Page 1 FIPS Policy
Juniper Networks SRX300, SRX320, SRX340, SRX345 and SRX550-M
Services Gateways
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Level One Security
Policy
Version: 1.8
Date: December 22, 2017
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
Page 2 FIPS Policy
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary........................................................................ 6
1.2 Mode of Operation...................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 Zeroization................................................................................................................................... 9
2 Cryptographic Functionality.......................................................................................................10
2.1 Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................ 10
2.2 Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Allowed Protocols ..................................................................................................................... 14
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms............................................................................................................... 14
2.5 Critical Security Parameters ...................................................................................................... 15
3 Roles, Authentication and Services ............................................................................................17
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles....................................................................... 17
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 17
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 18
3.4 Non-Approved Services............................................................................................................. 20
4 Self-tests....................................................................................................................................21
5 Security Rules and Guidance......................................................................................................23
6 References and Definitions ........................................................................................................24
List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations.................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements.................................................................................................................. 5
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................................ 8
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................................... 10
Table 5 – Control Plane Authentec Approved Cryptographic Functions ..............................................................................11
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions........................................................................................................ 12
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions........................................................................................................ 12
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions....................................................................................................... 13
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................................ 13
Table 11 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode .......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 12 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)...................................................................................................................... 15
Table 13 - Public Keys............................................................................................................................................................ 15
Table 14 - Authenticated Services ........................................................................................................................................ 18
Table 15 - Unauthenticated Traffic....................................................................................................................................... 18
Table 16 - CSP Access Rights within Services........................................................................................................................ 18
Table 17: Public Key Access Rights within Services............................................................................................................... 19
Table 18 - Authenticated Services ........................................................................................................................................ 20
Page 3 FIPS Policy
Table 19 - Unauthenticated Traffic....................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 20 – References........................................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 22 – Datasheets........................................................................................................................................................... 25
List of Figures
Figure 1 – SRX300 Profile and rear View.......................................................................................................6
Figure 2 – SRX320 Profile and rear View ......................................................................................................6
Figure 3 - SRX340 Profile and rear View ......................................................................................................7
Figure 4 - SRX345 Profile and rear View ......................................................................................................7
Figure 5 – SRX550-M Profile and rear View .................................................................................................7
Page 4 FIPS Policy
1. Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential capabilities to
connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of users. By consolidating fast, highly
available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in a single device, enterprises can economically deliver
new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware – in this
case, a specific FIPS-compliant version, when configured in FIPS-MODE called JUNOS-FIPS-MODE, version 15.1X49-D60.
The firmware image is junos-srxsme-15.1X49-D60.10-domestic.tgz and the firmware Status service identifies itself as in
the “Junos OS 15.1X49-D60.10”.
This Security Policy covers the “Branch” models – the SRX300, SRX320, SRX340, SRX345 and SRX550-M1
models. They are
meant for corporate branch offices of various sizes. (Intended size is proportional to model number.)
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute JUNOS firmware on any of the
Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways listed in the table below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX300 SRX300 JUNOS 15.1X49-D60 6 x 10/100/1000; 2 SFP
SRX320 SRX320 JUNOS 15.1X49-D60 86 x 10/100/1000; 2 SFP; 2 MPIM expansion slots
SRX340 SRX340 JUNOS 15.1X49-D60
8 x 10/100/1000; 4 SFP; 4 MPIM expansion slots; 1 x
10/100/1000 management port
SRX345 SRX345 JUNOS 15.1X49-D60
8 x 10/100/1000; 4 SFP; 4 MPIM expansion slots; 1 x
10/100/1000 management port
SRX550-M1 SRX550-645AP-M
SRX550-645DP-M
JUNOS 15.1X49-D60
6 x 10/100/1000; 4 SFP; 2 MPIM expansion slots; 6
GPIM expansion slots
1
SRX550-M and SRX550 refer to the same security appliance model, whereas SRX550-M is convention used in FIPS Security Policy as well as other Juniper public
documents and SRX550 is convention for model name displayed on the actual hardware faceplate.
Page 5 FIPS Policy
The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. They include a firmware load
service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through
the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and require a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
Page 6 FIPS Policy
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the module’s various models are depicted in Figures 1-5 below. For all models the cryptographic
boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis, but for the SRX550-M the power supplies are excluded.
Figure 1. SRX 300
Figure 2. SRX 320
Page 7 FIPS Policy
Figure 3. SRX 340
Figure 4. SRX 345
Figure 5. SRX 550-M
Page 8 FIPS Policy
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power Power connector Power in
Reset Reset button Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Firmware load port Control in, Data in
WAN SHDSL, VDSL, T1, E1 Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
1.2 Mode of Operation
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved cryptographic algorithms
are supported. The module supports non-Approved algorithms when operating in the non-Approved mode of operation
as described in Sections 2.4 and 3.4. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of operation and the Approved
mode of operation, the CO must zeroize all CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3.
Then, the CO must run the following commands to configure the module into the Approved mode of operation:
co@fips-srx# set system fips level 2
co@fips-srx# commit
When AES-GCM is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must also configure the module to use
IKEv2 by running the following commands:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ike gateway <name> version v2-only
<name> - the user configured name for the IKE gateway
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
When Triple-DES is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must configure the IPsec proposal
lifetime-kilobytes to comply with [IG A.13] using the following command:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> lifetime-kilobytes <kilobytes>”
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
When Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm for IKE (regardless of the IPsec encryption algorithm), the lifetime-kilobytes
for the associated IPsec proposal must be greater than or equal to 12800.
When Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm for IPsec, the lifetime-kilobytes must be less than or equal to 33554432.
The operator can verify the module is operating in the Approved mode by verifying the following:
• The “show version” command indicates that the module is running the Approved firmware (i.e. JUNOS Software
Release [15.1X49-D60]).
• The command prompt ends in “:fips”, which indicates the module has been configured in the Approved mode of
operation.
Page 9 FIPS Policy
• The “show security ike” and “show security ipsec” commands show IKEv2 is configured when either an IPsec or
IKE proposal is configured to use AES-GCM.
1.3 Zeroization
The following command allows the Cryptographic Officer to zeroize CSPs contained within the module:
co@fips-srx> request system zeroize
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
Page 10 FIPS Policy
2. Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved, vendor affirmed, and non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Table 4 through Table 10 below. Table 11 summarizes the high level protocol algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
References to standards are given in square bracket [ ]; see the References table.
Items enclosed in curly brackets { } are CAVP tested but not used by the module in the Approved mode.
Note: Some Data Plane and Control Plane implementations have three algorithm certificates due to hardware accelerated
implementations. Each model utilizes one of the three algorithm certificates, depending on the hardware.
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Mode Description Functions
4348
4347
4346
AES [197]
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
2888
2887
2886
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256 λ = 128
3585
3584
3583
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest Generation
2352
2351
2350
Triple-DES [67] TCBC [38A]
Key Size: 3-key (3 independent 64-bit
keys)
Encrypt, Decrypt
Page 11 FIPS Policy
Table 5 – Control Plane Authentec Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
4345 AES [197]
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D] Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
N/A2
CKG
[133] Section 6.2
Asymmetric key generation using unmodified
DRBG output
[133] Section 7.3 Derivation of symmetric keys
1051 CVL
IKEv1 [135] SHA {1}, 256, 384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 [135] SHA {1}, 256, 384
1041
1040
1039
ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
2885 HMAC [198]
{SHA-1}
IKE Message Authentication, IKE KDF Primitive
SHA-256 λ = 128, 256
SHA-384 λ = 192, 384
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #4345 and HMAC Cert. #2885
Key establishment methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength
Triple-DES Cert. #2349 and HMAC Cert.
#2885
Key establishment methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength
2361
2360
2359
RSA [186]
PKCS1_V1_
5
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256) 3
SigGen, SigVer
3582 SHS [180]
{SHA-1}
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
2349 Triple-DES [67] TCBC [38A]
Key Size: 3-key (3
independent 64-bit keys)
Encrypt, Decrypt
2
Vendor Affirmed.
3
RSA 4096 SigGen was tested to FIPS 186-4; however, the CAVP certificate lists 4096 under FIPS 186-2.
Page 12 FIPS Policy
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
1398 DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256
Control Plane Random Bit Generation/ OpenSSL
Random Bit Generator
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Mode Description Functions
4362
AES [197]
CBC [38A]
CTR[38A]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A4
CKG
[133] Section 6.1
[133] Section 6.2
Asymmetric key generation using unmodified
DRBG output
[133] Section 7.3 Derivation of symmetric keys
1038 ECDSA [186]
{P-224 (SHA 256)}
P-256 (SHA 256)
{P-384 (SHA 256)}
SigGen
{P-224 (SHA 256)}
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)
{P-521 (SHA-256)}
KeyGen, SigVer
2902
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 160
SSH Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256 λ = 256
SHA-512 λ = 512
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #4362 and HMAC Cert. #2902
Key establishment methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength
Triple-DES Cert. #2358 and HMAC Cert.
#2902
Key establishment methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength
2358 RSA [186]
n=2048 (SHA 256)
{n=3072 (SHA 256)}
n=4096 (SHA 256)5
SigGen
n=2048 (SHA 256)
{n=3072 (SHA 256)}
KeyGen, SigVer
3600 SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation, SSH KDF Primitive
SHA-512 Message Digest Generation
2358
Triple-DES
[67]
TCBC [38A]
Key Size: 3-key (3
independent 64-bit keys)
Encrypt, Decrypt
4
Vendor Affirmed.
5
RSA 4096 SigGen was tested to FIPS 186-4; however, the CAVP certificate lists 4096 under FIPS 186-2.
Page 13 FIPS Policy
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
1071 CVL SSH [135] SHA 1, 256, 384 Key Derivation
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
3586 SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 10 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
Diffie-Hellman [IG] D.8 Provides 112 bits of encryption strength. Key agreement; key establishment
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman [IG] D.8
Provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption
strength.
Key agreement; key establishment
NDRNG Provides a minimum of 256 bits of entropy. Seeding the DRBG
Page 14 FIPS Policy
2.3 Allowed Protocols
Table 11 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv1
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC6
AES CBC 128/192/256
SHA-256,384
IKEv27 Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC8
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES GCM9
128/256
SHA-256,384
IPsec ESP
IKEv1 with optional:
• Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
• EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv1
3 Key Triple-DES CBC10
AES CBC 128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1-96
HMAC-SHA-256-128
IKEv2 with optional:
• Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
• EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv2
3 Key Triple-DES CBC11
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES GCM12
128/192/256
SSHv2
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC13
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES CTR 128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No parts of the IKEv1, IKEv2, ESP, and SSHv2 protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
The IKE and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher, and integrity. In Table
11 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used
in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect (non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an Approved mode of
operation.
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
6
The Triple-DES key for the IETF IKEv1 protocol is generated according to RFC 2409.
7
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296.
8
The Triple-DES key for the IETF IKEv2 protocol is generated according to RFC 7296.
9
The GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282.
10
The Triple-DES key for the ESP protocol is generated by the IETF IKEv1 protocol according to RFC 2409.
11
The Triple-DES key for the ESP protocol is generated by the IETF IKEv2 protocol according to RFC 7296.
12
The GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106.
13
The Triple-DES key for the IETF SSHv2 protocol is generated according to RFCs 4253 and 4344.
Page 15 FIPS Policy
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 12 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage CKG
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG N/A
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG N/A
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated.
ECDSA P-256. Used to identify the host.
[133] Section 6.1
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private
key used in SSH. Diffie-Hellman (N = 256 bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or
1024 bit1415
), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
SSH-SEK
SSH Session Key; Session keys used with SSH. Triple-DES (3key), AES,
HMAC.
[133] Section 7.3
ESP-SEK IPsec ESP Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC. [133] Section 7.3
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections. N/A
IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384 [133] Section 6.1
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys. [133] Section 7.3
IKE-SEK IKE Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC. [133] Section 7.3
IKE-DH-PRI
IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private
key used in IKE. Diffie-Hellman N = 224 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC
Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
CO-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the CO. N/A
User-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the User. N/A
Table 13 - Public Keys
Name Description and usage CKG
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256. [133] Section 6.1
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in
SSH key establishment. DH (L = 2048 bit), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-
Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384 [133] Section 6.1
14
SSH generates a Diffie-Hellman private key that is 2x the bit length of the longest symmetric or MAC key negotiated.
.
Page 16 FIPS Policy
Name Description and usage CKG
IKE-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in
IKE key establishment. Diffie-Hellman L = 2048 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or
EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
Auth-UPub
SSH User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the
module. ECDSA P-256 or P-384
N/A
Auth-COPub
SSH CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module.
ECDSA P-256 or P-384
N/A
Root CA
Juniper Root CA. ECDSA P-256 or P-384 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the
validity of the Juniper Package CA at software load.
N/A
Package CA
Package CA. ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of
Juniper Images at software load and boot.
N/A
Page 17 FIPS Policy
3. Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators, but does
not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using either
identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-user,
the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role may not change the configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, username and password over the Console and SSH
as well as username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human
readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20 characters.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0 time to process),
no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter
results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt =
15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of nine (9) possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach for the
attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned. This would allow the
attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute; this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no
such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/(9610
), which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum of 56,000,000
ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P-256 and P-384). The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 56,000,000/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000.
Page 18 FIPS Policy
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 16 lists the access to CSPs by each service,
and Table 17 lists the access to Public Keys by each service.
Table 14 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure
security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset x
Table 15 - Unauthenticated Traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
Table 16 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure security -- E GWR -- -- -- WR GWR -- -- -- W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure traffic -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize -- Z Z -- -- -- Z Z -- -- -- Z Z
SSH connect -- E E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec connect -- E -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- --
Console access -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote reset GZE GZ -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z
Local reset GZE GZ -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z
Page 19 FIPS Policy
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
CO-PW
User-PW
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output).
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
W = Write: The CSP is written to persistent storage in the module.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 17: Public Key Access Rights within Services
Service
Public Keys
SSH-
PUB
SSH-DH-
PUB
IKE-
PUB
IKE-DH-
PUB
Auth-
UPub
Auth-
COPub
Root-
CA
Package-
CA
Configure
security
GWR - GWR - W W - -
Configure - - - - - - - -
Secure
traffic
- - - - - - - -
Status - - - - - - - -
Zeroize Z - Z Z Z Z - -
SSH connect E GE - - E E - -
IPsec
connect
- - E GE - - - -
Console
access
- - - - - - - -
Remote
reset
- Z - Z Z Z - E
Local reset - Z - Z Z Z - E
Traffic - - - - - - - -
Software
load
- - - - - - EW EW
G = Generate: The module generates the key.
R = Read: The key is read from the module (e.g. the key is output).
E = Execute: The module executes using the key.
W = Write: The key is written to persistent storage in the module.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the key.
Page 20 FIPS Policy
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions provided by the non-
Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH
Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in Section 2.3 and the SSHv2 row of Table 11.
Table 18 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security (non-compliant) Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant) Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non-compliant) IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status (non-compliant) Show status x x
Zeroize (non-compliant) Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect (non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect (non-compliant) Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access (non-compliant) Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset (non-compliant) Software initiated reset x
Table 19 - Unauthenticated Traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-compliant) Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-compliant) Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
Page 21 FIPS Policy
4. Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive
data has not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior
to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
• Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Data Plane KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
• Control Plane Authentec KATs
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o EC Diffie-Hellman P-256 KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (used to satisfy the SHA-384 KAT)
o HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
Page 22 FIPS Policy
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
• OpenSSH KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
• Libmd KATs
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (used to satisfy the SHA-256 KAT)
o SHA-2-512 KAT
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment.
Upon successful completion of the self-tests, the module outputs “FIPS self-tests completed.” to the local console.
If a self-test fails, the module outputs “<self-test name>: Failed” to the local console and automatically reboots.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA and RSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 signature verification)
Page 23 FIPS Policy
5. Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically refers to a
requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule
implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext CSPs (i.e. SSH
PHK, IKE-PSK, or IKE-Priv via the Configure security service).
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to use IKEv2 when GCM is configured for IKE or IPsec ESP.
14. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to IPsec ESP lifetime-kilobytes to ensure the module does not
encrypt more than 2^32 blocks with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm for IKE and/or
IPsec ESP.
Page 24 FIPS Policy
6. References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths,
January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, December 2012
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key
Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June 2015.
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Diffie-
Hellman
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Page 25 FIPS Policy
Acronym Definition
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPIM Gigabit-Backplane Pluggable Interface Module
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IOC Input/Output Card
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
MPIM Mini-Pluggable Interface Module
NPC Network Processing Card
PIM Pluggable Interface Module
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SPC Services Processing Card
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-
DES
Triple - Data Encryption Standard
Table 22 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
SRX300
SRX320
SRX340
SRX345
SRX300 Line of
Services Gateways
for the Branch
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000550-en.pdf
SRX550-M SRX Series Services
Gateways for the
Branch
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000281-en.pdf