffie-Hellman ✓ Diffie- Hellman secret, shared se- cret Yes Certs #344, #346, #348, #350, #352, #354, #1260, #1261, #1262 RWX SP 800-56A ssh_pk_group_copy ssh_pk_group_coun t_randomizers ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree_async ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree_max_output_l ength ssh_pk_group_dh_r eturn_randomizer ssh_pk_group_dh_s ecret_free ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup_async ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup_max_output_l ength ssh_pk_group_free ssh_pk_group_gen erate ssh_pk_group_gen erate_randomizer ssh_pk_group_get_i nfo EC Diffie- Hellman ✓EC Diffie- Hellman secret, shared se- cret Yes Certs #344, #345, #346, #347, #348, RWX SP 800-56A ssh_pk_group_copy ssh_pk_group_coun t_randomizers ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 23 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO #349, #350, #351, #352, #353, #354, #355, #1260, #1261, #1262 ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree_async ssh_pk_group_dh_a gree_max_output_l ength ssh_pk_group_dh_r eturn_randomizer ssh_pk_group_dh_s ecret_free ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup_async ssh_pk_group_dh_s etup_max_output_l ength ssh_pk_group_free ssh_pk_group_gen erate ssh_pk_group_gen erate_randomizer ssh_pk_group_get_i nfo ssh_pk_group_prec ompute ssh_pk_group_sele ct_scheme ssh_dh_group_crea te_proxy Key Entry and Output Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 24 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO DSA key entry ✓ DSA pri- vate key and public key N/A W ssh_pk_import ssh_private_key_de fine ssh_private_key_im port ssh_public_key_def ine ssh_public_key_im port DSA key output ✓DSA pri- vate key and public key N/A R ssh_pk_export ssh_private_key_ex port RSA key entry ✓RSA pri- vate key and public key N/A W ssh_pk_import ssh_private_key_de fine ssh_private_key_im port ssh_public_key_def ine ssh_public_key_im port RSA key output ✓RSA pri- vate key and public key N/A R ssh_pk_export ssh_private_key_ex port ECDSA key en- try ✓ECDSA private key and public key N/A W ssh_pk_import ssh_private_key_de fine ssh_private_key_im port ssh_public_key_def ine ssh_public_key_im port ECDSA key out- put ✓ECDSA private key and public key N/A R ssh_pk_export ssh_private_key_ex port Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 25 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO Diffie-Hellman key entry ✓Diffie- Hellman private key and public key N/A W ssh_pk_import ssh_pk_group_imp ort ssh_pk_group_imp ort_randomizers Diffie-Hellman key output ✓Diffie- Hellman private key and public key N/A R ssh_pk_export ssh_pk_group_expo rt ssh_pk_group_expo rt_randomizers EC Diffie- Hellman key en- try ✓EC Diffie- Hellman private key and public key N/A W ssh_pk_import ssh_pk_group_imp ort ssh_pk_group_imp ort_randomizers EC Diffie- Hellman key output ✓EC Diffie- Hellman private key and public key N/A R ssh_pk_export ssh_pk_group_expo rt ssh_pk_group_expo rt_randomizers Management Installation ✓ N/A N/A N/A N/A Please refer to sec- tion 11.3 “Crypto- graphic Officer Guidance” for se- cure installation of the module. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 26 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO Initialization ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_crypto_library_ initialize ssh_crypto_library_ regis- ter_noise_request ssh_crypto_library_ regis- ter_progress_func ssh_pk_provider_re gister sg_crypto_register_ error_callback ssh_random_noise_ polling_init ssh_drbg_instantiat e sg_drbg_enable_co ntinuous_test ssh_drbg_reseed ssh_drbg_generate ssh_drbg_uninstant iate Mode manage- ment ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_crypto_get_cer tification_mode ssh_crypto_set_cer tification_mode Uninitialization ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_crypto_free ssh_crypto_library_ uninitialize ssh_crypto_library_ unregis- ter_noise_request ssh_random_noise_ polling_uninit External crypto registration ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX The external cryp- to registration is not supported on the tested For- cepoint platforms. The functions be- low return SG_CRYPTO_REGIS TER_NOT_SUPPORT Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 27 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO ED. sg_cipher_external _register sg_cipher_external _unregister sg_hash_external_r egister sg_hash_external_ unregister sg_mac_external_r egister sg_mac_external_u nregister sg_ciphermac_exte rnal_register sg_ciphermac_exte rnal_unregister Status Query status ✓ ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_crypto_library_ get_status ssh_crypto_library_ get_version ssh_crypto_status_ message Self-tests Perform self- tests ✓ ✓ N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_crypto_library_ self_tests Other services Compression ✓N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_compress_allo cate ssh_compress_free ssh_compress_get_ supported ssh_compress_is_n one ssh_compress_syn c_levels ssh_compress_buff er Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 28 of 46 Service Roles CSP Modes FIPS Ap- proved? Cert # (if appli- cable) Access Notes/API Func- tion Us- er CO Auxiliary ser- vices ✓N/A N/A N/A RX ssh_aux_pkcs1_pa d ssh_aux_pkcs1_un pad ssh_aux_pkcs1_wr ap_and_pad ssh_cipher_alias_g et_native ssh_cipher_alias_g et_supported ssh_cipher_alias_su pported ssh_ecp_set_param Table 4: FIPS-Approved Services Note – The 3305 and 6205 platforms share the same processor family and operating system. The CAVS certificates for 3305 will therefore apply to both 3305 and 6205 platforms. Use of this Non-Approved service listed below will cause the Module to operate in the Non-Approved mode implicitly. Service Roles Modes Access CSP Notes API Function AES Key Wrapping User KW, KWP RXW AES key CAVS tested on 4 plat- forms: 325- C2,2105, 3305,6205 #4591, #4592, #4593, #4716 sg_aes_key_unwrap_kek_with_padding sg_aes_key_unwrap_with_padding sg_aes_key_wrap_kek_with_padding sg_aes_key_wrap_with_padding ssh_aes_key_unwrap ssh_aes_key_unwrap_kek ssh_aes_key_wrap ssh_aes_key_wrap_kek Table 5: Non-Approved Services Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 29 of 46 4.3. Operator Authentication There is no operator authentication; assumption of role is implicit by action. 4.4. Mechanism and Strength of Authentication No authentication is required at Security Level 1; authentication is implicit by assumption of the role. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 30 of 46 5. Finite State Machine The following diagram represents the states and transitions of the cryptographic module. Figure 3: Cryptographic Module Finite State Machine The state model contains the following states: • UNLOADED: The start state of the cryptographic module is UNLOADED. The module is in this state until the shared library is loaded and linked to the application. Cryptographic operations are not available while in this state. • UNINITIALIZED: The module is in the UNINITIALIZED state after it has been loaded but not yet initialized, or it has been successfully uninitialized. Cryptographic operations are not available while in this state. • SELF-TEST: The module performs power-up self-tests during initialization or on-demand. Cryp- tographic operations are not available while in this state. • OK: The module enters the operational mode in the “OK” state after successfully passing the power-up self-tests. The cryptographic services are available in this state. • ERROR: The module enters this state after a self-test, a cryptographic operation or uninitializa- tion has failed. An error indicator is output by the module. The state transitions are as follows: 1. The shared library is loaded and linked dynamically to the application. 2. The cryptographic module is initialized using the ssh_crypto_library_initialize function. The function is called automatically when the shared library is loaded. 3. The self-tests succeed. 4. A cryptographic operation is performed successfully. 5. On-demand self-tests are performed using the ssh_crypto_library_self_tests function. 6. The cryptographic module is uninitialized using the ssh_crypto_library_uninitialize function. 7. The shared library is unloaded. 8. Power-up self-tests fail. 9. A conditional test fails during a cryptographic operation. 10. The module uninitialization fails because cryptographic objects are still referenced. 11. Cryptographic objects are no longer in use and the module uninitialization succeeds. This transition also occurs automatically when the power-up self-tests fail during the module initialization. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 31 of 46 6. Physical Security The cryptographic module is tested on the Forcepoint MIL-320, 5206, 3206, 3202, 1402, 1065 and 1035 appliances that consist of production-grade components with standard passivation and a production-grade enclosure. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 32 of 46 7. Operational Environment This module will operate in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition. The module operates on the Forcepoint NGFW Debian GNU/Linux based hardened operating system that is set in the FIPS compatible mode of operation. Login to the operating system is disabled and only the preinstalled Forcepoint application is running on the system. Therefore the operational environment is considered non-modifiable. The application that uses the cryptographic module is also the single user of the module. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 33 of 46 8. Cryptographic Key Management Keys are established externally. CSPs can be accessed only using the API. The operating system protects the memory and the address space of the process from unauthorized access. Name Auth Role Generation Type Output Storage Zeroization HMAC key for module integrity check User, CO Manufacturer 128 bits HMAC key N/A In module binary Zeroization is not required per FIPS IG 7.4 AES symmetric keys User External, electronic entry Symmetric key N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off Triple-DES symmetric keys User External, electronic entry Symmetric key N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off DSA private key User DSA key generation using DRBG, externally using DSA key entry Private key Encrypted, plaintext Plaintext in memory API call, power off RSA private key User RSA key generation using DRBG, externally using RSA key entry Private key Encrypted, plaintext Plaintext in memory API call, power off ECDSA private key User ECDSA key generation using DRBG, externally using ECDSA key entry Private key Encrypted, plaintext Plaintext in memory API call, power off HMAC key User External, electronic entry HMAC key N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off DRBG entropy input User External, electronic entry Entropy input N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off DRBG seed User /dev/random Seed N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off Diffie- Hellman secret User DSA key generation using DRBG Private key N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off Diffie- Hellman User Generated through Diffie- Symmetric Plaintext Plaintext in API call, power off Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 34 of 46 Name Auth Role Generation Type Output Storage Zeroization shared secret Hellman protocol key memory EC Diffie- Hellman secret User ECDSA key generation using DRBG, Private key N/A Plaintext in memory API call, power off EC Diffie- Hellman shared secret User Generated through Diffie- Hellman protocol Symmetric key Plaintext Plaintext in memory API call, power off Table 6: Key Management 8.1. Random Number Generation The cryptographic module implements an AES block cipher based DRBG with derivation function according to SP 800-90A. The module obtains the seed and the entropy input string by default from /dev/random. The entropy source can be changed by setting the new source either in the /etc/qscrypto.entropysource file or in the LIBQSCRYPTO_ENTROPY_SOURCE environment variable. The seed and the entropy input string are both 256 bytes long. Their security strength is 256 bits, i.e., 1 bit per byte is assumed. In the operational environment, /dev/random is used as the entropy source. The Linux kernel has been patched to contain the CPU Jitter Random Number Generator [19]. 8.2. Key/CSP Generation DSA key pairs are generated using random bits from DRBG according to FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.1.1. RSA key pairs are generated using probable primes with conditions using auxiliary probable primes and random bits from the DRBG according to FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.3.6. ECDSA key pairs are generated using extra random bits from the DRBG according to FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.1. Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman secrets and public values are generated using random bits from the DRBG. 8.3. Key/CSP Establishment The cryptographic module supports Diffie-Hellman primitives for key agreement using ephemeral keys: • FFC DH dhEphem, C(2, 0, FFC DH) using 2048-bit group • ECC CDH Ephemeral Unified Model, C(2, 0, ECC CDH) using p-224, p-256, p-384, and p-521 curves CAVEAT 1: Diffie-Hellman key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; CAVEAT 2: EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 35 of 46 8.4. Key Entry and Output The cryptographic module supports electronic entry of symmetric keys and HMAC keys. The application using the cryptographic module can import secret keys to the module in plaintext within the physical boundary. Private keys can be exported in plaintext to the application using the module within the physical boundary. There is no output of intermediate key generation values from the module at any point in time. The module does not support manual entry of keys. 8.5. Key Storage The keys and CSPs are stored in plaintext in memory. The module does not provide persistent storage of keys. 8.6. Zeroization Procedure The stored keys and CSPs are zeroized when the application calls the appropriate API function: ssh_cipher_free, ssh_mac_free, ssh_private_key_free, ssh_pk_group_free and ssh_crypto_library_uninitialize. Intermediate key material is zeroized automatically by the module when no longer needed. All keys and CSPs can be zeroized by powering off the module and performing a system restore operation by the operational environment. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 36 of 46 9. Self-Tests 9.1. Power-Up Tests The power-up self-tests are executed automatically when the cryptographic module is loaded. The ssh_crypto_library_initialize() function returns 0 (SSH_CRYPTO_OK) when the power-up self-tests are successfully completed. If the power-up self-tests fail, the cryptographic module outputs an error message and enters an error state. No further operations are allowed when the module is in an error state. The cryptographic module causes the process termination with a non-zero exit status when the power- up self-tests have failed. The computer will need to be restarted in order for the cryptographic module to enter to an operational state. Self-tests are performed on-demand when the user calls the ssh_crypto_library_self_tests() function. Algorithm Test AES Known Answer Test (KAT), encryption and decryption are tested separately Triple-DES KAT, encryption and decryption are tested separately DSA Pair-wise consistency test (PCT) for DSA key pair generation RSA KAT for signature generation and verification tested separately, PCT for RSA key pair generation ECDSA KAT for signature generation, PCT for ECDSA key pair generation SHS KAT for SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 HMAC KAT for HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-512 DRBG KAT Diffie-Hellman KAT, PCT EC Diffie-Hellman KAT, PCT Table 7: Power-Up Tests The following are the error messages related to self-test failure: Reason For Failure Error Message Failure of AES/Triple-DES KAT Cipher algorithm test failed during self-test Failure of RSA/DSA/Diffie- Hellman KAT or PCT Public key algorithm test failed during self-test Failure of ECDSA/EC- Diffie-Hellman KAT or PCT Unknown error code (exit code 160) Failure of SHS KAT Hash algorithm test failed during self-test Failure of HMAC KAT Mac algorithm test failed during self-test Failure of integrity test The checksum of the library is incorrect. Integrity has been compromised Table 8: Error Messages Related to Self-Test Failure Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 37 of 46 It is the applications responsibility to reboot the appliance to recover the module from the error state. The library will not cause the rebooting of the appliance. 9.2. Integrity Check The cryptographic module uses the HMAC-SHA-256 message authentication code of the module binary for the integrity tests. The module reads the module binary file, computes the HMAC-SHA- 256 MAC of the file content and compares it to the known correct MAC that is input to the module when it is loaded. 9.3. Conditional Tests Algorithm Test DSA Pair-wise consistency test RSA Pair-wise consistency test ECDSA Pair-wise consistency test DRBG Continuous test Table 9: Conditional Tests The following are the error messages related to conditional test failure: Reason For Failure Error Message Failure of DSA pair-wise consistency test One of the following (%d is error code): Private key consistency test failed: %d Public key consistency test failed: %d DH group consistency test failed: %d and Cryptographic Library error occurred (1) Failure of RSA pair-wise consistency test One of the following (%d is error code): Private key consistency test failed: %d Public key consistency test failed: %d and Cryptographic Library error occurred (1) Failure of ECDSA pair- wise consistency test One of the following (%d is error code): Private key consistency test failed: %d Public key consistency test failed: %d DH group consistency test failed: %d and Cryptographic Library error occurred (1) Failure of DRBG continuous test Continuous DRBG test failed Cryptographic Library error occurred (0) Table 10: Error Messages Related to Conditional Test Failure Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 38 of 46 10. Design Assurance 10.1. Configuration Management Git and SharePoint are used for configuration management of the cryptographic module. 10.2. Delivery and Operation The cryptographic module is never released as source code. It is delivered as part of the Forcepoint NGFW software (formerly Stonesoft Security Engine). The FIPS 140-2-compatible Forcepoint NGFW software image is downloaded from the Forcepoint website. The Forcepoint NGFW software is also preinstalled on Forcepoint NGFW appliances (see Table 2: Tested Platforms). Product information for the appliances is available at the Forcepoint website: https://www.forcepoint.com/product/network-security/forcepoint-ngfw 10.2.1. Downloading a FIPS 140-2-compatible engine version A FIPS 140-2-compatible version of the Forcepoint NGFW software is downloaded as follows: 1. Go to the Forcepoint NGFW Downloads page at https://support.forcepoint.com/Downloads. 2. Enter the Proof-of-License (POL) or Proof-of-Serial (POS) code in the License Identification field and click Submit. 3. Click Forcepoint NGFW downloads. The Forcepoint NGFW Downloads page opens. 4. Download the .zip installation file. 5. Verify the SHA checksum. The correct checksum is shown on the download page. 10.3. Cryptographic Officer Guidance 10.3.1. Installation The cryptographic module is delivered as part of the Forcepoint NGFW software. To run the cryptographic module on a Forcepoint NGFW appliance, the NGFW software is set to a FIPS 140-2- compatible operating mode. 10.3.1.1 Upgrading appliances to the FIPS 140-2-compatible engine version Forcepoint NGFW appliances are delivered with the most recent engine software preinstalled. The engine software must be upgraded to the FIPS 140-2-compatible engine version before entering FIPS-compatible operating mode. This is necessary even if the same version was installed previously, because the file system checksum is stored during the upgrade process. To upgrade to the FIPS-compatible engine version: 1. Save the FIPS 140-2-compatible engine upgrade zip file in the root directory of a USB memory stick. Note – The engine upgrade zip file must be in the root directory of the media. 2. Boot up the appliance. The Engine Configuration Wizard starts. 3. In the NGFW Initial Configuration Wizard, select Firewall/VPN for the role. 4. Select Upgrade. The Select Source Media dialog opens. 5. Select USB Memory. The upgrade starts. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 39 of 46 6. Select OK. The engine reboots and the Engine Configuration Wizard starts with the engine im- age verification dialog shown. Select Calculate. The file system checksum is calculated and displayed below the checksum from the engine image zip file. 7. Verify that the calculated checksum is identical to the checksum from the zip file. 8. Select OK. The upgrade starts and the engine reboots. 9. Check the engine version to make sure that the certified version is loaded. 10. Select kernel in FIPS mode after reboot. Continue as instructed in Configuring the engine, below. 10.3.1.2 Configuring the engine To configure the engine: 1. Start the Engine Configuration Wizard as instructed in the Configuring the Engine in the Engine Configuration Wizard section of the Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide. 2. Configure the Operating System settings as instructed in the Configuring the Operating System Settings section of the Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide. Select Restricted FIPS- compatible operating mode. The SSH daemon and root password options are automatically disabled in the Engine Configuration Wizard. 3. Configure the network interfaces according to your environment as instructed in the Config- uring the Network Interfaces section of the Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide. 4. Contact the Management Server as instructed in the Contacting the Management Server section of the Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide. Enter node IP address manually is selected by default and other IP address options are disabled when FIPS-compatible operating mode is enabled. The engine restarts. 10.3.1.3 Verifying activation of FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode must be enabled during the initial configuration of the appliance. The following steps describe how to verify that FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode has been activated. To verify activation of FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode: 1. Verify that the following messages are displayed on the console when the engine restarts: FIPS: rootfs integrity check OK (displayed after the root file system integrity test has been executed successfully) FIPS power-up tests succeeded (displayed after the FIPS 140-2 power-up tests have been executed successfully) 2. Continue as instructed in the After Successful Management Server Contact section of the Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide. Note – If the engine does not enter the FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode even though it is configured to do so, or if the power-up tests fail (a power-up test error message is displayed or the success message is not displayed), the appliance must be reset to factory settings and reinstalled as instructed in Recovering from a FIPS 140-2 self-test failure. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 40 of 46 10.3.1.4 Resetting the appliance to factory settings Resetting the appliance to factory settings is not part of the normal installation procedure. There is no need to reset the appliance to factory settings before starting to use it for the first time. These instructions can be used to reset the appliance to factory settings when necessary, such as when initial configuration has been completed without enabling the Restricted FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode, during use, or when the appliance is being removed from use. To reset the appliance to factory settings: 1. Reboot the appliance and select System restore options from the boot menu. Forcepoint NGFW System Restore starts. 2. Enter 2 for Advanced data removal options. 3. Enter one of the following options: • 1 for 1 pass overwrite • 8 for a Custom number of overwrite passes If you selected Custom, enter the number of overwrite passes. A larger number of overwrites is more secure, but it may take a considerable amount of time depending on the appliance storage capacity. 10.3.1.5 Recovering from a FIPS 140-2 self-test failure If the FIPS 140-2 power-up self-tests fail, or the engine does not enter FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode, the appliance must be reset to factory settings and reinstalled according to these instructions. Begin by Resetting the appliance to factory settings. To recover from a FIPS 140-2 self-test failure: 1. Reset the appliance to factory settings as instructed in Resetting the appliance to factory settings. 2. Repeat the engine version upgrade as instructed in Upgrading appliances to the FIPS 140- 2-compatible engine version. 3. Configure the firewall engine and enable FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode as instructed in Configuring the engine. 4. Verify that FIPS-compatible operating mode is activated as instructed in Verifying activation of FIPS 140-2-compatible operating mode. 10.3.2. Entropy Source The cryptographic module uses /dev/random as the default entropy source. The entropy source can be changed by setting the new source either in the /etc/qscrypto.entropysource file or in the LIBQSCRYPTO_ENTROPY_SOURCE environment variable. /dev/random is always used as the entropy source for the cryptographic module when the Forcepoint NGFW software is in FIPS-compatible operating mode. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 41 of 46 10.3.3. Initialization The cryptographic module is initialized using the ssh_crypto_library_initialize() function before any cryptographic functionality is available. In order for the integrity check to succeed, the known HMAC-SHA-256 MAC needs to be available either in: /etc/checksums.fips file or LIBQSCRYPTO_CHECKSUM environment variable The /etc/checksums.fips file is provided with the Forcepoint NGFW software. 10.4. User Guidance 10.4.1. AES GCM In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. 10.4.2. Zeroization When a cryptographic key is no longer used, the key must be zeroized and freed using the ssh_cipher_free, ssh_mac_free and ssh_private_key_free functions for symmetric key encryption/decryption, message authentication and public key cryptography, respectively. 10.4.3. Key Export Private keys must not be exported unencrypted outside the physical module boundary from the application using the cryptographic module. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 42 of 46 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks No other attacks are mitigated. Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 43 of 46 12. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Specification API Application Programming Interface CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CFB Cipher Feedback CMT Cryptographic Module Testing CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Cryptographic Officer CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter CVT Component Verification Testing DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECB Electronic Codebook ECDH EC Diffie-Hellman EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FCC Federal Communications Commission FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards FSM Finite State Model GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code KAT Known Answer Test MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Science and Technology NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program OFB Output Feedback O/S Operating System PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 44 of 46 RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard UI User Interface Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 45 of 46 13. References [1] FIPS 140-2 Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf [2] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf [3] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402DTR.pdf [4] FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf [5] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf [6] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf [7] FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/archive/fips186- 2/fips186-2.pdf [8] FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf [9] ANS X9.31 Appendix A.2.4, Random Number Generator, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf [10]NIST SP 800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf [11]NIST SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf [12]NIST SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800- 38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf [13]NIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf [14]NIST SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist- sp-800-38E.pdf [15]NIST SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800- 56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf [16]NIST SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factor- ization Cryptography, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56B/sp800-56B.pdf Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy © 2018 Forcepoint / atsec information security. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 46 of 46 [17]NIST SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Ran- dom Bit Generators, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf [18]NIST SP 800-131A Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf [19]CPU Time Jitter Based Non-Physical True Random Number Generator, http://www.chronox.de/jent/doc/CPU-Jitter-NPTRNG.pdf