Document is uncontrolled when printed.
LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
FOR
Luna® G5 Cryptographic Module
(Includes configurations Cloning [CL], Signing – No Backup [SNB] and Key
Export [CKE])
DOCUMENT NUMBER: 002-500006-001
REVISION LEVEL: 16
REVISION DATE: May 11, 2018.
SECURITY LEVEL: Non-proprietary
© Copyright 2015-2018 SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC. reserves the right to make changes in the product or its specifications mentioned in this
publication without notice. Accordingly, the reader is cautioned to verify that information in this publication is current before
placing orders. The information furnished by SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC. in this document is believed to be accurate and
reliable. However, no responsibility is assumed by SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC. for its use, or for any infringements of
patents or other rights of third parties resulting from its use.
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PREFACE
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Luna® G5 Cryptographic
Module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More
information is available on the Luna G5 and other SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC (SafeNet
AT) products from the following sources:
 The SafeNet AT internet site contains information on the full line of security products at
http://www.safenetat.com/.
 For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed
below or on the SafeNet AT internet site at http://www.safenetat.com/about/contact/.
SafeNet AT Contact Information:
SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC
(Corporate Headquarters)
3465 Box Hill Corporate
Center Drive, Suite D
Abingdon, MD 21009
Telephone: 443-484-7070
Fax: 443-372-5627
SafeNet AT Customer Service:
U.S. 866-307-7233
govsupport@SafeNetAT.com
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Page
1. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................7
1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Scope........................................................................................................................................ 7
1.3 Overview.................................................................................................................................. 7
2. SECURITY POLICY MODEL INTRODUCTION .............................................................................8
2.1 Functional Overview ................................................................................................................ 8
2.2 Assets to be Protected............................................................................................................. 9
2.3 Operating Environment ......................................................................................................... 10
3. SECURITY POLICY MODEL DESCRIPTION ...............................................................................11
3.1 Operational Policy.................................................................................................................. 11
3.1.1 Module Capabilities........................................................................................................ 12
3.1.2 Partition Capabilities....................................................................................................... 13
3.2 FIPS-Approved Mode............................................................................................................. 18
3.3 Description of Operator, Subject and Object ........................................................................ 18
3.3.1 Operator ......................................................................................................................... 18
3.3.2 Roles ............................................................................................................................... 19
3.3.3 Account Data .................................................................................................................. 19
3.3.4 Subject ............................................................................................................................ 20
3.3.5 Operator – Subject Binding............................................................................................. 20
3.3.6 Object ............................................................................................................................. 21
3.3.7 Object Operations........................................................................................................... 21
3.4 Identification and Authentication.......................................................................................... 22
3.4.1 Authentication Data Generation and Entry.................................................................... 22
3.4.2 Limits on Login Failures .................................................................................................. 22
3.5 Access Control........................................................................................................................ 22
3.5.1 Object Protection............................................................................................................ 24
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3.5.2 Object Re-use.................................................................................................................. 25
3.5.3 Privileged Functions........................................................................................................ 25
3.6 Cryptographic Material Management ................................................................................... 25
3.6.1 Key Cloning ..................................................................................................................... 27
3.6.2 Key Mask/Unmask.......................................................................................................... 27
3.7 Cryptographic Operations...................................................................................................... 27
3.8 Self-tests ................................................................................................................................ 34
3.9 Firmware Security.................................................................................................................. 35
3.10 Physical Security................................................................................................................. 36
3.10.1 Tamper Evident Labels.................................................................................................... 36
3.11 EMI / EMC........................................................................................................................... 37
3.12 Fault Tolerance................................................................................................................... 38
3.13 Mitigation of Other Attacks................................................................................................ 38
3.13.1 External Protection......................................................................................................... 38
3.13.2 Environmental Protection............................................................................................... 38
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page
Table 1-1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements........................................................................................ 7
Table 3-1. Module Capabilities and Policies........................................................................................ 14
Table 3-2. Partition Capabilities and Policies ...................................................................................... 16
Table 3-3. Object Attributes Used in Access Control Policy Enforcement .......................................... 24
Table 3-4. Approved Security Functions for SafeXcel 3120................................................................. 28
Table 3-5. Approved Security Functions for Firmware Implementation............................................. 30
Table 3-6. Allowed Security Functions for Firmware Implementation ............................................... 31
Table 3-7. Non-FIPS Approved Security Functions.............................................................................. 32
Table 3-8. Module Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 34
Table 3-9. TEL-SAFENETAT and TEL-TRAC Tamper Evident Labels....................................................... 37
Table A-1. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...................................................... 39
Table A-2. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms.......................................................................... 39
Table A-3. Services Authorized for Roles............................................................................................. 39
Table A-4. Access Rights within Services............................................................................................. 40
Table A-5. Keys and Critical Security Parameters Used in the Module............................................... 42
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
Figure 2-1. Luna G5 Cryptographic Module (with front bezel attached) .............................................. 9
Figure 2-2. Luna G5 Cryptographic Boundary (with front bezel removed).......................................... 9
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Title Page
APPENDIX A. SECURITY POLICY CHECKLIST TABLES.......................................................................... 39
APPENDIX B. LIST OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .................................................... 45
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the security policies enforced by SafeNet Assured Technologies,
LLC’s (SafeNet AT) Luna® G5 cryptographic module1
.
The Luna G5 cryptographic module is available in the following configurations:
o Cloning [CL];
o Signing – No Backup [SNB]; and
o Key Export [CKE].
This document applies to Hardware Version LTK-03, Version Code 0102 and Hardware
Version LTK-03, Version Code 010323
with Firmware Versions 6.10.7, 6.10.9, and 6.11.2.
1.2 Scope
The security policies described in this document apply to the Password Authentication
(Level 2) configuration of the Luna G5 cryptographic module only and do not include any
security policy that may be enforced by the host appliance or server.
1.3 Overview
The cryptographic module meets all level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2 as summarized in
Table 1-1.
Table 1-1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles and Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Machine Model 2
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
1
Also known as the G5 cryptographic module.
2
The Hardware Version may also be displayed as LTK-03-0102. Both displays represent the same
Hardware Version of the Luna G5 cryptographic module.
3
From the perspectives of functionality and physical security, Hardware Version LTK-03, Version Code 0102 (or LTK-03-0102)
and Hardware Version LTK-03, Version Code 0103 (or LTK-03-0103) are equivalent.
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Table 1-1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements
Security Requirements Section Level
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2
2. SECURITY POLICY MODEL INTRODUCTION
2.1 Functional Overview
The Luna G5 cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic
module in the form of a small desktop device that connects to a computer workstation or
server via USB. The cryptographic module is contained within a secure enclosure that
provides physical resistance to tampering and response if the enclosure is opened. The
cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the
secure enclosure. Figure 2-1 depicts the Luna G5 cryptographic module; Figure 2-2 depicts
the Luna G5 cryptographic boundary.
A module is explicitly configured to operate in either FIPS Level 2 or FIPS Level 3 mode, and
may be configured to operate in a non-FIPS mode of operation. Configuration in FIPS mode
enforces the use of FIPS-approved algorithms only. Configuration in FIPS Level 2 mode
requires the use of passwords for user authentication. Note that selection of FIPS or non-
FIPS mode of operation occurs at initialization of the cryptographic module, and cannot be
changed during normal operation without zeroizing the module’s non-volatile memory.
A cryptographic module is accessed (electrically) via the USB communications interface
(located at the back of the device) with the host computer. A USB port, which is provided at
the front of the device, will be used to support future enhancements / functionality. The
module provides secure key generation and storage for symmetric keys and asymmetric key
pairs along with symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services. Access to key material
and cryptographic services for users and user application software is provided through the
PKCS #11 programming interface. A module may host multiple user definitions or
“partitions” that are cryptographically separated and are presented as “virtual tokens” to
user applications. Each partition must be separately authenticated in order to make it
available for use.
This Security Policy is specifically written for the Luna G5 cryptographic module in a
Password Authentication (FIPS Level 2) configuration.
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Figure 2-1. Luna G5 Cryptographic Module (with front bezel attached)
Figure 2-2. Luna G5 Cryptographic Boundary (with front bezel removed)
2.2 Assets to be Protected
The module is designed to protect the following assets:
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1. User-generated private keys,
2. User-generated secret keys,
3. Cryptographic services, and
4. Module security critical parameters.
2.3 Operating Environment
The module is assumed to operate as a key management and cryptographic processing card
within a security appliance that may operate in a TCP/IP network environment. The host
appliance may be used in an internal network environment when key management security
is a primary requirement. It may also be deployed in environments where it is used
primarily as a cryptographic accelerator, in which case it will often be connected to external
networks. It is assumed that the appliance includes an internal host computer that runs a
suitably secured operating system, with an interface for use by locally connected or remote
administrators and an interface to provide access to the module’s cryptographic functions
by application services running on the host computer. It is also assumed that only known
versions of the application services are permitted to run on the internal host computer of
the appliance.
It is assumed that trained and trustworthy administrators are responsible for the initial
configuration and ongoing maintenance of the appliance and the cryptographic module.
It is assumed that physical access to the cryptographic module will be controlled, and that
connections will be controlled either by accessing the module via a direct local connection
or by accessing it via remote connections controlled by the host operating system and
application service.
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3. SECURITY POLICY MODEL DESCRIPTION
This section provides a narrative description of the security policy enforced by the module,
in its most general form. It is intended both to state the security policy enforced by the
module and to give the reader an overall understanding of the security behavior of the
module. The detailed functional specification for the module is provided elsewhere.
The security behavior of the cryptographic module is governed by the following security
policies:
 Operational Policy
 Identification and Authentication Policy
 Access Control Policy
 Cryptographic Material Management Policy
 Firmware Security Policy
 Physical Security Policy
These policies complement each other to provide assurance that cryptographic material is
securely managed throughout its life cycle and that access to other data and functions
provided by the product is properly controlled. Configurable parameters that determine
many of the variable aspects of the module’s behavior are specified by the higher level
Operational Policy implemented at two levels: the cryptographic module as a whole and
the individual partition. This is described in section 3.1.
The Identification and Authentication policy is crucial for security enforcement and it is
described in section 3.4. The access control policy is the main security functional policy
enforced by the module and is described in section 3.5, which also describes the supporting
object re-use policy. Cryptographic Material Management is described in section 3.6.
Firmware security, physical security and fault tolerance are described in sections 3.8
through 3.12.
3.1 Operational Policy
The module employs the concept of the Operational Policy to control the overall behavior of
the module and each of the partitions within. At each level, either the module or the partition
is assigned a fixed set of “capabilities” that govern the allowed behavior of the module or
individual partition. The Security Officer (SO) establishes the Operational Policy by
enabling/disabling or refining the corresponding policy elements to equate to or to be more
restrictive than the pre-assigned capabilities.
The set of configurable policy elements is a proper subset of the corresponding capability
set. That is, not all elements of the capability set can be refined. Which of the capability set
elements have corresponding policy set elements is pre-determined based on the
“personality” of the partition or manufacturing restrictions placed on the module. For
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example, the module capability setting for “domestic algorithms and key sizes available”
does not have a corresponding configurable policy element.
There are also several fixed settings that do not have corresponding capability set elements.
These are elements of the cryptographic module’s behavior that are truly fixed and,
therefore, are not subject to configuration by the SO. The specific settings4
are the
following:
 Allow/disallow non-sensitive secret keys – fixed as disallow.
 Allow/disallow non-sensitive private keys – fixed as disallow.
 Allow/disallow non-private secret keys – fixed as disallow.
 Allow/disallow non-private private keys – fixed as disallow.
 Allow/disallow secret key creation through the create objects interface – fixed
as disallow.
 Allow/disallow private key creation through the create objects interface – fixed
as disallow.
Further, policy set elements can only refine capability set elements to more restrictive
values. Even if an element of the policy set exists to refine an element of the capability set,
it may not be possible to assign the policy set element to a value other than that held by the
capability set element. Specifically, if a capability set element is set to allow, the
corresponding policy element may be set to either enable or disable. However, if a
capability set element is set to disallow, the corresponding policy element can only be set to
disable. Thus, an SO cannot use policy refinement to lift a restriction set in a capability
definition.
3.1.1 Module Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the module level:
 Allow/disallow non-FIPS algorithms available.
 Allow/disallow password authentication (allowed and must be enabled in Level 2
configuration).
 Allow/disallow partition groups.
 Allow/disallow cloning.
 Allow/disallow masking5
.
4
The nomenclature used for these settings is based on PKCS#11.
5
A SafeNet AT term used to describe the encryption of a key for use only within a SafeNet AT
cryptographic module.
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 Allow/disallow unmasking.
 Allow/disallow Korean algorithms6
 Allow/disallow SO reset of partition PIN7
.
 Allow/disallow network replication.
 Allow/disallow forcing change of User authentication data.
 Allow/disallow Acceleration
3.1.2 Partition Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the partition level. All capability
elements described as “allow/disallow some functionality” are Boolean values where false
(or “0”) equates to disallow the functionality and true (or “1”) equates to allow the
functionality. The remainder of the elements are integer values of the indicated number of
bits.
 Allow/disallow changing of certain key attributes once a key has been created.
 Allow/disallow multipurpose keys.
 Allow/disallow operation without RSA blinding.
 Allow/disallow signing operations with non-local keys.
 Allow/disallow raw RSA operations.
 Allow/disallow private key wrapping
 Allow/disallow private key unwrapping.
 Allow/disallow secret key wrapping
6
Korean algorithms include SEED, ARIA, and KCDSA.
7
In this instance PIN is used generically to represent a Personal Identification Number or a password.
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 Allow/disallow secret key unwrapping
 Allow/disallow RSA signing without confirmation
 Number of failed Partition User logins allowed before partition is locked
out/cleared (default is 10; SO can configure it to be 3 <= N <= 10)
The following capabilities are configurable only if the corresponding capability/policy is
allowed and enabled at the module level:
 Allow/disallow private key cloning.
 Allow/disallow secret key cloning.
 Allow/disallow private key masking.8
 Allow/disallow secret key masking.
 Allow/disallow private key unmasking.
 Allow/disallow secret key unmasking.
The following tables summarize the module and partition capabilities, showing typical
capability settings for Luna G5 cryptographic modules used in the following configurations:
o Key Export (CKE),
o Signing – No Backup (SNB), and
o Cloning (CL).
An X indicates the default capability setting for each configuration of the module. Greyed-
out rows indicate that the corresponding capability setting is not used as a default for any
module configuration.
Table 3-1. Module Capabilities and Policies
Description Capability SNB CKE CL Policy Comments
Non-FIPS
algorithms
available
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the
availability of non-FIPS algorithms at the time the
cryptographic module is initialized.
Disable
Disallow Disable
The cryptographic module must operate using FIPS-
approved algorithms only. Must be disabled in FIPS mode
Password
authentication
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the use of
passwords without trusted path for authentication.
Disable
Disallow Disable
The cryptographic module must operate using the trusted
path and module-generated secrets for authentication.
Cloning
Allow X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the
availability of the cloning function for the cryptographic
module as a whole.
Disable
Disallow X Disable The cryptographic module must operate without cloning.
8
Key masking is a Luna product feature that provides encrypted key output. Key masking is AES
encryption employing additional proprietary obfuscation, which does not provide additional security.
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Description Capability SNB CKE CL Policy Comments
Masking
Allow
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the
availability of the masking function for the cryptographic
module as a whole.
Disable
Disallow X X X Disable The cryptographic module must operate without masking.
Unmasking
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the
availability of the unmasking function for the cryptographic
module as a whole.
Disable
Disallow Disable The cryptographic module must operate without unmasking.
Korean algorithm9
Allow
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable or disable the
availability of Korean algorithms for the cryptographic
module as a whole.
Disable
Disallow X X X Disable
The cryptographic module must operate without Korean
algorithms.
Partition reset
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable a partition to be reset
if it is locked as a result of exceeding the maximum number
of failed login attempts.
Disable
Disallow Disable
A partition cannot be reset and must be re-created as a
result of exceeding the maximum number of failed login
attempts.
Network
Replication
Allow X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable the replication of the
module’s key material over the network to a second
module.
Disable
Disallow X X Disable The module cannot be replicated over the network.
Force user PIN
change
Allow X X X
Enable This capability is set prior to shipment to the customer. If
enabled, it forces the user to change the PIN upon first
login.
Disable
Disallow Disable The user is never forced to change PIN on first login.
Acceleration
Allow X X X
Enable This capability is set prior to shipment to the customer. It
allows the use of the onboard crypto accelerator.
Disable
Disallow Disable Remote authentication cannot be enabled for the module.
9
Korean algorithms are only available upon customer request.
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Table 3-2. Partition Capabilities and Policies
Description Prerequisite Capability SNB KE CL Policy Comments
Multipurpose keys N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable the use of keys for more than one
purpose, e.g., an RSA private key could be used for digital signature and for
decryption for key transport purposes.
Disable
Disallow Disable Keys can only be used for a single purpose.
Change attributes N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the policy to enable changing key attributes.
Disable
Disallow Disable Key attributes cannot be changed.
Operate without RSA
blinding
N/A
Allow X X X
Enable
SO can configure the use of blinding mode for RSA operations. Blinding mode is
used to defeat timing analysis attacks on RSA digital signature operations, but it
also imposes a significant performance penalty on the signature operations.
Disable
Disallow Disable Blinding mode is not used for RSA operations.
Signing with non-local keys N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to sign with externally-generated private keys that
have been imported into the partition.
Disable
Disallow Disable Externally-generated private keys cannot be used for signature operations.
Raw RSA operations N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to use raw (no padding) format for RSA
encrypt/decrypt operations for key transport purposes.
Disable
Disallow Disable Raw RSA cannot be used.
Private key wrapping N/A
Allow X
Enable SO can configure the ability to wrap private keys for export.
Disable
Disallow X X Disable Private keys cannot be wrapped and exported from the partition.
Private key unwrapping N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to unwrap private keys and import them into the
partition.
Disable
Disallow Disable Private keys cannot be unwrapped and imported into the partition.
Secret key wrapping N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to wrap secret keys and export them from the
partition.
Disable
Disallow Disable Secret keys cannot be wrapped and exported from the partition.
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Description Prerequisite Capability SNB KE CL Policy Comments
Secret key unwrapping N/A
Allow X X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to unwrap secret keys and import them into the
partition.
Disable
Disallow Disable Secret keys cannot be unwrapped and imported into the partition.
Private key cloning
Cloning
enabled,
Trusted path
authenticatio
n enabled
Allow X
Enable SO can configure the ability to clone private keys from one module and partition
to another.
Disable
Disallow X X Disable
Private keys cannot be cloned.
Secret key cloning
Cloning
enabled,
Trusted path
authenticatio
n enabled
Allow X X
Enable SO can configure the ability to clone secret keys from one module and partition
to another.
Disable
Disallow X Disable
Secret keys cannot be cloned.
Private key masking
Masking
enabled
Allow
Enable SO can configure the ability to mask private keys for storage outside the
partition.
Disable
Disallow X X X Disable Private keys cannot be masked for storage outside the partition.
Secret key masking
Masking
enabled
Allow
Enable SO can configure the ability to mask secret keys for storage outside the
partition.
Disable
Disallow X X X Disable Secret keys cannot be masked for storage outside the partition.
Private key unmasking
Secret key
cloning
enabled
Allow X X
Enable This setting allows unmasking of private keys.
Disable
Disallow Disable Private keys cannot be unmasked
Secret key unmasking
Secret key
cloning
enabled
Allow X X
Enable This setting allows unmasking of secret keys.
Disable
Disallow Disable Secret keys cannot be unmasked
Minimum / maximum
password length
User
password
authenticatio
n enabled
7-16 characters
Configurabl
e
The SO can configure the minimum password length for Level 2 modules, but
minimum length must always be >= 7.
Number of failed Partition
User logins allowed
N/A
Minimum:1,
Maximum:10
Configurabl
e
The SO can configure; default maximum value is 10.
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3.2 FIPS-Approved Mode
The SO controls operation of a module in FIPS-approved mode, as defined by FIPS PUB 140-2, by
enabling or disabling the appropriate Module Policy settings (assuming each is allowed at the
Module Capability level). To operate in FIPS-approved mode, the following policy settings are
required:
 “Non-FIPS Algorithms Available” must be disabled.
 “Private key wrapping” must be disabled.
 “Private key unwrapping” must be disabled.
 “Secret key wrapping” must be disabled.
 “Secret key unwrapping” must be disabled.
AES and Triple-DES key wrapping and key unwrapping are not allowed when operating in FIPS-
approved mode.
Additionally, for operation at FIPS Level 2:
 “Password authentication” must be enabled (implies that trusted path authentication is
disallowed or disabled), and
 Raw RSA operations can only be used for key transport in FIPS mode.
The policy setting for “Password authentication” may also be configured in the case where “Non-
FIPS Algorithms Available” has been enabled.
If the SO selects policy options (i.e., enables “Non-FIPS Algorithms Available”) that would place a
module in a mode of operation that is not approved, a warning is displayed and the SO is prompted
to confirm the selection. The SO can confirm that the cryptographic module is in FIPS mode by
utilizing the “hsm showinfo” command. With this command, the following message will be
displayed, “The HSM is in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode”.
3.3 Description of Operator, Subject and Object
3.3.1 Operator
An operator is defined as an entity that acts to perform an operation on a module. An operator may
be directly mapped to a responsible individual or organization, or it may be mapped to a composite
of a responsible individual or organization plus an agent (application program) acting on behalf of
the responsible individual or organization.
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In the case of a Certification Authority (CA), for example, the organization may empower one
individual or a small group of individuals acting together to operate a cryptographic module as part
of the company’s service. The operator might be that individual or group, particularly if they are
interacting with a module locally. The operator might also be the composite of the individual or
group, who might still be present locally to a module, plus the CA application running on a network-
attached host computer.
3.3.2 Roles
In a Level 2 configuration (Password Authentication), the Luna cryptographic module supports the
following authenticated roles: the Security Officer (SO), Audit Officer10
, and Partition User. It also
supports one unauthenticated operator role, the Public User, primarily to permit access to status
information and diagnostics before authentication.
The SO is a privileged role, which exists only at the module level, whose primary purpose is to
initially configure the module for operation and to perform security administration tasks such as
partition creation.
The Audit Officer is a privileged role, which exists only at the module level to initialize, configure,
and manage secure audit logging. Only the Audit Officer can initialize, configure and manage the
secure audit logging feature. This allows for a separation of duties between an Audit Officer and the
other roles (e.g., SO, Partition User) that the Audit Officer is auditing – preventing administrative
and user personnel from tampering with the log files and preventing the Audit Officer from
performing administrative tasks or from accessing keys.
The Partition User is the key management and user role for the partition. The SO, by disabling the
“User Key Management” policy (see Table 3-1), can limit the Partition User to a read-only role that
limits the operator to performing cryptographic operations only.
For an operator to assume any role other than Public User, the operator must be identified and
authenticated. The following conditions must hold in order to assume one of the authenticated
roles:
 No operator can assume the Audit Officer, Partition User or Security Officer role before
identification and authentication;
 No identity can assume more than one authenticated roles at the same time. e.g., Partition
User, plus the Security Officer role, or Audit Officer, plus Security Officer.
For additional information regarding roles and authorized services, please refer to Table A-1 and
Table A-3.
3.3.3 Account Data
10
Within the confines of the operational use of the Luna cryptographic module, the FIPS 140-2 term of “Crypto
Officer” encompasses the Luna cryptographic module roles of “Security Officer” and “Audit Officer”.
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The module maintains the following User and SO account data:
 Partition ID or SO ID number.
 Partition User encrypted or SO encrypted authentication data (checkword).
 Partition User authentication challenge secret (one for each role, as applicable).
 Partition User locked out flag.
An authenticated User is referred to as a Partition User. The ability to manipulate the account data
is restricted to the SO and the Partition User. The specific restrictions are as described below:
1. Only the Security Officer role can create (initialize) and delete the following security attributes:
o Partition ID.
o Checkword.
2. If Partition reset is allowed and enabled, the SO role only can modify the following security
attribute:
o Locked out flag for Partition User.
3. Only the Partition User can modify the following security attribute:
o Checkword for Partition User.
4. Only the Security Officer role can change the default value, query, modify and delete the
following security attribute:
o Checkword for Security Officer.
3.3.4 Subject
For purposes of this security policy, the subject is defined to be a module session. The session
provides a logical means of mapping between applications connecting to a module and the
processing of commands within a module. Each session is tracked by the Session ID, the Partition ID
and the Access ID, which is a unique ID associated with the application’s connection. It is possible to
have multiple open sessions with a module associated with the same Access ID/Partition ID
combination. It is also possible for a module to have sessions opened for more than one Partition ID
or have multiple Access IDs with sessions opened on a module. Applications running on remote host
systems that require data and cryptographic services from a module must first connect via the
communications service within the appliance, which will establish the unique Access ID for the
connection and then allow the application to open a session with one of the partitions within a
module. A local application (e.g., command line administration interface) will open a session
directly with the appropriate partition within a module without invoking the communications
service.
3.3.5 Operator – Subject Binding
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An operator must access a partition through a session. A session is opened with a partition in an
unauthenticated state and the operator must be authenticated before any access to cryptographic
functions and Private objects within the partition can be granted. Once the operator is successfully
identified and authenticated, the session state becomes authenticated and is bound to the Partition
User represented by the Partition ID. Any other sessions opened with the same Access ID/Partition
ID combination will share the same authentication state and be bound to the same Partition User.
3.3.6 Object
An object is defined to be any formatted data held in volatile or non-volatile memory on behalf of an
operator. For the purposes of this security policy, the objects of primary concern are private
(asymmetric) keys and secret (symmetric) keys.
3.3.7 Object Operations
Object operations may only be performed by a Partition User. The operations that may be
performed are limited by the role associated with the user’s login state, see section 3.5. New
objects can be made in several ways. The following list identifies operations that produce new
objects:
o Create,
o Copy,
o Generate,
o Unwrapping,
o Derive.
Existing objects can be modified and deleted. The values of a subset of attributes can be changed
through a modification operation. Objects can be deleted through a destruction operation.
Constant operations do not cause creation, modification or deletion of an object. These constant
operations include:
 Query an object’s size;
 Query the size of an attribute;
 Query the value of an attribute;
 Use the value of an attribute in a cryptographic operation;
 Search for objects based on matching attributes;
 Cloning an object;
 Wrapping an object; and
 Masking and unmasking an object.
Secret keys and private keys are always maintained as Sensitive objects and, therefore, they are
permanently stored with the key value encrypted to protect its confidentiality. Key objects held in
volatile memory do not have their key values encrypted, but they are subject to active zeroization in
the event of a module reset or in response to a tamper event. For additional information about the
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clearing of sensitive data, see Section 3.13. Operators are not given direct access to key values for
any purpose.
3.4 Identification and Authentication
3.4.1 Authentication Data Generation and Entry
The module requires that Partition Users, the Audit Officer, and the SO be authenticated by proving
knowledge of a secret shared by the operator and the module. The FIPS mode is determined when
the module is initialized: a module that is to support Level 2 mode must be initialized using a
password to define the SO authentication data.
For a module operating in FIPS Level 2 mode, the SO must enable the “User password
authentication” (implies that the trusted path authentication is disallowed or disabled). The SO
defines a user password when a partition is created. The minimum length of the password must
always be equal to or greater than 7 characters, and up to 16 characters.
3.4.2 Limits on Login Failures
The module also implements a maximum login attempts policy. The policy differs for an SO
authentication data search, a Partition User authentication data search, or an Audit Officer data
search.
In the case of an SO authentication data search:
 If three (3) consecutive SO logon attempts fail, a module is zeroized.
In the case of a Partition User authentication data search, one of two responses will occur,
depending on the partition policy:
1. If “Partition reset” is Allowed and Enabled, then if “n” (“n” is set by the SO at the time
the cryptographic module is initialized) consecutive operator logon attempts fail, the
module flags the event in the Partition User’s account data, locks the Partition User and
clears the volatile memory space. The SO must unlock the partition in order for the
Partition User to resume operation.
2. If “Partition reset” is not Allowed or not Enabled, then if “n” consecutive Partition User
logon attempts via the physical trusted path fail, the module will erase the partition.
The SO must delete and re-create the partition. Any objects stored in the partition,
including private and secret keys, are permanently erased.
In the case of an Audit Officer data search:
 If three consecutive Audit Officer logon attempts fail, the Audit Officer account will be
locked for 60 seconds. After the 60 second lockout timeout, the Audit Officer may
attempt to logon to the module again.
3.5 Access Control
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The Access Control Policy is the main security function policy enforced by a module. It governs the
rights of a subject to perform privileged functions and to access objects stored in a module. It
covers the object operations detailed in section 3.3.7.
A subject’s access to objects stored in a module is mediated on the basis of the following subject
and object attributes:
 Subject attributes:
o Session ID
o Access ID and Partition ID associated with session
o Session authentication state (binding to authenticated Partition identity and role)
 Object attributes:
o Owner. A Private object is owned by the Partition User associated with the subject that
produces it. Ownership is enforced via internal key management.
o Private. If True, the object is Private. If False, the object is Public.
o Sensitive. If True, object is Sensitive. If False, object is Non-Sensitive.
o Extractable11
. If True, object may be extracted. If False, object may not be extracted.
o Modifiable. If True, object may be modified. If False, object may not be modified.
Objects are labelled with a number corresponding to their partition and are only accessible by a subject
associated with the owning Partition ID. Only generic data and certificate objects can be non-sensitive.
Sensitive objects are encrypted using the partition’s secret key to prevent their values from ever being
exposed to external entities. Key objects are always created as Sensitive objects and can only be used
for cryptographic operations by a logged in Partition User. Key objects that are marked as extractable
may be exported from a module using the Wrap operation if allowed and enabled in the partition’s
policy set. Table 3-3 summarizes the object attributes used in Access Control Policy enforcement.
11Extract means to remove the key from the control of the module. This is typically done using the Wrap
operation, but the Mask operation is also considered to perform an extraction when cloning is enabled for the
container.
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Table 3-3. Object Attributes Used in Access Control Policy Enforcement
Attribute Values Impact
PRIVATE
TRUE – Object is private to (owned by) the operator identified
as the Access Owner when the object is created.
Object is only accessible to subjects (sessions) bound to the
operator identity that owns the object.
FALSE – Object is not private to one operator identity. Object is accessible to all subjects associated with the
partition in which the object is stored.
SENSITIVE
TRUE – Attribute values representing plaintext key material
are not permitted to exist (value encrypted).
Key material is stored in encrypted form.
FALSE – Attribute values representing plaintext data are
permitted to exist.
Plaintext data is stored with the object and is accessible to all
subjects otherwise permitted access to the object.
MODIFIABLE
TRUE – The object’s attribute values may be modified. The object is “writeable” and its attribute values can be
changed during a copy or set attribute operation.
FALSE – The object’s values may not be modified. The object can only be read and only duplicate copies can be
made.
EXTRACTABLE
TRUE – Key material stored with the object may be extracted
from the Luna cryptographic module using the Wrap
operation.
The ability to extract a key permits sharing with other crypto
modules and archiving of key material.
FALSE – Key material stored with the object may not be
extracted from the Luna cryptographic module.
Keys must never leave a module’s control.
The module does not allow any granularity of access other than owner or non-owner (i.e., a Private
object cannot be accessible by two Partition Users and restricted to other Partition Users). Ownership
of a Private object gives the owner access to the object through the allowed operations but does not
allow the owner to assign a subset of rights to other operators. Allowed operations are those permitted
by the cryptographic module and Partition Capability and Policy settings.
The policy is summarized by the following statements:
 A subject may perform an allowed operation on an object if the object is in the partition with
which the subject is associated and one of the following two conditions holds:
1. The object is a “Public” object, i.e., the PRIVATE attribute is FALSE, or
2. The subject is bound to the Partition User that owns the object.
 Allowed operations are those permitted by the object attribute definitions within the
constraints imposed by the module and Partition Capability and Policy settings.
3.5.1 Object Protection
The module cryptographically protects the values of sensitive objects stored in its internal flash memory.
Sensitive values are protected using AES 256 bit encryption with three different keys – each having a
separate protection role. The three keys used to protect sensitive object values are the following:
 User Storage Key (USK)/Security Officer Master Key (SMK) – this key is created by the
cryptographic module when the User or SO is created. It is used to maintain cryptographic
separation between users’ keys.
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 Master Tamper Key (MTK) – this key is securely held by the on-board cryptographic and security
co-processor chip. It encrypts keys as they are generated to ensure that they can only be used
by the co-processor itself or with authorization from it.
 Key Encryption Key (KEK) – this key is stored in battery-backed RAM in the module. It also
encrypts all sensitive object values and is used to provide the “decommissioning” feature. The
KEK is erased in response to an external decommission signal. This provides the capability to
prevent access to sensitive objects in the event that the module has become unresponsive or
has lost access to primary power.
3.5.2 Object Re-use
The access control policy is supported by an object re-use policy. The object re-use policy requires that
the resources allocated to an object be cleared of their information content before they are re-allocated
to a different object.
3.5.3 Privileged Functions
The module shall restrict the performance of the following functions to the SO role only:
 Module initialization
 Partition creation and deletion
 Configuring the module and partition policies
 Module zeroization
 Firmware update
3.6 Cryptographic Material Management
Cryptographic material (key) management functions protect the confidentiality of key material
throughout its life-cycle. The FIPS PUB 140-2 approved key management functions provided by the
module are the following:
(1) Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG) in accordance with NIST SP 800-90A section 10.2.1.
(2) Cryptographic key generation in accordance with the following indicated standards:
a. RSA 2048-4096 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2, FIPS PUB 186-4 and ANSI
X9.31.
b. Triple-DES 112 bits12
and 168 bits (SP 800-67).
12
To use the two-key Triple-DES algorithm to encrypt data or wrap keys in an Approved mode of operation, the
module operator shall ensure that the same two-key Triple-DES key is not used for encrypting data (or wrapping
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c. AES 128, 192, 256 bits (FIPS PUB 197).
d. DSA 2048 and 3072 bit key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2 and FIPS PUB 186-4.
e. Elliptic Curve key pairs (curves in accordance with SP 800-57) in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2
and FIPS PUB 186-4.
f. Diffie-Hellman key pairs.
g. Key Derivation in accordance with NIST SP 800-108 (Counter mode).
(3) Diffie-Hellman (2048 bits) (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength). 13
(4) EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (curves in accordance with SP 800-57) key establishment in accordance
with NIST SP 800-56A.
(5) Encrypted key storage (using AES 256 bit encryption) and key access following the PKCS #11
standard.
(6) Destruction of cryptographic keys is performed in one of three ways as described below in
accordance with the PKCS #11 and FIPS PUB 140-2 standards:
a. An object on a Luna cryptographic module that is destroyed using the PKCS #11 function
C_DestroyObject is marked invalid and remains encrypted with the Partition User's key or a Luna
cryptographic module’s general secret key until such time as its memory locations (flash or
RAM) are re-allocated for additional data on a Luna cryptographic module, at which time they
are purged and zeroized before re-allocation.
b. Objects on a Luna cryptographic module that are destroyed as a result of authentication failure
are zeroized (all flash blocks in the Partition User’s memory turned to 1's). If it is an SO
authentication failure, all flash blocks used for key and data storage on a Luna cryptographic
module are zeroized.
c. Objects on a Luna cryptographic module that are destroyed through C_InitToken (the SO-
accessible command to initialize a Luna cryptographic module available through the API) are
zeroized, along with the rest of the flash memory being used by the SO and Partition Users.
keys) with more than 220
plaintext data (or plaintext keys). Please refer to Section 2 of SP 800-131A for
restriction information regarding its use until December 31, 2015.
13
Non-Approved but allowed method in FIPS mode.
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Keys are always stored as secret key or private key objects with the Sensitive attribute set. The key
value is, therefore, stored in encrypted form using the owning Partition User’s Storage Key (USK) and the
Master Tamper Key (MTK) stored in the on-board co-processor chip. Access to keys is never provided
directly to a calling application. A handle to a particular key is returned that can be used by the
application in subsequent calls to perform cryptographic operations.
Private key and secret key objects may be imported into a module using the Unwrap, Unmask (if cloning
and unmasking are enabled at the module level) or Derive operation under the control of the Access
Control Policy. Any externally-set attributes of keys imported in this way are ignored by a module and
their attributes are set by a module to values required by the Access Control Policy.
3.6.1 Key Cloning
Key cloning is a Luna product feature that uses a one-time 3-key Triple-DES key as a session key to
encrypt an object being transferred from one Luna module to another. Objects transferred using the
cloning protocol may be keys, user data, or module data. The Triple-DES session encrypting key is
obtained by combining the 24 byte cloning domain value (randomly generated by the module) with
random one-time data generated by source and target modules and exchanged using RSA 4096-based
transport.
3.6.2 Key Mask/Unmask
Key masking is a Luna product feature that uses a 256-bit AES key, which is unique to the module, to
encrypt a key object for output in a way that ensures the key can only be imported, by unmasking, into
the module from which it originally came or one that has been initialized to contain the same “master”
key for the module. The key mask operation takes a key handle as input and uses the module’s
validated AES implementation to create the masked key output.
The key unmask operation takes a masked (encrypted) key object as input, performs the necessary
decryptions inside the module and returns a handle to the imported key.
Note that for both mask and unmask operations, the user (or calling application acting on the user’s
behalf) never has access to the actual key values – only handles assigned to the key objects in the
module.
3.7 Cryptographic Operations
Because of its generic nature, the module’s cryptographic co-processor and firmware support a wide
range of cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms. The approved cryptographic functions and
algorithms that are relevant to the FIPS 140-2 validation are the following:
1. Symmetric encryption/decryption: Triple-DES 112 bits14
and 168 bits (SP 800-67).
14
To use the two-key Triple-DES algorithm to encrypt data in an Approved mode of operation, the module
operator shall ensure that the same two-key Triple-DES key is not used for encrypting datawith more than 220
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2. Symmetric encryption/decryption: AES 128, 192, 256 bits (FIPS PUB 197).
3. Signature generation (FIPS PUB 186-4): RSA 2048-3072 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5) with SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RSA 2048-3072 bits (PSS) with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
RSA 2048-3072 bits (ANSI X9.31) with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512; DSA 2048-3072
bits with SHA-224, SHA-256; ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.
4. Signature verification (FIPS PUB 186-4): RSA 1024-3072 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5) with SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RSA 1024-3072 bits (PSS) with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, RSA 1024-3072 bits (ANSI X9.31) with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512; DSA 1024-3072 bits with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256; ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512.
5. Signature generation (FIPS PUB 186-2): RSA 2048-4096 bits with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512.
6. Signature verification (FIPS PUB 186-2): RSA 1024-4096 bits with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512; DSA 1024 bits with SHA-1.
7. Hash generation SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (FIPS PUB 180-4).
8. Keyed hash generation HMAC using SHA-115
, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (FIPS PUB
198-1).
9. Message authentication Triple-DES MAC (FIPS PUB 113) and CMAC (NIST SP 800-38B).
10. Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG) (NIST SP 800-90A section 10.2.1)
Table 3-4. Approved Security Functions for SafeXcel 3120
Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
AES: (ECB, CBC, GCM); Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 192, 256) 2664
Triple-DES: (TECB, TCBC); Encrypt/Decrypt KO 1,2)16 1598
Hashing
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Byte Only) 2237
Message Authentication Code
plaintext data (or plaintext keys). Please refer to Section 2 of SP 800-131A for restriction information regarding
its use until December 31, 2015.
15
Only keys of 112 bits or greater are allowed in FIPS mode when using HMAC-SHA-1.
16
To use the two-key Triple-DES algorithm to encrypt data in an Approved mode of operation, the module
operator shall ensure that the same two-key Triple-DES key is not used for encrypting data with more than 220
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
HMAC-SHA-117
, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 1655
Triple-DES MAC (based on Certificate No. 1598) Vendor Affirmed
Asymmetric
RSA:
FIPS186-2: ALG[ANSIX9.31]; KEYGEN(Y); (MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096 PubKey Values: 3, 17, 65537); SIG (gen);
(MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096; SIG (ver) (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096); ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5];
SIG(gen); (MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096); SIG(ver); (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096); ALG[RSASSA-PSS];
SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096); SIG (ver) (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096);
1369
DSA:
FIPS186-4: PQG(gen): [ (2048, 224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ); ]
KEYGEN: [ (2048,224); (2048,256) (3072,256) ]
SIG(gen): [ (2048,224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ); ]
SIG(ver): [ (1024,160) SHA( 1 ); (2048,224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ); ]
804
ECDSA:
FIPS186-4: PKG: CURVES ( P-224; P-256; P-384) Testing Candidates
SIG(gen): CURVES ( P-224: (SHA-224) P-256: (SHA-224, 256); P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384)
SIG(ver): CURVES ( P-192: (SHA-1); P-224: (SHA-1, 224); P-256: (SHA-1, 224, 256) P-384: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384)
461
Random Number Generation
NIST SP 800-90A DRBG (CTR) AES-256 428
plaintext data (or plaintext keys). Please refer to Section 2 of SP 800-131A for restriction information regarding
its use until December 31, 2015.
17
Only keys of 112 bits or greater are allowed in FIPS mode when using HMAC-SHA-1.
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Table 3-5. Approved Security Functions for Firmware Implementation
Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
AES: (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, GCM); Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 192, 256) 2668
Triple-DES: (TECB, TCBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB64); Encrypt/Decrypt KO 1,2) 18
1600
Hashing
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Byte Only) 2241
Message Authentication Code
HMAC-SHA-119
, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 1659
Triple-DES MAC (based on Certificate No. 1600) Vendor Affirmed
AES CMAC (Key Sizes Tested: 128 192 256) 2668
Asymmetric
RSA:
FIPS186-2: [ANSIX9.31]; KEYGEN ) (MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096 PubKey Values: 3, 17, 65,537 ); SIG (gen) ) (MOD:
2048, 3072, 4096); SIG (ver) (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096); [RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]; SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048,
3072, 4096); SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); SIG(ver); (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096); SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512);
[RSASSA-PSS]; SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048, 3072, 4096); SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); SIG(ver); (MOD: 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072, 4096) SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512))
FIPS 186-4: KEY(gen):
[ANSIX9.31] (MOD: 2048, 3072); SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048 SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); 3072); SHA(224, 256, 384, 512) ;
SIG (ver) (MOD: 1024 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512); 2048 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512); 3072); SHA(1, 224, 256, 384,
512)); [RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]; SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048 SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); 3072); SHA(224, 256, 384, 512);
SIG(ver); (MOD: 1024 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512); (2048 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512); 3072; SHA(1, 224, 256, 384,
512); ALG[RSASSA-PSS]; SIG(gen) (MOD: 2048 SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); 3072); SHA(224, 256, 384, 512); SIG(ver);
(MOD: 1024 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512), 2048 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512), 3072 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512))
1372
DSA:
FIPS186-2: SIG(ver) MOD (1024)
FIPS186-4:
KEYGEN: [ (2048, 224); (2048,256); (3072,256) ]
SIG(gen): [ (2048, 224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ) ]
SIG(ver): [ (1024,160) SHA( 1 ); (2048, 224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ) ]
808
18
To use the two-key Triple-DES algorithm to encrypt data in an Approved mode of operation, the module
operator shall ensure that the same two-key Triple-DES key is not used for encrypting data with more than 220
plaintext data (or plaintext keys). Please refer to Section 2 of SP 800-131A for restriction information regarding
its use until December 31, 2015.
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
ECDSA:
FIPS186-2: PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
SIG(ver): CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
FIPS186-4: PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571) Testing
Candidates
SIG(gen): CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384,
512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)
K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-224,
256, 384, 512) B-233 (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-
571: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)
SIG(ver): CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) P-384: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512)
K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-409:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233 (SHA-1,
224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512)
464
Key Agreement Scheme
ECC: ( ASSURANCES )
SCHEMES [ Ephemeral Unified ( KARole(s): Initiator / Responder )
( ( EB: P-224 SHA224 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 ) ( EC: P-256 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 ) ( ED: P-
384 SHA384 SHA512 ) ( EE: P-521 ) ]
[ OnePassDH ( No_KC: [N/A] ) ( KARole(s): Initiator / Responder )
( EB: P-224 SHA224 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 HMAC )
( EC: P-256 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 HMAC ) ( ED: P-384 SHA384 SHA512 HMAC )
( EE: P-521 ) ]
44
Key Derivation
NIST SP 800-108 (Counter Mode) 15
Table 3-6. Allowed Security Functions for Firmware Implementation
Allowed Security Functions
Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
Non-FIPS Approved security functions are not available for use when the module has been configured to operate
in FIPS-approved mode, see section 3.2.
19
Only keys of 112 bits or greater are allowed in FIPS mode when using HMAC-SHA-1.
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Table 3-7. Non-FIPS Approved Security Functions
Non-FIPS Approved Security Functions
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
DES
RC2
RC4
RC5
CAST5
SEED
ARIA
Hashing
MD2
MD5
HAS-160
Message Authentication Code
AES MAC (non-compliant)
DES-MAC
RC2-MAC
RC5-MAC
CAST5-MAC
SSL3-MD5-MAC20
SSL3-SHA1-MAC21
20
Used by the TLS protocol. TLS has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or the CMVP.
21
Used by the TLS protocol. TLS has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or the CMVP.
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HMAC (Cert #1659, Cert #1655 – non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Asymmetric
KCDSA
RSA X-509
RSA (Cert #1369, Cert #1372 – non compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
DSA (Cert #804, Cert #808 – non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
ECDSA (Cert #461, Cert #464 – non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Generate Key
DES
RC2
RC4
RC5
CAST5
SEED
ARIA
GENERIC-SECRET
SSL PRE-MASTER22
Key Agreement
ECC (non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology; non-compliant less than 112 bits)
Key Transport
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength)
AES (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
22
Used by the TLS protocol. TLS has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or the CMVP.
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Triple-DES (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
Entropy Source
Hardware Random Number Generator (free-running local oscillators)
3.8 Self-tests
The module provides self-tests on power-up and on request to confirm the firmware integrity, and to
check the random number generator and each of the implemented cryptographic algorithms.
Table 3-8. Module Self-Tests
Test When Performed Where Performed Indicator
Boot loader performs a SHA-1 integrity check of the
firmware prior to firmware start
Power-on Firmware Module halt23
Boot loader performs ECDSA integrity check of the
binary running on the 3120.
Power-on Hardware Module halt
DRBG Instantiate Function Known Answer Test (KAT) Power-on Hardware Module halt
DRBG Generate Function KAT Power-on Hardware Module halt
DRBG Reseed Function KAT Power-on Hardware Module halt
DRBG Uninstantiate Function KAT Power-on Hardware Module halt
Triple-DES KATs (e / d) Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt24
SHA-1 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
SHA-224 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
SHA-256 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
SHA-384 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
SHA-512 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
HMAC SHA-1 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
HMAC SHA-224 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
HMAC SHA-256 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
HMAC SHA-384 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
HMAC SHA-512 KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
RSA sig-gen KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
23 Details of the failure can be obtained from the dual-port following a module halt.
24
An error message is output, the cryptographic module halts, and data output is inhibited.
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Test When Performed Where Performed Indicator
RSA sig-ver KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
DSA sig-gen KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
DSA sig-ver KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
Diffie-Hellman KAT Power-on/Request Firmware Module halt / Error - Halt
AES KATs (e / d) Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
AES-GCM KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
ECDH KAT Power-on/Request Firmware Module halt / Error - Halt
ECDSA sig-gen KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
ECDSA sig-ver KAT Power-on/Request Firmware / Hardware Module halt / Error - Halt
KDF KAT Power-on/Request Firmware Module halt / Error - Halt
DRBG conditional tests Continuous Firmware / Hardware Error - Halt
HRNG conditional tests Continuous Firmware / Hardware Error - Halt
RSA – Pair-wise consistency test (asymmetric key
pairs)
On generation Firmware / Hardware Error
DSA – Pair-wise consistency test (asymmetric key
pairs)
On generation Firmware / Hardware Error
ECDSA – Pair-wise consistency test (asymmetric key
pairs)
On generation Firmware / Hardware Error
Firmware load test (4096-bit RSA sig ver) On firmware update load Firmware Error – module will continue
with existing firmware
While the module is running Power-On Self Tests (POST) all interfaces are disabled until the successful
completion of the self-tests.
3.9 Firmware Security
The Firmware Security Policy assumes that any firmware images loaded in conformance with the policy
have been verified by SafeNet AT to ensure that the firmware will function correctly. The policy applies
to initial firmware loading and subsequent firmware updates.
The module shall not allow external software25 to be loaded inside its boundary. Only properly
formatted firmware may be loaded. The communication of initial or updated firmware to a target
module shall be initiated by a SafeNet AT module dedicated to that function. Firmware shall be digitally
signed using the SafeNet AT Manufacturing signature key and encrypted using a secret key that can be
derived (based on an internally held secret key) by the receiving module for decryption. RSA (4096 bits)
PKCS #1 V1.5 with SHA-256 is used as the approved signature method. The unencrypted firmware must
not be visible outside a module before, during, and after the loading operation.
25 External software means any form of executable code that has been generated by anyone other than SafeNet
AT and has not been properly formatted and signed as a legitimate SafeNet AT firmware image.
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The Boot Loader shall provide an integrity check to ensure the integrity of the firmware and to ensure
the integrity of any permanent security-critical data stored within a cryptographic module.
3.10 Physical Security
The Luna cryptographic module is a multi-chip stand-alone module as defined by FIPS PUB 140-2 section
4.5. The module is enclosed in a strong metal enclosure that provides tamper-response. Any tampering
that might compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual inspection of the tamper evident
labels on the module. Refer to Section 3.10.1 Tamper Evident Labels for more information on the
tamper evident labels.
Opening or removing the enclosure will cause a tamper signal and the module will respond as described
below. Within the metal enclosure, a hard opaque epoxy covers the circuitry of the cryptographic
module. Attempts to remove this epoxy will cause sufficient damage to the cryptographic module so
that it is rendered inoperable.
The module’s enclosure is opaque to resist visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the
device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device.
The plaintext Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) stored inside the module are the Master Tamper Key
(MTK), the Key Encryption Key (KEK) and the Token/Module Variable Key (TVK), which is used to
implement the auto-activation feature. The MTK is stored in the battery-backed RAM in the security co-
processor chip and the KEK and TVK are stored in the module’s battery-backed RAM. The MTK and TVK
are erased in the event of a tamper detection from the enclosure tamper signal. The KEK is erased when
a decommission signal is received.
The module also senses and responds to out-of-range temperature and voltage conditions. In the event
that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or voltage, it will clear all working memory and
halt operations. It can be reset and placed back into operation when proper operating conditions have
been restored.
3.10.1 Tamper Evident Labels
There are two tamper evident labels used on the module’s enclosure: one covering a screw on the left
side of the enclosure and one covering a screw on the rear side of the enclosure.
Figure 3-1. Tamper Evident Label Locations
Two variants of tamper evident labels have been evaluated for use with this module: TEL-SAFENETAT
and TEL-TRAC. Either of these tamper evident labels can be used in the FIPS-validated configuration of
the module. Refer to the photographs in Table 3-9 to identify the different tamper evident label
variants.
Serialized Tamper
Evident Labels
Seal Location #1 Seal Location #2
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TEL-SAFENETAT TEL-TRAC
Table 3-9. TEL-SAFENETAT and TEL-TRAC Tamper Evident Labels
Tamper evident labels are applied to the module during the manufacturing process. The Security Officer
should perform a visual inspection of the tamper evident labels for evidence of tamper
3.11 EMI / EMC
The module conforms to FCC Part 15 Class B requirements for home use.
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3.12 Fault Tolerance
If power is lost to a module for whatever reason, the module shall, at a minimum, maintain itself in a
state that it can be placed back into operation when power is restored without compromise of its
functionality or permanently stored data.
A module shall maintain its secure state26
in the event of data input/output failures. When data
input/output capability is restored the module will resume operation in the state it was prior to the
input/output failure.
3.13 Mitigation of Other Attacks
3.13.1 External Protection
The external metal enclosure of the G5 has a lid removal detection mechanism which, when triggered
will cause a tamper event to be communicated to the cryptographic module. When the external tamper
signal is asserted the NVRAM in the SafeXcel 3120 device is zeroized.
Timing attacks are mitigated directly by a module through the use of hardware accelerator chips, with
built-in protection against such attacks, for crypto operations. The use of hardware acceleration
ensures, for example, that all RSA signature operations complete in very nearly the same time, therefore
making the analysis of timing differences irrelevant. RSA blinding may also be selected as an option to
further mitigate this type of attack.
3.13.2 Environmental Protection
While in operation the G5 will monitor the card input voltage, temperature, and battery state.
The G5 monitors input voltage to the CCA. The upper voltage limit is 12.7V. All on-board voltages are
derived from the 12V input.
The G5 monitors the operating temperature of the assembly. Temperature excursions outside the 0
degrees Celsius to 60 degrees Celsius range are signaled as an exception to both the CPU and the
SafeXcel 3120.
In the event that both power and the battery are removed, the G5 will zeroize the SafeXcel 3120
NVRAM.
26 A secure state is one in which either a Luna cryptographic module is operational and its security policy
enforcement is functioning correctly, or it is not operational and all sensitive material is stored in a
cryptographically protected form on a Luna cryptographic module.
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APPENDIX A. SECURITY POLICY CHECKLIST TABLES
Table A-1. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
Security Officer Role-based Level 2 – Password
Audit Officer Role-based Level 2 – Password
Partition User Role-based Level 2 – Password
Public User Not required N/A
Table A-2. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Password (Level 2) Configurable by SO from 7 to 16 characters. The probability of
guessing the challenge secret in a single attempt is 1 in 627
(approximately 3.5 x 1012). With login failure thresholds of 3 for
SO and configurable from 1 to 15 (default 10) for users, this
ensures the FIPS 140-2 required thresholds can never be
reached.
All services listed in Tables A-3 and A-4 can be accessed in FIPS and non-FIPS mode. The services
listed in Tables A-3 and A-4 use the security functions listed in Table 3-4, Table 3-5, Table 3-6, and
Table 3-7. When the module is operating in FIPS-approved mode as described in Section 3.2, the
Non-FIPS Approved Security Functions in Table 3-7 are disabled and cannot be used for these
services. The non-Approved functions in Table 3-7 can only be accessed through the services when
the module is in non-FIPS Approved mode.
Table A-3. Services Authorized for Roles
Role Authorized Services
Security Officer Show Status, Self-test, Initialize Module, Configure Module Policy, Create Partition, Configure Partition
Policy, Zeroize, Firmware Update
Audit Officer Show Status, Initialize and Configure Secure Audit Logging, Change Audit Officer’s Password, Verify
Secure Audit Log Files, Import and Export Secure Audit Log Files, Synchronize Module Clock with the
Clock of the Host System, Import and Export the Wrapped Secure Audit Logging Key, Show Secure Audit
Log Status.
Partition User Show Status, Self-test, Key and Key Pair Generation, Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt, Asymmetric
Signature/Verification, Symmetric & Asymmetric Key Wrap/Unwrap, Symmetric & Asymmetric Key
Mask/Unmask, Store Data Object, Read Data Object, Partition Backup and Restore
Public User Show Status, Self-test, Store Public Data Object, Read Public Data Object
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Table A-4. Access Rights within Services
Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Role Type(s) of Access
Show Status27 N/A All N/A
Self-test N/A SO and Partition User N/A
Initialize Module Authentication data via trusted path SO Write – SO authentication data
Configure Module Policy Authentication data via trusted path SO Use28
Create Partition Authentication data via trusted path SO Write – User authentication data
Configure Partition Policy Authentication data via trusted path SO Use
Zeroize Authentication data, symmetric keys, asymmetric
key pairs
SO Write, Erase
Firmware Update MVK29 SO Use, Write (firmware only)
Key and Key Pair Generation Symmetric keys, asymmetric key pairs Partition User Write
Symmetric Key Wrap/ Unwrap Symmetric with RSA
Symmetric with Symmetric ECB mode
Partition User Use, Write
Asymmetric Key Wrap/ Unwrap Asymmetric with Symmetric CBC mode Partition User Use, Write
Symmetric Key Mask/ Unmask Symmetric with AES 256 Partition User Use, Write
Asymmetric Key Mask/ Unmask Symmetric with AES 256 Partition User Use, Write
Partition Backup / Restore Symmetric keys, asymmetric key pairs Partition User Transfer30
Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt Symmetric keys Partition User, Use
Asymmetric Signature RSA, DSA private keys Partition User, Use
Asymmetric Verification RSA, DSA public keys Partition User, Use
Store Data Object Non-cryptographic data Partition User,
Public User31
Write
27
Show status is provided by invoking the “hsm showinfo” command from the administrative
interface. It will display identifying information about the module such as label, serial number,
firmware version, etc., and state whether the module is in FIPS-approved mode.
28 Use means access to key material for use in performing a cryptographic operation. The key
material is never visible.
29
Public key value. See Table A-5 for its description.
30 Transfer means moving a key using the cloning protocol from one cryptographic module to
another.
31
The Public User has access to Public Data Objects only.
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Table A-4. Access Rights within Services
Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Role Type(s) of Access
Read Data Object Non-cryptographic data Partition User,
Public User32
Read
Initialize Secure Audit Logging Symmetric keys Audit Officer Write
Change Audit Officer’s Password Authentication Data via trusted path Audit Officer Read, Write
Configure Secure Audit Logging N/A Audit Officer Read, Write
Synchronize Module’s clock with
the Host system’s clock
N/A Audit Officer Write
Verify, Import, and Export secure
audit log files
N/A Audit Officer Read
Show secure audit log status N/A Audit Officer Read
Import and Export the Wrapped
Secure Audit Logging Key
Symmetric keys Audit Officer Write, Read
32
The Public User has access to Public Data Objects only.
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Table A-5. Keys and Critical Security Parameters Used in the Module
Keys and CSPs CSP Type Generation Input / Output Storage Destruction Use
User Password 7-16 characters N/A Input in encrypted form
Flash memory in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
Used in Password Authentication (Level 2)
configuration only. The user provided password
used for authentication in a Level 2 configuration.
Minimum of 7 characters and maximum of 16.
Cloning Domain
Vector
48-Byte value
Derived from
password using
concatenation KDF
Input via ICD interface
Flash memory
encrypted with
UGSK
N/A
48-byte value that is used to control a module’s
ability to participate in the cloning protocol.
Encrypted with the USK / SMK.
User Storage Key
(USK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted
N/A
The storage key for the user. This key is used to
encrypt all sensitive attributes of all private objects
owned by the user. Encrypted, as a part of the UAV,
by the PIN key33.
Security Officer
Master Key (SMK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted
N/A
The storage key for the SO. This key is used to
encrypt all sensitive attributes of all private objects
owned by the SO. Encrypted, as part of the SOV, by
the PIN key.
Global Storage Key
(GSK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted
N/A
32-byte AES key that is the same for all users on a
specific Luna cryptographic module. It is used to
encrypt permanent parameters within the non-
volatile memory area reserved for use by the
module. Encrypted, as part of the UAV/SOV, by the
PIN key
Secondary Global
Storage Key (SGSK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
USKs and SMK
N/A
It is used to encrypt non-permanent parameters
(parameters regenerated for every module
initialization).
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key
(TUK)
RSA-2048 bit private
key
ANSI X9.31 Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
N/A
A 2048-bit RSA private key used in the cloning
protocol.
Token or Module RSA-2048 public / Loaded at Public key output in Flash memory N/A Used in exchange of session encryption key as part
33
The PIN key is the key derived from the user’s / SO’s password or authentication data.
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Keys and CSPs CSP Type Generation Input / Output Storage Destruction Use
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC)
private certificate manufacturing plaintext plaintext of the handshake during the cloning protocol.
U2 Key 3-Key Triple-DES AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
N/A
24-byte Triple-DES key used in conjunction with the
auth code for a firmware update to derive a key
used to decrypt the firmware update image when it
is loaded into the module. Used for backwards
compatibility purposes with earlier firmware
versions.
Token or Module
Variable Key (TVK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
Used to encrypt authentication data stored for auto-
activation purposes. The non-volatile RAM is
actively zeroized in response to a tamper event.
Master Tamper Key
(MTK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
The MTK encrypts all sensitive values.
Key Encryption Key
(KEK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Output encrypted
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
Decommission signal
The KEK encrypts all sensitive values and is zeroized
in response to a decommission signal.
Masking Key AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
SGSK
N/A
AES 256-bit key used during masking operations.
Stored encrypted using the SGSK.
Manufacturer’s
Integrity Certificate
(MIK)
RSA-4096 public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Not Input or Output
Flash memory in
plaintext
N/A
Used in verifying Hardware Origin Certificates
(HOCs), which are generated in response to a
customer function call to provide proof of hardware
origin.
Manufacturer’s
Verification Key
(MVK)
RSA-1024 public key
Loaded at
manufacturing
Not Input or Output
Flash memory in
plaintext
N/A
1024-bit public key counterpart to the Manufacturer’s
Signature Key (MSK) held at SafeNet AT. Used for key
migration support for legacy HSMs
Device
Authentication Key
(DAK)
RSA 2048 bit private
key
ANSI X9.31 Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
N/A
2048-bit RSA private key used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a key or a
specific action originated within the hardware
crypto module.
Hardware Origin Key
(HOK)
RSA 4096 bit private
key
ANSI X9.31 Not Input or Output
Flash memory
encrypted with
GSK
N/A
A 4096-bit RSA private key used to sign certificates
for other device key pairs, such as the TWC. It is
generated at the time the device is manufactured.
Hardware Origin
Certificate (HOC)
RSA-4096 public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Not Input or Output
Flash memory in
plaintext
N/A
The X.509 public key certificate corresponding to the
HOK. It is signed by the Manufacturer’s Integrity Key
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Keys and CSPs CSP Type Generation Input / Output Storage Destruction Use
(MIK) at the time the device is manufactured.
DRBG Key AES-256
Hardware random
source
Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
32 bytes AES key stored in the BBRAM of the
internal security co-processor. Used in the
implementation of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR (AES)
DRBG.
DRBG Seed 384 bits
Hardware random
source
Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
Random seed data drawn from the Hardware RBG in
the security co-processor and used to seed the
implementation of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR (AES)
DRBG.
DRBG V 128 bits
Hardware random
source
Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
Part of the secret state of the approved DRBG. The
value is stored in the security co-processor as
plaintext and is generated using the methods
described in SP800-90A.
DRBG Entropy Input 384 bits
Hardware random
source
Not Input or Output
Tamperable
BBRAM in
plaintext
Zeroized as part of a
tamper event
The entropy value used to initialize the approved
DRBG. The 48-byte value is stored ephemerally in
memory of the security co-processor.
Secure Audit Logging
Key (SALK)
256 bit HMAC AES-CTR DRBG
Input / Output
encrypted
Flash memory in
plaintext and
encrypted with
SADK
N/A
A 256-bit key used to verify the data integrity and
the authentication of the log messages. It’s saved in
the parameter area of the Flash memory.
Secure Audit Domain
Key (SADK)
AES-256 AES-CTR DRBG
Input / Output
encrypted
Flash memory
encrypted with
USK
N/A
A 256-bit key that is used to wrap / unwrap the SALK
when it is exported / imported from / to the
module.
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
Term Definition
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certification Authority
CKE Key Export with Cloning
CL Cloning (a capability configuration used to allow the secure transfer of
key objects from one module to another for backup and restore and
object replication purposes).
CLI Command Line Interface
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DAK Device Authentication Key
DH Diffie Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GSK Global Storage Key
HA High Assurance
HOC Hardware Origin Certificate
HOK Hardware Origin Key
HRNG Hardware Random Number Generator
HSM Hardware Security Module
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
MAC Message Authentication Code
Masking A SafeNet AT term to describe the encryption of a key for use only
within a SafeNet AT cryptographic module.
MIC Manufacturer’s Integrity Certificate
MIK Manufacturer’s Integrity Key
MSK Manufacturer’s Signature Key
MTK Master Tamper Key
MVK Manufacturers Verification Key
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Term Definition
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RA Registration Authority
RNG Random Number Generator
SA Server-Attached
SADK Security Audit Domain Key
SALK Security Audit Logging Key
SCU Secure Capability Update
SGSK Secondary Global Storage Key
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SMK Security Officer’s Master Key
SNB Signing No Backup
SO Security Officer
TUK Token or Module Unwrapping Key
TVK Token or Module Variable Key
TWC Token or Module Wrapping Certificate
TWK Token or Module Wrapping Key
USK User’s Storage Key