YUBICO, INC.
YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.0
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Yubico, Inc., YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module This document may be freely reproduced and
distributed, but only in its entirety and without modification
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 General..................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Security Levels..............................................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.....................................................................................................................7
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification................................................................8
2.3 Excluded Components..................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................................9
2.5 Algorithms....................................................................................................................................................9
2.6 Security Function Implementations...........................................................................................................13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ..................................................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy........................................................................................................................................19
2.9 Key Generation...........................................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment......................................................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols......................................................................................................................................20
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................................................20
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................................20
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication....................................................................................................................21
4.1 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................................21
4.2 Roles...........................................................................................................................................................22
4.3 Approved Services......................................................................................................................................22
4.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................................38
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .........................................................................................................39
5 Software/Firmware Security...............................................................................................................................39
5.1 Integrity Techniques...................................................................................................................................39
5.2 Initiate on Demand ....................................................................................................................................39
6 Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................................39
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...................................................................................39
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................................................39
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required............................................................................................................39
7.2 EFP/EFT Information ..................................................................................................................................39
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges .....................................................................................................40
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8 Non-Invasive Security .........................................................................................................................................40
8.1 Mitigation Techniques ...............................................................................................................................40
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management......................................................................................................40
9.1 Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................................40
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................................................41
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................................................41
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................................42
9.5 Transitions..................................................................................................................................................49
10 Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................................49
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................49
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................49
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ...................................................................................................................51
10.4 Error States ................................................................................................................................................52
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.................................................................................................................53
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.......................................................................................................................................53
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................................53
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................................53
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.....................................................................................................................53
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................................................53
11.5 End of Life...................................................................................................................................................54
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................................................54
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels..................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware.......................................................................................................8
Table 3: Modes List and Description .............................................................................................................................9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................12
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .........................................................................................................................12
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms ..............................................................................................................12
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................................................13
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms .......................................................................................................13
Table 9: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................................................19
Table 10: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................................................20
Table 11: Entropy Sources...........................................................................................................................................20
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces.....................................................................................................................................21
Table 13: Authentication Methods..............................................................................................................................22
Table 14: Roles.............................................................................................................................................................22
Table 15: Approved Services .......................................................................................................................................38
Table 16: Non-Approved Services................................................................................................................................39
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required..............................................................................................................39
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information ....................................................................................................................................40
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures ..................................................................................................................40
Table 20: Storage Areas...............................................................................................................................................41
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods..........................................................................................................................41
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods .............................................................................................................................42
Table 23: SSP Table 1...................................................................................................................................................44
Table 24: SSP Table 2...................................................................................................................................................49
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................49
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Table 26: Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................51
Table 27: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................................................51
Table 28: Conditional Periodic Information.................................................................................................................52
Table 29: Error States ..................................................................................................................................................53
List of Figures
Figure 1 - YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module ................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - Block Diagram................................................................................................................................................8
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1 GENERAL
1.1 OVERVIEW
This document defines the Security Policy for the Yubico, Inc. (Yubico) YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module, hereafter
“the module”.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1. The module is a single-chip embodiment as defined by FIPS
140-3 and conforms to Security Level 3.
1.2 SECURITY LEVELS
The module meets the overall requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
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Table 1: Security Levels
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
2.1 DESCRIPTION
The YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module (the module) is a single-chip module validated at FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3.
Figure 1 - YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module
Purpose and Use:
The module is the core component of the Yubico YubiHSM 2 product and is a dedicated hardware security module
that offers superior protection for private keys against theft and misuse.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics:
The critical components within the module are encapsulated inside a single, integrated circuit.
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the IC package that comprises the Infineon Technologies SLE
78CLUFX5000P.
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Figure 2 - Block Diagram
2.2 TESTED AND VENDOR AFFIRMED MODULE VERSION AND IDENTIFICATION
The YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module is designed to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3 (refer to
Table 1). The module is available in the following configuration (refer to Table 2):
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
SLE78CLUFX5000P SLE78CLUFX5000P 2.4.1 SLE78CLUFX5000P Single-Chip
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
N.B. The module returns the hardware identifier ‘78CLUFX5000P’ and firmware version ‘2.4.1’ when queried
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
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2.3 EXCLUDED COMPONENTS
The module does not exclude any components from the requirements of FIPS 140-3.
2.4 MODES OF OPERATION
Modes List and Description:
The module supports an Approved mode and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode must be
initialized per the instructions in this Security Policy. The module does not support a degraded mode of operation
or a maintenance interface. The module requires zeroisation prior to changing the mode of operation. The mode
of operation cannot be changed if any SSPs are present. The operator must update the default Authentication Key
upon authenticating to the module for the first time.
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved Only Approved algorithms are available. Approved 01
Non-Approved Both Approved and non-Approved algorithms are available. Non-Approved 00
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module requires zeroisation prior to changing the mode of operation. The mode of operation cannot be
changed if any SSPs are present. The operator must update the default Authentication Key upon authenticating to
the module for the first time. Section 11.1 provides mode change instructions.
2.5 ALGORITHMS
The YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module supports the approved cryptographic algorithms shown in Table 4.
Approved Algorithms:
The module supports the following approved cryptographic algorithms.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5891 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A5891 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CMAC A5891 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A5891 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KWP A5891 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
Counter DRBG A5891 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5891 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5891 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5891 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen A5891 Curve - ED-25519 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen A5891 Curve - ED-25519
PreHash - No
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer A5891 Curve - ED-25519 FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A5891 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5891 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A5891 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A5891 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A5891 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
fullUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
onePassDh -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
onePassUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF ANS 9.63 (CVL) A5891 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Key Data Length - Key Data Length: 512, 640
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108 A5891 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-
2040 Increment 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A5891 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-crt
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A5891 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5891 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5891 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA Signature Primitive (CVL) A5891 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5891 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA-1 A5891 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5891 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A5891 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A5891 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module supports the following vendor affirmed algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Yubico Common
Cryptographic Library
NIST SP 800-133r2, Section 4 example 1,
Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
ECDSA Curve:brainpool256r1, brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1, secp256k1
Yubico Common Cryptographic
Library
IG C.A
KAS Curve:brainpool256r1, brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1
Yubico Common Cryptographic
Library
IG C.A
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
DES No security claimed For internal integrity checking use only
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Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
ECDSA Signature Primitive with SHA-1 Non-Approved signature generation
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Primitive with SHA-1 Non-Approved signature generation
RSA PSS Signature Primitive with SHA-1 Non-Approved signature generation
secp256k1 (ECDSA and KAS) - Currently not included as
part of IG C.A for key agreement
Non-Approved key agreement and signature
generation with non-Approved curve
Decrypt PKCS#1 Decryption
Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 SECURITY FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AKG AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
RSA 2048, 3072,
4096, ECDSA P-224,
P-256, P-384, P-521
Standard:NIST FIPS
186-5
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
Counter DRBG:
(A5891)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Modulo: 2048,
3072, 4096
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521,
brainpool256r1,
brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1
EDDSA KeyGen:
(A5891)
Curve: ed25519
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AKV AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Standards:NIST SP
800-56Ar3, FIPS
186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
EDDSA KeyGen:
(A5891)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5891)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
ECSP UNK Signature
Generation
Primitive
Standard:NIST FIPS
186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521,
brainpool256r1,
brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1
Counter DRBG:
(A5891)
ENC BC-Auth Symmetric
Encryption
Standard:NIST FIPS
197
AES-CBC: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
AES-ECB: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
ENC-A BC-Auth Authenticated
Symmetric
Encryption
Standard:NIST FIPS
197
AES-CCM: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
DEC BC-UnAuth Symmetric
Decryption
Standard:NIST FIPS
197
AES-CBC: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
AES-ECB: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
DEC-A BC-UnAuth Authenticated
Symmetric
Decryption
Standard:NIST FIPS
197
AES-CCM: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
ESV ENT-ESV NIST SP 800-90B
Physical Entropy
Source
Standard:NIST SP
800-90B
KAS-SC KAS-Full Secure Channel,
which provides data
protection and
integrity using NIST
SP 800-135r1 ANSI
X9.63 KDF
Standard:NIST SP
800-56Ar3
IG:IG D.F Scenario 2
path (2), split
Key
confirmation:No
Key Derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5891)
Curve: P-256
KDF ANS 9.63:
(A5891)
KAS-KG KAS-KeyGen Key Generation Standard:NIST SP
800-56Ar3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
KBKDF KBKDF Key-Based Key
Derivation CMAC-
AES128 (Secure
Channel). Only used
as part of session
establishment.
Standard:NIST SP
800-108
KDF SP800-108:
(A5891)
KTS-CBC-CMAC KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping using
Secure Channel
Session Keys
Standard:NIST SP
800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology 128
AES-CBC: (A5891)
Key Size: 128
AES-CMAC: (A5891)
Key Size: 128
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
bits of security
strength
KTS-CCM KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping using
AES-CCM Wrap Key
Standards:NIST SP
800-38F, SP 800-
108, Global
Platform GPC 2.3
Amendment D v1.2
SCP03
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CCM: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
KTS-IFC KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Encapsulation Standard:NIST SP
800-56Br2
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG D.G
Key
confirmation:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 150 bits of
security strength
KTS-IFC: (A5891)
Modulo: 2048,
3072, 4096
KTS-KWP KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping using
AES-KWP Wrap Key
Standard:NIST SP
800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-KWP: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
MAC MAC Keyed MAC Standard:NIST FIPS
198-2
AES-CMAC: (A5891)
Key Size: 128, 192,
256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A5891)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A5891)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A5891)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A5891)
SHA-1: (A5891)
SHA2-256: (A5891)
SHA2-384: (A5891)
SHA2-512: (A5891)
RAND DRBG Random Number
Generation
Standard:NIST SP
800-90Ar1
Counter DRBG:
(A5891)
PKV AsymKeyPair-
PubKeyVal
Public key
validation
Standards:NIST SP
800-56Ar3, FIPS
186-5, SP 800-56Br2
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
KTS-IFC: (A5891)
Modolo: 2048,
3078, 4096
RSADP UNK RSA Decryption
Primitive
Standard:NIST SP
800-56Br2
RSA Decryption
Primitive Sp800-
56Br2: (A5891)
Modulo: 2048,
3072, 4096
RSASP UNK RSA Signature
Primitive
Standard:NIST FIPS
186-5
RSA Signature
Primitive: (A5891)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Modulo: 2048,
3072, 4096
SigGen DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
Standard:NIST FIPS
186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Modulo: 2048,
3072, 4096
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521,
brainpool256r1,
brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1
EDDSA SigGen:
(A5891)
Curve: ed25519
SHA2-256: (A5891)
SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification
Standard:NIST FIPS
186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A5891)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5891)
EDDSA SigVer:
(A5891)
KAS-SSC KAS-SSC Shared Secret
Computation
Standard:NIST SP
800-56Ar3
IG :IG D.F Scenario
2, path (1)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A5891)
Type: Co-factor
One-Pass Diffie
Hellman
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521,
brainpool256r1,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
brainpool384r1,
brainpool512r1
SymKG CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
Standard:NIST SP
800-133r2
Counter DRBG:
(A5891)
CKG - Sym: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 ALGORITHM SPECIFIC INFORMATION
Compliance to SP 800-56Ar3 assurances:
For KAS-ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). The key derivation functions comply with NIST SP 800-
56Cr2 (i.e., KDA HKDF SP 800-56Cr2 (Cert. #A5891)) and ANS 9.63 (i.e., KDF ANS 9.63 (Cert. #A5891). Furthermore,
the module obtained the appropriate assurances, as required in Sections 5.6.2 of NIST SP 800-56Ar3. Full public
key validation (NIST SP 800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.3) is implemented. No key confirmation is implemented.
Compliance to NIST SP 800-56Br2 Assurances
For KTS RSA, the module satisfies IG D.G. The RSA keys for KTS-IFC (Cert. #A5891) have lengths of at least 2048 bits,
which are acceptable per NIST SP 800-131Ar2. The modulus sizes, the method for key generation, and the roles
(initiator, i.e., the module performs encapsulation, or responder, i.e., the module performs unencapsulation) are
specified in Table 9. The RSA key generation algorithm is CAVP validated (Cert. #A5891). No key confirmation is
implemented.
The module implements the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and obtains the appropriate assurances as required
in Sections 5 and 6 of NIST SP 800-56Br2. The module performs partial public-key validation. No key confirmation is
implemented.
ECDSA with Non NIST-Recommended Curves: brainpool256r1, brainpool384r1, and brainpool512r1. These curves
are allowed per IG C.A for ECDSA.
KAS with NIST Allowed Curves: brainpool256r1, brainpool384r1, brainpool512r1. These curves are allowed per IG
C.A.
DES for Integrity Checks: The module supports DES for internal integrity checks with no security claimed.
2.8 RBG AND ENTROPY
The module incorporates a NIST SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG (Cert. #A5891) that is seeded from the module’s NIST SP
800-90B validated entropy source. The unmodified output of the DRBG is used for generating cryptographic key
material. The DRBG is instantiated anew every power-on. The threshold for reseeding is monitored to not exceed
248
per SP800-90A.
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Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E196 Infineon Technologies AG
Table 10: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Infineon 16-bit Security Controller
M7893B11 Entropy Source
Physical M7893B11 8 bits 2.55928
bits
Non-Vetted
Conditioning
Table 11: Entropy Sources
2.9 KEY GENERATION
The module generates symmetric cryptographic keys in conformance with NIST SP 800-133r2 using a NIST SP 800-
90A conforming DRBG (Cert. #A5891 ) for the encryption and protection of data and cryptographic keys. The
module generates asymmetric cryptographic key pairs in conformance with FIPS 186-4 and FIPS 186-5 for the
generation or verification of digital signatures, or for the facilitation of key agreement in conformance with NIST SP
800-56Ar3.
2.10 KEY ESTABLISHMENT
The module supports key establishment using KAS with a supported security strength of 128 bits, depending on
the selection of key sizes utilized. The module supports AES-based key transport with a supported security strength
between 128 and 256 bits, depending on the selection of key sizes utilized. The module supports RSA-based key
transport with a supported security strength between 112 and 150 bits, depending on the selection of key sizes
utilized.
The module incorporates KTS-IFC in conformance with NIST SP 800-56Br2.
2.11 INDUSTRY PROTOCOLS
No industry protocols are used in this module.
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES
3.1 PORTS AND INTERFACES
The module incorporates physical ports and logical interfaces. The physical ports are defined within the table
below:
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
USB pins (D+/D-) Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
SSPs, Operator data, Commands, Return Codes, and Error Status
Touch Button Interface Control Input Physical presence indicator
LED Interface Status Output Emits power to an LED, if attached
Power Interface Power N/A
I2C I/O Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
SSPs, Operator data, Commands, Return Codes, and Error Status
Interface Select Control Input Interface selection
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION
4.1 AUTHENTICATION METHODS
The module supports authentication methods for the Cryptographic Officer (CO) role. This role has separate
identity -based authentication methods as indicated in Table 12. The module supports two authentication
methods: Knowledge of a shared secret and possession of a private key. For each authentication attempt, the
operator must present their unique identifier. The methods are in conformance with NIST SP 800-140E and SP 800-
63B (refer to Section 5.1.6).
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Knowledge
of a shared
secret
Knowledge
of a shared
secret
Cryptographic
Software
The shared secret is a 128-
bit AES key. The
probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a
false acceptance will occur
is 1/2^128 which is less
than 1/1,000,000.
Each session takes approximately
40 ms. The module can only
perform 1500 session
establishment attempts per
minute (one session takes
approximately 40 ms to
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
establish), which is less than
1/100,000.
Possession
of Private
Key
Knowledge
of the static
private key
Cryptographic
Software
The KAS-ECC private key
uses curve P-256, which
has a security strength of
128 bits. The probability
that a random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is
1/2^128 which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Possession of a Static Private Key
(i.e., KAS-ECC, P-256) to establish
a session key during session
establishment. The strength of
the ECC key is 128 bits.
Authentication attempts take at
least 150ms, which results in less
than 420 attempts per minute
due to performance constraints.
Table 13: Authentication Methods
4.2 ROLES
The module supports a Cryptographic Officer (CO) role and an Unauthenticated role. The Unauthenticated role has
access to non-security-relevant services only.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO Knowledge of a shared secret
Possession of Private Key
Unauthenticated Identity N/A None
Table 14: Roles
The module supports multiple concurrent operators (up to 16) separated by unique sessions. Operator
authentication does not persist beyond power-cycling the module. The selection of roles is implicit.
4.3 APPROVED SERVICES
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This module supports the following approved services listed in Table 14. Please note that all services are protected
by Session Keys except for the following services:
− Echo
− Device Info
− Get Device Public Key
− Power-On
− Reset Device (Manual Invocation)
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Authenticate
Session
Complete the
mutual
authentication
process started
with Create
Session
Return
code:
0x84
Challenge
response
Cryptogram
Success/Erro
r
MAC Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Blink Device Blink the LED of
the device to
identify it
Return
code:
0xEB
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Change
Authenticatio
n Key
Change an
Authentication Key
Return
code:
0xEC
New
Authenticatio
n Key
Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
PKV
Crypto Officer
- Authentication
Keys: W
- Session Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- KAS Public
Keys: W
Close Session Close the current
Session and
release it for re-
use
return
code
0xC0
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys:
E,Z
Create OTP
AEAD
Create a Yubico
OTP AEAD
return
code
0xE1
OTP AEAD
request
OTP AEAD ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-CCM
MAC
Crypto Officer
- OTP AEAD Key:
E
- OTP ECB Key:
R,W
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Create
Session
Begin the mutual
authentication
process for
establishing a
Session
return
code
0x83
Auth ID, Host-
Challenge,
Public Key
Device
Challenge,
Cryptogram,
KAS Public
Key
KAS-SC
KAS-KG
KBKDF
MAC
RAND
PKV
Crypto Officer
- Authentication
Keys: E
- Session Keys:
G
- KAS Private
Keys: E
- KAS Public
Keys: R,W,E
- DRBG State:
G,E
Decrypt CBC Decrypt CBC with
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xF1
Encrypted
data
Decrypted
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: E
- Session Keys: E
Decrypt ECB Decrypt ECB with
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xEF
Encrypted
data
Decrypted
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: E
- Session Keys: E
Decrypt OAEP Decrypt using RSA-
OAEP
Return
code
0xD9
OAEP
encrypted
data
OAEP
decrypted
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
RSADP
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Decrypt OTP Decrypt a Yubico
OTP
Return
code
0xE0
OTP
encrypted
data, OTP
AEAD, OTP
ECB Key
OTP
decrypted
data
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-CCM
MAC
Crypto Officer
- OTP AEAD Key:
E
- OTP ECB Key:
W,E
- Session Keys: E
Delete Object Delete an Object Return
code
0xD8
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Authentication
Keys: Z
- HMAC Key: Z
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: Z
- KAS Private
Keys: Z
- KAS Public
Keys: Z
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: Z
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: Z
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: Z
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: Z
- OTP AEAD Key:
Z
- Session Keys: E
Derive KAS-
ECC-SSC
Perform a KAS-
ECC-SSC operation
Return
code
0xD7
KAS-ECC
public key
Shared
Secret
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
PKV
KAS-SSC
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: W,E
- Shared Secret:
G,R
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Device Info Gets device
version, device
serial, supported
Algorithms and
available log
entries
Return
code
0x86
None Device Info
response
message
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Unauthenticate
d
- Session Keys: E
Echo Echo data back
from the device
Return
code
0x81
None Echo
response
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Unauthenticate
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
d
- Session Keys: E
Encrypt CBC Encrypt CBC with
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xF2
None Encrypted
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: E
- Session Keys: E
Encrypt ECB Encrypt ECB with
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xF0
None Encrypted
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: E
- Session Keys: E
Export RSA
Wrapped
Export KTS-IFC
Data in Yubico
internal format.
Return
code
0xF6
None Exported
object
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-IFC
KTS-KWP
MAC
RAND
SymKG
Crypto Officer
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: R,E
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: G,R,E
- Authentication
Keys: R
- HMAC Key: R
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: R
- KAS Private
Keys: R
- KAS Public
Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: R
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: R
- OTP AEAD Key:
R
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Export
Wrapped
Retrieves an
Object under wrap
from the device.
The Object is
encrypted using a
Wrap Key (AES-
CCM)
Return
code
0xCA
None Exported
object
ENC
DEC
KTS-CCM
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Authentication
Keys: R
- HMAC Key: R
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: R,E
- KAS Private
Keys: R
- KAS Public
Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: R
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: R
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: R
- OTP AEAD Key:
R
- Session Keys: E
Generate
Asymmetric
Key
Generate an
Asymmetric Key
Return
code
0xC6
None Success/Erro
r
AKG
AKV
ENC
DEC
KAS-KG
MAC
RAND
PKV
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: G
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: G
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Generate
Attestation
Certificate
Generate
attestation of an
Asymmetric Key,
output is an X.509
certificate
Return
code
0xE4
None Attestation
certificate
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
SigGen
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- Attestation
Key: E
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: R
- KAS Public
Keys: R
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Generate
HMAC Key
Generate an HMAC
Key
Return
code
0xDA
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
SymKG
Crypto Officer
- HMAC Key: G
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Generate OTP
AEAD Key
Generate an OTP
AEAD Key
Return
code
0xE6
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
SymKG
Crypto Officer
- DRBG State:
G,E
- OTP AEAD Key:
G
- Session Keys: E
Generate
Symmetric
Key
Generate a
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xEE
None Success/Erro
r
SymKG Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: G
- DRBG State:
G,E
Generate
Wrap Key
Generate a Wrap
Key (AES-CCM)
that can be used
for export, import,
wrap data and
unwrap data
Return
code
0xDB
None Success/Erro
r
AKG
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
SymKG
Crypto Officer
- DRBG State:
G,E
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: G
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: G
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: G
- Session Keys: E
Get Device
Public
Get Device Public
Key for KAS
Authentication
Return
code
0x8A
None Device
Public Key
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
Unauthenticate
d
- KAS Public
Keys: R
Crypto Officer
- KAS Public
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Keys: R
- Session Keys: E
Get Log
Entries
Fetch device audit
log
Return
code
0xCD
None Log entries
response
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Get Object
Info
Get Object
metadata
Return
code
0xCE
None Object info
response
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Get Opaque Retrieve an
Opaque Object
(user provided
data) from the
device
Return
code
0xC3
None Opaque data ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Get Option Fetch a device-
global option
Return
code
0xD0
None Option data ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Get Pseudo
Random
Get pseudo-
random data from
device.
Return
code
0xD1
None Random
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Get Public Key Fetch a public key
from device
Return
code
0xD4
None Public key ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: R
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: R
- Session Keys: E
Get RSA
Wrapped
Get KTS-IFC Data Return
code
0xF4
None Exported
object
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-IFC
KTS-KWP
MAC
Crypto Officer
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: R,E
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: G,R,E
- Authentication
Keys: R
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
RAND
SymKG
- HMAC Key: R
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: R
- KAS Private
Keys: R
- KAS Public
Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: R
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: R
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: R
- OTP AEAD Key:
R
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Get Storage
Info
Fetch storage
information.
Return
code
0xC1
None Storage
information
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Get Template Fetch a Template
Object from the
device
Return
code
0xDF
None Template
data
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Import RSA
Wrapped
Import KTS-IFC
Data
Return
code
0xF7
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-IFC
KTS-KWP
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: W,E
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: W,E
- Authentication
Keys: W
- HMAC Key: W
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: W
- KAS Private
Keys: W
- KAS Public
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: W
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: W
- OTP AEAD Key:
W
- Session Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
Import
Wrapped
Import a
wrapped/encrypte
d object into the
device
Return
code
0xCB
Import data Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-CCM
MAC
Crypto Officer
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: W,E
- Authentication
Keys: W
- HMAC Key: W
- KAS Private
Keys: W
- KAS Public
Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: W
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: W
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: W
- OTP AEAD Key:
W
- Session Keys: E
List Objects List Objects in
device
Return
code
0xC8
None List of
objects
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Power On Power on the
module
Services
available
None None AKV
ESV
KAS-KG
RAND
PKV
Unauthenticate
d
- Entropy Input :
G,E
- DRBG Seed :
G,E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- KAS Private
Keys: G
Put
Asymmetric
Key
Import an
Asymmetric Key
Return
code
0xC5
Asymmetric
key
Success/Erro
r
AKV
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: G
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Put
Authenticatio
n Key
Store a new
Authentication Key
Return
code
0xC4
Authenticatio
n key
Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
PKV
Crypto Officer
- Authentication
Keys: W
- DRBG State:
W,E
- Session Keys: E
- KAS Public
Keys: W
Put HMAC
Key
Import an HMAC
Key
Return
code
0xD2
HMAC key Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- HMAC Key: W
- Session Keys: E
Put Opaque Stores Opaque
data (user
provided data) in
the device
Return
code
0xC2
Opaque data Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Put OTP AEAD
Key
Import an OTP
AEAD Key
Return
code
0xE5
OTP AEAD key Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- OTP AEAD Key:
W
- Session Keys: E
Put Public
Wrap Key
Import a public
KTS-IFC Key
Return
code
0xF3
Public Wrap
key
Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
PKV
Crypto Officer
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: W
- DRBG State:
W,E
- Session Keys: E
Put RSA
Wrapped
Put KTS-IFC Data Return
code
0xF5
Wrapped data Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-IFC
KTS-KWP
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: W,E
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: W,E
- Authentication
Keys: W
- HMAC Key: W
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: W
- KAS Private
Keys: W
- KAS Public
Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: W
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: W
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: W
- OTP AEAD Key:
W
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Put
Symmetric
Key
Import a
symmetric Key
Return
code
0xED
Symmetric
key
Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Encryption
Keys: W
- Session Keys: E
Put Template Store a Template Return
code
0xDE
Template
data
Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Put Wrap Key Import a Wrap Key Return
code
0xCC
Wrap key Success/Erro
r
AKV
ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: W
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: W
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Randomize
OTP AEAD
Create an OTP
AEAD from
random data
Return
code
0xE2
None OTP AEAD ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-CCM
MAC
RAND
SymKG
Crypto Officer
- OTP AEAD Key:
E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- OTP ECB Key:
G,R
- Session Keys: E
Reset Device Factory reset a
device
(Zeroization)
Return
code
0x88
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- DRBG State: Z
- Authentication
Keys: Z
- Session Keys:
E,Z
- Encryption
Keys: Z
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: Z
- KAS Private
Keys: Z
- KTS-IFC Private
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Key: Z
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: Z
- KAS Public
Keys: Z
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: Z
- Attestation
Key: Z
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: Z
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: Z
- OTP AEAD Key:
Z
- HMAC Key: Z
Unauthenticate
d
- DRBG State: Z
- Authentication
Keys: Z
- Session Keys:
E,Z
- Encryption
Keys: Z
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: Z
- KAS Private
Keys: Z
- KTS-IFC Private
Key: Z
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: Z
- KAS Public
Keys: Z
- KTS-IFC Public
Key: Z
- Attestation
Key: Z
- AES-KWP
Wrap Key: Z
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: Z
- OTP AEAD Key:
Z
- HMAC Key: Z
Rewrap OTP
AEAD
Rewrap an OTP
AEAD
Return
code
0xE3
OTP AEAD OTP AEAD ENC
DEC
KTS-CBC-
CMAC
KTS-CCM
MAC
Crypto Officer
- OTP AEAD Key:
E
- OTP ECB Key:
R,W
- Session Keys: E
Session
Message
Send a command
over an
established session
Return
code
0x85
Encrypted
message
Encrypted
response
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Set Log Index Set the last
extracted log entry
Return
code
0xE7
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Set Option Set a device-global
option
Return
code
0xCF
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
Crypto Officer
- Session Keys: E
Signature
Primitive
ECDSA
Signature primitive
with ECDSA
Return
code
0xD6
None ECDSA
signature
ECSP
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Sign EdDSA Sign with EdDSA Return
code
0xEA
Message EdDSA
digital
signature
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
SigGen
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Sign HMAC Perform an HMAC
operation in device
and return the
result
Return
code
0xD3
Message HMAC
signature
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- HMAC Key: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Signature
Primitive
PKCS1
Signature primitive
with RSA-
PKCS#1v1.5
Return
code
0xC7
Message PKCS1
signature
ENC
DEC
MAC
RSASP
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: E
- Session Keys: E
Signature
Primitive PSS
Signature primitive
using RSA-PSS
Return
code
0xD5
Message PSS
signature
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
RSASP
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
SSH Certify Generate an SSH
Certificate
Return
code
0xDD
None SSH cert ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
SigGen
SigVer
Crypto Officer
- Asymmetric
Private Keys: E
- Asymmetric
Public Keys: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Unwrap Data Decrypt (unwrap)
data using a Wrap
Key
Return
code
0xE9
None None ENC
DEC
DEC-A
MAC
Crypto Officer
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: E
- Session Keys: E
Verify HMAC Verify an HMAC Return
code
0xDC
None Success/Erro
r
ENC
DEC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- HMAC Key: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP Access
Wrap Data Encrypt (wrap)
data using a Wrap
Key
Return
code
0xE8
None Wrapped
data
ENC
ENC-A
DEC
MAC
RAND
Crypto Officer
- AES-CCM
Wrap Key: E
- DRBG State:
G,E
- Session Keys: E
Table 15: Approved Services
4.4 NON-APPROVED SERVICES
In the non-Approved mode, the module supports all services from the Approved mode with the following
additional services and modifications:
- Decrypt PKCS#1
- ECDSA service with SHA-1
- RSA PKCS#1 Signature Generation with SHA-1
- RSA PSS Signature Generation with SHA-1
- ECDSA service with secp256k1
- Decrypt ECDH service with secp256k1The module only supports non-Approved services within the OTP
functional unit, which must be explicitly selected.
Name Description Algorithms Role
Decrypt PKCS1 RSA Decryption primitive
with PKCS#1 v1.5
Decrypt PKCS#1 CO
Derive ECDH with
secp256k1
Derive ECDH with
secp256k1
secp256k1 (ECDSA and KAS) - Currently not
included as part of IG C.A for key
agreement
CO
Signature Primitive ECDSA
with secp256k1 or SHA1
Signature Primitive ECDSA
with secp256k1 or SHA1
ECDSA Signature Primitive with SHA-1 CO
Signature Primitive PKCS1
with SHA1
Signature Primitive PKCS1
with SHA1
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Primitive with
SHA-1
CO
Signature Primitive PSS
with SHA1
Signature Primitive PSS with
SHA1
RSA PSS Signature Primitive with SHA-1 CO
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Table 16: Non-Approved Services
4.5 EXTERNAL SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE LOADED
The module does not support external firmware loads.
5 SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY
5.1 INTEGRITY TECHNIQUES
The module performs a 16-bit Error Detection Code (EDC) for the Firmware Integrity Test, covering all executable
code.
5.2 INITIATE ON DEMAND
All self-tests may be invoked on demand by power cycling the module.
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
6.1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TYPE AND REQUIREMENTS
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module is defined as a single-chip embodiment whose operational environment is classified as non-modifiable.
The firmware is loaded within manufacturing and then locked from being modified.
7 PHYSICAL SECURITY
7.1 MECHANISMS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED
The module is a single-chip embodiment with a hard, opaque enclosure. The IC packaging is tamper-evident and
removal-resistant.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
IC packaging Monthly Inspect for physical evidence of tamper
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT INFORMATION
The module does not support Environmental Failure Protection (EFP) mechanisms for high/low voltage and
temperature extremes. The module underwent Environmental Failure Testing (EFT) instead (refer to Table 17).
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Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -42C EFT Undefined Failure.
HighTemperature 128C EFT Undefined Failure.
LowVoltage 1.85v EFT The module shuts down.
HighVoltage 10.6v EFT Undefined Failure.
Table 18: EFP/EFT Information
N.B. There are two sets of possibilities for the last column. For EFP, states can be Shutdown or Zeroise. For EFT, states can be
Shutdown, Zeroization, Undefined Failure, Known Error State, or Continues to Operate Normally.
7.3 HARDNESS TESTING TEMPERATURE RANGES
The module has been tested at the operational, storage and distribution temperatures listed in Table 18. The
module’s hardness is assured within these ranges.
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -25C
HighTemperature 85C
Table 19: Hardness Testing Temperatures
8 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY
8.1 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
The module does not provide protections against non-invasive security methods.
9 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS MANAGEMENT
9.1 STORAGE AREAS
All SSPs are stored in plaintext form within the volatile RAM or non-volatile flash memory.
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Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Plaintext in volatile RAM Dynamic
NVM Plaintext in persistent NVM Static
Table 20: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP INPUT-OUTPUT METHODS
Specific SSPs may be entered and output from the module via various methods, which include plaintext (direct
entry) or protected by either a secure channel or an Approved KTS.
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
PubKey-Entry USB Host NVM or
RAM
Plaintext Automated Electronic
PubKey-Output NVM or
RAM
USB Host Plaintext Automated Electronic
Secure-Channel-Entry USB Host NVM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-CBC-
CMAC
Secure-Channel-
Output
RAM USB Host Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-CBC-
CMAC
Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP ZEROIZATION METHODS
Each of the six functional units includes separate instructions for zeroization. In all cases, zeroization is the active
overwriting of SSP values with 0s (zeros).
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroisation All CSPs zeroized SSPs are immediately overwritten
with 0s
Reset Device
service
Delete Object Specified object is zeroized Specified CSP is immediately
overwritten with 0s
Delete Object
service
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Close Session Secure Channel CSPs are
zeroized
CSPs are immediately overwritten
with 0s
Close Session
service
Zeroisation-
PowerCycle
Ephemeral CSPs zeroised upon
power cycle
Ephemeral SSPs are overwritten
with 0s
Power Cycle
Zeroisation-
AfterUse
Ephemeral CSPs zeroised after
use
SSPs are immediately overwritten
with 0s after use
Automatic
Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPS
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES-CCM Wrap
Key
Secures other CSPs
("objects").
128, 192, 256 -
128 - 256
Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG KTS-CCM
AES-KWP Wrap
Key
Secures other CSPs
("objects").
128, 192, 256 -
128 - 256
Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG KTS-KWP
Asymmetric
Private Keys
Signature
generation, ECC CDH
Component
Primitive, or
modular
exponentiation
RSA 2048 -
4096;
ed25519; EC P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521, or
Non-NIST
Curve - 112 -
256
Private -
CSP
AKG ECSP
RSADP
RSASP
SigGen
KAS-SSC
Asymmetric
Public Keys
Signature
verification (by
external entities),
ECC CDH
Component
Primitive
RSA 2048 -
4096 bits or EC
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521 or
Non-NIST
curves - 112 -
256
Public -
PSP
AKG SigVer
KAS-SSC
Attestation Key Attests authenticity
of other keys,
RSA 2048 -
4096 bits or EC
Private -
Neither
SigGen
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
producing a new
X.509 certificate for
the attested key
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521 or
Non-NIST
curves - 112 -
256
Authentication
Keys
Used to derive
session keys for
Secure Channel and
authenticates the
operator
128 - 128 Symmetric
- CSP
KBKDF
DRBG Seed Seeds the DRBG.
Personalization
string is 384 bits.
1600 bits - 384 ENT - CSP ESV Counter
DRBG
(A5891)
DRBG State Random number
generation. V and
Key
V = 128, Key =
256 - 256 bit
DRBG - CSP Counter
DRBG
(A5891)
Counter
DRBG
(A5891)
Encryption
Keys
Used for data
encryption
128 - 256 - 128
- 256
Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG ENC
DEC
Entropy Input Entropy for the
DRBG
1216 bits - 384
(3/2 security
strength)
ENT - CSP ESV ESV
HMAC Key Data integrity key >= 128 bits - >=
128 bits
Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG MAC
KAS Private
Keys
Key establishment
private keys for
secure channel
EC P-256 - 128
bits
Private -
CSP
KAS-KG KAS-SC
KAS Public Keys Key establishment
public keys.
EC P-256 - 128
bits
Public -
PSP
KAS-KG KAS-SC
KTS-IFC Private
Key
KTS-IFC Unwrap RSA 2048,
3072, 4096 -
112 - 150 bits
Private -
CSP
AKG KTS-IFC
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
KTS-IFC Public
Key
KTS-IFC Wrap RSA 2048,
3072, 4096 -
112 - 150 bits
Public -
PSP
AKG KTS-IFC
OTP AEAD Key Secure Yubico OTP
values for further
verification by a
validation process
128, 192, 256 -
128 - 256
Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG KTS-CCM
OTP ECB Key Decrypts OTPs
generated by a
YubiKey
128 - 128 Symmetric
- CSP
SymKG DEC
Session Keys Session keys for
Secure Channel
128 - 128 Symmetric
- CSP
KAS-SC
KBKDF
ENC
DEC
MAC
Shared Secret Shared secret
calculated from a
key agreement
handshake
256 - 521 - 128 Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-SSC KAS-SSC
Table 23: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES-CCM Wrap
Key
Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Authentication
Keys:Protected By
HMAC Key:Protected By
Asymmetric Private
Keys:Protected By
OTP AEAD Key:Protected
By
Session Keys:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Encrypts
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES-KWP Wrap
Key
Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until Use Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG State:Generates
KTS-IFC Public
Key:Encrypts
KTS-IFC Private
Key:Encrypts
Session Keys:Encrypts
Asymmetric
Private Keys
Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
RAM:Plaintext
NVM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Asymmetric Public
Keys:Paired With
Shared Secret:Derives
Session Keys:Encrypts
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Protected by
Asymmetric
Public Keys
Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Asymmetric Private
Keys:Paired With
Session Keys:Encrypts
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Encrypts
Shared Secret:Derived
From
Attestation Key NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use N/A Asymmetric Public
Keys:Paired With
Asymmetric Public
Keys:Signs
Authentication
Keys
Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until use Zeroisation
Delete Object
Session Keys:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Encrypts
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Until use Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG State:Derived From
DRBG State RAM:Plaintext Until
reboot
Zeroisation-
PowerCycle
DRBG Seed :Derives
Asymmetric Private
Keys:Generated From
Asymmetric Public
Keys:Generated From
HMAC Key:Generated
From
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Generated From
KAS Private
Keys:Generated From
KAS Public
Keys:Generated From
KTS-IFC Private
Key:Generated From
KTS-IFC Public
Key:Generated From
Encryption
Keys:Generated From
OTP AEAD Key:Generated
From
OTP ECB Key:Generated
From
Encryption Keys Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Session Keys:Encrypts
Entropy Input RAM:Plaintext Until use Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG Seed :Derived From
HMAC Key Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Session Keys:Encrypts
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Channel-
Output
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Encrypts
KAS Private Keys Secure-
Channel-
Entry
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG State:Generated
KAS Public Keys:Paired
With
Session Keys:Derived
From
KAS Public Keys Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
PubKey-Entry
PubKey-
Output
RAM:Plaintext
NVM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG State:Generates
KAS Private Keys:Paired
With
Session Keys:Derived
From
KTS-IFC Private
Key
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generated
KTS-IFC Public Key:Paired
With
KTS-IFC Public Key Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
KTS-IFC Private
Key:Paired With
Session Keys:Encrypts
DRBG State:Generates
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Protected by
OTP AEAD Key Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
NVM:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Until Use Zeroisation
Delete Object
DRBG State:Generates
Session Keys:Encrypts
OTP ECB Key:Protected By
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Encrypts
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Encrypts
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
OTP ECB Key Secure-
Channel-
Entry
Secure-
Channel-
Output
RAM:Plaintext Until Use Zeroisation-
AfterUse
DRBG State:Generates
OTP AEAD Key:Encrypts
Session Keys:Encrypts
Session Keys RAM:Plaintext Until Use Zeroisation
Close Session
Authentication
Keys:Protected By or
Derives
KAS Private Keys:Derives
KAS Public Keys:Protected
By or Derives
Encryption
Keys:Protected By
Asymmetric Private
Keys:Protected By
Asymmetric Public
Keys:Protected By
KTS-IFC Private
Key:Protected By
KTS-IFC Public
Key:Protected By
Shared Secret:Protected
By
HMAC Key:Protected By
OTP AEAD Key:Protected
By
OTP ECB Key:Protected By
AES-CCM Wrap
Key:Protected By
AES-KWP Wrap
Key:Protected By
Shared Secret RAM:Plaintext Until Use Zeroisation-
AfterUse
Asymmetric Private
Keys:Derives
Asymmetric Public
Keys:Derives
Session Keys:Encrypts
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Table 24: SSP Table 2
9.5 TRANSITIONS
SHA-1: The module uses SHA-1 for HMAC. Per CMVP Programmatic Transitions and NIST SP 800-131Ar2, usage of
SHA-1 for non-digital-signature applications is deprecated through Dec 31, 2030.
Minimum key size transition: In accordance with NIST SP 800-131Ar2, the module meets the minimum key size
requirement of 112. NIST SP 800-57, Part 1 includes a transition to a security strength of 128 bits from 2031 and
beyond.
10 SELF-TESTS
The following pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. All self-tests are performed
regardless of whether the module is in the approved or non-approved mode. The data output interface is inhibited
whenever the cryptographic module is in a self-test condition.
10.1 PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS
The following pre-operational test is performed upon power-up and on-demand, the latter by power-cycling the
module. The module transitions to its error state if the test fails.
Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
LRC 16-bit Error Detection Code KAT SW/FW Integrity Implicit N/A
Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS
The following conditional tests are performed upon power-up, on-demand and periodically.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CCM
(A5891)
128-bit KAT CAST Implicit Encrypt KAT Power-On
AES-ECB
(A5891)
128-bit KAT CAST Implicit Decrypt KAT Power-On
Counter
DRBG
(A5891)
CTR_DRBG KAT CAST Implicit SP800-90A Health Tests for
Instantiate, Reseed, and
Generate
Power-On
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5891)
P-256, SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital Signature
Generation KAT
Power-On
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5891)
P-256, SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital Signature
Verification KAT
Power-On
EDDSA
SigGen
(A5891)
Ed25519,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Implicit Digital Signature
Generation KAT
Power-On
EDDSA SigVer
(A5891)
Ed25519,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Implicit Digital Signature
Verification KAT
Power-On
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5891)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Implicit MAC Power-On
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5891)
P-256 KAT CAST Implicit Shared Secret Computation
KAT
Power-On
KDF ANS 9.63
(A5891)
X9.63 KAT CAST Implicit Key Derivation Power-On
KDF SP800-
108 (A5891)
AES CMAC KAT CAST Implicit Key Derivation Power-On
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5891)
2048-bit
PKCS#1 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital signature generation
KAT. Satisfies KTS-IFC un-
encapsulation self-test
requirements per IG D.G
Power-On
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5891)
2048-bit
PKCS#1 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Implicit Digital signature
verification KAT. Satisfies
KTS-IFC encapsulation self-
test requirements per IG
D.G
Power-On
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHS (A5891) SHA-1, SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Implicit Hash KAT Power-On
NIST SP 800-
90B Entropy
APT, RCT SP800-90B
Health Tests
CAST Implicit APT, RCT Upon use
PWCT Sign/Verify Sign/Verify PCT Implicit EC, ED, RSA Upon Key
Generation
Table 26: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 PERIODIC SELF-TEST INFORMATION
The module regularly performs its periodic self-tests at an interval of 29 hours.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
LRC KAT SW/FW Integrity 29 hours Automatic
Table 27: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CCM (A5891) KAT CAST Power-On Manual
AES-ECB (A5891) KAT CAST Power-On Manual
Counter DRBG
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
EDDSA SigGen
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Yubico, Inc., YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module This document may be freely reproduced and
distributed, but only in its entirety and without modification
Page 52 of 54
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
EDDSA SigVer
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
KDF ANS 9.63
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
KDF SP800-108
(A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A5891)
KAT CAST Power-On Manual
SHS (A5891) KAT CAST Power-On Manual
NIST SP 800-90B
Entropy
SP800-90B Health
Tests
CAST 29 hours Automatic
PWCT Sign/Verify PCT Power-On Manual
Table 28: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 ERROR STATES
The module transitions into the error state when an error condition is encountered and provides an error status
indicator (i.e., blinking an attached LED before rebooting). All data output and cryptographic functions are
inhibited while the module is in the error state (refer to Table 28).
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
Upon detection of any failures in a pre-
operational or conditional self-test
Self-test
failure
Power
Cycle
Attached LED blinks special
sequence, then reboots.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Yubico, Inc., YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module This document may be freely reproduced and
distributed, but only in its entirety and without modification
Page 53 of 54
Table 29: Error States
10.5 OPERATOR INITIATION OF SELF-TESTS
Self-tests may be invoked on demand by power cycling the module.
11 LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE
There are no specific maintenance requirements.
11.1 INSTALLATION, INITIALIZATION, AND STARTUP PROCEDURES
The following initialization procedures must be adhered to prior to first use. Only when this procedure is
completed will the module operate in the approved mode.
The module operates in the non-Approved mode by default. To configure the module into the Approved mode of
operation, the operator shall perform the following:
1. Use the “Reset Device” service as follows: “reset 0”. This step may be omitted if the module has never
been used
2. Use the “Set Option” service as follows: “put option 0 fips-mode 01”
3. Import new Authentication Keys to replace the default values. (Enforced in Approved mode)
To configure the module into the non-Approved mode of operation from the Approved mode, the operator need
only invoke the “Reset Device” service. After a “Reset Device” service, the module will verify that all CSPs have
been zeroized and then assume the non-Approved mode.
To check the mode of operation, the operator may perform the following:
• Use the “Get Option” service as follows: “get option 0 fips-mode”
o “01” return code indicates the Approved mode
o “00” return code indicates the non-Approved mode
11.2 ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
There are no further instructions for administrators beyond those outlined in the Installation, Initialization, and
Startup Procedures.
11.3 NON-ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
There are no further instructions for non-administrators beyond those outlined in the Installation, Initialization,
and Startup Procedures.
11.4 DESIGN AND RULES
The following security rules are enforced by the cryptographic module to ensure the FIPS 140-3 security
requirements are met.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Yubico, Inc., YubiHSM 2 Cryptographic Module This document may be freely reproduced and
distributed, but only in its entirety and without modification
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1. The module supports an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode indicator
must be returned to the end user.
2. The module does not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the module’s cryptographic
services.
3. Concurrent operators are separated by unique sessions. No services from a given session can modify the
services/data of another separate session.
4. The module inhibits data output during self-tests, firmware load, zeroization and error states.
5. The module logically disconnects data output from the processes performing zeroization and key
generation.
6. The module enforces identity-based authentication.
7. The module does not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off or reboot.
8. The module supports the following role: Cryptographic Officer (CO).
9. The module does not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode.
10. The module does not support the following logically distinct interfaces:
• Data input interface
• Data output interface
• Control input interface
• Status output interface
• Power interface
11. The module protects critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification and
substitution.
12. The module performs power-on, on-demand and periodic self-testing.
13. The module logs errors whenever an error state is entered.
14. The module does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.
11.5 END OF LIFE
To prepare the module for disposal, zeroize the module using the "Reset Device" service and dispose of it at an
electronic recycling facility.
12 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module is not purposefully designed to mitigate any attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements.