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CN Series Security Non-Proprietary Policy v1.00
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Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet)
CN Series Encryptors
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.00
16 June 2026
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General..................................................................................................................................................................................................10
1.1 Overview........................................................................................................................................................................................10
1.2 Security Levels...............................................................................................................................................................................11
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ......................................................................................................................................................12
2.1 Description.....................................................................................................................................................................................12
Purpose and Use:............................................................................................................................................................................12
Encryptor deployment......................................................................................................................................................................13
Encryptor management ...................................................................................................................................................................14
Ethernet implementation..................................................................................................................................................................15
Transport Independent Mode (TIM) operation .................................................................................................................................16
Hybrid Session Establishment .........................................................................................................................................................17
Quantum Resistant Algorithms (QRA) .............................................................................................................................................17
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).....................................................................................................................................................17
TRANSEC operation........................................................................................................................................................................17
Module Type:...................................................................................................................................................................................18
Module Embodiment:.......................................................................................................................................................................18
Cryptographic Boundary:.................................................................................................................................................................19
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ....................................................................................................20
Tested Module Identification – Hardware: .......................................................................................................................................20
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................................................................................20
2.4 Modes of Operation........................................................................................................................................................................20
Modes List and Description: ............................................................................................................................................................20
2.5 Algorithms......................................................................................................................................................................................21
Approved Algorithms: ......................................................................................................................................................................21
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:............................................................................................................................................................28
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: ................................................................................................................................................28
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: .......................................................................................................28
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:..........................................................................................................................................28
2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................................................................28
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .......................................................................................................................................................32
AES-GCM Key and IV generation for TLS (Conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H/Scenario 1)...............................................................32
AES-GCM Key and IV generation for data-plane encryption (Conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H/Scenario 4) ...................................32
Secure Message Exchange (SME) protocol algorithms...................................................................................................................32
TLS protocol algorithms...................................................................................................................................................................33
SSH Protocol Algorithms .................................................................................................................................................................33
SNMPv3 Protocol Algorithms ..........................................................................................................................................................33
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................................................................................34
Entropy CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 & CN9120 .................................................................................34
Entropy CN6100 ..............................................................................................................................................................................34
2.9 Key Generation ..............................................................................................................................................................................34
2.10 Key Establishment .......................................................................................................................................................................34
2.11 Industry Protocols ........................................................................................................................................................................34
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...........................................................................................................................................................36
3.1 Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................................................36
CN4010 Ports ..................................................................................................................................................................................37
CN4020 Ports ..................................................................................................................................................................................37
CN6010 & CN6110 Encryptor Ports ................................................................................................................................................38
CN6100 Encryptor Ports..................................................................................................................................................................38
CN6140 Encryptor Ports..................................................................................................................................................................39
CN6000 Series Encryptor Power Supplies and Fan Tray ................................................................................................................39
CN9100 Encryptor Ports..................................................................................................................................................................39
CN9120 Encryptor Ports..................................................................................................................................................................39
CN9000 Series Encryptor Power Supplies and Fan Tray ................................................................................................................40
3.2 Data privacy...................................................................................................................................................................................41
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication......................................................................................................................................................42
4.1 Authentication Methods..................................................................................................................................................................42
4.2 Roles..............................................................................................................................................................................................43
4.3 Approved Services.........................................................................................................................................................................43
4.4 Non-Approved Services .................................................................................................................................................................56
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded..............................................................................................................................................56
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status ............................................................................................................................................................56
5 Software/Firmware Security ..................................................................................................................................................................57
5.1 Integrity Techniques.......................................................................................................................................................................57
5.2 Initiate on Demand.........................................................................................................................................................................57
6 Operational Environment.......................................................................................................................................................................58
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ........................................................................................................................58
Type of Operational Environment: Limited.......................................................................................................................................58
7 Physical Security ...................................................................................................................................................................................59
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required................................................................................................................................................59
7.2 EFP/EFT Information .....................................................................................................................................................................62
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ........................................................................................................................................63
8 Non-Invasive Security............................................................................................................................................................................64
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management.........................................................................................................................................65
9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................................................................................65
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................................................................................65
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ..............................................................................................................................................................66
9.4 SSPs..............................................................................................................................................................................................67
9.5 Transitions .....................................................................................................................................................................................78
9.6 Additional Information ....................................................................................................................................................................78
KeySecure Connector integration (Split Key SMK)..........................................................................................................................78
10 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................................................................79
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................................................79
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................................................79
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information......................................................................................................................................................84
10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................................................................................87
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests....................................................................................................................................................87
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance...........................................................................................................................................................................88
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures .......................................................................................................................88
11.2 Administrator Guidance................................................................................................................................................................88
Delivery............................................................................................................................................................................................88
Location...........................................................................................................................................................................................88
Administrator Guidance: Approved mode........................................................................................................................................88
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................................................................................91
11.4 End of Life....................................................................................................................................................................................91
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..................................................................................................................................................................92
12.1 Attack List ....................................................................................................................................................................................92
TRANSEC .......................................................................................................................................................................................92
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness ...............................................................................................................................................................92
12.3 Guidance and Constraints............................................................................................................................................................92
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels ...........................................................................................................................................................................11
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ...................................................................................................................................20
Table 3: Modes List and Description ........................................................................................................................................................20
Table 4: Approved Algorithms ..................................................................................................................................................................27
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .......................................................................................................................................................28
Table 6: Security Function Implementations.............................................................................................................................................32
Table 7: Entropy Certificates ....................................................................................................................................................................34
Table 8: Entropy Sources.........................................................................................................................................................................34
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................................................................36
Table 10: Authentication Methods............................................................................................................................................................42
Table 11: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................................................43
Table 12: Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................................................55
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ..........................................................................................................................................59
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information................................................................................................................................................................63
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ..............................................................................................................................................63
Table 16: Storage Areas...........................................................................................................................................................................65
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods.......................................................................................................................................................66
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods.........................................................................................................................................................67
Table 19: SSP Table 1 .............................................................................................................................................................................73
Table 20: SSP Table 2 .............................................................................................................................................................................78
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................................................79
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ..............................................................................................................................................................84
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .......................................................................................................................................84
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information...............................................................................................................................................87
Table 25: Error States ..............................................................................................................................................................................87
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – Data Flow through the Encryptor.............................................................................................................................................13
Figure 2 – Link (point-to-point) Configuration ...........................................................................................................................................13
Figure 3 – Meshed (multipoint) Configuration...........................................................................................................................................14
Figure 4 – Layer 2 Ethernet connections..................................................................................................................................................15
Figure 5 – Multipoint VLAN connections...................................................................................................................................................16
Figure 6 – Transport Independent Mode connections ..............................................................................................................................17
Figure 7 – TRANSEC constant rate transport frame assembly ................................................................................................................18
Figure 8 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram .................................................................................................................................19
Figure 9 – Front View of the CN4010 Encryptor.......................................................................................................................................37
Figure 10 – Rear View of the CN4010 Encryptor .....................................................................................................................................37
Figure 11 – Front View of the CN4020 Encryptor.....................................................................................................................................37
Figure 12 – Rear View of the CN4020 Encryptor .....................................................................................................................................38
Figure 13 – Front View of the CN6010 & CN6110 Encryptor ...................................................................................................................38
Figure 14 – Front View of the CN6100 Encryptor.....................................................................................................................................38
Figure 15 – Front View of the CN6140 Encryptor.....................................................................................................................................39
Figure 16 – Rear View: CN6000 Series Encryptor ...................................................................................................................................39
Figure 17 – Front View of the CN9100 Encryptor.....................................................................................................................................39
Figure 18 – Front View of the CN9120 Encryptor.....................................................................................................................................40
Figure 19 – Rear View: CN9000 Series Encryptor ...................................................................................................................................40
Figure 20 – CN4000 Series factory installed tamper seals.......................................................................................................................60
Figure 21 – CN6000 Series factory installed tamper seals.......................................................................................................................61
Figure 22 – CN9000 Series factory installed tamper seals.......................................................................................................................62
Figure 23 – “FIPS mode” selection...........................................................................................................................................................89
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References
For more information on the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program please refer to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology website at www.nist.gov/cmvp.
The following standards from NIST are all available via the URL: www.nist.gov/cmvp.
[1] FIPS PUB 140-3: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
[2] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR).
[3] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements.
[4] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Brev1 CMVP Security Policy Requirements.
[5] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Crev2 CMVP Approved Security Functions.
[6] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140Drev2 CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and
Establishment Methods.
[7] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms.
[8] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics.
[9] ISO/IEC 19790:2012(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for
cryptographic modules.
[10] ISO/IEC 24759:2017(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic
modules.
[11] NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program.
[12] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197.
[13] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
186-4.
[14] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4.
[15] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-131Arev2, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths.
[16] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-90Arev1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators.
[17] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Arev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography.
[18] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
186-4.
[19] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Brev2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Integer Factorization Cryptography.
[20] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-108rev1 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions.
[21] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56Crev2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key Establishment
Schemes.
[22] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation.
[23] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-133rev2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation.
[24] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-67rev2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher.
[25] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-135rev1, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation
Functions
[26] Senetas CN Series User Guides
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
CA Certification Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CFB Cipher Feedback
CM7 Senetas Encryptor Remote Management Application Software
CI Connection Identifier (used interchangeably with Tunnel)
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DEK Data Encrypting Key(s)
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EFT Environmental Failure Testing
ESV Entropy Source Validation
ESV (P) Physical Entropy Source
ESV (NP) Non-Physical Entropy Source
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FTPS FTP Secure (FTP Over TLS)
Gbps Gigabits per second
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GDK Group Derivation Key
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IP Internet Protocol
IV Initialization Vector
KAS-ECC Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Scheme (ECDH)
KAS-FCC Finite Field Key Agreement Scheme (DH)
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KDK Key Derivation Key
KEM Key Encapsulation Method
KID Key ID
KEK Key Encrypting Key(s)
KMIP Key Management Interoperability Protocol
KMS Key Management Service
LED Light Emitting Diode
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MAC Media Access Control (Ethernet source/destination address)
Mbps Megabits per second
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
OQS Open Quantum Safe
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PSP Public Security Parameter
PUB Publication
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
QRA Quantum Resistant Algorithms
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request for Comment
RBG Random Bit Generator
RCT Repeat Count Test
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman Public Key Algorithm
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable (transceiver)
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol
SID Sender ID
SMC Gemalto’s Network Security Management Center
SME Secure Message Exchange
SMK System Master Key
SP Special Publication
SPB Shortest Path Bridging
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TACACS+ Terminal Access Control Access Control Server
TIM Transport Independent Mode
TLS Transport Layer Security
TRANSEC TRANsmission SECurity (also known as Traffic Flow Security or TFS)
X.509 Digital Certificate Standard RFC 2459
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Senetas Corporation Ltd. CN Series Encryptors (running
firmware version 5.5.0/5.5.1) comprising of the CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6100, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 and
CN9120 hardware cryptographic models. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the module
operates to meet the FIPS 140-3 Level 3 requirements.
The CN Series Encryptors are distributed worldwide under different brands as depicted in this Security Policy. Senetas
distributes under their own brand. Thales SA, the master worldwide distributor, distributes under the joint Thales/Senetas
and SafeNet/Senetas brands.
FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3), Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting
sensitive but unclassified information. Based on four security levels for cryptographic modules, this standard identifies
requirements in twelve sections. For more information about the NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) and the FIPS 140-3 standard, visit www.nist.gov/cmvp.
This Security Policy, using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification, describes how the CN4010,
CN4020, CN6010, CN6100, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 and CN9120 models comply with the twelve sections of the
standard. In this document, the CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6100, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 and CN9120 Encryptors
are collectively referred to as the “CN Series Encryptors” and individually as “the module” or “the encryptor”. The CN4010
and CN4020 models are collectively referred to as the “CN4000 Series”. The CN6010, CN6100, CN6110 and CN6140
models are collectively referred to as the “CN6000 Series”. The CN9100 and CN9120 models are collectively referred to
as the “CN9000 Series”. The model name refers to all of the relevant module versions i.e. CN6010 refers to the module
versions A6010B (AC), A6011B (DC), A6012B (AC/DC).
This Security Policy and the associated CMVP certificate are for firmware 5.5.0/5.5.1 only – the loading of any other
firmware version on the specified CN Series Encryptors is out of scope of this FIPS 140-3 validation.
This Security Policy contains only non-proprietary information. Any other documentation associated with FIPS 140-3
conformance testing and validation is proprietary and confidential to Senetas Corporation Ltd. and is releasable only
under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For more information describing the CN Series Encryptors systems, visit
https://www.senetas.com.
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1.2 Security Levels
The module meets the overall Security Level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The table below reflects the individual
security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
CN Series Encryptors operate in point-to-point and point-to-multipoint network topologies at data rates ranging from
10Mb/s to 100Gb/s.
Encryptors are typically installed between an operator’s private network equipment and public network connection and are
used to secure data travelling over either fibre optic or CAT5/6 cables.
Devices establish one or more encrypted data paths referred to as `connections`. The term refers to a connection that has
been securely established and is processing data according to a defined encryption policy. Each `connection` has a
`connection identifier` (CI) and associated CI mode that defines how data is processed for each policy. Connections are
interchangeably referred to as ‘tunnels’.
The CN Series Encryptors support CI Modes of ‘Secure’, ‘Discard’ and ‘Bypass’. These CI Modes can be applied to all
data carried on a connection or to a selected subset or grouping which can be user configured in accordance with the
specific protocol being carried on the network connection. A typical example in the case of an Ethernet network would be
to make policy decisions based upon an Ethernet packet’s VLAN ID.
The default CI Mode negotiated between a pair of connected encryptors is `Discard`. In this mode user data is not
transmitted to the public network.
In order to enter `Secure` mode and pass information securely, each encryptor must be activated and ‘Certified` by a
trusted body (refer to Section 11.2 Administrator Guidance for initial configuration steps) and exchange the key encrypting
key (KEK) and initial data encryption key (DEK), using the RSA-OAEP-256 key transport process in accordance with SP
800-56Brev2 Section 9. Alternatively, ECDSA/ECDH utilises ephemeral key agreement for the purpose of establishing
DEKs in accordance with SP 800-56Arev3. If the session key exchange is successful this results in a separate secure
session per connection, without the need for secret session keys (DEKs) to be displayed or manually transported and
installed.
When deployed in layer 2 Ethernet networks, the modules can be configured in point-to-point mode (Line Mode) to
establish connections between pairs of modules or they can be configured in multi-point mode (MAC Multipoint and VLAN
modes) to establish connections between groups of encryptors. The authentication and key establishment algorithms in
these modes of operation are determined by the X.509 certificate assigned to the connections.
Additionally, Transport Independent Mode1 (TIM) allows concurrent secure connections between encryptors over OSI
network layers 2, 3 and 4. DEKs are derived/distributed using one of two key provider mechanisms:
• Key Derivation Function (KDF)
• External Key Server using KMIP
When the KDF mechanism is configured, the encryptors are loaded with a Key Derivation Key via CM7. The KDK is used
to derive the DEKs using a KDF that conforms to SP 800-108rev1.
The external key server mechanism relies on a 3rd party Key Management Service (KMS) such as SafeNet’s KeySecure
to distribute the DEKs to the encryptors.
1 TIM is not available on the CN9100 and CN9120 models, and the CN6140 model in 4x10G Mode.
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Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual data flow through the encryptor.
1. A data packet arrives at the encryptor’s interface ports. When operating in Line mode data packets are processed
according to a single CI policy, otherwise,
2. The encryptor looks up the appropriate packet header field, e.g. Encryptor Sender ID (SID), MAC address or
VLAN ID and determines whether the field has been associated with an existing CI,
3. If a match is found, the encryptor will process the data packet according to the policy setting for that CI and send
the data out the opposite port. If a match cannot be found, the data packet is processed according to the default
policy setting.
Figure 1 – Data Flow through the Encryptor
Encryptor deployment
Figure 2 illustrates a point-to-point (or link) configuration in which each module connects with a single far end module and
encrypts the entire bit stream. If a location maintains secure connections with multiple remote facilities, a separate pair of
encryptors needs to be deployed for each physical connection (link).
Figure 2 – Link (point-to-point) Configuration
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Figure 3 illustrates a meshed network configuration. Each module is able to maintain simultaneous secured connections
with many far end encryptors.
Figure 3 – Meshed (multipoint) Configuration
Encryptor management
Encryptors can be centrally controlled or managed across local and remote stations using the CM7 or SMC remote
management applications. The remote management applications reside outside the cryptographic boundary and are not
in the scope of the FIPS validation. Encryptors support both in-band and out-of-band SNMPv3 management. In-band
management interleaves management messages with user data on the encryptor’s network interface port whilst out-of-
band management uses the dedicated Management Ethernet port. A Command Line Interface (CLI) is also available via
the console RS-232 port. Alternatively, the CLI can be accessed remotely via SSH (when configured). When configuring
remote CLI access, the authentication algorithm is restricted to ECDSA. ECDSA keys are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384
and P-521 curves.
Approved mode of operation enforces the use of SNMPv3 privacy and authentication. Management messages are
encrypted using AES-128 or AES-256.
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Ethernet implementation
The Ethernet encryptor provides layer 2, 3 and 4 security services by encrypting the contents of data frames across
Ethernet networks. The encryptor connects between a local (protected) network and a remote (protected) network across
the public (unprotected) network. An encryptor is paired with one or more remote Ethernet encryptors to provide secure
data transfer over encrypted connections as shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4 – Layer 2 Ethernet connections
The encryptor’s Ethernet receiver receives frames on its ingress port; valid frames are classified according to the Ethernet
header then processed according to the configured policy.
Allowable policy actions are:
• Encrypt – payload of frame is encrypted according to the defined policy
• Discard – drop the frame, no portion is transmitted
• Bypass – transmit the frame without alteration
CN Series tunnels are encrypted using CAVP validated AES algorithms. The CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6110 (1G
mode) and CN6140 (1G mode) 1G Ethernet encryptors support AES encryption with a key size of 128 or 256 bits in
cipher feedback (CFB), counter (CTR) and Galois Counter (GCM) modes. The CN6100, CN6110 and CN6140 in 10G
Ethernet mode and the CN9000 Series support AES encryption with a key size of 128 or 256 bits in counter (CTR) and
Galois Counter (GCM) modes.
Connections between encryptors use a unique key pair with a separate key for each direction. Unicast traffic can be
encrypted using AES CFB, CTR or GCM modes whereas Multicast/VLAN traffic in a meshed network must use AES CTR
or GCM modes.
The Ethernet transmitter module calculates and inserts the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) at the end of the frame. The
frame is then encoded and transmitted. For details about Unicast and Multicast network topologies supported by the
modules see next section.
Unicast operation
Unicast traffic is encrypted using a key pair for each of the established connections.
When operating in line mode, there is just one entry in the connection table. When operating in multipoint mode,
connection table entries are managed by MAC address or VLAN ID and can be added manually, or if ‘Auto discovery’ is
enabled, they will be automatically added based on the observed traffic. Entries do not age and will remain in the table.
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Multipoint VLAN operation
Multicast traffic between encryptors connected in line mode shares the same single key pair that is used by unicast traffic.
VLAN encryption mode is used to encrypt traffic sent to all encryptors on a VLAN. Unlike unicast encryption (which
encrypts traffic from a single sender to a single receiver and uses a unique pair of keys per encrypted connection), VLAN
encryption within a multipoint network requires a group key management infrastructure to ensure that each encryptor can
share a set of encryption keys per VLAN ID. The group key management scheme which is used for VLAN mode is
responsible for ensuring group keys are maintained across the visible network.
The group key management scheme is designed to be secure, dynamic and robust; with an ability to survive network
outages and topology changes automatically. It does not rely on an external key server to distribute group keys as this
introduces both a single point of failure and a single point of compromise.
For robustness and security, a group key master is automatically elected amongst the visible encryptors within a mesh
based on the actual traffic.
If communications problems segment the network, the group key management scheme will automatically
maintain/establish new group key managers within each segment.
Figure 5 – Multipoint VLAN connections
Transport Independent Mode (TIM) operation
In Transport Independent Mode, each encryptor in the network must be configured with a unique Sender ID (SID), The
SID is sent in a shim inserted into each encrypted frame and is used by the receiving encryptor to identify the origin of the
frame. When running in this mode, the SID is interchangeably referred to as the Key ID (KID).
Egress data flow (Encrypt data received on Local port and transmitted on Network Port)
Each encryptor has a single transmission 256-bit AES Data Encrypting Key (DEK) and all secure traffic is encrypted using
that key.
Ingress data flow (Decrypt data received on Network port and transmitted on Local Port)
When an encryptor receives an encrypted frame, it uses the KID in the frame’s shim to identify the key to use for
decryption. If the receiver doesn’t have keys for the received KID, it will request them from the configured key provider. A
receiver must store two DEKs plus a salt for every peer encryptor that it communicates with.
TIM key updates
In Transport Independent Mode, keys are periodically updated using either a time-based mechanism or a frame counter-
based mechanism.
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Figure 6 – Transport Independent Mode connections
Hybrid Session Establishment
Hybrid session establishment is available in line with NIST guidance for use of both approved and quantum resistant key
establishment methods. When operating in this mode, the approved methods may be augmented with both Quantum
Resistant Algorithm methods, and/or Quantum Key Distribution mechanisms.
Quantum Resistant Algorithms (QRA)
The CN Series Encryptors support the use of candidate Quantum Resistant Algorithms. The user can select from a full list
consisting of the RSA/ECDSA algorithms and OQS signing algorithms. The keys established using the approved
RSA/ECDH algorithms are combined with data established using the Quantum Resistant Algorithms.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
The CN Series Encryptors support the use of Quantum Key Distribution devices such as ID Quantique’s Cerberis QKD
system or any industry standard ETSI compliant QKD systems for hybrid key establishment. For hybrid key establishment
the keys distributed using the approved RSA/ECDH algorithms are combined with the data derived from the QKD server.
TRANSEC operation
Traffic Analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in
communication. TRANSEC is TRANsmission SECurity, and is used to disguise patterns in network traffic to prevent
Traffic Analysis. TRANSEC mode can be optionally enabled between two end points of a point-point rate-limited layer 2
service provider network.
When operating in TRANSEC mode (CN4000 and CN6000 Series only), transport frames exit the network port at a
constant rate irrespective of the rate at which user data arrives at local port. This ensures that Traffic Analysis, if
performed, would generate no useful insight into the user data. The transport frame rate and length are user configurable.
AES encryption protects the user data and when operating in GCM encryption mode provides the additional guarantee of
data authentication.
TRANSEC mode coupled with AES-256 GCM provides triple layer protection of user data.
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Figure 7 – TRANSEC constant rate transport frame assembly
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
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Cryptographic Boundary:
The CN Series Encryptors are hardware cryptographic modules. The CN6000 Series and CN9000 Series outer casing
defines the cryptographic boundary aside from the pluggable transceivers, dual redundant power supplies and
replaceable fan tray module that lie outside the cryptographic boundary. The CN4000 Series outer casing defines the
cryptographic boundary aside from the pluggable transceivers on the CN4020 and the “AC to DC” plug-pack adapter
which lie outside the cryptographic boundary. The cryptographic boundary is depicted by the red dashed line in Figure 8
below.
Firmware
Cryptographic
Algorithms
8P8C
(mag)
8P8C
(mag) Management Ports
Keypad
(CN6000/
CN9000
Series)
Power
Supply A
Power
Supply B
Dual Fan
Tray
High Speed Crypto
System
Power/Cooling
System
Common Library
Cryptographic Algorithms
Management System
+12V
AC/DC
Network Port/s
Connection to
unprotected network
Local Port/s
Connection to protected
network
Management
Ethernet
SNMPv3
CN6000/9000 Series Dual
Power Input
CN4000 Series Power
input
Cryptographic Boundary
Management
Console
RS232
Entropy
Source
CPU
LEDs
Emergency
Erase
Button
Tamper
Optical
Transceiver/s
Optical
Transceiver/s
Power Distribution
and Fan Control
FLASH
Memory
SDRAM
BBRAM
Figure 8 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
CN4010 A4010B [O] A4010B [Y] A4010B [T] 5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XC7Z020
* Power: DC * Interface/Protocol: 1G Ethernet, 1G
TIM * Transceiver/Connector: RJ45
CN4020 A4020B [O] A4020B [Y] A4020B [T] 5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XC7Z020
* Power: DC * Interface/Protocol: 1G Ethernet, 1G
TIM * Transceiver/Connector: SFP
CN6010
A6010B [O] A6010B [Y] A6010B [T]
A6011B [O] A6011B [Y] A6011B [T]
A6012B [O] A6012B [Y] A6012B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XC7Z020
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 1G
Ethernet, 1G TIM * Transceiver/Connector: RJ45,
SFP
CN6100
A6100B [O] A6100B [Y] A6100B [T]
A6101B [O] A6101B [Y] A6101B [T]
A6102B [O] A6102B [Y] A6102B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Intel® ATOM,
Xilinx®
XC6VLX195T
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 10G
Ethernet, 10G TIM * Transceiver/Connector: XFP
CN6110
A6110B [O] A6110B [Y] A6110B [T]
A6111B [O] A6111B [Y] A6111B [T]
A6112B [O] A6112B [Y] A6112B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XC7Z030
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 1G
Ethernet, 1G TIM, 10G Ethernet, 10G TIM *
Transceiver/Connector: RJ45, SFP+
CN6140
A6140B [O] A6140B [Y] A6140B [T]
A6141B [O] A6141B [Y] A6141B [T]
A6142B [O] A6142B [Y] A6142B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9
Xilinx® XC7Z045
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 1G
Ethernet, 1G TIM, 10G Ethernet, 10G TIM, 4x10G
Ethernet * Transceiver/Connector: SFP+
CN9100
A9100B [O] A9100B [Y] A9100B [T]
A9101B [O] A9101B [Y] A9101B [T]
A9102B [O] A9102B [Y] A9102B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XCVU095
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 100G
Ethernet * Transceiver/Connector: CFP4
CN9120
A9120B [O] A9120B [Y] A9120B [T]
A9121B [O] A9121B [Y] A9121B [T]
A9122B [O] A9122B [Y] A9122B [T]
5.5.0/5.5.1
Arm® Cortex A9,
Xilinx® XCVU095
* Power: AC, DC, AC/DC * Interface/Protocol: 100G
Ethernet * Transceiver/Connector: QSFP28
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Note 1: Model variants distinguished by [O], [Y] and [T] are identical except for logos on the front fascia:
[O] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. sole branded version
[Y] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. & SafeNet co-branded version
[T] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. & Thales SA co-branded version
2.3 Excluded Components
None
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
The module supports an approved mode of operation. The module will be in the approved mode of operation when
configured as detailed in section 11.2 Administrator Guidance. The Module does not implement any non-approved
services when configured as per section 11.2 Administrator Guidance.
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
FIPS mode fips parameter on/enabled Approved CLI "fips" command, CM7 Status pane (FIPS Mode)
Table 3: Modes List and Description
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2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The module implements the approved algorithms in the table below.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A3451
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3435
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3437
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3439
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3445
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3451
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3549
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3435
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3436
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3437
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3438
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3439
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3440
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3441
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3442
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CTR A3443
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3444
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3445
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3446
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3447
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3448
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3451
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3458
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3459
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3460
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3492
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3549
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A3435
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
SP 800-38D
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
AES-GCM A3436
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3437
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3438
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3439
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3440
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3441
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-GCM A3442
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3443
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3444
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3445
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3446
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3447
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3448
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3451 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
SP 800-38D
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 120, 128, 248, 256, 0
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0, 120, 128, 248, 256
AES-GCM A3458
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3459
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3460
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A3549
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 368, 384, 1016, 1024
AAD Length - AAD Length: 112, 128, 640, 688
SP 800-38D
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3451
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3451 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3451
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4)
A3451
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
Hash DRBG A3451
Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - No
Mode - SHA2-256
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 512
Nonce - Nonce: 128
Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 0-1024
Increment 8
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0-1024 Increment 8
Returned Bits - 1024
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA-1 A3451
MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3450
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3451
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A3451
MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A3451
MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 80-320 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 A3451
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521
Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation
iutId - 123456ABCD
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - Initiator, Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Auxiliary Function Methods -
Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-256
Fixed Info Pattern - literal[abcd1234]||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation
Key Length - 256
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3 A3451
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - MODP-2048
Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation
iutId - 123456ABCD
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - Initiator, Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Auxiliary Function Methods -
Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-256
Fixed Info Pattern - literal[abcd1234]||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation
Key Length - 256
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SNMP (CVL) A3451
Password Length - Password Length: 64-232 Increment 8
Engine ID - 80000dce0300d01f010ce8, 80000dce0300d01f010ce9
SP 800-135 Rev.
1
KDF SP800-108 A3451
KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - HMAC-SHA2-256
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 256
Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data
Counter Length - 32
Supports Empty IV - No
Requires Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 0
SP 800-108 Rev.
1
KDF SSH (CVL) A3451
Cipher - AES-128, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-512
SP 800-135 Rev.
1
KDF TLS (CVL) A3451
TLS Version - v1.2
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135 Rev.
1
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
KTS-IFC A3451
Function - keyPairGen, partialVal
IUT ID - CAFECAFE
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA2-256
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 256
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4)
A3451
Key Generation Mode - B.3.6
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - Table C.3
Info Generated By Server - No
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A3451
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A3451
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A3451 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A3451 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A3451 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3450 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3451 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A3451 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A3451 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A3449 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
TDES-CFB8 A3451
Direction - Decrypt
Keying Option - 1
SP 800-67 Rev.
2
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
(CVL)
A3451
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
Key Block Length - Key Block Length: 1024
SP 800-135 Rev.
1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Note 1: Triple-DES is only used to decrypt CSPs stored in FLASH memory when upgrading from legacy versions of software. The CSPs are
subsequently re-encrypted using AES-256 CFB. Triple-DES is no longer used by the module for encryption operations.
Note 2: The module does not generate RSA keys < 2048 for use in X.509v3 certificates in accordance with SP 800-131Arev2.
Note 3: The module does not support the use of SHA-1 for X.509v3 certificate digital signatures in line with SP 800-131Arev2.
Note 4: HMAC keys < 112 bits are non-compliant in line with SP 800-131Arev2. HMAC keys for SSL and TLS are a minimum of 160 bits.
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Note 5: Approved RSA-OAEP-256 key transport as per SP 800-56Brev2 Section 9 using 2048-bit keys (112-bit equivalent strength) with OAEP padding
using SHA-256 can be employed to establish the AES 128- or 256-bit symmetric keys used to secure connections between cryptographic modules.
Note 6: AES-256 key wrapping provides 256 bits of encryption strength and can be employed to establish the AES 128- or 256-bit symmetric keys used
to secure connections between cryptographic modules.
Note 7: It is possible to configure an encryptor to use ECDH ephemeral key agreement with NIST P-256 (128-bit equivalent strength), P-384 (192-bit
equivalent strength) or NIST P-521 (256-bit equivalent strength) curves to establish AES 256-bit symmetric keys. Only the use of P-521 will ensure that
the established key maintains the full 256 bits of encryption strength.
Note 8: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement using 2048-bit Oakley Group 14 (112-bit equivalent strength) is employed to establish the AES 128-bit SNMPv3
privacy keys used to secure the management interface between the management application and the cryptographic module.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module implements the vendor-affirmed algorithms in the table below.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG 1 Key Type:Symmetric and Asymmetric N/A SP 800-133rev2 Section 4/Example 1
CKG 2 Key Type:Symmetric N/A SP 800-133rev2 Section 6.3/ Approved Method 2
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The module implements the security functions listed in the table below.
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SMK
BC-UnAuth
AES-CFB128: (A3451)
Key Length: 256
Symmetric Decryption
SMK
BC-UnAuth TDES-CFB8: (A3451)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 1
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
1G Ethernet FPGA Bulk
encryption/ decryption of
User data.
AES-CFB128: (A3435,
A3437, A3439, A3445,
A3549)
AES-CTR: (A3435,
A3437, A3439, A3445,
A3451, A3549)
AES-GCM: (A3435,
A3437, A3439, A3445,
A3549)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 2
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
1G Ethernet TIM FPGA
Bulk encryption/
decryption of User data.
AES-CTR: (A3436,
A3438, A3440, A3443,
A3460)
AES-GCM: (A3436,
A3438, A3440, A3443,
A3460)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 3
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
10G Ethernet FPGA Bulk
encryption/ decryption of
User data.
AES-CTR: (A3459,
A3441, A3448)
AES-GCM: (A3459,
A3441, A3448)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 4
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
10G Ethernet TIM FPGA
Bulk encryption/
decryption of User data.
AES-CTR: (A3458,
A3442, A3444)
AES-GCM: (A3458,
A3442, A3444)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 5
BC-UnAuth
10Gx4 Ethernet FPGA
Bulk encryption/
decryption of User data.
AES-CTR: (A3492)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 6
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
100G Ethernet FPGA
Bulk encryption/
decryption of User data.
AES-CTR: (A3446,
A3447)
AES-GCM: (A3446,
A3447)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
TLS
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
Encryption/ decryption of
TLS session data
AES-CBC: (A3451)
AES-GCM: (A3451)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SSH
BC-UnAuth
Encryption/ decryption of
SSH session data
AES-CTR: (A3451)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SNMPv3
BC-UnAuth
Encryption/ decryption of
SNMPv3 session data
AES-CFB128: (A3451)
KAS SME KAS-Full
SME Key Agreement
between modules
IG D.F:Scenario 2 path
(2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3451)
KAS TLS KAS-Full TLSv1.2 Key Agreement
IG D.F:Scenario 2 path
(2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3451)
KAS SSH KAS-Full SSH Key Agreement
IG D.F:Scenario 2 path
(2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3451)
KAS SNMP KAS-Full SNMP Key Agreement
IG D.F:Scenario 2 path
(2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides 112 bits
of encryption strength
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3451)
KTS 1 KTS-Encap
Key Transport between
modules
IG D.G:Approved
Method, Bullet 2
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides 112 bits
of encryption strength
KTS-IFC: (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KTS 2 KTS-Wrap
SME Key Transport
between modules
IG D.G:Approved
Method, Bullet 1
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides 256 bits
of encryption strength
AES-CFB128: (A3451)
Key Length: 256
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Authentication SME 1
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
Authenticate remote end
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
4): (A3451)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Authentication SME 2
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
Authenticate remote end
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
Authentication TLS 1
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
Authenticate remote end
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
4): (A3451)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Authentication TLS 2
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
Authenticate remote end
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
Authentication SSH
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
Authenticate remote end
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
Message Authentication
TLS
MAC
Generation and
verification of TLS data
integrity
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
Message Authentication
SSH
MAC
Generation and
verification of SSH data
integrity
HMAC-SHA-1: (A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A3451)
SHA-1: (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
Message Authentication
SNMP
MAC
Generation and
verification of SNMP data
integrity
HMAC-SHA-1: (A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A3451)
SHA-1: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KDF SME KBKDF
Generate SME KEK and
SME HMAC keys from
KDK, Generate SME
GEK and SME HMAC
keys from GDK
KDF SP800-108:
(A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
KDF TIM KBKDF
Generate TIM DEK from
KDK
KDF SP800-108:
(A3451)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
KDF TLS KAS-135KDF
KDF TLS: (A3451)
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
KDF SSH KAS-135KDF
KDF SSH: (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
KDF SNMP KAS-135KDF
KDF SNMP: (A3451)
SHA-1: (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Secure Hash SHA Calculate secure hash SHA2-256: (A3451)
DRBG Request DRBG
Request random data
from DRBG
Hash DRBG: (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Entropy Source
ENT-Cond
ENT-ESV
Request Entropy
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3450)
SHA2-256: (A3450)
SHA3-256: (A3449)
Firmware Load Test DigSig-SigVer
Verify Firmware
signature
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Bypass Integrity Test SHA
Check bypass parameter
integrity
SHA2-256: (A3451)
Generate Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen
Generate an asymmetric
key pair
SP 800-133rev2 Sections
5.1:Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG output
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4): (A3451)
Hash DRBG: (A3451)
Generate Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen
Generate an asymmetric
key pair
SP 800-133rev2 Sections
5.1 and 5.2:Asymmetric
key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
Hash DRBG: (A3451)
Generate Asymmetric
Keys 3 (DH Key
Generation during Key
Agreement)
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen
Generate an asymmetric
key pair
SP 800-133rev2 Sections
5.2:Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG output
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A3451)
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A3451)
Hash DRBG: (A3451)
Generate Symmetric Key
1 (Direct generation from
DRBG)
CKG
Generate a symmetric
key
SP 800-133rev2 Section
6.1:Direct generation of
symmetric key using
unmodified DRBG output
CKG 1: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Generate Symmetric Key
2 (Symmetric Keys
Produced by Combining
(Multiple) Keys and Other
Data)
CKG
Generate a symmetric
key
SP 800-133rev2 Section
6.3:Symmetric Keys
Produced by Combining
(Multiple) Keys and Other
Data
CKG 2: ()
Sign X.509 Certificate DigSig-SigGen
Sign an X.509 Certificate
Signing Request
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
4): (A3451)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A3451)
SHA2-256: (A3451)
SHA2-384: (A3451)
SHA2-512: (A3451)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-GCM Key and IV generation for TLS (Conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H/Scenario 1)
• The module conforms to TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in SP 800-52rev2, Section 3.3.1.
• When the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key,
the module will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key according to RFC 5246.
• In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption
shall be established.
AES-GCM Key and IV generation for data-plane encryption (Conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H/Scenario 4)
The IV is 96 bits in length and is internally generated deterministically in compliance with Section 8.2.1 of SP 800-38D.
Secure Message Exchange (SME) protocol algorithms
The Senetas Secure Message Exchange (SME) protocol is used to establish secure connections between modules. The
approved cryptographic algorithms employed by the SME protocol are listed below.
Algorithm Type Algorithm
Authentication
RSA2
ECDSA1
Key Exchange
ECDH1
RSA-OAEP
AES-256-CFB with HMAC-SHA256
Hash for HMAC SHA-256
ECDH KDF
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Signature
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Symmetric Encryption
AES-128-CFB
AES-256-CFB
AES-128-CTR
AES-256-CTR
AES-128-GCM
AES-256-GCM
Note 1: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
Note 2: The module does not generate RSA keys < 2048 for use in X.509v3 certificates in accordance with SP 800-131Arev2
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TLS protocol algorithms
The TLS protocol (version 1.2) is used for FTPS (firmware upgrades), RESTful interface and KMS (KeySecure). The
approved cryptographic algorithms employed by the TLS protocol are listed below.
TLS Cryptographic Algorithms (FTPS, RESTful)
OpenSSL1
Cipher Suite Authentication Key Exchange Symmetric
Encryption
Hash for HMAC2
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-GCM4
SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-GCM4
SHA-256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA-384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-CBC SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA-256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-CBC SHA-256
Note 1: OpenSSL version 1.1.1n
Note 2: Minimum HMAC key size is 256 bits.
Note 3: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
Note 4: The AES GCM IV is internally generated randomly in compliance with TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS and Section 8.2.2 of
SP 800-38D.
TLS Cryptographic Algorithms (KMS)
OpenSSL1 Cipher Suite Authentication Key Exchange Symmetric
Encryption
Hash for HMAC2
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-GCM4
SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-GCM4
SHA-256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA-384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-CBC SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA-256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-CBC SHA-256
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 RSA5
ECDH3
AES-256-GCM4
SHA-384
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 RSA5
ECDH3
AES-128-GCM4
SHA-256
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA-384 RSA5
ECDH3
AES-256-CBC SHA-384
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA-256 RSA5
ECDH3
AES-128-CBC SHA-256
Note 1: OpenSSL version 1.1.1n.
Note 2: Minimum HMAC key size is 256 bits.
Note 3: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
Note 4: The AES GCM IV is internally generated randomly in compliance with TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS and Section 8.2.2 of
SP 800-38D.
Note 5: Minimum RSA key size allowed is 2048 bits.
SSH Protocol Algorithms
The SSH protocol (version 2.0) is used for Remote CLI and SFTP (firmware upgrades). The approved cryptographic
algorithms employed by the SSH protocol are listed below.
Algorithm Type Algorithm
Authentication ECDSA1
Key Exchange ECDH1
Symmetric Encryption
AES-256-CTR
AES-128-CTR
Hash for HMAC
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Note 1: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
SNMPv3 Protocol Algorithms
The SNMPv3 protocol is used for Remote management. The approved cryptographic algorithms employed by the
SNMPv3 protocol are listed below.
Algorithm Type Algorithm
Authentication
HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA512
Key Exchange DH1
Symmetric Encryption
AES-128-CFB
AES-256-CFB
Note 1: MODP-2048-bit Oakley Group 14 using SHA-256 for key derivation.
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2.8 RBG and Entropy
Entropy CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 & CN9120
The CN4010, CN4020, CN6010, CN6110, CN6140, CN9100 & CN9120 models employ a hardware based (physical) true
random number generator (RNG) that has been validated for compliance with SP 800-90B. Based on noise source testing
and analysis, the estimated minimum amount of entropy per output bit is 1.0 bits. The overall amount of generated
entropy meets the required security strength of 256 bits based on the entropy per bit and the amount of entropy requested
by the module.
Entropy CN6100
The CN6100 employs a software based (non-physical) true random number generator (RNG) that has been validated for
compliance with SP 800-90B. Based on testing and analysis, the estimated minimum amount of entropy per output bit is
1.0 bits. The overall amount of generated entropy meets the required security strength of 256 bits based on the entropy
per bit and the amount of entropy requested by the module.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E51 Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet)
E49 Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet)
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Senetas TRNG Entropy
Source
Physical
Xilinx® XC7Z015, Xilinx® XC7Z020, Xilinx®
XC7Z030, Xilinx® XC7Z045
256 bits
Full
Entropy
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3450)
Senetas CPU Jitter
Entropy Source
Non-
Physical
Intel® Atom 256 bits
Full
Entropy
SHA3-256 (A3449)
Table 8: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
Asymmetric RSA and ECDSA keys are generated in accordance with FIPS186-4. Symmetric keys are generated using
unmodified DRBG output in accordance with SP 800-133rev2 or using the SP 800-108rev1 and the SP 800-135rev1
compliant KDF functions.
2.10 Key Establishment
Keys are established using KTS-IFC (RSA-OAEP-256) key transport process in accordance with SP 800-56Brev2, ECDH
and DH ephemeral key agreement in accordance with SP 800-56Arev3.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module supports TLSv1.2, SSH version 2.0 and SNMPv3.
No parts of the SNMP protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
No parts of the TLS protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
No parts of the SSH protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
RJ45
Management
Ethernet
Control
Input
Status
Output
SNMPv3, Remote CLI (SSH), Upgrade image transfer via FTP/FTPS (TLS)/SFTP (SSH), RESTful
I/F (TLS), KMS (TLS)
RJ-45 RS-232
Console
Control
Input
Status
Output
CLI
USB
Control
Input
Upgrade image transfer
Keypad
Control
Input
Navigation of LCD menu system and limited configuration input (Set IP address, Activation via CM7,
USB upgrades)
LCD
Status
Output
Displays configuration information in response to commands entered via the keypad. Also displays
system information such as boot sequence and active alarm messages
Power LED
Status
Output
Indicate powered state
System LED
Status
Output
Indicate the system operational state
Secure LED
Status
Output
Indicate the system secure state
LAN LED
Status
Output
Indicate management LAN link status and activity
Local LED
Status
Output
Indicate Local Port link status and activity
Network LED
Status
Output
Indicate Network Port link status and activity
Alarm LED
Status
Output
Indicate system alarm state
Temperature
LED
Status
Output
Indicate temperature warning alarm
Battery LED
Status
Output
Indicate internal battery state
Network Port
Data Input
Data Output
Status
Output
The Network Port connects to the public network; access is protected by X.509 certificates. Sends
and receives ciphertext user data, via the public network, to and from a peer cryptographic module
When in-band management is configured the Network Port may also receive control input and
transmit status output
Local Port
Data Input
Data Output
The Local Port connects to the private network; access is protected by X.509 certificates. Sends and
receives plaintext user data to and from the local network
Emergency
Erase button
Control
Input
The concealed front panel Emergency Erase button can be activated using a paperclip or similar tool
and will immediately delete the System Master Key. The Emergency Erase button functions
irrespective of the powered state of the module
Power
connectors
Power
Provides power to the module, AC or DC for CN6000 and CN9000 Series and DC (via an "AC to DC"
plug pack) for the CN4000 Series
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
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Note: The Control Output interface was intentionally omitted from this table, as the module does not implement it.
CN4010 Ports
The CN4010 status LEDs and Emergency Erase Button are located on the module front panel.
Figure 9 – Front View of the CN4010 Encryptor
The CN4010 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support electrical media in the form of RJ45 electrical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces
are common to the CN4000 Series.
Figure 10 – Rear View of the CN4010 Encryptor
CN4020 Ports
The CN4020 status LEDs and Emergency Erase Button are located on the module front panel.
Figure 11 – Front View of the CN4020 Encryptor
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The CN4020 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support optical media in the form of SFP optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are
common to the CN4000 Series.
Figure 12 – Rear View of the CN4020 Encryptor
CN6010 & CN6110 Encryptor Ports
The CN6010 & CN6110 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and
insecure network respectively, support optical or electrical media in the form of RJ45 electrical physical ports or SFP
(CN6010) or SFP+ (CN6110) optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are common to the CN6000 Series.
Figure 13 – Front View of the CN6010 & CN6110 Encryptor
CN6100 Encryptor Ports
The CN6100 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support optical media in the form of XFP optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are
common to the CN6000 Series.
Figure 14 – Front View of the CN6100 Encryptor
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CN6140 Encryptor Ports
The CN6140 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support optical media in the form of SFP+ optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are
common to the CN6000 Series.
Figure 15 – Front View of the CN6140 Encryptor
CN6000 Series Encryptor Power Supplies and Fan Tray
The CN6000 Series Encryptors support dual redundant power supplies which are available in two variants, an AC version
for typical installs and a DC version for telecoms applications. Any power supply combination i.e. AC/AC, AC/DC or
DC/DC is supported.
Figure 16 – Rear View: CN6000 Series Encryptor
CN9100 Encryptor Ports
The CN9100 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support optical media in the form of CFP4 optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are
common to the CN9000 Series.
Figure 17 – Front View of the CN9100 Encryptor
CN9120 Encryptor Ports
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The CN9120 Encryptor’s Local and Network data ports, which provide connectivity between the secure and insecure
network respectively, support optical media in the form of QSFP28 optical physical ports. All other ports and interfaces are
common to the CN9000 Series.
Figure 18 – Front View of the CN9120 Encryptor
CN9000 Series Encryptor Power Supplies and Fan Tray
CN9000 Series Encryptors support dual redundant power supplies which are available in two variants, an AC version for
typical installs and a DC version for telecoms applications. Any power supply combination i.e. AC/AC, AC/DC or DC/DC is
supported.
Figure 19 – Rear View: CN9000 Series Encryptor
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3.2 Data privacy
To ensure user data privacy the module prevents data output during system initialization. No data is output until the
module is successfully authenticated (activated) and the module certificate has been properly loaded. Following system
initialization, the module prevents data output during the self-tests associated with a power cycle or reboot event. No data
is output until all self-tests have completed successfully. The module also prevents data output during and after
zeroisation of data plane cryptographic keys and SSP zeroisation occurs when the tamper circuit is triggered. During the
upgrade process the module inhibits data when loading the new software image until the self-tests have completed
successfully. In addition, the system’s underlying operational environment logically separates key management functions
and SSP data from the data plane. All input and output of data on the management plane and data plane are either
physically separated (separate ports) or logically separated by protocol type.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The supported authentication methods are listed in the table below.
Method
Name
Description
Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Console
Auth
Direct console
CLI
connection
Username
and
Password
Crypto Officers and Users accessing the
module CLI, via the Local Console, must
authenticate using a password that is at least
8 characters and at most 29 characters in
length. The characters used in the password
must be from the ASCII character set of
alphanumeric and special (printable)
characters. This yields a minimum of 94^8
possible combinations making the possibility
of correctly guessing a password 1/94^8
which is far less than 1/ 1,000,000
After three failed authentication attempts via
the CLI, access is locked for 3 minutes. With
the 3 minute lockout, the possibility of
randomly guessing a password in 60 seconds
is 3/94^8 which is less than 1/100,000.
SSH
Auth
Remote SSH
CLI
connection
Username
and
Password
Crypto Officers and Users accessing the
module CLI, via Remote SSH CLI, must
authenticate using a password that is at least
8 characters and at most 29 characters in
length. The characters used in the password
must be from the ASCII character set of
alphanumeric and special (printable)
characters. This yields a minimum of 94^8
possible combinations making the possibility
of correctly guessing a password 1/94^8
which is far less than 1/ 1,000,000
After three failed authentication attempts via
the CLI, access is locked for 3 minutes. With
the 3 minute lockout, the possibility of
randomly guessing a password in 60 seconds
is 3/94^8 which is less than 1/100,000.
SNMP
Auth
Remote
SNMP
connection
Username
and
Password
Crypto Officers and Users accessing the
module via SNMPv3, must authenticate
using a password that is at least 8 characters
and at most 29 characters in length. The
characters used in the password must be
from the ASCII character set of alphanumeric
and special (printable) characters. This yields
a minimum of 94^8 possible combinations
making the possibility of correctly guessing a
password 1/94^8 which is far less than 1/
1,000,000
User passwords must be at least 8 characters
in length. The characters used in the
password must be from the ASCII character
set of alphanumeric and special (printable)
characters. This yields a minimum of 94^8
possible combinations. Assuming an
automated brute force attack that can make
20 login attempts per second then the
probability of success in one minute is
1200/94^8 which is less than 1/100,000.
HTTPS
Auth
Remote
connection to
Restful
interface
Username
and
Password
Crypto Officers and Users accessing the
module via the Restful interface, must
authenticate using a password that is at least
8 characters and at most 29 characters in
length. The characters used in the password
must be from the ASCII character set of
alphanumeric and special (printable)
characters. This yields a minimum of 94^8
possible combinations making the possibility
of correctly guessing a password 1/94^8
which is far less than 1/ 1,000,000
User passwords must be at least 8 characters
in length. The characters used in the
password must be from the ASCII character
set of alphanumeric and special (printable)
characters. This yields a minimum of 94^8
possible combinations. Assuming an
automated brute force attack that can make
20 login attempts per second then the
probability of success in one minute is
1200/94^8 which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
Note: The module suppresses feedback of authentication data being entered, by returning * or blank characters.
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4.2 Roles
Roles cannot be changed while authenticated to the module; however, the module permits multiple concurrent operators.
While only one operator may connect to the Local Console at a time, multiple concurrent remote sessions are permitted.
Remote management is not session oriented; thus, multiple operators may be issuing commands with each command
processed individually as it is received by the module.
The module’s access control rules, system timing, and internal controls maintain separation of the multiple concurrent
operators. Only 10 concurrent users can access the CLI via SSH.
The module supports four user roles as detailed in the table below.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Administrator Identity CO
Console Auth
SSH Auth
SNMP Auth
HTTPS Auth
Supervisor Identity CO
Console Auth
SSH Auth
SNMP Auth
HTTPS Auth
Upgrader Identity CO
Console Auth
SSH Auth
SNMP Auth
HTTPS Auth
Operator Identity User
Console Auth
SSH Auth
SNMP Auth
HTTPS Auth
Table 11: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The module supports the approved services listed in the table below.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Set Real Time
Clock
N/A
Time and
Date
New time and
date
Administrator
Supervisor
Activation
Activate an erased
module by updating
the primary
administrator
account
credentials.
activation
status, audit
log
New
administrator
credentials
Status
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
KTS 1
Secure Hash
Administrator
- Activation RSA
Private Key: E
- Activation RSA
Public Key: R
- Authentication
Passwords: W
- Authentication
Password Hash:
G
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Generate
X.509v3
Certificate
Signing
Request
Generate an
X.509v3 certificate
signing request to
be signed by a
trusted certifying
authority
certificate
status, audit
log
Certificate
Details
CSR
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Generate Asymmetric Keys
1 (RSA)
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Administrator
- RSA Private
Keys: G
- RSA Public
Keys: G
- ECDSA Private
Keys: G
- ECDSA Public
Keys: G
- X509v3
Certificates: R
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Load X.509v3
Certificate
(*Note 1)
Load a signed
X.509 Certificate
certificate
status audit
log
Signed X.509
Certificate
Updated
certificate table
Administrator
- RSA Public
Keys: W
- ECDSA Public
Keys: W
- X509v3
Certificates: W
Create User
Account
command
status, audit
log
User details
and
passwords
Updated user
table
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Secure Hash
Administrator
- Authentication
Passwords: W
- Authentication
Password Hash:
G
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Modify User
Account
command
status, audit
log
User details
and
passwords
Updated user
record
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Secure Hash
Administrator
- Authentication
Passwords: W
- Authentication
Password Hash:
G
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Delete User
Account
command
status, audit
log
User record
index
Updated user
table
Administrator
- Authentication
Passwords: Z
- Authentication
Password Hash:
Z
View User
Account
N/A
User record
index
User record Administrator
Edit Connection
Action Table
(Bypass)
command
status, audit
log
Command
Connection
status
Bypass Integrity Test
Administrator
Supervisor
View
Connection
Action Table
N/A Command
Connection
table
Administrator
Supervisor
Upgrader
Operator
Show Version N/A Command Versioning info
Administrator
Supervisor
Upgrader
Operator
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Show Status N/A Command
Status
information
Administrator
Supervisor
Upgrader
Operator
Clear Audit Trail N/A Command
Command
status
Administrator
View Audit Trail N/A Command Audit log
Administrator
Supervisor
Upgrader
Operator
Clear Event Log N/A Command
Command
status
Administrator
View Event Log N/A Command Event log
Administrator
Supervisor
Upgrader
Operator
Change FIPS
mode status
command
status, audit
log
FIPS mode
setting (on/off)
Command
status
Administrator
Run Self-test
(Reboot
Command)
N/A Command Self-test status
Administrator
Supervisor
Install Firmware
Upgrade
command
status, audit
log
Signed
firmware
upgrade
image
Updated
firmware
version
Symmetric Decryption SMK
Firmware Load Test
Administrator
- Firmware
Upgrade RSA
Public Key: E
- Triple-DES
System Master
Key: E
Upgrader
- Firmware
Upgrade RSA
Public Key: E
- Triple-DES
System Master
Key: E
Establish FTPS
(TLS) Session
command
status,
event log
Session
parameters
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption TLS
KAS TLS
Authentication TLS 2
Message Authentication
TLS
KDF TLS
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Administrator
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Certificates:
R,W
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Upgrader
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates:
R,W
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Establish SFTP
(SSH) Session
command
status,
event log
Session
parameters
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SSH
KAS SSH
Authentication SSH
Message Authentication
SSH
KDF SSH
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Administrator
- SSH Private
Keys: E
- SSH Public
Keys: R,E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Upgrader
- SSH Private
Keys: E
- SSH Public
Keys: R,E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Re/Start Secure
Connection
Start or restart a
data plane secure
connection
command
status,
event log
Command
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 1
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 2
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 3
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 4
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 5
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption Data
Plane 6
KAS SME
KTS 1
KTS 2
Administrator
- RSA Private
Keys: E
- RSA Public
Keys: R,W,E
- ECDSA Private
Keys: E
- ECDSA Public
Keys: R,W,E
- SME ECDH
Private Keys:
G,E
- SME ECDH
Public Keys:
G,R,W,E
- SME ECDH
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SME KDK:
G,R,W,E
- Group
Derivation Keys
(GDK): G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Authentication SME 1
Authentication SME 2
KDF SME
KDF TIM
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Generate Symmetric Key 1
(Direct generation from
DRBG)
- Key Encrypting
Keys (KEK): G,E
- Group
Establishment
Keys (GEK):
G,E
- SME HMAC
keys: G,E
- Data
Encrypting Keys
(DEK): G,R,W,E
- TIM KDK: E
- X509v3
Certificates:
R,W
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Supervisor
- RSA Private
Keys: E
- RSA Public
Keys: R,W,E
- ECDSA Private
Keys: E
- ECDSA Public
Keys: R,W,E
- SME ECDH
Private Keys:
G,E
- SME ECDH
Public Keys:
G,R,W,E
- SME ECDH
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SME KDK:
G,R,W,E
- Group
Derivation Keys
(GDK): G,E
- Key Encrypting
Keys (KEK): G,E
- Group
Establishment
Keys (GEK):
G,E
- SME HMAC
keys: G,E
- Data
Encrypting Keys
(DEK): G,R,W,E
- TIM KDK: E
- X509v3
Certificates:
R,W
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
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Erase Module -
Zeroise (CLI
Command)
Zeroise Module
command
status,
event log
Command Status None
Administrator
- System Master
Key (SMK): Z
- Triple-DES
System Master
Key: Z
- SMK_Local: Z
- SMK_Mask: Z
- SMK_CSP: Z
- Activation RSA
Private Key: Z
- Activation RSA
Public Key: Z
- RSA Private
Keys: Z
- RSA Public
Keys: Z
- ECDSA Private
Keys: Z
- ECDSA Public
Keys: Z
- SME ECDH
Private Keys: Z
- SME ECDH
Public Keys: Z
- SME ECDH
Shared Secret:
Z
- X509v3
Certificates: Z
- Authentication
Passwords: Z
- Authentication
Password Hash:
Z
- Key Encrypting
Keys (KEK): Z
- Data
Encrypting Keys
(DEK): Z
- TIM KDK: Z
- Group
Establishment
Keys (GEK): Z
- SME HMAC
keys: Z
- SME KDK: Z
- Group
Derivation Keys
(GDK): Z
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys: Z
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys: Z
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret: Z
- SNMPv3
Privacy Keys: Z
- SNMPv3
Integrity Keys: Z
- DRBG Seed: Z
- DRBG Entropy
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Input and
Nonce: Z
- DRBG V and C
internal state
parameters: Z
- SSH Private
Keys: Z
- SSH Public
Keys: Z
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys: Z
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: Z
- SSH Shared
Secret: Z
- SSH Privacy
Keys: Z
- SSH Integrity
Keys: Z
- TLS Private
Keys: Z
- TLS Public
Keys: Z
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys: Z
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: Z
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: Z
- TLS Master
Secrets: Z
- TLS Privacy
Keys: Z
- TLS Integrity
Keys: Z
- Keyvault
Private Keys: Z
- Keyvault Public
Keys: Z
- Firmware
Upgrade RSA
Public Key: Z
Establish a
Remote
Management
(SNMP)
Session
Login status
Session
parameters
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SNMPv3
KAS SNMP
Message Authentication
SNMP
KDF SNMP
Generate Asymmetric Keys
3 (DH Key Generation
during Key Agreement)
Administrator
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys: G,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret: G,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy Keys:
G,E
- SNMPv3
Integrity Keys:
G,E
Supervisor
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys: G,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret: G,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy Keys:
G,E
- SNMPv3
Integrity Keys:
G,E
Upgrader
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys: G,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret: G,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy Keys:
G,E
- SNMPv3
Integrity Keys:
G,E
Operator
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys: G,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret: G,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy Keys:
G,E
- SNMPv3
Integrity Keys:
G,E
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Establish a
Remote CLI
(SSH) Session
Login status
Session
parameters
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SSH
KAS SSH
Authentication SSH
Message Authentication
SSH
KDF SSH
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Administrator
- SSH Public
Keys: E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
Supervisor
- SSH Public
Keys: E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
Upgrader
- SSH Public
Keys: E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
Operator
- SSH Public
Keys: E
- SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- SSH Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- SSH Shared
Secret: G,E
- SSH Privacy
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Establish
RESTful HTTPS
(TLS) Session
HTTPS
Connection
status
Session
parameters
Connection
success/failure
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption TLS
KAS TLS
Authentication TLS 2
Message Authentication
TLS
KDF TLS
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Administrator
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates: R
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Supervisor
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates: R
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Upgrader
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates: R
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Operator
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates: R
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
KeyVault Sign
(X.509v3
Certificate
Signing
Request)
Sign an X.509v3
CSR
operation
output
CSR for
signing
Signed
certificate
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Sign X.509 Certificate
Administrator
- RSA Private
Keys: E
- ECDSA Private
Keys: E
- X509v3
Certificates:
R,W
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
KeyVault
Encrypt
Encrypt a
base64url encoded
32 byte block of
plaintext.
operation
output
32 Byte
plaintext data
block
Encrypted
block
KTS 1
Administrator
- RSA Public
Keys: E
KeyVault
Decrypt
Decrypt a
base64url encoded
32 byte block of
ciphertext
operation
output
32 Byte
encrypted
data block
Decrypted
block
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
KTS 1
Administrator
- RSA Private
Keys: E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
KeyVault DRBG
Access
Output a 32 byte
block of random
data from the
DRBG
operation
output
Command
32 byte output
from DRBG
DRBG Request
Administrator
- DRBG Entropy
Input and
Nonce: E
- DRBG Seed: E
- DRBG V and C
internal state
parameters: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
KeyVault
Backup
Create backup of
CA certificate
operation
output
Command Backup file
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Administrator
- Keyvault
Private Keys:
R,E
- Keyvault Public
Keys: R,E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
KeyVault
Restore
Restore backup of
CA certificate
operation
output
Command,
Backup file
Command
status
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Administrator
- Keyvault
Private Keys:
W,E
- Keyvault Public
Keys: W,E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Enable
KeySecure
Enable KeySecure
connector
operation
output, audit
log
Command
Command
status
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption SMK
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption TLS
KAS TLS
Authentication TLS 1
Authentication TLS 2
Message Authentication
TLS
KDF TLS
Generate Asymmetric Keys
2 (EC)
Generate Symmetric Key 1
(Direct generation from
DRBG)
Generate Symmetric Key 2
(Symmetric Keys Produced
by Combining (Multiple)
Keys and Other Data)
Administrator
- TLS Private
Keys: E
- TLS Public
Keys: R,E
- TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys:
G,E
- TLS Key
Exchange Public
Keys: G,R,E
- TLS Premaster
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Master
Secrets: G,E
- TLS Privacy
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
- X509v3
Certificates: W
- SMK_Local:
G,E
- SMK_Mask:
W,E
- SMK_CSP:
G,E
- System Master
Key (SMK): E
Generate
Random
command
status, audit
log
Command Random
DRBG Request
Entropy Source
Administrator
- DRBG Entropy
Input and
Nonce: E
- DRBG Seed: E
- DRBG V and C
internal state
parameters: E
Table 12: Approved Services
Note 1: The Load X.509 Certificate service can access any RSA or ECDSA Public/Private keys that are associated with the certificate being loaded.
The RSA key size in a certificate is checked when the certificate is loaded onto the module. If the key size is below 2048 bits, the certificate will be rejected.
The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:
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G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
Only signed and authenticated firmware upgrade images that pass the firmware load test can be installed on the module
by authorised users.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
The module implements a bypass capability initiated by an authenticated user with sufficient privileges. Prior to
application, the integrity of the current configuration is confirmed. After this the change is enacted by updating the static
configuration and then enforcing the policy in the hardware data path controller.
Bypass status is evident through policy configuration.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
A 32-byte SHA-256 hash is used for each firmware component to verify the integrity of all components within the
cryptographic module when the module is powered up, during the periodic test and on demand.
The original hash calculation is performed, for each module within the system, at firmware build time. The hash values are
then maintained within the system. During the self-test, the hash calculation is performed again for each module and
compared with the stored values that were generated at build time. Any discrepancy will cause the self-test to fail and the
module will transition to the Secure Halt state. Refer to section 10 Self-Tests for further information.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The user can execute the Software/Firmware integrity test on demand by issuing the reboot command.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
N/A. The operational environment of the module does not provide access to a general-purpose operating system (OS).
The module employs a limited operational environment. Only signed and authenticated firmware upgrade images that
pass the firmware load test can be installed on the module by authorised users.
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Tamper
Evidence
In accordance with the organization's
Security Policy.
Tamper indication is available to all user roles via physical evidence of
tampering against the tamper evident seals. The Crypto Officer is responsible
for the physical security inspection. Inspect the enclosure and tamper evident
seals for physical signs of tampering or attempted access to the cryptographic
module.
Tamper
Circuit
No direct inspection or test is required;
triggering the circuit will block all data
flow. It is recommended that the
module's alarm table is reviewed on a
daily basis.
The module enters the tampered state when the circuit is triggered. Once in
this state, the module blocks all user traffic until the module is re-activated and
re-certified. Tamper indication is available to all users via the alarm
mechanism. During normal operation, the Secure LED is illuminated green.
When the unit is not activated and/or uncertified (i.e. it has no loaded
certificate since it is either in the default factory manufactured state or a user
erase operation has been executed) or in the tampered state, the Secure LED
is illuminated red and all traffic is blocked.
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
CN Series Encryptors have a multiple-chip standalone embodiment and employ the following physical security
mechanisms:
1. The encryptor is made of commercially available, production grade components meeting commercial
specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration. All Integrated Circuit (IC) chips have
passivation applied to them. The production grade metal enclosure is opaque to the visible spectrum. All
ventilation holes are factory fitted with metal baffles to obscure visual access and to prevent undetected physical
probing inside the enclosure. Attempts to enter the module without removing the cover will cause visible damage
to the module, while removing the cover will trigger the tamper circuitry.
2. Access to the internal circuitry is restricted by the use of tamper detection and response circuitry which is
operational whether or not power is applied to the module. Attempting to remove the enclosure’s cover
immediately causes the module to be set into ‘Discard’ mode and initiates the zeroisation of all SSPs. For further
details refer to Section 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.
3. Two tamper evident seals are pre-installed (at factory). Both are placed between the top cover and underside of
the main enclosure. Attempting to remove the top cover to obtain access to the internal components of the
module will irreparably disturb these seals, thus providing visible evidence of the tamper attempt. Replacement
tamper seals cannot be ordered from the supplier. A module with damaged tamper evident seals should be
returned to the manufacturer by the Crypto Officer.
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Figure 20 – CN4000 Series factory installed tamper seals
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Figure 21 – CN6000 Series factory installed tamper seals
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Figure 22 – CN9000 Series factory installed tamper seals
While the physical security mechanisms protect the integrity of the module and its SSPs, it is strongly recommended that
the cryptographic module be maintained within a physically secure, limited access room or environment.
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Environmental Failure Protection is implemented in the CN Series Encryptors for both temperature and voltage. The
internal temperature and main 12VDC input voltage are constantly monitored and if the sensed values exceed the critical
thresholds the encryptor will shutdown. The critical thresholds are given in the table below.
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Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature
CN4010: 15 C, CN4020: 15 C, CN6010: 20 C, CN6100: 5 C, CN6110/CN6140: 10 C,
CN9100/CN9120: 10 C
EFP Shutdown
HighTemperature
CN4010: 85 C, CN4020: 80 C, CN6010: 85 C, CN6100: 80C, CN6110/CN6140: 80 C,
CN9100/CN9120: 85C
EFP Shutdown
LowVoltage CN4010: 9.0 V, CN4020/CN6010/CN6100/CN6110/CN6140/CN9100/CN9120: 10.2 V EFP Shutdown
HighVoltage CN4010: 15.0 V, CN4020/CN6010/CN6100/CN6110/CN6140/CN9100/CN9120: 13.8 V EFP Shutdown
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
The module’s enclosures were tested across the temperature ranges detailed in the table below. No perceptible
deformation or change to the enclosure’s integrity occurred during testing.
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -20 C
HighTemperature 80 C
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 Non-Invasive Security
Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F).
The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
The module’s SSP storage areas are detailed in the table below.
Storage Area
Name
Description
Persistence
Type
FLASH Memory Storage of encrypted CSPs and PSPs in FLASH file system. Static
SDRAM Temporary storage of SSPs in main dynamic memory. Dynamic
BBRAM
Tamper protected battery backed dynamic memory used for storage of the SMK. A tamper event will
erase the contents of the BBRAM whether the module is in a powered or unpowered state.
Static
High Speed
Crypto System
Storage of data plane connection DEKs in FPGA memory blocks. Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The module’s SSP input-output methods are detailed in the table below.
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Keysecure Input
KeySecure Key
Server
SDRAM Encrypted Manual Electronic
Activation Public Key Output FLASH Memory CM7 Encrypted Manual Electronic
Keyvault Backup FLASH Memory CM7 Encrypted Manual Electronic
Keyvault Restore CM7 FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
SME Public Key Input 1 Peer encryptor SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
SME Public Key Output 1 FLASH Memory Peer encryptor Plaintext Automated Electronic
SME Public Key Input 2 Peer encryptor SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS SME
SME Public Key Output 2 SDRAM Peer encryptor Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS SME
X509v3 Certificate Input 1 CM7 FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Input 2 SSH CLI FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Input 3 CLI FLASH Memory Plaintext Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Input 4
Peer encryptor via
SME
SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Input 5 TLS Server SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Output 1 FLASH Memory CM7 Encrypted Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Output 2 FLASH Memory SSH CLI Encrypted Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Output 3 FLASH Memory CLI Plaintext Manual Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Output 4 FLASH Memory
Peer Encryptor via
SME
Plaintext Automated Electronic
X509v3 Certificate Output 5 FLASH Memory TLS Client Plaintext Automated Electronic
SME Key Input 1 Peer encryptor SDRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS 1
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Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SME Key Output 1 SDRAM Peer encryptor Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS 1
SME Key Input 2 Peer encryptor SDRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS 2
SME Key Output 2 SDRAM Peer encryptor Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS 2
TIM KDK Input 1 CM7 FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
TIM KDK Input 2 SSH CLI FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
TIM KDK Output FLASH Memory CM7 Encrypted Manual Electronic
Authentication Password Input 1 CM7 FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
Authentication Password Input 2 SSH CLI FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
Authentication Password Input 3 CLI FLASH Memory Plaintext Manual Direct
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman Public Key
Input
CM7 SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
KAS
SNMP
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman Public Key
Output
SDRAM CM7 Plaintext Automated Electronic
KAS
SNMP
SSH Public Key Input 1 CM7 FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
SSH Public Key Input 2 SSH CLI FLASH Memory Encrypted Manual Electronic
SSH Public Key Input 3 CLI FLASH Memory Plaintext Manual Electronic
SSH Public Key Output FLASH Memory CM7 Encrypted Manual Electronic
SSH Key Exchange Public Key Input SSH Client/Server SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS SSH
SSH Key Exchange Public Key
Output
SDRAM SSH Client/Server Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS SSH
TLS Key Exchange Public Key Input TLS Client/Server SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS TLS
TLS Key Exchange Public Key
Output
SDRAM TLS Client/Server Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS TLS
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
The module’s SSP zeroisation methods are detailed in the table below.
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Tamper
Event
Zeroization will be initiated immediately
upon detection of a tamper event. The
Tamper Circuit is active at all times; the
specific tamper response differs slightly
based on the module's power state. From
a practical standpoint the effect on the
SSPs is the same.
The tamper initiated zeroization process achieves the
following: 1. Zeroization of the System Master Key (SMK)
rendering CSPs stored in FLASH memory indecipherable.
Zeroization of the SMK occurs irrespective of the powered
state of the module. 2. When powered on and the Tamper
Circuit is triggered, the module will automatically: a. Set the
encryption mode for each session (CI) to DISCARD ensuring
no user data is output from the module, b. Log the tamper
event to the Audit Log, c. Set the System, Secure and Alarm
LEDs to flash RED on the front panel and herald the tamper
event via the internal speaker, d. Initiate the Zeroization
sequence zeroizing all Session Keys (DEKs) and SSPs in
volatile system memory and non-volatile Configuration and
User account data, e. REBOOT the module. 3. When
powered off and the Tamper Circuit is triggered, there are no
SSPs in system volatile memory to be zeroized however upon
re-powering the module, the zeroized System Master Key will
indicate that the system has been tampered. The module will:
a. Log the tamper event to the Audit log, b. Initiate the
Zeroization sequence, c. Continue to the BOOT, returning the
module to the un-Activated factory default state. 4. When the
BOOT sequence has completed the module will have: a.
Generated a new System Master Key, b. Re-created the
default administration account, c. Set the encryption mode to
DISCARD, d. Entered the factory default state ready for
Configuration (as described in Section 11.2).
Emergency
Erase Button
The "Emergency" Erase feature is initiated
when the concealed front panel
Emergency Erase button is depressed
Causes the same response as Tamper Event above.
Operator
Initiated
Erase
Command
A Crypto Officer can initiate a module
Erase remotely using the remote
management application or when
physically in the presence of the module
using the management console CLI
interface or Front Panel key press Erase
sequence.
Once initiated the module Zeroization sequence immediately
carries out the following: * Sets each session (CI) to
DISCARD, before zeroizing the DEKs * Zeroizes the SMK
rendering CSPs stored in FLASH memory indecipherable. *
Deletes CSPs stored in FLASH memory, module
configuration and all certificate information. * Automatically
REBOOTs the module destroying all SSPs residing in volatile
system memory.
Operator
Initiated
Power Cycle Module Power Cycle
Sensitive data stored in a device's memory is securely erased
by initiating a system power-off followed by a restart.
Operator
Initiated
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
The module’s SSPs are detailed in the table below.
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
System Master
Key (SMK)
AES key used to encrypt CSPs
stored in FLASH memory
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key 1 (Direct
generation
from DRBG)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SMK
Triple-DES
System Master
Key
Used to decrypt CSPs stored in
FLASH memory during upgrade
from legacy software version.
192 bits -
168 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Symmetric Decryption
SMK
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
They are re-encrypted using AES
256 SMK (see row above)
SMK_Local
When KeySecure is configured,
the local System Master Key
(SMK_local) is generated from
the internal DRBG and stored it in
tamper protected memory.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key
component -
CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key 1 (Direct
generation
from DRBG)
SMK_Mask
When KeySecure is configured,
the module will obtain a System
Master Key mask (SMK_mask)
from the external KeySecure
server.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key
component -
PSP
SMK_CSP
SMK_local and SMK_mask are
combined to create SMK_CSP
which is used to encrypt and
decrypt the CSPs stored in
FLASH memory.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key 2
(Symmetric
Keys
Produced by
Combining
(Multiple) Keys
and Other
Data)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SMK
Activation RSA
Private Key
Used to unwrap/decapsulate user
credentials sent from CM7 to
module
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
KTS 1
Activation RSA
Public Key
Used to wrap/encapsulate user
credentials sent from CM7 to
module
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
KTS 1
RSA Private
Keys
Used for authentication and key
wrapping between modules
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Authentication SME 1
Authentication TLS 1
RSA Public
Keys
Used for authentication and key
wrapping between modules
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Authentication SME 1
Authentication TLS 1
ECDSA
Private Keys
Used for authentication between
modules
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication SME 2
Authentication TLS 2
ECDSA Public
Keys
Used for authentication between
modules
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication SME 2
Authentication TLS 2
SME ECDH
Private Keys
Established during the SME key
agreement process and
destroyed once the process is
complete. The ECDH Ephemeral
Private Key is used to create the
shared secret.
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS SME
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
SME ECDH
Public Keys
Established during the SME key
agreement process and
destroyed once the process is
complete. The ECDH Ephemeral
Public Key is used to create the
shared secret.
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS SME
SME ECDH
Shared Secret
Established during the SP 800-
56Arev3 compliant ECDHE key
agreement
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS SME KAS SME
X509v3
Certificates
An X.509 certificate is associated
with a session/connection in an
operational environment or a
service such as FTPS.
Certificates used for secure
connections are produced, upon
request from the module, and
signed by the Certificate Authority
(CA) to establish root trust
between encryptors. Once a
certificate has been
authenticated, Far-end encryptors
use the signed RSA Public Key to
wrap the initial session keys
(KEKs) used to encrypt a session.
Alternatively, far end encryptors
use the ECDSA public key to
authenticate messages sent
during the ECDH key agreement
process.
-
X509v3
Certificate -
PSP
Authentication SME 1
Authentication SME 2
Authentication TLS 1
Authentication TLS 2
Authentication
Passwords
Up to 30 unique Crypto Officers
(Administrators, Supervisors,
Upgraders) or Users (Operators)
may be defined, with associated
passwords, within the module.
8-29 ASCII
characters -
Password -
CSP
Authentication
Password
Hash
256 bits -
Secure
Hash - CSP
Secure Hash
Key Encrypting
Keys (KEK)
For each RSA based session (CI)
and EC Multipoint sessions, the
AES KEK is derived from the
SME KDK or SME GDK
respectively, using an SP 800-
108rev1 compliant KDF. The KEK
persists for the life of the session
and is used to secure the Data
Encrypting Key that may be
changed periodically during the
session. EC point to point
connections use ECDH key
agreement to generate the DEKs.
In this case there is no need for
KEKs.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF SME KTS 2
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
Data
Encrypting
Keys (DEK)
The module generates DEKs for
each data flow path in the secure
connection (one for the Initiator-
Responder path and another for
the Responder-Initiator path). The
DEKs encrypt and decrypt the
user data transferred between the
Encryptors. These active session
keys are normally changed
periodically based on the key
update interval. For secure
connections assigned to RSA
certificates RSA-OAEP-256 KTS
is used to transfer the initial DEK
to a far-end module. Subsequent
DEKs are transferred using AES
key wrapping with the KEK
authenticated with HMAC-SHA-
256. For each ECC based
connection a pair of encryptors
use ECDH KAS to establish
DEKs. In Transport Independent
Mode each encryptor uses a
single egress DEK to encrypt all
secure traffic. Each encryptor
maintains 2 egress DEKs one in
current use and one stored for the
next key update. The egress
DEKs are
123 bits,
256 bits -
123 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF TIM
Generate
Symmetric
Key 1 (Direct
generation
from DRBG)
KAS SME
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 1
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 2
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 3
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 4
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 5
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Data Plane 6
TIM KDK
The KDK is used to derive the
DEKs using a SP 800-108
compliant KDF.
256 bits -
Key
Derivation
Key - CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key 1 (Direct
generation
from DRBG)
KDF TIM
Group
Establishment
Keys (GEK)
The GEK is used to wrap the
group SME KDKs and initial
DEKs using AES-256 CFB
authenticated with HMAC-SHA-
256.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF SME KTS 2
SME HMAC
keys
The SME HMAC keys are used to
protect the integrity of the AES
key wrapped messages between
encryptors.
256 bits -
256 bits
Integrity -
CSP
KDF SME KTS 2
SME KDK
For each RSA based session
(CI), the module generates a 256-
bit SME KDK. The SME KDK is
used to separately derive the
KEK and the SME HMAC keys
using an SP 800-108 compliant
KDF. RSA Key transport is used
to transfer this key to a far-end
module. EC Multipoint
connections use the GEK and
AES keywrap to transport the
KDK.
256 bits -
Key
Derivation
Key - CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key 1 (Direct
generation
from DRBG)
KDF SME
Group
Derivation
Keys (GDK)
When a subordinate joins an
ECDSA/ECDH VLAN or multicast
group session the key master
256 bits -
Key
Derivation
Key - CSP
KAS SME KDF SME
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
from the group and the
subordinate use ECDH
ephemeral key agreement to
establish a GDK that is used to
separately derive the GEK and
the SME HMAC keys using a SP
800-108rev1 compliant KDF
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman
Private Keys
The key is created using Oakley
group 14 for each remote
SNMPv3 management session to
enable agreement of the SNMPv3
privacy key between the module
and the management station
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 3 (DH
Key
Generation
during Key
Agreement)
KAS SNMP
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys
The key is created using Oakley
group 14 for each remote
SNMPv3 management session to
enable agreement of the SNMPv3
privacy key between the module
and the management station.
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 3 (DH
Key
Generation
during Key
Agreement)
KAS SNMP
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman
Shared Secret
The shared secret is created
during the SNMPv3 DH key
agreement process
2048 bits -
112 bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS SNMP KDF SNMP
SNMPv3
Privacy Keys
For each SNMPv3 remote
management session, the module
uses an AES privacy key
established during DH key
agreement process to secure the
control / flow path in the secure
connection.
128 bits,
256 bits -
128 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF SNMP
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Integrity Keys
The SNMPv3 Integrity keys are
used to protect the integrity of the
data transmitted across the
secure SNMP connection
160 bits,
512 bits -
160 bits,
512 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF SNMP
Message
Authentication SNMP
DRBG Seed
Used as input for SP 800-90Ar1
Hash_DRBG
440 bits -
Input to
DRBG -
CSP
DRBG
Request
DRBG Request
DRBG Entropy
Input and
Nonce
Used as input for SP 800-90Ar1
Hash_DRBG
384 bits -
Input to
DRBG -
CSP
Entropy
Source
DRBG Request
DRBG V and
C internal state
parameters
The V and C parameters store
the internal state of the SP 800-
90rev1 DRBG
440 bits -
DRBG State
Variables -
CSP
DRBG
Request
DRBG Request
SSH Private
Keys
ECDSA key used to authenticate
the module with the remote
client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication SSH
SSH Public
Keys
ECDSA key used to authenticate
the module with the remote
client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication SSH
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
SSH Key
Exchange
Private Keys
ECDH key created for each SSH
session to enable agreement of
the SSH shared secret between
the module and the remote
client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS SSH
SSH Key
Exchange
Public Keys
ECDH key created for each SSH
session to enable agreement of
the SSH shared secret between
the module and the remote
client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS SSH
SSH Shared
Secret
Used to derive the SSH Privacy
and Integrity Keys
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS SSH KDF SSH
SSH Privacy
Keys
Generated during the SSH I key
agreement process and used for
encryption of the data transmitted
across the secure SSH
connection
128 bits,
256 bits -
128 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF SSH
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SSH
SSH Integrity
Keys
The SSH Integrity keys are used
to protect the integrity of the data
transmitted across the secure
SSH connection
256 bits,
512 bits -
256 bits,
512 bits
Integrity Key
- CSP
KDF SSH
Message
Authentication SSH
TLS Private
Keys
Used to authenticate the module
with the remote client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521,
2048 bits -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits,
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication TLS 1
Authentication TLS 2
TLS Public
Keys
Used to authenticate the module
with the remote client/server
P-256, P-
384, P-521,
2048 bits -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits,
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
Authentication TLS 1
Authentication TLS 2
TLS Key
Exchange
Private Keys
The ECDH key is created for
each TLS session to enable
agreement of the TLS shared
secret between the module and
the remote server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS TLS
TLS Key
Exchange
Public Keys
The ECDH key is created for
each TLS session to enable
agreement of the TLS shared
secret between the module and
the remote server
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KAS TLS
TLS Premaster
Secrets
The TLS Premaster Secret is
used to generate the TLS Master
Secret
384 bits -
Shared
secret -
CSP
KAS TLS KDF TLS
TLS Master
Secrets
The TLS Master Secret is used to
derive TLS Privacy and Integrity
keys
384 bits -
Key
Derivation
Key - CSP
KDF TLS KDF TLS
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 73 of 92
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
TLS Privacy
Keys
Generated during the TLS key
agreement process and used for
encryption of the data transmitted
across the secure TLS
connection
128 bits,
256 bits -
128 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF TLS
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
TLS
TLS Integrity
Keys
The TLS Integrity keys are used
to protect the integrity of the data
transmitted across the secure
TLS connection
256 bits,
384 bits -
256 bits,
384 bits
Integrity Key
- CSP
KDF TLS
Message
Authentication TLS
Keyvault
Private Keys
Used for Keyvault operations
P-256, P-
384, P-521,
2048 bits -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits,
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KTS 1
Sign X.509 Certificate
Keyvault
Public Keys
Used for Keyvault operations
P-256, P-
384, P-521,
2048 bits -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits,
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 1 (RSA)
Generate
Asymmetric
Keys 2 (EC)
KTS 1
Firmware
Upgrade RSA
Public Key
The Firmware Upgrade RSA
Public Key is the public
component of the module's
firmware upgrade RSA key pair. It
is used for authenticating the
firmware upgrade image
(signature verification only). The
Firmware Upgrade RSA Public
Key is embedded in the module's
firmware
2048 bits -
112 bits
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Factory
Installed
Firmware Load Test
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
System Master Key
(SMK)
BBRAM:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Triple-DES System
Master Key
BBRAM:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
SMK_Local BBRAM:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
SMK_Mask:Combined with
SMK_Mask Keysecure Input SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle SMK_Local:Combined with
SMK_CSP SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use Power Cycle
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 74 of 92
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Activation RSA
Private Key
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Activation RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Activation RSA
Public Key
Activation Public
Key Output
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Activation RSA Private
Key:Paired With
RSA Private Keys
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
RSA Public Keys:Paired
With
RSA Public Keys
SME Public Key
Input 1
SME Public Key
Output 1
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
RSA Private Keys:Paired
With
ECDSA Private
Keys
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
ECDSA Public Keys:Paired
With
ECDSA Public Keys
SME Public Key
Input 1
SME Public Key
Output 1
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
ECDSA Private Keys:Paired
With
SME ECDH Private
Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SME ECDH Public
Keys:Paired With
SME ECDH Public
Keys
SME Public Key
Input 2
SME Public Key
Output 2
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SME ECDH Private
Keys:Paired With
SME ECDH Shared
Secret
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SME ECDH Private
Keys:Agreed using
SME ECDH Public
Keys:Agreed using
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 75 of 92
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
X509v3 Certificates
X509v3 Certificate
Input 1
X509v3 Certificate
Input 2
X509v3 Certificate
Input 3
X509v3 Certificate
Input 4
X509v3 Certificate
Input 5
X509v3 Certificate
Output 1
X509v3 Certificate
Output 2
X509v3 Certificate
Output 3
X509v3 Certificate
Output 4
X509v3 Certificate
Output 5
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
RSA Public Keys:Associated
with
ECDSA Public
Keys:Associated with
TLS Public Keys:Associated
with
Keyvault Public
Keys:Associated with
Authentication
Passwords
Authentication
Password Input 1
Authentication
Password Input 2
Authentication
Password Input 3
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Authentication
Password Hash
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Key Encrypting
Keys (KEK)
SDRAM:Plaintext
The KEK persists for
the life of the
session
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SME KDK:Derived From
Group Derivation Keys
(GDK):Derived From
Data Encrypting
Keys (DEK)
SME Key Input 1
SME Key Output 1
SME Key Input 2
SME Key Output 2
SDRAM:Plaintext
The DEKs are
updated when the
key change interval
expirers
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TIM KDK
TIM KDK Input 1
TIM KDK Input 2
TIM KDK Output
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Group
Establishment Keys
(GEK)
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
Group Derivation Keys
(GDK):Derived From
SME HMAC keys SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
Group Derivation Keys
(GDK):Derived From
SME KDK:Derived From
SME KDK
SME Key Input 1
SME Key Output 1
SME Key Input 2
SME Key Output 2
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 76 of 92
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Group Derivation
Keys (GDK)
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Private
Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Public Keys:Paired With
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public
Keys
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public Key
Input
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public Key
Output
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Private Keys:Paired With
SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Shared
Secret
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Private Keys:Agreed Using
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Public Keys:Agreed Using
SNMPv3 Privacy
Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret:Derived From
SNMPv3 Integrity
Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret:Derived From
DRBG Seed SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
DRBG Entropy Input and
Nonce:Created From
DRBG Entropy
Input and Nonce
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
DRBG V and C
internal state
parameters
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
DRBG Seed:Associated with
SSH Private Keys
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
SSH Public Keys:Paired
With
SSH Public Keys
SSH Public Key
Input 1
SSH Public Key
Input 2
SSH Public Key
Input 3
SSH Public Key
Output
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
SSH Private Keys:Paired
With
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 77 of 92
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
SSH Key Exchange
Private Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SSH Key Exchange Public
Keys:Paired With
SSH Key Exchange
Public Keys
SSH Key Exchange
Public Key Input
SSH Key Exchange
Public Key Output
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SSH Key Exchange Private
Keys:Paired With
SSH Shared Secret SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SSH Key Exchange Private
Keys:Agreed Using
SSH Key Exchange Public
Keys:Agreed Using
SSH Privacy Keys SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SSH Shared Secret:Derived
From
SSH Integrity Keys SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
SSH Shared Secret:Derived
From
TLS Private Keys
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
TLS Public Keys:Paired With
TLS Public Keys
X509v3 Certificate
Input 1
X509v3 Certificate
Input 2
X509v3 Certificate
Input 3
X509v3 Certificate
Output 1
X509v3 Certificate
Output 2
X509v3 Certificate
Output 3
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
TLS Private Keys:Paired
With
TLS Key Exchange
Private Keys
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Key Exchange Public
Keys:Paired With
TLS Key Exchange
Public Keys
TLS Key Exchange
Public Key Input
TLS Key Exchange
Public Key Output
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Key Exchange Private
Keys:Paired With
TLS Premaster
Secrets
SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Key Exchange Private
Keys:Agreed Using
TLS Key Exchange Public
Keys:Agreed Using
TLS Master Secrets SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Premaster
Secrets:Derived From
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 78 of 92
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
TLS Privacy Keys SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Master Secrets:Derived
From
TLS Integrity Keys SDRAM:Plaintext Zeroised after use
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Power Cycle
TLS Master Secrets:Derived
From
Keyvault Private
Keys
Keyvault Backup
Keyvault Restore
FLASH
Memory:Encrypted
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Keyvault Public Keys:Paired
With
Keyvault Public
Keys
Keyvault Backup
Keyvault Restore
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
Tamper Event
Emergency
Erase Button
Erase
Command
Keyvault Private Keys:Paired
With
Firmware Upgrade
RSA Public Key
FLASH
Memory:Plaintext
N/A
Table 20: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
Please see the latest revision of SP 800-131 and CMVP Programmatic Transitions page for transitions that may affect this
module.
9.6 Additional Information
KeySecure Connector integration (Split Key SMK)
The CN Series Encryptors have the ability to communicate with SafeNet’s KeySecure key management system. When
KeySecure is enabled and correctly configured the encryptor will still derive a local System Master Key (SMK_local) from
the internal DRBG and store it in tamper protected memory. In addition, it will also obtain a System Master Key mask
(SMK_mask) from the external KeySecure server. When the encryptor needs to encrypt or decrypt the CSPs stored in
FLASH memory it will retrieve SMK_local and SMK_mask and combine them to create SMK_CSP which is used to
perform the operation.
This feature allows centralised management of SSPs within a network of encryptors. Deleting SMK_mask in the
KeySecure server will destroy the SSPs in the encryptor. The KeySecure feature is disabled by default.
Please note that throughout this Security Policy SMK can be used to refer to both the SMK and the SMK_CSP as they
both perform the same function even though they have different generation methods.
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 79 of 92
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
A set of pre-operational self-tests are executed during the power up sequence. The design of the CN Series Encryptors
ensures that all data output, via the data output interface and management interfaces, is inhibited whenever the module is
in a pre-operational self-test condition. Status information displaying the results of the self-tests is allowed from the status
output interface. No CSPs, plaintext data, or other information, that if misused could lead to a compromise, is passed to
the status output interface.
The SHA2-256 algorithm is tested using a known answer test prior to it being used for the Software/Firmware Integrity
self-test.
Upon successful completion of the pre-operational self-tests the LCD will display a message stating that the self-tests
passed and the module will allow access via the CLI and remote management tools. The data-plane ports will be enabled
and normal operation will commence.
The module’s pre-operational self-tests are detailed in the table below.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
SHA2-256
(A3451)
Integrity
Test
SW/FW
Integrity
Audit Log
A 32-byte SHA2-256 hash is used to verify the integrity of all components
within the cryptographic firmware when the module is powered up and on
demand by issuing the reboot command. The SHA2-256 algorithm is
tested using a KAT prior to the Software/ Firmware integrity test running.
Bypass
Policy
Bypass Audit Log
The Bypass/Encrypt Policy test ensures that the Bypass/Encrypt policy
setting is observed by the encryption datapath and that a frame cannot be
spuriously transmitted in bypass (plaintext) when it should have been
encrypted (and vice versa).
RTC/
Tamper
Critical
Function
Audit Log Tamper memory is examined for evidence of a Tamper Condition.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
A set of conditional self-tests run when required.
The conditional cryptographic algorithm known answer tests are run during the power up (pre-operational) sequence.
The module’s conditional self-tests are detailed in the table below.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A3451)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3451)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3451)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
P-256, P-
384, P-521
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 80 of 92
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
P-256, P-
384, P-521
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
P-256, P-
384, P-521
PCT PCT Audit Log
ECDSA Public and Private keys are used for the
calculation and verification of digital signatures.
These keys are tested at the time they are used with
a sign/verify pair-wise consistency test
Key Pair
Generation
Hash DRBG
(A3451)
256-bit KAT CAST Audit Log
SP 800-90 A Section 11.3 (Instantiate, Reseed,
Generate and Un-instantiate)
Power Up
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A3451)
160-bit KAT CAST Audit Log MAC Power Up
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A3451)
256-bit KAT CAST Audit Log MAC Power Up
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A3451)
384-bit KAT CAST Audit Log MAC Power Up
HMAC-
SHA2-512
(A3451)
512-bit KAT CAST Audit Log MAC Power Up
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3451)
P-256, P-
384, P-521
KAT CAST Audit Log
ECDH (Cofactor) Ephemeral Unified Model SP 800-
56Arev3
Power Up
ECDH PCT
P-256, P-
384, P-521
PCT PCT Audit Log
ECDH Public and Private keys are used for SP 800-
56Arev3 approved key agreement. These keys are
tested at the time they are used with a pair-wise
consistency test.
Key Pair
Generation
KAS-FFC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3451)
2048-bit KAT CAST Audit Log DH dhEphem 2048 MODP group SP 800-56Arev3 Power Up
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
(A3451)
2048-bit PCT PCT Audit Log
DH Public and Private keys are used for SP 800-
56Arev3 approved key agreement. These keys are
tested at the time they are used with a pair-wise
consistency test.
Key Pair
Generation
KDF SNMP
(A3451)
160-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Key Derivation Power Up
KDF SP800-
108 (A3451)
256-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Key Derivation Power Up
KDF SSH
(A3451)
256-bit,
512-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Key Derivation Power Up
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC7627
(A3451)
256-bit,
384-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Key Derivation Power Up
KTS-IFC
(A3451)
2048-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 81 of 92
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
2048-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Sign/ Verify Power Up
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
2048-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Sign/ Verify Power Up
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
2048-bit PCT PCT Audit Log
RSA Public and Private keys are used for the
calculation and verification of digital signatures and
for key transport. These keys are tested for
consistency, based on their purpose, at the time
they are used. RSA wrapping keys are tested by an
encrypt/decrypt pair-wise consistency test; signature
keys are tested by a sign/verify pair-wise
consistency test
Key Pair
Generation
SHA-1
(A3451)
160-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Secure Hash Power Up
SHA2-256
(A3451)
256-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Secure Hash Power Up
SHA2-384
(A3451)
384-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Secure Hash Power Up
SHA2-512
(A3451)
512-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Secure Hash Power Up
TDES-CFB8
(A3451)
192-bit KAT CAST Audit Log Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3435)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3435)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3435)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3436)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3436)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3437)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3437)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3437)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3438)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3438)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3439)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 82 of 92
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CTR
(A3439)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3439)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3440)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3440)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3459)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3459)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3458)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3458)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3549)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3549)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3549)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3443)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3443)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3441)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3441)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3442)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3442)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CFB128
(A3445)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3445)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3445)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3460)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3460)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
CN Series Encryptors FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd.
Page 83 of 92
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CTR
(A3448)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3448)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3444)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3444)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3492)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3446)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3446)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-CTR
(A3447)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A3447)
128-bit,
256-bit
KAT CAST Audit Log Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
SHA2-256
Bypass
Parameter
Integrity
256-bit Bypass Audit Log
The module supports alternating between Bypass,
Discard and Encrypt modes (which can be seen
from the management interface). The configuration
files that control the bypass/discard and encrypt
settings are integrity checked using a stored
checksum (32- byte SHA-256 hash). Conditional
bypass tests are enforced by checking the integrity
during each process initialisation that memory maps
specific configuration data. If the Hash is valid, the
process continues execution with that data,
otherwise a re-initialisation is executed to failsafe
values. Once running, a process will update the
relevant configuration data when required,
recalculating and storing the new hash value.
Process
Initialisation
Firmware
Load Test
RSA SigVer
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Load
Audit Log
When a new firmware image file is generated by the
vendor, the file is encrypted and then signed with
the firmware upgrade RSA private key. When any
firmware load is applied to the encryptor in the field,
the module verifies the authenticity of the firmware
image file using its copy of the firmware upgrade
RSA public key. Only firmware loads with a valid
and verified firmware upgrade RSA signature are
accepted
Firmware Load
Battery
Critical
Function
Audit Log
The battery voltage is tested to determine if it is
critically low. This test is guaranteed to fail prior to
the battery voltage falling below the minimum
specified data retention voltage for the associated
battery-backed components. If this test fails, the
battery low alarm condition is raised. The module
continues to operate however it is advisable that the
battery be replaced immediately. The battery is
located in the removable fan tray and can be
ordered from the module's supplier. Battery alarm
indication is available to all user roles via the alarm
mechanism
Continuous
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RTC /
Tamper
Memory
Critical
Function
Audit Log
The Real Time Clock (RTC) oscillator is checked at
start-up and the Tamper memory is examined
continuously for evidence of a Tamper Condition.
Continuous
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
FD CAST Audit Log SP 800-90B Section 4
Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
Adaptative
Proportion
Test (APT)
FD CAST Audit Log SP 800-90B Section 4
Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
A subset of the pre-operational tests run periodically. The Bypass/Encrypt Policy test and Software/Firmware Integrity test
are scheduled to run every 24 hours. The critical function tests run continuously. The action taken upon failure of a
periodic self-test is context dependent.
The module’s periodic self-tests are detailed in the table below.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
SHA2-256 (A3451) Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity 24 Hours Automatic
Bypass Policy Bypass 24 Hours Automatic
RTC/ Tamper Critical Function Continuous Automatic
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC (A3451) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3451) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3451) KAT CAST
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3451)
KAT CAST
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3451)
KAT CAST
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3451)
PCT PCT
Hash DRBG (A3451) KAT CAST
HMAC-SHA-1 (A3451) KAT CAST
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3451)
KAT CAST
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A3451)
KAT CAST
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A3451)
KAT CAST
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3
(A3451)
KAT CAST
ECDH PCT PCT PCT
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3
(A3451)
KAT CAST
Safe Primes Key
Generation (A3451)
PCT PCT
KDF SNMP (A3451) KAT CAST
KDF SP800-108 (A3451) KAT CAST
KDF SSH (A3451) KAT CAST
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
(A3451)
KAT CAST
KTS-IFC (A3451) KAT CAST
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
4) (A3451)
KAT CAST
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3451)
KAT CAST
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4) (A3451)
PCT PCT
SHA-1 (A3451) KAT CAST
SHA2-256 (A3451) KAT CAST
SHA2-384 (A3451) KAT CAST
SHA2-512 (A3451) KAT CAST
TDES-CFB8 (A3451) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3435) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3435) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3435) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3436) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3436) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3437) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3437) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3437) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3438) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3438) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3439) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3439) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3439) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3440) KAT CAST
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM (A3440) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3459) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3459) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3458) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3458) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3549) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3549) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3549) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3443) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3443) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3441) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3441) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3442) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3442) KAT CAST
AES-CFB128 (A3445) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3445) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3445) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3460) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3460) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3448) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3448) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3444) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3444) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3492) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3446) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3446) KAT CAST
AES-CTR (A3447) KAT CAST
AES-GCM (A3447) KAT CAST
SHA2-256 Bypass
Parameter Integrity
Bypass
Firmware Load Test Signature Verification SW/FW Load
Battery Critical Function
RTC / Tamper Memory Critical Function
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
FD CAST
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Adaptative Proportion
Test (APT)
FD CAST
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The module’s self-test error states are described in the table below.
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Secure Halt
The module will enter a Secure
shutdown state and Halt ("Secure
Halt"). Thereby preventing the
module being configured and
passing any data over the Network
data output interface.
Pre-Operational
Software/ Firmware
Integrity test failure
Cryptographic KAT
failure
Pre-Operational RTC/
Tamper test failure
RCT or APT Failure
Attempt to recover by
power-cycle. If the Secure
Halt condition persists the
module cannot be
recovered and must be
returned to the factory.
LEDs flashing red (all
models) and alarm
message on LCD
(CN6000 and CN9000
Series) Audit Log (if
recoverable)
Configuration
Erase
The module's policy configuration will
be erased and reset to factory
defaults. Global policy mode will be
set to Discard preventing all data
being transmitted over the Network
data output interface.
Conditional Bypass
Parameter Integrity test
failure
Reconfigure and attempt to
pass Network data
Audit Log
Global mode
discard
If the Bypass Policy Test fails when
the module is in the pre-operational
or operational state, the global mode
parameter is set to discard inhibiting
all data being transmitted over the
Network data output interface.
Bypass Policy test
failure
Observe carefully and
reconfigure unit, if error
persists check "User Guide"
Audit Log
Error/Alarm
Error/Alarm logged. System state
unchanged
PCT failure
Conditional
Software/Firmware
Load test failure
Observe carefully and re-
attempt, if error persists
check "User Guide"
Audit Log
Table 25: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
Crypto Officers can run the pre-operational self-tests on demand by issuing a module reboot command. This may be
accomplished via the Local Console, or by cycling the power to the module. Use of the Local Console or power cycling the
module requires a direct connection or physical access to the module, respectively.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
This section provides information for Crypto Officers to install, configure and operate the module in FIPS mode.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Delivery
Before the shipment proceeds, a serial number is allocated for the ordered module. Prior to the module shipping, a
Shipping Advice form listing the purchase order number, the model number, the serial number and date of shipment is
sent to the purchaser. When the module is delivered, the CO can verify that the model and serial numbers on the outside
of the packaging, the model and serial numbers attached to the encryptor itself, and the numbers listed on the Shipping
Advice form, all match. The CO can also verify that the encryptor has not been modified by examining the tamper evident
seal on the outside of the unit. If a seal is broken, then the integrity of the encryptor cannot be assured and the supplier
should be informed immediately.
Upon receipt of an encryptor, the following steps should be undertaken:
1. Inspect the shipping label as well as the label on the bottom of the system to ensure it is the correct version of the
hardware.
2. Inspect the encryptor for signs of tampering. Check that the tamper evident tape and the covers of the device do
not show any signs of tampering. If tampering is detected, return the device to the manufacturer.
Do not install the encryptor if it shows signs of tampering or has an incorrect label. Contact your organization’s Security
Officer for instructions on how to proceed.
If the device has the correct label and shows no signs of tampering, proceed to the next section.
Location
The encryptor must be installed in a secure location to ensure that it cannot be physically bypassed or tampered with.
Ultimately the security of the network is only as good as the physical security around the encryptor.
Always maintain and operate the CN Series Encryptors in a protected/secure environment. If it is configured in a staging
area, and then relocated to its operational location, never leave the unit unsecured and unattended.
Ideally the encryptor will be installed in a climate-controlled environment with other sensitive electronic equipment (e.g. a
telecommunications room, computer room or wiring closet). The encryptor can be installed in a standard 19-inch rack or
alternatively mounted on any flat surface. Choose a location that is as dry and clean as possible. Ensure that the front and
rear of the encryptor are unobstructed to allow a good flow of air through the fan vents.
The encryptor is intended to be located between a trusted and an untrusted network. The Local Interface of the encryptor
is connected to appropriate equipment on the trusted network and the Network Interface of the encryptor is connected to
the untrusted (often public) network.
Depending on the topology of your network, the Local Interface will often connect directly to a router or switch, while the
Network Interface will connect to the NTU provided by the network carrier.
Administrator Guidance: Approved mode
As outlined in this Security Policy, Crypto Officers (more specifically, Administrators and Supervisors) are the only
administrators/operators that can make configuration changes or modify the system settings. The Crypto Officer is
responsible for the physical security inspection.
The CN Series Encryptors are designed to operate in an approved mode. The operator can query the FIPS status
(operating mode) of a module, and authorized operators may change the FIPS mode of operation. The FIPS status can
be queried from the Local Console via the CLI or remotely via the remote management application.
To ensure that no CSPs are accessible from a previous operating mode a module Erase and Reboot are automatically
performed upon mode change.
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The console command is:
> fips on<ENTER>
The Senetas CM7 remote management application screen for reporting the FIPS status is found on the User
Management screen, in the System pane under FIPS Mode. All of the versioning information is also displayed. Refer to
Figure 23 below.
Figure 23 – “FIPS mode” selection
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Note: Read all of the instructions in this section before installing, configuring, and operating the CN Series
Encryptors.
Full configuration instructions are provided in the User Guides [26]. Use the guidance here to constrain the configuration
so that the device is not compromised during the configuration phase. This will ensure the device boots properly and
enters FIPS 140-3 approved mode.
When powering up the module for the first time, use the front panel or the CLI to configure the system for network
connectivity. Then use the remote management application to initialize the module and perform the configuration
operations.
1. Power on the unit.
The system boot-up sequence is entered each time the module is powered on and after a firmware restart. The
module automatically completes self-tests and verifies the authenticity of its firmware as part of the initialization
process. The results of these tests are reported on the front panel LCD and are also logged in the system audit log.
If errors are detected during the diagnostic phase, the firmware will not complete the power up sequence but will
instead enter a Secure shutdown state and Halt (“Secure Halt”). If this occurs the first time power is applied or any
time in the future, the module will notify the CO that a persistent (hard) error has occurred and that the module must
be returned for inspection and repair.
2. Follow the User Guides [26] section to set the system’s IP Address, Date and Time.
3. If the CM7 application is being run for the first time, it will ask if the CM7 installation will act as the Certification
Authority (CA) for the secure network. If the user selects yes, a private and public RSA or ECDSA key pair that will
be used to sign X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests from the module is generated by the CM7 application.
4. Activate the cryptographic module.
A newly manufactured or erased cryptographic module must be Activated before X.509 certificate requests can be
processed. See the User Guide’s commissioning section for details.
Activation ensures that the default credentials of the ‘admin’ account are replaced with those specified by the
customer prior to loading signed X.509 certificates into the module.
The updated user credentials (username and password) are transmitted to the encryptor using RSA 2048 public
key encryption, and a hashing mechanism is used by the local administrator to authenticate the message.
5. Install a signed X.509 certificate into the cryptographic module.
CN Series Encryptors support X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) and will accept certificates signed by
the remote management application CM7 (when acting as a CA) as well as certificates signed by External CAs. In
both cases each encryptor supplies upon request an X.509v3 CSR containing the module’s details and either a
2048-bit Public RSA key or an ECDSA Public key using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves.
The administrator then takes the CSR and has it signed by either the trusted local CA (the remote management
application CM7 for X.509v3 certificates using either a 2048-bit Public RSA key or an ECDSA Public key using
NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves) or an external CA for X.509v3 certificates using either a 2048- or 4096-bit
Public RSA key or an ECDSA Public key using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves. For a typical deployment this
procedure is repeated for all cryptographic modules in the network and the signed certificates are installed into each
module.
After an X.509 certificate has been installed into an encryptor the administrator can create supervisor, upgrader
and operator accounts.
At this point the encryptor is able to encrypt in accordance with the configured security policy; the ENT (enter) key
on the front panel is disabled; and the default factory account has been removed.
6. Ensure the encryptor is in FIPS 140-3 mode (default setting) via the Senetas CM7 remote management application’s
Management-Access tab. See Figure 23 for details. Alternatively log into the CLI and run the CLI command “fips
on” and follow the prompts. After the unit reboots, log into the CLI and run the “fips” command without an argument.
The command should return the message “FIPS mode enabled”.
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7. The maximum number of encryptors allowed in a multipoint group is 512. When operating in multipoint mode (MAC
Multicast or VLAN mode) with Sender ID (SID) enabled, the user must set a unique SID between 1 and 512 for
each encryptor within the Multipoint group.
8. Configure the security policy to enable encrypted tunnels with other CN Series Encryptors. Configuration of the
security policy is network specific; refer to the User Guides [26] for specific details.
Note: The module also supports TACACS+. If TACACS+ is enabled the module is no longer considered to be in
approved mode.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Non-administrators (Operator privilege level) are able to view the modules configuration parameters and message logs.
Non-administrators are not able to configure the module. Please refer to the User Guides [26] for comprehensive
information on non-Administrator (Operator) functions.
11.4 End of Life
As outlined in NIST SP 800-88 Revision 1; for secure destruction of networking devices at the end of their service life:
• Zeroise the encryptor by running the CLI erase –f command or by pressing the emergency erase button, which is
accessible via the front panel using a paper clip.
• Shred to <2mm (.07”) squared particles or less, Disintegrate, Pulverise or Incinerate by burning the encryptor in a
licensed incinerator.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The CN4000 Series and CN6000 Series can be configured to mitigate against traffic analysis attacks on point-to-point
connections using the TRANSEC feature.
The module does not mitigate against any other specific attacks.
TRANSEC
Traffic Analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in
communication. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted and cannot be decrypted. TRANSEC
provides transmission security and is used to disguise patterns in network traffic to prevent Traffic Analysis.
A TRANSEC enabled module exhibits the following encryption characteristics:
• Generates and transmits fixed size encrypted Ethernet frames at a constant frame rate from the WAN facing
network port.
• Encrypts the entire Ethernet frame received on the local port so that no MAC addresses, other header information
or payload data is exposed.
• The rate of the transmitted Ethernet frame is constant and independent of the received plaintext traffic rate from
the local port.
• In the absence of user data from the local port the TRANSEC encryptor module fills the transmitted frames with
pseudo random or encrypted data such that it cannot be distinguished from encrypted user data.
TRANSEC encryptor modules default to decrypting traffic received on their network interface and discard all introduced
traffic that is not ‘real’ user data.
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness
By transmitting a constant stream of encrypted data, TRANSEC mode effectively prevents traffic flow analysis.
12.3 Guidance and Constraints
Please refer to the User Guides [26] for configuration instructions.
Please note that both encryptors must be operating at the same speed (bandwidth).