AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2026 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.
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Amazon Web Services Inc.
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic)
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Pkwy, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 General ................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels..............................................................................................................................5
1.3 Additional Information...................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification .....................................................................................................6
2.1 Description....................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ....................................................7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................................8
2.4 Modes of Operation .......................................................................................................................8
2.5 Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................8
2.6 Security Function Implementations .............................................................................................13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ....................................................................................................18
2.8 RBG and Entropy.........................................................................................................................21
2.9 Key Generation ...........................................................................................................................21
2.10 Key Establishment.....................................................................................................................21
2.11 Industry Protocols......................................................................................................................21
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................................22
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................................22
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...................................................................................................23
4.1 Authentication Methods ..............................................................................................................23
4.2 Roles ...........................................................................................................................................23
4.3 Approved Services ......................................................................................................................23
4.4 Non-Approved Services ...............................................................................................................29
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................................30
5 Software/Firmware Security ...............................................................................................................31
5.1 Integrity Techniques....................................................................................................................31
5.2 Initiate on Demand......................................................................................................................31
6 Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................32
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements......................................................................32
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ......................................................................................32
7 Physical Security................................................................................................................................33
8 Non-Invasive Security ........................................................................................................................34
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management......................................................................................35
9.1 Storage Areas..............................................................................................................................35
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ..........................................................................................................35
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.............................................................................................................35
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................36
9.5 Transitions...................................................................................................................................40
10 Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................................41
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10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests.........................................................................................................41
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................41
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ...................................................................................................50
10.4 Error States ...............................................................................................................................56
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.................................................................................................57
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ........................................................................................................................58
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ....................................................................58
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................59
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..............................................................................................................60
12.1 Attack List .................................................................................................................................60
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness ............................................................................................................60
Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations...............................................................................................61
Appendix B. References ........................................................................................................................62
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels ..........................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)..................7
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ...............................................8
Table 4: Modes List and Description........................................................................................................8
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...............................................................................................................12
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ....................................................................................................12
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.................................................13
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms...................................................................................13
Table 9: Security Function Implementations .........................................................................................18
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................................22
Table 11: Roles .....................................................................................................................................23
Table 12: Approved Services.................................................................................................................29
Table 13: Non-Approved Services .........................................................................................................30
Table 14: Storage Areas........................................................................................................................35
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods.....................................................................................................35
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods .......................................................................................................35
Table 17: SSP Table 1 ...........................................................................................................................38
Table 18: SSP Table 2 ...........................................................................................................................40
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .....................................................................................................41
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................49
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.....................................................................................50
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information............................................................................................56
Table 23: Error States ...........................................................................................................................57
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram..........................................................................................................................6
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0 of the AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic). It contains the security rules under
which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as
specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for
an overall Security Level 1 module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
This Security Policy describes the features and design of the module named AWS-LC
Cryptographic Module (dynamic) using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3
specification. The FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies the
security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a
security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS
140-3. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada
for the protection of sensitive or designated information.
This Non-Proprietary Security Policy may be reproduced and distributed, but only whole and
intact and including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors.
In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied
documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained.
The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout
the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who
would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply
additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy,
and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) (hereafter referred to as “the module”)
provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying
operating system through a C language Application Program Interface (API).
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The block diagram in Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary of the module and its
interfaces with the operational environment and the PAA and the flow of information
between the module and operator (depicted through the arrows).
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the bcm.o file (version AWS-LC FIPS 2.0.0). This
file is dynamically linked to the userspace application during the compilation process.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The TOEPP is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and
Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code
Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
bcm.o AWS-LC FIPS 2.0.0 HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Amazon
Linux 2
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2023
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2023
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Ubuntu
22.04
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Ubuntu
22.04
Amazon EC2 c5.metal with 192
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8275CL
No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Amazon
Linux 2023
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
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Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Amazon
Linux 2023
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Ubuntu
22.04
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 Yes N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Ubuntu
22.04
Amazon EC2 c7g.metal with 128
GiB system memory and Elastic
Block Store (EBS) 200 GiB
Graviton3 No N/A AWS-LC FIPS
2.0.0
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not claim any excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Automatically entered whenever an
approved service is requested
Approved Return value 1 from the API call
sequence specified in section 4.3.
Non-approved
mode
Automatically entered whenever a
non-approved service is requested
Non-
Approved
Return value 1 from the API call
sequence specified in section 4.3.
Table 4: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
When the module starts up successfully, after passing the pre-operational self-test and the
cryptographic algorithms self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the approved mode
of operation by default and can only be transitioned into the non-approved mode by calling
one of the non-approved services listed in the Non-Approved Services table. The module will
transition back to approved mode when approved service is called. Section 4 provides
details on the service indicator implemented by the module. The service indicator identifies
when an approved service is called.
Degraded Mode Description:
The module does not implement a degraded mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Key Length - 128
Tag Length - 32
IV Length - IV Length: 104
Payload Length - Payload Length:
0-256 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0, 256,
65536
SP 800-38C
AES-CMAC A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Generation,
Verification
Key Length - 128, 256
MAC Length - MAC Length: 32-
128 Increment 8
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length:
8-128 Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than
maximum value - Yes
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A4484, A4485, A4486, A4487, A4488,
A4489, A4490, A4493, A4494, A4495,
A4496, A4497, A4498, A4499, A4500,
A4501, A4502, A4503, A4504
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4485, A4486, A4488, A4490, A4494,
A4495, A4496, A4498, A4499, A4500,
A4502, A4503, A4504
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External, Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128,
32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length:
128-65536 Increment 128
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-320
Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A4485, A4486, A4488, A4490, A4494,
A4495, A4496, A4498, A4499, A4500,
A4502, A4503, A4504
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External, Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128,
32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-320
Increment 8
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length:
128-4096 Increment 128
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
Payload Length - Payload Length:
8-4096 Increment 8
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length:
128-65536 Increment 128
Tweak Mode - Hex
Data Unit Length Matches
Payload Length - Yes
SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG A4484, A4487, A4489, A4493, A4497,
A4501
Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No
Additional Input - Additional
Input: 256
Entropy Input - Entropy Input:
384
Nonce - Nonce: 0
Personalization String Length -
Personalization String Length:
384
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Secret Generation Mode - testing
candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Component - No
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 224
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 112-
524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Domain Parameter Generation
Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Fixed Info Pattern -
uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo||l
Fixed Info Encoding -
concatenation
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared
Secret Length: 224-2048
Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF SSH (CVL) A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-
256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF TLS (CVL) A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
TLS Version - v1.0/1.1, v1.2
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
PBKDF A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Iteration Count - Iteration Count:
1000-10000 Increment 1
HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Password Length - Password
Length: 14-128 Increment 1
Salt Length - Salt Length: 128-
4096 Increment 8
Key Data Length - Key Data
Length: 128-4096 Increment 8
SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
p mod 8 - 0
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
q mod 8 - 0
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Info Generated By Server - No
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
Mask Function - mgf1
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5,
PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
Salt Length - 28
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
Mask Function - mgf1
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A4483, A4491, A4492, A4505, A4506,
A4507, A4508
Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
Asymmetric Cryptographic
Key Generation (CKG)
Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A SP 800-133r2, section 4, direct
DRBG output without XOR
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved
mode of operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
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Name Caveat Use and Function
MD5 Allowed per IG 2.4.A Message Digest used in TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF only
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES with OFB or CFB1, CFB8 modes Encryption, Decryption (not CAVP tested)
AES-GCM, CCM, GMAC, XTS keys not listed in the
Approved Services table of the Security Policy
Encryption, Decryption
AES using aes_*_generic function Encryption, Decryption (not CAVP tested)
AES GMAC using aes_*_generic Message Authentication Generation (not CAVP
tested)
Curve secp256k1 Signature Generation, Signature Verification,
Shared Secret Computation
Diffie Hellman Shared Secret Computation (not CAVP tested)
HMAC-MD4, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-3,
HMAC- RIPEMD-160
Message Authentication Generation (not CAVP
tested)
MD4 Message Digest
MD5 Message Digest (outside of TLS)
RSA using RSA_generate_key_ex Key Generation (not complaint with FIPS186-
5)
ECDSA using EC_KEY_generate_key Key Generation (not complaint with FIPS186-
5)
RSA using keys less than 2048 bits Signature Generation
RSA using keys less than 1024 bits Signature Verification
RSA Key Encapsulation/Un-encapsulation (not
compliant with SP 800-56BRev2), sign/verify
primitive operations without hashing
RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 and OAEP padding Encryption primitive
SHA-1, SHA-3 Signature Generation (not CAVP tested)
SHAKE, RIPEMD-160, SHA-3 Message Digest (not CAVP tested)
TLS KDF using any SHA algorithms not listed in SP the
Approved Services table of the Security Policy or TLS
KDF using non extended master secret
Key Derivation
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
ECDSA Key
Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Key Generation ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Asymmetric
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
RSA Key
Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Key Generation RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
ECDSA Key
Verification
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Key Verification ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
ECDSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation (FIPS
186-5)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
RSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
ECDSA Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Legacy ECDSA
Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Legacy RSA
Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
RSA Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5, FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A4483, A4492,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Message
Authentication
Generation with
AES
MAC Message
Authentication
Generation
AES-CMAC: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-GMAC: (A4500,
A4495, A4494,
A4496, A4504,
A4485, A4502,
A4486, A4498,
A4488, A4499,
A4490, A4503)
Message
Authentication
Generation with
HMAC
MAC Message
Authentication
Generation
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HMAC-SHA2-224:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
Message
Authentication
Verification with
AES-GMAC
MAC Message
Authentication
Generation
AES-GMAC: (A4500,
A4495, A4494,
A4496, A4504,
A4485, A4502,
A4486, A4498,
A4488, A4499,
A4490, A4503)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC-SSC
(Shared Secret
Computation with
EC Diffie-Hellman)
KAS-SSC Shared Secret
Computation
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2 path (1)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
HKDF Key
Derivation
KAS-56CKDF Key Derivation KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SSH Key Derivation KAS-135KDF Key Derivation KDF SSH: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
TLS Key Derivation KAS-135KDF Key Derivation KDF TLS: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
PBKDF Key
Derivation
PBKDF Key Derivation PBKDF: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
Message Digest SHA Message Digest SHA-1: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SHA2-224: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SHA2-256: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SHA2-384: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SHA2-512: (A4483,
A4492, A4505,
A4491, A4508,
A4506, A4507)
SHA2-512/256:
(A4483, A4492,
A4505, A4491,
A4508, A4506,
A4507)
Authenticated
Encryption
BC-Auth Authenticated
Encryption
AES-GCM: (A4500,
A4495, A4494,
A4496, A4504,
A4485, A4502,
A4486, A4498,
A4488, A4499,
A4490, A4503)
AES-CCM: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-KW: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-KWP: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
Authenticated
Decryption
BC-Auth Authenticated
Decryption
AES-GCM: (A4500,
A4495, A4494,
A4496, A4504,
A4485, A4502,
A4486, A4498,
A4488, A4499,
A4490, A4503)
AES-CCM: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-KW: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-KWP: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
Symmetric
Encryption
BC-UnAuth Encrypt a plaintext AES-CBC: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-CTR: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-ECB: (A4500,
A4501, A4495,
A4494, A4496,
A4504, A4485,
A4502, A4486,
A4498, A4488,
A4499, A4493,
A4484, A4489,
A4490, A4503,
A4497, A4487)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A4501, A4493,
A4484, A4489,
A4497, A4487)
Symmetric
Decryption
BC-UnAuth Decrypt a
ciphertext
AES-CBC: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-CTR: (A4501,
A4493, A4484,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A4489, A4497,
A4487)
AES-ECB: (A4500,
A4501, A4495,
A4494, A4496,
A4504, A4485,
A4502, A4486,
A4498, A4488,
A4499, A4493,
A4484, A4489,
A4490, A4503,
A4497, A4487)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A4501, A4493,
A4484, A4489,
A4497, A4487)
Random Number
Generation
DRBG Random Number
Generation
Counter DRBG:
(A4501, A4493,
A4484, A4489,
A4497, A4487)
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
GCM IV
The module offers three AES GCM implementations. The GCM IV generation for these
implementations complies respectively with IG C.H under Scenario 1, Scenario 2, and
Scenario 5. The GCM shall only be used in the context of the AES-GCM encryption executing
under each scenario.
Scenario 1, TLS 1.2
For TLS 1.2, the module offers the GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1
of IG C.H. The module is compliant with SP800-52rev2 and the mechanism for IV generation
is compliant with RFC5288. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from
Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52rev2.
The module explicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not
exhaust the maximum number of possible values of 2^{64-1} for a given session key. If this
exhaustion condition is observed, the module returns an error indication to the calling
application, which will then need to either abort the connection, or trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key.
In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure
that a new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario
shall be established.
Scenario 2, Random IV
In this implementation, the module offers the interfaces
EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce() and EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce() for
compliance with Scenario 2 of IG C.H and SP800-38D Section 8.2.2. The 96-bit AES-GCM IV,
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containing 96 bits of entropy, is generated randomly internal to the module using module’s
approved DRBG, without outputting the IV to the calling application. The DRBG is seeded
from the entropy source.
Scenario 5, TLS 1.3
August 2018, using the ciphersuites that explicitly select AES-GCM as the
encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The module supports acceptable
AES-GCM ciphersuites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52rev2.
The module implements, within its boundary, an IV generation unit for TLS 1.3 that keeps
control of the 64-bit counter value within the AES-GCM IV. If the exhaustion condition is
observed, the module will return an error indication to the calling application, who will then
need to either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new key for AES-GCM), or terminate the
connection.
In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure
that new AES-GCM keys encryption or decryption under this scenario are established. TLS
1.3 provides session resumption, but the resumption procedure derives new AES-GCM
encryption keys.
AES XTS
The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with AES XTS shall not exceed 220
AES blocks, that is 16MB, of data per XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in Section 4 of
SP 800-38E. The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on
storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in
transit. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check to ensure
that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical.
Key_1 and Key_2 shall be generated and/or established independently according to the rules
for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3.
Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2
The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP 800-132.
The module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, in which the Master Key
(MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with
SP 800-132 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.N, the following requirements shall be met:
• Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The MK shall not be used for
other purposes. The module accepts a minimum length of 112 bits for the MK or DPK.
• Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as
cryptographic Keys.
• The minimum length of the password or passphrase accepted by the module is 14
characters. This results in the estimated probability of guessing the password to be
at most 10-14. Combined with the minimum iteration count as described below, this
provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against
brute-force attacks.
• A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module
to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the SP 800-
90Ar1 DRBG provided by the module.
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, if the time required to
generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The module
restricts the minimum iteration count to be 1000.
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Compliance to SP 800-56ARev3 assurances
The module offers ECDH shared secret computation services compliant to the SP 800-
56ARev3 and meeting IG D.F scenario 2 path (1). To meet the required assurances listed in
section 5.6 of SP 800-56ARev3, the module shall be used together with an application that
implements the “TLS protocol” and the following steps shall be performed.
• The entity using the module, must use the module's "Key Pair Generation" service for
generating ECDH ephemeral keys. This meets the assurances required by key pair
owner defined in the section 5.6.2.1 of SP 800-56ARev3.
• As part of the module's shared secret computation (SSC) service, the module
internally performs the public key validation on the peer's public key passed in as
input to the SSC function. This meets the public key validity assurance required by
the sections 5.6.2.2.1/5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Arev3.
• The module does not support static keys therefore the "assurance of peer's
possession of private key" is not applicable.
Key Establishment
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS).
However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be
used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS.
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS).
However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external
operator/application as part of an approved KTS.
Legacy Algorithms
According to IG C.M, digital signature verification using RSA with a 1024-bits modulus is
approved for legacy usage only. Digital signature verification using SHA-1 is approved for
legacy usage only. The CAVP certificates for these algorithms are listed in the Approved
Algorithms table. These legacy algorithms can only be used on data that was generated
prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.
SHA-1 is only approved in the module when used for Message Digest, Message
Authentication Generation with HMAC, HKDF Key Derivation, SSH Key Derivation and
Signature Verification (Legacy). The use of SHA-1 for Digital Signature Generation is non-
approved in the module.
See section 9.5 regarding algorithm transitions.
Approved Modulus Sizes for RSA Digital Signature
RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-5) has been CAVP tested with all the supported RSA modulus lengths
(i.e., 2048, 3072, 4096). This is documented in the Approved Algorithms table of the
Security Policy. All modulus sizes for SigVer have also been CAVP tested. There is no RSA
signature with keys for which CAVP testing is not available. The minimum number of the
Miller-Rabin tests used in the primality testing complies with Table B.1 in FIPS 186-5. The
RSA SIgVer (186-4) and (FIPS 186-5) have been CAVP tested with the modulus sizes of 1024
(FIPS 186-4) and 2048, 3072, 4096 (FIPS 186-5). All modulus sizes in which testing is
available have been tested by the CAVP.
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2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
The module provides an SP800-90Arev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator
(DRBG) using CTR_DRBG mechanism with AES-256 for generation of key components of
asymmetric keys, and random number generation. The DRBG is seeded with 256-bit of
entropy input provided from an external entity to the module. This corresponds to scenario 2
(b) of IG 9.3.A i.e., the DRBG that receives a LOAD command with entropy obtained from
inside the physical perimeter of the operational environment but outside of module's
cryptographic boundary. The calling application shall use an entropy source that meets the
security strength required for the CTR_DRBG as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 3 and
should return an error if minimum strength cannot be met.
Per the IG 9.3.A requirement, the module includes the caveat "No assurance of the minimum
strength of generated keys".
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant
with SP 800-133Rev2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP
800-90ARev1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133Rev2, as documented
in the Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Table.
Additionally, the module implements methods for key derivation and key generation as
documented in the Security Function Implementations Table.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements methods that may be used as part of a Key Agreement Scheme or a
Key Transport Scheme as listed in the Security Function Implementations table.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module implements the SSH key derivation function for use in the SSH protocol (RFC
4253 and RFC 6668).
GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is compliant with versions 1.2 and 1.3
of the TLS protocol (RFC 5288 and 8446) and shall only be used in conjunction with the TLS
protocol. Additionally, the module implements the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 key derivation
functions for use in the TLS protocol.
No parts of the SSH, TLS, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters for data.
N/A Data Output API output parameters for data.
N/A Control Input API function calls.
N/A Status Output API return codes, error message.
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
As a Software module, the module interfaces are defined as Software or Firmware Module
Interfaces (SMFI), and there are no physical ports. The module does not implement a control
output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not support authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role Crypto Officer None
Table 11: Roles
The module does not support concurrent operators.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encryption Encryption Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key,
plaintex
t
Cipherte
xt
Symmetric
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: W,E
Decryption Decryption Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key,
cipherte
xt
Plaintext Symmetric
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: W,E
Authentica
ted
Encryption
Authenticated
encryption
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key, IV,
plaintex
t
Cipherte
xt, MAC
tag
Authentica
ted
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: W,E
Authentica
ted
Decryption
Authenticated
decryption
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key,
cipherte
xt, MAC
tag, IV
Plaintext Authentica
ted
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: W,E
Message
Authentica
tion
Generation
MAC generation Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key/HM
AC key,
plaintex
t
MAC tag Message
Authentica
tion
Generation
with AES
Message
Authentica
tion
Generation
with HMAC
Crypto
Officer
- HMAC
Key: W,E
- AES
Key: W,E
Message
Authentica
tion
Verification
MAC
verification
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
AES
key,
cipherte
xt, MAC
tag, IV
Plaintext Message
Authentica
tion
Verification
with AES-
GMAC
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Message
Digest
Generating
message digest
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Messag
e
Message
digest
Message
Digest
Crypto
Officer
Random
Number
Generation
Generating
random
numbers
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Output
length
Random
bytes
Random
Number
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- Entropy
Input (per
IG D.L):
W,E
- DRBG
Seed (per
IG D.L):
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State (V,
Key) (per
IG D.L):
G,E
Key
Generation
Generating key
pair
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
RSA:
Modulus
size;
ECDSA:
Curve
RSA:
Module
generat
ed RSA
public
key,
Module
generat
ed RSA
private
key;
ECDSA:
Module
Generat
ed EC
Private
Key,
Module
Generat
ed EC
Public
Key
ECDSA Key
Generation
RSA Key
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- Module
generate
d RSA
Public
Key: G,R
- Module
generate
d RSA
Private
Key: G,R
- Module
generate
d EC
Public
Key: G,R
- Module
generate
d EC
Private
Key: G,R
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
G,E,Z
Key
Verification
Verifying the
public key
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Public
key
Success/
error
ECDSA Key
Verification
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Public
Key: W,E
Signature
Generation
Generating
signature
Return value 1 from the
function:
Messag
e, EC
private
Digital
signatur
e
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- EC
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
key or
RSA
private
key
RSA
Signature
Generation
Private
Key: W,E
- RSA
Private
Key: W,E
Signature
Verification
Verifying
signature
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Signatur
e, EC
public
key or
RSA
public
key
Digital
signatur
e
verificati
on result
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Legacy
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Legacy
RSA
Signature
Verification
RSA
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Public
Key: W,E
- RSA
Public
Key: W,E
Shared
Secret
Computati
on
Calculating the
Shared Secret
Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
EC
public
key, EC
private
key
Shared
Secret
KAS-ECC-
SSC
(Shared
Secret
Computati
on with EC
Diffie-
Hellman)
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Public
Key: W,E
- EC
Private
Key: W,E
- Shared
Secret:
G,R
TLS KDF
Key
Derivation
Deriving keys Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret,
TLS
Master
Secret
TLS
Master
Secret,
TLS
Derived
Key
TLS Key
Derivation
Crypto
Officer
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret :
G,E,R,Z
- TLS
Derived
Key:
G,R,Z
HKDF Key
Derivation
Deriving keys Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Shared
Secret
HKDF
Derived
key
HKDF Key
Derivation
Crypto
Officer
- Shared
Secret:
W,E
- KDA
HKDF
derived
key: G,R
SSH Key
Derivation
Deriving keys Return value 1 from the
function:
Shared
Secret
SSH KDF
Derived
Key
SSH Key
Derivation
Crypto
Officer
- Shared
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Secret:
W,E
- SSH KDF
Derived
Key: G,R
PBKDF Key
Derivation
Deriving keys Return value 1 from the
function:
FIPS_service_indicator_check_a
pproved()
Passwor
d
PBKDF
Derived
Key
PBKDF Key
Derivation
Crypto
Officer
-
Password:
W,E
- PBKDF
Derived
Key: G,R
Zeroization Zeroize PSP in
volatile
memory
N/A SSP N/A None Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key: Z
- HMAC
Key: Z
- Entropy
Input (per
IG D.L): Z
- DRBG
Seed (per
IG D.L): Z
- DRBG
Internal
State (V,
Key) (per
IG D.L): Z
- RSA
Public
Key: Z
- RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Module
generate
d RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Module
generate
d RSA
Private
Key: Z
- EC
Public
Key: Z
- EC
Private
Key: Z
- Module
generate
d EC
Public
Key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Module
generate
d EC
Private
Key: Z
- Shared
Secret: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret : Z
- TLS
Derived
Key: Z
- KDA
HKDF
derived
key: Z
-
Password:
Z
-
Intermedi
ate Key
Generatio
n Value:
Z
- SSH KDF
Derived
Key: Z
- PBKDF
Derived
Key: Z
On-
Demand
Self-test
Initiate power-
on self-tests by
reset
N/A N/A Pass or
fail
ECDSA Key
Generation
RSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
RSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Legacy
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Legacy
RSA
Signature
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Verification
RSA
Signature
Verification
Message
Authentica
tion
Generation
with AES
Message
Authentica
tion
Generation
with HMAC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
(Shared
Secret
Computati
on with EC
Diffie-
Hellman)
HKDF Key
Derivation
SSH Key
Derivation
TLS Key
Derivation
PBKDF Key
Derivation
Message
Digest
Authentica
ted
Encryption
Authentica
ted
Decryption
Symmetric
Encryption
Symmetric
Decryption
Random
Number
Generation
On-
Demand
Integrity
Test
Initiate integrity
test on-demand
N/A N/A Pass or
fail
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Status
Show status of
the module
state
N/A N/A Module
status
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Version
Show the
version of the
module using
awslc_version_s
tring
N/A N/A Module
name
and
version
None Crypto
Officer
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Table 12: Approved Services
For the above table, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions
(types) that the service has for each SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
For the role, CO indicates “Crypto Officer”.
The module implements a service indicator that indicates whether the invoked service is
approved. The service indicator is a return value 1 from the
FIPS_service_indicator_check_approved function. This function is used together with two
other functions. The usage is as follows:
• STEP 1: Should be called before invoking the service.
int before = FIPS_service_indicator_before_call();
• STEP 2: Make a service call i.e., API function for performing a service.
Func();
• STEP 3: Should be called after invoking the service.
int after = FIPS_service_indicator_after_call();
• STEP 4: Return value 1 indicates approved service was invoked.
int ret = FIPS_service_indicator_check_approved(before, after);
Alternatively, all the above steps can be done by using a single call using the function
CALL_SERVICE_AND_CHECK_APPROVED(approved, func).
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
AES with OFB or CFB1, CFB8
modes
Encryption, Decryption AES with OFB or CFB1, CFB8
modes
CO
AES-GCM, CCM, GMAC, XTS keys
not listed in the Approved Services
table of the Security Policy
Encryption, Decryption AES-GCM, CCM, GMAC, XTS keys
not listed in the Approved Services
table of the Security Policy
CO
AES using aes_*_generic function Encryption, Decryption AES using aes_*_generic function CO
AES GMAC using aes_*_generic Message Authentication
Generation
AES GMAC using aes_*_generic CO
Curve secp256k1 Signature Generation,
Signature Verification,
Shared Secret
Computation
Curve secp256k1 CO
Diffie Hellman Shared Secret
Computation
Diffie Hellman CO
HMAC-MD4, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-
SHA1, HMAC-SHA-3, HMAC-
RIPEMD-160
Message Authentication
Generation
HMAC-MD4, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-
SHA1, HMAC-SHA-3, HMAC-
RIPEMD-160
CO
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Name Description Algorithms Role
MD4 Message Digest MD4 CO
MD5 Message Digest (outside
of TLS)
MD5 CO
RSA using RSA_generate_key_ex Key Generation RSA using RSA_generate_key_ex CO
ECDSA using
EC_KEY_generate_key
Key Generation ECDSA using
EC_KEY_generate_key
CO
RSA using keys less than 2048 bits Signature Generation RSA using keys less than 2048 bits CO
RSA using keys less than 1024 bits Signature Verification RSA using keys less than 1024 bits CO
RSA Key Encapsulation/Un-
encapsulation,
sign/verify primitive
operations without
hashing
RSA CO
RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 and OAEP
padding
Encryption primitive RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 and OAEP
padding
CO
SHA-1, SHA-3 Signature Generation SHA-1, SHA-3 CO
SHAKE, RIPEMD-160, SHA-3 Message Digest SHAKE, RIPEMD-160, SHA-3 CO
TLS KDF using any SHA algorithms
not listed in SP the Approved
Services table of the Security
Policy or TLS KDF using non
extended master secret
Key Derivation TLS KDF using any SHA algorithms
not listed in SP the Approved
Services table of the Security
Policy or TLS KDF using non
extended master secret
CO
Table 13: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support loading of external software or firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing a HMAC value calculated at run time on
the bcm.o file, with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored within the module that was computed
at build time.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The module provides on-demand integrity test. The integrity test can be performed on
demand by reloading the module. Additionally, the integrity test can be performed using the
On-Demand Integrity Test service, which calls the BORINGSSL_integrity_test function.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module must be compiled and installed as stated in section 11. The user should confirm
that the module is installed correctly by following steps 4 and 5 listed in section 11.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as
well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or
systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools
implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational
environment.
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7 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The module claims no non-invasive security techniques.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service execution.
The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs
Dynamic
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
API input
parameters
Operator calling
application (TOEPP)
Cryptographic
module
Plaintext Manual Electronic
API output
parameters
Cryptographic
module
Operator calling
application (TOEPP)
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module does not support entry and output of SSPs beyond the physical perimeter of the
operational environment. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in
the plaintext form and output via API output parameters in the plaintext form to and from
the calling application running on the same operational environment.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Zeroizes the SSPs
contained within the
cipher handle.
Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with
zeroes and then it is released, which renders
the SSP values irretrievable. The completion
of the zeroization routine indicates that the
zeroization procedure succeeded.
By calling the
cipher related
zeroization API
Automatic Automatically
zeroized by the
module when no
longer needed
Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with
zeroes, which renders the SSP values
irretrievable.
N/A
Module Reset De-allocates the
volatile memory
used to store SSPs
Volatile memory used by the module is
overwritten within nanoseconds when power
is removed.
By unloading
and reloading
the module
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
AES Key AES Key 128-256
bits - 128-
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
Message
Authentication
Generation with
AES
Message
Authentication
Verification with
AES-GMAC
Authenticated
Encryption
Symmetric
Encryption
Authenticated
Decryption
Symmetric
Decryption
HMAC Key HMAC Key 112-256
bits - 112-
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
Message
Authentication
Generation with
HMAC
Entropy Input
(per IG D.L)
Entropy Input
(per IG D.L)
256 bits -
256 bits
Entropy Input
- CSP
Random Number
Generation
DRBG Seed
(per IG D.L)
DRBG Seed
(per IG D.L)
256 bits -
256 bits
Seed - CSP Random
Number
Generation
Random Number
Generation
DRBG
Internal State
(V, Key) (per
IG D.L)
DRBG Internal
State (V, Key)
(per IG D.L)
256 bits -
256 bits
Internal state
- CSP
Random
Number
Generation
Random Number
Generation
RSA Public
Key
RSA Public
Key
1024,
2048,
3072, 4096
bits - 80-
150 bits
Public key -
PSP
Legacy RSA
Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification
RSA Private
Key
RSA Private
Key
2048,
3072, 4096
bits - 112-
150 bits of
strength
Private key -
CSP
RSA Signature
Generation
Module
generated
RSA Public
Key
Module
generated
RSA Public
Key
2048,
3072, 4096
bits - 112-
150 bits
Public key -
PSP
RSA Key
Generation
Module
generated
RSA Private
Key
Module
generated
RSA Private
Key
2048,
3072, 4096
bits - 112-
150 bits
Private key -
CSP
RSA Key
Generation
EC Public Key EC Public Key P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Public key -
PSP
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Legacy ECDSA
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
Signature
Verification
KAS-ECC-SSC
(Shared Secret
Computation
with EC Diffie-
Hellman)
EC Private
Key
EC Private
Key
P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Private key -
CSP
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
KAS-ECC-SSC
(Shared Secret
Computation
with EC Diffie-
Hellman)
Module
generated EC
Public Key
Module
generated EC
Public Key
P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Public key -
PSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
Module
generated EC
Private Key
Module
generated EC
Private Key
P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Private key -
CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
Shared Secret Shared Secret P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
KAS-ECC-SSC
(Shared Secret
Computation
with EC Diffie-
Hellman)
HKDF Key
Derivation
SSH Key
Derivation
TLS Key
Derivation
PBKDF Key
Derivation
TLS Pre-
Master Secret
TLS Pre-
Master Secret
P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
TLS pre-
master
secret - CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS Master
Secret
TLS Master
Secret
384 bits -
112-256
bits
TLS master
secret - CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
HKDF Key
Derivation
SSH Key
Derivation
TLS Key
Derivation
PBKDF Key
Derivation
TLS Derived
Key
Generated by
TLS KDF key
derivation
112-256
bits - 112-
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
KDA HKDF
derived key
KDA HKDF
derived key
112-2048
bits - 112-
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
HKDF Key
Derivation
SSH KDF
Derived Key
SSH KDF
Derived Key
112-256
bits - 112-
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
SSH Key
Derivation
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
PBKDF
Derived Key
PBKDF
Derived Key
112-4096
bits - 112-
256 bits of
strength
Symmetric
key - CSP
PBKDF Key
Derivation
Password Password 112-1024
bits - N/A
Password -
CSP
PBKDF Key
Derivation
Intermediate
Key
Generation
Value
Intermediate
Key
Generation
Value
224-4096
bits - 112-
256 bits
Intermediate
value - CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
RSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Generation
RSA Key
Generation
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
HMAC Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
Entropy Input
(per IG D.L)
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Automatic DRBG Seed (per IG
D.L):Generates
DRBG Seed (per
IG D.L)
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Automatic Entropy Input (per IG
D.L):Generated From
DRBG Internal State
(V, Key) (per IG
D.L):Generates
DRBG Internal
State (V, Key)
(per IG D.L)
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
DRBG Seed (per IG
D.L):Generated From
RSA Public Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
RSA Private
Key:Paired With
RSA Private Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
RSA Public Key:Paired
With
Module
generated RSA
Public Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
Module generated RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated From
Module
generated RSA
Private Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
Wipe and Free
memory block
Module generated RSA
Public Key:Paired With
Intermediate Key
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
service
completion
allocated
Module Reset
Generation
Value:Generated From
EC Public Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
EC Private Key:Paired
With
Shared
Secret:Generates
EC Private Key API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
EC Public Key:Paired
With
Shared
Secret:Generates
Module
generated EC
Public Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Module generated EC
Private Key:Paired
With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated From
Shared
Secret:Generates
Module
generated EC
Private Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
Module generated EC
Public Key:Paired With
Intermediate Key
Generation
Value:Generated From
Shared
Secret:Generates
Shared Secret API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
EC Public Key:Derived
From
EC Private
Key:Derived From
Shared Secret:Derived
From
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
TLS Master Secret
:Derives
TLS Master
Secret
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived From
TLS Derived
Key:Derives
TLS Derived Key API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
TLS Master Secret
:Derived From
KDA HKDF
derived key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
Shared Secret:Derived
From
SSH KDF
Derived Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
Shared Secret:Derived
From
PBKDF Derived
Key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
Wipe and Free
memory block
Password:Derived
From
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
service
completion
allocated
Module Reset
Password API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Wipe and Free
memory block
allocated
Module Reset
PBKDF Derived
Key:Derives
Intermediate
Key Generation
Value
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation to
service
completion
Automatic Module generated RSA
Public Key:Generates
Module generated RSA
Private Key:Generates
Module generated EC
Public Key:Generates
Module generated EC
Private Key:Generates
Table 18: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes,
starting January 1, 2031.
The FIPS 186-4, has been superseded by FIPS 186-5. FIPS 186-4 was withdrawn on February
3, 2024. The details regarding usage of Legacy algorithms are specified in Section 2.7.
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 41 of 63
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4483)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4491)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4492)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4505)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4506)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4507)
SHA2-256 Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
N/A
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the pre-operational self-test automatically when the module is loaded
into memory; the pre-operational self-test is the software integrity test that ensures that the
module is not corrupted. While the module is executing the pre-operational self-test,
services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.
The software integrity test is performed after a set of conditional cryptographic algorithm
self-tests (CASTs). The set of CASTs executed before the software integrity test consists of
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT, which is used in the pre-operational self-test, and the SHA2-256 KAT.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A4501) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4493) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4484) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4489) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4497) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4487) -
Encryption
128-bit keys,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 42 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A4500) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4495) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4494) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4496) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4504) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4485) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4502) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4486) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4498) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4488) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4499) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4490) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4503) -
Encryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4501) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4493) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4484) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4489) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 43 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A4497) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-CBC
(A4487) -
Decryption
128-bit keys,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4500) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4495) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4494) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4496) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4504) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4485) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4502) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4486) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4498) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4488) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4499) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4490) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AES-GCM
(A4503) -
Decryption
128-bit keys, 96-
bit IV, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
operation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4483) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4492) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 44 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA-1 (A4505) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4491) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4508) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4506) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA-1 (A4507) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4483)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4492)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4505)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4491)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4508)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4506)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4507)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4483)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4492)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4505)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4491)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4508)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2026 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 45 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA2-512
(A4506)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
SHA2-512
(A4507)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4483)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4492)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4505)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4491)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4508)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4506)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4507)
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4501)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4493)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4484)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4489)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4497)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
Counter DRBG
(A4487)
AES-256 without
prediction
resistance
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Compliant with SP
800-90Ar1
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2026 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.
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Page 46 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
SHA-256; P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4483)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4492)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4505)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4491)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4508)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2026 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 47 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4506)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4507)
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
KDF TLS
(A4483)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4492)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4505)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4491)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4508)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4506)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDF TLS
(A4507)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4483)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2026 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.
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Page 48 of 63
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4492)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4505)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4491)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4508)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4506)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
KDA HKDF
Sp800-56Cr1
(A4507)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4483) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4492) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4505) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4491) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4508) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4506) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
PBKDF (A4507) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
4096 bit key and
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
verification
Test runs at
power-on before
the integrity test
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
PKCS#1 v1.5 with
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Successful key
pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
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Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
The module performs self-tests on approved cryptographic algorithms, using the tests
shown in Table 22. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the self-
tests. The CASTs are performed in the form of Known Answer Tests (KATs), in which the
calculated output is compared with the expected known answer (that are hard-coded in the
module). A failed match causes a failure of the self-test. If any of these self-tests fails, the
module transitions to error state.
Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests
The module implements RSA and ECDSA key generation service and performs the respective
pairwise consistency test (PCT) using sign and verify functions when the keys are generated
(Table 22). If any of these self-tests fails, the module transitions to error state and is
aborted.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4483)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4491)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4492)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4505)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4506)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4507)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC (A4501) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4493) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4484) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4489) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4497) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4487) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4500) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4495) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM (A4494) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4496) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4504) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4485) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4502) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4486) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4498) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4488) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4499) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4490) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4503) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4501) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4493) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4484) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4489) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4497) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A4487) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4500) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4495) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4494) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4496) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4504) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4485) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4502) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4486) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM (A4498) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4488) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4499) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4490) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A4503) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4483) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4492) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4505) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4491) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4508) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4506) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A4507) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4483) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4492) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4505) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4491) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4508) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4506) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A4507) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4483) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4492) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4505) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4491) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4508) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4506) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A4507) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A4501)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Counter DRBG
(A4493)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A4484)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A4489)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A4497)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A4487)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4483) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4492) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4505) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4491) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4508) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4506) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF TLS (A4507) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF Sp800-
56Cr1 (A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4483) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4492) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4505) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4491) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4508) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4506) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF (A4507) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4483)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4492)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4505)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4491)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4508)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4506)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4507)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
The module does not support periodic self-tests.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error The library is
aborted with
SIGABRT signal.
Module is no
longer
operational the
data output
interface is
inhibited
Pre-
operational
test failure
Conditional
test failure
Module
reset
Per-operational test failure: Error message is output
(i.e., "FIPS integrity test failed.") on the stderr and
then the module is aborted; Conditional test failure:
For CAST failure, an error message (i.e., "* KAT
failed") is output on the stderr and then the module is
aborted. For PCT failure, an error (i.e.,
"EC_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED" or
"RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED") is output
in the error queue and then the module generates
new key, If the PCT still does not pass, eventually the
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
module will be aborted after 5 tries. The abort
statement indicates that the module has been
aborted.
Table 23: Error States
If the module fails any of the self-tests, the module enters an error state. To recover from
any error state, the module must be rebooted.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The software integrity tests and the CASTs for AES, SHS, DRBG, HMAC, KAS-ECC-SSC, TLS
KDF, KDA HKDF, PBKDF2 can be invoked by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the
module. The CASTs for ECDSA and RSA can be invoked by requesting the corresponding Key
Generation or Digital Signature services. Additionally, all the CASTs can be invoked by
calling the BORINGSSL_self_test function. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by
requesting the Key Generation service.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module bcm.o is embedded into the shared library libcrypto.so which can be obtained
by building the source code at the following location [1]. The set of files specified in the
archive constitutes the complete set of source files of the validated module. There shall be
no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build.
[1] https://github.com/aws/aws-lc/archive/refs/tags/AWS-LC-FIPS-2.0.0.zip
The downloaded zip file can be verified by issuing the “sha256sum AWS-LC-FIPS-2.0.0.zip”
command. The expected SHA2-256 digest value is:
6241EC2F13A5F80224EE9CD8592ED66A97D426481066FEAA4EFC6F24E60BBC96
After the zip file is extracted, the instructions listed below will compile the module. The
compilation instructions must be executed separately on platforms that have different
processors and/or operating systems. Due to six possible combinations of OS/processor, the
module count is six (i.e., there are six separate binaries generated, one for each entry listed
in the Tested Operational Environments table).
Amazon Linux 2 and Amazon Linux 2023:
1. sudo yum groupinstall "Development Tools"
2. sudo yum install cmake3 golang
3. cd aws-lc-fips-2022-11-02/
4. mkdir build
5. cd build
6. cmake3 -DFIPS=1 ..
7. make
Ubuntu 22.04:
1. sudo apt-get install build-essential
2. sudo apt-get install cmake
3. Get latest Golang archive for your architecture
4. sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go*.tar.gz
5. cd aws-lc-fips-2022-11-02/
6. mkdir build
7. cd build
8. cmake -DFIPS=1 -DGO_EXECUTABLE=/usr/local/go/bin/go ..
9. make
Upon completion of the build process, the module’s status can be verified by the command
below. If the value obtained is “1” then the module has been installed and configured to
operate in FIPS compliant manner.
./tool/bssl isfips
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Lastly, the user can call the “show version” service using awslc_version_string function and
the expected output is “AWS-LC FIPS 2.0.0” which is the module version. This will confirm
that the module is in the operational mode. Additionally, the “AWS-LC FIPS” also acts as the
module identifier and the verification of the "dynamic" part can be done using following
command with an application that was used for dynamic linking. The "U" in the output
confirms that the module is dynamically linked.
Command: nm <application_name> | grep awslc_version_string
Example Output: “ U awslc_version_string”
11.2 Administrator Guidance
When the module is at end of life, for the GitHub repo, the README will be modified to mark
the library as deprecated. After a 6-month window, more restrictive branch permissions will
be added such that only administrators can read from the FIPS branch.
The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs. The SSP value only exists in
volatile memory and that value vanishes when the module is powered off. So as a first step
for the secure sanitization, the module needs to be powered off. Then for actual deprecation,
the module will be upgraded to newer version that is approved. This upgrade process will
uninstall/remove the old/terminated module and provide a new replacement.
The Approved and non-Approved modes of operation are specified in section 2.4. The
administrative functions are specified in the Approved Services table. All the logical
interfaces are specified in section 3.1. The requirements and restrictions that shall be
considered when operating the module in approved mode are specified in section 2.7 and
section 6. The installation, initialization, and startup procedures specified in section 11.1
shall be followed.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
RSA timing attacks.
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness
RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA
decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from
that attack.
The module provides the mechanism to use the blinding for RSA. When the blinding is on,
the module generates a random value to form a blinding factor in the RSA key before the
RSA key is used in the RSA cryptographic operations.
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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CTS Ciphertext Stealing
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code
HKDF HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key-based Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI Processor Algorithm Implementation
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PBKDF2 Password-based Key Derivation Function v2
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC Shared Secret Computation
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing
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Appendix B. References
FIPS 140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
FIPS 140-3 IG
(Last Update:
September 2,
2025)
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-
3-ig-announcements
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS 186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
February 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
May 9, 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1.pdf
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions
August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC 3526 More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet
Key Exchange (IKE)
May 2003
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3526.txt
RFC 4106 The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)
June 2005
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4106
RFC 7296 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
October 2014
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7296
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and
Techniques
December 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP 800-38A
Addendum
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants
of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
October 2010
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a-
add.pdf
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SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode
for Authentication
May 2005
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf
SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode
for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP 800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES
Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
December 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP 800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
June 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP 800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP 800-140Br1 CMVP Security Policy Requirements
March 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.pdf