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FIPS 140-2 Security
Policy
BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit, Versions 6.0, 6.0.2 and 6.0.3
Document version 1.3
BlackBerry Security Certifications, BlackBerry
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Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................... 2
LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................................................................... 4
LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 6
1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ................................................................................. 8
1.1 PHYSICAL SPECIFICATIONS................................................................................................................ 8
1.2 COMPUTER HARDWARE AND OS...................................................................................................... 10
1.3 SOFTWARE SPECIFICATIONS............................................................................................................ 11
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES.............................................................. 12
3 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION................................................................................. 13
3.1 ROLES AND SERVICES..................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 SECURITY FUNCTION....................................................................................................................... 14
3.3 OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION .......................................................................................................... 18
4 FINITE STATE MODEL ...................................................................................................................... 19
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................... 20
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................................................................... 21
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................... 22
7.1 KEY GENERATION ........................................................................................................................... 22
7.2 KEY ESTABLISHMENT ...................................................................................................................... 22
7.3 KEY ENTRY AND OUTPUT ................................................................................................................. 22
7.4 KEY STORAGE ................................................................................................................................ 23
7.5 KEY ZEROIZATION ........................................................................................................................... 23
8 SELF-TESTS....................................................................................................................................... 24
8.1 POWER-UP TESTS........................................................................................................................... 24
8.2 ON-DEMAND SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................ 24
8.3 CONDITIONAL TESTS ....................................................................................................................... 24
8.4 FAILURE OF SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................. 24
9 DESIGN ASSURANCE....................................................................................................................... 25
9.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................................... 25
9.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION.............................................................................................................. 25
9.3 DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................................................................... 25
9.4 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................. 25
10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................................................. 26
10.1 TIMING ATTACK ON RSA.............................................................................................................. 26
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10.2 ATTACK ON BIASED PRIVATE KEY OF DSA .................................................................................... 26
DOCUMENT AND CONTACT INFORMATION......................................................................................... 33
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List of Figures
Figure 1. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12 architecture.............................................................................. 6
Figure 2. Cryptographic module hardware block diagram............................................................................ 9
Figure 3: Cryptographic module software block diagram........................................................................... 11
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List of Tables
Table 1. Summary of achieved security levels per FIPS 140-2 section....................................................... 7
Table 2. Implementation of FIPS 140-2 interfaces..................................................................................... 12
Table 3. Roles and services ....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 4. Supported cryptographic algorithms............................................................................................. 14
Table 5. Key and CSP, key size, security strength, and access ................................................................ 17
Table 6. Module self-tests .......................................................................................................................... 24
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Introduction
BlackBerry® is the leading wireless solution that allows users to stay connected to a full suite of
applications, including email, phone, enterprise applications, the Internet, Short Message Service (SMS),
and organizer information. BlackBerry is a totally integrated package that includes innovative software,
advanced BlackBerry wireless devices and wireless network service, providing a seamless solution. The
BlackBerry® Enterprise Service 12 architecture is shown in the following figure.
Figure 1. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12 architecture
BlackBerry® smartphones are built on industry-leading wireless technology and, combined with
BlackBerry Enterprise Service, provide users with an industry leading, end to end security solution. With
the use of BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12, you can manage BlackBerry smartphones, as well as iOS®
devices, Android™ devices, and Windows phones® all from a unified interface.
BlackBerry 10 smartphones contain the BlackBerry OS Cryptographic Library, a software module that
provides the cryptographic functionality required for basic operation of the device. The BlackBerry
Cryptographic Tool Kit expands the secure capabilities and features BlackBerry is known for, to devices
running operating systems other than the BlackBerry OS.
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit, hereafter referred to as the cryptographic module or module,
provides the following cryptographic services:
• Data encryption and decryption
• Message digest and authentication code generation
• Random data generation
• Digital signature verification
• Elliptic curve key agreement
More information on the BlackBerry solution is available from http://ca.blackberry.com/.
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit meets the requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1
as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of achieved security levels per FIPS 140-2 section
Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Cryptographic Module Security Policy 1
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1 Cryptographic module specification
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit is a multiple-chip, stand-alone software cryptographic module in
the form of an object that operates with the following components:
• Commercially available general-purpose computer hardware
• Commercially available OS that runs on the computer hardware
1.1 Physical specifications
The general, computer hardware component consists of the following devices:
• CPU (microprocessor)
• Working memory located on the RAM and contains the following spaces:
o Input/Output buffer
o Plaintext/ciphertext buffer
o Control buffer
Note: Key storage is not deployed in this module.
• Program memory is also located on the RAM
• Hard disk (or disks), including flash memory
• Display controller, including the touch screen controller
• Keyboard interface
• Mouse interface, including the trackball interface
• Audio controller
• Network interface
• Serial port
• Parallel port
• USB interface
• Power supply
Figure 2 illustrates the configuration of this component.
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Key:
Cryptographic boundary
Flow of data, control input, and status output
Flow of control input
Flow of status output
Figure 2. Cryptographic module hardware block diagram
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1.2 Computer hardware and OS
The combinations of computer hardware and OS include the following representative platforms:
For version 6.0:
QNX® Neutrino® 6.6, ARMv7 (Binary compatible to QNX Neutrino 6.5)
QNX Neutrino 6.5 x86
Red Hat® Linux® AS 5.6 32-bit x86 (Binary compatible to AS 4.x/5.0-5.5)
Red Hat Linux AS 5.6 64-bit x86 (Binary compatible to AS 4.x/5.0-5.5)
For version 6.0.2:
Android 4.4.2, ARMv7
Android 4.0.4, x86
iOS version 6.1.4, ARMv7
Windows Phone 8.0, ARMv7
Windows 7 Enterprise, 64-bit x86
iOS version 6.1.4, ARMv7s
Android 5.0.1, ARMv8
iOS version 8.0, ARMv8
Windows 7 Enterprise, 32-bit x86
Centos Linux Release 7.1, 64-bit x86
MacOS X Yosemite 10.10.4, 64-bit x86
For version 6.0.3:
MacOS X El Capitan 10.11.4, 64-bit x86
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit is also suitable for any manufacturer’s platform that has
compatible processors, equivalent or larger system configurations, and compatible OS versions. For
example, an identical BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit can be used on any compatible Linux or
Windows for x86 processors, or iOS for ARMv7 processors. The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit will
run on these platforms and OS versions while maintaining its compliance to the FIPS 140-2 Level 1
requirements.
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1.3 Software specifications
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit provides services to the C computer language users in an object
format. A single source code base is used for all identified computer hardware and operating systems.
The interface into the BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit is through application programming interface
(API) function calls. These function calls provide the interface to the cryptographic services, for which the
parameters and return codes provide the control input and status output as shown in Figure 3.
Key:
Cryptographic boundary
Data flows
Figure 3: Cryptographic module software block diagram
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2 Cryptographic module ports and interfaces
The cryptographic module ports correspond to the physical ports of the BlackBerry device that is
executing the module, and the module interfaces correspond to the module’s logical interfaces. The
following table describes the module ports and interfaces.
Table 2. Implementation of FIPS 140-2 interfaces
FIPS 140-2 interface Module ports Module interfaces
Data Input Keyboard, touch screen, microphone, USB
port, headset jack, wireless modem, and
Bluetooth® wireless radio
Input parameters of module
function calls
Data Output Speaker, USB port, headset jack, wireless
modem, and Bluetooth wireless radio
Output parameters of module
function calls
Control Input Keyboard, touch screen, USB port,
trackball, BlackBerry button, escape
button, backlight button, and phone button
Module function calls
Status Output USB port, primary LCD screen, and LED Return codes of module
function calls
Power Input USB port Initialization function
Maintenance Not supported Not supported
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3 Roles, services, and authentication
3.1 Roles and services
The module supports User and Crypto Officer roles. The module does not support a maintenance role.
The module does not support multiple or concurrent operators and is intended for use by a single
operator; thus it always operates in single-user mode.
Table 3. Roles and services
Services Crypto Officer User
Initialization services
Initialization X X
Deinitialization X X
Self-tests X X
Show status X X
Symmetric ciphers (AES, TDES)
Key generation X X
Encrypt X X
Decrypt X X
Key zeroization X X
Hash algorithms and message authentication (SHA, HMAC)
Hashing X X
Message authentication X X
Random number generation (pRNG)
Instantiation X X
Seeding X X
Request X X
CSP/Key zeroization X X
Digital signature (DSA, ECDSA, RSA)
Key pair generation X X
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Services Crypto Officer User
Sign X X
Verify X X
Key zeroization X X
Key establishment (DH, ECDH, ECMQV, RSA)
Key pair generation X X
Shared secret generation X X
Wrap X X
Unwrap X X
Key zeroization X X
To operate the module securely, the Crypto Officer and User are responsible for confining those methods
that have been FIPS 140-2 Approved. Thus, in the Approved mode of operation, all roles shall confine
themselves to calling FIPS Approved algorithms, as shown in Table 4.
3.2 Security function
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit supports many cryptographic algorithms. Table 4 shows the set of
cryptographic algorithms supported by the BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit.
Table 4. Supported cryptographic algorithms
Algorithm
FIPS
Approved or
Allowed
Certificate number
Block ciphers TDES (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) [FIPS
46-3]
X #1159, #1773, #2164
AES (ECB, CBC, CFB128, OFB128,
CTR, CCM, GCM, CMAC, XTS) [FIPS
197]
X #1789, #3029, #3946
AES EAX [ANSI C12.22]
DES (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64)
DESX (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64)
AES (CCM*) [ZigBee 1.0.x]
ARC2 (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) [RFC
2268]
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Algorithm
FIPS
Approved or
Allowed
Certificate number
Stream cipher ARC4
Hash functions SHA-1 [FIPS 180-4] X #1571, #2530, #3256
SHA-224 [FIPS 180-4] X #1571, #2530, #3256
SHA-256 [FIPS 180-4] X #1571, #2530, #3256
SHA-384 [FIPS 180-4] X #1571, #2530, #3256
SHA-512 [FIPS 180-4] X #1571, #2530, #3256
MD5 [RFC 1321]
MD4 [RFC 1320]
MD2 [RFC 1115]
AES MMO [ZigBee 1.0.x]
Message
authentication
HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS 198] X #1054, #1914, #2571
HMAC-SHA-224 [FIPS 198] X #1054, #1914, #2571
HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS 198] X #1054, #1914, #2571
HMAC-SHA-384 [FIPS 198] X #1054, #1914, #2571
HMAC-SHA-512 [FIPS 198] X #1054, #1914, #2571
HMAC-MD5 [RFC 2104]
AES-XCBC-MAC [RFC 3566]
pRNG DBRG [NIST SP 800-90A] X #127, #579, #1151
ANSI X9.62 RNG [ANSI X9.62]
ANSI X9.31 RNG [ANSI X9.31]
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Algorithm
FIPS
Approved or
Allowed
Certificate number
Digital
signature
DSS [FIPS 186-4] X #563, #891, #1076
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4, ANSI X9.62] X #242, #553, #866
RSA PKCS1 v1.5 [FIPS 186-4, PKCS#1
v2.1]
X #894, 1574, #2017
RSA PSS [FIPS 186-4, PKCS#1 v2.1] X #894, 1574, #2017
ECNR [IEEE 1363]
ECQV
Key agreement DH [NIST SP 800-56A] Security strength
>= 112 bits
X #25, #50, #79
DH [NIST SP 800-56A] Security strength
< 112 bits
ECDH [NIST SP 800-56A]
Component (ECC CDH)
X #25, #50,
#7, #67, #789
ECMQV [NIST SP 800-56A] X #25, #50, #79
ECPVS [ANSI X9.92]
ECSPEKE [IEEE 1363.2]
Key wrapping RSA PKCS1 v1.5 [PKCS#1 v2.1] X
RSA OAEP [NIST SP 800-56B]
RSA KEM [ANSI X9.44]
ECIES [ANSI X9.63]
The DES, DESX, AES CCM* (CCM Star) and EAX modes, pRNG (ANSI X9.62 and ANSI X9.31), ARC2,
ARC4, MD5, MD4, MD2, AES MMO, HMAC-MD5, AES-XCBC-MAC, ECNR, ECQV, ECIES, ECPVS,
ECSPEKE, key establishment (key wrapping) techniques, RSA OAEP and RSA KEM, and DH with
strength < 112 bits are supported as non FIPS Approved algorithms. To operate the module in
compliance with FIPS, these algorithms should not be used.
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Note: 2-Key Triple-DES decryption is permitted for legacy purposes. 2-Key Triple-DES encryption is
considered a non FIPS Approved algorithm as of January 1st
, 2016. Please consult NIST SP 800-131A
for additional details on algorithm transitions.
Table 5 summarizes the keys and CSPs used in the FIPS mode.
Table 5. Key and CSP, key size, security strength, and access
Algorithm Key and CSP Key size
Security
strength
Access
AES Key 128 to 256 bits 128 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
TDES Key 168 bits 112 bits Create, Read, Use
HMAC Key 160 to 512 bits 128 to 256 bits Use
pRNG (DRBG) seed 112-256 bits 112-256 bits Use
DSA Key pair 2048 to 15360
bits
112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
ECDSA Key pair 224 to 521 bits 112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
RSA Key pair 2048 to 15360
bits
112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
DH Static/ephemeral
key pair
2048 to 15360
bits
112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
ECDH Static/ephemeral
key pair
224 to 521 bits 112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
ECMQV Static/ephemeral
key pair
224 to 521 bits 112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
RSA key
wrapping
Key pair 2048 to 15360
bits
112 to 256 bits Create, Read, Use
Note:
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength).
• EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256
bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength).
• ECMQV (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength).
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength).
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• Digital signature generation that provides less than 112 bits of security (using RSA, DSA or ECDSA) is
disallowed beginning January 1st, 2014.
• Digital signature generation using SHA-1 as its underlying hash function is disallowed beginning
January 1st, 2014.
• HMAC-SHA-1 shall have a key size of at least 112 bits.
3.3 Operator authentication
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit does not deploy an authentication mechanism. The operator
implicitly selects the Crypto Officer and User roles.
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4 Finite State Model
The Finite State Model contains the following states:
• Installed/Uninitialized
• Initialized
• Self-Test
• Idle
• Crypto Officer/User
• Error
The following list provides the important features of the state transitions:
When the Crypto Officer installs the module, the module is in the Installed/Uninitialized state.
When the initialization command is applied to the module, the module is loaded into memory and
transitions to the Initialized state. Then, the module transitions to the Self-Test state and automatically
runs the power-up tests. While in the Self-Test state, all data output through the data output interface
is prohibited. On success, the module enters the Idle state; on failure, the module enters the Error
state and the module is disabled. From the Error state, the Crypto Officer might need to reinstall the
module to attempt correction.
From the Idle state, which is entered only if the self-test has succeeded, the module can transition to
the Crypto Officer/User state when an API function is called.
When the API function has completed successfully, the state transitions back to the Idle state.
If the conditional test (continuous RNG test or Pair-wise consistency Test) fails, the state transitions to
the Error state and the module is disabled.
When the on-demand self-test is executed, the module enters the Self-Test state. On success, the
module enters the Idle state; on failure, the module enters the Error state and the module is disabled.
When the de-initialization command is executed, the module returns to the Installed/Uninitialized state.
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5 Physical security
The BlackBerry device that executes this module is manufactured using industry standard integrated
circuits and meets the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 physical security requirements.
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6 Operational environment
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit runs on a single-user operational environment where each user
application runs in a virtually separated, independent space.
Note: Modern operating systems, such as Linux, Windows, Android, iOS, or QNX provide such
operational environments.
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7 Cryptographic key management
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit provides the underlying functions to support FIPS 140-2 Level 1
key management. The user will select FIPS Approved algorithms and will handle keys with appropriate
care to build up a system that complies with FIPS 140-2. The Crypto Officer and User are responsible for
selecting FIPS 140-2 validated algorithms. For more information, see Table 4.
7.1 Key generation
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit provides FIPS 140-2 compliant key generation. The underlying
random number generation uses a FIPS Approved method, a DRBG (Hash, HMAC, Counter).
The module also supports Dual_EC DRBG, ANSI X9.62 and ANSI X9.31 RNGs, however, the use of
Dual_EC DRBG or ANSI X9.62/ANSI X9.31 RNGs is non-approved for key generation. No keys
generated using the Dual_EC DRBG or ANSI X9.62/ANSI X9.31 RNGs can be used to protect sensitive
data in the Approved mode. Any random output in Approved mode using these DRBG/NDRNGs is the
equivalent to plaintext
7.2 Key establishment
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit provides the following FIPS Approved or Allowed key
establishment techniques [5]:
• Diffie Hellman (DH): The DH key agreement technique implementation supports modulus sizes from
512 bits to 15360 bits that provides between 56 and 256 bits of security strength, where 2048 bits and
above must be used to provide a minimum of 112 bits of security in the FIPS mode.
• EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) & ECMQV : The ECDH and ECMQV key agreement technique
implementations support elliptic curve sizes from 163 bits to 521 bits that provides between 80 and
256 bits of security strength, where 224 bits and above must be used to provide a minimum of 112 bits
of security in the FIPS mode.
• RSA PKCS1 v1.5: The RSA PKCS v1.5 key wrapping implementation supports modulus sizes from
512 bits to 15360 bits that provides between 56 bits and 256 bits of security, where 2048 bits and
above must be used to provide minimum of 112 bits of security in the FIPS mode.
It is the responsibility of the calling application to make sure that the appropriate key establishment
techniques are applied to the appropriate keys.
7.3 Key entry and output
Keys must be imported to and exported from the cryptographic boundary in encrypted form using a FIPS
Approved algorithm.
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7.4 Key storage
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit is a low-level cryptographic toolkit; therefore, it does not provide
key storage.
7.5 Key zeroization
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit provides zeroizable interfaces that implement zeroization
functions; for more information, see Table 3. Zeroization of keys and SPs must be performed by calling
the destroy functions of the objects when they are no longer needed; otherwise, the BlackBerry
Cryptographic Tool Kit will not function.
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8 Self-tests
8.1 Power-up tests
Self-tests are initiated automatically by the module at start-up. The following tests are applied.
Table 6. Module self-tests
Test Description
Known Answer Tests (KATs) KATs are performed on TDES, AES, ASE GCM, SHS (using HMAC-
SHS), HMAC-SHS, DRBG, ANSI X9.62 RNG, ANSI X9.31 RNG,
RSA Signature Algorithm, and KDF. For DSA and ECDSA, a Pair-
wise Consistency Test is used.
For DH, ECDH, ECMQV, the underlying arithmetic implementations
are tested using DSA and ECDSA tests.
Software integrity test The software integrity test deploys ECDSA signature validation to
verify the integrity of the module.
8.2 On-demand self-tests
The Crypto Officer or User can invoke on-demand self-tests by invoking a function, which is described in
Appendix C Crypto Officer and User Guide in this document.
8.3 Conditional tests
The continuous RNG test is executed on all RNG generated data, examining the first 160 bits of each
requested random generator for repetition. This examination makes sure that the RNG is not stuck at any
constant value. In addition, upon each generation of a DSA, ECDSA, or RSA key pair, the generated key
pair is tested for its correctness by generating a signature and verifying the signature on a given message
as a Pair-wise Consistency Test. Upon reception of a DH, ECDH, or ECMQV key generation, the SP 800-
56A conformant computation is performed.
8.4 Failure of self-tests
Self-test failure places the cryptographic module in the Error state, wherein no cryptographic operations
can be performed. If any self-test fails, the cryptographic module will output error code and enter the Error
state.
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9 Design assurance
9.1 Configuration management
A configuration management system for the cryptographic module is employed and has been described
in documentation submitted to the testing laboratory. The module uses the Concurrent Versioning System
(CVS) or Subversion (SVN) to track the configurations.
9.2 Delivery and operation
To review the steps necessary for the secure installation and initialization of the cryptographic module,
see Appendix C – Crypto Officer and User Guide section C.1.
9.3 Development
Detailed design information and procedures have been described in documentation that was submitted to
the testing laboratory. The source code is fully annotated with comments, and it was also submitted to the
testing laboratory.
9.4 Guidance documents
The Crypto Officer Guide and User Guide outlines the operations for the Crypto Officer and User to
ensure the security of the module.
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10 Mitigation of other attacks
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit implements mitigation of the following attacks:
• Timing attack on RSA
• Attack on biased private key of DSA
10.1 Timing attack on RSA
When employing Montgomery computations, timing effects allow an attacker to tell when the base of
exponentiation is near the secret modulus. This attack leaks information concerning the secret modulus.
In order to mitigate this attack, the bases of exponentiation are randomized by a novel technique that
requires no inversion to remove (unlike other blinding methods, for example, see BSAFE Crypto-C User
Manual v4.2).
Note: Remote timing attacks are practical. For more information, see Remote Timing Attacks are Practical
[9].
10.2 Attack on biased private key of DSA
The standards for choosing ephemeral values in El-Gamal type signatures introduce a slight bias. Daniel
Bleichenbacher presented the means to exploit these biases to ANSI.
In order to mitigate this attack, this bias in RNG is reduced to levels that are far below the Bleichenbacher
attack threshold.
To mitigate this attack, NIST published Change Notice 1 of FIPS 186-2.
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Appendix A Acronyms
Introduction
This appendix lists the acronyms used in this document.
Acronyms
Acronym Full term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ARC Alleged Rivest’s Cipher
CBC cipher block chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CFB cipher feedback
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
CSP critical security parameter
CTR counter
CVS Concurrent Versioning System
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG deterministic random bit generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB electronic codebook
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Standard
ECMQV Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone
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Acronym Full term
ECNR Elliptic Curve Nyburg Rueppel
ECQV Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication code
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
KAT known answer test
LCD liquid crystal display
LED light-emitting diode
MD Message Digest Algorithm
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
OFB output feedback
PIM personal information management
PIN personal identification number
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standard
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
pRNG pseudorandom number generator
RFC Recursive Flow Classification
RNG random number generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Service
SMS Short Message Service
SVN Subversion
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
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Acronym Full term
USB Universal Serial Bus
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Appendix B References
Introduction
This appendix lists the references that were used for this project.
References
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, December 3, 2002
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex A: Approved Security Functions for
FIPS PUB 140-2, Draft, July 26, 2011
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for
FIPS PUB 140-2, Draft, August 12, 2011
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex C: Approved Random Number
Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, Draft, July 26, 2011.
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex D: Approved Key Establishment
Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, Draft, July 26, 2011.
NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB
140-2, Draft, January 4, 2011.
NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, July 15, 2011.
NIST Frequently Asked Questions for the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, December 4,
2007.
David Brumley, Dan Boneh, “Remote Timing Attacks are Practical”, Stanford University
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
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Appendix C Crypto Office and User
Guide
C.1 Installation
In order to carry out a secure installation of the BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit, the Crypto Officer must
follow the procedure described in this section.
C.1.1 Installing the cryptographic module
The Crypto Officer is responsible for the installation of the BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit. Only the
Crypto Officer is allowed to install the product.
Note: Place the object in an appropriate location on the computer hardware for your development
environment.
C.1.2 Uninstalling the cryptographic module
Remove the object from the computer hardware.
C.2 Commands
C.2.1 Initialization
The sbg_FIPS140Initialize() function runs a series of self-tests on the module. These tests
examine the integrity of the object and the correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms. If these tests
are successful, a value of SB_SUCCESS is returned and the module is enabled.
C.2.2 Deinitialization
The sbg_FIPS140Deinitialize() function deinitializes the module.
C.2.3 Self-tests
The sbg_FIPS140RunTest() function runs a series of self-test and returns SB_SUCCESS if the tests
are successful. These tests examine the integrity of the object and the correct operation of the
cryptographic algorithms. If these tests fail, the module is disabled. Section C 3 in this appendix describes
how to recover from the disabled state.
C.2.4 Show Status
The sbg_FIPS140GetState() function returns the current state of the module.
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C.3 When the cryptographic module is disabled
When BlackBerry Cryptographic Tool Kit becomes disabled, attempt to bring the module back to the
Installed/Uninitialized state by calling sbg_FIPS140Deinitialize() and then to initialize the module
by calling sbg_FIPS140Initialize(). If the initialization is successful, the module is recovered. If this
attempt fails, uninstall the module and reinstall it. If the module is initialized successfully after this
reinstallation, the recovery is successful. A failed recovery attempt indicates a fatal error. Contact
BlackBerry Support immediately.
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Document and contact information
Contact Corporate office
Security Certifications Team
certifications@blackberry.com
(519) 888-7465 ext. 72921
BlackBerry B
2200 University Ave. E
Waterloo, ON, Canada
N2K 0A7
www.blackberry.com
Version Date Author Reason for revision
1.0 February 18, 2015 Randy Eyamie Original release
1.1 December 14, 2015 Randy Eyamie New platforms added.
1.2 March 1, 2016 Randy Eyamie Updates for SP 800-131A
transitions
1.3 May 4, 2016 Randy Eyamie Update for version 6.0.3