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F5, Inc.
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.0
2025-09-23
Prepared by:
www.lightshipsec.com
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General........................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels........................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification..............................................................................................6
2.1 Description ............................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.................................................8
2.3 Excluded Components ............................................................................................................8
2.4 Modes of Operation................................................................................................................8
2.5 Algorithms .............................................................................................................................9
2.6 Security Function Implementations........................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ..............................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..................................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation ....................................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment ..............................................................................................................14
2.11 Industry Protocols...............................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ................................................................................................15
3.1 Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................................................15
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.............................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods .......................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles ...................................................................................................................................16
4.3 Approved Services ................................................................................................................17
4.4 Non-Approved Services.........................................................................................................38
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ......................................................................................38
5 Software/Firmware Security .......................................................................................................39
5.1 Integrity Techniques .............................................................................................................39
5.2 Initiate on Demand...............................................................................................................39
6 Operational Environment ...........................................................................................................40
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..................................................................40
7 Physical Security ........................................................................................................................41
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required.........................................................................................41
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals – CX410 Chassis..............................................................................41
7.3 User Placed Tamper Seals – CX1610 Chassis............................................................................42
7.4 Filler Panels..........................................................................................................................46
8 Non-Invasive Security.................................................................................................................47
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ................................................................................48
9.1 Storage Areas.......................................................................................................................48
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods....................................................................................................48
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.......................................................................................................48
9.4 SSPs ....................................................................................................................................49
9.5 Transitions...........................................................................................................................55
10 Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................56
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests...................................................................................................56
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests..........................................................................................................56
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information..............................................................................................58
10.4 Error States........................................................................................................................59
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ...........................................................................................59
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .................................................................................................................60
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures.................................................................60
11.2 Administrator Guidance ......................................................................................................60
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ...............................................................................................60
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.......................................................................................................61
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).....8
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid....................................8
Table 4: Modes List and Description.............................................................................................8
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - ..................................................................................................10
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Entropy Source Conditioning Component ................................11
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms..........................................................................................11
Table 8: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................13
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.......................................................................................................14
Table 10: Entropy Sources .........................................................................................................14
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................15
Table 12: Authentication Methods ..............................................................................................16
Table 13: Roles...........................................................................................................................16
Table 14: Approved Services......................................................................................................38
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................41
Table 16: Storage Areas.............................................................................................................48
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................48
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................48
Table 19: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................52
Table 20: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................55
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................56
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................57
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Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..........................................................................58
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information .................................................................................59
Table 25: Error States.................................................................................................................59
List of Figures
Figure 1: The F5OS-C Cryptographic Module block diagram.................................................................6
Figure 2: The F5 CX1610 Chassis, fully populated with 16 BX520 traffic blades......................................7
Figure 3: The F5 CX410 Chassis, fully populated with 8 BX110 traffic blades..........................................7
Figure 4: The front side of the module shows the placement of seals # 1, 2, and 3. .............................41
Figure 5: The left side of the module shows the placement of seals # 4 and 5. ....................................42
Figure 6: The rear side of the module shows the placement of seal #4, securing the fan unit to the
chassis..........................................................................................................................................42
Figure 7: The right side of the module shows the placement of seal #6...............................................42
Figure 8: The front side of the module shows the placement of seals #1 and 2, securing the System
Controller units to the module........................................................................................................43
Figure 9: The left side of the module shows the placement of seal #3. ...............................................44
Figure 10: The right side of the module shows the placement of seals #4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.......................44
Figure 11: A rear-right angle shot of the module shows the placement of seals #5, 6, 7, and 8. ............45
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the F5OS Cryptographic Module Version C-1.8.1 VELOS Chassis,
version 1.8.1 describes how the module meets the security requirements specified in FIPS 140-3 for an overall
security level 2 module and outlines the security rules and operating procedures required to maintain compliance.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment 2
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The F5OS Cryptographic Module Version C-1.8.1 VELOS Chassis (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a firmware
module operating in a chassis platform which provides platform layer services components for the VELOS system
controllers and chassis partitions.
Module Type: Firmware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary for the module is defined as the F5OS-C image,
which contains the operating system, all calling applications, and implements all approved services.
Figure 1: The F5OS-C Cryptographic Module block diagram
The Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) for the module is defined as the module outer
metal chassis of the F5 CX1610 and CX410 models and all components within the chassis, excluding the traffic blades.
The CX1610 and CX410 Chassis models are pictured below.
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Figure 2: The F5 CX1610 Chassis, fully populated with 16 BX520 traffic blades
Figure 3: The F5 CX410 Chassis, fully populated with 8 BX110 traffic blades
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
F5OS-C 1.8.1 N/A HMAC-SHA2-384
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
F5OS-C
1.8.1
CX1610 (chassis)
with SX1610 (system
controller)
Intel Denverton-
NS C3958
Yes N/A 1.8.1
F5OS-C
1.8.1
CX410 (chassis) with
SX410 (system
controller)
Intel Denverton-
NS C3758
Yes N/A 1.8.1
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not exclude any components within the cryptographic boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
The approved mode of
operation
Approved Global ("FIPS Module: F5OS-C
Cryptographic Module")
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The module only supports approved mode of operation. The operator can confirm that the module is operating in
the approved mode by invoking the following commands:
“Show system security fips-module” (which will output the following:)
“System security fips-module state name “FIPS Module: F5OS-C Cryptographic Module”
“show system licensing” (which will output the following:)
“FIPS 140 Compliant Mode, <CX1610 / CX410>”
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2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4783 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A4783 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128
Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum
value - Yes
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4783 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128, 256,
104, 408
AAD Length - AAD Length: 128, 384, 160,
720, 0
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A4783 Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256
Nonce - Nonce: 128
Personalization String Length -
Personalization String Length: 0-256
Increment 256
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Curve - P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - testing
candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Component - No
Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA-1 A4783 MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128,
1024
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A4783 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128,
1024
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A4783 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128,
1024
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4782 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SSH (CVL) A4782 Cipher - AES-128, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
p mod 8 - 0
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
q mod 8 - 0
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Info Generated By Server - No
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4782 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A4783 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4783 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4783 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A4782 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
Key Block Length - Key Block Length: 1024
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms -
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Entropy Source Conditioning Component
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA3-256 A4093 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Entropy Source Conditioning Component
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP800-133rev2 - Section 4,
example 1
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms, allowed in the approved mode of operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms, with no security claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any non-approved, not allowed algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
RSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Generation of
RSA public and
private key
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
Counter DRBG:
(A4783)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
RSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen Generation of
an RSA
signature
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
RSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer Verification of
an RSA
signature
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Generation of
ECDSA public
and private key
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
Counter DRBG:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A4783)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
ECDSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen Generation of
an ECDSA
signature
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer Verification of
an ECDSA
signature
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A4782)
KAS-TLS KAS-Full Computation of
a shared secret
using EC Diffie-
Hellman and
derivation of
TLS session
keys
IG:D.F Scenario
2, path (2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 (CVL)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 192 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4782)
Scheme:
ephemeralUnified
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A4782)
KAS-SSH KAS-Full Computation of
a shared secret
using EC Diffie-
Hellman and
derivation of
SSH session
keys
IG:D.F Scenario
2, path (2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 (CVL)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 192 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4782)
Scheme:
ephemeralUnified
KDF SSH:
(A4782)
AES-CBC BC-UnAuth AES encryption
and decryption
AES-CBC:
(A4783)
Key Length: 128,
192
AES-CTR BC-UnAuth AES encryption
and decryption
AES-CTR:
(A4783)
Key Length: 128,
192
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-GCM BC-Auth Authenticated
AES encryption
and decryption,
deterministic IV
construction per
NIST 800-38D
8.2.1
AES-GCM:
(A4783)
Key Length: 128,
192
HMAC MAC Message
authentication
code generation
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4783)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4783)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A4783)
SHA-1: (A4783)
SHA2-256:
(A4783)
SHA2-384:
(A4783)
DRBG Seed ENT-Cond
ENT-ESV
Generate DRBG
Seed
SHA3-256:
(A4093)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-GCM – IG C.H, Scenario 1:
TLS v1.2:
The Module is compliant with TLS v1.2 and SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The Module supports TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher
Suites for TLS, as described in RFC5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with
FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, Scenario 1a.
No more than 264
–1 AES-GCM encryptions may be performed in the same session and if the invocation counter
reaches its maximum value 264
–1, the next AES-GCM encryption is performed with the invocation counter set to 0.
When a session is terminated for any reason, the keys and IVs are zeroised and cannot be used again.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, new keys and IVs for use with the AES-GCM are established.
SSHv2:
This module is compliant with RFCs 4252, 4253 and the rules for using AES-GCM documented in RFC 5647. The IV is
only used in the context of the AES-GCM mode encryptions within the SSHv2 protocol.
The fixed field is 4-bytes in length and is derived form the SSH-KDF, ensuring a unique fixed field for each SSH session.
The invocation field is 8-bytes in length and is incremented each time the AES-GCM function is invoked. No more
than 264
–1 AES-GCM encryptions may be performed in the same session and if the invocation counter reaches its
maximum value 264
–1, the next AES-GCM encryption is performed with the invocation counter set to 0.
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When a session is terminated for any reason, the keys and IVs are zeroised and cannot be used again.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, new keys and IVs for use with the AES-GCM are established
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E85 F5, inc.
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
CPU
Jitter
RNG
Non-
Physical
F5OS-C 1.8.1 on CX1610
(Controller) on Intel Denverton-
NS C3958, Intel Denverton-NS
C3758 on F5OS-C 1.8.1
256 Full
entropy
A4093
Table 10: Entropy Sources
The module uses “CPU Jitter RNG, version 3.4.1” to seed the DRBG during the modules’ boot process and to
periodically reseed the DRBG. The entropy loaded into the approved SP800-90Arev1-compliant CTR_DRBG is 256
bits per call. The entropy source implements a vetted SHA3-256 post-conditioning component, which is applied to
all output from the noise source.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with FIPS 186-5 to generate RSA and ECDSA
keys. Seeds for these services are generated from the unmodified output of the module's approved DRBG.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements the following approved key agreement methods per 140-3 IG D.F:
Elliptic Curves
The module establishes EC DH shared secrets compliant to SP 800-56Arev3, using elliptic-curves specified in
Appendix D of SP 800-186.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module implements compliant key derivation functions (KDFs) as part of its implementations of the following
protocols:
- TLS 1.2
- SSH
No parts of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP or CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
MGMT Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
TLS/SSH protocol input/output messages, Configuration
commands for interface management, API which controls
system state (e.g. reset system, power off system), API
which provides system status information
Power Interface
(AC or DC)
Power Power
Status LEDs Status
Output
System health information, Non-security relevant
LED
Touchscreen
Status
Output
Networking information, Non-security relevant
Backplane
Connection
Data Input
Data Output
Module configuration, Module SSPs
USB None None in the approved mode of operation
CONSOLE None None in the approved mode of operation
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The module contains the logical interfaces described in the table above.
The module does not implement a control output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Password Username and
password pair
Operator Authentication
(Password)
1 in
676,000,000
3 in
676,000,000
ECDSA
Key
ECDSA Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer 1 in 2^128 3 in
676,000,000
Table 12: Authentication Methods
The module implements the following identity-based authentication mechanisms:
Password: The minimum password length is 8 characters, enforced by the module. A password must contain at
least 1 lower case letter, 1 upper case letter, and 2 numbers. Therefore, the weakest possible password consists of
1 upper case letter, 1 lower case letter, and 6 numbers.
Given the above, the probability of guessing the correct password in the worst-case scenario would be
(1/10)^6*(1/26)*(1/26), or 1 in 676,000,000. If authentication by password fails 3 times, the account is locked out
and must be unlocked by an Administrator (CO).
ECDSA key-pair: The smallest curve used by the module for key-based authentication in P-256, giving a security
strength of 128 bits. Therefore, the chance of success for an authentication attempt using a randomly generated
key is 1 in 2^128, which is smaller than 1 in 1,000,000. If key-based authentication fails, the user is prompted for a
password. If authentication by password fails 3 times, the account is locked out and must be unlocked by an
Administrator (CO).
User can authenticate to the module using the following interfaces:
CLI: The module offers a CLI connection to users over the SSHv2 protocol, using an ethernet connection.
GUI: The module offers a Web-based user interface to users over the HTTPS (TLS 1.2) protocol, using an ethernet
connection.
The module does not maintain authenticated sessions upon power cycling. Power cycling the platform will require
users to establish a new connection and reauthenticate to the module using one of the above methods.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Administrator Identity CO Password
ECDSA Key
Resource Admin Identity User Password
Operator Identity User Password
User Identity User Password
Table 13: Roles
The module provides the following roles:
- Administrator: The main administrator role for the cryptographic module and the defined crypto officer
role. Has access to all administrative functions and services of the module.
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- Resource Admin: An administrative user role that has access to a subset of Administrator services, such as
viewing audit logs.
- Operator: A user role that has access to a subset of module services, such as read-only informational
services, modifying the user’s own password, and establishing connections to the module.
- User: A limited user role that has access to read-only informational services only.
The module supports a configurable concurrent user limit, which applies to all roles except for the Administrator
(CO) role. The default number of concurrent user connections handled by the module is 10, but the limit can be
modified by the Administrator (CO). Connections from the Administrator role (CO) contributes to the number of
concurrent connections, but the Administrator role is not bound by the concurrent user limit. (i.e. The default limit
is 10 total users + n Administrators)
4.3 Approved Services
The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
List Users Display list of all
user accounts
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command List of user
accounts
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Operator
User
Create
Additional
User
Create
additional user
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Username,
password,
role
Confirmati
on of
account
creation
None Administra
tor
-
Password:
W
Modify
Existing
Users
Modify Existing
Users
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Username,
modificatio
n (new
username,
role,
password
expiry
data/tally
count)
Confirmati
on of
account
creation
None Administra
tor
-
Password:
W
Delete User Delete existing
user
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
Username Confirmati
on of
deletion
None Administra
tor
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 18 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
on of
service
Unlock
User
Remove lock
from user who
has exceeded
login attempts
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Username Confirmati
on of
unlock
None Administra
tor
Update
Own
Password
Update own
password
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Username,
password
Confirmati
on of
password
update
None Administra
tor
-
Password:
W
Resource
Admin
-
Password:
W
Operator
-
Password:
W
User
-
Password:
W
Update
Others
Password
Update others
password
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Username,
password
Confirmati
on of
password
update
None Administra
tor
-
Password:
W
Configure
Password
Policy
Set password
policy features
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
New
password
policy
Confirmati
on of
configurati
on change
None Administra
tor
Create TLS
Certificate
Self-signed
certificate
creation
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Certificate
identificatio
n
information
Confirmati
on of
certificate
creation
None Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
E
- TLS RSA
private
key: E
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 19 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
E
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: E
Create TLS
Key
Used for the
SSL certificate
key file
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Key
identificatio
n
information
Confirmati
on of key
creation
RSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen
DRBG
Seed
Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
G
- TLS RSA
private
key: G
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
G
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: G
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
Delete TLS
Certificate/
Key
Self-signed
certificate/key
deletion
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Certificate/
Key
identificatio
n
information
Confirmati
on of
certificate/
key
deletion
None Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
W
- TLS RSA
private
key: W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
W
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: W
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 20 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
List
Certificate
List device TLS
certificate
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command List
certificates
None Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
R
Resource
Admin
- TLS RSA
public key:
R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
R
Operator
- TLS RSA
public key:
R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
R
User
- TLS RSA
public key:
R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
R
List Private
Keys
List device TLS
private key
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command List private
keys
None Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
private
key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: R
Resource
Admin
- TLS RSA
private
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
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Page 21 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: R
Operator
- TLS RSA
private
key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: R
User
- TLS RSA
private
key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: R
View List of
System
Audit Logs
Display list of
logs/files of
configuration
changes
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command List of log
file names
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Operator
User
View
Contents of
System
Audit Logs
Display list of
logs/files of
configuration
changes
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Content of
log file
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Configure
SSH
Access
Enable/Disable
SSH access
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
SSH
access
options
Confirmati
on of
configurati
on of SSH
access
options
None Administra
tor
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
W
Configure
SSH IP
Address
List
Configure IP
address allow
list
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
IP address
list
Confirmati
on of
configurati
on of SSH
IP address
list
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 22 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Configure
SSH User
Configurati
on
Update
ssh/authorized_
keys file for user
authentication
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
SSH
ECDSA
public key
Confirmati
on of
configurati
on of SSH
user
configurati
on
None Administra
tor
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
W
Create a
Tenant
Create tenant
deployment
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Tenant-
console
credentials
Confirmati
on of
creation of
tenant and
tenant-
console
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Reboot
System
Restart system,
Zeroize SSPs
stored in RAM
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Confirmati
on of
system
reboot
None Administra
tor
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 23 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
-
Password:
Z
- Entropy
input
string: Z
- DRBG
seed: Z
- DRBG
internal
state V: Z
- DRBG
internal
state key:
Z
- AES-
GCM IV: Z
Resource
Admin
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 24 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
-
Password:
Z
- Entropy
input
string: Z
- DRBG
seed: Z
- DRBG
internal
state V: Z
- DRBG
internal
state key:
Z
- AES-
GCM IV: Z
Secure
Erase
Full system
zeroization
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Confirmati
on of
zeroization
None Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
Z
- TLS RSA
private
key: Z
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: Z
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 25 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
- SSH
ECDSA
private
key: Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
-
Password:
Z
- Entropy
input
string: Z
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 26 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- DRBG
seed: Z
- DRBG
internal
state V: Z
- DRBG
internal
state key:
Z
SSH
Session
Service
Establish and
maintain SSH
session
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
User,
address,
password,
algorithm,
key sizes,
primary
secret
Confirmati
on of SSH
session
establishm
ent
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
SigGen
ECDSA
SigVer
KAS-
SSH
AES-
CBC
AES-
CTR
AES-
GCM
HMAC
DRBG
Seed
Administra
tor
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- SSH
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- SSH
shared
secret:
G,E
- SSH
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 27 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
-
Password:
R,W
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Resource
Admin
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- SSH
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- SSH
shared
secret:
G,E
- SSH
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
-
Password:
R,W
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 28 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Operator
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- SSH
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G,W
- SSH
shared
secret:
G,W
- SSH
derived
session
key: G
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
-
Password:
R,W
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
User
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 29 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- SSH
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- SSH
shared
secret:
G,E
- SSH
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
-
Password:
R,W
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Closing
SSH
Session
Close SSH
session
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Confirmati
on of SSH
session
closure
None Administra
tor
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
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Page 30 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
Resource
Admin
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
Operator
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 31 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
User
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- SSH
shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session
key: Z
TLS
Session
Service
Establish and
maintain TLS
session
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Address,
algorithms,
keys
Confirmati
on of
establishm
ent of TLS
session
RSA
KeyGen
RSA
SigGen
RSA
SigVer
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
SigGen
ECDSA
SigVer
KAS-
TLS
AES-
CBC
AES-
GCM
HMAC
DRBG
Seed
Administra
tor
- TLS RSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS RSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 32 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
key: G
- TLS pre-
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Resource
Admin
- TLS RSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS RSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 33 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- TLS pre-
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Operator
- TLS RSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS RSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 34 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- TLS pre-
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
User
- TLS RSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS RSA
private
key: G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
G,W
- TLS
ECDSA
private
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 35 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
key: G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,W
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: G
- TLS pre-
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
primary
secret:
G,E
- TLS
derived
session
key: G,E
- DRBG
seed: E
- DRBG
internal
state V:
W,E
- DRBG
internal
state key:
W,E
- AES-
GCM IV:
G,E
Closing
TLS
Session
Close TLS
session
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Confirmati
on of TLS
session
closure
None Administra
tor
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 36 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
Resource
Admin
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
Operator
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 37 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
User
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session
key: Z
Show
Version
Return the
module name
and version
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Version
information
and
module
name
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Operator
User
Show
License
Return license
information
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command FIPS
license
information
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Operator
User
Show
Status
Return the
module status
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Status of
the module
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Operator
User
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 38 of 61
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Self-Test Execute integrity
test and CASTs
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Results of
the self-
tests
HMAC Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Show
Tenant
Lists tenant
information
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command List tenant
information
None Administra
tor
Resource
Admin
Firmware
Update
Loads a new
version of the
module firmware
Implicit,
i.e.
completi
on of
service
Command Success or
Fail
message,
Automatic
reboot
RSA
SigVer
Administra
tor
Table 14: Approved Services
As the module implements only approved services and has a global approved mode indicator, successful completion
of any module service acts as the implicit approved service indicator.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not provide any non-approved services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module supports the updating of the entire firmware image, which has been signed internally by F5. Firmware
images are transferred to the module by the crypto officer from the administrative GUI over HTTPS. This GUI
firmware loading menu only accepts ISO files in the proper format for the F5 device. On loading, the system validates
the authenticity of the introduced ISO using an RSA 8192-bit signature verification. Successful verification will trigger
installation of the new firmware image and an eventual reboot of the device.
Any firmware image that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module uses HMAC-SHA2-384 as the approved integrity technique for the verification of firmware. During
startup, the module computes the MAC values of the installed module firmware image and compares against the
stored MAC value computed at build time. If the values do not match, the module enters the Error state.
If the module TOEPP contains 2 system controllers, each system controller contains an instance of the module
firmware, and each instance separately performs the module integrity check on its own firmware. This ensures that
no matter which system controller is currently active, the module firmware is checked.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The on-demand pre-operational self-tests, including the approved integrity check and all module CASTs are
performed as part of startup and can be initialized by rebooting the module.
Pairwise consistency tests can be invoked on demand by invoking a service that generates asymmetric keys within
the module.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The module’s operational environment is considered limited as additional firmware can be loaded to the device in
the form of an F5OS-C build, which replaces the existing build, but not all firmware components within the device.
The module contains the entire operating system (OS) for the host device. Therefore, the module itself has control
over all SSPs contained within the cryptographic boundary and all spawned processes. The module’s modern OS
supports and enforces memory separation between application processes.
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper evident
seals
Once per
Quarter
Inspect tamper-evident seals for signs of tamper /
unauthorized access
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals – CX410 Chassis
Number: 6
Placement: Shown in figures 4-7
Surface Preparation: Yes
The surfaces should be cleaned with 70% Isoproyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the
seals. Ensure that the surface is clean and dry before applying seals. Allow 72 hours for seals to adhere
before operating the module.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Administrator (Crypto Officer)
Part Numbers: F5-UPG-FB-STICKER-1
Figure 4: The front side of the module shows the placement of seals # 1, 2, and 3.
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Figure 5: The left side of the module shows the placement of seals # 4 and 5.
Figure 6: The rear side of the module shows the placement of seal #4, securing the fan unit to the chassis.
Figure 7: The right side of the module shows the placement of seal #6.
7.3 User Placed Tamper Seals – CX1610 Chassis
Number: 8
Placement: Shown in figures 8-11
Surface Preparation: Yes
The surfaces should be cleaned with 70% Isoproyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the
seals. Ensure that the surface is clean and dry before applying seals. Allow 72 hours for seals to adhere
before operating the module.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Administrator (Crypto Officer)
Part Numbers: F5-UPG-FB-STICKER-1
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Figure 8: The front side of the module shows the placement of seals #1 and 2, securing the System Controller units
to the module.
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Figure 9: The left side of the module shows the placement of seal #3.
Figure 10: The right side of the module shows the placement of seals #4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
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Figure 11: A rear-right angle shot of the module shows the placement of seals #5, 6, 7, and 8.
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7.4 Filler Panels
While the module does include blank filler panels for the traffic blades bays, no security relevant components can
be seen in either module chassis when the blank filler panels are not present. The module does not rely on the blank
filler panels to meet physical security requirements, including opacity.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The Module does not implement any mitigation methods against non-invasive attacks.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM RAM of the module system controller Dynamic
SSD SSD storage of the module system controller Static
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Password External RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
Module SSD to
External Entity
(TLS)
SSD External Encrypted Automated Electronic KAS-TLS
Module SSD to
External Entity
SSD External Plaintext Automated Electronic
Module RAM to
External entity
RAM External Plaintext Automated Electronic
External Entity to
Module
External RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Secure Erase Zeroizes all SSPs
present in module
The CLI command
overwrites the storage
location keys with 0's,
making them irretrievable.
Issue CLI command or
select option in GUI
menu
Close TLS
Session
Zeroizes all TLS
session keys
The protocol
implementation zeroizes
all session keys stored
temporarily, in RAM
Close session, or
remove power from
connected device
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate SSH
application
Zeroizes all SSH
session keys
The protocol
implementation zeroizes
all session keys stored
temporarily, in RAM
Close session, or
remove power from
connected device
Reboot System /
Remove power
Reboot System /
Remove power
form host system
SSPs stored temporarily
in RAM are zeroised and
unretrievable
Reboot system
(Command, GUI Option,
Power Button), Remove
power (Power button /
Unplug)
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
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When the Secure Erase, Close TLS Session, and Close SSH Session / Terminate SSH application zeroization methods
are used, the memory locations occupied by the zeroized SSPs are overwritten with zeros before freeing the memory
location for use. Temporary values generated during the module integrity check are zeroized when no longer
needed. Procedural zeroization of SSPs stored temporarily in module RAM, must be performed under control of the
module operator.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
TLS RSA
public
key
Public portion
of RSA key pair
used by for
establishing
TLS (HTTPS)
connection
2048,
3072,
4096-bits
- 112-
150-bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA
KeyGen
RSA
SigVer
TLS RSA
private
key
Private portion
of RSA key pair
used by for
establishing
TLS (HTTPS)
connection
2048,
3072,
4096-bits
- 112-
150-bits
Private Key -
CSP
RSA
KeyGen
RSA
SigGen
TLS
ECDSA
public
key
Public portion
of ECDSA key
pair used by for
establishing
TLS (HTTPS)
connection
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
SigVer
TLS
ECDSA
private
key
Private portion
of ECDSA key
pair used by for
establishing
TLS (HTTPS)
connection
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
SigGen
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public
key
Public portion
of EC Diffie-
Hellman key
pair used for
key agreement
during TLS
handshake
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
TLS
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key
Private portion
of EC Diffie-
Hellman key
pair used for
key agreement
during TLS
handshake
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
TLS
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
TLS pre-
primary
secret
Shared secret
computed as a
result of EC
Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
256, 384
bits - 128,
192-bits
Secret - CSP KAS-TLS KAS-
TLS
TLS
primary
secret
Secret value
output from
TLS KDF
384 bits -
192-bits
Secret - CSP KAS-TLS KAS-
TLS
TLS
derived
session
key
Encryption and
MAC secret
keys used for
protecting TLS
session
communication
s
128-256-
bits
(AES),
112-192-
bits
(HMAC) -
128-256-
bits
(AES),
112-192-
bits
(HMAC)
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-TLS AES-
CBC
AES-
GCM
HMAC
SSH
ECDSA
public
key
Public portion
of ECDSA key
pair used by for
establishing
SSH
connection
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
SSH
SSH
ECDSA
private
key
Private portion
of ECDSA key
pair used by for
establishing
SSH
connection
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
SSH
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public
key
Public portion
of EC Diffie-
Hellman key
pair used for
key agreement
during SSH
handshake
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
SSH
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key
Private portion
of EC Diffie-
Hellman key
pair used for
key agreement
during SSH
handshake
P-256, P-
384 - 128,
192-bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS-
SSH
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
SSH
shared
secret
Shared secret
computed as a
result of EC
Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
256-bits,
384-bits -
128, 192-
bits
Secret - CSP KAS-SSH KAS-
SSH
SSH
derived
session
key
Encryption and
MAC secret
keys used for
protecting SSH
session
communication
s
128, 192
(CBC
only), 256
bits (AES)
112-192-
bits
(HMAC) -
128, 192
(CBC
only),
256-bits
(AES)
112-192-
bits
(HMAC)
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-SSH AES-
CBC
AES-
CTR
AES-
GCM
HMAC
Passwor
d
Secret value
used by
operator to
authenticate to
the module
Variable
length,
minimum
8
character
s - 1 in
2.8x10^1
5
Authenticatio
n Data - CSP
Entropy
input
string
Random bits
obtained by
entropy source
256-bits -
256-bits
Secret - CSP RSA
KeyGe
n
ECDSA
KeyGe
n
DRBG
seed
String of bits
used as input
to DRBG
440-bits -
256-bits
Secret - CSP RSA
KeyGe
n
ECDSA
KeyGe
n
DRBG
internal
state V
"V" portion of
the DRBG
internal state,
as defined by
SP 800-90Ar1
128-bits -
128-bits
Secret - CSP RSA
KeyGe
n
ECDSA
KeyGe
n
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
DRBG
internal
state key
"Key" portion of
the DRBG
internal state,
as defined by
SP 800-90Ar1
256-bits -
256-bits
Secret - CSP RSA
KeyGe
n
ECDSA
KeyGe
n
AES-
GCM IV
Initialization
vector for AES-
GCM within
SSH and TLS
protocols
96-bits - - Initialization
Vector - PSP
AES-GCM AES-
GCM
(A4783
)
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
TLS RSA
public key
Module
SSD to
External
Entity
SSD:Plaintext Secure Erase TLS RSA private
key:Paired With
TLS RSA
private key
Module
SSD to
External
Entity (TLS)
SSD:Plaintext Secure Erase TLS RSA public
key:Paired With
TLS
ECDSA
public key
Module
SSD to
External
Entity
SSD:Plaintext Secure Erase TLS ECDSA
private
key:Paired With
TLS
ECDSA
private key
Module
SSD to
External
Entity (TLS)
SSD:Plaintext Secure Erase TLS ECDSA
public key:Paired
With
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
Module
RAM to
External
entity
External
Entity to
Module
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close TLS
Session
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key:Paired With
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close TLS
Session
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key:Paired With
TLS pre-
primary
secret
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close TLS
Session
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS
primary
secret
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close TLS
Session
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS pre-primary
secret:Derived
From
TLS
derived
session key
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close TLS
Session
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS primary
secret:Derived
From
SSH
ECDSA
public key
Module
SSD to
External
Entity
SSD:Plaintext N/A SSH ECDSA
private
key:Paired With
SSH
ECDSA
private key
SSD:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate
SSH
application
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
SSH ECDSA
public key:Paired
With
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
Module
RAM to
External
entity
External
Entity to
Module
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate
SSH
application
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
SSH EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key:Paired With
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate
SSH
application
SSH EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key:Paired With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
SSH
shared
secret
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate
SSH
application
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
SSH
derived
session key
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Close SSH
Session /
Terminate
SSH
application
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
SSH shared
secret:Derived
From
Password Password RAM:Plaintext
SSD:Obfuscated
Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
Entropy
input string
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
DRBG
seed
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
DRBG
internal
state V
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
DRBG
internal
state key
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Remove
power
AES-GCM
IV
RAM:Plaintext Secure Erase
Reboot
System /
Remove
power
TLS derived
session
key:Used With
SSH derived
session
key:Used With
Table 20: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
The module’s SHA-1 implementation will be considered non-approved for all uses as of January 1, 2030.
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A4783)
HMAC-
SHA2-384
MAC SW/FW
Integrity
Console
message
MAC verification (Compare
computed HMAC value of
entire software image to
stored MAC)
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module’s integrity check is the only pre-operational self-test implemented in the module. This can be invoked
on demand by power-cycling the module, or by the Administrator (CO), by inputting the following CLI command:
system security integrity-check controllers
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A4783)
256-bit KAT CAST Console
message
Encrypt On Startup
AES-CBC
(A4783)
256-bit KAT CAST Console
message
Decrypt On Startup
SHA-1
(A4783)
- KAT CAST Console
message
Hash On Startup
SHA2-256
(A4783)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Console
message
Hash On Startup
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A4783)
HMAC-
SHA2-384
KAT CAST Console
message
MAC verification On Startup
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
P-256 KAT CAST Console
message
Signature
Generation
On Startup
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
P-256 KAT CAST Console
message
Signature
Verification
On Startup
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
2048-bit KAT CAST Console
message
Signature
Generation
On Startup
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
2048-bit KAT CAST Console
message
Signature
Generation
On Startup
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC7627
(A4782)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Console
message
Key Derivation On Startup
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KDF SSH
(A4782)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Console
message
Key Derivation On Startup
Counter
DRBG
(A4783)
AES-256 KAT CAST Console
message
DRBG CAST
exercises the
following
functions from
NIST SP 800-
90A: Instantiate
(11.3.2),
Generate (11.3.3)
and Reseed
(11.3.4).
On Startup
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
P-256 PCT PCT Console
message
Key Pair
generation and
validation
Generation of
ECDSA Key
Pair
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5) (A4782)
2048-bit PCT PCT Console
message
Key Pair
generation and
validation
Generation of
RSA Key Pair
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A4782)
P-256 KAT CAST Console
message
Shared Secret
Computation
On Startup
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3 -
ECDH PCT
P-256 PCT PCT Console
message
Signature
Verification
Generation of
ECDH Key
Pair
Repetition
Count Test
(Entropy)
- RCT CAST Console
message
Repetition Count
Test on entropy
source
On Startup,
Continuously
on entropy
source
outputs
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
- APT CAST Console
message
Adaptive
Proportion Test
on entropy source
On Startup,
Continuously
on entropy
source
outputs
SHA3-256
(A4093)
256-bit KAT CAST Console
message
Hash On Startup
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
The module’s cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CAST) are run as part of module startup and can be invoked on
demand by power-cycling the module.
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
384 (A4783)
MAC SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
(A4783)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
AES-CBC
(A4783)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
SHA-1 (A4783) KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
SHA2-256
(A4783)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
384 (A4783)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
KDF SSH
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
Counter DRBG
(A4783)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
PCT PCT On Key Pair
Generation
-
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4782)
PCT PCT On Key Pair
Generation
-
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4782)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3 -
ECDH PCT
PCT PCT On Key Pair
Generation
-
Repetition Count
Test (Entropy)
RCT CAST On Demand,
Continuous
-
Adaptive
Proportion Test
APT CAST On Demand,
Continuous
-
SHA3-256
(A4093)
KAT CAST On Demand Manual, by
module reboot
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
The module is security level 2 and not subject to periodic self-test requirements.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Error All data output and
cryptographic services are
inhibited in the error state.
If any self-
test fails
Reboot module when
all System Controllers
are in Error mode
<name of
test> self-test
failed.
Table 25: Error States
The module transitions to an error state when any module self-test fails. All data output and cryptographic functions
are inhibited when in the error state.
If both the primary (active) and secondary (standby) system controllers are active when the module enters the error
state, the module will immediately pass control from the active to the standby system controller, and transition back
to the normal operation state.
If there is only 1 active system controller, such as when the primary controller has already failed and passed control
to the secondary controller, then module must be rebooted to clear the error condition.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
All pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests can be invoked on demand by the module operator by
power-cycling the module.
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 60 of 61
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
- The hardware platform (TOEPP) is shipped directly from the Vendor to the customer via a professional
carrier and the shipment tracked by that carrier.
- The Crypto Officer should inspect the product packaging for signs of tamper during transit.
- The Crypto Officer should verify the product matches the description and pictures in this Security Policy and
ensure that all components are present in the package.
- The Crypto Officer should follow the instructions found in the “Install and Upgrade Software” here:
https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/velos-1-5-0/velos-systems-installation-upgrade/title-install-upgrade-
software.html#ch-title-install-sw
- The Crypto Officer should follow the instructions found in the “F5 VELOS system initial configuration”
guide, Section “License the system automatically from the system controller webUI” here:
https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/hardware/velos-systems-getting-started/gs-system-initial-
config.html#velos-setup-wizard-overview
- The device will reboot and return to operation in the Approved mode.
- The administrator should verify that the module is operating in the approved mode of operation, with the
FIPS license installed at any time by issuing the commands listed in Section 2.4: Modes of Operation, of
this security policy and verifying that the output matches the expected output.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The administrator may verify that the module is operating in the approved mode of operation, with the FIPS license
installed at any time by issuing the commands listed in Section 2.4: Modes of Operation, of this security policy and
verifying that the output matches the expected output. The services available to administrators are listed in Section
4.3: Approved Services, of this security policy.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
There is no specific non-administrator for proper use of the module once configured into the approved mode of
operation. The services available to non-administrators are listed in Section 4.3: Approved Services, of this security
policy.
F5OS-C Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
F5, Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 61 of 61
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.