Cisco Catalyst 4503-E, Catalyst 4506-E, Catalyst 4507R-E, Catalyst
4507R+E, Catalyst 4510R-E, Catalyst 4510R+E with Supervisor Cards
(WS-X45-SUP7-E and WS-X45-Sup7L-E) and Line Cards (WS-X4748-
RJ45V+E, WS-X4712-SFP+E, WS-X4640-CSFP-E, WS-X4748-
NGPOE+E, and WS-X4748-RJ45-E)
FIPS 140-2 Level 2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Overall Level 2 (Sections 3 and 10 Level 3) Validation
Version 0.11
May 2013
2
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 3
Configuration.................................................................................................................. 3
References....................................................................................................................... 5
FIPS 140-2 Submission Package .................................................................................... 5
Module Description ............................................................................................................ 7
Module Validation Level................................................................................................ 9
Cryptographic Boundary................................................................................................... 10
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................... 10
Roles, Services, and Authentication ................................................................................. 11
User Role ...................................................................................................................... 11
CO Role ........................................................................................................................ 12
Services......................................................................................................................... 12
Cryptographic Key/CSP Management.............................................................................. 14
Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................ 19
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................... 19
Non-Approved Algorithms ........................................................................................... 19
Self-Tests ...................................................................................................................... 20
Physical Security............................................................................................................... 21
Module Opacity ............................................................................................................ 21
Tamper Evidence .......................................................................................................... 24
Secure Operation............................................................................................................... 28
Initial Setup................................................................................................................... 28
System Initialization and Configuration....................................................................... 28
Remote Access.............................................................................................................. 28
Identifying Switch Operation in an Approved Mode ................................................... 29
Related Documentation..................................................................................................... 30
Obtaining Documentation................................................................................................. 30
Cisco.com...................................................................................................................... 30
Product Documentation DVD....................................................................................... 30
Ordering Documentation .............................................................................................. 31
Documentation Feedback ................................................................................................. 31
Cisco Product Security Overview..................................................................................... 31
Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products........................................................... 32
Obtaining Technical Assistance........................................................................................ 32
Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website ................................................... 32
Submitting a Service Request....................................................................................... 33
Definitions of Service Request Severity....................................................................... 33
Obtaining Additional Publications and Information......................................................... 34
Definition List................................................................................................................... 35
3
Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst
4503-E, Catalyst 4506-E, Catalyst 4507R-E, Catalyst 4507R+E, Catalyst 4510R-E,
Catalyst 4510R+E with Supervisor Cards (WS-X45-SUP7-E and WS-X45-Sup7L-E) and
Line Cards (WS-X4748-RJ45V+E, WS-X4712-SFP+E, WS-X4640-CSFP-E, WS-
X4748-NGPOE+E, and WS-X4748-RJ45-E), referred to in this document as the modules
or switches. This security policy describes how modules meet the security requirements
of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may
be freely distributed.
Versions:
• Catalyst 4503-E
• Catalyst 4506-E
• Catalyst 4507R+E
• Catalyst 4507R-E
• Catalyst 4510R+E
• Catalyst 4510R-E
• Supervisor Card WS-X45-SUP7-E
• Supervisor Card WS-X45-Sup7L-E
• Line Card WS-X4748-RJ45V+E
• Line Card WS-X4712-SFP+E
• Line Card WS-X4640-CSFP-E
• Line Card WS-X4748-NGPOE+E
• Line Card WS-X4748-RJ45-E
• Catalyst 4503 FIPS kit packaging (WS-C4503-FIPS-KIT=)
• Catalyst 4506 FIPS kit packaging (WS-C4506-FIPS-KIT=)
• Catalyst 4507 FIPS kit packaging (WS-C4507-FIPS-KIT=)
• Catalyst 4510 FIPS kit packaging (WS-C4510-FIPS-KIT=)
• Filler Plate (C4K-SLOT-CVR-E)
• IOS-XE version 3.3.1SG
Configuration
The switches included as part of the FIPS validation may be configured in the following
configurations.
Chassis Supervisor Cards Line Cards
Catalyst 4503‐E
Single supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Two (2) of the following line
cards in any configuration.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single supervisor card WS‐X45‐
Sup7L‐E
Up to Two (2) of the following line
cards in any configuration.
4
Chassis Supervisor Cards Line Cards
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Catalyst 4506‐E
Single supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Single supervisor card WS‐X45‐
Sup7L‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Catalyst 4507R+E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
Sup7L‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Catalyst 4507R‐E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
Sup7L‐E
Up to Five (5) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
5
Chassis Supervisor Cards Line Cards
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Catalyst 4510R+E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Eight (8) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Catalyst 4510R‐E
Dual supervisor card WS‐X45‐
SUP7‐E
Up to Eight (8) of the following line
cards in any combination.
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
Single line card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
Single line card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
Single line card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
Table 1: Module Hardware Configurations
References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical
terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is
available on the module from the following sources:
• The Cisco Systems website (http://www.cisco.com) contains information on the
full line of products from Cisco Systems.
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
• FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 —
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government
requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2
standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
FIPS 140-2 Submission Package
The security policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In
addition to this document, the submission package includes:
• Vendor Evidence
• Finite State Machine
6
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this non-proprietary security policy, the FIPS 140-2 validation
documentation is proprietary to Cisco Systems, Inc. and is releasable only under
appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact
Cisco Systems, Inc. See “Obtaining Technical Assistance” section for more information.
7
Module Description
Branch office networking requirements are dramatically evolving, driven by web and e-
commerce applications to enhance productivity and merging the voice and data
infrastructure to reduce costs. The Catalyst 4500 series switches with the VPN Services
Port Adapter offer versatility, integration, and security to branch offices. The Catalyst
4500 series switches provide a scalable, secure, manageable remote access server that
meets FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, as a multi-chip standalone module.
The switches include cryptographic algorithms implemented in IOS-XE software, IOS-
XE Image Signing software, and hardware ASICs. The line card ASICs implement CTS
(Cisco proprietary TrustSec protocol) supporting IEEE 802.1AE for Layer 2 CTS and
contain hardware implementations of the GCM and ECB modes of the AES algorithm.
The switches support the Cisco TrustSec protocol which provides policy-based access
control, identity-aware networking, and data confidentiality and integrity; and Virtual
Switching System which is a system virtualization technology that allows the pooling of
multiple Catalyst 4500 switches into a single virtual switch.
The switches also support SSH and TLS to provide remote administrative access to the
module.
The following pictures are representative each of the switch modules:
Figure 1: Catalyst 4503-E Switch
8
Figure 2: Catalyst 4506-E Switch
Figure 3: Catalyst 4507R+E/4507R-E Switch
9
Figure 4: Catalyst 4510R+E/ 4510R-E Switch
Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self‐Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Overall module validation level 2
Table 2: Module Validation Level
10
Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined as being the physical enclosure of the chassis.
All of the functionality described in this publication is provided by components within
this cryptographic boundary. The module incorporates one or two supervisor cards and
one or more line cards in a single configuration.
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The module
also supports a power interface. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in
the following tables:
Physical Interface Logical Interface
Supervisor Card WS‐X45‐SUP7‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
Supervisor card WS‐X45‐SUP7L‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
Line Card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
10/100/1000Mbps
Line Card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
10GE (SFP+)
Line Card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
SFP/CSFP
Line Card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
10/100/1000Mbps
Line Card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
10/100/1000Mbps
Data Input Interface
Supervisor Card WS‐X45‐SUP7‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
Supervisor card WS‐X45‐SUP7L‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
Line Card WS‐X4748‐RJ45V+E
10/100/1000Mbps
Line Card WS‐X4712‐SFP+E
10/100/1000Mbps
Data Output Interface
11
Physical Interface Logical Interface
Line Card WS‐X4640‐CSFP‐E
10/100/1000Mbps
Line Card WS‐X4748‐NGPOE+E
10/100/1000Mbps
Line Card WS‐X4748‐RJ45‐E
10/100/1000Mbps
Supervisor Card WS‐X45‐SUP7‐E
Management Port
Console Port
Supervisor card WS‐X45‐SUP7L‐E
Management Port
Console Port
Control Input Interface
Supervisor Card WS‐X45‐SUP7‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
Supervisor card WS‐X45‐SUP7L‐E
Management Port
USB Ports
Secure Digital Slot
Console Port
LEDs
Status Output Interface
Power Plug Power Interface
Table 3: Physical To Logical Interfaces
Note: USB ports and Secure Digital slot on each Supervisor card are disabled by TELs in
FIPS mode
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the
module. There are two roles in the Switch that operators may assume: the Crypto Officer
(CO) role and the User role. The administrator of the Switch assumes the CO role in
order to configure and maintain the Switch using CO services, while the Users exercise
security services over the network. The module supports RADIUS for authentication.
User Role
The role assumed by users obtaining general security services. From a logical view, user
activity exists in the data-plane. Users access via network ports using the CTS (CTS uses
802.1X and EAP-FAST for authentication), IPSec, SSH, or TLS protocols.
CTS, IPSec and SSH can use password based credentials – in such a case the user
credentials must be at least eight (8) characters long (max characters for the password is
twenty-five (25)),, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in
length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1)
alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of
randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 832,000,000. In order to
successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over
12
13,000,000 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capability of the
console port. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the
odds of guessing the correct sequence.
In addition, CTS, IPSec, SSH, and TLS can also use certificate credentials using 1024 bit
RSA keys and SHA-1 – in such a case the security strength is 80 bits, so an attacker
would have a 1 in 280
chance of a successful authentication which is much stronger than
the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000
probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be
capable of approximately 1.8 x 1021
attempts per minute, which vastly exceeds the
operational capabilities of the module to support.
CO Role
The role assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the switch via CLI through the
console port and performing management functions and module configuration. From a
logical view, CO activity exists only in the control plane. IOS prompts the CO for their
username and password, if the password is validated against the CO’s password in IOS
memory, the user is allowed entry to the IOS executive program. A CO can assign
permission to access the CO role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional COs.
CO passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long (max characters for the password
is twenty-five (25)), including at least one letter and at least one number character, in
length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1)
alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of
randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 832,000,000. In order to
successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over
13,000,000 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capability of the
console port. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the
odds of guessing the correct sequence.
Services
Role Authentication
Method
Services
User CTS/IPsec/SSH/TLS
Authentication
Status Functions: view state of interfaces, view state of
connection, version of IOS currently running.
Network Functions: connect to other network devices
through outgoing telnet or PPP, and initiate diagnostic
network services (for example, ping or mtrace).
Terminal Functions: adjust the terminal session (that is,
lock the terminal and adjust flow control).
Directory Services: display directory of files kept in flash
memory.
‐ Perform Self Tests: occurs upon system startup.
Cryptographic Console login Configure the switch: define network interfaces and
13
Role Authentication
Method
Services
Officer settings, create command aliases, set the protocols the
switch will support, enable interfaces and network
services, set system date and time, and load authentication
information.
Define rules and filters: create packet filters that are
applied to user data streams on each interface. Each filter
consists of a set of rules, which define a set of packets to
permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol
ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Status functions: view the switch configuration, routing
tables, and active sessions; view health, temperature,
memory status, voltage, and packet statistics; review
accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Manage the switch: log off users, shut down or reload the
switch, manually back up switch configurations, view
complete configurations, manager user rights, and restore
switch configurations.
Set Encryption/Bypass ‐ Place module into Encryption or
Bypass state.
‐ Perform Self‐Tests ‐ Perform the FIPS 140 start‐up tests
on demand.
Unauthenticated N/A Show status (viewing LEDs), passing traffic through the
device and power‐cycling the device.
Table 4: Module Roles/Service
14
Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security
parameters such as passwords. The tamper evidence seals provide physical protection for
all keys. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on the CO role login, and
can be zeroized by the CO. All zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored
the key. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically. Persistent keys are entered by
the CO via the console port CLI, transient keys are generated or established and stored in
DRAM.
The module supports the following critical security parameters (CSPs):
ID
Algorithm/
Size/Mode
Size Description Origin Storage
Zeroization
Method
RNG Seed ANSI X9.31
Appendix
A.2.4
Using the 2‐
Key
Triple‐DES
Algorithm
64‐bits This is the seed for
X9.31 RNG.
Generated by the
module
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
RNG Seed Key ANSI X9.31
Appendix
A.2.4
Using the 2‐
Key
Triple‐DES
Algorithm
128‐bits This is the seed key
for X9.31 RNG.
Generated by the
module
DRAM
(plaintext)
power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
128‐bits Internal V value used
as part of SP
800-90 CTR_DRBG
Generated by
entropy source
via the
CTR_DRBG
derivation
function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
256‐bits Internal Key value
used as part of SP
800-90 CTR_DRBG
Generated from
entropy source
via CTR_DRBG
derivation
function
DRAM
(plaintext)
power cycle the
device
Diffie‐Hellman
private
exponent
Diffe‐
Hellman
1024‐2048
bits
The private exponent
used in Diffie‐Hellman
(DH) exchange.
Generated using
ANSI X9.31 RNG
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
after shared
secret
generated
Diffie‐Hellman
shared secret
Diffe‐
Hellman
256 bits Shared secret
generated by the
Diffie‐Hellman Key
exchange
Shared secret
derived by the
Diffie‐Hellman
Key exchange
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
expires
15
ID
Algorithm/
Size/Mode
Size Description Origin Storage
Zeroization
Method
SAP Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK)
Shared
Secret
64 byte key
used to
derive PTK
which is
used to
generate
CTS session
MAC and
Encryption
keys. Only
the first 32
bytes are
used by
CTS.
64 byte key used to
derive PTK which is
used to generate CTS
session MAC and
Encryption keys. Only
the first 32 bytes are
used by CTS.
Generated by
ACS server and
sent to
Authenticator
encrypted by
RADIUS AES KEK
WRAP KEY
DRAM
(plaintext)
Unconfigure
the PMK in CTS
manual mode
or unconfigure
cts dot1x in CTS
dot1x mode.
SAP Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
Shared
Secret
256‐bit Concatenation of KCK
and KEK.
Concatenation of
KCK and KEK.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
expires
SAP Key
Encryption
Key (KEK)
AES 128‐bit Used to encrypt SAP
payloads during SAP
protocol
implementations.
Derived by SAP DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
expires
SAP Key
Confirmation
Key (KCK)
HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bit Used to protect SAP
payloads integrity
during SAP protocol
implementations.
Derived by SAP DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
expires
802.1ae
Session Keys
AES‐GCM 128‐bit Used for bulk
encryption of data
Derived by SAP XgStub2
ASIC
(plaintext)
Automatically
when session
expires
CTS password Shared
Secret
Up to 256
bytes
This is CTS credential.
Used for CTS device to
authenticate itself.
The maximum size is
256 bytes.
CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
“#clear cts
credentials”
CTS PAC
secret
Shared
Secret
256‐bits CTS PAC is a Protected
Access Credential that
is mutually and
uniquely shared
between the peer and
ACS. It is used to
secure EAP‐FAST
tunnel.
Generated and
sent by ACS to
the CTS device
NVRAM
(plaintext)
“#clear cts
pacs”
RADIUS AES
KEK WRAP
KEY
AES key
wrap KEK
256‐bits Used to protect SAP
Pairwise Master Key
(PMK)
CO configured DRAM
(plaintext)
Resetting or
rebooting the
module
RADIUS AES
KEK WRAP
MACK
AES key
wrap MACK
160‐bits Used to protect SAP
Pairwise Master Key
(PMK)
CO configured DRAM
(plaintext)
Resetting or
rebooting the
module
16
ID
Algorithm/
Size/Mode
Size Description Origin Storage
Zeroization
Method
Skeyid HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits Used to derive
skey_d.
Value derived
from the shared
secret within IKE
exchange.
Zeroized when
IKE session is
terminated.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
skeyid_d HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits Derived as part of the
IKE process.
The IKE key
derivation key for
non ISAKMP
security
associations.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple‐
DES/AES
Triple‐DES
(168‐
bits)/AES
(128/192/2
56‐bits)
The IKE session
encrypt key.
Value derived
from the shared
secret within IKE
exchange
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits The IKE session
authentication key.
Value derived
from the shared
secret within IKE
exchange
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
ISAKMP
preshared
Shared
Secret
At least
eight
characters
The key used to
generate IKE skeyid
during preshared‐key
authentication.. This
key can have two
forms based on
whether the key is
related to the
hostname or the IP
address.
Configured by CO NVRAM
(plaintext )
“# no crypto
isakmp key”
IKE RSA
Authenticatio
n private Key
RSA 1024 ‐ 2048
bits
RSA private key for
IKE authentication.
Generated by
using FIPS
approved DRBG
NVRAM
(plaintext)
“# crypto key
zeroize rsa"
IPSec
encryption
key
Triple‐
DES/AES
Triple‐DES
(168‐
bits)/AES
(128/192/2
56 bits AES
keys)
The IPSec encryption
key. Zeroized when
IPSec session is
terminated.
Derived using the
IKE key
derivation
function
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session
terminated.
IPSec
authentication
key
HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits The IPSec
authentication key.
The zeroization is the
same as above.
Derived using the
IKE key
derivation
function
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session
terminated.
RSA private
key (SSH)
RSA 1024 ‐ 2048
bits
Private key used in
SSH protocol
Generated by
using FIPS
approved DRBG
NVRAM
(plaintext)
“#crypto key
zeroize rsa”
17
ID
Algorithm/
Size/Mode
Size Description Origin Storage
Zeroization
Method
SSH session
key
TDES / AES 128, 256
bits (AES)
168 bits
(TDES)
This is the SSH session
key. It is used to
encrypt all SSH data
traffics traversing
between the SSH
client and SSH server.
Derived as part
of SSH session
set‐up
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized when
SSH session is
terminated
SSH session
authentication
key
HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits This key is used to
perform the
authentication
between the SSH
client and SSH server.
Derived as part
of SSH session
set‐up
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized when
SSH session is
terminated
RSA private
key (TLS)
RSA 1024 ‐ 2048
bits
Identity certificates
for module itself and
also used in TLS
negotiations. This CSP
is used for both SSL
VPN and SIP Gateway
Signaling Over TLS
Transport.
Generated by
using FIPS
approved DRBG
NVRAM
(plaintext)
“#crypto key
zeroize rsa”
TLS pre‐
master secret
Shared
Secret
384‐bits Shared secret created
using asymmetric
cryptography from
which new HTTPS
session keys can be
created.
Created as part
of TLS session
establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized when
TLS session is
terminated
TLS Session
Key
Triple‐
DES/AES
Triple-DES
(168-
bits)/AES
(128/192/25
6-bits)
Derived using the TLS
protocol.
Derived as part
of TLS session
establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized when
TLS session is
terminated
TLS Session
Authenticatio
n Key
HMAC‐SHA‐
1
160‐bits Derived using the TLS
protocol.
Derived as part
of TLS session
establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized when
TLS session is
terminated
User
password
Shared
Secret
8‐25
characters
long,
including at
least one
letter and
at least one
number
character
Password of the user
role
CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
Set new
password
Enable
password
Shared
Secret
8‐25
characters
long
CO password CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
Set new
password
18
ID
Algorithm/
Size/Mode
Size Description Origin Storage
Zeroization
Method
Enable secret Shared
Secret
8‐25
characters
long,
including at
least one
letter and
at least one
number
character
Obfuscated password
of the CO role.
CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
Set new
password
RADIUS secret Shared
Secret
At least
eight (8)
characters
long,
including at
least one
letter and
at least one
number
character
The RADIUS Shared
Secret
CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
# no radius‐
server key”
TACACS+
secret
Shared
Secret
At least
eight (8)
characters
long,
including at
least one
letter and
at least one
number
character
The TACACS+ shared
secret
CO configured NVRAM
(plaintext)
# no tacacs‐
server key”
Table 5: CSP Table
The services accessing the CSPs, the type of access and which role accesses the CSPs are
listed below.
Role Service Critical Security Parameters
User Role Network Functions RNG Seed, RNG Seed, RNG Seed Key Diffie‐Hellman private
exponent, Diffie‐Hellman shared secret, 802.11x‐REV PMK,
CTS Password, CTS PAC secret, Secure RADIUS KEK, Secure
RADIUS MACK, Skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encrypt key,
IKE session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared, IKE RSA
Authentication private Key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec
authentication key (R), User password (W)
Crypto‐Officer Role Configure the Switch 802.11x‐REV PMK, Secure RADIUS KEK, Secure RADIUS
MACK, CTS Password, Enable Password, Skeyid, skeyid_d,
IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, IKE RSA Authentication private Key,
IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key (R/W/D)
Table 6: Role CSP Access
19
Cryptographic Algorithms
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The Cisco Switches support many different cryptographic algorithms. However, only
FIPS approved algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation. The
following table identifies the approved algorithms included in the Switches for use in the
FIPS mode of operation.
Algorithm Implementation CAVP Certificate
AES IOS‐XE Firmware #1977
Hardware #2057
Triple‐DES IOS‐XE Firmware #1282
SHS IOS‐XE Firmware #1730
IOS‐XE Image Signing Implementations #1731
HMAC IOS‐XE Firmware #1190
RSA IOS‐XE Firmware #1023
IOS‐XE Image Signing Implementations #1024
ANSI X9.31 RNG IOS‐XE Firmware #1072
SP 800‐90A CTR_DRBG IOS‐XE Firmware #179
Table 7: FIPS-Approved Algorithms for use in FIPS Mode
Non-Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are
not permitted for use in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:
• NDRNG
• MD4
• MD5
In addition, the modules support the following key establishment/derivation schemes:
• Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 112
bits of encryption strength)
• RSA key transport (key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 112
bits of encryption strength)
• AES (Cert. #1977, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 256
bits of encryption strength)
20
Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically
during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all
components are functioning correctly. The modules implement the following power-on
self-tests:
• IOS-XE Firmware Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o Firmware Integrity Test
o AES KAT
o AES-CMAC KAT
o CTR_DRBG KAT
o HMAC SHA-1 KAT
o X9.31 RNG KAT
o FIPS 186-2 RSA KAT
o SHA-1 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
o Triple-DES KAT
• IOS-XE Image Signing Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o FIPS 186-3 RSA KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
• Cat4k ASIC Algorithm Implementation (Hardware)Known Answer Tests:
o AES-GCM KAT
The modules perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-
tests must be passed before any operator can perform cryptographic services. The power-
on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior any
other operations; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-
test failure.
In addition, the modules also provide the following conditional self-tests:
• IOS-XE Firmware Implementation Conditional Self-Tests
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for ANSI X9.31 RNG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A CTR_DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for the non-approved RNGs
o Bypass Test (IPSec Bypass Test)
o Bypass Test (TrustSec Bypass Test)
o FIPS 186-2 RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
o Firmware Load Test
• IOS-XE Image Signing Implementation Conditional Self-Tests
o FIPS 186-3 RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
21
Physical Security
This module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use
of opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity
and tamper evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence. The following sections
illustrate the physical security provided by the module.
Module Opacity
To install an opacity shield on the Catalyst 4500 series switches, follow these steps:
1. The opacity shield is designed to be installed on a Catalyst 4500 series switch
chassis that is already rack-mounted. If your Catalyst 4500 series switch chassis is
not rack-mounted, install the chassis in the rack using the procedures contained in
the Catalyst 4500 Series Switches Installation Guide. If your Catalyst 4500 series
switch chassis is already rack-mounted, proceed to step 2.
2. Open the FIPS kit packagings. The kits contain the following items:
• WS-C4503-FIPS-KIT=: A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation
hardware for the Catalyst 4503-E switch chassis.
• WS-C4506-FIPS-KIT=: A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation
hardware for the Catalyst 4506-E switch chassis.
• WS-C4507-FIPS-KIT=: A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation
hardware for the Catalyst 4507R+E/4507R-E switch chassis.
• WS-C4510-FIPS-KIT=: A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation
hardware for the Catalyst 4510R+E/4510R-E switch chassis.
• All Kits: An envelope with 60 FIPS tamper evidence labels.
• All Kits: An envelope containing a disposable ESD wrist strap.
3. Select the appropriate opacity shield kit for your system. Set the other opacity
shield kit aside.
4. Open the protective packaging and remove the opacity shield and the two bags of
installation hardware. The bag with the part number 69-1497 contains the
installation hardware for -E chassis. Select the bag of installation hardware
appropriate for your installation. Set the second bag of fasteners aside; you will
not need them for this installation.
22
5. Open the bag of installation hardware (Bag with part number 69-1497) and
remove the following: Two M4 thumbscrews, four M4 snap rivet fastener
sleeves, and four M4 snap rivet pins.
6. Ensure that any open slots are covered using the provided slot cover (C4K-SLOT-
CVR-E).
Note: Extra snap fasteners are included in the bags of installation hardware in case of loss
or damage.
Note: Installation hardware from one bag is not interchangeable with the installation
hardware from the second bag.
The following figures illustrate the installation of the opacity shields for each platform.
Figure 5: Catalyst 4503-E Opacity Shield Installation
23
Figure 6: Catalyst 4506-E Opacity Shield Installation
Figure 7: Catalyst 4507R+E/ 4507R-E Opacity Shield Installation
24
Figure 8: Catalyst 4510R+E/ 4510R-E Opacity Shield Installation
Tamper Evidence
The module is validated when tamper evident labels and security devices are installed on
the initially built configuration as indicated. Any changes, modifications or repairs
performed after the initially built configuration that requires the removal of any TEL will
invalidate the module.
The total number of tamper evident labels required for the configuration is dependent on
the cards installed in the chasis.
Once the module has been configured to meet overall FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements,
the module cannot be accessed without signs of tampering. The CO shall inspect for signs
of tampering periodically. Any extra TELs must remain in the CO control and must be
securely stored in a monitored location.
If the CO must remove or change TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason, the CO
must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must
remove the debris using a damp cloth.
To seal the system, CO should apply TELs as depicted in the figures below. The
following table identifies the number of TELs required for each chassis.
25
Number of Slots Model TELs
Three (3) 4503‐E Eight (8)
Six (6) 4506‐E Eleven (11)
Seven (7)
4507R‐E
4507R+E
Fifteen (15)
Ten (10)
4510R‐E
4510R+E
Eighteen (18)
Table 8: Tamper Evident Labels
Please notice that the numbers of TELs listed in table 8 are applied to all possible
hardware configurations specified in Table 1in this document.
The following figures illustrate the installation of the TELs for each platform.
Figure 9: Catalyst 4503-E TEL Installation
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
Figure 10: Catalyst 4506-E TEL Installation
27
Figure 11: Catalyst 4507R+E/ 4507R-E TEL Installation
1
2
3
4 5 6
7 8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Figure 12: Catalyst 4510R+E/ 4510R-E TEL Installation
28
Secure Operation
The Switches meet all the overall Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setup
instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this
Switch without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS
approved mode of operation.
Initial Setup
1. The CO must apply opacity shield and tamper evidence labels as described above.
System Initialization and Configuration
1. The CO must create the “enable” password for the CO role. Procedurally, the
password must be at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one
number, and is entered when the CO first engages the “enable” command. The CO
enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
enable secret [PASSWORD]
2. The CO must always assign passwords (8-25 characters, including at least one letter
and at least one number) to users. Identification and authentication on the
console/auxiliary port is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command
line, the CO enters the following syntax:
line con 0
password [PASSWORD]
login local
3. The CO enables FIPS mode using the following command:
Switch(config)# fips
4. The CO may configure the module to use RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication.
If the module is configured to use RADIUS, the Crypto-Officer must define RADIUS
or shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long, including at least one letter
and at least one number.
5. The CO shall only assign users to a privilege level 1 (the default).
6. The CO shall not assign a command to any privilege level other than its default.
Remote Access
1. SSH access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation, using SSH
v2 and a FIPS approved algorithm.
2. HTTPS/TLS access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation,
using SSLv3.1/TLSv1.0 and the associated FIPS approved algorithms.
29
Identifying Switch Operation in an Approved Mode
The following activities are required to verify that that the module is operating in an
Approved mode of operation.
1. Verify that the tamper evidence labels and FIPS opacity shields have been properly
placed on the module based on the instructions specified in the “Physical Security”
and “Secure Operation” sections of this document.
2. Verify that the length of User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets are
at least eight (8) characters long, include at least one letter, and include at least one
number character, as specified in the “Secure Operation” section of this document.
3. Verified that the output of "The FIPS mode is on" was shown on the Command Line
Interface after login Crypto Officer role.
30
Related Documentation
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the security appliances in
the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic device security policy. More
information is available on the security appliances from the sources listed in this section
and from the following source:
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the security appliances.
Obtaining Documentation
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available on Cisco.com. Cisco also
provides several ways to obtain technical assistance and other technical resources. These
sections explain how to obtain technical information from Cisco Systems.
Cisco.com
You can access the most current Cisco documentation at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
You can access the Cisco website at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com
You can access international Cisco websites at this URL:
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Product Documentation DVD
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available in the Product Documentation
DVD package, which may have shipped with your product. The Product Documentation
DVD is updated regularly and may be more current than printed documentation.
The Product Documentation DVD is a comprehensive library of technical product
documentation on portable media. The DVD enables you to access multiple versions of
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products and to view technical documentation in HTML. With the DVD, you have access
to the same documentation that is found on the Cisco website without being connected to
the Internet. Certain products also have .pdf versions of the documentation available.
The Product Documentation DVD is available as a single unit or as a subscription.
Registered Cisco.com users (Cisco direct customers) can order a Product Documentation
DVD (product number DOC-DOCDVD=) from Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
31
Ordering Documentation
Beginning June 30, 2005, registered Cisco.com users may order Cisco documentation at
the Product Documentation Store in the Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
Nonregistered Cisco.com users can order technical documentation from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. (0800 to 1700) PDT by calling 1 866 463-3487 in the United States and Canada, or
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States and Canada, or elsewhere at 011 408 519-5001.
Documentation Feedback
You can rate and provide feedback about Cisco technical documents by completing the
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You can send comments about Cisco documentation to bug-doc@cisco.com.
You can submit comments by using the response card (if present) behind the front cover
of your document or by writing to the following address:
Cisco Systems
Attn: Customer Document Ordering
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-9883
We appreciate your comments.
Cisco Product Security Overview
Cisco provides a free online Security Vulnerability Policy portal at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
From this site, you can perform these tasks:
• Report security vulnerabilities in Cisco products.
• Obtain assistance with security incidents that involve Cisco products.
• Register to receive security information from Cisco.
A current list of security advisories and notices for Cisco products is available at this
URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
If you prefer to see advisories and notices as they are updated in real time, you can access
a Product Security Incident Response Team Really Simple Syndication (PSIRT RSS)
feed from this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_psirt_rss_feed.html
32
Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products
Cisco is committed to delivering secure products. We test our products internally before
we release them, and we strive to correct all vulnerabilities quickly. If you think that you
might have identified a vulnerability in a Cisco product, contact PSIRT:
• Emergencies — security-alert@cisco.com
An emergency is either a condition in which a system is under active attack or a condition
for which a severe and urgent security vulnerability should be reported. All other
conditions are considered nonemergencies.
• Nonemergencies — psirt@cisco.com
In an emergency, you can also reach PSIRT by telephone:
• 1 877 228-7302
• 1 408 525-6532
Tip
We encourage you to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or a compatible product to encrypt
any sensitive information that you send to Cisco. PSIRT can work from encrypted
information that is compatible with PGP versions 2.x through 8.x. Never use a revoked or
an expired encryption key. The correct public key to use in your correspondence with
PSIRT is the one linked in the Contact Summary section of the Security Vulnerability
Policy page at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
The link on this page has the current PGP key ID in use.
Obtaining Technical Assistance
Cisco Technical Support provides 24-hour-a-day award-winning technical assistance.
The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website on Cisco.com features extensive
online support resources. In addition, if you have a valid Cisco service contract, Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC) engineers provide telephone support. If you do not
have a valid Cisco service contract, contact your reseller.
Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website
The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website provides online documents and
tools for troubleshooting and resolving technical issues with Cisco products and
technologies. The website is available 24 hours a day, at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Access to all tools on the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website requires a
Cisco.com user ID and password. If you have a valid service contract but do not have a
user ID or password, you can register at this URL:
http://tools.cisco.com/RPF/register/register.do
Note
33
Use the Cisco Product Identification (CPI) tool to locate your product serial number
before submitting a web or phone request for service. You can access the CPI tool from
the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website by clicking the Tools &
Resources link under Documentation & Tools. Choose Cisco Product Identification
Tool from the Alphabetical Index drop-down list, or click the Cisco Product
Identification Tool link under Alerts & RMAs. The CPI tool offers three search options:
by product ID or model name; by tree view; or for certain products, by copying and
pasting show command output. Search results show an illustration of your product with
the serial number label location highlighted. Locate the serial number label on your
product and record the information before placing a service call.
Submitting a Service Request
Using the online TAC Service Request Tool is the fastest way to open S3 and S4 service
requests. (S3 and S4 service requests are those in which your network is minimally
impaired or for which you require product information.) After you describe your
situation, the TAC Service Request Tool provides recommended solutions. If your issue
is not resolved using the recommended resources, your service request is assigned to a
Cisco engineer. The TAC Service Request Tool is located at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/servicerequest
For S1 or S2 service requests or if you do not have Internet access, contact the Cisco
TAC by telephone. (S1 or S2 service requests are those in which your production
network is down or severely degraded.) Cisco engineers are assigned immediately to S1
and S2 service requests to help keep your business operations running smoothly.
To open a service request by telephone, use one of the following numbers:
Asia-Pacific: +61 2 8446 7411 (Australia: 1 800 805 227)EMEA: +32 2 704 55 55USA:
1 800 553-2447
For a complete list of Cisco TAC contacts, go to this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/contacts
Definitions of Service Request Severity
To ensure that all service requests are reported in a standard format, Cisco has established
severity definitions.
Severity 1 (S1) – Your network is “down,” or there is a critical impact to your
business operations. You and Cisco will commit all necessary resources around
the clock to resolve the situation.
Severity 2 (S2) – Operation of an existing network is severely degraded, or
significant aspects of your business operation are negatively affected by
inadequate performance of Cisco products. You and Cisco will commit full-time
resources during normal business hours to resolve the situation.
Severity 3 (S3) – Operational performance of your network is impaired, but most
business operations remain functional. You and Cisco will commit resources
during normal business hours to restore service to satisfactory levels.
34
Severity 4 (S4) – You require information or assistance with Cisco product
capabilities, installation, or configuration. There is little or no effect on your
business operations.
Obtaining Additional Publications and Information
Information about Cisco products, technologies, and network solutions is available from
various online and printed sources.
• Cisco Marketplace provides a variety of Cisco books, reference guides,
documentation, and logo merchandise. Visit Cisco Marketplace, the company
store, at this URL:
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• Cisco Press publishes a wide range of general networking, training and
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publications. For current Cisco Press titles and other information, go to Cisco
Press at this URL:
http://www.ciscopress.com
• Packet magazine is the Cisco Systems technical user magazine for maximizing
Internet and networking investments. Each quarter, Packet delivers coverage of
the latest industry trends, technology breakthroughs, and Cisco products and
solutions, as well as network deployment and troubleshooting tips, configuration
examples, customer case studies, certification and training information, and links
to scores of in-depth online resources. You can access Packet magazine at this
URL:
http://www.cisco.com/packet
• iQ Magazine is the quarterly publication from Cisco Systems designed to help
growing companies learn how they can use technology to increase revenue,
streamline their business, and expand services. The publication identifies the
challenges facing these companies and the technologies to help solve them, using
real-world case studies and business strategies to help readers make sound
technology investment decisions. You can access iQ Magazine at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/iqmagazine
• or view the digital edition at this URL:
http://ciscoiq.texterity.com/ciscoiq/sample/
• Internet Protocol Journal is a quarterly journal published by Cisco Systems for
engineering professionals involved in designing, developing, and operating public
and private internets and intranets. You can access the Internet Protocol Journal at
this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/ipj
• Networking products offered by Cisco Systems, as well as customer support
services, can be obtained at this URL:
35
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/index.html
• Networking Professionals Connection is an interactive website for networking
professionals to share questions, suggestions, and information about networking
products and technologies with Cisco experts and other networking professionals.
Join a discussion at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/discuss/networking
• World-class networking training is available from Cisco. You can view current
offerings at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/learning/index.html
Definition List
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
ACS – Access Control Server
CMVP – Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSEC – Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
CSFP – Compact Small Form-Factor Pluggable Transceiver
CTS – Cisco proprietary TrustSec protocol
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC – Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
KAT – Known Answer Test
LED – Light Emitting Diode
MAC – Message Authentication Code
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVRAM – Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
RAM – Random Access Memory
RNG – Random Number Generator
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
SFP - Small Form-Factor Pluggable Transceiver
SFP+ - Enhanced Small Form-Factor Pluggable
Triple-DES – Triple Data Encryption Standard