Sun StorageTekTM
T10000B
Tape Drive
Security Policy
Part Number 316055101
Revision: AB
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
September 1, 2009
Copyright Sun Microsystems 2009. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy September 1, 2009
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 MODULE OVERVIEW..............................................................................................................................4
2 SECURITY LEVEL...................................................................................................................................6
3 MODES OF OPERATION (AREA 1)........................................................................................................7
3.1 APPROVED ALGORITHMS ............................................................................................................................7
3.2 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS......................................................................................................................8
3.3 DETERMINING FIPS MODE.........................................................................................................................8
3.4 CONFIGURING THE DRIVE IN FIPS MODE........................................................................................................9
3.4.1 Using an EKT to enable FIPS mode for KMS 1.x.....................................................................10
3.4.2 Using VOP to enable FIPS mode for KMS 2.x..........................................................................10
4 PORTS AND INTERFACES...................................................................................................................11
5 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY............................................................................13
5.1 ASSUMPTION OF ROLES.............................................................................................................................13
6 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)..........................................................16
6.1 DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS......................................................................................................................17
7 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................................17
7.1 ROLES AND SERVICES..............................................................................................................................17
8 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (AREA 6)..........................................................................................20
9 SECURITY RULES.................................................................................................................................21
9.1 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................21
10 PHYSICAL SECURITY.........................................................................................................................21
10.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS............................................................................................................21
10.2 REQUIRED OPERATOR ACTIONS................................................................................................................23
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY.....................................................................................23
12 REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................23
13 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................................................................................25
Page 2
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy September 1, 2009
TABLE OF TABLES
TABLE 1: MODULE SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION........................................................................6
TABLE 2: PORTS AND INTERFACES DESCRIPTION............................................................................11
TABLE 3: ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION...................................13
TABLE 4: STRENGTHS OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS............................................................14
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)........................................16
TABLE 6: DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC KEYS WITHIN THE ETD.............................................................17
TABLE 7: SERVICES AUTHORIZED FOR ROLES..................................................................................18
TABLE 8: UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES............................................................................................20
TABLE 9: INSPECTION/TESTING OF PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS......................................23
Release History
Date Rev Description Name
02/23/09 AA Initial version of Security Policy as submitted to NIST CMVP, with
minor formatting changes.
Engineering Change: EC000860
Matt Ball
06/24/09 AB Updated allowed firmware revisions to include 1.41.210 and
1.41.211, based on change letter to NIST.
Included changes based on NIST comments.
Engineering Change: EC001172
Matt Ball
Page 3
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
1 Module Overview
The Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive (ETD) (HW P/N:315488302; Firmware Versions: 1.40.208,
1.41.210, or 1.41.211) is a hardware cryptographic module with a multi-chip standalone physical
embodiment as defined by FIPS 140-2. The primary purpose of this device is to provide FIPS 140-2 Level
2 security to data on magnetic tape, when operated in FIPS mode.
The ETD can be used in one of two system configurations: Key Management System (KMS) 1.x or KMS
2.x. In the KMS 1.x configuration, the Sun StorageTek Crypto Key Management Station and the Sun
StorageTek Key Token (FIPS 140-2 Certificate #993) manage the encryption keys used by the ETD. A
Sun StorageTek Key Token acts as a key loader in the context of FIPS 140-2, and can be configured as
either an “enabling key token” (EKT) or an “operational key token” (OKT) (see [KMS1UG]). Figure 1
shows the KMS 1.x configuration.
In the KMS 2.x configuration, the ETD requests keys from the Sun StorageTek Crypto Key Management
System (version 2.1 and higher), which is a cluster of two or more key management appliances. Figure 2
shows the KMS 2.x configuration.
For more information on these system components please see the website http://docs.sun.com and
browse under Hardware->Tape Storage->Tape Drives.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 4
Figure 1: KMS 1.x Component Diagram
KMS 1.x
Token Bay
Key Token
(EKT or OKT)
Token Bay
Key Token
(EKT or OKT)
ETD
Ethernet
Air Gap
Ethernet
Insert/Remove Insert/Remove
Figure 2: KMS 2.x Component Diagram
KMS 2.x
Cluster
ETD
Ethernet
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
The cryptographic boundary of the ETD is the external surface of the tape drive’s commercial grade
metallic enclosure. Excluded from the boundary are the components visible through the tape cartridge slot
and the components visible from the ventilation holes. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the cryptographic
boundary as defined:
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 5
Figure 3: Front Image of the ETD
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Note: The picture in Figure 4 is upside-down to show the bottom cover of the ETD.
2 Security Level
The ETD meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2, as is detailed in
Table 1.
Table 1: Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 6
Figure 4: Rear Image of the ETD
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Security Requirements Section Level
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
3 Modes of Operation (Area 1)
3.1 Approved Algorithms
Once configured per the procedures as defined in Section 3.4 the module is only able to operate in a FIPS
140-2 Approved Mode of operation. Within the FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of operation the following
Approved algorithms are available: :
• AES CCM supporting 256 bit keys, which provide for the following operations in both hardware
(AES Certificate # 495) and firmware (AES Certificate # 647):
o Encryption
o Decryption
o Authentication
• RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 supporting 2048 bit keys (RSA Certificate # 334) for digital signature
verification (firmware load test)
• HMAC SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 398) to create the challenge response as part of the certificate
service of the KMS 2.x Agent Toolkit.
• SHA-1 (SHS Certificate # 736) for the following:
o as part of digital signature verification for the firmware
o as part of HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC certificate # 398)
o for hashing passwords used for authentication
• AES ECB (AES Certificate # 941) supporting 256-bit keys. Used as part of the AES Key Wrap
algorithm to securely establish keying material.
• SP 800-90 CTR DRBG (DRBG Certificate # 6) for generating random numbers used for nonce
values and cryptographic keys
• AES CTR (AES Certificate # 942) as part of the SP 800-90 CTR DRBG.
• AES CBC mode with 256-bit key (AES Certificate # 967), used within TLS session between ETD
and KMS 2.x.
• HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 540)with 160-bit key used to protect the integrity of TLS
communications between the ETD and KMS 2.x.
• SHA-1 (SHS Certificate #937)
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 7
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
o as part of the TLS Key Derivation Functionality
o as part of HMAC SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 540)
3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following Non-Approved algorithms that are allowed for use within
FIPS Approved mode: MD5 as used within the TLS1.0 Key Derivation Function. (see [TLS1.0])
• AES Key Wrap (AES Certificate #941) used to securely establish media keys (Vendor
Affirmed, key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of strength)
• RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 supporting 2048-bit keys, for RSA public key encryption used to provide
FIPS 140-2 allowed key transport within the TLS protocol. Key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of security.
• Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) (provides entropy input to the
SP800-90 DRBG, and random values for use within the TLS protocol)
• MD5 is used within the TLS protocol as part of key derivation
3.3 Determining FIPS Mode
The user can determine whether the ETD is operating in FIPS mode by examining the VOP (Virtual
Operator Panel). VOP is an external software application and the primary ETD remote management tool.
VOP utilizes ETD services remotely. VOP is described in more detail in the document "Virtual Operator
Panel User's Guide" (see [VOPUG]).
Figure 5 shows the "View Current Drive Settings" of the VOP application (Drive Operations → View Drive
Data). The user can tell if the ETD has selected an Approved mode of operation by verifying that the
labels "Encryption active" and "Running in FIPS mode" are both set to "Yes". If either of these labels is set
to "No" then the ETD is not in a FIPS Approved mode.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 8
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
3.4 Configuring the Drive in FIPS mode
An ETD can only be configured for FIPS mode as a one-time decision taken during the encryption
enrollment process. Once an ETD is licensed for encryption, it will remain in either FIPS mode or non
FIPS compliant mode, depending on the configuration.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 9
Figure 5: VOP: View Current Drive Settings
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
There are two ways to configure the ETD to be in permanent FIPS 140-2 mode:
1. Insert a valid EKT (Enabling Key Token) into a token bay that is connected to an unlicensed ETD.
(see 3.4.1 ). This is for KMS 1.x only.
2. Use the Virtual Operator Panel (VOP) to license the ETD for encryption and set permanent FIPS
mode (see 3.4.2 ). This is valid for KMS 2.x.
3.4.1 Using an EKT to enable FIPS mode for KMS 1.x
The process of inserting an EKT into an ETD that is not licensed for encryption will, by default, configure
the ETD to always encrypt and to enter permanent FIPS mode. For process details on creating an EKT
and using it to configure the ETD, see [KMS1UG] (“Enable Encryption in a Drive”, Chapter 2).
KMS 1.x FIPS Enable and License Procedure:
1. Create EKT and insert into the Token Bay connected to an unlicensed ETD and wait for the LED
to indicate that the ETD has device keys.
2. Issue an IPL and then verify the FIPS status through VOP when the ETD completes a reboot.
3.4.2 Using VOP to enable FIPS mode for KMS 2.x
VOP FIPS 140-2 configuration of ETD requires the presence of both a Sun service representative and the
customer. In addition they will need to follow the licensing process as outlined in [KMS2IM] (KMS 2.x
Installation and Service Manual), under “License and Enroll the Tape Drives” in Chapter 3 “T-Series Tape
Drives”.
Both the Sun service representative and the customer (in the role of the Crypto-Officer) shall perform the
following actions to enable FIPS mode through VOP:
1. The service representative shall examine the hardware part number on the rear label of the Tape
Drive to ensure that it matches the part number as listed in Section 1 of this document. The
service representative shall examine each of the seven tamper evident labels applied to the
exterior chassis of the drive to ensure they have not been removed or altered (See section 7 of
this document for examination details).
2. The service representative shall, using VOP, click on the menu item Drive Operations → View
Drive Data.
3. The service representative shall select the Version Tab and verify that the firmware version listed
is that listed in Section 1 of this document.
4. The service representative shall license the tape drive for encryption using the process from
[KMS2IM].
5. The service representative shall set the drive offline by selecting Drive Operations → Set Offline.
6. The service representative shall bring up the “Configure Drive Parameters” Window (see Figure
7) by selecting “Drive Data” from the Configure menu of the main VOP window, and in this window
the customer (in the role of the Crypto-Officer) shall perform the following:
a) Set the “Use tokens” field to “No”.
b) Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “Yes”.
c) Set the “Set FIPS mode(permanent)” field to “On”.
d) Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and KMS 2.x IP address (see [KMS2IM]).
7. Click on the “Commit” button. The ETD will then reboot and come up in permanent FIPS mode.
8. Verify that FIPS mode was correctly set by examining the FIPS status (see 3.3 ).
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 10
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
4 Ports and Interfaces
This section describes all ports and interfaces supported by the Tape Drive. Table 2 below provides a
listing of the following physical ports and logical interfaces(see [ETDOG] for details).
Table 2: Ports and Interfaces Description
Physical Port Qty Logical interface
definition
Technical Specification
DB15(RS232) 1 data output,
status output,
control input
Primarily used for tape library communications.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 11
Figure 7: VOP: "Configure Drive Parameters" Window
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Physical Port Qty Logical interface
definition
Technical Specification
Host Interface 2 data input,
data output,
status output,
control input
This interface is used to transfer user data between the
ETD and the host. When the host transfers user data to
the ETD through this interface, the ETD encrypts and
writes the data to the magnetic media. When the host
receives user data from the ETD through this interface,
the ETD delivers data read from the magnetic media
that has been decrypted by the ETD.
The interface can be configured to support one of two
protocols:
1) Fibre Channel, in accordance with the Fibre
Channel Protocol-3 (FCP-3)[1], SCSI Primary
Commands-3 (SPC-3), and SCSI Stream Commands
(SSC-3) specifications [8]
2) FICON, in accordance with the Fibre Channel
Single-Byte Command Code Sets-3 Mapping Protocol
(FC-SB-3), Revision 1.6 specification [9]
Tape head 1 data input,
data output
Provides the interface to the magnetic tape media,
where the user data to be encrypted is written to, and
where the data to be decrypted is read from.
Tape media resides in six possible cartridge types:
1) Standard Data
2) SPORT (reduced length) Data
3) VolSafe (write-once) Data
4) Sport VolSafe Data (reduced length, write-once)
5) Cleaning
6) Diagnostic (used by a service representative).
Operator Panel
Connector
1 status output,
control input
A 20-pin connector (located on the bottom of the ETD)
that is designed to connect to a Rack Mount Operator
Panel. This connector includes wires that are designed
to hook to the following external components:
1) Four LED’s to provide status output.
2) An LCD display is used to display ETD status
and configuration menu text.
3) Four push button micro-switches. Two of the
four switches are used to navigate through the ETD
configuration menus. The other two switches are used to
rewind/unload a cartridge, reboot the ETD, and to enter
Boot Monitor mode at power-up.
NOTE: The three interfaces listed directly above are not
part of the Tape Drive. They reside on an optional Sun
Microsystems External Rack Mount Chassis into which
two Tape Drives may be inserted.
Power Interface 1 power input 88-264 VAC @ 48-63 Hz
Drive Status LED 1 status output Provides status on the overall state of the ETD
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 12
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Physical Port Qty Logical interface
definition
Technical Specification
Encryption Status
LED
1 status output Provides status on the encryption configuration of the
ETD.
Rear Panel Switch 1 control input Used by the service representative to temporarily set the
ETD’s IP settings to factory default values.
RFID Reader 1 data input,
data output
Allows the tape drive to obtain control input from the
RFID chip inside the magnetic tape cartridge.
The RFID chip contains information that includes:
1) The state of the Media Information Record(MIR)
2) Location of the MIR and End-Of-Data (EOD) on
tape
3) Cartridge type
4) The write operations count
5) Manufacturing information (e.g. serial number)
6) Certain performance/usage statistics
RJ45(Ethernet) 1 data input,
data output,
status output,
control input
This primary uses of this interface are to:
1) Configure the ETD
2) Deliver encryption keys to the ETD
3) Obtain ETD status and diagnostic data
4) Download firmware to the ETD
5) Deliver status information to an SNMP server.
5 Identification and Authentication Policy
5.1 Assumption of roles
The ETD cryptographic module shall support two distinct authenticated operator roles, User and Crypto-
Officer (C.O.). Table 3 shows the roles and authentication methods.
Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
User Role-based operator
authentication.
Any of the following Authentication Mechanisms (see Table 4)
are allowed for authenticating the User Role:
1. OC_Key:256-bit AES key
2. CA_Cert Private Key: 2048-bit RSA Private key
Crypto-Officer Role-based operator
authentication.
Any of the following Authentication Mechanisms (see Table 4)
are allowed for authenticating the Crypto-Officer Role:
1. VOP Password: 7 byte shared secret.
2. Passphrase: 8 byte shared secret.
3. PC_Key: 256-bit AES key
4. DS_Key: 256-bit AES key
5. FSRootCert: 2048-bit private RSA key
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 13
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Table 4 shows the strengths of authentication mechanisms for assuming each supported role based on
the following descriptions of table headings:
• Authentication Mechanism: This is the CSP (critical security parameter) or public key used to
authenticate an operator.
• Strength of Mechanism Per Guess: This is the probability that a single random authentication
attempt succeeds. To meet FIPS 140-2 requirements, this probability needs to be less than 1 in
1,000,000.
• Strength of Mechanism Per Minute: This is the probability that a series of random
authentications succeeds over a one minute period. To meet FIPS 140-2 requirements, this
probability needs to be less than 1 in 100,000.
Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
Description Strength of Mechanism
Per Guess
Strength of Mechanism
Per Minute
VOP Password A 7 character password
chosen from the set of 96
printable ASCII characters
used to authenticate a Crypto-
Officer. Each guess is throttled
by the data rate of the Ethernet
port, at 100 MBits/s.
The probability that a
random attempt
succeeds or a false
acceptance occurs is no
greater than 1 in
75,144,747,810,816
(96^-7), which is less
than 1 in 1,000,000.
The ETD allows fewer than
4,687,500 (at 100 MBits/s,
assuming a send and
receive packet of 64 bytes
each for each attempt, and
10 bits per byte encoding)
authentication attempts in a
one minute period;
therefore the random
success rate for multiple
retries is 1 in 16030879
(=4,687,500 /96^7).
Passphrase A minimum 8 character
password, selected from the
set of 96 printable ASCII
characters used to authenticate
a Crypto-Officer. The
Passphrase is stretched using
SHA-1 such that it takes 1/10
of a second to compute the
Authentication Secret.
1 in 7.2 x 1015
(=1 in 968
). 1 in 1.2 x 1013
(based on
600 attempts per minute).
FSRootCert A 2048-bit RSA signing key
(with 112 bits of strength) used
for signing firmware image.
Verified using FSRootCert.
Chance of guessing
private key is 1 in 2112
per
attempt.
No more than one attempt
is allowed each millisecond,
which means that no more
than 60,000 attempts are
allowed in a one minute
period, putting the chance
of guessing the RSA
private key to 1 in
(2112
)/60,000.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 14
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Authentication
Mechanism
Description Strength of Mechanism
Per Guess
Strength of Mechanism
Per Minute
PCKey (Via
Token)
A 256-bit AES CCM key used
to authenticate a Crypto-Officer
during the licensing phase and
enrollment phase
Chance of guessing
PCKey and
authenticating is 1 in 1077
(2256
).
In a one minute period, the
chance of a successful
authentication is less than 1
in 10^71. (This is limited by
traffic over a 100Mbps
Ethernet link, with minimum
packet size of 70 bytes and
an assumed 10 bits per
byte encoding)
DSKey (Via
Token)
A 256-bit AES CCM key used
to authenticate a Crypto-
Officer.
NOTE: This key is only a CSP
in the 1.x configuration. In the
2.x configuration this key. In a
2.x configuration this key will
not exist.
Chance of guessing
DSKey and
authenticating is 1 in 1077
(2256
).
In a one minute period, the
chance of a successful
authentication is less than 1
in 10^71. (See rationale for
PCKey)
OCKey (Via
Token)
A 256-bit AES CCM key used
to authenticate a User
NOTE: This key is only
categorized as a CSP in the
1.x configuration. In the 2.x
configuration this key will not
exist.
Chance of guessing
OCKey and
authenticating is 1 in 1077
(2256
),
In a one minute period, the
chance of a successful
authentication is less than 1
in 10^71. (See rationale for
PCKey)
CA_Cert Private
Key
A 2048-bit RSA private key
(with 112-bits of strength) that
corresponds to the public key
within the CA_Cert Used to
authenticate the server during
the TLS handshake.
Chance of guessing
private key is 1 in 5.2 x
1033
(2112
) per attempt.
No more than one attempt
is allowed each millisecond,
which means that no more
than 60,000 attempts are
allowed in a one minute
period, putting the chance
of guessing the RSA
private key to 1 in
(2^112)/60,000.
6 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Table 5 describes the CSPs that are contained within the ETD.
Table 5: Description of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description/Usage
Preset
Communication Key
(PCKey)
The Preset Communication Key is a 256-bit AES key loaded into the ETD during
manufacturing. In the KMS 2.x configuration, the PCKey is used for encryption
licensing. In the KMS 1.x configuration, the PCKey is used to enable encryption
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 15
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
CSP Description/Usage
within a new ETD, and to reinitialize an ETD after the Reset service has been used.
Communication Key
(OCKey)
A Communication Key is a 256-bit AES key used in the KMS 1.x configuration to
encrypt communications between an OKT and an ETD. The OCKey is also used to
provide mutual-authentication between an OKT and an ETD.
Device Split Key
(DSKey)
A Device Split Key is a 256-bit AES key used in the KMS 1.x configuration to
protect Media Keys and to support device key updates from an EKT after an ETD
has been initialized.
Media Key (MEKey) Media Keys are 256-bit AES CCM keys which are generated outside the Tape
Drive by either the KMS 1.x or the KMS 2.x. An ETD uses a MEKey to encrypt and
decrypt the customer bulk data it processes.
Wrap Key (WKey) A Wrap Key is a 256-bit AES keys used in the KMS 1.x configuration to wrap a set
of DSKey (MEKey xor DSKey), KeyID pairs. The objective of this process is to add
an additional layer of encryption security beyond that provided by DSKey.
Passphrase This is an 8-byte character string supplied independently to both the ETD and the
KMS 2.x cluster as part of the enrollment process in the KMS 2.x configuration.
The Passphrase must contain characters from at least three of the four character
classes, and has a minimum length configurable by the end user. The Passphrase
is used to mutually authenticate the ETD and KMS 2.x during first time
authentication, and is erased from drive memory when the enrollment process
completes.
VOP Password
(TelnetPW)
A 7-byte shared secret used to authenticate an operator the Crypto-Officer Role.
CTR_DRBG The CSPs within the SP 800-90 CTR DRBG are an AES-256 key , the 128-bit
value V, and a reseed counter. The CTR_DRBG generates random numbers for
nonce values and cryptographic keys
AES Key Wrap Key
(AKWK)
An AES Key Wrap Key is a 256-bit AES ECB key used to protect the ME_Keys with
AES Key Wrap as they enter the ETD
Dump Encryption
Key (DEKey)
A Dump file encryption key is a 256-bit AES CCM key used for encrypting the dump
files during generation and storage.
Tape Drive Private
Key (TDPrivKey)
The Tape drive Private Key is a 2048-bit RSA private key used during the TLS
handshake to authenticate the Tape Drive to a appliance within a KMS 2.x cluster.
CA_Private Key The CA_Cert Private Key is for authentication of the appliance during TLS1.0
communication between the ETD and a KMS 2.x cluster.
FSRootCert Private
Key
The FSRootCert Private Key is used to authenticate the firmware updates by
authenticating the final firmware signing key in a certificate chain.
TLS_PM Premaster Secret for the TLS session. It consists of 2 bytes of version number
concatenated with 46 bytes of random data.
TLS_MS Master Secret for the TLS session; 48 bytes of pseudo-random data generated
according to TLS, based on a hash of the premaster secret and nonces
TLS_EMK Enccrypt MAC Key for TLS, used with HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits)
TLS_DMK Decrypt MAC Key for TLS, used with HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits)
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 16
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
CSP Description/Usage
TLS_ECK Encrypt Crypto Key for TLS. 256-bit key used in AES-CBC mode to encrypt TLS
data.
TLS_DCK Decrypt Crypto Key for TLS. 256-bit key used in AES-CBC mode to decrypt TLS
data.
6.1 Definition of Public Keys
Table 6 describes the public keys stored with the ETD.
Table 6: Description of Public Keys within the ETD
Public Key Name Description
CA_Cert CA Certificate public key self-signed by a KMS 2.x cluster. Contains a 2048-bit
RSA Public Key for each appliance in a KMS 2.x cluster. Used by the ETD to
authenticate the appliance during the TLS handshake.
Tape Drive Public
Key (TDPubKey)
The Tape drive Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA key used by TLS. The ETD sends
this key to the KMS 2.x cluster to authenticate the Tape Drive during the TLS
handshake. It is stored within an X.509 certificate within the ETD.
Key Wrap Key Public
Key (KWKPublicKey)
The Key Wrap Key Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA public key used to wrap the AES
Key Wrap Key.
Dump Encryption
Public Key
(DEPubKey)
The Dump Encryption Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA public key used to wrap the
DEKey. It is stored stored in an X.509 certificate
Firmware Signature
Public Key
(FSPubKey)
The Firmware Signature Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA key used to validate any
uploaded firmware.
Firmware Signature
Root Certificate Key
(FSRootCert)
The Firmware Signature Root Certificate Key is a 2048-bit RSA key within a PEM
encoded certificate used to validate the certificate chain within the candidate
firmware image.
7 Access Control Policy
7.1 Roles and Services
Table 7 shows the services available to each authorized role and CSP access (Crypto-Officer (C.O.), or
User). See section 6 for a description of the keys and CSPs.
Table 7: Services Authorized for Roles
Name of
Service
Service Description Available on: Role Access to Keys/CSPs
Enroll ETD Authenticates an external
management system acting on
behalf of the Crypto-Officer (KMS
2.x cluster) to the ETD using the
Passphrase.
RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Uses Passphrase;
Writes and uses CA_Cert;
Writes TDPrivKey;
Writes TDPubKey
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 17
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Access Type Definitions:
Use: The CSP is used within an ETD security function or authentication mechanism.
Write: The CSP is written to internal volatile or persistent memory of the ETD. This is done during
the input of a new CSP or the modification of an existing.
Generates: Generates the CSP using the FIPS Approved SP800-90 DRBG.
Derives: The CSP is derived using the Allowed TLS1.0 Key Derivation Function.
The ETD supports the unauthenticated services listed below in Table 8. None of the services modify,
disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys and CSPs, or otherwise affect the security of the ETD.
Table 8: Unauthenticated Services
Name of Service Service Description Available On:
Show Status Provides the current status of the ETD. Drive Status LED,
Encryption Status LED,
Operator Panel
Connector,
RJ45(Ethernet),
Host Interface,
DB15(RS232)
Power-Cycle/Perform
Self-Tests
When the ETD is power-cycled, the ETD exercises
the cryptographic hardware and firmware tests for the
FIPS Approved algorithms, as listed in 9.1 .
Power Interface
Fibre Channel Interface
Management
Provides non-security relevant ETD management
and status output (see [ETDIR]).
Host Interface
LibraryManagement Provides non-security relevant ETD management
and status outputof the ETD.
DB15 (RS232)
Operator Panel Provides non-security relevant ETD management
and status output. See [ETDOG] for details.
Operator Panel
Connector
Rear Panel Switch Mechanical switch located on the rear of the ETD
that allows the module to enter the boot monitor
mode.
Rear Panel Switch
8 Operational Environment (Area 6)
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the ETD
functions in a limited operational environment. As such, the module performs a firmware load test (RSA
signature verification) to verify the authenticity and integrity of any newly loaded code (Note: New code
images running on the hardware platform must be FIPS 140-2 validated as a single module).
9 Security Rules
9.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements
This section documents the security rules enforced by the ETD cryptographic module
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 18
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
1) The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User role and the
Crypto-Officer role.
2) When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3) The cryptographic module shall encrypt and decrypt sensitive data using the AES-256 CCM algorithm
4) The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests:
a) Power-up Self-tests
i) Cryptographic algorithm tests:
(1) AES ECB KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt)
(2) AES Key Wrap KAT (Wrap/Unwrap)
(3) AES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt)
(4) AES CCM Firmware Implementation KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt)
(5) AES CCM Hardware Implementation KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt)
(6) SP800-90 CTR DRBG KAT
(7) SHA-1 KAT
(8) HMAC SHA-1 KAT
(9) HMAC SHA-1(TLS) KAT (SHA-1 as used within this HMAC is tested as part of this KAT)
(10) RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 Known Answer Test (verification only)
ii) Firmware Integrity Test (32 bit CRC)
b) Conditional Self-tests:
i) Firmware Load Test: 2048 bit RSA PKCS1 digital signature verification
ii) SP800-90 DRBG Continuous Test
iii) NDRNG Continuous Test
5) An operator may command the module to perform the power up self-test by initiating a power cycle of
the module.
6) The cryptographic module inhibits data output during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
7) Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
8) The module supports concurrent operators.
10 Physical Security
10.1 Physical Security Mechanisms
The ETD multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms:
• Production-grade components
• Production-grade opaque enclosure
• Tamper evident labels
The following figures (Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10) show the locations of the seven tamper-evident
seals on the ETD. The seals are identified by a red circle.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 19
Figure 8: Tamper Evident Seals on Left Side
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
Upon secure receipt of the ETD cryptographic module, the operator shall examine all seven tamper-
evident seals to determine whether the ETD has been compromised. If any of the seven tamper-evident
labels show evidence of tampering, then the module is not physically secure and is no longer compliant
with FIPS 140-2.
The following list describes possible ways that the tamper-evident labels show evidence of tampering:
1. The pattern “Void” is visible through the tamper-evident label.
2. One or more corners of the tamper-evident label is lifted.
3. The tamper-evident label is missing.
4. A tamper-evident label on the sides is misplaced such that it does not touch two metal covers.
5. The tamper-evident label on the bottom is misplaced such that it does not cover the screw that
secures the front bezel (honeycomb grate that allows airflow).
10.2 Required Operator Actions
The operator is required to periodically inspect tamper evident seals using the following guidance found in
Table 9:
Physical Security Mechanisms Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper-Evident Seals Per internal security policy
requirements of ETD customer.
Inspect seven tamper seals; three
on the left side, three on the right
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 20
Figure 9: Tamper Evident Seals on Right Side
Figure 10: Tamper Evident Seal on Bottom
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
side, and one on the bottom.
Table 9: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks.
12 References
[1619.1] IEEE Std 1619.1-2007, IEEE Standard for Authenticated Encryption with Length
Expansion for Storage Devices. May 2008.
[CCM] NIST Special Publication 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Modes of Operation: The
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality. U.S. DoC/NIST, May 2004. Available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html
[ETDIR] T10000 Tape Drive: Interface Reference Manual, Sun Microsystems, Part Number
MT9259J. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/MT9259J.
[ETDOG] Sun Microsystems T10000 Operator’s Guide, Part No. 96174, Rev. EB. Available at
http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/96174revEB.
[FC-SB-3] Fibre Channel Single-Byte Command Code Sets-3 Mapping Protocol (FC-SB-3), Revision
1.6 specification.
[FCP-3] Fibre Channel Protocol-3 (FCP-3), SCSI Primary Commands-3 (SPC-3), and SCSI
Stream Commands (SSC-3) specifications
[KMS1UG] Sun Key Management Station Users Guide, Part No. 96262, Rev B. Available at
http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/CRCM2146
[KMS2IM] KMS 2.0 Installation and Service Manual (Rev. BA), Part Number 316194903BA, Sun
Microsystems. June 2008. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/316194903BA.
[SPC-3] SCSI Primary Commands-3 (SPC-3)
[SSC-3] SCSI Stream Commands (SSC-3)
[TLS1.0] RFC 2246: “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0”.
[VOPUG] Virtual Operator Panel User's Guide (Customer) rev JA, Sun Microsystems, Part Number
96179JA, April 2008. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/96179revJA.
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 21
Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy
13 Definitions and Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CO Crypto-Officer
ETD The Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive.
IPL Initial Program Load. The process that brings up the ETD after a power-on or reset.
TLS Transport Layer Security, v1.0, as defined by IETF RFC 2246
User Data Arbitrary data which is being written to or read from magnetic tape.
VOP Virtual Operator Panel – Software used to configure the ETD
Sept. 1, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AB Page 22