Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2022. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Voice Processing Module Cryptographic
Module (VPMCM) / Telephone Media
Gateway Cryptographic Module
(TMGCM)
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.1
Revision Date: April 11, 2022
Motorola Solutions, Inc. VPM Cryptographic Module / TMG Cryptographic Module Security Policy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. MODULE OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................3
2. SECURITY LEVEL ..........................................................................................................................................5
3. MODE OF OPERATION..................................................................................................................................6
3.1. FIPS APPROVED MODE CONFIGURATION....................................................................................................6
3.2. FIPS APPROVED MODE ...............................................................................................................................6
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES............................................................................................................................8
5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ...........................................................................9
5.1. ASSUMPTION OF ROLES ...............................................................................................................................9
6. PHYSICAL SECURITY ...................................................................................................................................9
7. SERVICES AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS.......................................................................10
7.1. SERVICES ..................................................................................................................................................10
7.2. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) .......................................................................12
7.3. CSP MODES OF ACCESS ............................................................................................................................14
8. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................................................16
9. SECURITY RULES.........................................................................................................................................16
10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY .......................................................................................18
11. GLOSSARY......................................................................................................................................................19
12. ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................................19
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1. Module Overview
The Voice Processing Module Cryptographic Module (VPMCM) / Telephone Media Gateway
Cryptographic Module (TMGCM), otherwise referred to as the module (HW P/Ns
VPMCRYPTO_B or VPMCRYPTO_C; FW Version R01.13.00), with AES256 Encryption
Algorithm (FW Version R01.00.00) installed is a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module
whose central purpose is to provide cryptographic services to the Voice Processing Module in
which it is embedded. The Voice Processing Module provides dispatch console audio routing
between a dispatch operator (e.g., 911, dispatcher) and a local network. The module is a
hardware module with a multi-chip embedded physical embodiment as defined by the FIPS 140-
2 standard. The boundary is defined as being only the perimeter of the metal enclosure and the
PC board within that enclosure (see red outline in Figures 1 and 2). Within this enclosure are
multiple Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) Atmel 518591 processors (Model
#5185912Y01 or #5185912Y03) used for handling cryptographic services. There are 64 traces
on the board that pass into the boundary and continue out of the boundary, with no connections
to any components within the module; therefore, they are excluded from the interfaces of the
module. The module (HW P/N VPMCRYPTO_B, VPMCRYPTO_C; FW Version R01.13.00) is
referred to as the Telephone Media Gateway Cryptographic Module (TMGCM) when it provides
cryptographic services for interconnect calls. In this context, TMGCM is simply another name
for VPMCM.
Figure 1 – Front of the Cryptographic Module
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Figure 2 – Back of the Cryptographic Module
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2. Security Level
This cryptographic module is designed to operate at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 1. The
table below shows the FIPS 140-2 Level of security met for each of the eleven areas specified
within the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
Table 1 – VPMCM/TMGCM Cryptographic Module Security Level Specification
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section
Validated Level at
overall Security Level 1
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Security Level 1
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3. Mode of Operation
The module must be configured to operate in either a FIPS Approved or Non-Approved mode of
operation. Documented below are the configuration settings that are required for the module to
be used in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation at overall Security Level 1. To verify that
the Module is in the Approved mode of operation, output from the FIPS Status service can be
obtained as specified in Table 2.
Table 2 - FIPS Mode Status
FIPS Mode Status Message
Enabled FIPS status is: FIPS Level 1
Disabled (Non-Compliant
Algorithm)
FIPS status is: FIPS mode is disabled, due to non-compliant algorithms loaded
Disabled (No External Entropy) FIPS status is: FIPS mode is disabled, due to lack of external entropy seed
3.1. FIPS Approved Mode Configuration
The following procedure shall be followed by an authorized operator during the initialization of
the module upon first use:
Use the Program Update service to install only the AES256 Encryption Algorithm (FW Version
R01.00.00). AES is the only Approved algorithm which is configurable using the Program
Update service. For a full list of algorithms used in FIPS Approved Mode, please see Tables 3
and 4. Upon each power-up of the module, the external host is responsible for automatically
uploading entropy to the module in order for the module to operate in FIPS mode. If external
entropy is not provided to the module, the module will internally generate entropy and FIPS
mode will be disabled.
3.2. FIPS Approved Mode
FIPS Approved mode is a mode of operation in which only Approved or Allowed algorithms are
able to be utilized. The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved
algorithms.
Table 3 – FIPS Approved Algorithms
FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP Cert. # Description of Use
AES-256 encrypt/decrypt (OFB,
CBC, ECB, and CFB8)
819 When installed, used for Encryption/Decryption within APCO
OTAR to provide secure key establishment and data
confidentiality.
AES-256 Key Unwrap (SP800-
38F)
5452 Used to unwrap keys entered into the module
CKG (Vendor Affirmed) IG D.12 Key generation:
[133rev2] Section 4 and 6.1 Direct symmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG output
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP Cert. # Description of Use
DRBG (SP800-90A AES-256
CTR DRBG)
A1635 Used for IV and KPK generation.1
KTS N/A
AES KW Cert. #5462, Key Establishment methodology
provides 256 bits of strength.
RSA-2048 PKCS #1 V1.5
(signature verification)
396
Used for digital signature verification during
software/firmware integrity test and software/firmware load
test.
SHA-256 817
Used for digital signature verification during
software/firmware integrity test and software/firmware load
test.
Table 4 – FIPS Allowed Algorithms
FIPS Allowed Algorithm CAVP Cert. # Description of Use
AES MAC 819
Used to provide authentication within APCO OTAR. AES
MAC as used within APCO OTAR has been vendor affirmed
and is approved when used for Project 25 APCO OTAR.
In the non-Approved mode of operation, the module implements the following non-Approved
cryptographic algorithms: ADP, DES-OFB, DES-XL, DVI-XL and DVP-XL. It should be noted
that if any or all of the aforementioned algorithms are loaded onto the module, it automatically
defaults to the non-FIPS approved mode of operation. The non-FIPS approved algorithms must
be removed, leaving only AES, for the module to function in FIPS Approved mode of operation.
In addition, the module will zeroize/invalidate all keys when transitioning between FIPS
approved and non-FIPS approved modes.
1
The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is determined by the user of the module which is outside of the
module’s physical boundary. The target application shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength
required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and set
required bits into the module by calling module defined API functions. Since entropy is loaded passively into the
module, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys.
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4. Ports and Interfaces
Table 5 below provides a listing and description of all VPM physical ports and logical interfaces.
Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces Description
Physical Port Qty Logical interface definition Technical Specification
Synchronous Serial
Interface (SSI)
1
- Data input
- Data output
- Status output
- Control input
The SSI interface provided by the module provides
the central control interfaces accessible by an
operator. It directly interfaces with a QUICC
Ethernet controller.
Key Variable Loader
(KVL)
1
- Data input
- Status output
- Control input
This interface provides the input and output to a
Key Variable Loader (KVL).
FPGA 1
- Data input
- Data output
- Status output
- Control input
The FPGA interface is used for audio and control
data between the MACE ICs and the DSPs
Power Input 1 - 3.3v Power input
This port is the only power input port supported by
the module.
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5. Identification and Authentication Policy
5.1. Assumption of roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles (User, Cryptographic-Officer). The following
tables explain these roles, and their respective authentication policies/mechanisms in further
detail:
Table 6 – Roles
Role Type of Authentication
Cryptographic Officer Role The role is implicitly assumed.
User Role The role is implicitly assumed.
6. Physical Security
The VPMCM/TMGCM module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module which includes
the following physical security mechanisms:
• Production-grade components with standard passivation.
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7. Services and Critical Security Parameters
This section lists the services available to the Module in the Approved and non-Approved
Modes. Note that the services available to the non-Approved Mode are the same as those
available to the Approved Mode; the only difference is that non-Approved algorithms will be
used for some services while in the non-Approved Mode.
7.1. Services
Table 7 – Services
Name of Service Service Description
Load Entropy
Load external entropy used to seed the DRBG. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS
mode.
Privileged APCO
OTAR
Modify and query the Key Database via APCO OTAR Key Management Messages.
Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Encrypt Digital
The Encrypt Digital service is used to configure and encrypt voice transmissions or other
data. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Decrypt Digital
The Decrypt Digital service is used configure and decrypt voice transmissions or other
data. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
AES Key
Unwrapping
AES Key Unwrapping is for the decryption of keys using the AES Key Wrap algorithm.
Bypass Configure a voice call in plaintext. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Transfer Key
Variable
The Transfer Key Variable Service is used to manually establish keys to the module Key
Database via a Key Variable Loader (KVL). Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Change Active
Keyset
This service modifies the currently active keyset used for selecting keys for encryption /
decryption services. An active keyset is used to store a group of keys for current use,
while inactive keysets are used to store keys for future use. Available in both FIPS and
non-FIPS mode.
Delete Key
Variable
Invalidate KEKs and TEKs via the KVL interface. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS
mode.
Keyset Check
Obtain status information about a specific keyset. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS
mode.
Key Query
Obtain status information about a specific TEK or KEK via the KVL interface. Available
in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Configure
Module
Perform configuration of the module (e.g., OTAR configuration) via the KVL interface.
Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Algorithm List
Query
Provides a list of algorithms loaded onto the Module via the KVL UI. Available in both
FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Program Update
The Program Update service is used to modify module firmware. Firmware upgrades are
authenticated using a digital signature. The Program Update Public Signature Key (a
2048-bit public RSA key) is used to validate the signature of the firmware image being
loaded before it is allowed to be executed. All keys and CSPs are preserved during a
Program Update, and zeroized/invalidated only under the following circumstances:
1. Key Database Version/Format Change
2. Programming of non-FIPS algorithms, causing a FIPS mode transition
Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Note: To maintain FIPS 140-2 validation, only validated firmware can be loaded.
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Name of Service Service Description
Version Query
Provides module firmware version numbers via the KVL UI. Available in both FIPS and
non-FIPS mode.
FIPS Status Provides current FIPS status. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Perform Self
Tests
Performs module Power-On Self-Tests which are comprised of cryptographic algorithms
test and firmware integrity and load tests. Initiated by module reset or transition from
power off state to power on state. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Reset Crypto
Module
Soft reset of module to remove module from error states or a transition from power off to
power on state. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Erase Crypto
Module
Zeroize/invalidate all keys from the Key Database. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS
mode.
Non-Privileged
APCO OTAR
Status and Capabilities Key Management Messages (KMM) used to determine system
compatibility and connectivity. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
Extract Action
Log
Status Request. Provides detailed history of error events. Available in both FIPS and non-
FIPS mode.
Clear Error Log Clears history of error events. Available in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
FIPS Diagnostic
Status
Display the current number of calls, clear vs. secure. Available in both FIPS and non-
FIPS mode.
Download
Configuration
Parameters
Download configuration parameters used to specify module behavior. Available in both
FIPS and non-FIPS mode.
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7.2. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following CSPs and keys are contained within the module:
Table 8 – CSP Definitions
CSP Description/Usage
SP800-90A DRBG Seed
This is a 384-bit seed value used within the SP800-90A DRBG. The seed is
derived using the Input String as external entropy (256-bits) and an internally
generated personalization string (128-bits). The seed is not stored but
temporarily exists in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the
module.
Entry – n/a
Output - n/a
Storage – in plaintext in volatile memory
Zeroization - on power off
Generation – internally by combining entropy from an external source and an
internally generated personalization string
Input String
This is a 256-bit string entered into the module from an external source for
input into the DRBG Seed. The input string is not stored but temporarily exists
in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the module.
Entry – Entropy supplied from an external source in plaintext.
Output - n/a
Storage – in plaintext in volatile memory
Zeroization - on power off
Generation –n/a
SP800-90A internal state (“V”
and “Key”)
This is the internal state of the SP800-90A DRBG during initialization. The
internal state is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory and is
zeroized by power cycling the module. The internal state is not entered into or
output from the module.
Entry - n/a
Output - n/a
Storage – in plaintext in volatile memory
Zeroization - on power off
Generation - Internal to the SP800-90A DRBG
Image Decryption Key (IDK)
A 256-bit AES key used to decrypt downloaded images. The IDK is not output
from the module.
Entry - on Program Update service request
Output - n/a
Storage - Plaintext in RAM, plaintext in Flash, with one half of the key stored in
the boot block and the other stored in boot ROM Zeroization - on Program
Update service request
Generation - n/a
Key Encryption Keys (KEKs)
256-bit AES Keys used for encryption of keys in OTAR. KEKs are entered in
plaintext form via the KVL and via OTAR. KEKs received via OTAR are
encrypted with another KEK. Stored in plaintext in RAM and encrypted by the
KPK in flash. KEKs are not output from the module.
Entry – plaintext via KVL, input encrypted with AES Key Wrap over the
Ethernet Interface
Output – N/A
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CSP Description/Usage
Storage – stored encrypted by KPK with AES256-CFB8 in non-volatile
memory
Zeroization - on Delete Key Variable, Erase Crypto Module, and Program
Update service requests
Key Protection Key (KPK)
This is a 256-bit AES key used to encrypt all other keys stored in non-volatile
memory. Generated internally using the SP800-90A DRBG. Stored in
plaintext in non-volatile memory. The KPK is not entered into or output from
the module.
Entry - n/a
Output - n/a
Storage – stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory
Zeroization - on Program Update, and Erase Crypto Module service requests
Generation - SP800-90A DRBG
Traffic Encryption Keys
(TEKs)
256-bit AES Keys used for enabling secure communication with target devices
and for encryption and authentication of Key Management Messages in OTAR.
TEKs are entered encrypted (AES Key Wrapping) over the Ethernet interface.
The TEKS are stored encrypted with the KPK (AES256-CFB8) in non-volatile
memory. TEKs are stored in plaintext in RAM only as long as needed.
Entry – input encrypted with AES Key Wrap over the Ethernet Interface
Output – n/a
Storage – stored encrypted on KPK with AES256-CFB8 in non-volatile
memory
Zeroization - on Delete Key Variable, Erase Crypto Module, and Program
Update service requests
Table 9 – Public Key(s)
Public Key Description/Usage
Public Programmed Signature
Key
A 2048-bit RSA public key used to validate the signature of the firmware image
being loaded before it is allowed to be executed. Stored in non-volatile
memory. Loaded during manufacturing and as part of the boot image during a
Program Update service. The Public Programmed Signature Key is not output
from the module.
Entry - on Program Update service request
Output - n/a
Storage - in plaintext in non-volatile memory
Zeroization - on Program Update service request
Generation - n/a
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7.3. CSP Modes of Access
The following tables describe the various methods in which keys are accessed in the
VPMCM/TMGCM as well as how access is controlled per operator and service.
Table 10 – CSP Access Types
CSP Access Type Description
C – Check CSP Checks status and key identifier information of key.
D – Decrypt CSP Decrypts TEK or KEK retrieved from non-volatile memory using the KPK.
E – Encrypt CSP Encrypts TEK or KEK with KPK prior to storage in non-volatile memory.
G – Generate CSP Generates KPK, SP800-90A DRBG internal state
I – Invalidate CSP Marks encrypted TEKs or KEKs stored in non-volatile memory as invalid.
TEKs or KEKs marked invalid can then be over-written when new TEKs or
KEKs are stored.
S – Store CSP Stores CSPS as follows:
KPK in volatile and non-volatile memory.
Encrypted TEKs or KEKs in non-volatile memory, over-writing any
previously invalidated TEK or KEK in that location.
Plaintext IDK in non-volatile memory.
U – Use CSP Uses CSP internally to perform service
Z – Zeroize CSP Zeroizes key/CSP.
- – No access The service does not access the CSP.
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Table 11 – CSP versus CSP Access
Service CSP Role
Input
String
SP800-90
A
seed
SP800-90
A
seed
internal
state
IDK
KEKs
KPK
TEKs
User
Role
Crypto-Officer
Role
Load Entropy U G - - - - - √ √
Privileged APCO OTAR - - - -
D, U, E,
Z, S
U
D, U, E, I,
Z, S
√ √
Encrypt Digital - - - - - U D, U √ √
Decrypt Digital - - - - - U D, U √ √
AES Key Unwrap - - - U - -
Bypass - - - - - - - √ √
Transfer Key Variable - - - -
D, E, Z,
S
U
D, E, I,
Z, S
√ √
Change Active Keyset - - - - - - - √ √
Delete Key Variable - - - - I - I √ √
Keyset Check - - - - C - C √ √
Key Query - - - - D U D √ √
Configure Module - - - - - - - √ √
Algorithm List Query - - - - - - - √ √
Version Query - - - - - - - √ √
Program Update - - - U, Z, S Z Z Z √ √
FIPS Status - - - - C - C √ √
Perform Self-Tests - - - - - - - √ √
Reset Crypto Module Z Z G, U, Z - - G, S - √ √
Erase Crypto Module Z Z G, U, Z - I G, S I √ √
Non-Privileged APCO OTAR (not
for key entry) - - - - - - - √ √
Extract Action Log - - - - - - - √ √
Clear Error Log - - - - - - - √ √
FIPS Diagnostic Status - - - - - - - √ √
Download Configuration
Parameters - - - - I
Z, G,
S
I √ √
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8. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
VPMCM/TMGCM module supports a limited modifiable operational environment.
9. Security Rules
The VPMCM/TMGCM module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security
rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User
role and the Cryptographic Officer role.
2. The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests:
A. Power up Self-Tests
i. Cryptographic algorithm test:
1. SHA-256 Known Answer Test (KAT)
2. AES-256 KAT for each mode in the OFB, CBC, ECB, and 8-bit
CFB (encrypt and decrypt). (Cert. # 819)
3. AES-256 KW KAT (decrypt only) (Cert. #5452)
4. SP800-90A DRBG KAT Section 11.3 Health Tests (instantiate,
reseed, and generate)
5. RSA 2048 is tested as part of the Firmware integrity test. RSA is
only used to perform signature verification.
ii. Firmware integrity test: A digital signature is generated over the code
when it is built using SHA-256 and RSA-2048 and is stored with the code
upon download into the module. When the module is powered, up the
digital signature is verified.
B. Conditional Tests
i. Firmware load test: A digital signature is generated over the code when it
is built using SHA-256 and RSA-2048. Upon download into the module,
the digital signature is verified. If the digital signature matches the test
passes, otherwise it fails.
ii. SP800-90A DRBG Continuous Test
iii. Alternating Bypass Test: The module performs two independent internal
tests to verify that clear calls are processed correctly.
3. At any time, the operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the
power-up self-test by using the Reset service or by Power-cycling the module
4. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
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This section documents the security rules imposed by the vendor:
1. The VPMCM/TMGCM module does not support multiple concurrent operators.
2. The module does not support the output of plaintext or encrypted keys.
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10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The VPMCM/TMGCM has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks.
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11. Glossary
KeyDatabase A database containing KEKs and TEKs.
KeySet
Logical grouping of keys. KeySets can be active (available for use) or
inactive (not available for use).
12. Acronyms
ALGID Algorithm Identifier
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKR Common Key Reference
CO Crypto Officer
CPS Customer Programming Software
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
IV Initialization Vector
KEK Key Encryption Key
KAT Known Answer Test
KID Key Identifier
KLK Key Loss Key
KMM Key Management Message
KPK Key Protection Key
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KVL Key Variable Loader
MAC Message Authentication Code
MACE Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
OFB Output Feedback
OTAR Over The Air Rekeying
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
TMGCM Telephone Media Gateway Cryptographic Module
VPMCM Voice Processing Module Cryptographic Module