Page 1 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). WinMagic Corp WinMagic Cryptographic Module for macOS/Linux FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy WinMagic Corp 5770 Hurontario Street, Suite 501 Mississauga, Ontario L5R 3G5 Canada info@winmagic.com winmagic.com +1 905 502 7000 Page 2 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table of Contents 1 General................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5 1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 5 2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5 2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6 2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7 2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7 2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 7 2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10 2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10 2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10 2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................11 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11 3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................11 4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................11 4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................11 4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................11 4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................14 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................14 5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................14 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................14 5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................14 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................14 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................14 7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................14 8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................14 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................15 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................15 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................15 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................15 Page 3 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................15 10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................17 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................17 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................17 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................19 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................20 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................20 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................20 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................20 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................20 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................21 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................21 Page 4 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 6 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 7 Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7 Table 5: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 8 Table 7: Security Function Implementations............................................................................... 9 Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................10 Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................10 Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................11 Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................11 Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................13 Table 13: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................15 Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................15 Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................15 Table 16: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................16 Table 17: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................17 Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................17 Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................19 Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................19 Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................20 Table 22: Error States...............................................................................................................20 List of Figures Figure 1 Module Block Diagram................................................................................................. 6 Page 5 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 1 General 1.1 Overview This document defines the Security Policy for WinMagic Cryptographic Module for macOS/Linux 1.0 (hence the Module) shipped with WinMagic software products. The Module meets FIPS 140-3 overall Level 1 requirements, with security levels by validation components specified in section 1.2 below. 1.2 Security Levels Section Title Security Level 1 General 1 2 Cryptographic module specification 1 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1 4 Roles, services, and authentication 1 5 Software/Firmware security 1 6 Operational environment 1 7 Physical security N/A 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 1 10 Self-tests 1 11 Life-cycle assurance 1 12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A Overall Level 1 Table 1: Security Levels 1.3 Additional Information In accordance with AS02.05, [ISO19790] §7.7 Physical Security is optional and does not apply to the Module. 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description Purpose and Use: The Module is a software library, designed to run as a multi-chip standalone embodiment on Windows platform. The Module leverages cryptographic services for WinMagic software products. Module Type: Software Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Cryptographic Boundary: Page 6 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). The cryptographic boundary of the Module is the set of binary files comprising the Module. No components are excluded from [140-3] requirements. The pre-operational approved integrity test is performed over all components of the cryptographic boundary. Updates to the Module are provided as a complete replacement in accordance with AS04.27 – AS04.35. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): Figure 1 depicts the Module operational environment, with the software module cryptographic boundary highlighted in red inclusive of all Module entry points (API calls). The Module is defined as a Software module as per AS02.03. The physical perimeter is a general-purpose computer which wholly contains the Module and operating system. Applications (out of validation scope) CPU Operating System RAM Hard disk I/O ports API calls System calls General Purpose Linux Computer ( TOEPP ) Cryptographic Boundary WinMagic Cryptographic Module (libsduser.so inc. Entropy Source, libsduserchecksum.dat) Applications (out of validation scope) CPU Operating System RAM Hard disk I/O ports API calls System calls General Purpose macOS Computer ( TOEPP ) Cryptographic Boundary WinMagic Cryptographic Module (libSdUser.dylib inc. Entropy Source, chku.dat) Figure 1 Module Block Diagram 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification Tested Module Identification – Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): Package or File Name Software/ Firmware Version Features Integrity Test libsduser.so / libSdUser.dylib 1.0 HMAC-SHA-256 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) Page 7 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Operating System Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host OS Version(s) macOS 15 Sequoia MacBook Pro 14" Apple M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) No 1.0 Ubuntu 24.10 ThinkPad T14s Gen 6 SnapDragon® Elite X1E-78-100 (ARMv8) No 1.0 Ubuntu 24.04 LTS Dell Latitude 7490 Intel Core i3-7130U (Kaby Lake) No 1.0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 Dell Latitude 7490 Intel Core i3-7130U (Kaby Lake) No 1.0 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. No vendor-affirmed operational environments are claimed for this validation of the Module. 2.3 Excluded Components The Module does not include excluded components. 2.4 Modes of Operation Modes List and Description: Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved Mode Automatically entered after module initialization Approved CKR_CRYPTOKI_INITIALIZED (0x0) Table 4: Modes List and Description The Module does not implement either a non-approved or degraded mode of operation 2.5 Algorithms Approved Algorithms: Page 8 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC A6383 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 SP 800-38A AES-ECB A6383 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 SP 800-38A HMAC DRBG A6383 Prediction Resistance - No Mode - SHA2-256 SP 800-90A Rev. 1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 A6383 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- 384 A6383 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- 512 A6383 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1 PBKDF A6383 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 8192- 12288 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8- 128 Increment 8 SP 800-132 SHA2-256 A6383 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A6383 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A6383 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 5: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG Type:Symmetric SP 800-133rev2 Section 4, example 1 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. The Module does not implement non-approved, allowed algorithms. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. The Module does not implement non-approved, allowed algorithms with no security claimed. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Page 9 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). The Module does not implement non-approved, not allowed algorithms. 2.6 Security Function Implementations Name Type Description Properties Algorithms Block Cipher BC-UnAuth Unauthenticated Block Ciphers bits:256 AES-CBC: (A6383) AES-ECB: (A6383) Secure Hash SHA Secure Hash Functions SHA2-256: (A6383) SHA2-384: (A6383) SHA2-512: (A6383) Message Authentication MAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Codes (generation and verification) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A6383) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A6383) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A6383) Deterministic Random Bit Generator DRBG SP 800-90Ar1 "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators" HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A6383) HMAC DRBG: (A6383) Password- Based Key Derivation PBKDF SP 800-132 "Recommendation for Password- Based Key Derivation: Part 1: Storage Applications" HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A6383) PBKDF: (A6383) Key Transport KTS-Wrap Non-authenticated BC with Hash- Based MAC bits:256 AES-CBC: (A6383) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A6383) Symmetric Key Generation CKG SP 800-132 "Recommendation for Password- Based Key Derivation: Part 1: Storage Applications" HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A6383) HMAC DRBG: (A6383) Table 7: Security Function Implementations Page 10 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information Password-based key derivation is implemented by the Module in compliance with SP 800-132 Option 2a. The data protection key is recovered using KTS (AES256+HMAC_SHA256) security function. The length of the password input is in the range of 8-128 bytes. Assuming the password is a CP1252 printable string, the probability of guessing 128-byte (64-char) password is estimated as 2^(-420). The iteration count is provided to the Module as a 64-bit unsigned integer input parameter. This allows the application employing the Module to introduce a sufficiently high delay appropriate for the target environment. The keys derived from passwords (PBKDF) may only be used in storage applications. 2.8 RBG and Entropy Cert Number Vendor Name E234 winmagic Table 8: Entropy Certificates Name Type Operational Environment Sample Size Entropy per Sample Conditioning Component WinMagic CPU Jitter Entropy Source Non- Physical Ubuntu 24.10 on SnapDragon X -Ubuntu 24.04 LTS on Intel Core i3-7130U (Kaby Lake) - Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 on Intel Core i3-7130U (Kaby Lake) - macOS 15 Sequoia with Apple M2 Pro (ARMv8.6- A) 256 bits 256 bits SHA3-256: A6411 Table 9: Entropy Sources This cryptographic module receives entropy from a CPU Jitter RNG that is validated for compliance with NIST SP 800-90B. The overall amount of generated entropy meets the required security strength of 256 bits based on the entropy per bit and 1152 bits of entropy requested by the Module from the entropy source. 2.9 Key Generation Cryptographic keys are generated by module internal RNG in accordance with SP 800-133r2 6.2 "Derivation of Symmetric Keys". 2.10 Key Establishment The Module implements Key Transport security function by using AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA2-256 per IG D.G for establishment of symmetric cryptographic keys in the Module. Page 11 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 2.11 Industry Protocols The Module does not support industry protocol services. 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes N/A Control Input API entry point: stack frame including non-sensitive parameters N/A Data Input API call parameters passed by reference or value for cryptographic service input N/A Data Output API call parameters passed by reference for cryptographic service output N/A Status Output API return value: enumerated status resulting from call execution Table 10: Ports and Interfaces The Module does not map any interfaces to physical ports. The above table defines the Module’s [140-3] logical interfaces. 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods N/A for this module. The cryptographic module does not provide an authentication or identification method of its own. 4.2 Roles Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Role CO None Table 11: Roles The Module supports the Crypto Officer (CO) operator role, and does not support multiple concurrent operators, a maintenance role or bypass capability. The CO role is implicitly identified by the service requested. 4.3 Approved Services Page 12 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Name Description Indicato r Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Random Byte Generator Generates random bytes using the DRBG Success ful completi on (status = 0) Request ed number of bytes Status return Random bytes Determinist ic Random Bit Generator Crypto Officer - DRBG_ENT : G,E - DRBG_SEE D: G,E - DRBG_STA TE: G,E Key Generator Generates a symmetric key using the DRBG Success ful completi on (status = 0) None Status return Symmetr ic key Symmetric Key Generation Crypto Officer - AES_KEY: G,E Message Digest Generates a message digest Success ful completi on (status = 0) Input Data Status return Hash Secure Hash Crypto Officer Message Authenticat ion Generates or verifies message authentication code Success ful completi on (status = 0) Key, input data Status return MAC Message Authenticat ion Crypto Officer - HMAC_KEY : W,E Data Encryption / Decryption Encrypts or decrypts data using a symmetric block cipher Success ful completi on (status = 0) Key, AES mode, input data Status return Cipherte xt or plaintext Block Cipher Crypto Officer - AES_KEY: W,E Key Derivation Derives a key from password Success ful completi on (status = 0) String containin g a passwor d Status return derived key Password- Based Key Derivation Crypto Officer - PBKDF_KM: G,E Key Transport Exports or imports a key protected by key wrapping. Success ful completi on (status = 0) Wrappin g key, key to wrap or unwrap Status return Wrapped or unwrapp ed key Key Transport Crypto Officer - AES_KEY: R,W,E Page 13 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Name Description Indicato r Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Self-Test Runs the integrity test and Conditional Self-Tests on booting or on demand by calling "C_SendComm and" API Success ful completi on (status = 0) none Status return None Crypto Officer Show Version Provides module name and version Success ful completi on (status = 0) none Status return String containin g the name and version None Crypto Officer Zeroize Zeroize SSP stored in volatile memory of GPC by invoking "C_Finalize()" API or power- cycling Success ful completi on (status = 0) Referenc e to a structure (s) containin g SSPs Status return None Crypto Officer - AES_KEY: Z - HMAC_KEY : Z - DRBG_ENT : Z - DRBG_SEE D: Z - DRBG_STA TE: Z - PBKDF_KM: Z Show Status Show module status Success ful completi on (status = 0) none Status return None Crypto Officer Table 12: Approved Services The Module supports an implicit indicator in the form of successful completion of the service call. The following convention is used to specify access permission of each service to SSP: • G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP Page 14 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). • R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output) • W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module • E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation • Z = Zeroise: The Module zeroises the SSP 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. The Module does not implement non-approved services. 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The Module does not load any external software/firmware. 5 Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques As per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.10.2.2 the Module uses HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A6383) as the approved technique to verify integrity of the Module. 5.2 Initiate on Demand The Crypto Officer can initiate the integrity test on demand at any time after the module transitioned to operational state as described in section 10.5 “Operator Initiation of Self-Tests”. The Module performs HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT before performing the integrity test. 6 Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable 7 Physical Security N/A for this module (as per section 1.2) 8 Non-Invasive Security N/A for this module (as per section 1.2) Page 15 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type SSPsRAM Memory allocated by module in RAM for temporary storage of SSPs used by services. Dynamic Call stack API input/output parameters Dynamic Table 13: Storage Areas The Module does not implement persistent storage of SSPs. 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type SFI or Algorithm Input Call stack SSPsRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic Output SSPsRAM Call stack Plaintext Automated Electronic Key Entry SSPsRAM Call stack Encrypted Manual Electronic Key Transport Key Export Call stack SSPsRAM Encrypted Manual Electronic Key Transport Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Free service context Clear and free SSPs when they are no longer needed Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten by zeroes making the SSPs irretrievable. Zeroize Module reset De-allocate SSPsRAM used to store SSPs Allocated volatile memory is overwritten with zeroes within nanoseconds when power is removed. Unload the module Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs Name Description Size - Strengt h Type - Categor y Generated By Establishe d By Used By AES_KEY Key used for symmetric 256 - 256 Symmetri c Key - CSP Determinist ic Random Key Transport Block Cipher Page 16 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Name Description Size - Strengt h Type - Categor y Generated By Establishe d By Used By encryption with AES Bit Generator HMAC_KEY Key used in HMAC algorithm 256 - 256 Symmetri c Key - CSP Determinist ic Random Bit Generator Key Transport Message Authenticati on DRBG_ENT Entropy collected from module ES 1152 - 256 Entropy Input - CSP Deterministi c Random Bit Generator DRBG_SEE D Entropy- based value used for DRBG instantiation 1048 - 256 Seed - CSP Determinist ic Random Bit Generator Deterministi c Random Bit Generator DRBG_STA TE Internal values (K,V) of HMAC_DRB G 64 - 256 Internal State - CSP Determinist ic Random Bit Generator Deterministi c Random Bit Generator PBKDF_KM Derived key material 256 - 256 Symmetri c Key - CSP Password- Based Key Derivation Password- Based Key Derivation Table 16: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Outpu t Storage Storage Duratio n Zeroizatio n Related SSPs AES_KEY Input Key Entry Key Export SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context Module reset HMAC_KEY Input Key Entry SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context Module reset DRBG_ENT SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context Module reset DRBG_SEED SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context DRBG_ENT:Derived From Page 17 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Name Input - Outpu t Storage Storage Duratio n Zeroizatio n Related SSPs Module reset DRBG_STAT E SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context Module reset DRBG_SEED:Derive d From PBKDF_KM Output SSPsRAM:Plainte xt While in use Free service context Module reset Table 17: SSP Table 2 10 Self-Tests 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details HMAC- SHA2-256 (A6383) key: 256 bits KAT SW/FW Integrity CKR_OK or CKRT_HMAC_SHA Verifies MAC of libsduser.so and libSdUser.dylib Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests Each time the Module is powered on or loaded the integrity of the Module is verified as per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.10.2.2 by running the Pre-Operational Self-Tests (POST). The Module runs the Conditional Self-Tests (CAST) prior to integrity check thus satisfying ISO/IEC 24759:2017(E) assertion AS10.20 for the integrity technique (HMAC-SHA2-256) being employed. The POST executes outside of user control when the Module is powering on or being loaded. The services are not available, input and output are inhibited. Once POST succeeds the Module becomes operational, otherwise it transitions to the error state. 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests Algorith m or Test Test Properti es Test Metho d Test Typ e Indicator Details Conditio ns HMAC DRBG (A6383) HMAC- SHA2- 256 KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_PRNG Instantiate, Generate Runs at power-on prior to Page 18 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Algorith m or Test Test Properti es Test Metho d Test Typ e Indicator Details Conditio ns integrity test AES- CBC (A6383) Encrypt 256 bits KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_SELF_TEST_ENC RYPT Encrypt Runs at power-on prior to integrity test AES- CBC (A6383) Decrypt 256 bits KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_SELF_TEST_DEC RYPT Decrypt Runs at power-on prior to integrity test SHA2- 256 (A6383) - KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HASH_SHA Digest Runs at power-on prior to integrity test SHA2- 384 (A6383) - KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HASH_SHA Digest Runs at power-on prior to integrity test SHA2- 512 (A6383) - KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HASH_SHA Digest Runs at power-on prior to integrity test HMAC- SHA2- 256 (A6383) 256 bits KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HMAC_SHA Message Authenticati on Runs at power-on prior to integrity test HMAC- SHA2- 384 (A6383) 256 bits KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HMAC_SHA Message Authenticati on Runs at power-on prior to integrity test HMAC- SHA2- 512 (A6383) 256 bits KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_HMAC_SHA Message Authenticati on Runs at power-on prior to integrity test PBKDF (A6383) Salt: 224 bits Count: 9954 KAT CAS T CKR_OK or CKRT_PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Runs at power-on prior to integrity test Page 19 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Algorith m or Test Test Properti es Test Metho d Test Typ e Indicator Details Conditio ns Key: 256 bits RCT - - CAS T Status Repetition Count Test Continuo us APT - - CAS T Status Adaptive Proportion Test Continuo us Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests Indicator value CKR_OK (0) indicates CAST passage. Otherwise, an error code is returned. The CAST is available on demand while the Module is operational. It can be executed by the Crypto Officer manually at any time as described in 10.5. Self-testing at the level of individual algorithms is not supported. 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A6383) KAT SW/FW Integrity On startup Manually Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method HMAC DRBG (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually AES-CBC (A6383) Encrypt KAT CAST On-Demand Manually AES-CBC (A6383) Decrypt KAT CAST On-Demand Manually SHA2-256 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually SHA2-384 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually SHA2-512 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2- 384 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2- 512 (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually PBKDF (A6383) KAT CAST On-Demand Manually RCT - CAST - - Page 20 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method APT - CAST - - Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States Name Descripti on Conditio ns Recov ery Metho d Indicator MODULE_INITIALIZATION _FAILED Module aborts initializati on, displays an error message and returns control to OS. One of the algorith ms has failed KAT. Module has failed integrity check reset module Module state is set to CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INIT IALIZED Table 22: Error States If an error occurs during self-testing, the Module enters error state and must be re-initialized before it can be used again. 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests Operator initiates on-demand self-tests by issuing requests to the Self-Test service via corresponding API call provided by the Module. 11 Life-Cycle Assurance 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures WinMagic Cryptographic Module is distributed as a component of WinMagic data encryption and user authentication software products. It is never shipped separately. All steps required to install the Module are included in the installation of a particular product in a specific operational environment. 11.2 Administrator Guidance Administrators do not need special instructions on installation of the Module. Instead, they follow the deployment guidance or manual provided with the product to be installed. This installs the Module automatically. Page 21 of 21 Copyright © WinMagic Corp., 2025 WinMagic Corp. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). The Public Use Document for the WinMagic CPU Jitter Entropy Source needs to be followed as Administrative Guidance. Public Use Document 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance The Module does not include non-administrator guidance. 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A for this module (as per section 1.2).