Date: 6/5/2019
www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2019 Palo Alto Networks. Non‐proprietary security policy may be reproduced only
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Panorama 8.1 M‐100, M‐200, M‐500 and
M‐600
FIPS 140‐2 Non‐Proprietary Security Policy
Palo Alto Networks
3000 Tannery Way
Santa Clara, CA 95054
www.paloaltonetworks.com
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Change Record
Table 1 ‐ Change Record
Date Author Description of Change
8/02/2018 Quang Trinh Initial Authoring
9/21/2018 Quang Trinh Add FIPS Kits description for M‐200 and M‐600
10/18/2018 Quang Trinh
Update based on physical security testing, add CAVP
algorithm certificates
11/16/2018 Quang Trinh Update based on operational testing
12/18/2018 Quang Trinh Update based on UL comments
6/5/2019 Quang Trinh Updates to address CMVP comments
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Contents
1 Module Overview .............................................................................................................................................7
2 Mode of Operation.........................................................................................................................................12
2.1 FIPS 140‐2 Approved Mode of Operation..............................................................................................................12
2.2 Selecting Panorama, Management‐Only, and PAN‐DB Approved modes of operation........................................13
2.3 Security Levels for the Panorama Mode, Management‐Only Mode, and the PAN‐DB Mode...............................14
2.4 Selecting Panorama Log Collector Approved Mode of Operation.........................................................................15
2.5 Security Level for Panorama Log Collector Mode..................................................................................................15
2.6 Non‐Approved Mode of Operation........................................................................................................................16
2.7 Approved and Allowed Algorithms........................................................................................................................16
2.8 Non‐Approved, Non‐Allowed Algorithms in Non‐Approved Mode........................................................................20
3 Ports and Interfaces........................................................................................................................................21
4 Identification and Authentication Policy........................................................................................................29
4.1 Assumption of Roles..............................................................................................................................................29
5 Security Parameters .......................................................................................................................................31
6 Access Control Policy......................................................................................................................................33
6.1 Roles and Services .................................................................................................................................................33
6.2 Unauthenticated Services......................................................................................................................................37
7 Operational Environment...............................................................................................................................38
8 Security Rules .................................................................................................................................................38
9 Physical Security Policy...................................................................................................................................41
9.1 Physical Security Mechanisms...............................................................................................................................41
9.2 Operator Required Actions....................................................................................................................................42
10 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy..................................................................................................................43
11 References......................................................................................................................................................43
12 Definitions and Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................43
Appendix A – M‐100 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (28 Seals).........................................................44
Appendix B – M‐200 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (Fifteen (15) Seals) ..........................................50
Appendix C – M‐500 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals).........................................................54
Appendix D – M‐600 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals).........................................................62
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Tables
Table 1 ‐ Change Record...........................................................................................................................................2
Table 2 – Validated Version Information................................................................................................................12
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification .......................................................................................................14
Table 4 – Module Security Level Specification .......................................................................................................15
Table 5 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in Current Module...............................................................................16
Table 6 ‐ FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in Current Module ..................................................................................19
Table 7 ‐ Supported Protocols in FIPS Approved Mode..........................................................................................20
Table 8 ‐ Non‐Approved, Non‐Allowed Algorithms Used in Current Module ........................................................20
Table 9 – M‐100 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................22
Table 10 – M‐200 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces.................................................................................................23
Table 11 – M‐200 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces.................................................................................................24
Table 12 – M‐500 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................................25
Table 13 – M‐600 Front Ports and Interfaces.........................................................................................................27
Table 14 – M‐600 Back Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................28
Table 15 – Panorama or Management‐Only Mode ‐ Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.......29
Table 16 ‐ Log Collector Mode ‐ Role and Required Identification and Authentication ........................................29
Table 17 ‐ PAN‐DB Mode ‐ Role and Required Identification and Authentication................................................30
Table 18 ‐ Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms .............................................................................................30
Table 19 ‐ Private Keys and CSPs ............................................................................................................................31
Table 20 ‐ Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................32
Table 21 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 Manager (Panorama or Management‐
Only Mode).....................................................................................................................................................34
Table 22 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 Log Collector Mode .....................36
Table 23 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐500/M‐600 Private Pan‐DB Mode...........................................37
Table 24 ‐ Unauthenticated Services......................................................................................................................37
Table 25 ‐ Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms............................................................................42
Figures
Figure 1 – Front of M‐100.........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 – Front of M‐100 with FIPS Kit....................................................................................................................8
Figure 3 – Rear of M‐100 with FIPS Kit .....................................................................................................................8
Figure 4 – Front of M‐200.........................................................................................................................................8
Figure 5 – Front of M‐200 with FIPS Kit....................................................................................................................8
Figure 6 – Rear of M‐200 with FIPS Kit .....................................................................................................................9
Figure 7 –Front of M‐500..........................................................................................................................................9
Figure 8 – Front of M‐500 with FIPS Kit....................................................................................................................9
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Figure 9 – Rear of M‐500 with FIPS Kit ...................................................................................................................10
Figure 10 – Right Side of M‐500 with FIPS Kit.........................................................................................................10
Figure 11 – Left Side of M‐500 with FIPS Kit...........................................................................................................10
Figure 12 –Front of M‐600......................................................................................................................................10
Figure 13– Front of M‐600 with FIPS Kit.................................................................................................................11
Figure 14 – Rear of M‐600 with FIPS Kit .................................................................................................................11
Figure 15 – Right Side of M‐600 with FIPS Kit.........................................................................................................11
Figure 16 – Left Side of M‐600 with FIPS Kit...........................................................................................................11
Figure 17 – M‐100 Ports and Interfaces (Front and Back)......................................................................................21
Figure 18 – M‐200 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................................23
Figure 19 – M‐200 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................24
Figure 20 – M‐500 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................................25
Figure 21 – M‐500 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................25
Figure 22 – M‐600 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................................27
Figure 23 – M‐600 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................28
Figure 24 – M‐100: Remove Screws on Rear Side ..................................................................................................44
Figure 25 – M‐100: Attach Rear Opacity Shield......................................................................................................45
Figure 26 – M‐100: Apply Tamper Seals and Vent Overlays...................................................................................46
Figure 27 – M‐100: Apply Rail Kit............................................................................................................................47
Figure 28 – M‐100: Remove Front Plastic Bracket Covers and Screws ..................................................................47
Figure 29 – M‐100: Install Front Opacity Shield .....................................................................................................48
Figure 30 – M‐100: Install Outer Rails ....................................................................................................................49
Figure 31 – M‐200: Top Cover Replacement ..........................................................................................................50
Figure 32 – M‐200: Side View Before Rail Installation............................................................................................51
Figure 33 – M‐200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets ..............................................................................................51
Figure 34 – M‐200: Replacing Front Rack‐Mount Brackets....................................................................................52
Figure 35 – M‐200: Attach FIPS Front Cover...........................................................................................................52
Figure 36 – M‐200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side.......................................................................................53
Figure 37 – M‐200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear.......................................................................................53
Figure 38 – M‐500: Remove Front Handles and Modules......................................................................................54
Figure 39 – M‐500: Secure the Front Brackets .......................................................................................................55
Figure 40 – M‐500: Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules..................................................................................55
Figure 41 – M‐500: Install Front Opacity Shield .....................................................................................................56
Figure 42 – M‐500: Front Opacity Shield Installed .................................................................................................56
Figure 43 – M‐500: Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray...............................................................................................57
Figure 44 – M‐500: Install Rear Opacity Shield.......................................................................................................58
Figure 45 – M‐500: Apply Vent Overlays................................................................................................................59
Figure 46 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening .......................................................59
Figure 47 – M‐500: Install Rail Kit...........................................................................................................................60
Figure 48 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance .............................................................60
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Figure 49 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Top and Sides of the Appliance...................................................61
Figure 50 – M‐600: Top Cover Replacement ..........................................................................................................62
Figure 51 – M‐600: Front Cover Bracket.................................................................................................................63
Figure 52 – M‐600:FIPS Front Cover.......................................................................................................................63
Figure 53 – M‐600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)....................................................................................64
Figure 54 – M‐600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) ..................................................................................65
Figure 55 – M‐600:Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails........................................................................................65
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1 Module Overview
Panorama 8.1 M‐100, M‐200, M‐500 and M‐600 module management appliances provide centralized
management and visibility of Palo Alto Networks next generation firewalls. From a central location, you
can gain insight into applications, users, and content traversing the firewalls. The knowledge of what is on
the network, in conjunction with safe application enablement policies, maximizes protection and control
while minimizing administrative effort. Your security team can centrally perform analysis, reporting, and
forensics with the aggregated data over time, or on data stored on the local firewall.
The Panorama management appliances’ individual management and logging components can be
separated in a distributed manner to accommodate large volumes of log data. Panorama management
appliances can be deployed in the following ways:
 Centralized: In this scenario, all Panorama management and logging functions are combined into
a single device.
 Distributed: you can separate the management and logging functions across multiple devices,
splitting the functions between managers and log collectors.
o Panorama: The Panorama manager is responsible for handling the tasks associated with
policy and device configuration across all managed devices. The manager analyzes the
data stored in managed log collectors for centralized reporting.
o Management‐Only: Providing the ability to perform all functions of Panorama with the
exception of logging.
o Log Collector: Organizations with high logging volume and retention requirements can
deploy dedicated Panorama log collector devices that will aggregate log information from
multiple managed firewalls.
 Panorama on the M‐500 and M‐600 supports an additional mode, the PAN‐DB private cloud. The
PAN‐DB private cloud is an on‐premise solution that is suitable for organizations that prohibit or
restrict the use of the PAN‐DB public cloud service. With this on‐premise solution, you can deploy
one or more M‐500/M‐600 appliances as PAN‐DB servers within your network or data center.
The Palo Alto Networks Panorama management appliances are multi‐chip standalone modules, and are
shown in the figures below. The M‐100 is demonstrated in Figure 1 through Figure 3, M‐200 is
demonstrated in Figure 4 through Figure 6, the M‐500 is demonstrated in Figure 7 through Figure 11, and
M‐600 is demonstrated in Figure 12 through Figure 16. The cryptographic boundary is defined by the
external perimeter of the appliance including the FIPS kit.
M‐100
Figure 1 – Front of M‐100
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Figure 2 – Front of M‐100 with FIPS Kit
Figure 3 – Rear of M‐100 with FIPS Kit
M‐200
Figure 4 – Front of M‐200
Figure 5 – Front of M‐200 with FIPS Kit
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Figure 6 – Rear of M‐200 with FIPS Kit
M‐500
Figure 7 –Front of M‐500
Figure 8 – Front of M‐500 with FIPS Kit
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Figure 9 – Rear of M‐500 with FIPS Kit
Figure 10 – Right Side of M‐500 with FIPS Kit
Figure 11 – Left Side of M‐500 with FIPS Kit
M‐600
Figure 12 –Front of M‐600
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Figure 13– Front of M‐600 with FIPS Kit
Figure 14 – Rear of M‐600 with FIPS Kit
Figure 15 – Right Side of M‐600 with FIPS Kit
Figure 16 – Left Side of M‐600 with FIPS Kit
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Details regarding the versioning and hardware are displayed in Table 2 below.
Table 2 – Validated Version Information
Module Part Number
Hardware
Version
FIPS Kit Part
Number
FIPS Kit
Version
Firmware
Version
Panorama M‐100
1TB RAID: 2 x 1TB RAID Certified
HDD for 1TB of RAID Storage
910‐000030 00D 920‐000140 00A 8.1.6
Panorama M‐100
4TB RAID: 8 x 1TB RAID Certified
HDD for 4TB of RAID Storage
910‐000092 00D 920‐000140 00A 8.1.6
Panorama M‐200 910‐000176 00A 920‐000208 00A 8.1.6
Panorama M‐500 910‐000073 00D 920‐000145 00A 8.1.6
Panorama M‐600 910‐000175 00A 920‐000209 00A 8.1.6
2 Mode of Operation
2.1 FIPS 140‐2 Approved Mode of Operation
The module provides both FIPS 140‐2 Approved and non‐Approved modes of operation. The module is
configured during initialization to operate only in an Approved or non‐Approved mode of operation when
in the operational state. The module cannot alternate service by service between Approved and non‐
Approved modes of operation.
The following procedure will configure the Approved mode of operation:
 The tamper evidence seals and opacity shields must be installed as per Section 9. The FIPS kit must be
correctly installed to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
 During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by entering ‘maint’
when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
 Select “Continue.”
 Select the “Set FIPS‐CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
 Select “Enable FIPS‐CC Mode”.
 When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re‐initialize and continue into the Approved
mode.
 The module will reboot.
 In the Approved mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
 Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS‐CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
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 Status output interface will indicate “FIPS‐CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
 The module will display “FIPS‐CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface.
2.2 Selecting Panorama, Management‐Only, and PAN‐DB Approved Modes of Operation
Panorama appliances support multiple configurations that provide varying services. The Cryptographic
Officer can initialize the module into different Approved modes of operation. The primary and default
mode of operation is the Panorama mode. The Management‐Only mode of operation is the same as
Panorama mode except there is no log collecting service. The Log Collector mode of operation is a
secondary mode that provides a focused log collecting and forwarding capability. Directions to convert
the appliance into the Log Collector mode are discussed below in Section 2.4. The M‐500 and M‐600
provide a fourth mode, PAN‐DB Private Cloud server.
Convert the M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 appliance from Panorama mode to the Management‐Only
mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode management‐only”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Management‐Only mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
Convert the M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 appliance from Management‐Only mode to the Panorama
mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode panorama”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
Convert the M‐500/M‐600 appliance from Panorama Manager mode to the dedicated PAN‐DB Private
Cloud mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode panurldb”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to PAN‐DB Private Cloud mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
Convert the M‐500/M‐600 appliance from PAN‐DB mode to the Panorama Manager mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode panorama”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
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2.3 Security Levels for the Panorama Mode, Management‐Only Mode, and the PAN‐DB Mode
The cryptographic modules meet the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140‐2.
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self‐Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Note: When initialized in Panorama, Management‐Only, or PAN‐DB
Private Cloud mode, the module supports Level 3, identity based
authentication.
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2.4 Selecting Panorama Log Collector Approved Mode of Operation
Convert the M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 appliance from Panorama mode to the dedicated Panorama Log
Collector mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode logger”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama Log Collector mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
Convert the M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 appliance from Panorama Log Collector mode to the Panorama
mode:
 Log into the CLI via SSH
 Enter “request system system‐mode panorama”
 Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
 The system will reboot and perform the required power on self‐tests.
2.5 Security Level for Panorama Log Collector Mode
The cryptographic modules meet the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140‐2.
Table 4 – Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self‐Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
When initialized in Panorama Log Collector mode, the module supports
Level 2 role based authentication.
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2.6 Non‐Approved Mode of Operation
The following procedure will put the modules into the non‐Approved mode of operation:
 During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by entering ‘maint’
when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
 Select “Continue.”
 Select the “Set FIPS‐CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
 Select “Disable FIPS‐CC Mode”.
 When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re‐initialize and continue into the Approved
mode.
 The module will reboot.
2.7 Approved and Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms in all the Approved modes.
Table 5 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in Current Module
FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP
Cert. #
AES [FIPS 197, SP800‐38A]:
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
ECB, CBC, CTR modes; Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256‐bit
CFB128 mode; Encrypt/Decrypt; 128‐bit
Note: AES‐OFB, AES‐CFB1, AES‐CFB8 and AES‐CFB128 (192, 256 bit) were
also tested but are not available for use
5890
AES‐CCM [SP800‐38C]: Encrypt and Decrypt, 128‐bit
Note: AES‐CCM was tested but is not used by the module except for the
self‐test.
5890
AES‐GCM [SP800‐38D]: Encrypt and Decrypt, 128 and 256‐bit
Note 1: GCM IV handling is compliant with FIPS IG A.5 and SP800‐38D.**
Note 2: GCM 192‐bit was tested but is not used by the module.
5890
CKG:
Function: Key Generation
Method 1: Asymmetric Key Generation; SP800‐133 §6, seed results from
an unmodified DRBG output
Vendor Affirmed
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP
Cert. #
Method 2: Symmetric Key Generation; SP800‐133 §7.1 (symmetric key
results from an unmodified DRBG output), §7.2, and §7.3
CVL: ECDSA Signature Generation
 P‐256 SHA: SHA‐224, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512
 P‐384 SHA: SHA‐224, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512
Note: P‐224 was tested, but not used by the module
2122
CVL: Elliptical Curve Diffie‐Hellman Exchange [SP800‐56A]
‐ECC CDH Primitive (Section 5.7.1.2)
‐ P‐256, P‐384, P‐521
‐KAS‐ECC all except KDF
2119
CVL: Diffie‐Hellman Exchange [SP800‐56A]
KAS‐FFC all except KDF
‐ Parameter sets: FB and FC
2119
CVL: KDF, Application Specific [SP800‐135]
‐TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 KDF
‐SNMPv3 KDF
‐SSHv2 KDF
Note: ‐ IKE v1/v2 KDF were tested but are not used by the module.
2120
CVL: RSA [SP800‐56B]
Function: Key Transport
‐RSADP
2121
DRBG [SP800‐90A]
‐CTR DRBG with AES‐256
Derivation function enabled.
2451
DSA [FIPS 186‐4]
‐Key Generation: 2048 bits
‐Prerequisite to CVL #2119
1485
ECDSA [FIPS 186‐4]
‐ Key Pair Generation P‐256, P‐384 and P‐521
‐ PKV P‐256, P‐384, and P‐521
‐ Signature Generation P‐256, P‐384 and P‐521; with all SHA‐2 sizes*
‐ Signature Verification P‐256, P‐384 and P‐521; with SHA‐1 and all SHA‐
2 sizes*
Note: P‐224 was tested, but not used by the module
1570
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP
Cert. #
*Does not include the “short SHA‐512” sizes SHA‐512/224 or SHA‐512/256
HMAC [FIPS 198]
‐ HMAC‐SHA‐1 with λ=96, 160
‐ HMAC‐SHA‐256 with λ=256
‐ HMAC‐SHA‐384 with λ=384
‐ HMAC‐SHA‐512 with λ=512
3865
KAS: SP 800‐56A Rev.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellman Exchange (CVL Certs.
#2119 and #2120, vendor affirmed; key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
Vendor Affirmed
SP 800‐56A Rev.2 Diffie‐Hellman Exchange (CVL Certs. #2119 and #2120,
vendor affirmed; key agreement; key establishment methodology provides
112 bits of encryption strength)
Vendor Affirmed
KTS [SP800‐38F §3.1]:
‐ AES‐GCM (128 or 256 bits)
(Key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits or 256
bits of encryption strength)
5890
KTS [SP800‐38F §3.1]:
‐ AES‐CBC (128/192/256 bits) plus HMAC
‐ AES‐CTR (128/192/256 bit) plus HMAC
(Key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits
and 256 bits of encryption strength)
AES 5890
HMAC 3865
RSA [FIPS 186‐4]
‐ Key Pair Generation: 2048 and 3072 bits
‐ Signature Generation (ANSI X9.31, RSASSA‐PKCS1_v1‐5, RSASSA‐PSS):
2048, 3072, and 4096‐bit with hashes (SHA‐1+
/256/384/512)
‐ Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31, RSASSA‐PKCS1_v1‐5, RSASSA‐PSS):
1024++
, 2048, 3072, 4096‐bit (per IG A.14) with hashes (SHA‐
1/224+++
/256/384/512)
+
: Only used for signature generation in SSH in the Approved Mode
++
: This size is not supported for RSASSA‐PKCS1_v1‐5
+++
: This Hash algorithm is not supported for ANSI X9.31
3086
SHA‐1 and SHA‐2 [FIPS 180‐4]
SHA‐1, SHA‐224, SHA‐256, SHA‐384, SHA‐512
4641
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP
Cert. #
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non‐Digital Signature Applications
Note: SHA‐224 was tested, but is not used by the module.
** The module is compliant to IG A.5: GCM is used in the context of TLS and SSH:
 For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Option 1 of IG A.5: it is used in a manner compliant with SP
800‐52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment. (From this RFC, the GCM
cipher suites in use are TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.) During operational testing, the module was
tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
 For SSH, the module meets Option 4 of IG A.5. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived using the
SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 64 bits
in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the
entire invocation field space of 264
is exhausted. (It would take hundreds of years for this to occur.)
In all of the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are
zeroized when the module is power‐cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM keys is
established.
The cryptographic module supports the following non‐FIPS Approved algorithms that are allowed for use in FIPS‐
CC mode in all Approved modes.
Table 6 ‐ FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in Current Module
FIPS Allowed Algorithm
Diffie‐Hellman (CVL Cert. #2119 with CVL Cert. #2120, key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
CMAC ‐ A self‐test is performed for this algorithm, but it is not used by the module.
MD5 (within TLS)
NDRNG (seeding source) This provides a minimum of 256 bits of entropy to M‐100, M‐200, and M‐
600 DRBG, and 128 bits of entropy for M‐500 DRBG.
RSA wrap and unwrap, non‐compliant to SP800‐56B RSA (CVL Cert. #2121, key wrapping; key
establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
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Table 7 ‐ Supported Protocols in FIPS Approved Mode
Supported Protocols*
TLS v1.01
, v1.1 and 1.2
SSHv2
SNMPv3
*Note: these protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP.
2.8 Non‐Approved, Non‐Allowed Algorithms in Non‐Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports the following non‐Approved algorithms. No security claim is made in
the current module for any of the following non‐Approved algorithms. All algorithms in this mode of
operation are deemed as non‐compliant.
Table 8 ‐ Non‐Approved, Non‐Allowed Algorithms Used in Current Module
Non‐FIPS Allowed Algorithms in Non‐Approved Mode
Digital Signatures (non‐Approved strengths, non‐compliant):
RSA Key Generation: 512, 1024, 4096
RSA signature generation: Modulus bit length less than 2048 or greater than 4096 bits; up to 16384
bits
RSA signature verification: Modulus bit length less than 1024 or greater than 4096 bits; up to 16384
bits
ECDSA: B, K, P curves not equal to P‐256, P‐384 or P‐521
DSA: 768 to 4096 bits
Encrypt/Decrypt: Camellia, SEED, Triple‐DES(non‐compliant), Blowfish, CAST, RC4, DES
Hashing: RIPEMD, MD5
Firmware Integrity Check: HMAC‐SHA‐256
Key Exchange (non‐Approved strengths):
Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellman: B, K, P curves not equal to P‐256, P‐384 or P‐521
Diffie‐Hellman: 768, 1024 and 1536 bit modulus
RSA: Less than 2048 bit modulus
1
See vendor imposed security rule #4 in Section 8
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Non‐FIPS Allowed Algorithms in Non‐Approved Mode
Message Authentication: UMAC, HMAC‐MD5, HMAC‐RIPEMD
3 Ports and Interfaces
The M‐100 module provides the following ports and interfaces.
Figure 17 – M‐100 Ports and Interfaces (Front and Back)
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Table 9 – M‐100 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty. FIPS 140‐2 Designation
1 DB9 Console port 1 Status output
2 RJ45 Management and data communication
(MGT)
1 Data input, control input, data
output, status output
3 RJ45 Port 1 (Front) and Port 2 (Rear)
10/100/1000 Ethernet
2 Data input, control input, data
output, status output
4 RJ45 Port 3 (Rear) 10/100/1000 Ethernet 1 Data input, control input, data
output, status output
5 Front LEDs System Health, Internal HDD activity,
LAN Activity
3 Status output
6 UID button
with LED
(Front and
Back)
Button that activates a flashing LED on
front and back of chassis to help
identify physical location
2 Control input, status output
7 Power Button
with LED
Power on and shut down device 1 Control input, status output
8 NMI Button Disabled 1 Disabled
9 USB Disabled 4 Disabled
10 Power Port Power interface 1 Power input
Note: The slots A1/A2, B1/B2, C1/C2, D1/D2 are hard drive bays, which are depicted as populated in Figure 17. The 1TB
model, P/N: 910‐000030, will have two slots populated, while the 4TB model, P/N: 910‐000092, will have all eight slots
populated.
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The M‐200 module provides the following ports and interfaces.
Figure 18 – M‐200 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
Table 10 – M‐200 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty. FIPS 140‐2 Designation
1 NA System drive used for operating system 1 NA
2 Unique
Identification
(UID) button
Button that activates a flashing LED on
front and back of chassis to help
identify physical location
1 Control input
3 System Info
LED
Indicate system information such as
overheat condition, fan or power
failures
1 Status output
4 Network
actvitiy LEDs
Blinking green indicates network
activity
2 Status output
5 Hard disk LED Blinking yellow indicates activity 1 Status output
6 Power LED Solid green indicates power is on 1 Status output
7 Reset button Button to reboot the appliance 1 Control input
8 Power button Power on and shut down appliance 1 Control input
9 NA Hard disks used for log storage 4 NA
10 Hard disk LEDs Indicate disk activity or failure 2 Status output
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Figure 19 – M‐200 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces
Table 11 – M‐200 FIPS 140‐2 Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty. FIPS 140‐2 Designation
1 Power Power supplies 2 Power In
2 RJ45 Management and 10/100/1000
Ethernet Ports
4 Data input, control input, data
output, status output
3 USB Disabled 2 Disabled
4 IPMI Disabled 1 Disabled
5 DB9 Console port 1 Status output
6 Unique
Identification
(UID) LED
UID LED that illuminates bright blue
when you push the UID button on the
front of the appliance
1 Status output
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The M‐500 module provides the following ports and interfaces.
Figure 20 – M‐500 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
Figure 21 – M‐500 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces
Table 12 – M‐500 Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty.
FIPS 140‐2
Designation
1 Power
Button and
Reset
Reboot or shut down device 2 Control input
2 Front LED
Panel
Power, Power failure, HDD,
Overheat/Fan failure
4 Status output
3 Drives LEDs Left LED—drive failure
Right LED—activity
48 Status output
4 Power Power supplies 2 Power In
5 DB9 Console 1 Status Output
6 USB USB (Reserved for future use) 4 Disabled
7 RJ45 MGT Ethernet 10/100/1000 1 Data input,
Control input,
Data output,
Status output
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Interface Name and Description Qty.
FIPS 140‐2
Designation
Ethernet 1, 2, 3 3 Data input,
Control input,
Data output,
Status Output
8 VGA Graphic port (Reserved for future use) 1 Disabled
9 UID button
with LED
Button that activates LED on front and
back of chassis to help identify physical
location
1 Control input,
Status output
10 SFP Ports 10 Gigabit Ethernet enhanced Small
Form‐Factor Pluggable (SFP+) ports
2 Data Input,
Control input,
Data Output,
Status Output
Note: By default, the M‐500 appliance ships with Qty. 8 1TB drives installed in drive bays A1 – D2. Qty. 8
additional drives can be installed in drive bays E1 – H2. Drive bays I1 – L2 can be utilized for adding
additional drives.
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The M‐600 module provides the following ports and interfaces.
Figure 22 – M‐600 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
Table 13 – M‐600 Front Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty.
FIPS 140‐2
Designation
1 Power
button
Power on and shut down appliance 1 Control input
2 Reset
button
Button to reboot the appliance 1 Control input
3 Power LED Solid green indicates power is on 1 Status output
4 Power
failure LED
Solid red indicates power supply failed
or no power source
1 Status output
5 Hard disk
LED
Blinking yellow indicates activity 1 Status output
6 System Info
LED
Indicate system information such as
overheat condition, fan or power
failures
1 Status output
7 NA Hard disks used for log storage 4 NA
8 Hard disk
LEDs
Indicate disk activity or failure 2 Status output
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Figure 23 – M‐600 Back Panel Ports and Interfaces
Table 14 – M‐600 Back Ports and Interfaces
Interface Name and Description Qty.
FIPS 140‐2
Designation
1 NA System drive used for operating system 1 NA
2 Power Power supplies 2 Power In
3 RJ45 Management and 10/100/1000
Ethernet Ports
4 Data input,
control input, data
output, status
output
4 USB Disabled 2 Disabled
5 IPMI Disabled 1 Disabled
6 DB9 Console port 1 Status output
7 UID button
with LED
(Front and
Back)
Button that activates a flashing LED on
front and back of chassis to help
identify physical location
2 Control input,
status output
8 SFP Ports 10 Gigabit Ethernet enhanced Small
Form‐Factor Pluggable (SFP+) ports
2 Data Input,
Control input,
Data Output,
Status Output
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4 Identification and Authentication Policy
4.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module in Panorama mode,
Management‐Only mode, or PAN‐DB mode enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication
credentials associated with operator accounts. The Log Collector mode only supports one role, the
Crypto‐Officer role.
The module supports concurrent operators.
The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability.
Table 15 – Panorama or Management‐Only Mode ‐ Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Crypto‐Officer
(CO)
This role has
administrative
capabilities for
Panorama Manager
services. The CO has the
ability to create other
CO and User accounts
that have limited service
access.
Identity‐based
operator
authentication
Username and
password and/or
certificate/public key
based authentication.
User This User role has read‐
only access defined for a
set of configuration and
status information
Identity‐based
operator
authentication
Username and
password and/or
certificate/public key
based authentication.
Table 16 ‐ Log Collector Mode ‐ Role and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Crypto‐Officer
(CO)
This role has
administrative
capabilities for Log
Collector services.
Role‐based operator
authentication
Username and
Password and/or public
key based
authentication
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Table 17 ‐ PAN‐DB Mode ‐ Role and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Crypto‐Officer
(CO)
This role has
administrative
capabilities for PAN‐DB
services.
Identity‐based operator
authentication
Username and
Password
User This User role has
read‐only access
defined for a set of
configuration and
status information.
Identity‐based operator
authentication
Username and
Password
Table 18 ‐ Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Username and Password The minimum password length is six (6) characters (95 possible
characters). The probability that a random attempt will succeed or
a false acceptance will occur is 1/(956
) which is less than
1/1,000,000.
The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within
one‐minute is 10/(956
), which is less than 1/100,000. The
Panorama’s configuration supports at most ten attempts to
authenticate in a one‐minute period.
Certificate/public key
based authentication
The security modules support certificate‐based authentication
using RSA 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P‐256, ECDSA P‐384
or ECDSA P‐521.
The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112
) which
is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully
authenticating to the module within a one‐minute period is
3,600,000/(2112
), which is less than 1/100,000. The device
supports at most 60,000 new sessions per second to
authenticate in a one‐minute period.
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5 Security Parameters
Table 19 ‐ Private Keys and CSPs
Key/CSP Description
ECDSA Private Keys
Supports establishment of TLS session keys, SSH
host authentication, and certificate signing keys
(ECDSA P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
RSA Private Keys
Supports establishment of TLS session keys, SSH
host authentication, and certificate signing keys
(RSA 2048, 3072 or 4096 bits)
TLS DHE private
Components
Diffie‐Hellman private component used in TLS
connections (DH Group 14, L = 2048, N >=224)
TLS ECDHE Private
Components
EC Diffie‐Hellman private component used in TLS
connections (ECDHE P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
TLS Pre‐Master Secret
Secret value used to derive the TLS Master Secret
along with client and server random nonces
TLS Master Secret Secret value used to derive the TLS session keys
TLS Encryption keys
AES session keys used in TLS connections (128 or
256 bits; CBC or GCM)
TLS HMAC keys
HMAC‐SHA‐1/256/384 session keys used in TLS
connections
SSH DH private
components
Diffie‐Hellman private component
(DH Group 14, L=2048, N >=224 )
SSH ECDH private
components
EC Diffie‐Hellman private component
(P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
SSH Session Encryption
key
AES session key used in SSH connections
(128, 192, 256 bits: CBC or CTR)
(128 or 256 bits: GCM)
SSH Session
Authentication key
Session key used in SSH connections
(HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA2‐256, HMAC‐SHA2‐512)
Operator passwords Password for operator authentication
DRBG seed and state DRBG seed coming from the NDRNG and AES 256
CTR DRBG state used in the generation of a
random values
SNMPv3 Secrets SNMPv3 Authentication Secret and Privacy Secret
SNMPv3 Keys AES CFB Privacy key and HMAC‐ SHA‐1
Authentication keys
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Key/CSP Description
RADIUS Secret Authentication key for RADIUS server (must be
minimum of 6 characters)
Note: All CSP and keys defined may be accessed by the Manager and Log‐Collector
modes while the PAN‐DB mode only supports some of the CSP/keys defined. For
details regarding what CSPs are supported in each mode, please see Tables 17 – 19
above. The CSPs and keys may be shared between the Approved modes of operation.
Table 20 ‐ Public Keys
Key Name Description
CA Certificates RSA and/or ECDSA keys used to extend trust for
certificates.
RSA Public Keys / Certificates
RSA Public keys managed as certificates for the verification
of signatures, establishment of TLS, operator
authentication and peer authentication.
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)
ECDSA Public Keys / Certificates
ECDSA public keys managed as certificates for the
verification of signatures, establishment of TLS, operator
authentication and peer authentication (ECDSA P‐256, P‐
384, P‐521)
Client Authentication Public Key
Used to authenticate the end user (ECDSA P‐256, P‐384, P‐
521; RSA 2048, 3072, 4096 bits)
TLS DHE public components Used in key agreement (DH Group 14)
TLS ECDHE public components Used in key agreement (ECDHE P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
SSH DH public components Used in key agreement (DH Group 14)
SSH ECDH public components Used in key agreement (P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
SSH Host RSA public key Used in SSH public key authentication process
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)
SSH Host ECDSA public key Used in SSH public key authentication process
(ECDSA P‐256, P‐384, P‐521)
SSH Client RSA public key Used in SSH public key authentication process
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)
Firmware Authentication Key RSA key used to authenticate firmware (2048 bits)
Firmware Integrity Check Key
Used to check the integrity of crypto‐related code
(HMAC‐SHA‐256* and ECDSA P‐256)
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Key Name Description
*Keys used to perform power‐up self‐tests are not CSPs as
per IG 7.4
Note: All keys defined may be accessed by the Manager and Log‐Collector modes while PAN‐DB mode
only supports some of the keys defined. For details regarding what CSPs are supported in each mode,
please see Tables 17 – 19 above. The keys may be shared between the Approved modes of operation.
6 Access Control Policy
6.1 Roles and Services
The Approved and non‐Approved mode of operation provide identical services. While in the Approved
mode of operation all authenticated services and CSPs are accessed via authenticated SSH or TLS sessions.
Access is restricted to authenticated operators only and no interface is provided to modify the public or
private key.
For all authenticated services the following CSPs and public keys may be executed:
 TLS Management Access
o ECDSA Private Keys/Public Keys
o RSA Private Keys/Public Keys
o TLS DHE Private/Public Components
o TLS ECDHE Private/Public Components
o TLS Pre‐Master Secret
o TLS Master Secret
o TLS Encryption keys
o TLS HMAC keys
 SSH Management Access
o SSH DH public components
o SSH ECDH public components
o SSH Host RSA public key
o SSH Host ECDSA public key
o SSH Client RSA public key (Manager Mode only)
SNMPv3 authentication is supported but is not a method of module administration and does not allow
read/write access of CSPs. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSP and public keys related to
these protocols are used to access the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the
following tables. Additional service information and administrator guidance for Panorama can be found at
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/documentation.html
The Crypto‐Officer may access all services, and through the “management of administrative access”
service may define multiple Crypto‐Officer roles with limited services. The User role provides read‐only
access to the System Audit service. When configured in the default mode, Panorama Manager provides
services via web‐browser based interface and a command line interface (CLI). For the Panorama Log
Collector mode and PAN‐DB mode, only the CLI is available for management.
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The services listed below are also available in the non‐Approved mode. In the non‐Approved mode, non‐
Approved algorithms and non‐Approved algorithm strengths are used to access these services.
Table 21 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 Manager (Panorama or Management‐
Only Mode)
Service Description CSP/Key Access
System Provisioning Perform panorama licensing, diagnostics, debug
functions, manage Panorama support information
and switch between Panorama Manager, Logger,
and PAN‐DB modes.
N/A
System Audit Allows review of limited configuration and system
status via SNMPv3, logs, dashboard, show status,
and configuration screens. Provides no
configuration commit capability.
N/A
Panorama
Firmware Update
Download and install software and firmware
updates
Signature verification with
RSA public key
Panorama Manager
Setup
Presents configuration options for management
interfaces and communication for peer services
(e.g., SNMP, RADIUS).
Import, Export, Save, Load, revert and validate
Panorama configurations and state
Import or Export RSA/ECDSA
Private/Public Keys
Import SNMPv3 Secrets
Creation RADIUS Secret
Manage Panorama
Administrative
Access
Define access control methods via admin role
profiles, configure administrators and password
profiles
Configure local user database, authentication
profiles, sequence of methods and access domains
Import, modify, or delete
operator passwords
Import, modify, or delete
SSH Client RSA public keys
Modify SSH Host RSA public
key and SSH Host ECDSA
public key
Modify, Read, or delete TLS
Pre‐master secret, TLS
Master secret and TLS public
keys
Execute/Read/Write DRBG
seed and state
Configure High
Availability
Configure High Availability communication settings N/A
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Service Description CSP/Key Access
Panorama
Certificate
Management
Manage RSA/ECDSA certificates and private keys,
certificate profiles, revocation status, and usage;
show status.
Import or export RSA
/ECDSA private/public keys
Generate RSA/ECDSA
private/public keys
Sign RSA/ECDSA private keys
Execute/Read/Write DRBG
seed and state
Panorama Log
settings
Configure log forwarding N/A
Panorama Server
Profiles
Configure communication parameters and
information for peer servers such as Syslog, SNMP
trap servers, email servers and authentication
servers
Import SNMPv3 Secrets
Execute/Read SNMPv3 keys
Setup Managed
Devices and
Deployment
Set‐up and define managed devices, device groups
for firewalls
Configure device deployment applications and
licenses
View current deployment information on the
managed firewalls. It also allows you to manage
software versions and schedule updates on the
managed firewalls and managed log collectors.
N/A
Configure managed
Device Templates
Define and manage common base configuration
templates for managed firewalls. Template
configurations define settings that are required for
the management of the firewalls on the network.
Import or export RSA/ECDSA
private/public keys
Signature generation with
RSA/ECDSA private keys
Generate RSA/ECDSA
private/public keys
Execute/Read/Write DRBG
seed and state
Configure Managed
Device Groups
Define and manage common base of policies and
data objects for managed firewalls in configured
device groups
N/A
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Service Description CSP/Key Access
Configure managed
Log Collectors
Setup and manage other Log Collector
management, communication and storage settings
View current deployment information on the
managed Log Collectors. It also allows you to
manage software versions and schedule updates on
managed log collectors.
Modify operator passwords
Monitor system
status and logs
Review system status via the panorama system CLI,
dashboard and logs; show status.
N/A
Monitor network
activity
Review aggregated information across all managed
firewalls and show status. The aggregated view
provides actionable information on trends in user
activity, traffic patterns, and potential threats
across your entire network.
N/A
Switch Context Browses a managed firewall’s web based user
interface.
N/A
Table 22 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐100/M‐200/M‐500/M‐600 Log Collector Mode
Service Description CSP Access
Panorama Log
Collector Setup
Presents configuration options for management
interfaces and communication for peer services
Import, Export, Save, Load, revert and validate
Panorama configurations and state
Import or Export RSA/ECDSA
Private/Public Keys
Panorama
Firmware Update
Download and install software and firmware
updates.
Signature verification with
RSA public key
Manage Panorama
Administrative
Access
Update Administrator password Import or modify operator
passwords
Panorama
Certificate
Management
Manage RSA/ECDSA certificates and private keys,
certificate profiles, revocation status, usage; and
show status.
Import or export RSA/ECDSA
private/public keys
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Service Description CSP Access
Generate RSA/ECDSA
private/public keys
Sign with RSA/ECDSA private
keys
Execute/Read/Write DRBG
seed and state
Table 23 ‐ Authenticated Services – Panorama M‐500/M‐600 Private Pan‐DB Mode
Service Description CSP Access
Pan‐DB Setup Presents configuration options for management
interfaces and communication for peer services
Import, Export, Save, Load, revert and validate
Panorama configurations and state
N/A
System Audit Allows review of limited configuration and system
status via SNMPv3, logs, dashboard, show status,
and configuration screens. Provides no
configuration commit capability.
N/A
Panorama
Firmware Update
Download and install software and firmware
updates
Signature verification with
RSA public key
Manage PAN‐DB
Administrative
Access
Define access control methods via admin role
profiles
Import or modify operator
passwords
6.2 Unauthenticated Services
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
Table 24 ‐ Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Zeroize The device will overwrite all CSPs. The zeroization procedure is invoked
when the operator performs a factory reset. The operator must be present
to observe the method has completed successfully or in control via a remote
management session. During the zeroization procedure, no other services
are available.
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Procedures to perform zeroization:
 During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console
port connection (by entering ‘maint’ when instructed to do so) to
access the main menu.
 Select “Continue.”
 Select the “Factory Reset” option to enter the Approved mode.
 Select “Factory Reset”.
 When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re‐initialize
and continue into the Approved mode.
 The module will reboot.
Self‐Tests Run power up self‐tests on demand by power cycling the module.
Execute/Read access to FW integrity Check key.
Show Status (LEDs) View hardware status (on/off) of the module via the LEDs.
7 Operational Environment
The FIPS 140‐2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module
contains a non‐modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the
module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the
scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into
this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
8 Security Rules
The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140‐2 Level 2
module.
1. The cryptographic module provides distinct operator roles. When the module has not been placed
in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
2. The Panorama M‐100, M‐200, M‐500 and M‐600 cryptographic modules supports initialization as
a Log Collector in an Approved mode of operation with Level 2 role‐based authentication or
support initialization as a Panorama Manager or PAN‐DB (M‐500 and M‐600 only) in an Approved
mode of operation with Level 3 identity‐based authentication.
3. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. The cryptographic module performs the following tests for all Approved modes:
A. Power up Self‐Tests
1. Cryptographic algorithm tests
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a. AES Encrypt Known Answer Test
b. AES Decrypt Known Answer Test
c. AES CMAC Known Answer Test
d. AES GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
e. AES GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
f. AES CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
g. AES CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
h. ECDSA Sign Known Answer Test
i. ECDSA Verify Known Answer Test
j. RSA Sign Known Answer Test
k. RSA Verify Known Answer Test
l. RSA Encrypt Known Answer Test
m. RSA Decrypt Known Answer Test
n. HMAC‐SHA‐1 Known Answer Test
o. HMAC‐SHA‐256 Known Answer Test
p. HMAC‐SHA‐384 Known Answer Test
q. HMAC‐SHA‐512 known Answer Test
r. SHA‐1 Known Answer Test
s. SHA‐256 Known Answer Test
t. SHA‐384 Known Answer Test
u. SHA‐512 Known Answer Test
v. DRBG Known Answer Test
w. ECDH Known Answer Test
x. DH Known Answer Test
y. SP800‐90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
B. Firmware Integrity Test – HMAC‐SHA‐256 and ECDSA P‐256.
C. Conditional Self‐Tests
1. Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – performed on NDRNG and
DRBG
2. ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test Sign/Verify
3. RSA Pairwise Consistency Test Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt
4. Firmware Load Test – Verify RSA 2048 with SHA‐256 signature on firmware at
time of load
D. If any conditional test fails, the module will output ‘FIPS‐CC failure’ and the specific test
that failed.
5. The operator is capable of commanding the module to perform the power‐up self‐test by cycling
power of the module.
6. Upon re‐configuration to/from the Log Collector mode or PAN‐DB mode of operation from/to the
Manager mode, the cryptographic module reboots and perform all power‐up self‐tests.
7. Power‐up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
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8. Data output is inhibited during power‐up self‐tests and error states.
9. Processes performing key generation and zeroization processes are logically isolated from the
logical data output paths.
10. The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
11. Status information output from the module does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if
misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
12. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
13. The module maintains separation between concurrent operators.
14. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
15. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
16. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
Vendor imposed security rules:
1. When configured, the module automatically logs out the operator when the cryptographic
module remains inactive in any valid role for the administrator specified time interval.
2. When configured, the module enforces a timed access protection mechanism that supports at
most ten authentication attempts per minute. After the administrator specified number of
consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts has occurred, the cryptographic module
shall enforce a wait period of at least one (1) minute before any more login attempts can be
attempted. This wait period shall be enforced even if the module power is momentarily removed.
3. When FIPS‐CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not install plugins. If a plugin is install, the
module shall be configured in non‐Approved mode of operation.
4. When FIPS‐CC mode is enabled, TLSv1.0 is disabled. The operator should not re‐enable TLSv1.0.
TLSv1.0 can be used in an Approved mode of operation (Approved TLS KDF algorithm); however,
TLS v1.0 protocol is no longer considered as secure because of the Cipher Block Chaining IV attack,
a client of the module could use a vulnerable implementation.
5. When FIPS‐CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not use TACACS+. RADIUS may be used but
must be protected by TLS protocol. If TACAS+ or RADIUS without TLS protocol are set, the module
shall be configured in non‐Approved mode of operation.
6. The operator shall not generate 4096‐bit RSA key in FIPS‐CC mode. If the operator wants to
generate 4096‐bit RSA key, the module shall be configured in non‐Approved mode of operation.
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9 Physical Security Policy
9.1 Physical Security Mechanisms
The multi‐chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip
components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper‐evident seals that are applied on
the modules by the Crypto‐Officer. There are twenty‐eight (28) tamper‐evident seals for the M‐100,
fifteen (15) for the M‐200, twelve (12) for the M‐500, and twenty‐one (21) for the M‐600. All unused seals
are to be controlled by the Crypto‐Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without
evidence. The Crypto‐Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry. Tamper evident seals
must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation and once applied, the Crypto‐Officer
shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper evident seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque
enclosure without evidence. The Crypto‐Officer should inspect the seals and shields for evidence of
tamper every 30 days. If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto‐Officer should assume that the
modules have been compromised and contact support.
Note: For ordering information, see Table 2 for FIPS kit part numbers and versions. Opacity shields are
included in the FIPS kits.
Refer to Appendix A to D for instructions on installation and placement of the tamper seals and opacity
shields. The locations of the tamper‐evident seals implemented on the M‐100, M‐200, M‐500, and M‐600
are shown in Appendix A to Appendix D, respectively.
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9.2 Operator Required Actions
Table 25 ‐ Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
Model
Physical
Security
Mechanisms
Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
M‐100
M‐200
Tamper
Evident Seals
30 days Verify integrity of tamper‐evident
seals in the locations identified in
Appendix A and C of this Security
Policy.
M‐100
M‐200
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields
Side Rails
30 days Verify that opacity shields and side
rails have not been loosened or
deformed from their original shape,
thereby reducing their effectiveness.
M‐100 Top Overlays 30 days Verify top overlays have not been
removed or deformed. All edges
should maintain strong adhesion
characteristics.
M‐500
M‐600
Tamper
Evident Seals
30 days Verify integrity of tamper‐evident
seals in the locations specified in
Appendix B and D.
M‐500
M‐600
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields
30 days Verify that the front and rear opacity
shields have not been deformed from
their original shape, thereby reducing
their effectiveness.
M‐500
M‐600
Vent Overlays 30 days Verify that the vent overlays have not
been removed or deformed. All edges
should maintain strong adhesion
characteristics.
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10 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of the scope of FIPS 140‐2, so
these requirements are not applicable.
11 References
[FIPS 140‐2] FIPS Publication 140‐2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
12 Definitions and Acronyms
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
CA – Certificate Authority
CLI – Command Line Interface
CO – Cryptographic Officer
DB9 – D‐sub series, E size, 9 pins.
DH – Diffie‐Hellman
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
HA – High Availability
HMAC – (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code
LED – Light Emitting Diode
NDRNG – Non‐deterministic random number generator
NMI – Non‐Maskable Interrupt
RJ45 – Networking Connector
RSA – Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
TLS – Transport Layer Security
USB – Universal Serial Bus
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Appendix A – M‐100 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (28 Seals)
Step 1: From the rear of the module, remove the six (6) screws and port cover, as shown. Retain screws and port
cover for the Step 2.
Figure 24 – M‐100: Remove Screws on Rear Side
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Step 2: Attach the rear opacity shields.
A. Using two (2) #6‐32 3/8” screws, attach the lower rear cover bracket. Replace the port cover and secure
with the four (4) screws that you removed in Step 1.
B. Use four (4) #4‐40 1/4” screws to attach the rear cover to the bracket.
Figure 25 – M‐100: Attach Rear Opacity Shield
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Step 3: Apply tamper‐evident seals (two (2) seals) to the seam of the rear cover and rear outer edges of the
appliance (seals #1 and #2 in the illustration below). Apply tamper‐evident seals to the left and right sides
covering the side holes (two (2) seals #3 and #4). Apply top air vent overlay covers and tamper‐evident seals
(sixteen (16) seals #5‐#10 and #11‐#20).
Figure 26 – M‐100: Apply Tamper Seals and Vent Overlays
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Step 4: Place side inner rails to each side of the module and attach using rail kit screws.
Figure 27 – M‐100: Apply Rail Kit
Step 5: Remove the two (2) front plastic bracket covers and screws. Remove and retain the two (2) captive
screws from the plastic covers.
Figure 28 – M‐100: Remove Front Plastic Bracket Covers and Screws
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Step 6: Install front opacity shield and attach to brackets using four (4) 4‐40 x 0.25‐inch screws and thread a
captive screw through each side of the front cover bracket, as shown. Affix four (4) tamper seals on top and
bottom of module as shown.
Figure 29 – M‐100: Install Front Opacity Shield
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Step 7 – Slide module into outer rails and attach outer rails and apply four (4) seals overlapping the rack mount
bracket and the module sides.
Figure 30 – M‐100: Install Outer Rails
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Appendix B – M‐200 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (Fifteen
(15) Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
M‐200 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then
use a Phillips‐head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover
toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the FIPS top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click.
Reinsert and slide cover into position and secure with the two (2) screws.
Figure 31 – M‐200: Top Cover Replacement
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2. On the left side of the M‐200, firmly apply seven (7) tamper‐evident seals as indicated in the
illustration.
Figure 32 – M‐200: Side View Before Rail Installation
Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M‐200 and M‐600 Appliance Hardware
Reference”. The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the front inner rails.
Figure 33 – M‐200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets
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3. Attach the FIPS front cover brackets.
Replace the front rack‐mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner‐rack
rails with the FIPS rack‐mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on each
bracket. The FIPS handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 34 – M‐200: Replacing Front Rack‐Mount Brackets
4. Attach the FIPS front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M‐200 FIPS front cover over the FIPS brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb
screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 35 – M‐200: Attach FIPS Front Cover
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5. Attach the FIPS back cover to the back of the appliance.
Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw on each
side), and turn the screws clockwise to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper‐evident seal to each location shown in the following M‐200 illustrations. Ensure you
apply two (2) tamper‐evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15 on the rear
illustration).
Before you apply the tamper‐evident seals, ensure that the appliance and FIPS kit surfaces are clean
and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching
the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and FIPS
kit surfaces.
Figure 36 – M‐200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side
Figure 37 – M‐200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear
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Appendix C – M‐500 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals)
Step 1:
Remove the two pull handles and front modules on the left and right side of the appliance by removing the three
(3) screws located behind each handle/module. There is no need to disconnect the LED circuit board attached to
the end of the ribbon cable. Retain these screws for Step 2.
Figure 38 – M‐500: Remove Front Handles and Modules
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Step 2:
Attach the left and right front cover brackets to the appliance using the six (6) screws that you removed in Step 1.
First attach the brackets using the bottom screws (one on each side) as shown in Figure 39, ensuring that you feed
the ribbon cable and LED circuit board through the left bracket. Replace the front modules and secure them using
the middle and top screws on each side as shown in Figure 40.
Figure 39 – M‐500: Secure the Front Brackets
Figure 40 – M‐500: Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules
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Step 3:
Secure the front opacity shield to the right and left front brackets that you installed in Step 2. Use two (2) screws
(provided) on each side.
Figure 41 – M‐500: Install Front Opacity Shield
Figure 42 – M‐500: Front Opacity Shield Installed
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Step 4:
Attach the rear opacity shield tray to the appliance. First, remove the two (2) screws (shown in Figure 43) from the
appliance and use these screws to secure the rear opacity shield tray.
Note: Install the back cables (power cords and network/management cables) because you will not be able to
access these ports after the next step.
Figure 43 – M‐500: Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray
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Step 5:
Place the rear opacity shield on top of the rear opacity shield tray ensuring that you run the cables through the
opening at the bottom. Secure the opacity shields with two (2) screws (provided) on each side.
Figure 44 – M‐500: Install Rear Opacity Shield
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Step 6:
Cover the vent openings as shown in Figure 45 by applying one (1) overlay sticker over the left side vent and one
(1) overlay sticker over the right side vent. Each overlay requires two (2) tamper seals as shown in Figure 46 (A).
Also apply one (1) additional tamper seal as shown in Figure 46 (B) #5.
Figure 45 – M‐500: Apply Vent Overlays
Figure 46 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening
A
B
[ 1 ]
[ 2 ]
[ 3 ]
[ 4 ]
[ 5 ]
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Step 7:
Re‐attach the rail kit to the appliance as shown in Figure 47 and then add three (3) tamper seals to the bottom of
the appliance as shown in Figure 48. One (1) tamper seal prevents tampering of the front opacity shield connected
to the bottom of the appliance and two (2) tamper seals wrap around the upper and lower rear opacity shields to
prevent tampering of the rear opacity shields.
Figure 47 – M‐500: Install Rail Kit
Figure 48 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance
[ 6 ]
[ 7 ]
[ 8 ]
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Step 8:
Place four (4) tamper seals on the top of the appliance. Two (2) tamper seals (#9 and #11) prevent tampering of the
top front and rear opacity shields and two (2) tamper seals (#10 and #12) prevents someone from attempting to
access the vent overlays by sliding the rail kit. This completes the FIPS kit installation.
Figure 49 – M‐500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Top and Sides of the Appliance
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Appendix D – M‐600 ‐ FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips‐
head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover
toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the FIPS top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click.
Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover
Figure 50 – M‐600: Top Cover Replacement
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2. Attach the FIPS front cover brackets.
Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on
each side), insert the M‐600 FIPS front‐cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the
handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The FIPS handles have standoffs
that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 51 – M‐600: Front Cover Bracket
3. Attach the FIPS front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M‐600 FIPS front cover over the FIPS pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning the
thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 52 – M‐600:FIPS Front Cover
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4. Install a tamper‐evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M‐600 Figure 53. You
need to install this seal before you install the M‐600 FIPS back cover.
5. Attach the FIPS back cover to the back of the appliance.
a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws
clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper‐evident seal to each location shown in the following M‐600 illustrations below.
Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install
tamper‐evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper‐evident seals on the back side of
the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 54). Apply two (2) tamper‐
evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 53).
Before you apply the tamper‐evident seals, ensure that the appliance and FIPS kit surfaces are
clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations.
Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to
the appliance and FIPS kit surfaces.
M‐600 Seal Placement (21 Seals)
Figure 53 – M‐600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)
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Figure 54 – M‐600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front)
Figure 55 – M‐600:Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails