Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module
LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000179-001
Rev. K
January 10, 2025
Contents
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002, Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales
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Document Information
Document Part Number 002-000149-002
Release Date January 10, 2025
Revision Version K
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2025 Thales. All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are trademarks and service marks of
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Thales does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall
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security standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily
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Under no circumstances, shall Thales be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case
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any liability with respect to security for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result
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002-000149-002, Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales
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incorrect or insecure functioning could result in damage to persons or property, denial of service or loss
of privacy.
Contents
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................6
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................10
PREFACE..........................................................................................................................13
1 General ........................................................................................................................14
1.1 Security Level.............................................................................................................................. 14
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.............................................................................15
2.1 Module Overview......................................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Module Description...................................................................................................................... 15
2.3 Test Configuration ....................................................................................................................... 18
2.4 Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 19
2.5 Non-Approved Algorithms ........................................................................................................... 32
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .................................................................................36
3.1 Ports and Interface Overview ...................................................................................................... 36
3.2 Trusted Channel.......................................................................................................................... 37
Trusted channel summary........................................................................................................... 37
Physical Trusted Path (USB)....................................................................................................... 38
Authentication Trusted Path (LCD) ............................................................................................. 38
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.............................................................................39
4.1 Roles ........................................................................................................................................... 39
4.2 Roles and Authentication ............................................................................................................ 43
Authentication Mechanism Summary.......................................................................................... 43
Activation ..................................................................................................................................... 45
Account lockout behaviours ........................................................................................................ 45
4.3 Approved Services ...................................................................................................................... 45
4.4 Non-Approved Services .............................................................................................................. 70
5 Software/Firmware Security .........................................................................................75
5.1 Firmware Integrity........................................................................................................................ 75
5.2 Firmware Load............................................................................................................................. 75
5.3 Firmware Components ................................................................................................................ 75
6 Operational Environment..............................................................................................76
7 Physical Security..........................................................................................................77
7.1 Mechanism Summary.................................................................................................................. 77
Module Construction.................................................................................................................... 77
Environment Failure Protection ................................................................................................... 77
7.2 Module Inspection ....................................................................................................................... 77
7.3 Environment Failure Protection ................................................................................................... 78
7.4 Module Case and Coatings ......................................................................................................... 78
8 Non-invasive security ...................................................................................................79
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9 SSP Management........................................................................................................80
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameter ...................................................................................................... 80
9.2 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification................................................... 98
9.3 Key Import/Export Methods......................................................................................................... 98
10 Self-Tests........................................................................................................101
10.1 Pre-Operational tests................................................................................................................. 101
10.2 Conditional tests........................................................................................................................ 101
10.3 Periodic Self-Tests .................................................................................................................... 106
11 Life-cycle Assurance .......................................................................................107
11.1 Choosing a secure location for the module............................................................................... 107
11.2 Performing secure initialization of the HSM .............................................................................. 107
11.3 Protection of data outside the HSM........................................................................................... 108
11.4 Reviewing the Module’s Log ..................................................................................................... 109
11.5 Protecting Authentication and Authorization Data..................................................................... 110
11.6 Managing Lost or Stolen iKeys.................................................................................................. 110
User Authentication iKeys ..................................................................................................... 110
11.7 Managing Lost or Stolen Passwords......................................................................................... 111
General.................................................................................................................................. 111
KCV ....................................................................................................................................... 111
Remote PED iKeys................................................................................................................ 112
11.8 Revoking Roles ......................................................................................................................... 112
11.9 Key Deletion .............................................................................................................................. 112
11.10 Resetting the HSM .................................................................................................................... 112
11.11 Updating Firmware .................................................................................................................... 113
11.12 Maintenance Requirements ...................................................................................................... 113
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..............................................................................114
13 Guidance.........................................................................................................115
13.1 Identifying the Module and Version........................................................................................... 115
13.2 Identifying the Module Type ...................................................................................................... 116
13.3 Approved Mode of Operation for USB HSM ............................................................................. 117
13.4 Approved Mode of Operation for Backup HSM......................................................................... 117
13.5 Using CA_PerformSelftest ........................................................................................................ 118
13.6 Nominal Ranges........................................................................................................................ 119
13.7 Assuming Roles......................................................................................................................... 119
13.8 Additional Guidance .................................................................................................................. 120
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AEK AccessID Encryption Key
AEK-KW AEK-Key Wrapping
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AU Audit User
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CDH Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
CID Client IDentity
CITS Chrysalis ITS
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CFB Cipher FeedBack
CMAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authenticate Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CPV3 Cloning Protocol Version 3
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR CounTeR
CU Crypto User
CVL Component Validation List
DEK Data Encryption Key
DH Diffie-Hellman
DMK Data MAC Key
DPK Data Protection Key
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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Term Definition
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EFT Environmental Failure Testing
EKA Ephemeral Key Agreement
EMI ElectroMagnetic Interference
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HA High Availability
HOC Hardware Origin Certificate
HOK Hardware Origin Key
HSM Hardware Security Module / Host Security Module
ICD Interface Control Design/Document
IG Implementation Guidance
ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical
Commission
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation Function
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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Term Definition
KCV Key Cloning Vector
KDF Key Derivation Function
KDM Key Destruction Method
KEV Key Encryption Vector
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
LCO Limited Crypto Officer
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
MGF Mask Generation Function
MIC Manufacturer’s Integrity Certificate
MIK Manufacturer’s Integrity Key
MK Master Key
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
N/A Not Applicable
OFB Output FeedBack
PAC PED Authentication Certificate
PAK PED Authentication Key
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PEC Password Encryption Certificate
PED PIN Entry Device
PEK Password Encryption Key
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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Term Definition
POST Power-on Self-Test
PSK Partition Storage Key
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PST Periodic Self-Test
RDK Role Domain Key
RNG Random Number Generator
RPV Remote PED Vector
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSASVE RSA Secret-Value Encapsulation
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SKA Static Key Agreement
SMK SKS Master Key
SKS Scalable Key Storage
SO Security Officer
SSC Shared Secret Computation
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
STC Secure Trusted Channel
STM Secure Transport Mode
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TUK Token or Module Unwrapping Key
TWC Token or Module Wrapping Certificate
USB Universal Serial Bus
USK User’s Storage Key
XTS XEX Tweakable block cipher ciphertext Stealing
References
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REFERENCES
[FIPS 140-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3, Security Requirements
for Cryptographic Modules, March 2019.
[FIPS 140-3 IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program, January 29, 2024.
[FIPS 180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard
(SHS), NIST, August 2015.
[FIPS 186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, Digital Signature
Standards (DSS), NIST, July 2013.
[FIPS 186-5] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, Digital Signature
Standards (DSS), NIST, February 2023.
[FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Specification for the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001.
[FIPS 198-1] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008.
[FIPS 202] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 202, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, August 2015.
[RFC 5639] Lochter M, Merkle J, ‘Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves
and Curve Generation’, Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 5639, March 2010.
[RFC 7748] Hamburg M, Turner S, “Elliptic Curves for Security”, Internet Research Task Force,
RFC 7748, January 2016.
[SEC 2] Certicom Research, ‘Standards for Efficient Cryptography - SEC2: Recommended
Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters’, Version 2.0, January 27, 2010.
[SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation – Methods and Techniques, December 2001.
[SP800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005 (with October 2016 updates).
[SP800-38D] NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007.
[SP800-38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010.
[SP800-38F] NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012.
[SP800-56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Revision 3, April 2018.
[SP800-56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, Revision 2, March 2019.
References
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[SP800-56Cr1] NIST Special Publication 800-56C, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in
Key-Establishment Schemes, Revision 1, April 2018.
[SP800-56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in
Key-Establishment Schemes, Revision 2, August 2020.
[SP800-67r2] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Revision 2, November 2017.
[SP800-90Ar1] NIST Special Publication SP800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Bit Generators, Revision 1, June 2015.
[SP800-90B] NIST, SP800-90B, “Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation”, January 2018.
[SP800-108r1] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Revision 1, Recommendation for Key Derivation
Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), August 2022.
[SP800-131Ar2] NIST Special Publication 800-131A, Revision 2, Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019.
[SP800-132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation: Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010.
[SP800-133r2] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, June 2020.
[SP800-135r1] NIST Special Publication 800-135, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific
Key Derivation Functions, December 2011.
[SP800-140Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-140C, Revision 2, CMVP Approved Security Functions:
CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759, July 2023.
[SP800-140Dr2] NIST Special Publication 800-140D, Revision 2, CMVP Approved Sensitive Security
Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods: CMVP Validation Authority
Updates to ISO/IEC 24759, July 2023.
[SP800-140E] NIST Special Publication 800-140E, CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms:
CMVP Validation Authority Requirements for ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Annex E and
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.17, March 2020.
[SP800-140F] NIST Special Publication 800-140F, CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation
Test Metrics: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759, March 2020.
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories, v2.1.
[ANSI X9.42] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.42-2003 (R2013), Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography.
[ANSI X9.62] American National Standard Institute ANSI X9.62, ‘Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)’,
November 16, 2005.
[ANSI X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011 (R2017), Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport
Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
References
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[ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018] ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018, ‘IT Security techniques – Digital Signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms’, 2018-11.
[ISO 19790:2012] ISO/IEC 19790:2012 (Corrected 2015-12-15, IDT) Information technology – Security
techniques – Security requirements for cryptographic modules, 2015-12-15.
[ISO 24759:2017] ISO/IEC 24759:2017 (Corrected 2017-03, IDT) Information technology – Security
techniques – Test requirements for cryptographic modules, 2017-03.
Preface
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PREFACE
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module in
the technical terms of [FIPS 140-3].
General information on Thales HSM alongside other Thales products is available from the following
sources:
 the Thales internet site contains information on the full line of available products at
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com
 product manuals and technical support literature is available from the Thales Customer Support Portal
at https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com/csm
 online manuals for the product can be found at https://www.thalesdocs.com
 technical or sales representatives of Thales can be contacted through one of the channels listed on
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/contact-us
NOTE: You require an account to access the Customer Support Portal. To create a new
account, go to the portal and click on the REGISTER link.
General
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1 General
1.1 Security Level
The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module meets all level 3 security requirements for [FIPS 140-3] as
summarized in the table below:
Table 1-1: Security Levels
[ISO 24759:2017] Section 6
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 3
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 3
10 Self-Tests 3
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Overview
The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module is a standalone hardware security module in the form of a USB
device. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure, which provides physical resistance.
The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure
in the USB device.
The module must be explicitly configured to operate in an Approved Mode of Operation using steps outlined in
sections 13.3 and 13.4. Configuration steps outlined in these sections are performed during the secure
initialization of the module.
The module only supports a single approved mode of operation and any configuration changes to settings
defining that mode will trigger a zeroization of all partition Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) and require the
full reset and re-initialization of the module.
NOTE Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module does not support degraded operation as
defined in [ISO 19790:2012].
The module provides secure key generation and storage for symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs along
with support for a broad range of cryptographic services. Access to key material and cryptographic services for
users and user application software is provided through the PKCS #11 programming API, which is implemented
over the module’s proprietary command interface.
The module may host multiple ‘user partitions’ which are cryptographically separated and are presented as
‘virtual tokens’ to user applications. A single ‘admin partition’ exists, which is dedicated to the HSM Security
Officer (HSM SO) and Administrator roles. Each partition must be separately authenticated in order to make it
available for use.
2.2 Module Description
The cryptographic module as defined in [ISO 19790:2012] is a hardware module with a multi-chip standalone
embodiment.
NOTE The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module can be used as follows:
 as a standalone device called the Thales Luna G7 USB HSM; or
 as a standalone device called the Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM.
The Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) of the modules is shown in Figure 2-1 and
Figure 2-2 below. The TOEPP is defined as the enclosure on the top and bottom sides of the USB device
defined as outlined.
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TOEPP
Figure 2-1: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module HW 808-000064-005 and 808-000064-006
Figure 2-2: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module HW 808-000080-001 and 808-000080-002
The module includes a CR2032, 3V, coin battery, which is excluded from the TOEPP boundary. This battery is used
to power the modules real-time clock when not connected through the 5V power interface. The real-time clock is not
used to support any approved security functions supported by the module.
TOEPP
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The following figure highlights the cryptographic boundary of the module covered by this certification:
Figure 2-3: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module cryptographic boundary.
The cryptographic boundary includes the bootloader and the main firmware. The bootloader and main firmware
are ‘firmware’ within the scope of definitions in [ISO 19790:2012].
NOTE As covered above, ‘firmware’ for the module includes the bootloader and main
firmware. To use the module in an approved mode of operation, all firmware, including the
bootloader and main firmware must be validated to [FIPS 140-3] to run on Thales Luna G7
Cryptographic Module.
Bootloader
1.x.x
G7 Hardware Platform
Cryptographic boundary
Main Firmware 7.7.3
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2.3 Test Configuration
The following tested configurations are covered in this security policy:
Table 2-1: Cryptographic module configuration.
Model Hardware
[Part Number and
Version]
Firmware Version Distinguishing Features
Thales Luna G7 USB
HSM or
Thales Luna G7
Backup HSM
808-000080-001 Main firmware: 7.7.3 with
Bootloader: 1.3.0, 1.5.0 or 1.6.0
Second USB port and screen with
higher resolution.
Thales Luna G7 USB
HSM or
Thales Luna G7
Backup HSM
808-000080-002 Main firmware: 7.7.3 with
Bootloader: 1.3.0, 1.5.0 or 1.6.0
Second USB port and screen with
higher resolution. Functionally
equivalent to 808-000080-001 with
the difference limited to the supply
choice for one of the non-security
enforcing internal components.
Thales Luna G7
Backup HSM
808-000064-005 Main firmware: 7.7.3 with
Bootloader: 1.3.0, 1.5.0 or 1.6.0
Single USB port and lower
resolution screen.
Thales Luna G7
Backup HSM
808-000064-006 Main firmware: 7.7.3 with
Bootloader: 1.3.0, 1.5.0 or 1.6.0
Single USB port and lower
resolution screen. Functionally
equivalent to 808-000064-005 with
the difference limited to the supply
choice for one of the non-security
enforcing internal components.
This document covers both the PED and password authentication configurations of the Thales Luna G7
Cryptographic Module.
NOTE The security features described in this document apply to the Thales Luna G7
Cryptographic Module only and do not include any feature that may be enforced by the
client or Thales Luna PED.
NOTE As the module is a hardware module of ‘multi-chip standalone’ embodiment, this
security policy is not required to list an operating system.
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2.4 Approved Algorithms
The following cryptographic library and associated CAVP certificates are used by the cryptographic module:
 SafeNet Bootloader Cryptographic Library (Cert #C2022) and (Cert #A6549); and
 SafeNet Cryptographic Library (Certs #C2020, #A674 and #A2125).
The following entropy noise source and associated ESV certificate is used by the cryptographic module:
 Thales G7 Hardware Platform TRNG (Cert #E97).
The approved algorithms implemented by the module, alongside their mapping to the certificates above, and
together with algorithms use by service, are listed in the Table 2-2 below.
Listings in the ‘Use / Function’ column map to services listed in Table 4-2 and Table 4-4.
NOTE The following certificates referenced above contain redundant listings not used by the
cryptographic module:
 Cert #C2020 includes listing for KAS-ECC, KAS-FFC, CVL (RSADP) and GMAC;;
 Cert #C2022 includes SHA1 and SHA2-256. The implementations for SHA1 and SHA2-256 are
present in the bootloader to verify firmware integrity but are redundant to other approved
security functions. Firmware authenticity is checked using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-384.
Implementations for these algorithms are present in the software libraries or hardware integrated
circuits used by the module and have completed CAVP testing but where these functions are
either not called by the modules executable code or the target function is not used as a security
function to satisfy requirements from FIPS 140-3.
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Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#A2125 ECDSA SigGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4]
Signature Generation
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571,
P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521.
Request HSM self-test, Generate signature or MAC
over user supplied data , Setup Remote PED Session.
#A2125 ECDSA SigVer
Standard: [FIPS 186-4]
Signature Verification
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571,
P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521.
Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data, Setup Remote PED Session.
#A2125 HASH_DRBG
Standard: [SP800-90Ar1].
SHA2-256 256-bits. Clone SMK between partitions, Configure partition for
high-available recovery / login, Create a user partition,
Enable/disable STM, Export secret or private key using
key wrapping, Extract entropy from DRBG, Generate
domain parameters, Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair, Generate signature or MAC over
user supplied data, Initialize the HSM, Initialize
Remote PED Vector (RPV), Initialize role, Perform
encrypt operation on user supplied data object,
Request HSM self-test, Setup Remote PED Session, Re-
seed partition DRBG, Rollover SMK for a given
partition.
#A2125 KAS-ECC
Standard: [SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with full key validation and key-
pair generation
KDF: OneStep using SHA2-512.
Key Confirmation: HMAC-SHA2-256 with 256-
bit key.
P-521. Setup Remote PED Session.
#A2125 KAS-ECC-SSC
Standard: [SP800-56Ar3].
ephemeralUnified, fullUnified, onePassDH B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KAS-FFC-SSC
Standard: [SP800-56Ar3]
dhHybrid1, dhEphem, dhHybridOneFlow,
dhOneFlow.
2048, 3072 and 4096-bits. Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KAS-IFC
Standards: [SP800-56Br2] and
[SP800-56Cr2].
KAS1-basic
Key generation method: rsakpg1-crt,
rsakpg2-crt.
KDF method: One-Step Key Derivation from
[SP800-56Cr2] using SHA2-512.
4096-bits. Clone SMK between partitions, Configure partition for
high-available recovery / login.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
21
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#A2125 KDA One-Step Sp800-56Cr1
Standard: [SP800-56Cr1].
One-Step Key Derivation
SHA1.
Shared secret length: 224-8192,
increment 1 byte.
Derived Key length: 512.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KDA One-Step Sp800-56Cr2
Standard: SP800-56Cr2.
One-Step Key Derivation
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Shared secret length: 224-8192,
increment 1 byte.
Derived Key length: 4096-bits.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object, Clone SMK
between partitions.
#A2125 KDF ANS 9.42 (CVL)1
Standard: [SP800-135r1].
SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512.
Shared secret length: 64-4096-bits,
increment 1 byte.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KDF ANS 9.63 (CVL)
Standard: [SP800-135r1].
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512. 128, 4096 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object.
#A2125 KTS-IFC
Standards: [SP800-56Br2] and
[SP800-56Cr2].
KTS-OAEP-basic
Key generation method: rsakpg1-crt and
rsakpg2-crt
Hash: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
Mask Generation Function: SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, and 8192 bits.
Caveat: Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 201 bits of
encryption strength
Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Initialize the HSM, Initialize role,
Change authentication data, Login as role.
#A2125 PBKDF2
Standard: [SP800-132].
HMAC-SHA2-512 Derived Key Length:
256-bits
Password Length:
128-bits
Salt Length: 256-bits
Initialize the HSM, Initialize Remote PED Vector (RPV),
Initialize role, Change authentication data, Login as
role, Request HSM self-test.
#A6549 RSA SigVer
Standard:. [FIPS 186-5]
Signature Verification
SHA2-384
4096-bit Request authentication and execution of main
firmware.
2
Used internal to the cryptographic module to derive the storage encryption key used to encrypt the checkword used during password-based authentication. The derived key is separately used to
encrypt for storage the USK which is independently also encrypted under the module generated KEK. The module uses method 1a from [SP800-132] where the derived Master Key (MK) is used
directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). Further information on use of PBKDF is provided in section 4.2.1.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
22
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#A674 RSA KeyGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Key Generation B.3.3 and B.3.6 4096 bits.
Vendor Note: Key sizes up to modulus
length 8192-bit are supported for key
generation by the module as permitted
by [SP800-131Ar2] but were not
supported for test by the NIST CAVP
program above modulus 4096-bits at the
time of module submission.
Configure partition for high-available recovery / login,
Generate local symmetric or asymmetric key-pair,
Initialize the HSM, Initialize role, Request HSM self-
test.
#A674 RSA SigGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Generation
(PKCS #1-v1.5 and PKCS-PSS): SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
(ANSI X9.31): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512.
Vendor affirmed using [FIPS 140-3 IG], C.C,
The Use and the Testing Requirements for
the Family of Functions defined in FIPS 202,
when using SHA-3.
4096-bit.
Vendor Note: Key sizes up to modulus
length 8192-bit are supported for key
generation by the module as permitted
by [SP800-131Ar2] but were not
supported for test by the NIST CAVP
program above modulus 4096-bits at the
time of module submission.
Clone SMK between partitions, Generate signature or
MAC over user supplied data, Request HSM self-test.
#A674 RSA SigVer
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Verification
(PKCS #1-v1.5 and PKCS-PSS): SHA1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-
224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
(ANSI X9.31): SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Vendor affirmed using [FIPS 140-3 IG], C.C,
The Use and the Testing Requirements for
the Family of Functions defined in FIPS 202,
when using SHA-3.
4096-bit.
Vendor Note: Key sizes up to modulus
length 8192-bit are supported for
signature generation and verification by
the module as permitted by [SP800-
131Ar2] but were not supported for test
by the NIST CAVP program above
modulus 4096-bits at the time of module
submission.
Load configuration update file, Clone SMK between
partitions, Configure partition for high-available
recovery / login, Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair, Request HSM self-test, Update
firmware, Verify signature or MAC over user supplied
data.
#C2020 AES-CBC
Standards: [FIPS 197].
CBC 128, 192, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Insert key from external storage using SKS, ,
Request HSM self-test.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
23
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 AES-CFB128
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38A].
CFB128 128, 192, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES- CFB8
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38A].
CFB8 128, 192, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-CMAC
Standards: [FIPS 197],
[SP800-38D], [SP800-38E] and
[SP800-38F].
CMAC 128, 192, 256 bits. Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Verify signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-CTR
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38A].
CTR 128, 192, 256 bits. Send or receive data over PED tunnel (remote PED),
Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object¸ Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-ECB
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38A].
ECB 128, 192, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-GCM3
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38D].
GCM 128, 192, 256 bits. Extract key to external storage using SKS, Perform
encrypt operation on user supplied data object,
Perform decrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Export secret or private key using key
wrapping, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-KW
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38F].
KW 128, 192, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Export secret or private key using key
wrapping, Request HSM self-test.
3 The module generates IVs internally using the approved DRBG where all IV used are 128-bits in length per [SP800-38D] and in accordance with FIPS 140-3 I.G. C.H, scenario 2.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
24
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 AES-KWP
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38F].
KWP 128, 192, 256 bits. Initialize the HSM, Create a user partition, Initialize
role, Export/import audit log secret key, Clone SMK
between partitions, Rollover SMK for a given partition,
Change authentication data, Initialize role, Configure
partition for high-available recovery / login, Login as
role, Initialize Remote PED Vector (RPV), Send or
receive data over PED tunnel (remote PED), Generate
local symmetric or asymmetric key-pair, Generate
domain parameters, Derive key from existing partition
secret or private key object, Import secret or private
key using key wrapping, Export secret or private key
using key wrapping, Insert key from external storage
using SKS, Extract key to external storage using SKS,
Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Generate signature or MAC over user
supplied data, Verify signature or MAC over user
supplied data, Change authentication data , Request
HSM self-test.
#C2020 AES-OFB
Standards: [FIPS 197] and
[SP800-38A].
OFB 128, 256 bits. Perform encrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform decrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 DSA KeyGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Key Generation 2048, 3072 bits. Generate local symmetric or asymmetric key-pair.
#C2020 DSA PQGGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Parameter Generation:
SHA2-224, SHA2-256
2048, 3072 bits. Generate domain parameters.
#C2020 DSA SigGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Generation
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
2048, 3072 bits. Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 DSA SigVer
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Verification
SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
1024, 2048, 3072 bits. Verify signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
25
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 ECDSA KeyGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Key Generation B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Generate local symmetric or asymmetric key-pair,
Initialize Remote PED Vector (RPV), Setup Remote PED
Session.
#C2020 ECDSA SigGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Generation
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test, Setup Remote PED Session,.
#C2020 ECDSA SigVer
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Verification
SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512.
B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224,
P-256, P-384, P-521.
Request HSM self-test, Setup Remote PED Session,
Verify signature or MAC over user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA-1
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 202].
HMAC-SHA-1 Mac size: 80, 96, 128, 160.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA2-224
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 180-4].
HMAC-SHA2-224 Mac size: 112, 128, 160, 192, 224.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Verify signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA2-256
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 180-4].
HMAC-SHA2-256 Mac size: 128, 192, 256.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Send or receive data over PED tunnel (remote PED),
Request HSM self-test, Generate signature or MAC
over user supplied data, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data, Generate secure log record.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA2-384
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 180-4].
HMAC-SHA2-384 Mac size: 192, 256, 320, 384.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA2-512
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 180-4].
HMAC-SHA2-512 Mac size: 256, 320, 384, 448, 512.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA3-224
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 202].
HMAC-SHA3-224 Mac size: 112, 128, 160, 192, 224.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA3-256
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 202].
HMAC-SHA3-256 Mac size: 128, 192, 256.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 HMAC-SHA3-384
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 202].
HMAC-SHA3-384 Mac size: 192, 256, 320, 384.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
26
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 HMAC-SHA3-512
Standards: [FIPS 198-1] and
[FIPS 202].
HMAC-SHA3-512 Mac size: 256, 320, 384, 448, 512.
Key size: key size < block size, key size =
block size, key size > block size.
Generate signature or MAC over user supplied data,
Request HSM self-test Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
#C2020 KDF
Standard: [SP800-108r1].
KBKDF
Mode: Counter
MAC Mode: CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192,
CMAC-AES256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-
224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384,
HMAC-SHA2-512
1024, 1032, 2048, and 2056.
Fixed Data Order: Before Fixed Data.
Counter Length: 32.
Initialize the HSM, Initialize role, Derive key from
existing partition secret or private key object, Change
authentication data, Login as role, Request HSM self-
test.
#C2020 RSA KeyGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4]
Key Generation B.3.3 and B.3.6 2048 and 3072 bits. Request HSM self-test, Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair.
#C2020 RSA SigGen
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Generation
(PKCS #1-v1.5 and PKCS-PSS): SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
(ANSI X9.31): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Vendor affirmed using [FIPS 140-3 IG], C.C,
The Use and the Testing Requirements for
the Family of Functions defined in FIPS 202,
when using SHA-3.
2048 and 3072 bits. Request HSM self-test, Generate signature or MAC
over user supplied data.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
27
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 RSA SigVer
Standard: [FIPS 186-4].
Signature Verification
(PKCS #1-v1.5 and PKCS-PSS): SHA1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-
224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
(ANSI X9.31): SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
Vendor affirmed using [FIPS 140-3 IG], C.C,
The Use and the Testing Requirements for
the Family of Functions defined in FIPS 202,
when using SHA-3.
1024, 2048 and 3072 bits. Request HSM self-test, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
Legacy4 for 1024 bits
#C2020 SHA1
Standard: [FIPS 180-4] and
[FIPS 202].
SHA1 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA2-224
Standard: [FIPS 180-4] and
[FIPS 202].
SHA2-224 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA2-256
Standards: [FIPS 180-4] and
[FIPS 202].
SHA2-256 N/A Request HSM self-test, Protect object integrity,
Enable/disable STM, Initialize role, Configure partition
for high-available recovery / login, Login as role,
Import secret or private key using key wrapping,
Insert key from external storage using SKS, Perform
digest operation on user supplied data.
#C2020 SHA2-384
Standard: [FIPS 180-4].
SHA2-384 N/A Request HSM self-test, Update firmware, Load
configuration update file, Configure partition for high-
available recovery / login, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
4 Legacy usage only. These legacy algorithms can only be used on data that was generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
28
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 SHA2-512
Standard: [FIPS 180-4].
SHA2-512 N/A Request HSM self-test, Clone SMK between partitions,
Enable/disable STM, Initialize role, Configure partition
for high-available recovery / login, Initialize Remote
PED Vector (RPV), Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair, Generate domain parameters,
Derive key from existing partition secret or private key
object, Import secret or private key using key
wrapping, Export secret or private key using key
wrapping, Perform digest operation on user supplied
data, Perform encrypt operation on user supplied
data object, Generate signature or MAC over user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA3-224
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHA3-224 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA3-256
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHA3-256 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA3-384
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHA3-384 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHA3-512
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHA3-512 N/A Request HSM self-test, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping, Perform digest operation on user
supplied data.
#C2020 SHAKE-128
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHAKE-128 N/A Request HSM self-test, Perform digest operation on
user supplied data.
#C2020 SHAKE-256
Standard:.[FIPS 202].
SHAKE-256 N/A Request HSM self-test, Perform digest operation on
user supplied data.
#C2020 Triple-DES-CBC
Standards:. [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
CBC 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping.
Legacy4 Decryption
#C2020 Triple-DES-CFB64
Standards: [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
CFB64 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object.
Legacy4 Decryption
Cryptographic Module Specification
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
29
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#C2020 Triple-DES-CFB8
Standards: [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
CFB8 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object.
Legacy4 Decryption
#C2020 Triple-DES-CMAC
Standards: [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38B].
CMAC (MAC verify only) 168-bits Request HSM self-test. Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
Legacy4 Verification
#C2020 Triple-DES-CTR
Standards:. [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
CTR 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping.
Legacy4 Decryption
#C2020 Triple-DES-ECB
Standards:. [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
ECB 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object, Import secret or private key
using key wrapping.
Legacy4 Decryption
#C2020 Triple-DES-OFB
Standards:. [SP800-67r2] and
[SP800-38A].
OFB 168-bits Request HSM self-test, Perform decrypt operation on
user supplied data object.
Legacy4 Decryption
#C2022 SHA2-384
Standard:. [FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-384 (Byte Only) N/A Request authentication and execution of main
firmware.
#A2125 KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC (Cert
#A2125) and CVL (Cert
#A2125))
Standards: [SP800-56Ar3],
and [SP800-135r1].
ephemeralUnified, and onePassDH with X9.63
KDF from [SP800-135r1] using SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Caveat: Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256-bits of
encryption strength.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC (Cert
#A2125) and KDA (Cert
#A2125))
Standards: [SP800-56Ar3] and
[SP800-56Cr2].
ephemeralUnified, and onePassDH with
OneStep KDF from [SP800-56Cr2]5 with
Auxiliary function: SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Caveat: Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256-bits of
encryption strength.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
5
available for use with the C_DeriveKey ICD command.
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Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method
Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s) Use / Function
#A2125 KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert
#A2125) and CVL (Cert
#A2125))
Standards: [SP800-56Ar3] and
[SP800-135r1].
Methods: dhHybrid1, dhEphem,
dhHybridOneFlow and dhOneFlow with X9.42
KDF from [SP800-135r1] using SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
Caveat: Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150-bits of
encryption strength.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#A2125 KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert
#A2125) and KDA (Cert
#A2125))
Standards: [SP800-56Ar3] and
[SP800-56Cr2].
Methods: dhHybrid1, dhEphem,
dhHybridOneFlow and dhOneFlow with
OneStep KDF from [SP800-56Cr2] with
Auxiliary function: SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
Caveat: Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150-bits of
encryption strength.
Request HSM self-test, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object.
#E97 Physical
[SP800-90B], [FIPS 180-4]
Live noise source Full Entropy Initialize the HSM, Create a user partition, Clone SMK
between partitions, Rollover SMK for a given partition,
Enable/disable STM, Request HSM self-test, Initialize
role, Configure partition for high-available recovery /
login, Initialize Remote PED Vector (RPV), Setup
Remote PED Session, Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair, Generate domain parameters,
Derive key from existing partition secret or private key
object, Export secret or private key using key
wrapping, Re-seed partition DRBG, Extract entropy
from DRBG, Perform encrypt operation on user
supplied data object, Generate signature or MAC over
user supplied data.
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Table 2-3: Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
CKG6
[SP800-133r2]
Vendor Affirmed Initialize the HSM, Create a user partition, Clone SMK between partitions, Rollover SMK for a
given partition, Initialize role, Change authentication data, Initialize Remote PED Vector (RPV),
Setup Remote PED Session, Generate local symmetric or asymmetric key-pair, Generate domain
parameters.
Table 2-4: Non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
Key Agreement Scheme
KAS-ECC-SSC
(Cert #A2125)
ephemeralUnified, fullUnified, onePassDH
When using Non-NIST curves from Table 2-6 and allowances from [FIPS 140-3 IG] C.A,
Use of Non-approved elliptic curves.
Derive key from existing partition
secret or private key object.
Key Transport
KTS (AES Cert.
#C2020)
Key unwrapping: key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
Uses allowances in [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.G, Key transport methods, for key unwrapping using
un-authenticated modes of encryption listed on Cert #C2020 without use of an additional
approved hash function.
Clone SMK between partitions,
Import secret or private key
using key wrapping.
Legacy4 Unwrapping
KTS (Triple-DES
Cert #C2020)
Key unwrapping: key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength.
Uses allowances in [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.G, Key transport methods, for key unwrapping using
un-authenticated modes of encryption listed on Cert #C2020 without use of an additional
approved hash function.
Import secret or private key
using key wrapping.
Legacy4 Unwrapping
Table 2-5: Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
N/A N/A N/A
6
Symmetric keys and seed for asymmetric key generation are created based on the direct output of the module DRBG (#C2020)
based on [SP800-133r2] using example 1 from section 4 and 6.1 where V is a string of binary zeroes and as such B =
V. Asymmetric Key pairs are generated based on [SP800-133r2], section 5.1 and 5.2 and using methods from [FIPS 186-4]. The
module supports derivation of keys from other keys as per [SP800-133r2], section 6.2.2, and supports the derivation of keys from
passwords using methods in 6.2.3 and [SP800-132] for storage encryption. Keys can also be recovered from key components
entered into the module using methods from [SP800-133r2], section 6.3 and both concatenation of components (option 1) or
Exclusive-Oring (option 2).
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Table 2-6: Supported non-NIST elliptic curve as per [FIPS 140-3] IG C.A
Curve Name
Curve Field Type
Definition Security Strength
Permitted Operations
Sign Verify Derive
Brainpool P512r1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 256-bits X X X
Brainpool P512t1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 256-bits X X X
Brainpool P-384r1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 192-bits X X X
Brainpool P-384t1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 192-bits X X X
Brainpool P320r1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 160-bits X X X
Brainpool P320t1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 160-bits X X X
secp256k1 Prime field – GF(p) [SEC 2]. 128-bits X X -
Brainpool P-256r1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 128-bits X X X
Brainpool P-256t1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 128-bits X X X
Brainpool P-224r1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 112-bits X X X
Brainpool P-224t1 Prime field – GF(p) [RFC 5639]. 112-bits X X X
2.5 Non-Approved Algorithms
Non-Approved security functions are not available for use when the module has been configured to operate in
the approved mode (see section 13.3 and 13.4).
The following table lists non-approved algorithms supported for use with certain user consumable services
when the module is configured in the non-Approved mode of operation during secure initialization.
NOTE The module is capable of supporting a single mode of operation. Transition from an
approved to non-approved mode of operation automatically triggers HSM zeroize module
service.
Table 2-7: Non-approved algorithms not allowed in the approved mode of operation.
Algorithm / Function Use / Function
Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
ARIA Perform decrypt operation on user supplied data
object, Perform encrypt operation on user
supplied data object, Derive key from existing
partition secret or private key object, Import
secret or private key using key wrapping.
CAST3
CAST5
DES
RC2
RC4
RC5
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Algorithm / Function Use / Function
RSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
RSA X.5097
SEED
SM4
Triple-DES (non-compliant for encrypt operations)
XOR8
Hashing
HAS-160 Derive key from existing partition secret or
private key object, Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data, Perform digest operation on
user supplied data.
KECCAK
MD2
MD5
RIPEMD-160
SM3
Message Authentication Code
AES-MAC Generate signature or MAC over user supplied
data, Verify signature or MAC over user supplied
data.
ARIA-CMAC
ARIA-MAC
CAST3-MAC
CAST5-MAC
COMP128
DES-MAC
HAS160-HMAC
HMAC (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
MD5-HMAC
MILENAGE
RC2-MAC
RC5-MAC
RIPEMD160-HMAC
SEED-CMAC
SEED-MAC
SM3-HMAC
SSL3-MD5-MAC
SSL3-SHA1-MAC
7
this algorithm allows RSA encryption of a supplied data object without the use of padding. Any required padding is added by the operator ahead
of supplying the data to this variant of the RSA encrypt/decrypt function.
8
this algorithm allows the operator to XOR supplied data with either a supplied base key or key derived from a base key. This function is
deprecated for use in any situation where security of the data or key is required.
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Algorithm / Function Use / Function
Triple-DES-CMAC (non-compliant for MAC generation)
Triple-DES-MAC
Triple-DES-x9.19-MAC
TUAK
Asymmetric
DSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength) Generate signature or MAC over user supplied
data, Verify signature or MAC over user supplied
data.
ECDSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
EdDSA
EdDSA PH
KCDSA
RSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
SM2
SM3
Key Derivation
AES9 Derive key from existing partition secret or
private key object.
ARIA
BIP32
DES
MD5
SHA10
SSL PRE-MASTER
SSL3-MASTER
SM3
Triple-DES
XOR11
Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology; non-compliant with
less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Derive key from existing partition secret or
private key object.
ECC (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Key Transport
AES12 Import secret or private key using key wrapping,
Export secret or private key using key wrapping.
ARIA
9
AES is non-approved for key derivation when used to derive keys using methods other than as permitted by NIST standard such as [SP800-
56Cr2] and [SP800-108r1] in particular, use of AES in ECB or CBC mode directly to derive keys.
10
SHA1, SHA2 and SHA3 are non-approved for key derivation when they are used to derive keys in a way that is non-compliant with NIST
standards such as [SP800-56Cr2], [SP800-108r1], [SP800-132] and [SP800-135r1].
11
XOR is non-approved for key derivation when selected as a mechanism to combine supplied user data with an existing module stored key.
12
AES is non-approved for key transport when used to encrypt keys using methods other than as permitted by NIST standards such as [SP800-
38F]. In particular, use of un-authenticated modes of AES for encryption without a separate authentication tag (e.g. signature or MAC) is non-
approved.
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Algorithm / Function Use / Function
CAST3
CAST5
DES
RC2
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology; non-compliant with less than
112 bits of encryption strength or when using PKCS#1, v1.5 padding)
RSA13
SEED
SM4
TDES
Asymmetric Key Generation
Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength) Generate local symmetric or asymmetric key-
pair, Generate domain parameters.
ECC (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
KCDSA
RSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
SM2
X9.42 Domain Parameter Generation
13
non-compliant when used for key transport using RSA variants that are [SP800-56Br2] non-compliant.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interface Overview
The following figure identifies the physical interfaces to the cryptographic module:
Cryptographic Boundary
BatteryExcluded
Top side view
Top view
Bottom side view
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
Smart Card reader
Power supply USB port
LCD touch screen
USB port
Right side view
7.7.2
Figure 3-1: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module physical interfaces.
NOTE The USB port on the right side of the figure is only present on the 808-000080-001
and 808-000080-002 versions on the hardware.
The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone hardware module in the small form factor device. The
cryptographic boundary of the module is shown above. The cryptographic boundary is defined to encompass
all components inside the enclosure, including the LCD touch screen panel.
The following table maps the physical interface to logical interfaces and supported data:
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Table 3-1: Ports and interfaces.
Physical port Logical interfaces Data that passes over port/interface
Top USB3 Type C port Data input interface, data output interface,
control input interface, status output interface
Diagnostics information when the firmware is
operational
Primary interface for user interaction with the
module using the ICD protocol as maps to PKCS #11
Encrypted channel for Thales Luna PED when
connected remotely
Right USB2 Type C port
(Only present on 808-
000080-001 and 808-000080-
002 versions of the
hardware)
Data input interface, data output interface,
control input interface, status output interface
Channel for the iKey when connected locally
Smart Card reader Data input interface, data output interface,
control input interface, status output interface
This is redundant interface not currently used by
the module. The interface is disabled in all current
configurations of the module
LCD Touch Screen Data input interface, data output interface,
control input interface, status output interface
During boot sequence:
 used to signal progress during the boot
process
General operation:
 Display useful information to the user
regarding the state of the device;
 Primary interface for user interaction when
the iKey is connected locally
Power supply 5V Power interface N/A
3.2 Trusted Channel
Trusted channel summary
Where CSP and authentication are not separately encrypted, these are exclusively passed into or output from
the module by a trusted channel.
The following trusted channels are defined for Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module:
 Physical Trusted Path (USB) – the local USB interface is considered a physical trusted path into the
module and is used to directly connect an iKey to the module.
 Authentication Trusted Path (LCD) – used for transport of authorization data from the user to the module.
All interfaces are only active for the input or output of CSPs in response to an active session over the ICD API.
The following sections describe each trusted path in more detail.
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Physical Trusted Path (USB)
If configured, the module can use an iKey as an external data input/output device for CSP and authentication
data. The iKey connects to the module’s rightmost USB port and is used to pass authentication data and CSPs
to and from the module via a physical trusted path. CSP’s and authentication data that are output to the iKey
are written to the iKey itself.
Authentication of the module by the iKey is done by physical means based on the direct physical connection of
the iKey to the Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module. All authentication data from the user is entered via the
module’s LCD screen.
Messages exchanged from the iKey and the module are encrypted using AES with a 256-bit key in CTR mode
alongside a MAC using HMAC-SHA2-256.
Authentication Trusted Path (LCD)
Authentication of the module is done using G7 UI via the liquid crystal display (LCD) of the Thales Luna G7
Cryptographic Module. This trusted channel is used as part of the identity based authorization scheme to
present the authentication data and is not separately authenticated.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module supports the following roles:
Table 4-1: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module Roles
Roles Principal Duties
HSM Security Officer (HSM SO)
[Admin Partition Role]
The HSM SO is responsible for managing the HSM. As such, the HSM SO is authorized to install and
configure the HSM and set and maintain global HSM security policies. He/she is also able to request
the load of new HSM firmware update files (FUF) and new Configuration Update Files (CUF).
The HSM SO is able to create and delete partitions, but is not authorized to generate, load or use
keys stored on the user partitions that have been created.
The HSM SO is able to create, manage and use keys created in the Admin Partition alongside is
responsible for initializing the ‘Administrator role’. The HSM SO can reset the Administrator
password (configuration dependent).
The HSM SO is responsible for selecting the authentication method during the HSM initialization.
The HSM can have only one HSM SO.
Administrator
[Admin Partition Role]
The Administrator is authorized to create, use, transfer and destroy key objects contained in the
Admin partition. This role has privileges that are a subset of the HSM SO role.
Partition Security Officer (Partition
SO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition SO creates the partition level Partition CO role, sets and changes partition-level
policies. This role also has an option to reset the Partition CO password (configuration dependent)
following lockout.
Partition Crypto Officer (Partition
CO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition CO role is authorized to create, use, destroy and transfer key objects for a given
partition. The Partition CO can optionally create the Partition LCO and Partition CU, and perform
initial assignment of key authorization data.
Partition Limited Crypto Officer
(Partition LCO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition LCO is an optional partition role authorized to create and use key objects, and perform
initial assignment of key authorization data. The role is only permitted to delete key objects where
per-key authorization is used and the correct authorization data for a given key object can be
presented to the cryptographic module.
Partition Crypto User (Partition CU)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition CU is the partition role authorized to use the key objects within the partition (e.g. sign,
encrypt/decrypt).
Audit User (AU)
[Admin Partition Role]
The AU initializes the secret key used to generate Message Authentication Code (MAC) for secure
audit messages alongside configuring logging levels for the HSM.
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Roles Principal Duties
Public User
[Admin or User Partition Role]
Unauthenticated user with limited access to perform signature verification with public keys where
CKA_PRIVATE = false, initialization of the module and roles and to read module status.
The act of logging into the roles can be found in section 13.7.
The mapping of the cryptographic module’s roles services can be found in the table below. In this table, ‘Any
role’ in the ‘role’ column signifies that any role identified in Table 4-1: Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module
Roles can access the corresponding service. This includes the ‘public user’ that is an implicit role and
unauthenticated by the module.
Table 4-2: Roles, Services, Input and Output.
Role Service Input Output
HSM Management
Any role HSM Factory Reset - -
Any role Initialize the HSM session, user ID, label,
domain, authentication
data (if password
authentication)
authentication data (if PED authentication),
return code
HSM SO Create a user partition session, label return code
HSM SO Delete a user partition session return code
Any role Query HSM status status information type status data, return code
Any role Query partition status status information type status data, return code
Any role Query HSM configuration hsm policy number policy status
Any role Query partition
configuration
partition policy numbers policy status
HSM SO Set HSM policy hsm policy number, value return code
HSM SO (admin partition)
Partition SO (user partition)
Set partition policy partition policy number,
value
return code
HSM SO Update firmware session, signed firmware
image
return code
Any role Protect object integrity object handle Return code
Any role HSM zeroize session return code
Any role Trigger user partition
zeroize
session return code
HSM SO Load configuration update
file
session, signed
configuration update image
return code
Any role Query the audit log status session audit log status, return code
Any role Generate secure log record session and app_ID,
message to log, message
type
return code
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Role Service Input Output
Any role Submit external messages
for entry into secure audit
log
session, message to be
logged
return code
AU Configure the audit log Session, log configuration
parameter and value
return code
AU Export/import audit log
secret key
session, wrapped log secret
(import only)
wrapped log secret (export only), return code
AU Set time on HSM real time
clock
session, time return code
AU Validate the audit log session, audit log segment,
audit log key ID
return code
HSM SO, Partition CO Clone SMK between
partitions
session, SMK ID return code
HSM SO, Partition CO Rollover SMK for a given
partition
session, SMK ID return code
Any role Enable/disable STM verification data (disable) verification data (enable), calculated
fingerprint (disabled), return code
Any role Request HSM self-test session, self-test ID return code
Role Management
Any role Query role status session, role role status, return code
HSM SO (required to
initialize Administrator)
HSM SO, Administrator,
AU, Partition SO, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition
CU, Public User (required
to initialize HSM SO, AU or
Partition SO)
Partition SO (required to
initialize Partition LCO or
Partition CU)
Initialize role session, user ID, role ID,
authentication data (if
password authentication)
authentication data (if PED configuration),
return code
HSM SO (required to
change HSM SO)
AU (required to change AU)
HSM SO or Administrator
(required to change
Administrator)
Partition SO (required to
change Partition SO and
Partition CO)
Partition CO or Partition
LCO (required to change
Partition LCO)
Note: Roles are not
changed, only the role
authentication data
Change authentication data session, user ID, role ID,
authentication data
authentication data (if PED configuration),
return code
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Role Service Input Output
HSM SO, Administrator,
AU, Partition SO, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition
CU
Configure partition for high-
available recovery / login
session, HA Login key
handle
return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
AU, Partition SO, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition
CU
Login as role session, role ID,
authentication data
return code
Any role Close authenticated
sessions
- return code
Luna PED Configuration
HSM SO Initialize Remote PED
Vector (RPV)
- return code
Any role Setup Remote PED Session PED_ID return code
Any role Send or receive data over
PED tunnel (remote PED)
when receiving data:
plaintext payload
when sending data: return
code
when sending data: plaintext payload
when receiving data: return code
Key Management Activities
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO
Generate local symmetric
or asymmetric key-pair
session, generation
algorithm, algorithm
parameters, public key
attributes, private key
attributes
public key handle, private key handle, return
code
Any role Generate domain
parameters
session, generation
algorithm, algorithm
parameters
domain object handle, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO
Derive key from existing
partition secret or private
key object
session, algorithm,
algorithm parameters, key
handles for input
derivation keys
key handle for resulting key, return code
Any role Import public key,
certificate, domain object
or data objects
session, object for import imported object handle, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO
Import secret or private key
using key wrapping
session, unwrapping
algorithm, algorithm
parameters, handle of
wrapping key (asymmetric),
handle of key to be
unwrapped
unwrapped key handle, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO
Export secret or private key
using key wrapping
session, wrapping
algorithm, algorithm
parameters, handle of
wrapping key, handle of
key to be wrapped
wrapped key, return code
Any role Read non-sensitive key
attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE = false
for a given key object
session, object attributes object data, return code
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Role Service Input Output
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU, Public User
Read non-sensitive key
attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE = true
for a given key object
session, object attributes object data, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Insert key from external
storage using SKS
session, SKS key blob inserted key object handle, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Extract key to external
storage using SKS
session, key handle SKS key blob, return code
Cryptographic Services
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition SO, Partition CO,
Partition LCO, Partition CU
Re-seed partition DRBG session, seed return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition SO, Partition CO,
Partition LCO, Partition CU
Extract entropy from DRBG session, size of random
data requested
random data, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition SO, Partition CO,
Partition LCO, Partition CU
Perform digest operation
on user supplied data
session, data to hash hash result, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Perform encrypt operation
on user supplied data
object
session, algorithm,
algorithm parameters, data
to encrypt
encrypted data, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Perform decrypt operation
on user supplied data
object
session, algorithm,
algorithm parameters, data
to decrypt
decrypted data, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Generate signature or MAC
over user supplied data.
session, algorithm,
algorithm parameters, data
to sign
signature, return code
HSM SO, Administrator,
Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU
Verify signature or MAC
over user supplied data
session, algorithm,
algorithm parameters, data
to verify, signature
return code
Bootloader Services
Any role Request complete erase of
the HSM main firmware
image and key stores
(excludes erase of
bootloader)
- -
Any role Request authentication and
execution of main firmware
- -
4.2 Roles and Authentication
Authentication Mechanism Summary
All users, except for the Public User, must authenticate to the module using identity-based authentication.
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If configured with PED, all roles must authenticate using an iKey. The iKey can be connected directly to the
device or to the Luna PED device. In case of Luna PED, the connection needs to be done over the Remote
PED channel. When a role is initialized, a module generates the authentication data as a 48-byte random value
and writes it to an iKey. Optionally, the Crypto-Officer, Limited Crypto Officer and Crypto-User roles can be
configured to use two-factor authentication by also assigning a password to the role.
If configured with Password, all roles must authenticate using a minimum of an 8-character password. When a
role is initialized under this configuration, the operator enters the initial password for the role.
Regardless of configuration (PED or Password), the password is delivered to the module encrypted with the
public key from the Password Encryption Certificate (PEC) using KTS-OAEP-basic from [SP800-56Br2].
Table 4-3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role
Authentication Method [SP800-140E]
Authentication Strength
Password
Configuration
PED Configuration
HSM SO Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device iKey: 48-byte random authentication data generated when a
role is initialized and stored on iKey. The probability of guessing
the authentication data in a single attempt is 1 in 2384. With a
maximum of 6000 failed login attempts per minute.
User provided byte array (minimum 8 bytes): Memorized secret
are limited to a character set of 86 characters14 presented to the
module as there ASCII byte representation. The strength of an 8
character password with character set size of 86 is log2(868).
This makes the probability of guessing the memorized secret in a
single attempt 1 in 251 The module supports a maximum of
6000 failed login attempts per minute when the failed login
count for a given role is disabled.
Automatic lock-out: This feature, which is enabled by default,
can be used to limit the impact of brute force attacks on login
and is covered in more detail in section 4.2.3.
Auditor Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
Partition SO Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
Partition CO Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
+ optional Memorized
Secret
Partition LCO Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
+ optional Memorized
Secret
Partition CU Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
+ optional Memorized
Secret
Administrator Memorized
Secret
Multi-Factor Crypto Device
Public User Not Required N/A N/A
When using the password authentication mechanism, the module encrypts a known check-word under a key
derived using PBKDF from [SP800-132] and option 1a from section 5.4, ‘Using the Derived Master Key to
Protect Data’. During a login attempt, the module generates a key from the supplied password, and attempts to
decrypt a known checkword. Successful login is achieved if the decrypted checkword matches the expected
value. If successful, the PBKDF derived key is used to remove a layer of encryption from the module stored
User Storage Key (USK)15.
The length of the password used as input to the PBKDF function is consistent with the password length
selected by the authenticating user, which is required to be between 8 and 255 characters long. Where
passwords are randomly generated, the probability of successfully guessing the password and deriving the
storage key for a minimum password length of 8 characters is 1 in 251. This probability is significantly reduced if
random passwords are not used.
14
Supported characters in memorized secret are limited to:
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789 !@#$%^*()-_=+[]{}/:',.~
15
When ‘decommission’ is enabled as a module capability, the USK is independently encrypted in storage under a 256-bit module generated AES
key.
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Guidance in Appendix A, ‘Security Considerations’ of [SP800-132] should be consulted when picking an
appropriate password length in situations where encryption layers derived from the user password are required
to protect the confidentiality of module protected user keys.
The module uses an iteration count of 1000 when generating the key used to decrypt the checkword. This limit
has been set to account for the fact that objects encrypted under the [SP800-132] derived key are never
exported from the module and are exclusively stored inside its cryptographic boundary where they are
physically protected. In addition, the module supports lock-out of all identities following a configurable number
of failed login attempts where this is the primary mechanism offered by the module to protect against brute-
forcing of memorized secret.
Activation
If PED authentication is configured, the Crypto-Officer, Limited Crypto Officer and Crypto-User roles can be
configured to use a two-step authentication process. The first stage is termed “Activation” and is performed
using an iKey. Once activated, access to key material and cryptographic services is not allowed until the
second stage of authentication, ‘User Login’, has been performed using the role’s password.
Once activated, a role stays activated until the role is explicitly deactivated, deleted or the module is reset16.
Account lockout behaviours
In addition to the cryptographic strength of the authentication mechanisms, all authenticating roles have the
ability to maintain a failed authentication count that can be configured to stop attempts to brute force
authentication data.
The maximum supported failed authentication attempts can be set to between 3 and 10 for each role with the
following lockout behaviours observed:
 lockout of the HSM SO role will trigger the HSM zeroize service;
 lockout of the Partition SO will trigger the Trigger user partition zeroize service; and
 lockout of the Administrator, AU, Partition CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU roles will block future
authentication attempts until the role is unlocked using the Change authentication data service.
4.3 Approved Services
All services listed in the table below can be accessed in approved mode and when in this mode exclusively
use the security functions listed in Table 2-2 and Table 2-6.
When the module is operating in this mode, security functions in Table 2-7 are disabled and blocked from being
used.
As notes on the content of Table 4-4: Approved Services:
 In the ‘Approved Security Functions’ column:
• ‘Algorithms’ maps the target service to cryptography from standards referenced in [SP800-140Cr2]
alongside corresponding CAVP certificates from Table 2-2 or ‘non-Approved but Allowed’ cryptography
from Table 2-6.
16
A module is reset in response to a trigger signal being received on a request from a host application.
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• ‘Key Management technique’ maps the target service to cryptography from standards referenced in
[SP800-140Dr2] alongside corresponding CAVP certificates from Table 2-2 or ‘non-Approved but
Allowed’ cryptography from Table 2-6.
• ‘Authentication Technique’ lists the permitted authentication mechanism as specified in [SP800-140E];
• For RSA, ECDSA and AES-KW, where multiple algorithms may be used based on module settings as
covered in Table 2-2 only the primary implementation is listed in the table.
 In the ‘Roles Column’:
• ‘Any role’ maps to all defined roles for the module. This includes HSM SO, Administrator, AU, Partition
SO, Partition CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU and Public User.
 In the ‘Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs’ column:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP;
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output);
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module;
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation; and
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
 In the ‘Indicator Column’:
• IND_1:
− For USB HSM – Partition Policy (43), Allow non-FIPS Algorithms is set to disabled AND HSM
Policy (56), Allow User Defined ECC Curves is set to disabled AND return code is CKR_OK; or
− For Backup HSM – HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted Restore is set to enabled AND return
code is CKR_OK; and
• IND_2:
− For USB HSM – Partition Policy (43), Allow non-FIPS Algorithms is set to disabled AND HSM
Policy (56), Allow User Defined ECC Curves is set to disabled AND return code is PED_RET_OK
or SP_RET_OK.; or
− For Backup HSM – HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted Restore is set to enabled AND return
code is PED_RET_OK or SP_RET_OK.
• IND_3:
− For USB HSM – Partition Policy (43) Allow non-FIPS Algorithms is set to disabled AND HSM
Policy (56), Allow User Defined ECC Curves is set to disabled AND return code is 0; or
For Backup HSM – HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted Restore is set to enabled AND return code is
0.
 In the ‘Keys and/or SSPs’ column:
• For a complete description of SSP referenced from the table, see Table 9-1.
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
HSM Management
HSM Factory Reset Factory reset deletes all roles
(including HSM SO), all users
and objects and sets all HSM
settings and policy to values
defined in pre-loaded
configuration update files.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
CITS-DAC, CITS-DAK, ECC
DAC, Secure Audit AccessID-
HMAC Key, PSK, USK, DRBG C,
DRBG V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, , KCV, SMK,
HAPUB, HAPK, RND,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), SALK, CWKHSM, CWKPED,
DEKHSM, DMKHSM, DEKPED,
DMKPED, , AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
Any role Z: (for ALL partition)
CITS-DAC, CITS-DAK, ECC
DAC, Secure Audit
AccessID-HMAC Key, PSK,
USK, DRBG C, DRBG V, KCV,
SMK.HAPUB, HAPK, RND,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
In addition, the following
HSM level keys are erased:
SALK, CWKHSM, CWKPED,
DEKHSM, DMKHSM, DEKPED,
DMKPED
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Initialize the HSM This service is used to initialize
the HSM on first use or
following zeroization.
Actions performed by this
service include:
 resets the admin partition;
 deletes all user partitions;
 initializes the HSM SO role;
 creates / selects KCV to be
used with the admin
partition;
 generates PEC, PEK, USK
and PSK keys for the
admin partition; and
 encrypts keys for storage
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), CKG,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), SHA
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
PBKDF (Cert #A2125),
KBKDF (Cert #C2020)
Authentication
technique: N/A
For ALL partition if present –
HOK, USK, PSK, SMK,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
For user partitions: HAPUB,
HAPK (for all roles)
For admin partition - HAPUB,
HAPK for Admin role only
PEK, PEC, USK, PSK, DRBG C,
DRBG V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, , KCV. PSK,
USK, GSK, User Password,
Password, PED
Authentication Data, Stored
User Password Hash, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
Any role Z: For ALL partition if
present – USK, PSK, SMK,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
For User Partitions –HAPUB,
HAPK (for all roles)
For Admin Partition –HAPUB,
HAPK for Admin role only
G and W: PEK, PEC, USK,
PSK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, KCV, Stored
User Password Hash
G: PED Authentication
Data, User Password
E: HOK, User Password, PED
Authentication Data,
Password, PSK, USK, GSK,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
Create a user partition This service creates a user
partition at the request of the
HSM SO.
The user partition is created in
memory but roles associated
with the partition are retained
in an un-initialized state.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed ,
KCV, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID..
HSM SO G: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed
W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed. KCV
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Delete a user partition This service is used to delete an
existing user partition.
During deletion, the module
zeroizes all objects associated
with the partition.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
PSK, USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, KCV, SMK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
HSM SO Z: PSK, USK, DRBG C, DRBG
V, KCV, SMK, Asymmetric
Key Pairs (general partition
or session keys), Symmetric
Keys (general partition or
session keys)
IND_1
Query HSM status This service is used to retrieve
general status information on
the module including items
such as:
 hardware, bootloader and
main firmware versions;
 module serial number;
 module state (e.g.,
zeroized, initialized);
 authenticated roles for
active session (if present);
 number of configured
partitions; and
 general error messages
and logs.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID IND_1
Query partition status This service is used to retrieve
general status information on a
target partition including items
such as:
 partition label and serial
number;
 partition state (e.g. iKey
initialized, user initialized,
login required);
 Active SMK ID.
 number of stored objects;
and
 used and free storage
space.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Query HSM configuration This service is used to retrieve
information on HSM
configuration and policy
settings.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Query partition
configuration
This service is used to retrieve
information on the
configuration and policy
settings for a target partition.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Set HSM policy This service is used to set
available HSM policy settings.
HSM policy can only be
configured if the corresponding
configuration item is enabled
which is defined based on
loaded configuration update
files.
If a given policy being set is a
‘destructive policy’ – changing
the setting will trigger
zeroization of the module.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), USK, PSK, KCV, SMK,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID..
HSM SO Z: for all destructive
policies - Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), Symmetric
Keys (general partition or
session keys), USK, PSK,
KCV
IND_1
Set partition policy This service is used to set
available partition policy
settings.
Partition policy can only be
configured if dependencies at
the HSM level of configurations
and policy are met.
If a given policy being set is a
destructive policy – changing
the setting will trigger
zeroization of all user objects
stored in the admin partition.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), SMK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
HSM SO (admin
partition)
Partition SO (user
partition)
Z: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), SMK.
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Update firmware This service validates and then
loads a new module main
firmware image (excluding
bootloader).
The replacement image is
signed using RSA PKCS #1-v1.5
signature using SHA2-384 and
4096-bit modulus.
Algorithms: RSA (Cert
#A674) – Signature
Verification, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
384
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Root Certificate, Firmware
Signing Certificate, AEK, AEK-
EK, AccessID.
HSM SO E: Root Certificate,
Firmware Signing
Certificate, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
IND_1
Protect object integrity This is an internal module
service used to protect the
integrity of all stored object
and configuration data.
All objects are stored with a
SHA2-256 hash, which is
checked on retrieval ahead of
object use.
Algorithms: SHA (Cert
#C2020) - SHA2-256
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
HSM zeroize This service zeroizes the
module with the exception of
the following:
 SSP associated with the
Audit partition and AU
role are not zeroized;
 RPV persists allowing use
of remote PED during re-
initialization.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
<As per service ‘HSM factory
reset’ above but excluding:
SALK, RPV>
Any role Z: <As per service ‘HSM
Factory reset’ above but
excluding: SALK, RPV>
IND_1
Trigger user partition
zeroize
This service erases of keys
stored in a user partition and
resets Any role to their un-
initialized state.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK, PSK, KCV, SMK, HAPUB,
HAPK, RND, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
Any role Z: USK, PSK, KCV, SMK,
HAPUB, HAPK, RND,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys)
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Load configuration
update file
This service validated the
signature on a loaded
configuration update file ahead
of its contents being stored on
the module. The configuration
update file defines the default
settings for one or a number of
HSM or Partition level
configuration and policy
settings.
Configuration update files are
signed using RSA PKCS #1-v1.5
signature using SHA2-384 and
4096-bit modulus.
Algorithms: RSA (Cert
#A674) – Signature
Verification, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
384
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Root Certificate and
Capability Signing Certificate,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO E: Root Certificate,
Capability Signing
Certificate, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
IND_1
Query the audit log status This service is used to retrieve
general status information on
the secure audit log.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Generate secure log
record
This is an internal module
service to the cryptographic
module used to add records to
the secure audit log.
AccessID are hashed with
SHA2-512 ahead of inclusion in
the log. Records are given a
MAC using HMAC-SHA2-256.
Algorithms: HMAC
(Cert #C2020) –
HMAC-SHA2-256, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
256, SHA2-512
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
SALK, Secure Audit AccessID-
HMAC, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
Any role E: SALK will be used if AU
role initialised, Secure Audit
AccessID-HMAC, AEK, AEK-
EK, AccessID.
IND_1
Submit external messages
for entry into secure
audit log
The service is used by
processes running outside the
boundary of the module to
submit entries to the module
audit log.
Entries are identified in the log
as having come from an
external source.
Algorithms: HMAC
(Cert #C2020) –
HMAC-SHA2-256, SHA
(Cert #C2020– SHA2-
256, SHA2-512
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
SALK, Secure Audit AccessID-
HMAC, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
Any role E: SALK will be used if AU
role initialised, Secure Audit
AccessID-HMAC, AEK, AEK-
EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Configure the audit log This service is used to configure
which audit events are to be
recorded in the secure audit log
and in addition to configure the
location of the secure logging
daemon used to extract log
sections from the module.
Events are selected based on
logging categories assigned to
different services with some
events always logged
unconditionally (e.g. tamper
events and self-test failures).
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. AU E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Export/import audit log
secret key
This service exports or imports
and encrypted copy of the
SALK.
This service can be used to
allow validation of the
authenticity of extracted log
sections between modules.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key,
KBKDF (Cert #C2020)
Authentication
technique: N/A
RDK, SALK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
AU E: RDK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
R: SALK
IND_1
Set time on HSM real
time clock
This service sets the time on
the module real time clock as
used for time-stamps in the
secure audit log alongside
enforcing the validity dates on
keys.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. AU E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Validate the audit log This service checks both the
integrity and authenticity of
extracted sections of the secure
module audit log.
Algorithms: HMAC
(Cert #C2020) –
HMAC-SHA2-256, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
256
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
SALK, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. AU E: SALK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
54
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Clone SMK between
partitions
This service uses the cloning
protocol to establish a shared
key between source and
destination partitions and then
to transfer a selected SMK
encrypted under this shared
key between partitions.
CPV3 is supported for both
import and export of SMK
Algorithms:
CPV3: HASH_DRBG
(Cert #A2125), AES
(Cert #C2020) – AES-
256 in KWP
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512
CPV3 - KAS (Cert
#A2125 – KAS1-basic
using 4096-bit
modulus and OneStep
KDF (with pre-shared
256-bit key as
additional input) with
SHA2-512
Authentication
technique: Single-
Factor Crypto
Software
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
Root Certificate, MIC, HOC
and TUK4, TWC4, KEVt, KCV
and Cloning Transfer Key,
SMK, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID
HSM SO is able to
clone (or receive)
the SMK from/to
the Admin Partition
Partition CO is able
to clone (or receive)
the SMK from/to
the user partition
E: DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
Root Certificate, MIC and
TUK4, TWC4, KEVt, KCV and
Cloning Transfer Key, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
R/W: SMK.
G: KEVt, Cloning Transfer
Key, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Rollover SMK for a given
partition
This service generates a new
SMK and demotes the current
SMK.
One transfer of all externally
stored keys to the new SMK is
complete, this service can
separately be used to zeroize
the old SMK.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, SMK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO, Partition
CO
E: USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: SMK, DRBG C, DRBG
V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
55
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Enable/disable STM This service generates or
validates a checksum for full
module integrity. This includes
integrity of all data stored in
memory (includes all keys,
executables, configuration data
etc).
Typically, the feature is used to
guarantee storage integrity
during shipping or an extended
period of storage. The feature
generates a seed and checksum
that are stored outside the
module by the user activating
STM.
Algorithms: SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
256
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed
(DRBG only used to create
STM), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
Modules in
zeroized State: Any
role
Initialized Module:
HSM SO
E: DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed
(DRBG only used to create
STM), AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Request HSM self-test This service allows components
of the power-on self-test to be
triggered on demand.
The service supports re-run of
the entire power-on self-test
alongside selection of
individual tests to re-run.
Algorithms: <All
general algorithms
from listed in Table
2-2 and Table 2-6
above>
Key management
technique: <All Key
Establishment and
Key Transport
methods from listed
in Table 2-2 and Table
2-6 above>
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Role Management
Query role status This service returns status in
relation to a target role (e.g.
whether the role is initialized or
not).
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
56
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Initialize role This service is used to initialize
a role (admin partition or user
partition).
Privileges required to initialize
a role are dependent on the
role being initialized.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
256
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), PBKDF (Cert
#A2125), KBKDF (Cert
#C2020)
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data, User
Password (if challenge-secret
enabled), Password, Stored
User Password Hash, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO (required
to initialize
Administrator)
Any role (required
to initialize HSM SO,
AU or Partition SO)
Partition SO
(required to
initialize Partition
LCO or Partition CU)
E: DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, PEK, PEC,
PED Authentication Data,
Stored User Password Hash
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
IND_1
Change authentication
data
This service is used to change
authentication data for a given
role (admin partition or user
partition).
Privileges required to change
the authentication data are
dependent on the target role
and HSM configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: PBKDF
(Cert #A2125), KBKDF
(Cert #C2020), CKG
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data, User
Password (if challenge-secret
enabled), Password, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO (required
to change HSM SO)
AU (required to
change AU)
HSM SO or
Administrator
(required to change
Administrator)
Partition SO
(required to change
Partition SO and
Partition CO)
Partition CO or
Partition LCO
(required to change
Partition LCO)
R: USK
E: KEK, PEK (if password
authentication used), PED
Authentication Data, Stored
User Password Hash (if
challenge-secret enabled),
Password, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
W: USK, Stored User
Password Hash.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
57
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Configure partition for
high-available recovery /
login
This service is used to setup,
authorize and use the high-
availability recovery feature for
partitions.
A given role can only configure
this feature for the role they
are assuming for a given
session.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key, RSA
(Cert #C2020) – RSA
PKCS #1-v1.5
signature validation
with SHA2-384 and
4096-bit modulus,
SHA (Cert #C2020) –
SHA2-256, SHA2-384
and SHA2-512
Key management
technique: ESV (Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), KAS (Cert
#A2125) – KAS1-basic
with 4096-bit
modulus, OneStep
KDF with SHA2-512,
AES (Cert #C2020) –
KWP mode with 256-
bit key
Authentication
technique: Single-
Factor Crypto
Software
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed.
HAPUB, HAPK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed.RND, Ksess, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator, AU,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
W: HAPUB, HAPK,
G: RND, Ksess.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
58
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Login as role This service is used to login as a
given role to a session setup
between the client and a target
partition.
Following successful login, the
authentication state for the
associated session will be
changed to that of the
successfully authenticated role.
Following login, the
authentication state of the
session is used check and track
privileges associated with the
role.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
256
Key management
technique: PBKDF
(Cert #A2125), KBKDF
(Cert #C2020), ESV
(Cert #E97),
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique:
Memorized Secret,
Multi-Factor Crypto
Device
KEK, PEK (if password
authentication used), PEN,
PED Authentication Data,
User Password (if challenge-
secret enabled), Password,
recovered USK, PSK, KCV,
GSK, SMK (if configured) (on
successful presentation of
correct login credentials),
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator, AU,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: KEK, PEK (if password
authentication used), PED
Authentication Data, User
Password (if challenge-
secret enabled), Password,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
G/W: PEN.
W: recovered USK, PSK,
KCV, GSK, SMK (if
configured) (on successful
presentation of correct
login credentials).
IND_1
Close authenticated
sessions
The service closes
authenticated sessions on the
request of the user.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK, PSK, KCV, GSK, SMK (if
configured) AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (session keys),
Symmetric Keys (session
keys)
Any role Z: USK, PSK, KCV, GSK, SMK
(if configured), Asymmetric
Key Pairs (session keys),
Symmetric Keys (session
keys).
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
59
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Luna PED Configuration
Initialize Remote PED
Vector (RPV)
This service triggers creation of
the module Remote PED
Vector.
As part of this service, keys
used by the PED for remote
PED setup are written to an
orange iKey connected to
Thales Luna PED during
initiation of the service.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), ECDSA (Cert
#C2020) – Key
Generation and
Signature Generation
over curve P-521
Authentication
technique: Single-
Factor Crypto
Software, Multi-
Factor Crypto Device
ECC HOK, PAK, DRBG C, DRBG
V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, HSM-SKA-
CREMOTE, GSK, RPV, RPV-C,
RPV-K, PED-SKA-C and PED-
SKA-K, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO E: ECC HOK, PAK, GSK, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
G: PED-SKA-C and PED-SKA-
K.
W: RPV, RPV-C, RPV-K.
G/W: HSM-SKA-CREMOTE,
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
60
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Setup Remote PED
Session
This service is used to derive a
number of shared keys
between the module and a
remote Thales Luna PED.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), KAS (Cert
#A2125) – Derivation:
fullUnified using
curve P-521 with full
key validation, key-
pair generation, KDF:
OneStep using SHA2-
512, Key
Confirmation: HMAC
with 256-bit key,
ECDSA (Cert #C2020)
– signature
generation and
validation using P-521
and SHA2-512, SHA
(Cert #C2020) – SHA2-
512
Authentication
technique: N/A
ECC MIC, ECC-HOCPED, IVHSM,
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
PAC, RPV-C, PED-SKA-C, PED-
EKA-C HSM-SKA-KREMOTE,
HSM-EKA-C, G: PED Master
Shared Secret, CWKHSM,
CWKPED, DEKHSM, DEKPED,
DMKHSM, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
Any role E: ECC MIC, ECC-HOCPED,
PAC, RPV-C, PED-SKA-C,
PED-EKA-C HSM-SKA-
KREMOTE, HSM-EKA-C, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
G: HSM-EKA-K, HSM-EKA-C,
PED Master Shared Secret,
DEKHSM, DEKPED, DMKHSM,
CWKHSM, CWKPED.
W: DEKHSM, DEKPED,
DMKHSM, CWKHSM, CWKPED.
G/E: IVHSM
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_2
Send or receive data over
PED tunnel (remote PED)
This service is used following
setup of an appropriate remote
PED tunnel in order to transmit
encrypted authentication data
over the PED tunnel.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key, CTR
mode with 256-bit
key, HMAC (Cert
#C2020) – HMAC-
SHA2-256, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-256
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
DEKHSM, DEKPED, DMKPED
CWKHSM, CWKPED, IVPED
Any role E: DEKHSM, DEKPED, DMKPED,
CWKHSM, CWKPED, IVPED.
IND_2
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
61
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Key Management Activities
Generate local symmetric
or asymmetric key-pair
This service is used to generate
symmetric keys or asymmetric
key pairs requested by the end-
user and stored in the
cryptographic module for use
with other user consumable
cryptographic services or to
export to other cryptographic
modules or systems.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), RSA (Cert
#C2020) – Key
Generation (all
supported methods
and curves), ECDSA
(Cert #C2020 - Key
Generation (all
supported methods
and curves)
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), CITS-DAK, CITS-DAC,
ECC DAC, ECC DAK, DRBG C,
DRBG V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator (for
admin partition
keys)
Partition CO,
Partition LCO (for
user partition)
E: USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
W: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys).
E/W: CITS-DAK, CITS-DAC,
ECC DAC, ECC DAK.
IND_1
Generate domain
parameters17
This service is used to generate
domain parameters requested
by the end-user and stored in
the cryptographic module for
use with other user
consumable cryptographic
services or to export to other
cryptographic modules or
systems.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), CKG, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), DSA (Cert
#C2020) – Domain
parameter generation
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed. ,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
Any role E: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
17
Public users cannot generate any objects where either CKA_SENSITIVE or CKA_PRIVATE attributes are true.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
62
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Derive key from existing
partition secret or private
key object
This service is used to derive
keys based on other key
material stored in the module
or supplied to it on request of
the end-user.
Derived keys are stored in the
cryptographic module for use
with other user consumable
cryptographic services or to
export to other cryptographic
modules or systems.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), KBKDF (Cert
#C2020), KAS-ECC-SSC
(Cert #A2125), KAS-
FFC-SSC (Cert
#A2125), KDA (Cert
#A2125), CVL (Cert
#A2125) – X9.42 KDF
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), USK, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed. Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO
E: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), USK, DRBG C, DRBG
V, Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
W: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys).
IND_1
Import public key,
certificate, domain object
or data objects18
This service is used to import
public key, certificate, domain
object or data objects.
When importing objects, if the
CKA_PRIVATE or
CKA_SENSITIVE key attribute it
set to true, the object will not
be visible to the public user
following creation.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
Any role W: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys).
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
18
Public users cannot generate/import any objects where either CKA_SENSITIVE or CKA_PRIVATE attributes are true.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
63
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Import secret or private
key using key wrapping
This service is used to import
secret or private key from the
admin or user partitions using
key wrapping.
Unauthenticated symmetric
encryption is permitted for key
unwrapping under Uses
allowances in [FIPS 140-3 IG]
D.G, Key transport methods.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: KTS-IFC
(Cert #A2125) – KTS-
RSA-OAEP-basic with
any supported key
size, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – any
supported hash, RSA
(CVL Cert #C2020) –
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
wrapping, AES (Cert
#C2020) – all
supported key sizes
and modes ECB, CBC,
CTR, KW, KWP, Triple-
DES (Cert #C2020) –
all supported key
sizes and modes ECB,
CBC, CTR
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), USK. Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO
E: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), USK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
W: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys).
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000149-002 Rev. K, January 10, 2025, Copyright © 2025 Thales.
64
Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Export secret or private
key using key wrapping
This service is used to export
secret or private key from the
admin or user partitions using
key wrapping.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125), KTS-IFC
(Cert #A2125) – KTS-
RSA-OAEP-basic with
any supported key
size, RSA (CVL Cert
#C2020) – RSA PKCS
#1 v1.5 wrapping, AES
(Cert #C2020) – KW
and KWP modes
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys). Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, USK. , AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO
E: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, USK, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
R: Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys).
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Read non-sensitive key
attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE = false for
a given key object
This service is used to read key
attributes to public objects
stored by users in the admin or
user partition on the
cryptographic module.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. Any role E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Read non-sensitive key
attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE = true for a
given key object
This service is used to read key
attributes to objects stored by
users in the admin or user
partition on the cryptographic
module and marked as private.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Insert key from external
storage using SKS
This service is used to import
key objects previously
extracted from a Thales Luna
cryptographic module using
either the SIM or SKS feature of
the HSM for external storage.
SKS inserted keys are encrypted
under a key never exposed
outside the cryptographic
module.
Three formats of objects for
import are support:
 SIM2+ is used with SKS for
external storage of keys as
the latest format; and
 SIM2 and SIM3 are legacy
formats supported for
import (exclusively) of
keys historically extracted
from older cryptographic
modules.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), HASH_DRBG
(Cert #A2125)
SIM2+ Format
Objects: AES (Cert
#C2020) – GCM mode
with 256-bit key
SIM3 Format Objects:
AES (Cert #C2020) –
CBC mode with 256-
bit key, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-256
SIM2 Format Objects:
AES (Cert #C2020) –
CTR mode with 256-
bit key, SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA1
Authentication
technique: N/A
SMK, USK. Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID,
ESV, DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: SMK, USK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
W: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys).
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Extract key to external
storage using SKS
This service is used to export
key objects from the module
using the SKS feature to extract
key objects for external
storage.
SKS extracted keys are
encrypted under a key never
exposed outside the
cryptographic module.
One format for objects
extracted from the module is
supported:
 SIM2+ is used with SKS for
external storage of keys.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key,
HMAC (Cert #C2020)–
HMAC-SHA2-256, SHA
(Cert #C2020) –SHA2-
256, SHA2-384
Key management
technique:
AES (Cert #C2020) –
GCM mode with 256-
bit key
Authentication
technique: N/A
SMK, USK. Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: SMK, USK, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
R: Symmetric Keys (general
partition or session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys).
IND_1
Cryptographic Services
Re-seed partition DRBG This service is used by a user to
trigger a manual re-seed
operation of the DRBG.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E/G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
Extract entropy from
DRBG
This service is used by a user to
request and export entropy
from the DRBG.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), HASH_DRBG
(Cert #A2125
Authentication
technique: N/A
DRBG C, DRBG V, Entropy
Input String, Entropy Seed,
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E/G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
IND_1
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Perform digest operation
on user supplied data
This service is used by a user to
request a hash over a block of
supplied data.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: SHA (Cert
#C2020) – all hash
options supported,
SHA3 (Cert #C2020) –
all hash options
supported
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID. IND_1
Perform encrypt
operation on user
supplied data object
This service is used by a user to
request encryption of a block of
user-supplied data using a
module stored cryptographic
key.
Ciphertext resulting from the
service is returned the user and
not stored.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – all
supported modes and
key sizes.
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125) – X9.63 KDF
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed, AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed.
IND_1
Perform decrypt
operation on user
supplied data object
This service is used by a user to
request decryption of a block of
user-supplied data using a
module stored cryptographic
key.
Plaintext resulting from the
service is returned the user and
not stored.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: AES (Cert
#C2020) – all
supported modes and
key sizes, Triple-DES
(Cert #C2020) – all
supported modes and
key sizes
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys).
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Generate signature or
MAC over user supplied
data
This service is used by a user to
request a signature or MAC
over a block of user supplied
data (or optionally a user
supplied hash for signatures)
using a module stored
cryptographic key.
The resulting signature from
the operation is returned the
user and not stored.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: RSA (Cert
#C2020), ECDSA (Cert
#C2020), DSA (Cert
#C2020), HMAC (Cert
#C2020), CMAC (Cert
#C2020) – AES and
Triple-DES, AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: ESV Cert
#E97), SHA (Cert
#C2020) – SHA2-512,
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String, Entropy
Seed, AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), DRBG C,
DRBG V, Entropy Input
String, Entropy Seed, AEK,
AEK-EK, AccessID.
G/W: DRBG C, DRBG V,
Entropy Input String,
Entropy Seed
IND_1
Verify signature or MAC
over user supplied data
This service is used by a user to
request validation of a
signature or MAC over a block
of user-supplied data using a
module stored cryptographic
key.
The service returns whether
the validation was successful.
This service is not possible for
the Backup configuration.
Algorithms: RSA (Cert
#C2020), ECDSA (Cert
#C2020), DSA (Cert
#C2020), HMAC (Cert
#C2020), CMAC (Cert
#C2020) – AES and
Triple-DES, AES (Cert
#C2020) – KWP mode
with 256-bit key
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys), AEK, AEK-EK, AccessID.
HSM SO,
Administrator,
Partition SO,
Partition CO,
Partition LCO,
Partition CU
E: USK (if request requires
access to key in non-volatile
storage), Symmetric Keys
(general partition or session
keys) or Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition or
session keys), AEK, AEK-EK,
AccessID.
IND_1
Roles, Services, and Authentication
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Table 4-4: Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs Roles
Access Rights to Keys
and/or SSPs Indicator
Bootloader Services
Request complete erase
of the HSM main
firmware image and key
stores (excludes erase of
bootloader)
This service is used to recover
from corrupt main firmware
and is performed as a factory
operation.
Following erase, card needs to
repeat manufacturing process
including loading factory signed
keys before it can be
operational again.
Algorithms: N/A
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or session
keys)
Any role None IND_3
Request authentication
and execution of main
firmware
This service is used to launch
the main firmware for the
module following successful
validation by the bootloader.
Algorithms: RSA (Cert
#C2022) – RSA PKCS
#1 v1.5 signature
validation with
modulus length 4096,
SHA (Cert #C2022) –
SHA2-384
Key management
technique: N/A
Authentication
technique: N/A
Root Certificate and
Firmware Signing Certificate
Any role E: Root Certificate and
Firmware Signing
Certificate
IND_3
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4.4 Non-Approved Services
Non-approved services listed in the table below are not available when the module has been configured to
operate in the approved mode (see section 13.3 and 13.4).
As notes on the content of Table 4-5:
 In the ‘Indicator Column’:
• IND_1:
o For USB HSM – Partition Policy (43) Allow non-FIPS Algorithms is set to disabled
AND HSM Policy (56), Allow User Defined ECC Curves is set to disabled AND return
code is CKR_OK; or
o For Backup HSM – HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted Restore is set to enabled AND
return code is CKR_OK.
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Table 4-5: Non-Approved Services
Service Description Non-Approved Algorithms Accessed Roles Indicator
Cryptographic Services
Perform digest operation on
user supplied data
This service is used by a user to
request a hash over a block of
supplied data.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration
HAS-160, KECCAK, MD2, MD5, RIPEMD-160, SM3. HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
SO, Partition CO, Partition LCO,
Partition CU.
IND_1
Perform encrypt operation
on user supplied data object
This service is used by a user to
request encryption of a block of
user-supplied data using a module
stored cryptographic key.
Ciphertext resulting from the
service is returned the user and not
stored.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
ARIA, CAST3, CAST5, DES, RC2, RC4, RC5, RSA19, RSA X.509,
SEED, SM4, Triple-DES, XOR.
HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU.
IND_1
Perform decrypt operation
on user supplied data object
This service is used by a user to
request decryption of a block of
user-supplied data using a module
stored cryptographic key.
Plaintext resulting from the service
is returned the user and not stored.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
ARIA, CAST3, CAST5, DES, RC2, RC4, RC5, RSA20, RSA X.509,
SEED, SM4, Triple-DES21
, XOR.
HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU.
IND_1
Generate signature or MAC
over user supplied data
This service is used by a user to
request a signature or MAC over a
block of user supplied data (or
optionally a user supplied hash for
signatures) using a module stored
cryptographic key.
The resulting signature from the
operation is returned the user and
not stored.
Symmetric Algorithms: ARIA-CMAC, SEED-CMAC, Triple-DES-
CMAC, HMAC22, HAS160-MAC, MD5-HMAC, SM3-HMAC,
RIPEMD160-HMAC, AES-MAC, ARIA-MAC, CAST3-MAC, CAST5-
MAC, DES-MAC, RC2-MAC, RC5-MAC, SEED-MAC, SSL3-MD5-
MAC, SSL3-SHA1-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC, Triple-DES-x9.19-MAC,
TUAK, MILENAGE, COMP128.
HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU.
IND_1
19
RSA is non-compliant when using PKCS#1, v1.5 padding for encryption or decryption.
20
RSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
21
Triple-DES is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
22
HMAC is non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
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Table 4-5: Non-Approved Services
Service Description Non-Approved Algorithms Accessed Roles Indicator
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
Asymmetric Algorithms: DSA23, ECDSA24, EdDSA, EdDSA PH,
KCDSA, RSA25, SM2, SM3.
Verify signature or MAC over
user supplied data
This service is used by a user to
request validation of a signature or
MAC over a block of user-supplied
data using a module stored
cryptographic key.
The service returns whether the
validation was successful.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
Symmetric Algorithms: ARIA-CMAC, SEED-CMAC, Triple-DES-
CMAC26, HMAC27, HAS160-MAC, MD5-HMAC, SM3-HMAC,
RIPEMD160-HMAC, AES-MAC, ARIA-MAC, CAST3-MAC, CAST5-
MAC, DES-MAC, RC2-MAC, RC5-MAC, SEED-MAC, SSL3-MD5-
MAC, SSL3-SHA1-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC, Triple-DES-x9.19-MAC,
TUAK, MILENAGE, COMP128.
Asymmetric Algorithms: DSA28, ECDSA29, EdDSA, EdDSA PH,
KCDSA, RSA30, SM2, SM3.
HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO, Partition CU.
IND_1
Key Management Activities
Derive key from existing
partition secret or private
key object
This service is used to derive keys
based on other key material stored
in the module or supplied to it on
request of the end-user.
Derived keys are stored in the
cryptographic module for use with
other user consumable
cryptographic services or to export
to other cryptographic modules or
systems.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
AES31, ARIA, BIP32, DES, MD5, SHA, SSL PRE-MASTER, SSL3-
MASTER, SM3, Triple-DES, XOR.
HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO.
IND_1
23
DSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
24
ECDSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
25
RSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
26
Triple-DES-CMAC is non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
27
HMAC is non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
28
DSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
29
ECDSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
30
RSA is non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
31
AES is non-approved for key derivation when use to derive keys using methods other than as permitted by NIST standard such as [SP800-56Cr2] and [SP800-108r1] in particular, use of AES in ECB or CBC
mode directly to derive keys.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
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Table 4-5: Non-Approved Services
Service Description Non-Approved Algorithms Accessed Roles Indicator
Generate local symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair
This service is used to generate
symmetric keys or asymmetric key
pairs requested by the end-user and
stored in the cryptographic module
for use with other user consumable
cryptographic services or to export
to other cryptographic modules or
systems.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration
Diffie-Hellman32, ECC33, KCDSA, RSA34, SM2. HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO.
IND_1
Import secret or private key
using key wrapping
This service is used to import secret
or private key from the admin or
user partitions using key wrapping
Unauthenticated symmetric
encryption is permitted for key
unwrapping under Uses allowances
in [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.G, Key transport
methods.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
ARIA, CAST3, CAST5, DES, RC2, RSA35, SEED, SM4. HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO.
IND_1
Export secret or private key
using key wrapping
This service is used to export secret
or private key from the admin or
user partitions using key wrapping.
This service is not possible for the
Backup configuration.
AES36, ARIA, CAST3, CAST5, DES, RC2, RSA, SEED, SM4, TDES. HSM SO, Administrator, Partition
CO, Partition LCO.
IND_1
Generate domain
parameters.37
This service is used to generate
domain parameters requested by
the end-user and stored in the
cryptographic module for use with
other user consumable
X9.42 Domain Parameter Generation Any role. IND_1
32
Diffie-Hellman key generation mechanisms are non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
33
ECC key generation mechanisms are non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
34
RSA key generation mechanisms are non-compliant with less than 112-bits of encryption strength.
35
RSA is non-approved for key transport when used with an encryption strength of 112-bits or when using PKCS#1, v1.5 padding for encryption.
36
AES is non-approved for key transport when used to encrypt keys using methods other than as permitted by NIST standards such as [SP800-38F]. In particular, use of un-authenticated modes of AES for
encryption without a separate authentication tag (e.g. signature or MAC) is non-approved.
37
Public users cannot generate any objects where either CKA_SENSITIVE or CKA_PRIVATE attributes are true. As such, the service would not affect the security of the module or the security of the information
being protected, as sought by 4.1.A.
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Table 4-5: Non-Approved Services
Service Description Non-Approved Algorithms Accessed Roles Indicator
cryptographic services or to export
to other cryptographic modules or
systems.
Software/Firmware Security
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Firmware Integrity
The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module’s firmware integrity is checked on startup as described in
section 10.1. The two keys used for the software and firmware Approved integrity techniques are the Root
Certificate and Firmware Signing Certificate.
The bootloader runs the self-test functions to check the firmware integrity as well as the cryptographic
algorithms used to check the bootloader and main firmware image authenticity. Any failures during these
tests will result in a module halt in which an error message is output, the module halts all functions and data
output is inhibited.
The bootloader and main firmware are stored as signed binaries using RSA PKCS #1-v1.5 with a 4096-bit
module and SHA2-384.
The operator can trigger an on-demand check of the module firmware using the CA_SelfTest Cryptoki API
command. An example of the CA_SelfTest Cryptoki API command in use can be found in section 13.5.
Periodic Self Tests (PST) are performed every 24 hours and run the firmware integrity tests and a subset of
the KAT tests. Failure of either of these self-tests during PST will trigger a module halt. Recovery from this
state will require the module to be restarted and for the detected fault to have cleared. Otherwise, the
module will re-halt during POST following restart. See section 10 for additional information about the PST.
5.2 Firmware Load
When new firmware is to be loaded using the hsm updatefw LunaCM command a separate mechanism is
used to authenticate the firmware than the pre-operational firmware self-test. An example of the hsm
updatefw LunaCM command can be found in section 11.11.
Once initiated the firmware load sequence uses a set series of ICD commands and all others are prohibited
until the firmware update is completed.
Updating the firmware is a two stage process. The first stage is to download the firmware to the module. The
second stage involves subsequently re-authenticating and loading the firmware following a module restart,
this occurs based on the bootloader during power-on ahead of the communications module being started.
The firmware load test can be found in Table 10-2.
5.3 Firmware Components
The following are the firmware components included on the module:
 hsm - this component is compiled as a 32bit LSB executable for PowerPC. This is identified throughout
this document as the ‘main firmware’.
 bootloader - the bootloader is an Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) executable. This is
identified throughout this document as the ‘bootloader’.
No source code, object code or just-in-time compiled code are included in the module.
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6 Operational Environment
The module uses a limited modifiable operational environment.
Physical Security
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanism Summary
Module Construction
The module is enclosed in a plastic enclosure that provides tamper-evidence. Any tampering that might
compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual inspection of the physical integrity of a module. The
HSM SO should perform a visual inspection of the module at regular intervals.
Within the plastic enclosure, a hard opaque epoxy covers the circuitry of the cryptographic module.
Attempts to remove this epoxy will cause sufficient damage to the cryptographic module so that it is
rendered inoperable.
The module’s enclosure is opaque to resist visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the
device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device.
Environment Failure Protection
The module supports an EFP mechanism that will trigger module shutdown if low or high temperature
extremes and out-of-range voltage conditions are detected whilst the module is active. This is covered in
more detail in section 7.3.
7.2 Module Inspection
The following routine inspections are recommended.
Table 7-1: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security Mechanism Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test
Guidance Details
Physical inspection of HSM
surfaces for signs of tamper
On receipt of HSM following transport
At any point following any un-authorized access to the environment
hosting the HSM
Following any extended periods of unattended storage for the module
<see below>.
Following manufacture, both the front and rear covers of the Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module are
permanently adhered to the PCB assembly using epoxy resin and with the lid assemblies having feet set
into the epoxy.
The polycarbonate case will show witness marks if any attempt is made to tamper with the plastic.
Any attempts to remove the case and covers will result in significant physical damage to the card rendering
it un-usable.
In the event of any observed damage, contact Thales to confirm whether observed anomalies are to be
expected or are confirmed signs of potential tampering.
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7.3 Environment Failure Protection
The module’s hardware is designed to sense and respond to out-of-range temperature conditions as well as
out-of-range voltage conditions. The temperature and voltage conditions are only monitored in the powered-
on state.
In the event that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or over voltage the module will reset itself,
clear all working memory, and log the event.
The module can be reset and placed back into operation when in-bound operating conditions have been
restored.
The module monitors the 5V voltage rails that can independently trigger an EFP event. The following table
covers the limits enforced by the module:
Table 7-2: EFP/EFT
Temperature or voltage measurement
Specify EFP or
EFT
Specify if this condition results
in a shutdown or zeroisation
Low Temperature 0°C ± 2°C EFP shutdown
High Temperature +70°C ± 2°C EFP shutdown
Low Voltage 3.9V ± 0.11V EFP shutdown
High Voltage 5.71V ± 0.145V EFP shutdown
7.4 Module Case and Coatings
The module PCB is potted using an epoxy-based compound inside the polycarbonate plastic case that
makes up the identified cryptographic boundary in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2.
The potting material has a Shore D hardness rating of 90 and an operating temperature from -65ºC to
+200ºC over which it maintains its hardness.
The following table lists the temperature range tested during the assessment of the module.
Table 7-3: Hardness testing temperature ranges
Hardness tested temperature measurement
Low Temperature -20ºC
High Temperature +80ºC
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8 Non-invasive security
N/A: [19790:2012] Section 6.8, Non-invasive security is non-applicable as there are currently no requirement
in [SP800-140F].
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9 SSP Management
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameter
The following table lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) used to perform approved security function
supported by the cryptographic module.
The following notes should be observed when reading the table:
 When reading the ’zeroization’ column the following mapping for listed overwrite methods should be
used:
• KDM1: Overwrite memory containing the key material (Explicit zeroization);
• KDM2: RAM reset (Implicit zeroization);
• KDM3: Erasure of entire memory sector(s) (Explicit zeroization); and
• KDM4: Erasure of the encrypting keys (Implicit zeroization).
NOTE A HSM wipe-out (KDM3) zeroizes all keys and CSPs on the module. This method
applies to every row in Table 9-1 and is explicitly called out in the table only if the SSP is not
covered by any other destruction method.
NOTE When an end-user triggers zeroization using a zeroization service and zeroization is
successful, return code CKR_OK is displayed.
 When reading the ‘strength’ column, the listed security strength is calculated using methods in [FIPS
140-3 IG] D.B, ‘Strength of SSP Establishment Methods’.
 When reading the ‘Security Function and Cert Number’ column, this is the security function that will
consume the SSP.
 Details on schemes covered under the ‘Key Import/Export methods’ column are expanded in section
9.3.
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Table 9-1: Summary of SSPs
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Root Certificate
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits RSA SigVer (#A674)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Loaded at
manufacture as
part of the
bootloader image.
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory in
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Root Key. It is self-
signed with its private key controlled by
Thales. Used in verifying Manufacturing
Integrity Certificate (MIC), firmware and
capability updates.
This key is a PSP.
Firmware Signing
Certificate
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits RSA SigVer (#A674)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Input with
Firmware Update
File, which is
considered
plaintext
N/A
Stored on Thales
managed
“Engineering”
HSM
Management
Policies
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM firmware updates.
This key is a PSP.
Capability Signing
Certificate
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits RSA SigVer (#A674)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Input with
Capability Update
File
N/A
Stored on Thales
managed
“Engineering”
HSM
Management
Policies
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM capability updates.
This key is a PSP.
Manufacturer’s
Integrity Certificate
(MIC)
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits RSA SigVer (#A674)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory in
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Manufacturing Integrity
Key (MIK) controlled by Thales. It is signed
by the Root Key. Used in verifying all key
material certified by Hardware Origin
Certificates (HOCs).
This key is a PSP.
ECC Manufacturing
Integrity Certificate
(ECC MIC)
ECC public
certificate for public
key on curve P-384
192-bits
ECDSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC Manufacturing
Integrity Key (ECC MIK). It is self-signed.
This key is a PSP.
Hardware Origin Key
(HOK)
4096-bit private key
150-bits
RSA SigGen
(#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
A 4096-bit RSA private key used to sign
certificates for other device key pairs, such as
the TWC4 used with CPV3. It is generated at
the time the device is manufactured.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Hardware Origin
Certificate (HOC)
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits
RSA SigVer
(#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory in
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the HOK. It is signed by the
Manufacturer’s Integrity Key (MIK) at the
time the device is manufactured. Used in
verifying all key material signed by the HOK.
This key is a PSP.
ECC Hardware Origin
Key
(ECC HOK)
ECC private key on
curve P-384
192-bits
ECDSA SigGen (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
ECC P-384 private key used to sign other
device keys and used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
This key is a CSP.
ECC Hardware Origin
Certificate
(ECC HOCtw)
ECC public
certificate for public
key on curve P-384
192-bits
ECDSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC HOK. It is signed
by the ECC Manufacturing Integrity Key (ECC
MIK). It is used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
This key is a PSP.
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key
(TUK4)
4096-bit private key
150-bits
RSA SigGen
(#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle –
KDM1.
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
A 4096-bit RSA private key used in the key
cloning protocol. It is generated each time
the module initializes from power up or
reset.
This key is a CSP.
Token or Module
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC4)
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits
RSA SigVer
(#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle –
KDM1.
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the TUK4. It is signed by
the HOK. Used in exchange of nonce (KEVt)
as part of the handshake during the cloning
protocol.
This key is a PSP.
Cloning Key
Encryption Vector –
target (KEVt)
384 bit nonce
256-bits
KDA One-Step
Sp800-56Cr2 (Cert
#A2125)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Exchanged during
CPV3 protocol (see
section 9.3 for
further details)
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized
following use –
KDM1
384-bit nonce used with the cloning protocol
and generated on the target HSM.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Cloning Transfer Key
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-CBC (Cert
#C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2]
Not Input or
Output
Established using
CPV3 as covered in
section 9.3
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized
following use –
KDM1
256-bit AES key derived during the cloning
protocol and used to transfer key objects
between source and target partitions using
the cloning protocol.
This key is a CSP.
Device
Authentication Key
(CITS-DAK)
4096-bit private key
150-bits
RSA SigGen
(#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle –
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
4096-bit RSA private key used for a specific
PKI implementation requiring assurance that
a key or a specific action originated within
the hardware crypto module.
This key is a CSP.
Device
Authentication Key
(CITS-DAC)
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits RSA SigVer (#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.3.6
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the CITS-DAK. Signed by
the HOK. Used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
This key is a PSP.
ECC Device
Authentication Key
(ECC DAK)
ECC private key on
curve P-384
192-bits
ECDSA SigGen (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
ECC P-384 private key
This key is a CSP.
ECC Device
Authentication
Certificate
(ECC DAC)
ECC public
certificate for public
key on curve P-384
192-bits
ECDSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Loaded in
plaintext during
manufacturing
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory
plaintext
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC DAK. It is signed by
the ECC HOK.
This key is a PSP.
Entropy Input String 384-bits
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Full-entropy
conditioned
output from
ESV Cert #E97)
approved
platform noise
source
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2
Random seed data drawn from the Hardware
RBG and used to seed an implementation of
the [SP800-90Ar1] Hash_DRBG using SHA2-
256 as the PRF.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Entropy Seed 640-bits
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
N/A
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2
640-bit value that is the concatenation of the
Entropy Input String (384-bits), Nonce (128-
bits) and 128-bit personalisation string. Used
as to initialise the internal state of
HASH_DRBG.
This key is a CSP.
DRBG V 256-bits
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Internal state
generated
using
HASH_DRBG
from [SP800-
90Ar1]
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2
Part of the secret state of the approved
DRBG. The value is generated using the
methods described in [SP800-90Ar1].
This key is a CSP.
DRBG C 256-bits
HASH_DRBG (Cert
#A2125)
Internal
Constant value
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2
Part of the secret state of the approved
DRBG. The value is generated using the
methods described in [SP800-90Ar1].
This key is a CSP.
Global Storage Key
(GSK)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
PSK
Full HSM Wipe -
KDM3
256-bit AES key that is the same for all users
on a specific Luna cryptographic module. It is
used to encrypt permanent parameters
within the non-volatile memory area
reserved for use by the module.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Role Domain Key
(RDK)
256-bit key
256-bits
Or
32 to 2040-
bits
KDA One-Step
Sp800-56Cr2 (Cert
#A2125)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
for PED
configuration
N/A for
Password
configuration
Input / Output via
direct connection
to PED
N/A
Flash Memory
encrypted with
USK
Factory Reset -
KDM1
For PED configurations, this is a 256-bit
value, the first 32-bytes of which are used as
an AES KW 256-bit key that is used to
wrap/unwrap the SALK when it is exported /
imported from / to the module.
It is either generated by the module or
imprinted onto the module at the time audit
user role is initialized. The 48-byte random
value is output from the original module
onto an iKey to enable initializing the Auditor
role on additional modules into the same
domain.
For password configurations, this value is an
8 - 255 character data string supplied by the
user during configuration of the secure audit
capability.
This key is a CSP.
Secure Audit Logging
Key (SALK)
256-bit HMAC key
256-bits
HMAC-SHA2-256
(Cert #C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Input / Output
encrypted under
the RDK and using
AES-256 in KWP
mode
N/A
Flash memory in
plaintext,
Flash memory
encrypted with
RDK
Factory Reset -
KDM1
A 256-bit key used to verify data integrity
and authentication of the log messages.
Saved in the parameter area of Flash
memory.
This key is a CSP.
Secure Audit
AccessID-HMAC Key
256-bit HMAC key
256-bits
HMAC-SHA2-256
(Cert #C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2
A 256-bit key used to create an HMAC of the
AccessID to be used in the Secure Audit logs,
to prevent against the theft of the actual
AccessID. A new key will be generated at
every module power-on or firmware reset.
This key is a CSP.
User Password (if
PED configuration
and optionally
selected)
8 - 255 character
data string
32 to 256-
bits
PBKDF (Cert
#C2020)
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and
encrypted under
the PEC and using
KTS-OAEP-basic
from [SP800-
56Br2]
N/A
A salted hash of
the password
stored in Flash
memory
encrypted with
PSK
Partition
deletion - KDM1
User provided password input by the
operator as a second factor of authentication
data.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
AccessID Encryption
Key – Encryption Key
(AEK-EK)
256-bit AES key
256-bit.
AES-KW (Cert
#C2020).
N/A
Imported
encrypted under
the PEC using KTS-
OAEP.
N/A.
Working SDRAM in
plaintext.
Power Cycle -
KDM2
A 256-bit key generated by the Thales Luna
client and submitted to the HSM for use to
wrap the HSM generated AEK for export to
the Thales Luna Client to encrypt the
AccessID.
A new key is generated for each AEK transfer
event.
This key is a CSP.
AccessID Encryption
Key (AEK)
256-bit AES key
256-bit.
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020).
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with AES-256.
Exported
encrypted under
the AEK-EK using
AES-KW.
N/A.
Working SDRAM in
plaintext.
Power Cycle –
KDM2
A 256-bit key used with AES-KWP to encrypt
the AccessID.
A new key will be generated at every module
power-on or firmware reset.
This key is a CSP.
AccessID
128-bit value
128-bit N/A. N/A.
Option 1:
Imported
encrypted using
the AEK and AES-
KW when STC is
not in use
Option 2: Either
encrypted using
AES-GCM or AES-
CTR with separate
HMAC and using
the Partition STC
Session Encryption
and
Authentication
Keys.
N/A.
Working SDRAM in
plaintext.
Power Cycle –
KDM2
128-bit secret value used as an authorization
token for sessions.
This key is a CSP.
Stored User
Password Hash (PED
configuration)
256-bit value
128-bits N/A
SHA2-256 (Cert
#C2020)
N/A N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
PSK
Zeroized
following use –
KDM1.
Hashed user password with 256-bit random
salt. SSP is compared with salted hash of
passwords supplied by the end-user as part
of login when using PED authentication with
optional memorized secret.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
PED Authentication
Data (if PED
configuration)
48-byte random
value
256-bits
KBKDF (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Input / Output via
direct connection
to PED
All messages sent
to the PED are
encrypted using
HSM CSP
Wrapping Key and
AES KWP
N/A
Not stored on
module
N/A
A 256-bit random value that is generated by
the module when a role is created and is
written out to the iKey connected to the
Thales Luna PED.
This key is a CSP.
Password
(Authentication Data
if Password
configuration)
8 – 255 character
data string
32 to 2040-
bits
PBKDF (Cert
#A2125)
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and
encrypted under
the PEC and using
KTS-OAEP-basic
from [SP800-
56Br2]
N/A
Not stored on
module
N/A
User provided password input by the
operator as authentication data.
This key is a CSP.
User Storage Key
(USK)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
User’s
Authentication
Data and KEK
Partition
deletion –
KDM1
This key is used to encrypt all sensitive
attributes of all private objects owned by
users of a partition (e.g. HSM SO,
Administration, Partition Crypto Officer).
This key is a CSP.
Partition Storage
Key (PSK)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
Partition
deletion - KDM1
This key is unique per-partition and used to
encrypt all SSP that are shared by all roles of
a given partition.
This key is a CSP.
SKS Master Key
(SMK)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Input/Output
using CPV3 N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
A randomly generated 256-bit secret used as
the master key for deriving all SKS key blob
encryption keys.
This key is a CSP.
HA Login Public Key
(HAPUB)
4096-bit public key
150-bits
KAS-IFC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Flash memory in
plaintext
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
A 4096-bit RSA public key used for the HA
Login protocol.
This key is a PSP.
HA Login Private Key
(HAPK)
4096-bit private key
150-bits
KAS-IFC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
A 4096-bit RSA private key used for the HA
Login protocol.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HA Login
Authentication Data
Encryption Key PIN
(RND)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Output encrypted
using AES-256 in
KWP mode and
using a shared
secret from output
of [SP800-56Br2],
KAS1-basic
exchange
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
Session closure
- KDM1
A 256-bit encryption key used with AES to
encrypt authentication data for export to the
primary HA Login instance.
This key is a CSP.
HA Login Ephemeral
Wrapping Key
(KSESS)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Output encrypted
with peer TWC
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
Session closure
- KDM1
A 256-bit encryption key used with AES to
encrypt authentication data for re-import
from the primary HA Login instance.
This key is a CSP.
Key Cloning Domain
Vector (KCV)
256-bit key
32 to 2040-
bits
KDA One-Step
Sp800-56Cr2 (Cert
#A2125)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
N/A for
Password
configuration
Input / Output via
direct connection
to Thales PED
N/A
Flash Memory
encrypted with
PSK
Partition
deletion - KDM1
Value that controls a partition’s ability to
participate in the cloning protocol.
In the case of PED configurations, it is
generated by the module or imprinted onto
the module at partition initialization time.
For password configurations, this 8 - 255
character data string is supplied by the user
during partition initialization.
For PED configurations, the 48-byte random
value is output from the original partition in
the domain to an iKey to enable initializing
additional modules into the domain.
This key is a CSP.
Remote PED Vector
(RPV) (if PED
configuration)
256-bits
KDA One-Step
Sp800-56Cr2 (Cert
#A2125)
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
A randomly generated 256-bit key, which
must be shared between a remote PED and a
cryptographic module in order to establish a
secure communication channel between
them.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
PED Authentication
Certificate (PAC)
ECC public key on
curve P-521
256-bits
ECDSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
An ECC public key certificate used to verify
certificates for remote connection with a
Luna PED.
This key is a PSP.
PED Authentication
Key (PAK)
ECC private key on
curve P-521
256-bits
ECDSA SigGen (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
An ECC private key used to sign certificates
used for local or remote connection with the
Thales Luna PED.
This key is a CSP.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement
Certificate for
Remote Connections
(HSM-SKA-CREMOTE)
ECC public key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Used by the Thales Luna PED to authenticate
the remote HSM to connect to and to extract
the HSM’s static ECC public key for:
• C(2e,2s, KAS-ECC) key-agreement
for remote connection with PED.
This key is a PSP.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Private
Key for Remote
Connections (HSM-
SKA-KREMOTE)
ECC private key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Used by the remote HSM as the static private
key for:
• C(2e,2s, KAS-ECC) key-agreement
agreement for remote connection
with PED.
This key is a CSP.
HSM Ephemeral
Key-Agreement
Certificate (HSM-
EKA-C)
ECC public key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
KDM1 -
following use
Used by the Thales Luna PED to authenticate
the remote HSM to connect to and to extract
the HSM’s ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s,
KAS-ECC) key-agreement agreement for
remote connection with a Thales Luna PED.
This key is a PSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HSM Ephemeral
Key-Agreement
Private Key (HSM-
EKA-K)
ECC private key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
KDM1 -
following use
Used by the Thales Luna PED to authenticate
the remote HSM and to extract the HSM’s
ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s, KAS-ECC)
key-agreement agreement for remote
connection with a Thales Luna PED.
This key is a CSP.
Remote PED Vector
Certificate (RPV-C)
ECC public key on
curve P-521
256-bits
ECDSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2 or KDM1
in response to
erase request
via ICD
command
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
An ECC public key certificate used by the
HSM device to verify PED-SKA-C, PED-EKA-C.
This key is a PSP.
Remote PED Vector
Private Key (RPV-K)
ECC private key on
curve P-521
256-bits
ECDSA SigGen (Cert
#C2020)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2 or KDM1
in response to
erase request
via ICD
command
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
An ECC private key used by the HSM to sign
PED-SKA-C, and by the Luna PED to sign PED-
EKA-C.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
PED Static Key-
Agreement
Certificate for
Remote Connections
(PED-SKA-C)
ECC public key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2 or KDM1
in response to
erase request
via ICD
command
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Used by the HSM to authenticate and extract
the Luna PED’s ECC ephemeral public key for
C(2e,2s, KAS-ECC) key-agreement.
Uniquely generated for each use.
This key is a PSP.
PED Static Key-
Agreement Private
Key
(PED-SKA-K)
ECC private key on
curve P-521
256-bits
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix B.4.1
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED
N/A
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM2 or KDM1
in response to
erase request
via ICD
command
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Used by the Thales Luna PED for Remote
connections. Act as An ECC static private key
for C(2e,2s, KAS-ECC) key-agreement.
Key is not used by the HSM as a SP but is
generated by it for use by the Luna PED.
This key is a CSP.
PED Master Shared
Secret
256-bit key
256-bits
KDA One-Step
Sp800-56Cr2 (Cert
#A2125)
N/A N.A
KAS-ECC (Cert
#A2125)
Working SRAM in
plaintext.
Zeroized
following use –
KDM1
Intermediate key value used during setup of
the Remote PED channel.
Key is the output of the ECDH function and
used to generate HSM and PED CSP
Wrapping Key, MAC key, IV and Data
Encryption Key. Keys are generated using
OneStep KDF from [SP800-56Cr2] with SHA2-
512.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HSM CSP Wrapping
Key (CWKHSM)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP
(Cert #C2020)
AES-CTR
(Cert #C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
wrapping exchanged SSPs.
Key is used with either AES-KWP or AES-CTR,
depending on the cipher suite negotiated
between the HSM and PED during remote
PED setup.
This key is a CSP.
PED CSP Wrapping
Key (CWKPED)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP
(Cert #C2020)
AES-CTR
(Cert #C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
wrapping exchanged SSPs.
Key is used with either AES-KWP or AES-CTR,
depending on the cipher suite negotiated
between the HSM and PED during remote
PED setup.
This key is a CSP.
HSM Data
Encryption Key
(DEKHSM)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP
(Cert #C2020)
AES-CTR
(Cert #C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
HSM-to-PED).
Key is used with either AES-KWP or AES-CTR,
depending on the cipher suite negotiated
between the HSM and PED during remote
PED setup.
This key is a CSP.
HSM MAC Key
(DMKHSM)
256-bit HMAC key
256-bits
HMAC-SHA2-256
(#C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from HSM-to-PED).
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HSM Initialization
Vector (IVHSM)
256-bit IV
256-bits
AES-KWP
(Cert #C2020)
AES-CTR
(Cert #C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from HSM-to-
PED).
Key is used with either AES-KWP or AES-CTR,
depending on the cipher suite negotiated
between the HSM and PED during remote
PED setup.
This key is a CSP.
PED Data Encryption
Key (DEKPED)
256-bit AES key
256-bits
AES-KWP
(Cert #C2020)
AES-CTR
(Cert #C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SDRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
PED-to-HSM).
Key is used with either AES-KWP or AES-CTR,
depending on the cipher suite negotiated
between the HSM and PED during remote
PED setup.
This key is a CSP.
PED MAC Key
(DMKPED)
256-bit HMAC key
256-bits
HMAC-SHA2-256
(#C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working SRAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from PED-to-HSM).
This key is a CSP.
PED Initialization
Vector (IVPED)
256-bit IV
256-bits
AES-KWP (Cert
#C2020)
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 as hash
Not Input or
Output
[SP800-56Ar3]
fullUnified with
full key validation
and key-pair
generation
Working RAM in
plaintext
PED Channel
Termination -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from PED-to-
HSM).
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Password Encryption
Key (PEK)
4096 bit private key
150-bits
RSA SigGen (Cert
#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6
Not Input or
Output
N/A
Working RAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Erased on user
zeroize request
or destructive
policy change
A 4096-bit RSA private key used to decrypt
user passwords that are provided to the
module. It is generated the first time it is
required.
This key is a CSP.
Password Encryption
Certificate (PEC)
4096-bit public key
certificate
150-bits
RSA SigVer(Cert
#A674)
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6
Certificate Output
in Plaintext
N/A
Working RAM in
plaintext
Power Cycle -
KDM1
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the PEK. It is created and
signed by the HOK the first it is required.
This key is a PSP.
Password Encryption
Nonce (PEN)
192-bit nonce
192-bits N/A
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
Output in Plaintext
Imported
encrypted under
the PEC using KTS-
OAEP.
N/A
Working RAM in
plaintext
Zeroized
following use –
KDM1.
Nonce used to provide replay protection with
the PEC protocol.
This key is a PSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general
partition or session
keys)
RSA, DSA, ECC, DH
112 to 256-
bit for ECC
keys
depending
on the
curve.
112 to 128-
bit for DSA
keys
depending
on
modulus
size.
112 to 201-
bits for RSA
keys
depending
on
modulus
length.
112 to 150-
bit for DH
keys
depending
on
modulus
length
RSA SigGen
RSA SigVer
(Cert #C2020,
#A674)
ECDSA SigGen
ECDSA SigVer
(Cert #C2020,
#A2125)
DSA SigGen
DSA SigVer (Cert
#C2020)
KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC
(Cert #A2125) and
KDA (Cert #A2125))
KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC
(Cert #A2125) and
CVL (Cert #A2125))
KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC
(Cert #A2125) and
KDA (Cert #A2125))
KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC
(Cert #A2125) and
CVL (Cert #A2125))
KAS-IFC (Cert
#A2125)
KTS-IFC (Cert
#A2125)
N/A (user
imported)
Or
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1. – for ECC
key-pair
Or
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6. – for
RSA, DH and
DSA keys
Input or output
encrypted
using Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or
session
keys) using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands using
key wrap/unwrap
ICD commands
and [SP800-38F]
encryption options
Input using
Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or
session
keys) using key
unwrap ICD
commands and
approved
symmetric
algorithms as
permitted by [FIPS
140-3 IG] D.G, Key
transport methods
When transferred
between
partitions using
SKS, encrypted
under the SMK
N/A
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
Session closure
– KDM1
General use asymmetric key
pairs that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module or generated by the module.
This key is a CSP.
This key is a PSP.
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Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys)
AES or Triple-DES,
MAC, KDF
128, 192 or
256-bit for
AES keys.
112-bit for
Triple-DES.
Triple-DES-CBC
Triple-DES-CFB64
Triple-DES-CFB8
Triple-DES-CMAC
Triple-DES-CTR
Triple-DES-ECB
Triple-DES-OFB
(Cert #C2020)
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
HMAC-SHA3-224
HMAC-SHA3-256
HMAC-SHA3-384
HMAC-SHA3-512
(Cert #C2020)
KDA (Cert #A2125)
KBKDF (Cert
#C2020)
AES-CBC
AES-CFB128
AES- CFB8
AES-CMAC
AES-CTR
AES-ECB
AES-GCM
AES-KW
AES-KWP
AES-OFB
(Cert #C2020)
N/A (user
imported)
Or
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
with SHA2-256
(module
generated)
Input or output
encrypted
using Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or
session
keys) using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands and
[SP800-38F]
encryption options
Input or output
encrypted
using
Asymmetric Keys
(general partition
or session keys)
using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands and
KTS-OAEP-basic
from [SP800-
56Br2]
Input using
Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or
session
keys) using key
unwrap ICD
commands and
approved
symmetric
algorithms as
permitted by [FIPS
140-3 IG] D.G, Key
transport methods
When transferred
between
Can be established
as the output of
supported [SP800-
56Ar3] compliant
key establishment
using other
partition stored
asymmetric key-
pair
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
Zeroized via ICD
command -
KDM1
Session closure
– KDM1
General use asymmetric key
pairs that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module or generated by the
module.
This key is a CSP.
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Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength
Security Function
and Cert Number
Generation Import/ Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
partitions using
SKS, encrypted
under the SMK
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9.2 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation
Specification
The module includes a non-deterministic Random Number Generator (RNG) within the module boundary.
The non-deterministic RNG is used exclusively to feed the DRBG (Cert #C2020).
The Non-Deterministic RNG complies with [SP800-90B] and has been certified using [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.J
with guidance set out in [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.K.
Table 9-2: Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
9.3 Key Import/Export Methods
Depending on the configuration of the module, the following methods of key import and export for
‘Asymmetric Key Pairs (general partition keys)’ and ‘Symmetric Keys (general partition keys)’ are available
as a service:
 Manual Key Import/Export
The manual import/export methods of the module are restricted to the G7 GUI and the iKey directly
attached to the module via the USB port.
• For the G7 GUI the import methods include password authentication data. This includes whether the
module is using Password authentication or is optionally selected with PED authentication.
• For the iKey the import/export methods include the PED authentication data, private/public keys and
PED Key Agreement certificates.
 Password Encryption Certificate (PEC) Import Protocol
Prior to submitting a password for authentication, the client:
• requests a 24-byte nonce using the LUNA_REQUEST_CHALLENGE command;
• requests the cryptographic module PEC using the LUNA_GET_PEC command; and
• validates the received certificate against an embedded copy of the Thales root certificate stored in
the client.
Following completion of above – the client concatenates the nonce (24 bytes) with their password (up to
248 bytes) and encrypts using RSA-OAEP with SHA512 for its MGF as defined in [SP800-56Br2] as
KTS-OAEP-basic.
Entropy sources Minimum number of bits
of entropy
Details
Non-deterministic jitter
from FRO.
The noise source outputs
blocks of entropy in 384
bits with H = 0.838411.
Following testing, the
DRBG is seeded with a
256-bit seed and 128-bit
nonce from the noise
source containing 384 *
0.838411 which equals
321 bits of entropy.
[SP800-90B] compliant Non-Deterministic RNG using a hardware based noise
internal to the module boundary (ESV #E97).
Raw noise collection is performed autonomously by hardware as entropy is
required to seed the on-chip DRBG (Cert #C2020). If the entropy register is not
full when the DRBG accesses it, the read will stall until the entropy is generated.
During each entropy collection cycle, 2500 samples of raw noise are collected.
All outputs from the noise source are subjected to statistical testing ahead of
being fed to the DRBG.
The output of the hardware noise source includes a total failure test to check
for bit-patterns consistent with hardware failures.
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 Plaintext Certificate Import
There are various plaintext certificates that can be imported onto the module via the ICD interface.
These include:
• Capability Signing Certificate, which is imported along with the Capability Update File (CUF).
• Firmware Signing Certificate, which is imported along with the Firmware Update File (FUF).
• HA Login Public Key which is a 4096-bit RSA public key used for the HA Login protocol.
For more information on the certificates, refer to Table 9-1 above.
When importing objects, if the CKA_PRIVATE or CKA_SENSITIVE key attribute it set to true, the object
will not be visible to the public user following creation.
This service is not possible for the Backup configuration.
 Key Wrap / Unwrap using Cloning Protocol Version 3 (CPV3)
Cloning is a product feature where KAS1-basic from [SP800-56Br2] is used to negotiate a shared secret
used to transfer partition objects between a source and destination partition and where these can be on
the same or different cryptographic module. The protocol uses the following options with KAS1-basic:
• RSASVE for transfer of shared secrets uses the public key from the TWC4 certificate which has
a modulus length of 4096-bits;
• The TWC4 certificate used is generated by an instance of the module as a trusted third party
(TTP) and is signed by the generating modules HOC. All TWC4 keys are generated using
rsakpg1-crt from section 6.3.1.3 of [SP800-56Br2] and where the generating module will
perform key pair validation as per steps 2 and 3b from section 6.4.1.1 as the TTP. On receipt of
a destination modules TWC4 used during the CPV3 protocol, the source module will validate
the certificate and its associated certificate chain back to a shared common root certificate.
This establishes the originating HSM as a TTP as defined in [SP800-56Br2];
• Shared keys are derived using One-Step KDF from [SP800-56Cr2] using SHA2-512. Inputs to
the KDF include the exchanged shared secret from the RSASVE transfer, alongside the pre-
shared 256-bit secret key (KCV or RDK) and additional HSM related shared information; and
• Encryption of the SMK during the transfer uses AES-256 in KWP mode and a single-use key
and IV derived from the output of the KDF.
This scheme uses a hybrid key transport method compliant with section 9.3 of [SP800-56Br2] where
KAS1-basic is used as a key establishment scheme followed by use of AES-256 in KWP mode as a
[SP800-38F] compliant key wrapping algorithm.
 Scalable Key Storage (SKS)
SKS allows the transfer of partition objects (symmetric and asymmetric keys, alongside other objects)
between partitions encrypted under the SMK, which must have been pre-shared between source and
destination partition using CPV3.
SKS uses AES-256 in GCM mode with a 128-bit random IV generated by the cryptographic module
using output from its [SP800-90Ar1] DRBG, and where a unique key per extraction is used. This key is
deriver using the shared partition SMK and a 256-bit random salt value (unique per SKS export
operation) and the SMK.
Encryption keys are derived using [SP800-108r1] PRF KDF and using AES-CMAC-256.
 Key Wrap / Unwrap
The key wrap operation is available for use to import or export raw Symmetric Keys (general partition or
session keys) or an Asymmetric Key Pair (general partition or session keys) – private key, using one of
the following options:
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• KTS-OAEP-basic from [SP800-56Br2] and where the following options are supported:
− Modulus lengths of 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, or 8192 for export or 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144,
or 8192 for import; and
− Hash and MGF options must match and be consistent with one of the following algorithms:
SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512.
− Where this mechanism is used with public keys generated by the module these are generated
using either rsakpg1-crt or rsakpg2-crt from section 6.3.1.3 of [SP800-56Br2] and where the
module is the ‘owner’. All keys generated by the module are subject to a pairwise consistency
check on generation and are separately validated as per either section 6.4.1.2 or 6.4.1.3 from
[SP800-56Br2] depending on the generation method used.
− Where this mechanism is used with a public key imported from outside the module, assurances
as per section 6.4.2 of [SP800-56Br2] shall be sought ahead of use of the public key. In this
scenario, the module is not providing any assurances for the generation methods of the
public/private key pair and where the resulting encrypt operation is not considered part of a key
transport scheme as defined in [FIPS 140-3 IG], D.G.
• [SP800-38F] compliant KTS using one of the following options for both key unwrapping and
wrapping:
− AES (128, 192 or 256-bit) in KW, KWP.
• [FIPS 140-3 IG] D.G, Key transport methods, compliant KTS for unwrap of key objects using one of
the following options:
− AES (128, 192 or 256-bit) in CBC, CTR or ECB modes; or
− Triple-DES (112 and 168-bit) in CBC, ECB and CTR.
The unwrap operation takes as input an encrypted symmetric key or asymmetric private key and a
handle to the key required to successfully unwrap the object. It decrypts the key and returns the handle
to the imported key.
 Key Unwrap using historic versions of SKS
The module supports key import for keys previously exported from another certified Thales HSM using
versions of SKS supported by legacy firmware versions and where related certificates are now on
NIST’s historical list.
Import is supported for key migration.
Objects imported using this method are either:
• encrypted using AES with 256-bit key in GCM mode with SHA2-256 for integrity protection; or
• encrypted using AES with 256-bit key in OFB mode and with SHA1 for integrity protection.
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10 Self-Tests
10.1Pre-Operational tests
The module performs the pre-operational self-tests upon power-up to confirm the firmware integrity, and to
check the continued correct operation of the random number generator and each of the implemented
cryptographic algorithms used in support of the integrity checks.
While the module is running these self-tests, all interfaces are disabled until the successful completion of the
self-tests. If any test fails an error message is output alongside being recorded in the error log, the module
halts, and data output is inhibited.
Table 10-1: Pre-operational self-tests
Test Operations Performed Indicator
Boot loader performs an RSA PKCS #1-v1.5 signature with
4096-bit modulus and SHA2-384 signature verification of
itself.
Verify, Digest Error output and module halt
Boot loader performs an RSA PKCS #1-v1.5 signature with
4096-bit modulus and SHA2-384 signature verification of the
main firmware prior to firmware start.
Verify, Digest Error output and module halt
NOTE Signature verification pre-operational self-tests will always be preceded by the
Conditional KAT on the bootloader implementations of RSA supporting a single mode of
operation. Transition from an approved to non-approved mode of operation automatically
triggers the HSM zeroize module service.
10.2 Conditional tests
The module automatically performs conditional self-tests based on the module operation. These self-tests
do not require operator input to initiate.
NOTE When conditional tests are run as part of the pre-operational self-test, the HSM will
test all possible implementations of a given algorithm independent of the HSM level
configuration and settings.
During PST, the module will exclusively test the implementation of a given algorithm in use
for a given configuration and settings of the HSM at the time of a given conditional test
executing.
Implemented conditional tests are in one of the following forms:
 Known Answer Test (KAT);
 Pair-wise Consistency Test (PCT);
 Statistical testing; or
 Hardware failure testing.
All KAT, alongside statistical testing of the noise source, is performed immediately following the pre-
operational self-test at module power-on.
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Table 10-2: Conditional self-tests
Test Cryptographic Mechanism Tested Location When Performed Operations Performed Indicator
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test (CAST)
SHA KAT
(#C2022)
Pre-operational: SHA2-384
PST: N/A
Bootloader Prior to first use. Digest. Error output and module halt
RSA KAT
(#A6549)
Pre-operational: RSA PKCS #1-v1.5, modulus
4096, SHA2-384
PST: N/A
Bootloader Prior to first use. Sign and Verify. Error output and module halt
Diffie-Hellman - FFC full
public-key validation
([SP800-56Ar3]/[SP800-
56Br2] compliant
implementation)
Tested as part of all key agreement operations. Main firmware Ahead of public key use
for derive operation.
Derive. Error output
ECDH – ECC full public-key
validation ([SP800-56Ar3]
compliant
implementation)
Tested as part of all key agreement operations. Main firmware Ahead of public key use
for derive operation.
Derive. Error output
DRBG KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: Instantiate, Generate and Re-
seed KAT for HASH_DRBG with SHA-256
PST: <as per pre-operational self-test>
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST N/A. Error output and module halt
SHA KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-
384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256
PST: hash are tested based on inclusion in the KAT
for higher-order algorithms
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Digest. Error output and module halt
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Test Cryptographic Mechanism Tested Location When Performed Operations Performed Indicator
HMAC KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-224,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-
512, HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-
SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512
PST: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-
384, SHA3-256
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Digest. Error output and module halt
RSA KAT
(#C2020 and #A674).
Pre-operational: Signature Generation, Sig
Verification for RSA X9.31 with SHA2-256, RSA
PKCS #1-v1.5 with SHA2-256, RSA PKCS #1-v1.5
(no hash), RSA PKCS #1-v1.5 with SHA2-256 and
SHA2-256 for MGF, RSA-OAEP-basic with 2048-bit
modulus and SHA1, SHA2-256 and SHA2-384,
SHA2-512 as MGF
PST: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
for: PKCS-PSS with modulus of 8192-bits and
SHA2-256, PKCS-PSS with modulus of 2048-bit
and SHA2-256, RSA-OAEP-basic with 2048-bit
modulus and SHA2-256 as MGF
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Sign, Verify, Encrypt, and Decrypt. Error output and module halt
DSA KAT (Signature
Generation, Sig
Verification)
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: Signature Generation, Signature
Verification for 2048-bit modulus with SHA2-224.
Signature Verification with 1024-bit modulus and
SHA1
PST: DSA with 2048-bit modulus and SHA2-224
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Sign and Verify. Error output and module halt
Diffie-Hellman KAT (Key
Agreement only, No
Derivation)
(#A2125)
Pre-operational: X9.42 Diffie-Hellman [SP800-
56Ar3] key derive with 2048-bit modulus
PST: <as per pre-operational self-test>
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Derive (X9.42 Derive operation –
no KDF).
Error output and module halt
AES KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB128, CFB8,
KW, KWP, GCM and CMAC covering 128-bit,192-
bit and 256-bit keys as supported by the different
modes
PST: CBC, GCM, KW, KWP – 256-bit key
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Encrypt, Decrypt. Error output and module halt
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Test Cryptographic Mechanism Tested Location When Performed Operations Performed Indicator
Triple-DES KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB64, CTR 168-
bit keys.
PST: ECB with 168-bit key
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Decrypt. Error output and module halt
Triple-DES KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: CMAC for 168-bit keys.
PST: <as per pre-operational self-test>
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Verify. Error output and module halt
ECDH KAT
(#A2125)
Pre-operational: KAS-ECC [SP800-56Ar3] shared
secret calculation (only) using curves P-224, P-
384, P-521 and K-233
PST: KAS-ECC with P-384, OneStep KDF using
SHA2-256
Main firmware Pre-operational, PST Derive (no KDF). Error output and module halt
ECDSA KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: Signature Generation, Signature
Verification with ECDSA and both curves P-256
and K-233 (no hashing)
PST: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
using ECDSA and curves P-256, K-233
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Sign, Verify. Error output and module halt
KBKDF KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: KBKDF [SP800-108r1] with AES-
CMAC, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 as PRF options
PST: KBKDF [SP800-108r1] using AES-CMAC as the
PRD with 128-bit key
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Derive. Error output and module halt
KDF KAT
(#C2020)
Pre-operational: OneStep KDF [SP800-56Cr2]
with SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512. X9.42/X9.63 KDF using SHA1.
PST: OneStep KDF [SP800-56Cr2] with SHA2-512.
X9.42 and X9.63 KDF [SP800-135r1] using SHA1.
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Derive. Error output and module halt
KAS1-basic KAT
(#A2125)
Pre-operational: KAS1-basic [SP800-56Br2] with
4096-bit modulus
PST: <as per pre-operational self-test>.
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Encrypt, Decrypt. Error output and module halt
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Test Cryptographic Mechanism Tested Location When Performed Operations Performed Indicator
PBKDF KAT
(#A2125)
Pre-Operational PBKDF [SP800-132] using HMAC-
SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-
SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512
PST: PBKDF [SP800-132] using HMAC-SHA2-512
Main firmware Prior to first use., PST Derive. Error output and module halt
Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT)
RSA PCT Performed for all RSA key generation mechanism Main firmware On generation Encrypt, Decrypt, Sign, Verify. Error output and module halt
DSA PCT Performed for all DSA key generation mechanism Main firmware On generation Sign and Verify. Error output and module halt
ECC PCT (covers keys used
for ECDSA and ECDH)
Performed for all ECC key generation mechanism Main firmware On generation Sign, Verify, and Derive. Error output and module halt
Software/Firmware Load Test (SW/FW Load)
Firmware Load Test Continuous Test: RSA PKCS #1-v1.5, modulus
4096 signature and SHA2-384
Main firmware On firmware update
request
Verify. Error output and FW update request
rejected
Manual Entry Test
N/A
Bypass Test
N/A
Critical Function Test
HRNG conditional tests Continuous Test: Total failure test on the output
from the hardware noise source, Repetition
Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test
statistical tests
Main firmware Continuous N/A. Error output and module halt
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10.3 Periodic Self-Tests
The module will perform periodic self-tests (PST) at set intervals of time for the pre-operational tests and a
subset of the KAT tests.
These tests will be performed every 24 hours, at which point the PSTs will be implemented as a single
asynchronous command with multiple steps that make up all PSTs that must be executed. The command
will be added to the HSM’s command scheduler run queue, alongside any other commands that have been
sent to the HSM.
Each time the PST command is given time to execute, it will perform a single step and then return priority to
other commands in the queue. Each step will be consistent in size with other cryptographic commands so as
not to impact overall performance of the HSM.
Conditional tests performed periodically are identified in Table 10-2 above as tests with ‘PST’ in the ‘When
Performed’ column.
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11 Life-cycle Assurance
11.1 Choosing a secure location for the module
Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module should be deployed in a secure environment that will protect the
module from sophisticated attackers with direct access.
This is standard practice for high-value assets such as HSMs and forms part of a defence-in-depth
approach to security.
Securing the environment of the HSM typically will include a combination of both:
 securing its location using physical defences; and
 procedures for monitoring and managing authorized access to the HSM.
The exact measures put in place will vary and should be commensurate with the potential consequences or
costs associated with the complete compromise of the HSM and cryptographic keys (or data objects) it
protects.
Common components of a physical security solution often include:
 dedicated areas (e.g. locked cage or cabinet) for the HSM as part of a general IT environment;
 monitored and audited physical access controls on IT environments hosting the HSM;
 hardened locks, doors and walls to increase the effort required to force access to the HSM;
 out-of-hours alarm systems on areas containing the HSM;
 24hr/365day on-site or remote guard service that will respond to alarms; and
 CCTV monitoring of areas containing the HSM to allow detection of activity in proximity to the HSM.
11.2 Performing secure initialization of the HSM
Before using the module it must be initialized, after which it should be immediately configured into its
approved mode of operation. Prior to secure initialization of the module, access control relies on procedural
controls only and the module should be received in the zeroised state with no initialized roles.
NOTE Failing to follow the steps to configure the module into the Approved Mode will
result in the module operating in a Non-Compliant state, which is outside the scope of this
validation.
NOTE The module shall be received in a zeroised state. To check the status of the module
use the hsm showinfo LunaCM command as described in section 13.1.
The module is confirmed as being in the zeroised state when the partition status
for the administration slot reports zeroized.
Initialization creates the HSM SO role, names the module, defines the authentication mode and associates
the admin partition with a key cloning domain.
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Initialization is performed using the hsm init command from LunaCM or LunaSH, though LunaSH can
only be used for the Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM.
It should be noted that the hsm init command should only be run when an individual has been assigned
to the HSM SO role and usually is run either by them or with them present.
Following initialization of the module, it should immediately be configured into its approved mode of
operation ahead of initialization of any further roles or creation of any stored key objects. Guidance on
configuring the approved mode of operation is provided in section 13.3 and 13.4.
NOTE As part of initialization when using PED based authentication, the end-user is asked if
they wish to duplicate your iKeys. It is strongly recommended that you do this and for
duplicate keys to be retained in secure storage for backup purposes. It is not possible to
copy iKeys at a later point.
11.3 Protection of data outside the HSM
Security of the overall system, including the HSM, is only as strong as its weakest component. As such, the
environment needs to take responsibility for securing artefacts relating to the HSM when outside its control.
In particular, the following explicit requirements shall be met:
 Where the Scalable Key Storage (SKS) Master Key (SMK) is transferred to multiple HSMs, all HSMs
must be deployed to an environment that meets the minimum security requirements applicable to a
given deployment as appropriate and derived from guidance provided in section 11.1.
 Audit logs extracted from the HSM should have their confidentiality protected (as appropriate) during
storage outside the HSM and should be stored in a way to minimize loss of individual log records that
could lead to false positives in relation to log integrity verification failure during log parsing activities.
 Secret data stored on iKeys shall be protected at all times (where PED authentication is in use) – this
includes authentication iKeys alongside iKeys used to transfer and store plaintext secret such as KCV,
RDK and RPV.
 Exported encrypted copies of the SALK shall be protected at all times. The SALK is encrypted under
the RDK but as a long-term key, the protected of the encrypted SALK during transfer between HSM
mitigates any risk associated with compromise of the plaintext RDK.
 Access to external encrypted key storage, though encrypted, should be maintained on a ‘need to know’
basis in order to minimize un-necessary creation of copies of the encrypted key object. This step is
recommended to minimize potential future risks should the cryptographic algorithms used to protect
keys experience a reduction in their security strength based on advances in cryptology.
 Secret keys or passwords used for authorization ahead of key use that are stored outside the HSM
should be encrypted even in a system within the supported IT environment.
 Authentication credentials (including AccessID that have authenticated session) must be protection from
disclosure beyond users with the associated privileges to use them. In particular this should include:
• Prohibiting use of client applications from sources that cannot be trusted with access to
authenticated sessions if either login is performed through them OR an existing AccessID is shared
with them.
In addition to the above, to minimize risks to data being transferred in plaintext through the local
environment of the HSM:
 All sensitive data should be encrypted if stored outside the HSM as part of a strategy to keep sensitive
data logically separate from other data managed by the IT environment.
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 Where possible, logically-independent ports should be used for data ingress and egress to the server
hosting the HSM.
 All physical and logical connections to Trusted IT system hosting the HSM should be controlled to
prohibit attempts to eavesdrop or modify sensitive traffic.
 No peripheral devices should be connected to the USB port other than authorized Thales devices. In
particular, no networking devices (wireless of wired) should be attached to this interface.
Permitted devices at the time of writing this document include: iKeys.
11.4 Reviewing the Module’s Log
The HSM maintains a host accessible log of events in PCIe accessible FRAM memory. This allows the log
on the Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module to be read by the host driver even if the bootloader or main
firmware has failed during power-on leaving the card in an un-responsive state.
 The FRAM log can viewed using the lunadiag tool installed with the Thales LunaCM client:
• to view the FRAM log select option 18 Read Diagnostic Log then one of:
− option 3 Tamper – will output event in the log dedicated to tamper with recorded events.
− option 1 card history – records reset events that can be correlated with either when a card
has been turned on or a soft or hard reset has had to occur.
The following figures show example output from the logs:
Tamper Log
Entry 0, 0x25 bytes read, timestamp = 7630, reset count = 1:
New FRAM LOG created.
Entry 1, 0xc9 bytes read, timestamp = 17167, reset count = 4:
LOG(TAMPER): ds3644_initialize - Warning: 10 L3 tamper settings do not match
default! Registers re-configured.
Actual values: 0x8f 0xff 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x5c 0xd2 0x7e
Entry 2, 0x31 bytes read, timestamp = 17167, reset count = 4:
ALM2008: Internal data corruption
Card History Log
Entry 0, 0x20 bytes read, timestamp = 303, reset count = 1965:
reset reason 0x9154008 Date: 2019-05-30 (Thursday) Time: 1:09:09
Entry 1, 0x20 bytes read, timestamp = 304, reset count = 1966:
reset reason 0x9154008 Date: 2019-05-30 (Thursday) Time: 1:09:38
Entry 2, 0x20 bytes read, timestamp = 3097, reset count = 1967:
reset reason 0x41154008 Date: 2019-05-30 (Thursday) Time: 22:06:07
When reading the FRAM log messages:
 timestamp – is the elapsed time in milliseconds since the last time the card was reset; and
 reset count – identifies the reset event the offset is relevant to. This can be used with the card
history log to calculate the time an event occurred by taking the data and time listed against the reset
event and then adding the offset from the timestamp.
In the scenario of a power-on or on-demand self-test failing, even if the triggered event causes the module
to enter the halted state, the details can be accessed through the FRAM log. If the FRAM logs cannot be
read following halt, this likely indicates the power-on self-tests detected an error during startup of the
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bootloader. If the main firmware experienced a halt during its power-on tests, then further error details will
still be accessible through the FRAM logs.
An example of the module failing the SHA2-224 self-test on startup is below:
---Entry 155, 0x40 bytes read, timestamp = 6495, reset count = 117:
LOG(CRITICAL): SHA2_SelfTest failed, rc=0x30000a
11.5Protecting Authentication and Authorization Data
In order to maintain the separation of user roles throughout the life of the HSM deployment and to avoid
compromise of a role, end users MUST:
 securely store authentication iKeys (where used) at all times;
 avoid (where used) storing corresponding PIN alongside authentication iKeys;
 never lend iKeys and/or disclose challenge-secret, PIN or passwords to anyone including other
authorized end users of the HSM;
 always inspect authentication iKeys (where used) prior to use to check for any signs of possible tamper;
and
 avoid writing down challenge-secrets, PIN or passwords in plaintext form and/or ensure any printed or
written copies of passwords are either separately encrypted or stored in a secure container only
accessible to the owner of the password or challenge-secret.
CAUTION! Should the end user fail to comply with these requirements this could lead to
subsequent compromise or malicious misuse of the HSM and its cryptographic keys.
CAUTION! In order to securely use the Thales Luna PED in its remote configuration, it is
important to check and acknowledge the serial number of the target HSM during setup of
the Remote PED tunnel.
If the displayed serial number does not match the expected target HSM serial number the
user must reject the displayed serial number at the PED, which will halt channel setup.
11.6 Managing Lost or Stolen iKeys
User Authentication iKeys
Should an end user lose an iKey or believe their iKey to have been compromised it is imperative for the
security of the HSM deployment that immediate action is taken to:
1. minimize the chances of subsequent misuse of the lost or compromised iKey; and
2. check for evidence of misuse of the iKey to allow for wider compromise recovery actions to be
considered.
Following identification of a lost or compromised iKey, the following actions should be taken:
 If a backup iKey was made and it includes a corresponding PIN, duplicate the iKey to allow re-issue
(while retaining a backup) but ensure the PIN is changed on all residual copies of the duplicated iKey
prior to re-deployment of the iKey.
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 If the iKey was originally issued with no PIN, the iKey should be considered compromised and will need
to be recreated:
• Recreating an iKey requires all objects stored in the impacted partition or HSM to be backed up to
allow for recovery following recreation of a new iKey.
− Where supported, cloning and SKS should be used to back up the HSM contents to a secondary
HSM.
− If an HSM SO iKey has been lost, all partitions and objects on the HSM should be backed up if
partitions are still available.
− If a Partition CO, Partition LCO or Partition CU iKey is lost, the impacted partition should be
backed up.
− If the AU iKey is lost, a copy of the Audit Logging Secret should be made and transferred to a
PED iKey.
− For the loss of an HSM SO iKey, LunaCM command hsm factoryReset followed by hsm
init should be run to re-create the iKey. This will result in a loss of all un-backed up objects on
the HSM.
• In the event of loss of a Partition CO, Partition LCO or Partition CU iKey, the HSM SO must use the
partition delete command to remove a partition before subsequently creating a new partition
using partition create.
• For AU, the audit partition must be re-initialised using the LunaCM command role init –name
audit to recreate a new AU iKey. The Audit Logging Secret can then be imported using the
audit import command from LunaCM.
11.7 Managing Lost or Stolen Passwords
General
Should a role believe their PIN or password to have been compromised (where used) but access to the
corresponding iKey or to the HSM was not possible, the following action should be taken:
 the PIN or password should be changed using:
• role changepw LunaCM command for a compromised password or iKey PIN to issue a new
password and the option to create a new iKey PIN where appropriate.
NOTE role resetpw is a sister command to role changepw and when enabled as a
capability can enable a Security Officer to reset a lost or forgotten password on behalf of an
end user.
At this time it is not possible to reset a password or PIN associated with the HSM SO role and as such, the
only route to change this PIN is to back up and then to reinitialize the HSM.
KCV
The KCV is used to register an HSM with a domain allowing it to transfer keys with other modules. Loss of a
domain key should be considered a security event.
Backups of the KCV or print-outs (optional) of the HSM-or-Partition domain secret should be retained. If this
has not been performed, it is not possible to recreate or replace the domain secret.
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In order to recover from complete loss of a domain secret, the objects in the HSM (where configuration permits)
need to be exported and re-imported into an HSM registered with a new domain.
Remote PED iKeys
When a Remote iKey is considered to be compromised, a new iKey should be generated and distributed to
all remote PED on the Orange iKey.
In order to create a new Remote PED iKey:
• run the ped vector init from LunaCM.
11.8 Revoking Roles
When an individual no longer has the requirement to hold the authorized role associated with the HSM, a
hand-over of iKeys and corresponding PIN or password should be arranged.
When an iKey has been lost for a role to be revoked, guidance on recovering from a lost end user
authentication iKey in section 11.6 should be followed.
11.9 Key Deletion
Keys can be deleted from a partition in one of a number of ways:
 deleting the partition using the partition delete LunaCM command as the HSM SO;
 calling in the C_DestroyObject Cryptoki API command that lets a Partition CO delete any
partition object owned by them;
 zeroization in response to authentication failure events (e.g. the HSM SO exceeding failed login
threshold for the HSM zeroizes the entire HSM; the Partition SO exceeding failed login threshold
for a user partition will zeroize the partition); and
 the entire module flash is erased using the bootloader terase and tplease commands. This
erases the main firmware (excluding bootloader) and all keys on the module.
NOTE Use of the terase and tplease bootloader commands to perform a complete
erase of all Flash based storage is not intended to be performed by customers and is
included here for completeness only.
The Flash contains keys created during manufacture that cannot be replaced without
repeating the full manufacturing process for the card.
Following erase of the flash, only signed main firmware in a format not made publicly
available can be loaded onto the module.
11.10 Resetting the HSM
Resetting is the process of removing all sensitive information from the cryptographic module.
Run the LunaCM hsm factoryreset command to reset the HSM to factory default settings. Care should
be taken to observe that the command executes to a successful completion.
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An example output from a successful factory reset is shown below:
lunacm:>hsm factoryreset
You are about to factory reset the HSM.
All contents of the HSM will be destroyed.
HSM policies will be reset and the remote PED vector will be erased.
Are you sure you wish to continue?
Type 'proceed' to continue, or 'quit' to quit now ->proceed
Command Result : No Error
Figure 11-1: Example successful factory reset console output from LunaCM
11.11 Updating Firmware
Updating the module’s firmware requires the HSM SO and the firmware update file to complete.
Run the LunaCM hsm updatefw command to update the current firmware to a new version. If any failures
are detected during the update, the command will fail and the module will continue running on the existing
firmware.
An example output from a successful firmware update is shown below:
lunacm:>hsm updatefw -fuf fwupdateG7_testCert_7.0.1_RC327.fuf -
authcode fwupdateG7_testCert_7.0.1_RC327.fuf.txt
You are about to update the firmware.
The HSM will be reset.
Are you sure you wish to continue?
Type 'proceed' to continue, or 'quit' to quit now -> proceed
Updating firmware. This may take several minutes.
Firmware update passed. Resetting HSM
Command Result : No Error
Figure 11-2: Example successful FW update console output from LunaCM
NOTE All updates of the firmware MUST be FIPS 140-3 validated before they can be loaded
for the module to remain in an approved mode of operation.
11.12 Maintenance Requirements
The module does not require any periodic maintenance outside the routine inspection of tamper evidence as
documented in Section 7.2.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
No assured mitigations to ‘other attacks’ are covered in this security policy.
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13 Guidance
13.1 Identifying the Module and Version
Ahead of putting the module into its approved mode of operation, it is important to identify the hardware,
main firmware and bootloader versions of the target module and to check these correspond to one of the
tested modules listed in section Table 2-1. The following sections provide guidance on checking each
element.
NOTE Any module returning hardware, main firmware and bootloader versions not listed in this
security policy is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 certificate.
Both hardware part numbers in this security policy are correlated with the Thales Luna G7
Cryptographic Module.
Checking the module’s name, hardware, bootloader and main firmware versions with38
:
 hsm showinfo when using LunaCM.
The command returns status information on the target cryptographic module including the version numbers
for both bootloader, main firmware and separately the hardware identity. Example output for the command
for a valid module is shown in the figure below with relevant versions and the module’s name highlighted in
red:
lunacm:>hsm showinfo
Slot Id -> 6
Partition Label -> g7_597068
Partition Serial Number -> 597068
Partition Model -> Luna G7
Partition Manufacturer -> Gemalto
Partition Status -> L3 Device, OK39
Session State -> CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION
Role Status -> none logged in
RPV Initialized -> No
Partition SMK OUIDs:
SMK-FW4: Not Initialized
SMK-FW6: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-FM: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-Rollover: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-Primary: 3c000000170000124c1c0900
38
LunaCM maps to the Luna ICD logical interface at the cryptographic module boundary.
39
The command will show “Zeroized” instead of “OK” if the module is in a zeroized state.
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Partition Storage:
Total Storage Space: 655360
Used Storage Space: 0
Free Storage Space: 655360
Object Count: 0
Overhead: 24408
HSM Storage:
Total Storage Space: 33554432
Used Storage Space: 679768
Free Storage Space: 32874664
Allowed Partitions: 1
Number of Partitions: 0
HSM Part Number -> 808-000080-001
Environmental:
System Temperature : 35 deg. C
Firmware Version -> 7.7.3
Bootloader Version -> 1.6.0
Rollback Firmware Version -> Not Available
License Count:
1. 621000186-000 G7 Base CUF
*** The HSM is in FIPS approved operation mode. ***
Command Result : No Error
13-1: Example output of hsm showinfo command from LunaCM
13.2Identifying the Module Type
The Thales Luna G7 Cryptographic Module comes in two configurations, the Thales Luna G7 USB HSM and
the Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM. Check the configuration with:
 slot list when using LunaCM.
The command returns status information of the cryptographic module including the configurations. Example
output for the command for a valid module is shown in the figure below with relevant configurations
highlighted in red:
Available HSMs:
Slot Id -> 105
Label -> g7backup_596424
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Serial Number -> 596424
Model -> Luna G7
Firmware Version -> 7.7.3
Bootloader Version -> 1.6.0
Configuration -> Luna HSM Admin Partition (PW) Backup Mode
Slot Description -> Admin Token Slot
HSM Status -> L3 Device, OK
Slot Id -> 108
Label -> g7_121212
Serial Number -> 121212
Model -> Luna G7
Firmware Version -> 7.7.3
Bootloader Version -> 1.6.0
Configuration -> Luna HSM Admin Partition (PW) Key Export With
Cloning Mode
Slot Description -> Admin Token Slot
HSM Status -> L3 Device, OK
13-2: Example output of slot list command from LunaCM
13.3Approved Mode of Operation for USB HSM
The module is configured to be in an Approved Mode of Operation on a per-partition basis.
To place a partition into its approved mode of operation, the HSM SO (Admin Partition) or Partition SO (User
Partition) must check and, if necessary, set the following partition level policy:
 Partition Policy (43) Enable non-FIPS Algorithms - this policy is set to true by default if HSM Policy
(12), Allow Non-FIPS Algorithms is separately set to true. If HSM Policy (12), Allow Non-FIPS
Algorithms is set to false, the module will set this value to false (enforced by the module). This
policy shall be set to false.
Ahead of configuring the individual partitions, the HSM SO must set the following HSM level policies:
 HSM Policy (56), Allow User Defined ECC Curves is enabled by default and shall be disabled.
If the HSM SO attempts to enable or disable these policies, a warning is displayed and the HSM SO is
prompted to confirm the selection. If this policy is left as enabled, the module will be operating in the non-
approved mode of operation.
Following entry into an approved mode of operation, any changes to either policy will trigger an automatic
zeroization of the HSM erasing all roles and partition stored key objects.
13.4Approved Mode of Operation for Backup HSM
To place the Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM into its approved mode of operation, the HSM SO must check
and, if necessary, set the following HSM level policy:
 HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted Restore – this is disabled by default and shall be enabled.
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If the HSM SO attempts to disable these policies, a warning is displayed and the HSM SO is prompted to
confirm the selection. If this policy is left as disabled, the module will be operating in the non-approved
mode of operation.
Following entry into an approved mode of operation, any changes to HSM Policy (55), Enable Restricted
Restore will trigger an automatic zeroization of the HSM erasing all roles and partition stored key objects.
13.5Using CA_PerformSelftest
To make the module perform its cryptographic self-tests as described in section 10.2 you must use the
following:
 Self Test (Option #90) when using the client tool.
This will give you 3 options of self-tests to run on the module:
 Option 1, H/W Test – runs the hardware self tests.
 Option 2, Crypto Test – runs the cryptographic self-tests.
 Option 3, RNG Test – runs the statistical self-tests.
 All other options shown are not functional and return an error.
Enter your choice : 90
Slots available:
slot#5 - Admin Token Slot
slot#6 - User Token Slot
slot#9 - Admin Token Slot
Select a slot (last selected slot = 6): 6
Test to perform:
[0] To cancel
[1] H/W Test
[2] Crypto Test
[3] RNG Test
[4] Perf mode on (us)
[5] Perf mode on (ns)
[6] Perf mode off
[7] Cryptographic Algorithm Self Tests
[8] Sentry off
[9] Sentry on
[10] Inject error: exit()
[11] Inject error: raise()
[12] Inject error: kernel oops
[13] Inject error: infinite loop
[14] List all enabled Sentry PKA engines (0:5)
[15] Disable a Sentry PKA engine (0:5)
[16] Enable a Sentry PKA engine (0:5)
> 2
Status: Doing great, no errors (CKR_OK)
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(TITLE) menu titles, (99 or FULL) Full Help, (NONE) No help, (0 or EXIT) Quit
Status: Doing great, no errors (CKR_OK)
13-3: Example output of the Self Test command from CKDemo
13.6Nominal Ranges
The nominal operating temperatures of the module are between 5 and 35°C. The module’s tamper
thresholds can be found in section 7.3.
The nominal operation voltage of the module is 5V DC. The module’s voltage thresholds can also be found
in section 7.3.
13.7Assuming Roles
To log into the module’s roles as described in section 4.1 you must first set the slot to the partition you wish
to log into. To set the slot you must first use the slot list LunaCM command to view the available slots,
as shown above in section 13.2. Once you have the chosen slot you wish to log into use the following:
 set slot when using LunaCM.
lunacm:> slot set -slot 4
Command Result : No Error
13-4: Example output of set slot command from LunaCM
Once set you may now log into any of the available roles to the partition by using:
 role login when using LunaCM.
lunacm:> role list
Roles (short)
============================
Partition SO po
Crypto Officer co
Limited Crypto Officer lco
Crypto User cu
Command Result : No Error
lunacm:>role login -name po
Please attend to the PED.
Command Result : No Error
13-5: Example output of role list and role login commands from LunaCM
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NOTE Some roles must first be initialized before they can be logged in. To do so you must use the
role init command in LunaCM
13.8 Additional Guidance
In addition to the direct guidance provided in this Security Policy, both Thales Luna G7 USB HSM and
Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM include extensive user guidance in their online free to access manual.
The full manuals for these products can be accessed at www.thalesdocs.com where the target products can
be found under ‘Luna HSMs’ and where the ‘read docs’ link will take you to the front page where the
document portal for Thales Luna G7 USB HSM. Thales Luna G7 Backup HSM documentation is part of the
Luna PCIe HSM and Luna Network HSM documentations.
As part of the product documentation:
 HSM Administration Guide – describes how to install your Thales Luna G7 USB HSM in a host
workstation, install the Luna HSM Client software, and configure the HSM for use with your
cryptographic applications.
 Partition Administration Guide – describes how to install Luna HSM Client and configure the
application partition on the HSM to create and store your cryptographic objects and perform
cryptographic operations.
 LunaCM Command Reference – describes how to access and use the LunaCM command line tool and
provides detailed syntax descriptions for each available command.
 SDK Reference – describes how to use the Luna HSM SDK to integrate your applications with a Luna
HSM.
NOTE When reviewing the manuals, you should refer to the latest version of each manual.
Should any conflict be identified between guidance in this security policy and statements in the
online product documentation, guidance in the security policy takes precedence.