Page 1 of 27
Icom Inc.
UT-125 FIPS #41,#51 and #61
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1-1-32 Kamiminami
Hirano-ku, Osaka 547-0003
Japan
Page 2 of 27
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................11
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................11
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................11
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................11
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................11
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................12
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................12
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................19
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................19
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................19
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................19
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................19
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................19
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................19
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................20
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................20
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................20
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................20
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................20
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................20
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................20
Page 3 of 27
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................21
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................21
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................24
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................24
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................24
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................25
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................26
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................26
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................27
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................27
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................27
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................27
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................27
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................27
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................27
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................27
Page 4 of 27
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 8
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 9
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................10
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................11
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................12
Table 9: Roles...........................................................................................................................12
Table 10: Approved Services ....................................................................................................18
Table 11: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................19
Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................20
Table 13: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................20
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................21
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................21
Table 16: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................22
Table 17: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................24
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................24
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................25
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................25
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................26
Table 22: Error States...............................................................................................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Block Diagram ........................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – Representative Images ............................................................................................. 7
Page 5 of 27
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document details the security policy for the cryptographic module UT-125 FIPS #41 Hardware
revision 2.2 and Hardware revision 2.3, UT-125 FIPS #51 Hardware revision 2.4 and Hardware revision
2.5, UT-125 FIPS #61 Hardware revision 2.6 and Hardware revision 2.7 implementing firmware version
1.4, herein identified as the optional encryption unit, UT-125 FIPS #41,#51 and #61 for Icom Inc. radios.
This non-proprietary security policy may be freely reproduced and distributed only in its entirety without
revision.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The UT-125 FIPS #41, #51 and #61 are multi-chip embedded cryptographic modules as defined by FIPS
140-3.
The cryptographic module can be incorporated into any Icom Inc. radio which requires FIPS 140-3 level 1
cryptographic security.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary consists of the entire printed circuit board, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
Page 6 of 27
Figure 1 - Block Diagram
Figure 2 contains representative images of the cryptographic module. Other than the labels, Rev 2.2 and
2.3 of the UT-125 #41 are externally identical. Likewise, Rev 2.4 and 2.5 of UT-125 #51, Rev 2.6 and Rev
2.7 of UT-125 #61 are also externally identical.
Digital Signal
Processor
(DSP)
EEPROM
FLASH ROM
Cryptographic Boundary
Icom Inc. radio
UT-125 FIPS
Data
Input/Output
Control
Input
Radio’s DSP
Page 7 of 27
Figure 2 – Representative Images
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
UT-125
#41
Rev2.2 and
Rev2.3
Rev. 1.7 TMS320VC5507ZAY Label, Display on the
radio display.
#41
#51
#61
Top Bottom
Page 8 of 27
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
UT-125
#51
Rev2.4 and
Rev2.5
Rev. 1.7 TMS320VC5507ZAY Label, Display on the
radio display.
UT-125
#61
Rev2.6 and
Rev2.7
Rev. 1.7 TMS320VC5507ZAY Label, Display on the
radio display.
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
The cryptographic module does not have any Excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Mode Approved Algorithm running Approved High-Level Status Indicator
via GPIO9 Port
Non-approved
Mode
When Approved Algorithm is
not running
Non-
Approved
Low-Level Status Indicator
via GPIO9 Port
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The cryptographic module supports both approved and non-approved modes depending on the McBSP
interface commands being invoked. The GPIO9 port indicates whether the module is using an Approved
security function by providing a High-Level Status Output for services using approved security functions
and a Low-Level Status Output for all other services.
Degraded Mode Description:
The cryptographic module does not support degraded operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The module’s CAVP certificates include algorithms/options that are not utilized by the module in the
approved mode. Only the algorithms/options listed in the table below are utilized by the module in the
approved mode.
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6944 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A6944 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38B
Page 9 of 27
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-ECB A6944 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KW A6944 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A6944 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG A6944 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A5246 Key Length - Key Length: 512 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6944 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
KDF SP800-
108
A6944 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths:
256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
SHA-1 A5246 Message Length - Message Length: 256-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6944 Message Length - Message Length: 256-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Section
4
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A SP800-133r2, Section 4 Example
1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
This module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation with No Security Claimed.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
This module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation with No Security Claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES-CBC-MAC MAC for OTAR
Page 10 of 27
Name Use and Function
DES ECB Crypto Key Encryption / Decryption
DES OFB Voice Encryption / Decryption
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Crypto Channel BC-UnAuth AES Ciphers AES-OFB:
(A6944)
AES-CBC:
(A6944)
AES-ECB:
(A6944)
Crypto Channel
KTS
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
Key Wrapping
Method 2
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256-
bits of security
strength
AES-KW:
(A6944)
AES-ECB:
(A6944)
Firmware Data
Integrity
MAC Data Integrity HMAC-SHA-1:
(A5246)
SHA-1: (A5246)
Key Derivation KBKDF Key Derivation
for MAC
KDF SP800-
108: (A6944)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6944)
SHA2-256:
(A6944)
Key Generation CKG CKG for
Reverse Warm
Start Key
Counter DRBG:
(A6944)
AES-ECB:
(A6944)
CKG Section 4:
()
Key Type:
Symmetric
Message
Authentication
MAC MAC for OTAR AES-CMAC:
(A6944)
AES-CBC:
(A6944)
Page 11 of 27
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
N/A for this module.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module’s DRBG is seeded with a factory pre-loaded entropy input string per FIPS 140-3 IG 9.3.A,
Scenario 2(a). Therefore, the following caveat applies to this module:
No assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys)
When the module is manufactured, a 256-bit entropy input string believed to contain 256-bits of entropy is
written to the Flash ROM.
At the first boot, this entropy input string is used to seed the DRBG. The state of the DRBG instance is
maintained even when the module’s power is turned off.
2.9 Key Generation
The Reverse Warm Start Key is generated by CKG compliant with SP800-133rev2 Section 4, 6.1. The
output U of the approved DRBG is used directly as the symmetric key, with no XOR or post-processing.
The DRBG is also fed with 256 bits of entropy from an external source, so the DRBG output also has at
least 256 bits of security strength.
The generated symmetric key is used only as the Reverse Warm Start Key in Section 9.4. Please refer to
section 9.4 SSPs.
Keys/SSPs generated/used in the approved mode shall not be used in the non-approved mode and vice-
versa.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
GND Power Ground
CSCKO Data Output McBSP clock output
CFSO Data Output McBSP frame sync output
Page 12 of 27
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
CFSI Data Input
Control Input
McBSP frame sync input
CSDO Data Output
Status Output
McBSP data output
CSCKI Data Input
Control Input
McBSP clock input
OPRST Control Input Reset signal
CSDI Data Input
Control Input
McBSP data input
OPACT Control Input Wake up signal
DVDD_3.3V Power External electrical power (+3.3V power line)
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
This module does not support the operator authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
User Role User None
Table 9: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
O = Crypto Officer
U = User
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Decryptio
n
Decoding from
ciphertext to
plaintext
Port
Output
(GPIO
9)
McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
or Data Input
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
or Data
Output
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Officer
-
Reverse
Warm
Page 13 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
(Request
Command)
(Response
Command)
Start
Key: E
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Start
Key: E
User
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: E
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Start
Key: E
Encryptio
n
Encoding from
plaintext to
ciphertext.
Port
Output
(GPIO
9)
McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
or Data Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
or Data
Output
(Response
Command)
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Officer
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: E
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Start
Key: E
User
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: E
Page 14 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Start
Key: E
Firmware
Update
Updating the
firmware in the
crypto module.
Port
Output
(GPIO
9)
McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command,
Indicate
Command)
Firmware
Data
Integrity
Crypto
Officer
-
CTR_DR
BG Key :
Z
-
CTR_DR
BG Seed
: Z
-
CTR_DR
BG V
counter :
Z
- HMAC
Key: E
- SP
800-90B
ENT (P)
Entropy
String : Z
Key Load Loading crypto
key using Key
Fill Device
Interface
Protocol.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
or Data Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command,
Indicate
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
W
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
W
Key
Managem
Changing/
Adding/
Generating/
Port
Output
McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
Crypto
Channel
Key
Crypto
Officer
- KEK
Page 15 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
ent
(OTAR)
Zeroising crypto
key and module
parameter.
(GPIO
9)
or Data Input
(Request
Command)
or Data
Output
(Response
Command)
Derivation
Key
Generatio
n
Crypto
Channel
KTS
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
W,E,Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key:
G,E,Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
W,E,Z
- Warm
Start
Key:
W,E,Z
User
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
W,E,Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key:
G,E,Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
W,E,Z
- Warm
Start
Key:
W,E,Z
Key
Zeroisatio
n
Zeroising crypto
key using Key
Fill Device
Interface
Protocol.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
Page 16 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
User
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
Message
Authentic
ation
Generating/Verifi
cation of
Message
Authentication
Code
N/A McBSP
command:
Control Input
or Data Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:
Status
Output or
Data Output
(Response
Command)
Message
Authentic
ation
Crypto
Officer
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: E
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Start
Key: E
User
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: E
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
E
- Warm
Page 17 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Start
Key: E
Power-Off Turning the
power off on the
module.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command,
Indicate
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
-
CTR_DR
BG Key :
Z
-
CTR_DR
BG V
counter :
Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: Z
User
-
CTR_DR
BG Key :
Z
-
CTR_DR
BG V
counter :
Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: Z
Self-Tests Self-testing the
operation of the
crypto functions.
N/A Reset signal
(Physical
port): Control
Input
McBSP
command:
Status
Output
None Crypto
Officer
User
Show Key
Status
Providing the
crypto
parameter.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
User
Show
Status
Showing current
status.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
User
Page 18 of 27
Name Description Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Function
s
SSP
Access
Show
Version
Show module's
versioning
information.
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
User
System
Managem
ent
Zeroising and
Initializing the
various setting
values
N/A McBSP
command:C
ontrol Input
(Request
Command)
McBSP
command:S
tatus Output
(Response
Command)
None Crypto
Officer
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
- Warm
Start
Key: Z
User
- KEK
(Key
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
-
Reverse
Warm
Start
Key: Z
-
TEK(Traf
fic
Encrypti
on Key):
Z
- Warm
Start
Key: Z
Table 10: Approved Services
Page 19 of 27
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Decryption Decoding from ciphertext to plaintext DES OFB Crypto
Officer,
User
Encryption Encoding from plaintext to ciphertext DES OFB Crypto
Officer,
User
Key
Management
Changing/Adding/Generating/Zeroising crypto
key and module parameter.
AES-CBC-
MAC
DES ECB
PRNG
Crypto
Officer,
User
Table 11: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The firmware update is performed via the Firmware Update service, which executes the firmware load
test.
5 Software/Firmware Security
The module’s firmware is provided as the 3059C4_17.MOT (boot and application firmware) or
3059C4_17(F).MOT (just application firmware) binary images.
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module uses CRC-32 as EDC method for the integrity test.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The firmware integrity test is performed every time the module is started / rebooted.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied :
As shown in Table 1, this cryptographic module operates at security level 1.
The module maintains control of its own SSPs retained within the module.
Page 20 of 27
The module’s operational environment consists of firmware with access to SSPs managed wholly by the
module itself. Please see Section 9 for SSP details.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
This module is a hardware module with a limited operational environment.
Cryptographic module stores firmware to flash ROM within cryptographic boundary.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
Production grade components N/A N/A
Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required
This is multi-chip embedded cryptographic module.
The circuitry uses standard passivation techniques and meets Security Level 1. This plug-in module is
contained within a production grade radio enclosure and uses commercially available IC chips.
8 Non-Invasive Security
The cryptographic module does not have non-invasive mitigation techniques.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
DSP RAM Temporary storage of SSP's Dynamic
EEPROM Persistent storage for cryptographic keys Static
Flash ROM Persistent storage of firmware and pre-loaded entropy Static
Table 13: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
KFD Protocol
to DSP RAM
External
KFD
DSP RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
Page 21 of 27
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
KFD Protocol
to EEPROM
External
KFD
EEPROM Plaintext Manual Electronic
OTAR Input
to DSP RAM
External
KMF
DSP RAM Encrypted Wireless Electronic Crypto
Channel
KTS
OTAR Input
to EEPROM
External
KMF
EEPROM Encrypted Wireless Electronic Crypto
Channel
KTS
OTAR Output DSP
RAM
External
KMF
Encrypted Wireless Electronic Crypto
Channel
KTS
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods
KFD stands for Key Fill Device, which functions as a Key Loader.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Firmware
Update
The firmware update
process overwrites the
factory pre-loaded DRBG
SSPs.
Overwritten SSPs are not
recoverable
Invoking firmware
update service
Power lost Module power loss causes
all SSPs stored in volatile
memory to be effectively
overwritten with zeroes.
Zeroised SSPs in volatile
memory are not
recoverable after being
effectively overwritten with
zeroes.
Disconnecting
power from module
host radio.
Zeriose
command
McBSP Command causes
all stored SSPs to be
overwritten with zeroes.
Zeroised SSPs in
EEPROM or DSP RAM
are not recoverable after
being overwritten with
zeroes.
Send the McBSP
command.
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
CTR_DRB
G Key
Used as part of
the internal state
of the DRBG
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6944)
Key
Generati
on
CTR_DRB
G Seed
DRBG input of
entropy input
384 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Manufactur
er Pre-
loaded
Key
Generati
on
Page 22 of 27
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
string and non-
random nonce.
CTR_DRB
G V
counter
Used as part of
the internal state
of the DRBG
128 bits
- 128
bits
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6944)
Key
Generati
on
HMAC
Key
Used for updating
the firmware
512 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetr
ic - CSP
Manufactur
er Pre-
loaded
Firmware
Data
Integrity
KEK (Key
Encryption
Key)
This is a Key
Wrapping Key,
and is used for
encryption/decrypti
on of other
cryptographic Key
in OTAR mode.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetr
ic - CSP
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Channel
KTS
Reverse
Warm
Start Key
Reverse Warm
Start Key is
generated by the
module and used
by OTAR
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetr
ic - CSP
Key
Generation
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Channel
KTS
Key
Generati
on
SP 800-
90B ENT
(P)
Entropy
String
Pre-loaded
entropy input for
DRBG.
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG
CSP -
CSP
Manufactur
er Pre-
loaded
Key
Generati
on
TEK(Traffi
c
Encryption
Key)
Used for
encryption/decrypti
on of voice and
data traffic through
the module's host
radio.
256-bits
- 256-
bits
Symmetr
ic - CSP
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Channel
KTS
Key
Derivatio
n
Warm
Start Key
Warm Start Key is
generated by an
OTAR KMF and
used by OTAR
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetr
ic - CSP
Key
Derivation
Crypto
Channel
Crypto
Channel
KTS
Key
Generati
on
Table 16: SSP Table 1
Page 23 of 27
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related
SSPs
CTR_DRBG
Key
DSP
RAM:Plaintext
Until power
lost
Power lost
CTR_DRBG
Seed
EEPROM:Plaintext
Flash
ROM:Plaintext
Zeriose
command
CTR_DRBG V
counter
DSP
RAM:Plaintext
Until power
lost
Power lost
HMAC Key EEPROM:Plaintext Zeriose
command
KEK (Key
Encryption
Key)
KFD
Protocol to
DSP RAM
KFD
Protocol to
EEPROM
OTAR Input
to DSP
RAM
OTAR Input
to
EEPROM
OTAR
Output
EEPROM:Plaintext Zeriose
command
Reverse Warm
Start Key
OTAR Input
to DSP
RAM
OTAR Input
to
EEPROM
DSP
RAM:Plaintext
Until power
lost or zeroise
command
received.
Zeriose
command
Power lost
SP 800-90B
ENT (P)
Entropy String
EEPROM:Plaintext
Flash
ROM:Plaintext
Zeriose
command
TEK(Traffic
Encryption
Key)
KFD
Protocol to
DSP RAM
KFD
Protocol to
EEPROM
OTAR Input
to DSP
RAM
OTAR Input
to
EEPROM
OTAR
Output
EEPROM:Plaintext Zeriose
command
Page 24 of 27
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related
SSPs
Warm Start
Key
OTAR Input
to DSP
RAM
OTAR Input
to
EEPROM
DSP
RAM:Plaintext
Until power
lost
Zeriose
command
Table 17: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
CRC-32 32-bit CRC KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Status
Output
32 bit CRC Check of
firmware integrity.
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
Decryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Decryption Start-up
AES-CBC
Encryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Encryption Start-up
AES-CMAC
Generation
(A6944)
256 bit key
with 64-bit
MAC length
KAT CAST Status
Output
MAC
Generation
Start-up
AES-ECB
Decryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Encryption Start-up
AES-ECB
Encryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Decryption Start-up
AES-OFB
Decryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Decryption Start-up
AES-OFB
Encryption
(A6944)
256-bits KAT CAST Status
Output
Encryption Start-up
Page 25 of 27
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter
DRBG
(A6944)
AES-256
with DF
KAT CAST Status
Output
SP 800-
90Ar1
Instantiate,
Generate
health tests
Start-up
CRC-16 16-bit CRC Manual
Entry
Test
Manual
Entry
Status
Output
Verify Key load
Firmware
Load Test
HMAC-SHA-
1
Firmware
Load Test
SW/FW
Load
Status
Output
Verify Firmware
update
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A5246)
512 bit key
with 160 bit
MAC length
KAT CAST Status
Output
Verify Start-up
KDF SP800-
108 (A6944)
Counter
Mode with
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Status
Output
Key
Derivation
Start-up
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests
KAT: Known Answer Test
FDT: Fault-Detection Tests
Integrity: Integrity Test
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
CRC-32 KAT SW/FW Integrity On demand Manual
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
Decryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
AES-CBC
Encryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
AES-CMAC
Generation
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
AES-ECB
Decryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
AES-ECB
Encryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
Page 26 of 27
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-OFB
Decryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
AES-OFB
Encryption
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
Counter DRBG
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
CRC-16 Manual Entry
Test
Manual Entry On demand Manual
Firmware Load
Test
Firmware Load
Test
SW/FW Load On demand Manual
HMAC-SHA-1
(A5246)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
KDF SP800-108
(A6944)
KAT CAST On demand Manual
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information
The module does not perform periodic self-tests.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Application
Self-Test
Error
Power-Up Self-Test
failure state in
Application
Program
Application
Self-Test
Error
McBSP
command:Control
Input
McBSP
command:Status
Output : $05
Boot Self-
Test Error
Power-Up Self-Test
failure state in Boot
Program
Boot Self-
Test Error
McBSP
command:Control
Input
McBSP
command:Status
Output : $04
EEPROM
Error
EEPROM's
communication
error state
Boot
EEPROM
Error
Application
EEPROM
Error
McBSP
command:Control
Input
McBSP
command:Status
Output : $03
Table 22: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The module’s pre-operational self-tests and conditional CASTs can be performed on demand by power
cycling the module.
Page 27 of 27
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Install
For the cryptographic module installation, refer the radio service manual.
Secure Initialization
The operator is responsible for ensuring sufficient security strength for the keys being loaded into the
module.
Key Loading Instructions
Crypto-Officer may load keys into the modules using the key loader devices.
The radio hardware communicates with the module through the defined ports.
Each key loaded into the module has an associated key ID which is used to associate the key with a
given radio channel.
Operation of the module
The cryptographic module contains non-approved security functions. Only services which utilize
approved security functions are indicated as such by the module.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Please refer to the McBSP command guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Please refer to the McBSP command guidance.
11.4 Design and Rules
The security rules presented below are a combination of those required by FIPS 140-3 for Level 1 secure
use and the security rules separately implemented by Icom Inc.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The cryptographic module is composed of production grade components which do not require any
maintenance or inspection by the user to ensure security.
11.6 End of Life
When distributing or discarding the cryptographic module to other operators, send the McBSP command
"All Key Zeroise" ($ 77) to initialize and sanitize all cryptographic keys (SSPs).
(Since the cryptographic module does not perform Operator Authentication, it does not retain
authentication data.)
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This module does not support other attack mitigation.