AWS Scalable Network Crypto Modules, Version 1.1
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Amazon Web Services, Inc.
AWS Scalable Network Crypto Modules, version 1.1
Version: 1.0
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document prepared by:
http://www.lightshipsec.com
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Table of Contents
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ............................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................... 5
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ...............................10
2.3 Excluded Components..................................................................................................11
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................11
2.5 Algorithms .....................................................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations .............................................................................13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ....................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................13
2.9 Key Generation..............................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment ......................................................................................................14
2.11 Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................15
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................15
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication...................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles ..............................................................................................................................16
4.3 Approved Services ........................................................................................................16
4.4 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................17
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................17
5 Software/Firmware Security................................................................................................18
5.1 Integrity Techniques......................................................................................................18
5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................18
6 Operational Environment ....................................................................................................19
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements.....................................................19
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................20
8 Non-Invasive Security..........................................................................................................21
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management .....................................................................22
9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................22
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...........................................................................................22
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..............................................................................................22
9.4 SSPs...............................................................................................................................22
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10 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................24
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..........................................................................................24
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................24
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information....................................................................................26
10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................27
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .................................................................................27
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.........................................................................................................28
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ...................................................28
11.2 Administrator Guidance..............................................................................................28
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance......................................................................................28
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...............................................................................................29
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)...10
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.............................................11
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................11
Table 5: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................11
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - AZ3324 device with AX1200 encryptor....................................12
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - CS8320 device with AC1200 encryptor ...................................12
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - [EVM] AWC-LC (Integrity Test)................................................12
Table 9: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................13
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................15
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................16
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................17
Table 13: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................22
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................22
Table 15: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................23
Table 16: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................23
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................24
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................26
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................26
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................27
Table 21: Error States...............................................................................................................27
List of Figures
Figure 1: Acacia AC1200 pluggable encryptor unit..................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Acacia Pico DSP (housed inside AC1200) .................................................................. 6
Figure 3: Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) physical perimeter ................................................. 7
Figure 4: Block diagram and module cryptographic boundary.................................................... 8
Figure 5: The AZ3324 device chassis containing 4 AX1200 units .............................................. 9
Figure 6: The CS8320 device chassis containing 4 AC1200 units.............................................10
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the AWS Scalable Network Crypto Modules,
version 1.1 describes how the module meets the security requirements specified in FIPS 140-3
for an overall security level 1 module and outlines the security rules and operating procedures
required to maintain compliance.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
MACsec and DWDM link encryption is used by AWS networking infrastructure to secure traffic
across its core network consisting of long-distance and large-scale data communications across
the globe. Traffic flowing across the AWS global network is protected by strong cryptography
and meets regulatory requirements.
Module Type: Software-hybrid
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary of the AWS Scalable Network Crypto Module consists of a
hardware and a software component, which is represented by the red dash line in Figure 4,
below. The software components of the module consist of the IV Helper, Self-test & Error
Manager, and a pre-loaded HMAC digest for integrity testing. The Acacia AC1200 (with Pico
DSP) (figures 1 and 2) and Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) (figure 3), are pictured below.
The chips represent the physical perimeter of the modules and implement the core
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cryptographic functionality, AES-GCM encryption and decryption used within the MACsec
protocol. They install in the pluggable sled slots on the front of the AZ3324 & CS8320. Up to
four iterations of the AWS Scalable Encryption Module can be installed in the AZ3324 &
CS8320 chassis at any given point in time. The modules operate separately from each other
and only share access to the AWS-LC library as shown in Figure 4.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The tested operational environment’s physical perimeter is defined as the AWS Network
devices (AZ3324 & CS8320) that contain the module. The TOEPP is represented in Figure 4,
and depicted in Figures 5 and 6, below.
Figure 1: Acacia AC1200 pluggable encryptor unit
Figure 2: Acacia Pico DSP (housed inside AC1200)
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Figure 3: Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) physical perimeter
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Figure 4: Block diagram and module cryptographic boundary
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Figure 5: The AZ3324 device chassis containing 4 AX1200 units
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Figure 6: The CS8320 device chassis containing 4 AC1200 units
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
NetOS-MACSec-
Self-Tests
1.1 Contains GCM IV
Helper, Self-Test &
Error Manager,
HMAC file
HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
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Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Model
and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
Acacia
AC1200
AC1200-MN3-
440
1.0 Pico DSP Housed in pluggable unit with
optical ports
Acacia
AX1200
AX1200-8X9-
44C
1.0 Jannu DSP Housed in pluggable unit with
optical ports
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
NetOS
2024
CS8320 Annapurna K2X-N (arm64) Yes - 1.1
NetOS
2024
AZ3324 NXP Layerscape LX2080
(arm64)
Yes - 1.1
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no module components excluded from the validation.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
The approved mode of
operation
Approved syslog (code=exited,
status=0/SUCCESS)
Table 5: Modes List and Description
When the module is powered up, the integrity of the module software is checked using an
approved software integrity check mechanism (HMAC-SHA2-256), by the bound module
(“AWS-LC Cryptographic Module (dynamic build)”, version “AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0”). Once these
self-tests have completed successfully, the module transitions into the approved mode of
operation. There are no other modes of operation implanted by the module.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
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AZ3324 device with AX1200 encryptor
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A4847 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4847 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - AZ3324 device with AX1200 encryptor
CS8320 device with AC1200 encryptor
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB C373 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM C681 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - CS8320 device with AC1200 encryptor
[EVM] AWC-LC (Integrity Test)
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5425 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5433 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5434 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
SHA2-256 A5425 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5433 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5434 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - [EVM] AWC-LC (Integrity Test)
The Approved Algorithms tables above list the approved algorithms implemented by the AWS
Encryption Module and the algorithms implemented within the bound module, which are used to
perform the software integrity test upon the module.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any vendor-affirmed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
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The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms with no security
claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, not allowed algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Encrypt Data BC-Auth Encryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-GCM:
(C681, A4847)
AES-ECB:
(C373, A4847)
Decrypt Data BC-Auth Encryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-GCM:
(C681, A4847)
AES-ECB:
(C373, A4847)
Software
Integrity Test
MAC [EVM] Integrity
check using
HMAC-SHA2-
256
implemented in
AWS-LC (bound
module)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5425,
A5433, A5434)
SHA2-256:
(A5425, A5433,
A5434)
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The AES-GCM Initialization Vector (IV) generation is compliant with IG C.H, resolution 1(c).
The module generates IVs deterministically following the guidance in IEEE 802.1AE.
While operating the approved mode of operation, the module should only be used to form a
MACsec link with another FIPS 140 validated module operating in the approved mode. The
device on each end of the MACsec link plays the role of either the Peer or the Authenticator.
No authentication server is involved.
As required by the MACsec module (IEEE 802.1AE), the IV has a length of 96 bits and is
constructed by the “IV Helper” by concatenating the 64-bit Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) with
the 32-bit Packet Number (PN)
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for AES-GCM encryption
and decryption operations shall be redistributed.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
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The module only generates SSPs used in the MACsec protocol deterministically. Therefore, the
module does not implement a DRBG and does not require an entropy source.
2.9 Key Generation
The module only generates AES-GCM IVs deterministically per the guidance given in IG C.H
and IEEE 802.1AE.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not implement any key establishment schemes.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module is an encryption component and does not implement any industry protocols.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
(AC1200) PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP,
PCIE_RDN, PCIE_REFCLK_P,
PCIE_REFCLK_N; (AX1200) TX0-15P/N,
Duplex Connector
Data Input Plaintext data to be
encrypted, Encrypted data
to be decrypted
(AC1200) PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP,
PCIE_RDN, PCIE_REFCLK_P,
PCIE_REFCLK_N; (AX1200) RX0-15P/N,
Duplex Connector
Data Output Plaintext data that has been
decrypted, Encrypted data
that has been encrypted
(AC1200) PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP,
PCIE_RDN, PCIE_REFCLK_P,
PCIE_REFCLK_N; (AX1200) TX0-15P/N
Control
Input
Function calls from the
calling applications
(AC1200) PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP,
PCIE_RDN, PCIE_REFCLK_P,
PCIE_REFCLK_N; (AX1200) RX0-15P/N
Status
Output
Status information regarding
module and services to OS
and Calling applications
(AC1200) Voltage_1.8V; (AX1200)
Voltage_1.8V
Power Electrical power to the
module
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
The Ports and Interfaces table above specifies the cryptographic module interfaces. The
physical interfaces are defined as the RX/TX or PCIe pins of the encryptor units. The logical
interfaces are logically separated from one another by the module’s hybrid-software design.
The power interface is physically separate from the other physical interfaces as the voltage pins
are distinct from the RX/TX/PCIe of the encryptor units. A control output interface is not
implemented.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not implement any authentication mechanisms. The sole role (Crypto Officer)
is assumed implicitly.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 11: Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the
operator of the module when performing a service.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Acces
s
Show
Status
Output
approved
mode status
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Comman
d
Status Output
(status=0/SUCCES
S, or
status=1/FAILURE)
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Module's
Versionin
g
Informatio
n
Output the
module
name and
version
identifiers
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Comman
d
Status Output
(AWS Encryption
Module, version
1.1)
None Crypto
Officer
Perform
Zeroisatio
n
Zeroise
SSPs
stored
temporarily
in RAM
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Procedur
e: Disable
individual
encryptor,
Reboot
host
device
Status Output:
"Sled <#> disabled
successfully",
Module reboot
None Crypto
Officer
- AES-
GCM
Key: Z
- AES-
GCM
IV: Z
Perform
Self-Tests
Perform the
module's
cryptograph
ic self-tests
on demand
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Procedur
e: Enable
individual
encryptor,
Reboot
host
device
Status Output:
"(code=exited,
status=0/SUCCES
S)"
None Crypto
Officer
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Acces
s
[EVM]
Perform
Self-tests
Perform the
EVM's
CASTs, and
the Integrity
Check upon
the module
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Procedur
e: Enable
individual
encryptor,
Reboot
host
device
Status Output:
"(code=exited,
status=0/SUCCES
S)"
Software
Integrity
Test
Crypto
Officer
Encrypt
Data
Encrypt
plaintext
data
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Plaintext
Data
(Network
Traffic)
Encrypted Data
(Network Traffic)
Encrypt
Data
Crypto
Officer
- AES-
GCM
Key: E
- AES-
GCM
IV:
G,E
Decrypt
Data
Decrypt
ciphertext
data
Global
(completio
n of
service)
Encrypte
d Data
(Network
Traffic)
Plaintext Data
(Network Traffic)
Decrypt
Data
Crypto
Officer
- AES-
GCM
Key: E
- AES-
GCM
IV: E
Table 12: Approved Services
The module provides approved services to the operator who assumes the Crypto Officer role as
defined in this document. The approved services defined in this section implement the security
function implementations defined in section 2.6 of this document.
The Crypto Officer can confirm that they are operating the “AWS Scalable Network Crypto
Modules, version 1.1” module by checking for the output “AWS Encryption Module, version 1.1”
from the module’s Show Module's Versioning Information service.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not implement any non-approved services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not allow the loading of external software or firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module’s software integrity self-test is managed within the module boundary by the Self-
Test and Error Manager, which calls the function fips_helper.py. During the module’s pre-
operational self-tests, the self-test and error handler passes the stored HMAC-SHA2-256 digest
to the bound module (AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0) to which calculates the HMAC of the module
software package and passes the result back to the Self-test and error handler. The Self-Test
and Error Manager compares the result with the stored HMAC file. If the 2 HMAC values do not
match, the integrity test fails, and the module enters the error state.
The bound module (AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0) must have passed its own software integrity test and
HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST before performing the HMAC calculation of the AWS Encryption
module’s software.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The conditional algorithm self-tests are run at module startup in addition to the software integrity
test. The crypto officer can initiate the self-tests on demand for the module by entering the
command “sledcmd --sled <#> enable”, or for all module’s present within the TOEPP by power-
cycling the host device.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The operating environments for the module are the AWS CS8320 and AZ3324 network devices
running NetOS 2024, which are limited operational environments. The module operational
environments are physically housed within a secure AWS facility and come pre-configured in
the approved mode by AWS engineers. AWS customers purchase infrastructure as-a-service
and have no direct system-level access to the host device.
The Crypto Officer should confirm that the module is operating in the approved mode by
checking for the approved mode indicator per the instructions in Section 11.2 of this document.
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7 Physical Security
Each module’s hardware consists of a the pluggable encryptor units which are made using
production grade components. The encryptor units house the DSP chips, which consist of
production grade components protected by a conformal coating as a standard passivation
technique. As the software portion of the hybrid module execute within a limited operational
environment, the module is defined as a multi-chip standalone embodiment.
The module itself provides no additional physical security techniques. However, the module will
reside inside of an AWS device which is installed within a secure AWS facility. The module will
therefore inherit these additional physical characteristics and protections.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against non-invasive
attacks.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Volatile Memory Process space of 'FIPS Helper', Chips registers Dynamic
External Process space of the calling applications Dynamic
Table 13: Storage Areas
The module stores keys and input/output data temporarily in volatile memory. The module does
not store keys or data persistently.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
N/A for this module.
SSPs are only input from or output to the calling applications within the module’s TOEPP. This
method is categorized as manual distribution, electronic entry/output (“CM Software to/from
App via TOEPP Path”).
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Remove Power Remove power
from the host
platform
Keys are procedurally zeroized
by rebooting the host platform,
which is acceptable at Software
level 1.
Crypto Officer
reboots or removed
power from host
platform
Disable/remove
SLED
Remove
individual
pluggable
encryptor unit
Keys are procedurally zeroized
by removing the individual
encryptor unit, thus removing
power, which is acceptable at
Software level 1.
Crypto Officer
removes SLED
(pluggable
encryptor) from host
platform
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods
SSPs are zeroised procedurally by power-cycling the host platform.
9.4 SSPs
The following table summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented:
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
AES-
GCM
Key
Encryption and
Decryption
256 bits -
256 bits
Authenticated
Symmetric Key
- CSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
AES-
GCM
IV
Initialization
Vector for AES-
GCM MACsec
encryption
96 bits -
N/A
Keying Material
- PSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Table 15: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES-GCM
Key
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Remove
Power
AES-GCM
IV:Used With
AES-GCM
IV
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Remove
Power
AES-GCM
Key:Used With
Table 16: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5425)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Calculate hash of
entire module software and
compare to known answer
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5433)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Calculate hash of
entire module software and
compare to known answer
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5434)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Calculate hash of
entire module software and
compare to known answer
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module’s startup integrity test is performed upon the module’s software by the bound
module (Amazon’s AWS-LC Cryptographic module).
As the modules do not implement bypass capability or any FIPS-defined critical functions, no
additional pre-operational self-tests are required.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(C681)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure")
Encrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(C681)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Decrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A4847)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure")
Encrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(A4847)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Decrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5425)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST syslog entry [EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module
on it's own
HMAC-SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the
module
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5433)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST syslog entry [EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module
on it's own
HMAC-SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the
module
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5434)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST syslog entry [EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module
on it's own
HMAC-SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the
module
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests
The conditional self-test for AES-GCM is run at module instantiation, before the first operational
use of the algorithm. The underling AES-ECB algorithm’s self-test requirements are satisfied by
the running of the AES-GCM self-test per IG 10.3.A, Resolution 1.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5425)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5433)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5434)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
(C681)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM
Decrypt (C681)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM
(A4847)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM
Decrypt (A4847)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5425)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5433)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5434)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information
The operator can perform the pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by re-
instantiating the individual module or power-cycling the host device.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Error Hard Error State:
MACsec interfaces
do not come up
Module fails
any self-test
Replace pluggable
unit and re-instantiate
module / reboot host
platform
syslog entry
(status=1/FAILURE)
Table 21: Error States
When the module fails any self-test, the module will immediately print a self-test failure indicator
to the syslog. The identified failure indicator for the module integrity test is “SELF TEST
FAILED!!!. Reason - Integrity tests failed”. The identified failure indicator for the AES-GCM
CAST is “self test failed on sled - <#>”. The module will automatically perform zeroisation of all
SSPs within the module boundary and transition to the Error state, printing an error state
indicator to the syslog (code=exited, status=1/FAILURE). When in the error state, the failed
encryptor’s interfaces will not be available and therefore, all cryptographic operation is inhibited.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator can perform the pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by re-
instantiating the individual module. The operator can also perform pre-operational and
conditional self-tests for all modules within the TOEPP by rebooting the host device.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The AWS Encryption Module is pre-installed and configured at an AWS facility and offered to
end users as an integrated part of AWS’ service offerings. As such, there are no installation,
initialization, or startup procedures to be performed by the Crypto Officer.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto Officer should ensure that the module is running in the approved mode of operation
before use. This can be determined by checking the syslog for the approved mode indicator
(code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS).
If an individual instance of the module has entered the error mode by failing any self-test, the
module can be replaced by the crypto officer by performing the following steps:
1. Disable the failed module by entering “sledcmd --sled <#> disable”
2. Disconnect and replace the pluggable encryptor unit
3. Instantiate the module instance for the new encryptor by entering “sledcmd –sled <#>
enable”
If the TOEPP has less than 4 encryptor units active, the Crypto Officer may add additional
encryptors by performing the following steps:
1. Connect the pluggable encryptor unit to an empty SLED bay
2. Instantiate the module instance for the new encryptor by entering “sledcmd –sled <#>
enable”
Either of the above processes will create a new instance of the module software and calling
application (outside of boundary) to manage the new encryptor unit. The module will
automatically perform its initialization routine including the running of all pre-operational and
conditional self-tests.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for MACsec encryption and
decryption shall be redistributed.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against other attacks.